lpu_admin midterm case doctrines

7/29/2019 LPU_Admin Midterm Case Doctrines

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[ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND ELECTIONS LAW CASE DOCTRINES –

MIDTERMS] August 26, 2013

1 Ysaac and Wong Compilation | LPU- College of Law – Atty. Reyes

TOPIC: DELEGATION OF POWERS – TESTS OF VALID DELEGATION

US vs. Ang Tang Ho – Completeness of Statute

Act 2868 – authorizes the Governor General with the consent of the Council State to issue the necessary

rules and regulations and making an appropriation for such purpose.

Does the Act delegate legislative power to the Governor-General? By the Organic Law, all Legislativepower is vested in the Legislature, and the power conferred upon the Legislature to make laws cannot be

delegated to the Governor-General, or any one else. The Legislature cannot delegate the legislativepower to enact any law.

If Act no 2868 is a law unto itself and within itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize theGovernor-General to make rules and regulations to carry the law into effect, then the Legislature itself

created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the Act within itself does not define crime, and is not a law, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or acrime, the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, then the Act is a delegation of legislative

power, is unconstitutional and void.

A law must be complete, in all its terms and provisions, when it leaves the legislative branch of

the government, and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegateof the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti , but which may beleft to take effect in futuro , if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.

The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to

determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make, its own action todepend.

Calalang vs. Williams – Sufficiency of Standards

Commonwealth Act. No. 548 by which the Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations for the regulation and control of the use of and traffic on national roads and streets.

The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of power to make the law which necessarilyinvolves a discretion as to what it shall be and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution tobe exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objectioncan be made.

The Commonwealth Act No. 548 does not confer legislative power upon the Director of Public Works andSecretary. The authority conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules andregulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but merely to carry outthe legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly. The delegated power is not the determination

of what the law shall be but merely the ascertainment of facts and circumstances upon which theapplication of said law is to be predicated.






TOPIC: CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS

Meralco vs. Pasay Transportation Company Inc. Et. Al.

Examining the statutory provision invoked, it is provided that the terms of the right of way and the

compensation to be paid shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme Court sitting as board of arbitrators, the decision of the majority shall be final.

The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our

government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court. Just asthe Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations by any otherdepartment of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of influence to the powersexpressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The Supreme Court and its membersshould not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty

not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial functions.The power conferred on this court is exclusively judicial, and it cannot be required or authorized toexercise any other. . . . Its jurisdiction and powers and duties being defined in the organic law of the

government, and being all strictly judicial, Congress cannot require or authorize the court to exercise anyother jurisdiction or power, or perform any other duty. . . . The award of execution is a part, and anessential part of every judgment passed by a court exercising judicial power.

Paz Garcia vs. Hon. Catalina Macaraig Jr.

Administrative complaint filed against the Judge for alleged dishonesty, violation of oath of office as a judge. Judge was unable to perform his duties because he has no court. Judge receives salary because he is working in the DOJ.

Court dismissed the complaint. After taking his oath and formally assuming this position as judge,

respondent had a perfect right to earn the salary of a judge even in the extreme supposition that he didnot perform any judicial function for he could, while preparing himself for his new job or for any good

reason, take a leave, as in fact, he had planned to do, were it not for the request of the Secretary of Justice for him to forego the idea and, instead, help the Department in whatever way possible whichwould not, it must be presumed, impair his position as a judge.

Detailing a judge in the Secretary of Justice should be discontinued. The line between what a judge maydo and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the othergreat departments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, least theprinciple of separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the people thru theConstitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service.

The fundamental advantages and the necessity of the independence of said three departments from eachother, limited only by the specific constitutional precepts a check and balance between and among them,have long been acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any temporary or passinggovernmental conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary under ourpresent constitutional scheme of government that no judge or even the lowest court in this Republicshould place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or

resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before they can havelegal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or this Supreme Court, as the case may be.






Romeo Edu vs. Hon. Vicente Ericta

Validity of Reflector Law – invalid exercise of the police power for being violative of the due process clause.

Court can pass upon the issue on the validity of a legislative enactment. There is no principle of constitutional adjudication that bars this Court from similarly passing upon the question of the validity of

a legislative enactment in a proceeding before it to test the propriety of the issuance of a preliminaryinjunction. The same felt need for resolving once and for all the vexing question as to theconstitutionality of a challenged enactment and thus serve public interest exists. What we have done in

the case of an order proceeding from one of the coordinate branches, the executive, we can very well doin the matter before us involving the alleged nullity of a legislative act.

Police power with state authority to enact legislation may interfere with personal liberty or property inorder to promote the general welfare. Persons and property could thus "be subjected to all kinds of

restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and prosperity of the state." Itsscope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it couldbe done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstancesthus assuring the greatest benefits.

The statute assailed is not infected with arbitrariness. It is not the product of whim or caprice. It is farfrom oppressive. It is a legitimate response to a felt public need. It can stand the test of the mostunsymphatetic appraisal.

It is a fundamental principle flowing from the doctrine of separation of powers that Congress may notdelegate its legislative power to the two other branches of the government, subject to the exception that

local governments may over local affairs participate in its exercise. What cannot be delegated is theauthority under the Constitution to make laws and to alter and repeal them; the test is thecompleteness of the statute in all its term and provisions when it leaves the hands of the

legislature. To determine whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power the inquirymust be directed to the scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate

its functions when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope of hisauthority.

To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must be a standard, which implies at the very leastthat the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lay down fundamental policy. Otherwise, thecharge of complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy,marks its limits, its maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. Itindicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is thecriterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrativeoffice designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules andregulations.

The standard may be either express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met.

The standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy andpurpose of the act considered as a whole. Consistency with the conceptual approach requires thereminder that what is delegated is authority non-legislative in character, the completenessof the statute when it leaves the hands of Congress being assumed.






Antonio Noblejas vs Claudio Teehankee

Noblejas was commissioner of land registration with the same rank, compensation and emoluments as a

judge of the CFI. He approved a subdivision plan that is in excess of his title. The Sec. of Justice required to him to explain. Noblejas argued that the Sec. has no jurisdiction over him since his rank is equivalent as a judge. He may only be investigated by the SC.

Noblejas is an executive official. Allowing the SC to investigate him would violate the doctrine of

separation of powers - it would charge the Supreme Court with an administrative function of supervisory

control over executive officials, simultaneously reducing pro tanto, the control of the Chief Executive over

such officials.

The judiciary cannot give decisions which are merely advisory, nor can it exercise or participate in the

exercise of functions which are essentially legislative or administrative. The Supreme Court and its

members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume

any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions.

Vera vs. Cuevas

BIR enforces Section 169 of the Tax Code – requiring respondents to put a label “not suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of age”. It contends that it has jurisdiction to enforce it by virtue of Sec. 3 of the Tax Code – BIR shall give effect and administer the supervisory and police power conferred by the Code.

Such view is untenable. The Bureau of Internal Revenue may claim police power only when necessary inthe enforcement of its principal powers and duties consisting of the "collection of all national internalrevenue taxes, fees and charges, and the enforcement of all forfeitures, penalties and fines connected

therewith." The enforcement of Section 169 entails the promotion of the health of the nation and is thusunconnected with any tax purpose.

Section 169 is being enforced only against respondent manufacturers of filled milk product and not as

against manufacturers, distributors or sellers of condensed skimmed milk such as SIMILAC, SMA,BREMIL, ENFAMIL, OLAC, in which, as admitted by the petitioner, the fatty part has been removed andsubstituted with vegetable or corn oil. The enforcement of Section 169 against the private respondents

only but not against other persons similarly situated as the private respondents amounts to anunconstitutional denial of the equal pro petition of the laws, for the law, equally enforced, would similarlyoffend against the Constitution.

TOPIC: CSC JURISDICTION CASES

Mateo vs. CA

A complaint was made by Morong Water District employees against Engr. Sta Maria. All Board Members of MOWAD conducted an investigation. He was placed under preventive suspension and was dismissed.Engr. Sta. Maria filed a Special Civil Action before the RTC challenging his dismissal. Petitioners argue that the court has no jurisdiction over disciplinary actions of government employees which is vested exclusively to the Civil Service.






The Supreme Court held that it has no jurisdiction. MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation createdpursuant to Presidential Decree No. 198, as amended, and as such its officers and employees are coveredby the Civil Service Law. Indeed the established rule is that the hiring and firing of employees of

government-owned and controlled corporations are governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Lawsand Rules and Regulations. Party aggrieved by a decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency of the

government involving termination of services may appeal to the Commission within fifteen (15) days.

DOH vs. NLRC

Respondent was hired as a patient assistant police force of Dr. Jose N. Rodriguez Memorial Hospital. He got into a fight while in the performance of his duties and a complaint was filed against him and his companions. He was found guilty and hence dismissed. He filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC. Petitioner instituted this action claiming that the NLRC has no jurisdiction over respondent.

DJRMH is an agency of the Government. The DJRMH falls well within the scope and/or coverage of theCivil Service Law in accordance with paragraph 1., Section 2, Article IX B, 1987 Constitution and the

provisions of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987 andPresidential Decree No. 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines.

As the central personnel agency of the Government, the Civil Service Commission administers the CivilService Law. It is, therefore, the single arbiter of all contests relating to the civil service. 6 The dischargeof this particular function was formerly lodged in one of its offices, the Merit Systems Protection Board(MSPB) which was vested with the power, among others, "to hear and decide on appeal administrativecases involving officials and employees of the civil service and its decision shall be final except thoseinvolving dismissal or separation from the service which may be appealed to the Commission". 7 However,with the issuance of Civil Service Commission Resolution No. 93-2387 on June 29, 1993, such appealsshall now be filed directly with the Civil Service Commission.

Worthy to note in this connection is the fact that the Labor Code itself provides that "the terms andconditions of employment of government employees shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and

regulations".

Conformably to the foregoing, it is, indeed, the Civil Service Commission which has jurisdiction over the present controversy. Its decisions are subject to review by the Supreme Court.

Jurisdiction is conferred by law. Where there is none, no agreement of the parties can provide one.

TOPIC: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS/BODIES

Lapinid vs. CSC

The appointment of petitioner as terminal supervisor was protested by Junsay on the basis of “preferential right”. He filed his protest before the CSC.

The only function of the Civil Service Commission in cases of this nature, according to Luego , is to review

the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law, and when it finds the appointeeto be qualified and all other legal requirements have been otherwise satisfied, it has no choice but toattest to the appointment.

Civil Service Commission has no power of appointment except over its own personnel. Neither does ithave the authority to review the appointments made by other offices except only to ascertain if theappointee possesses the required qualifications. The determination of who among aspirants with theminimum statutory qualifications should be preferred belongs to the appointing authority and not the Civil






Service Commission. It cannot disallow an appointment because it believes another person is betterqualified and much less can it direct the appointment of its own choice. Appointment is a highly discretionary act that even this Court cannot compel. While the act of

appointment may in proper cases be the subject of mandamus , the selection itself of the appointee —taking into account the totality of his qualifications, including those abstract qualities that define his

personality —is the prerogative of the appointing authority.

All the Commission is actually allowed to do is check whether or not the appointee possesses the

appropriate civil service eligibility or the required qualifications. If he does, his appointment is approved;if not, it is disapproved. No other criterion is permitted by law to be employed by the Commission when itacts on —or as the Decree says, "approves" or "disapproves' —an appointment made by the proper

authorities.

Rimonte vs. CSC

Petitioner contests the appointment of Respondent Roque arguing that she is not qualified to the position. Petitioner also avers that the Ombudsman has no discretion to appoint any person who possess at least the minimum qualifications to the vacant position.

The Civil Service Commission is the single arbiter of all contests relating to civil service; as such its judgments are unappealable and subject only to the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court. Respondent CivilService Commission found from the records that respondent Roque possessed the minimum qualificationsrequired for the position of Records Officer V to which she was appointed.

The head of an agency who is the appointing power is the one most knowledgeable to decide who canbest perform the functions of the office. Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must beperformed by the officer vested with such power according to his best lights, the only condition being

that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointmentcannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred.Indeed, this is a prerogative of the appointing authority which he alone can decide 18 The choice of

appointee from among those who possess the required qualifications is a political and administrativedecision calling for considerations of wisdom, convenience, utility and the interests of the service which

can best be made by the head of the office concerned, the person most familiar with the organizationalstructure and environmental circumstances within which the appointee must function. 19Hence, whenOmbudsman Vasquez appointed respondent Roque to the position of Records Officer V, his act in doing

so confirmed Roque's performance rating which can be understood to be at least very satisfactory. Fromthe vantage point of the Ombudsman, she is the person who can best fill the post and discharge itsfunctions. We cannot argue against this proposition.

As long as the appointee is qualified the Civil Service Commission has no choice but to attest to andrespect the appointment even if it be proved that there are others with superior credentials. The lawlimits the Commission's authority only to whether or not the appointees possess the legal qualificationsand the appropriate civil service eligibility, nothing else. If they do then the appointments are approved

because the Commission cannot exceed its power by substituting its will for that of the appointingauthority.

Caltex vs. COA

Petitioner asks to offset its remittances against its reimbursement vis-à-vis the OPSF.

There can be no offsetting of taxes against the claims that a taxpayer may have against the government,as taxes do not arise from contracts or depend upon the will of the taxpayer, but are imposed by law.






It is settled that a taxpayer may not offset taxes due from the claims that he may have against thegovernment. 58Taxes cannot be the subject of compensation because the government and taxpayer are

not mutually creditors and debtors of each other and a claim for taxes is not such a debt, demand,contract or judgment as is allowed to be set-off.

COA’s function is not only to promulgate rules but also enforce it. The Constitution authorizes them todisallow illegal expenditures of funds or uses of funds and property. Pursuant to its power to promulgate

accounting and auditing rules and regulations for the prevention of irregular, unnecessary, excessive orextravagant expenditures or uses of funds.

Cayetano vs. Monsod

Respondent Monsod was nominated by Pres. Cory Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC.Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualificationof having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Practice of law – any activity or out of court which requires the application of law, legal procedure,knowledge, training and experience.

It is well settled that when the appointee is qualified and all other legal requirements are satisfied theCommission has no alternative but to attest it.

To substitute the choice of the Commission to the choice of the appointing authority would mean anencroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is essentiallywithin the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested subject to the only condition that the appointeeshould possess the qualifications required by law.

The appointing process in a regular appointment consists of: (1) Nomination (2) Confirmation of the CA (3) issuance of the certificate of confirmation (4) acceptance.

Villa vs Lazaro

Construction of a funeral parlor – suit of injuction filed by Dr. Jesus Veneracion because allegedly violative of Zoning Ordinance. Proof of locational clearance and certification of the city planning were sent a multiple times.

Petitioner is plainly the victim of either gross ignorance or negligence or abuse of power, or acombination of both. All of the foregoing translates to a denial of due process against which the defenseof failure to take timely appeal will not avail.

These facts present a picture of official incompetence of gross negligence and abdication of duty, if not of active bias and partiality, that is most reprehensible. The result has been to subvert and put to naught

the Judgment rendered in a suit regularly tried and decided by a court of justice, to deprive one party of rights confirmed and secured thereby and to accord her adversary, in a different forum, the relief he had

sought and been denied in said case.

Administrative proceedings are not exempt from the operation of certain basic and fundamentalprocedural principles, such as the due process requirements in investigations and trials. And thisadministrative due process is recognized to include (a) the right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of

the institution of the proceedings that may affect a person's legal right; (b) reasonable opportunity toappear and defend his rights, introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor, (c) a tribunal so






constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction; and (d) a finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented atthe hearing, or at least contained in the records or disclosed to the parties affected.

CSC vs. Dacoycoy

Appointment made by respondent of his two sons as driver and utility worker through Mr. Daclag who is a subordinate of respondent.

One is guilty of nepotism if an appointment is issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of

consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: appointing authority; recommending authority; chief of the bureau or office and person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.

CA reversed the decision of the Civil Service and held respondent not guilty of nepotism. Who may nowappeal? Certainly not the respondent who was declared not guilty of the charge nor the complainant,

who was merely a witness to the government. Consequently, the Civil Service Commission has becomethe party adversely affected by such ruling which seriously prejudices the civil service system. Hence asan aggrieved party, CSC , may appeal the decision of the CA to the SC.

Domingo vs COMELEC

Petition for disqualification of Mayor Abalos Jr. for allegedly influencing public school teachers through his father Abalos Sr.

Where there is no proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or arbitrariness, Court may not review factual

findings of the COMELEC nor substitute its own findings on the sufficiency of evidence.

The complaint for election offenses is a criminal case which involves the ascertainment of the guilt orinnocence of the accused and requires a conviction on proof beyond reasonable doubt. A petition fordisqualification, meanwhile, requires merely the determination of whether the respondent committed acts

as to merit his disqualification and is done through administrative proceeding which requires a clearpreponderance of evidence. Hence no forum shopping exists.

Remolona vs. CSC

Dismissal of Estilito Remolona from the government service for dishonesty. The main issue posed for resolution is whether a civil service employee can be dismissed from the government service for an

offense which is not work-related or which is not connected with the performance of his official duty.

While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding,the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not beassisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent's capacity torepresent himself, and no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated withcounsel. In an administrative proceeding, a respondent has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not.






Dishonesty, in order to warrant dismissal, need not be committed in the course of theperformance of duty by the person charged. The rationale for the rule is that if a governmentofficer or employee is dishonest or is guilty of oppression or grave misconduct, even if said defects of

character are not connected with his office, they affect his right to continue in office. The Governmentcannot tolerate in its service a dishonest official, even if he performs his duties correctly and well,

because by reason of his government position, he is given more and ample opportunity to commit acts of dishonesty against his fellow men, even against offices and entities of the government other than theoffice where he is employed; and by reason of his office, he enjoys and possesses a certain influence and

power which renders the victims of his grave misconduct, oppression and dishonesty less disposed andprepared to resist and to counteract his evil acts and actuations. The private life of an employee cannotbe segregated from his public life. Dishonesty inevitably reflects on the fitness of the officer or employee

to continue in office and the discipline and morale of the service.

TOPIC: CHECKS ON REGULATORY AGENCIES

KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED vs. GUINGONA JR

Constitutional Law; Franchise; It is a settled rule that in all grants by the government to individuals orcorporations of rights. Privileges and franchises, the words are to be taken most strongly against the

grantee. - No interpretation of the said provision to relax or circumvent the prohibition can be allowed

since the privilege to hold or conduct charity sweepstakes races, lotteries, or other similar activities is a

franchise granted by the legislature to the PCSO. It is a settled rule that “in all grants by the government

to individuals or corporations of rights, privileges and franchises, the words are to be taken most strongly

against the grantee . . . . one who claims a franchise or privilege in derogation of the common rights of

the public must prove his title thereto b a grant which is clearly and definitely expressed, and he cannot

enlarge it by equivocal or doubtful provisions or by probable inferences. Whatever is not unequivocally

granted is withheld. Nothing passes by mere implication.”

LIM vs. PACQUING

Fact that the decision is erroneous does not divest the court that rendered it of the jurisdiction conferred

by law to try the case – Jurisdiction should be distinguished from the exercise thereof (Lamagan v. De la

Cruz, 40 SCRA 101 (1971). The authority to decide a case at all and not the decision rendered therein, is

what makes up jurisdiction. The fact that the decision is erroneous does not divest the court that

rendered it of the jurisdiction conferred by law to try the case.

The pronouncement of Justice Isagani A. Cruz in Mayor Pablo Magtales v. Pryce Properties Coporation,

G.R. No. 111097, July 20, 1994, apropos the operation of a gambling casino in Cagayan de Oro by the

Philippine Amusement and Games Inc., is cogent to the instant case, thus:

“The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generallyconsidered inimical to the interests of the people, there is noting in the Constitution categorically

proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it all. It is left to Congress to deal

with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling

altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for

whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits

lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom,






which this Court has not authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not

sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories.

That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding the wisdom,

morality or practicability of statues are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the

legislative and executive departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government.”

THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AYSON

The University of the Philippines as an institution of higher learning enjoys academic freedom. – It is

beyond cavil that the UP, as an institution of higher learning, enjoys academic freedom-the institutional

kind.

Scope of academic freedom as recognized by the Constitution. -In Garcia v. The Faculty Admission

Committee, Loyola School of Theology (68 SCRA 277 [1975]), the Court had occasion to note the scope

of academic freedom recognized by the Constitution as follows:

It is the business of a university to provide that atmosphere which is most conducive to speculation,

experiment and creation. It is an atmosphere in which there prevail the four essential freedom of a

university-to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall

be taught, and who may be admitted to study "'

UPCBHS was established subject to a number of conditions. - At this juncture, it must be pointed out

that UPCBHS was established subject to a number of conditionalities, e.g., it must be self-supporting, it

can serve as a feeder for the UP at Baguio, it can serve as a laboratory and demonstration school for

prospective teachers, failing in which the University can order its abolition on academic grounds, specially

where the purposes for which it was established was not satisfied

The University of the Philippines was created under its Charter to provide advanced tertiary education

and not secondary education. -Specifically, the University of the Philippines was created under its Charter

(Act No. 1870 [1908], as amended) to provide advanced tertiary education and not secondary education.

Section 2 of said Act states that "the purpose of said University shall be to provide advanced instruction

in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and to give professional and technical

training."chanrobles virtual

PAMANTASAN NG LUNGSOD NG MAYNILA, vs.HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT,

“Ad interim”, meaning and concept of.- From the arguments, it is easy to see why the petitioner shouldexperience difficulty in understanding the situation. Private respondent had been extended several “adinterim” appointments which petitioner mistakenly understands as appointments temporary in nature.Perhaps, it is the literal translation of the word “ad interim” which creates such belief. The term is definedby Black to mean “in the meantime” or for the time being. Thus, an officer ad interim is one appointed tofill a vancy, or to discharge the duties of the office during the absence or temporary incapacity of its






regular incumbent. But such is not the meaning nor the use intended in the context of Philippine law. Inreferring to Dr. Esteban’s appointments, the term is not descriptive of the nature of the appointmentsgiven to him. Rather, it is used to denote the manner in which said appointments were made, that is,

done by the President of the Pamantasan in the meantime, while the Board of Regents, which is originallyvested by the University Charter with the power of the appointment is unable to act.

“Ad interim” appointments,; Person authorized to issue ad interim appointments of officials of Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila. –In other words, if the Board of Regents is in session, the

Pamantasan President merely nominates while the Board issues the appointment. But when the Board isnot in session, the President is authorized to issue ad interim appointments. Such appointments arepermanent but their terms are only until the Board disapproves them. If confirmed, the appointee's term

is converted into the regular term inherent in the position.

Absence of express indication in the ad interim appointment that it is temporary, the appointment issuedis considered permanent, Reason – There is nothing in the Pamantasan Board of Regents’ Resolution No.485 which suggest that respondent Esteban’s appointment was temporary. The Board’s action was toconfirm or reject an existing ad interim appointment. If respondent’s appointment was intended to be

temporary, it should have been expressly stated. It cannot be made to rest on inconclusive evidence,specially because a temporary appointment divests the temporary appointee of the constitutional securityof tenure against removal without cause even if he is a civil service eligible.”

Power to appoint, discretionary on appointing power; Limits of discretion, General rule that the power of appointment must remain unhampered by judicial intervention; Exception – The power to appoint is, in

essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right of choice which he may exercise freelyaccording to his judgment, deciding for himself who is best qualified among those who have thenecessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is a prerogative of the appointing power that may be availed of

without liability, provided however, that it is exercised in good faith for the advancement of theemployer’s interest and not for the purpose of def eating or circumventing the rights of the employees

under special laws or under valid agreements, and provided further, that such prerogatives are notexercised in a malicious, harsh oppressive, vindictive or wanton manner, or out of malice or spite. The

general rule is that the power of appointment must remain unhampered by judicial intervention.However, when the law is violated or when there is grave abuse of discretion we have to step in.

Permanent appointees entitled to security of tenure under the Civil Service Law and the Constitution; Allegations of incompetence against appointee not provided; Dismissal of respondent appointee not forcause, but because of his temporary appointment. We cannot also sanction the termination of private

respondent’s services by petitioner. With his appointment now settled as permanent, the Civil ServiceLaw and the Constitution guarantee private respondent’s security of tenure as “No officer or employee inthe Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law” . Petitioner hasfailed to substantiate its allegations of incompetence against respondent Esteban whose record of government service appears quite impressive, Esteban was not dismissed for cause after proper

proceedings. His appointment was terminated on the ground that it was temporary.

University of the Philippines Board of Regents vs. Court of Appeals

Mandamus, defined. The writ of mandamus is not available to restrain an institution of higher learning

from the exercise of its academic freedom. -Mandamus is a writ commanding a tribunal,corporation, board or person to do the act required to be done when it or he unlawfullyneglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resultingfrom an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoymentof a right or office to which such other is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and






adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.23 In University of the Philippines Board of Regents v. Ligot-Telan ,24 this Court ruled that the writ was not available to restrain U.P.from the exercise of its academic freedom.

A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have been

denied due process. - As the foregoing narration of facts in this case shows, however, variouscommittees had been formed to investigate the charge that private respondent hadcommitted plagiarism and, in all the investigations held, she was heard in her defense.

Indeed, if any criticism may be made of the university proceedings before privaterespondent was finally stripped of her degree, it is that there were too many committee andindividual investigations conducted, although all resulted in a finding that private

respondent committed dishonesty in submitting her doctoral dissertation on the basis of which she was conferred the Ph.D. degree.

Indeed, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunityto explain ones side of a controversy or a chance to seek reconsideration of the action orruling complained of .27 A party who has availed of the opportunity to present his position

cannot tenably claim to have been denied due process.

28

cräläw

Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in thecourts of justice. - It is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled tohave an audience before the Board of Regents. Due process in an administrative contextdoes not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in the courts of justice.32 It is

noteworthy that the U.P. Rules do not require the attendance of persons whose cases areincluded as items on the agenda of the Board of Regents.33cräläwvirtualibräry

If an institution of higher learning can decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can alsodetermine on whom it can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates. - Art. XIV, 5 (2) of

the Constitution provides that [a]cademic freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning. This is nothing new. The 1935 Constitution35 and the 1973Constitution36 likewise provided for the academic freedom or, more precisely, for the

institutional autonomy of universities and institutions of higher learning. As pointed out bythis Court in Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology ,37 it is a

freedom granted to institutions of higher learning which is thus given a wide sphere of authority certainly extending to the choice of students. If such institution of higher learningcan decide who can and who cannot study in it, it certainly can also determine on whom it

can confer the honor and distinction of being its graduates.

Where it is shown that the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a universityhas the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred.- Where it is shownthat the conferment of an honor or distinction was obtained through fraud, a university has

the right to revoke or withdraw the honor or distinction it has thus conferred. This freedom

of a university does not terminate upon the graduation of a student, as the Court of Appealsheld. For it is precisely the graduation of such a student that is in question. It is noteworthythat the investigation of private respondents case began before her graduation. If she wasable to join the graduation ceremonies on April 24, 1993, it was because of too many

investigations conducted before the Board of Regents finally decided she should not havebeen allowed to graduate.

Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of higher learning, for the constitutionalsgrant of academic freedom “is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a grudging fashion.” -

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Wide indeed is the sphere of autonomy granted to institutions of higher learning, for theconstitutional grant of academic freedom, to quote again from Garcia v. Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of Theology, is not to be construed in a niggardly manner or in a

grudging fashion.

If the conferment of a degree is founded on error or fraud, the Boar of Regents is also empowered,subject to the observance of due process, to withdraw what it has granted without violating a student’srights; The pursuit of academic excellence is the university’s concern – it should be empowered, as an act

of self-defense, to take measures to protect itself from serious threats to its integrity. - Under the U.P.Charter, the Board of Regents is the highest governing body of the University of thePhilippines.38 It has the power to confer degrees upon the recommendation of the University

Council.39 It follows that if the conferment of a degree is founded on error or fraud, theBoard of Regents is also empowered, subject to the observance of due process, to withdraw

what it has granted without violating a students rights. An institution of higher learningcannot be powerless if it discovers that an academic degree it has conferred is not rightfullydeserved. Nothing can be more objectionable than bestowing a universitys highest academic

degree upon an individual who has obtained the same through fraud or deceit. The pursuit of academic excellence is the universitys concern. It should be empowered, as an act of self-defense, to take measures to protect itself from serious threats to its integrity.

University of the Philippines vs. Civil Service Commission

Right to appeal not a natural right nor a part of due process but merely a statutory privilege. - The right

to appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege which may beexercised only in the manner prescribed by and in accordance with the provisions of the law. 6Thisdoctrine is equally made applicable to quasi-judicial proceedings so that one must first ascertain the law

applicable to determine whether or not the party can appeal from the order or decision. 7The reason forthis is that even administrative proceedings must end sometime, just as public policy demands that

finality be written on judicial controversies. 8c

Where penalty imposed is less than 30 day suspension, CSC has no appellate jurisdiction. - Section 37 of

Presidential Decree No. 807, or the Civil Service Decree, provides that the Civil Service Commission shallhave appellate jurisdiction over all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty

of suspension for more than thirty (30) days, or a fine in an amount exceeding thirty (30) days salary,demotion in rank or salary, or transfer, removal or dismissal from office. 9The inescapable conclusion isthat in an administrative case, where the penalty imposed is not one of those covered by or is less than

those enumerated under Section 37, the decision of the disciplining authority shall be final andinappealable. Respondent CSC has no jurisdiction to review the same on appeal.

Republic vs. Manila Electric Company

When private property is used for a public purpose an is affected with public interest, it ceases to be

juris private only and becomes subject to regulation. - The regulation of rates to be charged by publicutilities is founded upon the police powers of the State and statutes prescribing rules for the control andregulation of public utilities are a valid exercise thereof. When private property is used for a publicpurpose and is affected with public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only and becomes subject to

regulation. The regulation is to promote the common good. Submission to regulation may be withdrawnby the owner by discontinuing use; but as long as use of the property is continued, the same is subject topublic regulation.9














The rates prescribed by the State must be one that yields a fair return on the public utility upon the valueof the property performing the service and one that is reasonable to the public for the services rendered.- In regulating rates charged by public utilities, the State protects the public against arbitrary and

excessive rates while maintaining the efficiency and quality of services rendered. However, the power toregulate rates does not give the State the right to prescribe rates which are so low as to deprive the

public utility of a reasonable return on investment. Thus, the rates prescribed by the State must beone that yields a fair return on the public utility upon the value of the property performingthe service and one that is reasonable to the public for the services rendered .10 The fixing of

just and reasonable rates involves a balancing of the investor and the consumer interests.11

The power to fix rates is a legislative function; Determination of whether the rates so fixed are

reasonable and just is a purely judicial question and is subject to the review of the courts. - While thepower to fix rates is a legislative function, whether exercised by the legislature itself or delegated through

an administrative agency, a determination of whether the rates so fixed are reasonable and just is apurely judicial question and is subject to the review of the courts.13

What is a just and reasonable rate is a question of fact calling for the exercise of discretion, good sense,

and a fair, enlightened and independent judgment. -In the fixing of rates, the only standard which thelegislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate bereasonable and just. It has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as toreasonableness, this standard may be implied.14 What is a just and reasonable rate is a question of fact

calling for the exercise of discretion, good sense, and a fair, enlightened and independent judgment. Therequirement of reasonableness comprehends such rates which must not be so low as to be confiscatory,or too high as to be oppressive. In determining whether a rate is confiscatory, it is essential also toconsider the given situation, requirements and opportunities of the utility.15

Major factors in determining the just and reasonable rates to be charged by a public utility. Indetermining the just and reasonable rates to be charged by a public utility, three major factors are

considered by the regulating agency:

a) rate of return;

b) rate base andc) the return itself or the computed revenue to be earned by the public utility based on the rate of

return and rate base.

The rate of return is a judgment percentage which, if multiplied with the rate base, provides a fair return

on the public utility is not prescribed by statute but by administrative and judicial pronouncements, thisCourt has consistently adopted a 12% rate of return for public utilities. The rate base, on the other handis an evaluation of the property devoted by the utility to the public service or the value of invested capitalor property which the utility is entitled to a return.

Other factors to consider for purposes of rate regulation. Aside from the financial condition of the public

utility, there are other critical factors to consider for purposes of rate regulation. Among others, they are:particular reasons involved for the request of the rate increase, the quality of services rendered by the;public utility, the existence of competition, the element of risk or hazard involved in the investment, thecapacity of consumers, etc. Rate regulation is the art of reaching a result that is good for the public utility

and is best for the public.

Factual findings of administrative bodies on technical matters within their area of expertise should beaccorded not only respect but even finality if they are supported by substantial evidence even if notoverwhelming or preponderant. - Settled jurisprudence holds that factual findings of administrative






bodies on technical matters within their area of expertise should be accorded not only respect but evenfinality if they are supported by substantial evidence even if not overwhelming or preponderant. 16 In onecase, 17 we cautioned that courts should "refrain from substituting their discretion on the weight of the

evidence for the discretion of the Public Service Commission on questions of fact and will only reverse ormodify such orders of the Public Service Commission when it really appears that the evidence is

insufficient to support their conclusions."18

The function of the court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is to determine whether under the

facts and circumstances, the final order entered by the administrative agency is unlawful orunreasonable. - In the cases at bar, findings and conclusions of the ERB on the rate that can be chargedby MERALCO to the public should be respected.19 The function of the court, in exercising its power of

judicial review, is to determine whether under the facts and circumstances, the final order entered by theadministrative agency is unlawful or unreasonable.20 Thus, to the extent that the administrative agency

has not been arbitrary or capricious in the exercise of its power, the time-honored principle is that courtsshould not interfere. The principle of separation of powers dictates that courts should hesitate to reviewthe acts of administrative officers except in clear cases of grave abuse of discretion.21

Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan (First Division)

Where a public officer was simultaneously Chairman of a government agency and a private foundationand signed an agreement between the two entities in his or her capacity as Chairman of the latter, he orshe is not deemed to have signed the agreement as a public officer within the contemplation of Republic Act 3019 in the absence of any proof that he or she was present when the Board of Directors of the

former authorized the transaction entered into. - The pivot of inquiry here is whether all the elements of the offense charged have been duly substantiated. As regards the first element, did petitioner Imelda R.Marcos enter into the Lease Agreement marked Exhibit B as a public officer? As clearly stated on the face

of the subject contract under scrutiny, petitioner signed the same in her capacity as Chairman of PGHFIand not as Human Settlement Minister nor as ex-officio Chairman of LRTA. It was Jose P. Dans, Jr. who

signed said Contract, as ex-officio Vice-Chairman of LRTA. Although petitioner was the ex- officio Chairman of LRTA, at the time, there is no evidence to show that she was present when the Board

of Directors of LRTA authorized and approved the Lease Agreement sued upon.

In light of the foregoing antecedent facts and circumstances, the irresistible conclusion is that petitioner

did not sign subject Lease Agreement as a public officer, within the contemplation of RA 3019 and,therefore, the first element of the offense charged is wanting.

The Chairman of a government agency may not be held liable for a questionable agreement entered intoby the agency where there is no proof that he or she attended the board meeting which deliberated. - Another sustainable ground for the granting of petitioners motion for reconsideration is the failure andinability of the prosecution to prove that petitioner was present when the Board of Directors of LRTA authorized and approved the Lease Agreement complained of. Albeit, petitioner was ex oficio chairman of

the Board of Directors of LRTA when the said Lease Agreement was entered into, there is no evidence

whatsoever to show that she attended the board meeting of LRTA which deliberated and acted uponsubject Lease Agreement (Exhibit B). It is thus beyond cavil that petitioner signed the said Lease Agreement as Chairman of the PGH Foundation, Inc., a private charitable foundation, and not as a publicofficer.

Presidential Commission on Good Government vs. Pena

Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction over the Presidential Commission on Good Government; Courtupholds the primacy of administrative jurisdiction as vested in the commission and holds that jurisdictions






over all sequestration cases fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,subject to review exclusively by the Supreme Court. - This special civil action for certiorari , prohibitionand mandamus with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order seeks to set aside the orders, dated

February 16 and March 5, 1987, rendered by respondent trial judge on grounds of lack of jurisdiction andgrave abuse of discretion. The main issue is whether regional trial courts have jurisdiction over the

petitioner Presidential Commission on Good Government (hereinafter referred to as the Commission) andproperties sequestered and placed in its custodia legis in the exercise of its powers under ExecutiveOrders Nos. 1, 2 and 14, as amended, and whether said regional trial courts may interfere with and

restrain or set aside the orders and actions of the Commission. The Court holds that regional trial courtsdo not have such jurisdiction over the Commission and accordingly grants the petition. To eliminate alldoubts, the Court upholds the primacy of administrative jurisdiction as vested in the Commission and

holds that jurisdiction over all sequestration cases of ill-gotten wealth, assets and properties under thepast discredited regime fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, subject to

review exclusively by this Court. *

It is a co-equal body with Regional Trial Courts and co-equal bodies have no power to control the other. -

As can be readily seen from the foregoing discussion of the duties and functions and the power andauthority of the Commission, it exercises quasi-judicial functions. In the exercise of quasi-judicialfunctions, the Commission is a co-equal body with regional trial courts and "co-equal bodies have nopower to control the other." 12 The Solicitor General correctly submits that the lack of jurisdiction of regional trial courts over quasi-judicial agencies is recognized in section 9, paragraph 3 of Batas

Pambansa Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980), which otherwise vests exclusive appellate jurisdiction in the Court of Appeals over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders, or awards of regional trial courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions.

Cruz vs. Youngberg

1. Constitutionality – Act No. 3155 is entirely valid. The Legislature passed Act No. 3155 to protect

the cattle industry of the country and to prevent the introduction of cattle diseases throughimportation of foreign cattle. It is now generally recognized that the promotion of industries

affecting the public welfare and the development of the resources of the country are objectswithin the scope of the police power (12 C.J., 927; 6 R.C.L., 203-206 and decisions cited therein;Reid vs . Colorado, 187 U.S., 137, 147, 152; Yeazel vs . Alexander, 58 Ill., 254). In this connectionit is said in the case of Punzalanvs . Ferriols and Provincial Board of Batangas (19 Phil., 214), thatthe provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, did not have the effect of denying to theGovernment of the Philippine Islands the right to the exercise of the sovereign police power inthe promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. The facts recited in paragraph 8 of the amended petition shows that at the time the Act No. 3155 was promulgated there wasreasonable necessity therefore and it cannot be said that the Legislature exceeded its power inpassing the Act. That being so, it is not for this court to avoid or vacate the Act uponconstitutional grounds nor will it assume to determine whether the measures are wise or the bestthat might have been adopted

2. Delegation of Power – The power given by the Act No. 3155 to the Governor –General to

suspend or not, at his discretion, the prohibition provided in the Act does not constitute anunlawful delegation of the legislative powers, but confers an authority or discretion as to itsexecution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to thelatter no valid objection can be made.






TOPIC: FUNCTIONS OF THE REGULATORY AGENCIES

Sangguniang Barangay of Don Mariano Marcos Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya vs. Martinez

Pertinent legal provisions and cases decided by the Court firmly established that the Sangguniang Bayanis not empowered to remove an elective local official from office.- The pivotal issue in this case is

whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan may remove Martinez, an elective local official, from office. Thepertinent legal provisions and cases decided by this Court firmly establish that the Sanggunaing Bayan isnot empowered to do so.

The Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials, since the power is

exclusively vested in the proper courts. - In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr .,17 the Court en banc categoricallyruled that the Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials, since the power isexclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of Section 60 of theLocal Government Code. It further invalidated Article 125, Rule XIX of the Rules and RegulationsImplementing the Local Government Code of 1991

The Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan cannot order the removal of an erring electivebarangay official from office, as the courts are exclusively vested with this power under Section 60 of theLocal Government Code; The most extreme penalty that the Sangguniang Panlungsod or SangguniangBayan may impose on the erring elective barangay official is suspension. - As the law stands, Section 61

of the Local Government Code provides for the procedure for the filing of an administrative case againstan erring elective barangay official before the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan. However,the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan cannot order the removal of an erring

electivebarangay official from office, as the courts are exclusively vested with this power under Section60 of the Local Government Code. Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by the barangay official are of a

grave nature and, if found guilty, would merit the penalty of removal from office, the case should be filedwith the regional trial court. Once the court assumes jurisdiction, it retains jurisdiction over the case evenif it would be subsequently apparent during the trial that a penalty less than removal from office is

appropriate. On the other hand, the most extreme penalty that the Sangguniang Panlungsod orSangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring elective barangay official is suspension; if it deems thatthe removal of the official from service is warranted, then it can resolve that the proper charges be filedin court.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriateadministrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before thesame may be elevate to the courts of justice for review. - The doctrine of exhaustion of administrativeremedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of acontroversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice forreview. Non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, which is one of the groundsallowed by the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint.22

Instances when the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validity resorted toimmediately. - The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, which is based on sound public

policy and practical consideration, is not inflexible. There are instances when it may be dispensed withand judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately. Among these exceptions are: 1) where thereis estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; 2) where the challenged administrativeact is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; 3) where there is unreasonable delay orofficial inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; 4) where the amount involved isrelatively small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; 5) where the question raised ispurely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice ; 6) where judicial

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intervention is urgent; 7) where its application may cause great and irreparable damage; 8) where thecontroverted acts violate due process; 9) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedieshas been rendered moot; 10) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 11) when

strong public interest is involved; and 13) inquo warranto proceedings.23

Where the case involves only legal questions, the litigant need not exhaust all administrative remediesbefore such judicial relief can be sought; A legal question is properly addressed to a regular court of justice rather than to an administrative body. - this Court in Castro v. Glori a 25 declared that where the

case involves only legal questions, the litigant need not exhaust all administrative remedies before such judicial relief can be sought. The reason behind providing an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that issues of law cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative officer.

Appeal to the administrative officer would only be an exercise in futility. A legal question is properlyaddressed to a regular court of justice rather than to an administrative body.26

Dagudag vs. Paderanga

Section 68-A states that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary or his

duly authorized representatives may order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered,removed, possessed or abandoned. - The DENR is the agency responsible for the enforcement of forestrylaws. Section 4 of Executive Order No. 192 states that the DENR shall be the primary agency responsiblefor the conservation, management, development, and proper use of the country's natural resources.

Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended by Executive Order No. 277, states that

possessing forest products without the required legal documents is punishable. Section 68-A states thatthe DENR Secretary or his duly authorized representatives may order the confiscation of any forestproduct illegally cut, gathered, removed, possessed, or abandoned.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic-courts, for reasons of law, comity andconvenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first beenresorted to and the proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correcttheir alleged errors, if any, commited in the administrative forum. - Judge Paderanga should havedismissed the replevin suit outright for three reasons. First, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies.

In Factoran, Jr. v. Court of Appeals ,20 the Court held that:

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law,comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrativeremedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given an

appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in theadministrative forum.

The Court held that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies before he can resort to the courts. -

In Dy v. Court of Appeals ,21 the Court held that a party must exhaust all administrative remedies beforehe can resort to the courts. In Paat v. Court of Appeals ,22 the Court held that:

This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek theintervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative

machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity todecide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted firstbefore court's judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of court's intervention










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is fatal to one's cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel the case issusceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action.

Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pending beforeadministrative agencies of special competence. - the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take

cognizance of cases pending before administrative agencies of special competence. The DENR is theagency responsible for the enforcement of forestry laws. The complaint for replevin itself stated thatmembers of DENR's Task Force Sagip Kalikasan took over the forest products and brought them to

the DENR Community Environment and Natural Resources Office . This should have alerted JudgePaderanga that the DENR had custody of the forest products, that administrative proceedings may havebeen commenced, and that the replevin suit had to be dismissed outright. In Tabao v. Judge Lilagan 25 - a

case with a similar set of facts as the instant case - the Court held that:

The complaint for replevin itself states that the shipment x x x [was] seized by the NBI for verification of supporting documents. It also states that the NBI turned over the seized items to the DENR "for officialdisposition and appropriate action." x x x To our mind, these allegations [should] have beensufficient to alert respondent judge that the DENR has custody of the seized items and that

administrative proceedings may have already been commenced concerning the shipment.Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot take cognizance of cases pendingbefore administrative agencies of special competence. x x x The prudent thing for respondent

judge to have done was to dismiss the replevin suit outright.

Carpio vs. Executive Secretary

The presidential power of control was held to man the power of the President to alter or modify or nullifyor set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the

judgment of the former with that of the latter. - This presidential power of control over the executivebranch of government extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest

clerk 17 and has been held by us, in the landmark case of Mondano vs . Silvosa , 18 to mean "the power of [the President] to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in theperformance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter." It is said

to be at the very "heart of the meaning of Chief Executive." 19

The “Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency” equally accepted as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President. -Equally well accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of the President, is the"Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency". As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control

powers all at the same time and in person, 20 he will have to delegate some of them to his Cabinetmembers.

The President’s power of control is directly exercised by him over the members of the Cabinet who in turnand by his authority, control the bureaus and other officers under their respective jurisdiction in theexecutive department. - Thus, and in short, "the President's power of control is directly exercised by him

over the members of the Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the bureaus and other officesunder their respective jurisdictions in the executive department." 23cha

TOPIC: FUNCTIONS OF THE REGULATORY AGENCIES – Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies, Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction or Prior Resort, Doctrineof Qualified Political Agency









Evangelista vs. Jarencio

Whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding investigations.

The life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact, the gathering, the organization and theanalysis of evidence. 7 Investigations are useful for all administrative functions, not only for rule making,

adjudication, and licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining

general policy, for recommending, legislation, and for purposes no more specific than illuminating

obscure areas to find out what if anything should be done. 8 An administrative agency may be authorized

to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings

whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature

may be taken 9 and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory

nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report findings to

appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions.

The administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not dependent upon a case orcontroversy in order to get evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being

violated or even just because it wants assurance that it is not. When investigative and accusatory duties

are delegated by statute to an administrative body, it, too may take steps to inform itself as to whether

there is probable violation of the law.21 In sum, it may be stated that a subpoena meets the requirements

for enforcement if the inquiry is (1) within the authority of the agency; (2) the demand is not too

indefinite; and (3) the information is reasonably relevant.

Privilege against self-incrimination extends in administrative investigations, generally, in scope similar to

adversary proceedings.

Ang Tibay vs. CIR

The CIR is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation which is the

Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a part of the integrated judicial

system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the government. Unlike a court

of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases

that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its

organic law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial

functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far

more comprehensive and extensive.

Procedural requirements:

(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's cause and submit evidence in support

thereof;

(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;






(3) The decision must have something to support itself;

(4) The evidence must be substantial;

(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the

record and disclosed to the parties affected;

(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law

and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;

(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the

parties to the proceeding can know the various Issue involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.

Lacuesta vs. Herrera

It is a well-recognized principle that purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be

interfered with by the courts (Coloso v. Board of Accountancy, G. R. No. L-5750, April 20, 1953).

In general, courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative

departments of the government. This is generally true with respect to acts involving the exercise of

judgment or discretion, and findings of fact. (54 Am. Jur. 558-559). Findings of fact by an administrative

board or official, following a hearing, are binding upon the courts and will not be disturbed except where

the board or official has gone beyond his statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly

acted arbitrarily and without regard to his duty or with grave abuse of discretion ..."

Where there is no showing that there was fraud, collusion, arbitrariness, illegality, imposition or mistake

on the part of the Office of the President or a department head, in rendering their questioned decisions

or of a total lack of substantial evidence to support the same, such administrative decisions are entitled

to great weight and respect and will not be interfered with by the courts.

Ang-Angco vs. Castillo

Whether the President has the power to take direct action on the case of petitioner even if he belongs to

the classified service in spite of the provisions now in force in the Civil Service Act of 1959.

"No officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed except for cause as provided for by law."

The Power of control of the President may extend to the Power to investigate, suspend or remove

officers and employees who belong to the executive department if they are presidential appointees or do

not belong to the classified service for such can be justified under the principle that the power to remove

is inherent in the power to appoint (Lacson V. Romero, supra ), but not with regard to those officers or

employees who belong to the classified service for as to them that inherent power cannot be exercised.

This is in line with the provision of our Constitution which says that "the Congress may by law vest the

appointment of the inferior officers, in the President alone, in the courts, or in heads of department"






(Article VII, Section 10 [3], Constitution). With regard to these officers whose appointments are vested

on heads of departments, Congress has provided by law for a procedure for their removal precisely in

view of this constitutional authority. One such law is the Civil Service Act of 1959.

Phil. Lawyers Association vs. Agrava

Whether or not the a Director of the PPO may require lawyers to submit and pass on examination

prescribed by it before they are allowed to practice.

Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms and

make regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and efficient

administration of his branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within

the jurisdiction of his bureau. Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of

the Philippines, provides that the Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the approval of the

Department Head, makes all rules and regulations necessary to enforce the provisions of said code.

Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states thatthe Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all

needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the code. We understand

that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for the Bureau of Customs and Internal

Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to govern the transaction of business in and to

enforce the law for said bureaus.

Members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice law, and in good standing, may

practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much of the business in said office

involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other

laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the

functions of the Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders anddecisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.

Phil. Movie Pictures Workers Association vs. Premiere Productions Inc.

The right to labor is a constitutional as well as statutory right. Every man has a natural right to the fruits

of his own industry. A man who has been employed to undertake certain labor and has put into it his

time and effort is entitled to be protected. The right of a person to his labor is deemed to be property

within the meaning of constitutional guarantees. That is his means of livelihood. He cannot be deprived

of his labor or work without due process of law .

No due process. Although the Court of Industrial Relations, in the determination of any question orcontroversy, may adopt its own rules of procedure and may act according to justice and equity without

regard to technicalities, and for that matter is not bound by any technical rules of evidence (section 20,

Commonwealth Act No. 103), this broad grant of power should not be interpreted to mean that it can

ignore or disregard the fundamental requirements of due process in the trials and investigation of cases

brought before it for determination. As aptly pointed out by this court, there are certain cardinal primary

rights which the Court of Industrial Relations must respect in the trial of every labor case. One of them is

the right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested to present his own case and submit






evidence in support thereof (Manila Trading and Supply Co. vs. Philippine Labor Union, 71 Phil., 124,

129). An ocular inspection of the establishment or premise involved is proper if the court finds it

necessary, but such is authorized only to help the court in clearing a doubt, reaching a conclusion, or

finding the truth. But it is not the main trial nor should it exclude the presentation of other evidence

which the parties may deem necessary to establish their case. It is merely an auxiliary remedy the lawaffords the parties or the court to reach an enlightened determination of the case.

Avelino vs. Cuenco

Election of Senate President – quorum or none.

The court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, in view of the separation of powers, the political

nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the senate of the power to elect its own

president, which power should not be interfered with nor taken over, by the judiciary.

Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that “the majority of all the members of theNational Assembly constitute a quorum to do business” and the fact that said provision was amended in

the Constitution of 1939, so as to read “a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do

business,” shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution to base the majority, not on the

number fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but on actual members or incumbents, and

this must be limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge their duties

by reason of death, incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the house or for other

causes which make attendance of the member concerned impossible, even through coercive

process which each house is empowered to issue to compel its members to attend the

session in order to constitute a quorum. That the amendment was intentional or made for some

purpose, and not a mere oversight, or for considering the use of the words “of all the members” as

unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the original Constitution which required “concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the National Assembly to expel a member” was amended

by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present Constitution, so as to require “the concurrence of two-thirds of all

the members of each House”. Therefore, as Senator Confesor was in the United States and absent from

the jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of the Senate at its session of February 21, 1949, were

twenty-three (23) and therefore 12 constituted a majority.

Estrada vs. Arroyo

TOPIC: THE REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURA DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVEPROCEEDINGS

Medina vs. COA

The denial of Medina's request for a formal investigation is not tantamount to a denial of her right to dueprocess. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one's sideor seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

In this case, Medina was given the opportunity to be heard when she filed her counter-affidavit andposition paper.

Domingo vs. Rayala






Rayala decries the alleged violation of his right to due process. He accuses the Committee on Decorum of railroading his trial for violatio n of RA 7877. He also scored the OP’s decision finding him guilty of

"disgraceful and immoral conduct" under the Revised Administrative Code and not for violation of RA7877. Considering that he was not tried for "disgraceful and immoral conduct," he argues that the verdict

is a "sham and total nullity."

Rayala was properly accorded due process. In previous cases, this Court held that:

[i]n administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1)the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect arespondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a

tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person chargedadministratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding bysaid tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during thehearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.48

The records of the case indicate that Rayala was afforded all these procedural due process safeguards. Although in the beginning he questioned the authority of the Committee to try him,49 he appeared,personally and with counsel, and participated in the proceedings.

What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the

particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by theprosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Torres

This is an administrative case for dishonesty, grave misconduct, and falsification of official document. To

sustain a finding of administrative culpability only substantial evidence is required, not overwhelming orpreponderant, and very much less than proof beyond reasonable doubt as required in criminalcases.12 Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept asadequate to support a conclusion.

Geronga vs. Varela

Two fundamental requirements54 of due process in administrative cases are that a person must be dulyinformed of the charges against him; and that he cannot be convicted of an offense or crime with whichhe was not charged.55 A deviation from these requirements renders the proceeding invalid and the judgment issued therein a lawless thing that can be struck down anytime.56

Solid Homes Inc. vs. Laserna

The constitutional mandate that, "no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein

clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based,"22 does not preclude the validity of "memorandum decisions," which adopt by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law containedin the decisions of inferior tribunals.

It must be stated that Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution need not apply to decisionsrendered inadministrative proceedings, as in the case a bar. Said section applies only to decisions

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rendered in judicial proceedings. In fact, Article VIII is titled "Judiciary," and all of its provisions haveparticular concern only with respect to the judicial branch of government. Certainly, it would be error tohold or even imply that decisions of executive departments or administrative agencies are oblige to meet

the requirements under Section 14, Article VIII.

The rights of parties in administrative proceedings are not violated as long as the constitutionalrequirement of due process has been satisfied. (refer to Ang Tibay).

For as long as the administrative decision is grounded on evidence, and expressed in a manner thatsufficiently informs the parties of the factual and legal bases of the decision, the due process requirementis satisfied.

TOPIC: APPLICABILITY OF TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN

ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

CSC vs. Colangco

The CSC essentially avers that the CA erred in finding that it committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering Resolution No. 021412 .15 The Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service 16 (Uniform Rules) does not require strict adherence to technical rules of evidence.

Administrative rules of procedure are construed liberally to promote their objective and to assist parties in

obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and defenses. Section 39of the Uniform Rules provides: The investigation shall be conducted for the purpose of ascertaining the truth without necessarily adhering to technical rules applicable in judicialproceedings. It shall be conducted by the disciplining authority concerned or his authorizedrepresentatives. (emphasis supplied)

The provision above clearly states that the CSC, in investigating complaints against civil servants, is not

bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence applicable in judicial proceedings.

As a general rule, a finding of guilt in administrative cases, if supported by substantial evidence (or "that

amount of evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion"),18 will besustained by this Court.

TOPIC: ADMINISTRATIVE AND CRIMINA PROCEEDINGS ARISING FROM THE SAME SET OFFACTS

Ferrer Jr. vs. Sandiganbayn

But one thing is administrative liability. Quite another thing is the criminal liability for the

same act. Our determination of the administrative liability for falsification of publicdocuments is in no way conclusive of his lack of criminal liability. As we have held in Tan v.Comelec , the dismissal of an administrative case does not necessarily bar the filing of a

criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts which were the subject of theadministrative complaint.24 (Emphasis supplied.)

The basis of administrative liability differs from criminal liability. The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public service, based on the time-









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honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On the other hand, the purpose of thecriminal prosecution is the punishment of crime.

To sustain petitioner's arguments will be to require the Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman to merelyadopt the results of administrative investigations which would not only diminish the powers and duties of

these constitutional offices, but also violate the independent nature of criminal and administrative casesagainst public officials. This will also amount to untold delays in criminal proceedings beforethe Sandiganbayan and Ombudsman, as every criminal trial and investigation before these bodies will be

made to await the results of pending administrative investigations. Such is not the intent of the framersof the Constitution and the laws governing public officers.

TOPIC: ADMINISTRATIVE RULEMAKING

Republic vs. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp.

Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce orimplement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. (Emphasis provided.)

These requirements of publication and filing were put in place as safeguards against abuses on the partof lawmakers and as guarantees to the constitutional right to due process and to information on mattersof public concern and, therefore, require strict compliance. Strict compliance with the requirementscannot be annulled by mere allegations that parties were notified of the existence of the implementingrules.

TOPIC: POWER OF THE OMBUDSMAN TO CONDUCT ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATONS ANDTO IMPOSE ADMINISTRATICE SANCTIONS ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Masing

The power of the Ombudsman to determine and impose administrative liability is not merelyrecommendatory but actually mandatory.

“The Ombudsman’s order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer oremployee is not merely advisory or recommendatory but is actually mandatory.” Implementation of the

order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer.

The powers of the ombudsman enumerated in the Constitution are NON-EXCLUSIVE. the manifest intent

of the lawmakers was to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinaryauthority in accord with the constitutional deliberations.[28] Unlike the Ombudsman-like agencies of the

past the powers of which extend to no more than making findings of fact and recommendations, and theOmbudsman or Tanodbayan under the 1973 Constitution who may file and prosecute criminal, civil or

administrative cases against public officials and employees only in cases of failure of justice, theOmbudsman under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 is intended to play a more active role in theenforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and other offenses committed by public officers

and employees.[29] The Ombudsman is to be an “activist watchman,” not merely a passive one.[30] He isvested with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions.

The authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations is beyondcavil.[40] As the principal and primary complaints and action center[41] against erring publicofficers and employees, it is mandated by no less than Section 13(1), Article XI of the Constitution.[42] In

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conjunction therewith, Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770 grants to the Ombudsman the authority to act on alladministrative complaints.

TOPIC: PRESCRIPTION; EXECUTION OF DECISION OF THE OMBUDSMAN

Office of the Ombudsman vs. CA

An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension orremoval and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having been underpreventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he did notreceive by reason of the suspension or removal.

A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as a matter

of course. Order is immediately executory even pending appeal in the Court of Appeals.TOPIC: MODES OF ACQUIRING TITLE TO PUBLIC OFFICE

BY CONTRACT OR SOME OTHER MODES AUTHORIZED BY LAW

Preclaro vs. Sandiganbayan

“Public officer" in R.A. No. 3019 which, according to Sec. 2(b) thereof "includes elective and appointiveofficials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the classified or unclassified or exemptionservice receiving compensation, even nominal, from the government. . . ."

The word "includes" used in defining a public officer in Sec. 2(b) indicates that the definition is notrestrictive. The terms "classified, unclassified or exemption service" were the old categories of positions inthe civil service which have been reclassified into Career Service and Non-Career Service 11 by PD 807providing for the organization of the Civil Service Commission 12 and by the Administrative Code of 1987.

Non-career service in particular is characterized by —

(1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual test of merit and fitness utilized for the career service ;and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made .

TOPIC: MODES AND KINDS OF APPOINTMENTS – ACTING

Marohombsar vs. Alonto

A bona fide appointment in an acting capacity is essentially temporary and revocable in character and the

holder of such appointment may be removed anytime even without hearing or cause. A person who

accepts an appointment in an acting capacity extended and received without any protest or reservation

and who acts thereunder for a considerable time cannot later be heard to say that the appointment was,

in reality, permanent and therefore there can be no removal except for cause.

The essence of an acting appointment is its temporary nature. It is a stop gap measure intended to fill an

office for a limited time until a permanent appointment is extended or a new appointee is chosen.






The nature of an acting appointment limits not only the claims of the appointee to a lengthy tenure but

also defines the authority of the appointing power. A public officer appointed in an acting capacity cannot

claim that the appointment shall in time ripen into a permanent one. However, neither can the appointing

power use the principle of temporary appointments to evade or avoid the security of tenure principle in

the Constitution and the Civil Service Law. This is similar to the rule that the head of an office cannotarbitrarily convert permanent positions to primarily confidential items so that he can more freely fire and

hire or rehire subordinates at his personal discretion. It is the nature of the functions attached to a

position, not the nomenclature or title given by the appointing authority which determines its primarily

confidential nature. For the same reason, the Court may inquire into the true nature of an "acting"

appointment to determine whether or not it is used as a device to circumvent the security of tenure

principle.

If it was a mere designation, it needs no confirmation. The fact that confirmation was needed shows thatit is an ad interim one. An ad interim appointment is one made during the time when the appointing orconfirming body is not in session and there is an existing clear and present urgency caused by animpending obstruction or paralyzation of the functions assigned to the office if no immediate appointment

is made.

TOPIC: TEMPORARY APPOINTMENT FOR A FIXED PERIOD

Ambas vs. Buenaseda

Acceptance of a temporary appointment is tantamount to the submission to the legal consequences, that

is that he can be terminated at anytime with or without cause.

Prior to the expiration of the term, petitioners could be removed only for just cause. The fact that

petitioners' appointments were classified as "temporary" did not grant a blanket authority to theSecretary of Health to remove them at anytime without cause for the term fixed by law protects the rightof the resident trainees from being removed from office without cause. A "term" of office fixed by law

allows the appointee to hold office, perform its functions, and enjoy its privileges and emoluments untilthe expiration of said period.It is the definite period of time prescribed by law by which an officer may

hold office. The non-renewal of their appointments with or without cause at the end of their term is avalid mode of termination.

TOPIC: ELIGIBILITY AND QUALIFICATION REQUIREMENTS

Frivaldo vs. Comelec

Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the

Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local GovernmentCode that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified

voter of the constituency where he is running. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that aqualified voter must be, among other qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being anindispensable requirement for suffrage under Article V, Section 1, of the Constitution.

Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of congress, by naturalization or by repatriation.

Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of

appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the

required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged.






The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of thepeople as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenlybelieved, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified.

TOPIC: DISABILITIES AND INIHIBITIONS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

Almeda vs. Perez

A test has been suggested to determine whether the proceeding for forfeiture is civil or criminal, thus:

. . . Forfeiture proceedings may be either civil or criminal in nature, and may be in rem or in personam. If

they are under a statute such that if an indictment is presented forfeiture can be included in the criminal

case they are in nature, although they may be civil in form; and where it must be gathered from the

statute that the action is meant to be criminal in its nature it cannot be considered as civil. If however,

the proceeding does not involve the conviction of wrongdoer for the offensecharged the proceeding is of

a civil nature; and under statutes which specifically so provision where the act or omission for which the

forfeiture is imposed is not also a misdemeanor, such forfeiture may be sued for recovered in a civil

action.

Cabal vs. Kapunan

Forfeiture is a divestiture property without compensation, in consequence of a default an offense, and

the term is used in such a sense in this article. A forfeiture, as thus defined, is imposed by way of punishment not by the mere convention of the parties, but by the lawmaking power, to insure a

prescribed course of conduct. It is a method deemed necessary by the legislature to restrain thecommission of an offense and to aid in the prevention of such an offense. The effect of such a forfeitureis to transfer the title to the specific thing from the owner to the sovereign power.

Generally speaking, information for the forfeiture of goods that seek no judgment of fine or imprisonment

against any person are deemed to be civil proceedings in rem. Such proceedings are criminal in nature tothe extent that where the person using the res illegally is the owner or rightful possessor of it, the

forfeiture proceeding is in the nature of a punishment. They have been held to be so far in the nature

criminal proceedings that a general verdict on several count in an information is upheld if one count is

good. According to the authorities such proceedings, where the owner of the property appears, are so far

considered as quasi-criminal proceeding as to relieve the owner from being a witness against himself and

to prevent the compulsory production of his books and papers.

The rule protecting a person from being compelled to furnish evidence which would incriminate him

exists not only when he is liable criminally to prosecution and punishment, but also when his answer

would tend to expose him to a forfeiture.

A person may not be compelled to testify in an action against him for a penalty or to answer any questionas a witness which would subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, where the penalty or forfeiture isimposed as a vindication of the public justice of the state.

Funa vs. Agra

At the center of the controversy is the correct application of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987

Constitution, viz:






Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants

shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their

tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate

in any business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege

granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the

conduct of their office.

A relevant and complementing provision is Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution,

to wit: Section 7. x xx

Unless otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall holdany other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

The differentiation of the two constitutional provisions was well stated in Funa v. Ermita: Thus, while all

other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the

government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their

positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly

authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the

general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13,

Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of

the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.

To hold an office means to possess or to occupy the office, or to be in possession and administration of

the office, which implies nothing less than the actual discharge of the functions and duties of the office.

The prohibition against dual or multiple offices being held by one official must be construed as to apply to

all appointments or designations, whether permanent or temporary, for i t is without question that the

avowed objective of Section 13, supra, is to prevent the concentration of powers in the Executive

Department officials, specifically the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet and their

deputies and assistants.

According to Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Elma, the only two exceptions against the holding of multiple

offices are: (1) those provided for under the Constitution, such as Section 3, Article VII, authorizing the

Vice President to become a member of the Cabinet; and (2) posts occupied by Executive officials

specified in Section 13, Article VII without additional compensation in ex officio capacities as provided by

law and as required by the primary functions of the officials’ offices.

"The Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants" found in Section 13, referred only to the

heads of the various executive departments, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries, and did notextend to other public officials given the rank of Secretary, Undersecretary or Assistant Secretary.

The term ex officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an "authority derived from official

character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character, but rather annexed to the official

position." Ex officio likewise denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a consequence of office,

and without any other appointment or authority other than that conferred by the office." An ex officio

member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a certain office, and without further

warrant or appointment.






The ex officio position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows thatthe official concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in the said position.

The general rule contained in Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution permits an appointive official to hold

more than one office only if "allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position." In the case of

Quimson v. Ozaeta, this Court ruled that, "[t]here is no legal objection to a government official occupying

two government offices and performing the functions of both as long as there is no incompatibility." The

crucial test in determining whether incompatibility exists between two offices -whether one office is

subordinate to the other, in the sense that one office has the right to interfere with the other.

A de jure officer is one who is deemed, in all respects, legally appointed and qualified and whose term of

office has not expired.

It has been held that "in cases where there is no de jure, officer, a de facto officer, who, in good faith

has had possession of the office and has discharged the duties pertaining thereto, is legally entitled to

the emoluments of the office, and may in an appropriate action recover the salary, fees and other

compensations attached to the office.

A de facto officer is one who derives his appointment from one having colorable authority to appoint, if

the office is an appointive office, and whose appointment is valid on its face. He may also be one who is

in possession of an office, and is discharging its duties under color of authority, by which is meant

authority derived from an appointment, however irregular or informal, so that the incumbent is not a

mere volunteer. Consequently, the acts of the de facto officer are just as valid for all purposes as those

of a de jure officer, in so far as the public or third persons who are interested therein are concerned.

TOPIC: RIGHTS OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

SSS Employees Association vs. CA

The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights, provides that the State "shall

guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and

peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 31].

While there is no question that the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to

organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to strike.

At present, in the absence of any legislation allowing government employees to strike, recognizing their

right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, they are prohibited from striking, by expressprovision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180.

Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law, government workers cannotuse the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their

employers. In government employment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly givendelegated power, the administrative heads of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, notthrough collective bargaining agreements.






Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either petition the Congressfor the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation ornegotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the improvement of those which are not fixed by

law. But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walk-outs and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the Govemment to accede to their demands.

Abellera vs. City of Baguio

"(T)he rule on payment of back salaries during the period of suspension of a member of the civil servicewho is subsequently ordered reinstated, is already settled in this jurisdiction. Such payment of salariescorresponding to the period when an employee, is not allowed to work may, be decreed not only if he is

found innocent of the charges which caused his suspension (Sec. 35, Rep. Act 2260), but also when thesuspension is unjustified."

Yarcia vs. City of Baguio

The general proposition is that a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he has not rendered

any service. As you work, so shall you earn. And even if We consider the punishment as suspension,

before a public official or employee is entitled to payment of salaries withheld, it should be shown that

the suspension was unjustified or that the employee was innocent of the charges preferred against him.

In Gonzales vs. Hernandez, it show that back salaries are ordered paid to an officer or an employee onlyif he is exonerated of the charge against him and his suspension or dismissal is found and declared to be

illegal."

Austria vs. Auditor General

A "reinstatement" under the aforequoted provision refers to a reinstatement to the same position fromwhich the subordinate officer or employee was suspended, and not merely a reinstatement in the

government service; it should not be so comprehensively understood as to include demotionalappointments issued pursuant to an adverse decision in an administrative case, the reason being that the"reinstatement" referred to in the law, is, under its very wording, held at par with exoneration in case

reinstatement is not possible because of the death of the suspended person.

TOPIC: LIABILITIES OF PUBLIC OFFICERS

CRIMINAL

People vs. Consigna

Whether or not the trial court, besides acquitting Consigna "for absolute lack of evidence," had the authority to order his reinstatement.

According to Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, a party found guilty of malversation of public fundsshall be punished with imprisonment and the additional penalty of special perpetual disqualification. It isclearly inferable from this that his conviction necessarily results in his dismissal from the public office heoccupied at the time he committed the offense. On the other hand, the preventive suspension of Consigna followed his indictment for the crime of malversation, and this was later followed by an orderfor his dismissal as a result of the administrative investigation to which he was subjected even while thecriminal case for malversation was pending in court. It must be observed, in this connection, thatalthough this administrative investigation was started after the filing of the criminal case, Consigna's






administrative superiors went ahead with said investigation — which ended with an order for his dismissal — instead of waiting for the result of the criminal case.

The case of People vs. Daleon , G.R. No. L-15630, March 24, 1961 — upon which appellant relies — is notcontrolling in the present, because our ruling in the former was simply to the effect that, upon acquitting

one charged with malversation of public funds, the court has no authority to order payment of hissalaries corresponding to the period of his suspension because his right to the same was not involved inthe case. This ruling does not apply to defendant's right — in case of acquittal — to reinstatement to the

position he was occupying at the time of his suspension, because, as we have said heretofore, thismatter would seem to be involved in the case of malversation albeit as a mere incident — becauseconviction of the offense charged results necessarily in a denial of such right to reinstatement in view of

the penalty of disqualification provided by law. If this is the inevitable result of conviction, reinstatementshould also follow acquittal.

Galang vs. CA

At the outset, it should be noted that, although both proceedings arose from the same facts, eachproceeding sought to deal with a violation of a provision of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 whichis entirely different and distinct from that dealt with in the other proceeding.

Same act constitutes two (2) or more different offenses not covered by Article 48 of the Revised PenalCode, except that, in the case at bar, one offense is punishable as a felony or crime, and the other is tobe dealt with administratively. The one is not legally inconsistent with the other, and the prosecution forthe former does not entail a waiver of the action due for the latter.

PNR vs. Domingo

Consigna clearly had no applicability in the case at bar, for herein respondent had been acquitted merely

"on reasonable doubt" unlike Consigna who was found innocent "for absolute lack of evidence."

Doctrine of Daleon: "This Court has held, however, that it is not within the power of the court, in theevent of an acquittal, to order the payment of the salaries and other emoluments which the accused hasfailed to receive during the period of his suspension from office" — since this matter falls within theprovince of the administrative authorities, who are not parties in the criminal case and who exercisecontrol and supervision over the accused in connection with his employment.

Respondent’s acquittal "on reasonable doubt" could not overturn the verdict of guilty in the administrativecase, by virtue whereof he had already been dismissed.

The Court's jurisprudence uniformly holds that the trial court in the criminal case, has no authority, in theevent of an acquittal of the accused employee, to order payment of back salaries.

While an acquitted accused may in appropriate cases claim payment of back salaries during the period of his suspension, or reinstatement in the case of his dismissal, his relief lies not in the same criminal casewherein he is acquitted but in the proper administrative or civil action prescribed by law.

The reason for the rule is that generally acquittal in the criminal case does not carry with it relief fromadministrative liability. The administrative case may generally proceed against a respondentindependently of a criminal action for the same act or omission and requires only a preponderance of






evidence to establish administrative guilt as against proof beyond reasonable doubt of the criminalcharge, as in the analogous cases provided by Art. 33 of the Civil Code.

CIVIL

Mindanao vs. Kintanar

Quieting of title against the government.

The complaint herein has been ordered dismissed as against appellees Kintanar, Enriquez and Fernandez,only in their private capacity because of lack of allegation to make them so liable in favor of appellant.

This is supported by the lack of relief asked for in the prayer of the complaint as again these appellees intheir private capacities.

SC ruled that the trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint because of lack of allegation to makethem liable and lack of prayer in the complainant as against the appellees in their private capacities.

Suit was filed against defendants under their official capacities hence it is a suit against the government.Government cannot be sued without its consent.

Rivera vs. Maclang

Municipality failed to pay for the materials delivered. Claim against municipality not valid because contract is void.

Present action is against defendant-appellee in his personal capacity on the strength of section 608 of thesame code, which provides as follows:

SEC. 608. Void contract — Liability of officer . — A purported contract entered into contrary to the

requirements of the next preceding section hereof shall be wholly void, and the officer assumingto make such contract shall be liable to the Government or other contracting party for anyconsequent damage to the same extent as if the transaction had been wholly between privateparties.

The position of defendant-appellee, as the officer who signed the contract with appellant in violation of section 607, comes squarely under the provision just quoted. His liability is personal, as it the transactionhad been entered into by him as a private party. We take it that the intention of the law in this respect isto ensure that public officers entering into transactions with private individuals calling for the expenditureof public funds observe a high degree of caution so that the government may not be the victim of ill-advised or improvident action by those assuming to represent it.

If a public officer is sued in his personal capacity, case will prosper.

TORT

Javellana vs. Tayo

Refusal to pay councilors of their salaries. Councilors sued mayor for damages.






'Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects,without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against thelatter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.'lawphil.net After perusal of all the records of this case has reached the conclusion that the sessions held by thepetitioner during the absence of the respondent Mayor were perfectly valid and legal.

The attendance of the Mayor is not essential to the validity of the session as long as there is quorumconstituted in accordance with law. To declare that the proceedings of the petitioners were null and void

is to encourage recalcitrant public officials who would frustrate valid session for political end orconsideration. Public interest will immensely suffer, if a mayor who belongs to one political group refusesto call or attend a session, because the Council is controlled by another political group. (And this was

upheld by the SC.)

Award proper under Article 27 of the new Civil Code, 3 considering that according to the trial court, he(Golez) was able to prove that he suffered the same, as a consequence of appellant's refusal to performhis official duty, not withstanding the action taken by the Provincial Fiscal and the Provincial Board

upholding the validity of the session in question.

Lim vs. Ponce De Leon

Illegal search and seizure of motor launch – without search warrant. Violation of constitutional rights.

There can be no question that without the proper search warrant, no public official has the right to enterthe premises of another without his consent for the purpose of search and seizure. 6 And since in thepresent case defendants-appellees seized the motor launch without a warrant, they have violated theconstitutional right of plaintiffs-appellants against unreasonable search and seizure.

A person whose constitutional rights have been violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moraldamages from the public officer or employee responsible therefor.

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs,

defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of anotherperson shall be liable to the latter for damages. xxx (9) The rights to be secure in one's person, house,papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.

To be liable under Article 32 of the New Civil Code it is enough that there was a violation of theconstitutional rights of the plaintiffs and it is not required that defendants should have acted with maliceor bad faith.

PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION

Bautista vs. Peralta

Petitioner reinstated but no payment of back salaries and other rights and privileges. Whether or not the decision of the Civil Service Board of Appeals to pay back wages is binding against NWSA.

Preventive suspension in administrative cases is not a penalty in itself. It is designed merely as measureof precaution so that the employee who is charged may be separated, for obvious reasons, from thescene of his alleged misfeasance while the same is being investigated. Thus if he is exonerated the lawprovides that he shall be restored to his position with full pay for the period of his suspension. (Sec. 35,






R.A. 2260.) This provision of course does not mean that reinstatement should not follow except in theevent of exoneration. The penalty of suspension — which necessarily is for a fixed period — alsocontemplates the same result after the penalty has been served.

The penalty imposed by the Civil Service Board of Appeals, was in effect served by him during the first

two months of his preventive suspension. His reinstatement during the rest of theperiod was no longerphysically possible, but there is no inherent obstacle to his receiving the back salaries corresponding tosuch period. Denial of the back salaries would amount to an amendment of the decision of the Civil

Service Board of Appeals, in effect increasing the two-month suspension meted out to him and convertingthe preventive suspension into the penalty itself.

Lastimosa vs. Vasquez

Administrative case against lastimosa (grave misconduct and gross neglect of duty) – contempt for failing to file the charge of attempted rape as directed by the ombudsman. Petitioner contends, the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case against the mayor because the crime involved (rape) was not committed in relation to a public office. For this reason it is argued that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority to place her and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension for refusing to follow his orders and to cite them for indirect contempt for such refusal.

The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint byany person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act oromission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." 14 This power has been held to include theinvestigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the actsor omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from, the performance of hisofficial duty 15 It is enough that the act or omission was committed by a public official. Hence, the crimeof rape, when committed by a public official like a municipal mayor, is within the power of the

Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.

§15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman the power to "punish for contempt, in

accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties providedtherein." There is no merit in the argument that petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar cannot be

held liable for contempt because their refusal arose out of an administrative, rather than judicial,proceeding before the Office of the Ombudsman. As petitioner herself says in another context, thepreliminary investigation of a case, of which the filing of an information is a part, is quasi judicial in

character.

Neither is there any doubt as to the power of the Ombudsman to discipline petitioner should it be foundthat she is guilty of grave misconduct, insubordination and/or neglect of duty, nor of the Ombudsman'spower to place her in the meantime under preventive suspension.

§21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions . — The Office of the Ombudsman shall havedisciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its subdivisions,

instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government, government-ownedor controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by

impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.

Petitioner contends that her suspension is invalid because the order was issued without giving her andProvincial Prosecutor Kintanar the opportunity to refute the charges against them and because, at anyrate, the evidence against them is not strong as required by §24. The contention is without merit. Priornotice and hearing is a not required, such suspension not being a penalty but only a preliminary step inan administrative investigation.





Respondent Deputy Ombudsman Mojica had personal knowledge of the facts justifying the preventivesuspension of petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor since the acts alleged in the administrative

complaint against them were done in the course of their official transaction with the Office of theOmbudsman. The administrative complaint against petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar was filed

in connection with their designation as deputies of the ombudsman in the prosecution of a criminal caseagainst Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo.

ILLEGAL DISMISSAL, REINSTATEMENT AND BACK SALARIES

Bangalisan vs. CA

Mass actions to dramatize grievances.

The ability to strike is not essential to the right of association. In the absence of statute, publicemployees do not have the right to engage in concerted work stoppages for any purpose.

On the issue of back wages, petitioners’ claim is premised on the allegation that their preventivesuspension, as well as the immediate execution of the decision dismissing or suspending them, areillegal. These submissions are incorrect.

Section 51 of Executive Order No. 292 provides that “(t)he proper disciplining authority may

preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, orneglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service.”

It is the nature of the charge against an officer or employee which determines whether he may be placedunder preventive suspension.

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to administrativeproceedings, an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of .[17] For as longas the parties were given the opportunity to be heard before judgment was rendered, the demands of due process were sufficiently met.

The issue regarding payment of back salaries during the period of suspension of a member of the civilservice who is subsequently ordered reinstated, is already settled in our jurisdiction. Such payment of salaries corresponding to the period when an employee is not allowed to work may be decreed if he isfound innocent of the charges which caused the suspension and when the suspension is unjustified

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1997/jul1997/124678.htm#_edn17




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