18160109 crim law review case doctrines midterms

8/6/2019 18160109 CRIM LAW REVIEW Case Doctrines Midterms

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2.1 Art.3. CLASSIFICATION OF FELONIES ACCDG TO THEIR MEANS OF COMMISSIONCASE TITLE KEYWORD(S) HELD/DOCTRINE(S)

1. CALIMUTAN V.PEOPLE

LACERATED SPLEEN.Victim Cantre, then w/ SananoPet Calimutan w/Bulalacao

Cantre grudge Bulalacaosuspected 2bed 1 throwing stones at Cantres house.

Cantre suddenly punched Bulalacaoranaway. Calimutan dashed 2wards the backs ofCantre & Sanano.

Calimutan then picked up a stone, as big asa mans fist, which he threw at victimCantre, hitting him at the left side of hisback.

Calimutan suffered severe backpain, he diedthe next day.

RTC held Calimutan guilty of Homicide Art.4 (1) RPC.CA affirmed.

W/N Calimutan is guilty of intentionalhomicide.

NO. this Court cannot, in good conscience, attribute topetitioner Calimutan any malicious intent to injure, muchless to kill, the victim Cantre; and in the absence of such

intent, this Court cannot sustain the conviction of petitionerCalimutan for the intentional crime of homicide, as renderedby the RTC and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Instead,this Court finds petitioner Calimutan guilty beyondreasonable doubt of the culpable felony of recklessimprudence resulting in homicide under Article 365 ofthe Revised Penal Code.

The prosecution did not establish that petitioner Calimutanthrew the stone at the victim Cantre with the specific intentof killing, or at the very least, of harming the victim Cantre.What is obvious to this Court was petitioner Calimutans

intention to drive away the attacker who was, at that point,the victim Cantre, and to protect his helper Bulalacao whowas, as earlier described, much younger and smaller in builtthan the victim Cantre.

Granting that petitioner Calimutan was impelled by a lawfulobjective when he threw the stone at the victim Cantre, hisact was committed with inexcusable lack of precaution.He failed to consider that a stone the size of a mansfist could inflict substantial injury on someone. Healso miscalculated his own strength, perhaps unaware,or even completely disbelieving, that he could throw a stone

with such force as to seriously injure, or worse, kill someone,at a quite lengthy distance of ten meters.

2.2 Art. 3. MISTAKE OF FACT2. DIEGO V.CASTILLO

Bigamy by wife, Cresencia1st marriage 1965 to Jorge de Perio Jr:divorced: 1978 in Texas, USA2nd marriage- 1987 to late Manuel Diego,brother of complainant

RTC-Cresencia Acquitted of Bigamy on thebasis of GF having acted w/o maliciousintent, believing that her marriage to Jorge

In his comment, respondent Judge stated: "That the accusedmarried Manuel P. Diego in the honest belief that she wasfree to do so by virtue of the decree of divorce is a mistakeof fact."

This Court, in People v. Bitdu, carefully distinguishedbetween a mistake of fact, which could be a basis forthe defense of good faith in a bigamy case, from amistake of law, which does not excuse a person, even


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had been validly dissolved.hence the instant case.

W/N Good Faith excuses a person fromliability founded on a mistake of law.

a lay person, from liability.

Bitdu held that even if the accused, who had obtained adivorce under the Mohammedan custom, honestly believedthat in contracting her second marriage she was not

committing any violation of the law, and that she had nocriminal intent,the same does not justify her act. ThisCourt further stated therein that with respect to thecontention that the accused acted in good faith incontracting the second marriage, believing that she hadbeen validly divorced from her first husband, it is sufficientto say that everyone is presumed to know the law,and the fact that one does not know that his actconstitutes a violation of the law does not exempt himfrom the consequences thereof.

3. ESTRADA V.SANDIGANBAYAN

PLUNDER LAWPetitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, makes a

stringent call for this Court to subject thePlunder Law to the crucible ofconstitutionality mainly because, accordingto him, (a) it suffers from the vice ofvagueness; (b) it dispenses with the"reasonable doubt" standard in criminalprosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes theelement ofmens rea in crimes alreadypunishable under The Revised PenalCode

,all of which are purportedly clearviolations of the fundamental rights of theaccused to due process and to be informed

of the nature and cause of the accusationagainst him.

W/N the crime of plunder is a malum in se ora malum prohobitum, given the fact that ispunishable under a SPECIAL LAW.

plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminalintent, even if punished by a special law, RA 7080.

any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum inse must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmativeby the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among theheinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.

The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is aheinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For whenthe acts punished are inherently immoral or inherentlywrong, they are mala in se and it does not matter that suchacts are punished in a special law, especially since in thecase of plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se.

Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunderas though they are mere prosecutions for violations of theBouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance againstjaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of theacts.

3.1 Art. 4. Wrongful act different from that intended4. PEOPLE V.MARCO

Town fiesta. Vine. Anus.

The Court finds Rafael Marco, DulcisimoBeltran, and Simeon Marco, guiltybeyond reasonable doubt of the crime

Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Revised Penal Code providesthat, "criminal liability shall be incurred by any personcommitting a felony (delito)although the wrongful act donebe different from that which he intended." Under thisprovision, one who commits an intentional felony is


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of Murder

Simeon Marco asked for cigarettes, waschasing Constancio Sebelvero while RafaelMarco, on the other hand, was approaching

Vicente Sebelbero. The latter had justshouted to his two sons to run away whenthe Rafael Marco overtook the decedent,Bienvenido Sebelbero, and stabbed him.Accused Dulcisimo Beltran, it will be noted,was not yet a participant. After the appellantwounded the decedent on the hand, thelatter continued running. There is noevidence however, that appellant continuedrunning after him (3) While running, thedecedent tripped on a vine and fell down.Accused Dulcisimo Beltran just came from

nowhere and stabbed the decedent near theanus. thereafter, Simeon Marco, who earlierhad been chasing Constancio Sebelberocame also and stabbed the decedent.

W/N RAFAEL Marco is guilty of Murder

responsible for all the consequences which may naturallyand logically result thereto whether form or intended or not.

It cannot be denied that the stabbing of the decedent by theappellant Rafael Marco, which caused a slight wound on the

former's hand was intentionally made; hence, felony.However, the ensuing death of the decedent was not thedirect, natural and logical consequence of the woundinflicted by the appellant. There was an active interveningcause, which was no other than the sudden and appearanceand participation of Simeon Marco and Beltran. And there isauthority that if the consequences produced have resultedfrom a distinct act or fact absolutely from the criminal casethe offender is not responsible for such consequence.

We are constrained to hold that he had no homicidal intent.He can be held criminally responsible only for the wound on

the back of the left hand of the deceased which is describedas a "stab wound, 2-1/2 inches wide at the back of the lefthand" by witness Felix S. Toledo, the Sanitary Inspector, whoexamined the corpse. And there being no evidence as to theperiod of incapacity or medical attendance consequence tosaid wound, appellant is guilty only of slight physical injuries.

3.2 ART. 4. IMPOSSIBLE CRIMES5. PEOPLE V.

DOMASIAN

KIDNAPPINGEnrico Agra, kidnapped by Pablito Domasian,he flagged a minibus and forced Enricoinside. Upon reaching market, Domasianhanded to jeepney the ransom note. In the

tricycle, the driver suspected that somethingwas wrong and reported the same to thetanods who pursued them. Domasian wasable to escape leaving Enrico behind. Laterthat same day, the Agras received theransom note.

Tan (the mastermind): the sending of theransom note was an impossible crime whichis not punishable. His reason is that Article 4(2) wont apply. As the crime alleged is notagainst persons or property but against

None. Art. 4(1) applies to him. Crim liability shall be incurredby any person committing a felony although the wrongful actdone be different from that which he intended.

Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of

kidnapping with serious illegal detention had already beencommitted. The act cannot be considered an impossiblecrime because there was no inherent improbability ofits accomplishment or the employment of inadequateor ineffective means. The delivery of the ransom noteafter the rescue of the victim did not extinguish the offense,which had already been consummated when Domasiandeprived Enrico of his liberty. The sending of the ransomnote would have had the effect only of increasing the penaltyto death under the last paragraph of Article 267 althoughthis too would not have been possible under the new


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liberty, he argues that it is not covered bythe said provision.

W/N there was an impossible crime.

Constitution.

6. INTOD V. CA LAND DISPUTE. HOUSE PEPPERED W/BULLETS.Sulpicio Intod and 4 others went toBernardina Palampangans house as theaccused wanted her killed because of a landdispute.Upon arriving thereat, the accused fired atPalampangans bedroom, but it turned outthat she was in another City and no one wasin the room when the accused fired theshots.RTC & CA: guilty of attempted murder.

W/N accused may only be held liable for animpossible crime.YES.

The factual situation in the case at bar present a physicalimpossibility which rendered the intended crime impossibleof accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of theRevised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act animpossible crime.

To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense wasAttempted Murder because the absence of Palangpanganwas a supervening cause independent of the actor's will, willrender useless the provision in Article 4, which makes aperson criminally liable for an act "which would be an offenseagainst persons or property, were it not for the inherent

impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case allcircumstances which prevented the consummation of theoffense will be treated as an accident independent of theactor's will which is an element of attempted and frustratedfelonies.

*Nota Bene: sabi ni sir, Intod couldve been liable at least for Alarms &Scandals punishable art115, RPC

4. ART. 6. STAGES OF EXECUTION7. VALENZUELA v.PPL

THEFT.TIDE. SHOEMART.Petitioner (accused) left the parking area

and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab anddirected it towards the parking space whereCalderon was waiting. Calderon loaded thestolen cartons ofTide Ultramatic inside thetaxi, then boarded the vehicle. All these actswere eyed by secguard, who proceeded tostop the taxi as it was leaving the openparking area. When secguard asked for areceipt of the merchandise, petitioner andCalderon reacted by fleeing on foot, butLago fired a warning shot to alert his fellowsecurity guards of the incident. Petitioner

and Calderon were apprehended at the

No crime of FRUSTRATED THEFT. CONSUMMATED theft only.Article 308 provides for a general definition of theft, and three alternativeand highly idiosyncratic means by which theft may be committed. In the

present discussion, we need to concern ourselves only with the generaldefinition since it was under it that the prosecution of the accused wasundertaken and sustained. On the face of the definition, there is only oneoperative act of execution by the actor involved in theft the taking ofpersonal property of another. It is also clear from the provision that in orderthat such taking may be qualified as theft, there must further be present thedescriptive circumstances that the taking was with intent to gain; withoutforce upon things or violence against or intimidation of persons; and it waswithout the consent of the owner of the property.

It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely dispose of theproperty stolen delves into the concept of taking itself, in that there couldbe no true taking until the actor obtains such degree of control over thestolen item. But even if this were correct, the effect would be to downgradethe crime to its attempted, and not frustrated stage, for it would mean that


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scene, and the stolen merchandiserecovered.Convicted of CONSUMMATED THEFT in RTC& CA.

Petitioner: he should only be convicted offrustrated theft since at the time he wasapprehended, he was never placed in aposition to freely dispose of the articlesstolen.

not all the acts of execution have not been completed, the taking nothaving been accomplished. Perhaps this point could serve as fertile groundfor future discussion, but our concern now is whether there is indeed acrime of frustrated theft, and such consideration proves ultimatelyimmaterial to that question. Moreover, such issue will not apply to the factsof this particular case. We are satisfied beyond reasonable doubt thatthe taking by the petitioner was completed in this case. With intentto gain, he acquired physical possession of the stolen cases ofdetergent for a considerable period of time that he was able todrop these off at a spot in the parking lot, and long enough to loadthese onto a taxicab.

Indeed, we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, isdeemed complete from the moment the offender gains possession of thething, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.

there can only be attempted and consummated theft.

8. VELASCO V.PPL

Accused Navy man. Victim CLEANINGOWNER TYPE JEEP.

Accused Rodolfo Velasco dashed out of thetricycle, approached the complainant andfired at him several times. The accusedmissed with his first shot but the second onehit the complainant at the upper arm,causing him to stumble on the ground. Thecomplainant stood up and ran, while theaccused continued firing at him but missed.

Pet argues he should only be convicted ofattempted homicide

Attempted murder.Having commenced the criminal act by overt acts but failingto perform all acts of execution as to produce the felony by

reason of some cause other than his own desistance,petitioner committed an attempted felony. Petitioner alreadycommenced his attack with a manifest intent to kill byshooting private complainant seven times, but failed toperform all the acts of execution by reason of causesindependent of his will, that is, poor aim and the swiftness ofthe latter. Private complainant sustained a wound on the leftarm that is not sufficient to cause his death. The settled ruleis that where the wound inflicted on the victim is notsufficient to cause his death, the crime is only attemptedmurder, since the accused did not perform all the acts ofexecution that would have brought about death.

9. BALEROS V.PPL Squeezed sex organ. UST med-student.cloth soaked in (chloroform) chemicalwith dizzying effects. Yaya. AccusedCHITO.

RTC & CA: guilty of attempted rape

W/N the act of the petitioner, i.e., thepressing of a chemical-soaked cloth while ontop of Malou, constitutes an overt act ofrape.

HELD: NO. it would be too strained to

Court is not saying that petitioner is innocent, under thepremises, of any wrongdoing whatsoever. The informationfiled against petitioner contained an allegation that heforcefully covered the face of Malou with a piece of clothsoaked in chemical. And during the trial, Malou testifiedabout the pressing against her face of the chemical-soakedcloth and having struggled after petitioner held her tightlyand pinned her down. Verily, while the series of actscommitted by the petitioner do not determineattempted rape, they constitute unjust vexationpunishable as light coercion under the second paragraph ofArticle 287 of the Revised Penal Code.


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construe petitioner's act of pressing achemical-soaked cloth in the mouth of Malouwhich would induce her to sleep as an overtact that will logically and necessarily ripeninto rape. As it were, petitioner did not

commence at all the performance ofany act indicative of an intent orattempt to rape Malou. It cannot beoveremphasized that petitioner wasfully clothed and that there was noattempt on his part to undress Malou,let alone touch her private part. Forwhat reason petitioner wanted thecomplainant unconscious, if that was reallyhis immediate intention, is anybodysguess.

The information against petitioner contains sufficient detailsto enable him to make his defense. There is no need toallege malice, restraint or compulsion in an information forunjust vexation. As it were, unjust vexation exists evenwithout the element of restraint or compulsion for the reason

that this term is broad enough to include any human conductwhich, although not productive of some physical or materialharm, would unjustly annoy or irritate an innocent person.The paramount question is whether the offenders act causesannoyance, irritation, torment, distress or disturbance to themind of the person to whom it is directed. That Malou, afterthe incident in question, cried while relating to herclassmates what she perceived to be a sexual attack and thefact that she filed a case for attempted rape proved beyondcavil that she was disturbed, if not distressed by the acts ofpetitioner.

10. PPL V.ALMAZAN

CHESS. Henry Almazan unexpectedlyarrived and brandished a .38 caliber revolverin front of the group. Almazan's fightingcocks had just been stolen and hesuspected Angel, one of the spectators, tobe the culprit. Thus he said, "manos-manosna lang tayo,"2 aimed his gun at Angel andpulled the trigger. It did not fire. He triedagain, but again it failed.

Henry shot Noli at the left side of hisstomach sending him immediately to the

ground. Henry then turned on Noel and shothim on the left thigh. Noli died. Noelsurvived.

RTC: guilty of murder & frustrated murder.

accused-appellant should be held liable for attemptedmurder, not frustrated murder. For the charge offrustrated murder to flourish, the victim should sustain afatal wound that could have caused his death were it notfor timely medical assistance. This is not the case before us.The court a quo anchored its ruling on the statement of Dr.Ticman on cross-examination that the wound of Noel couldcatch infection or lead to his death if not timely and properlytreated. However, in his direct testimony, Dr. Ticmandeclared that the wound was a mere minor injury for whichNoel, after undergoing treatment, was immediately advisedto go home. He even referred to the wound as a slight

physical injury that would heal within a week and for whichthe victim was in no danger of dying.

According to jurisprudence, if the victim was woundedwith an injury that was not fatal, and could not causehis death, the crime would only be attempted.

11. PPL V.LISTERIO

SUM OF MONEY. Brothers Jeonito &Marlon Araque. Accused blocked the 2victims path and attacked them with leadpipes and bladed weapons. Jeonito died.-guilty MurderMarlon: -guilty of attempted homicide

By sub

jective phase is meant [t]hat portion of the acts constituting thecrime included between the act which begins the commission of the crimeand the last act performed by the offender which, with the prior acts, shouldresult in the consummated crime. From that time forward, the phase isobjective. It may also be said to be that period occupied by the acts of theoffender over which he has control that period between the point where hebegins and the point where he voluntarily desists. Ifbetween these two

points the offender is stopped by reason of any cause outside of his own


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PPL: Listerio should be held guilty ofFRUSTRATED HOMICIDE.

HELD: for people. it is not the gravity ofthe wounds inflicted which determineswhether a felony is attempted orfrustrated but whether or not thesubjective phase in the commission ofan offense has been passed.

voluntary desistance, the subjective phase has not been passed and it is anattempt. If he is not so stopped but continues until he performs the last act,it is frustrated.

in case of an attempt the offender never passes the subjective phase ofthe offense. He is interrupted and compelled to desist by the intervention ofoutside causes before the subjective phase is passed.On the other hand, in case of frustrated crimes, the subjective phase iscompletely passed. Subjectively the crime is complete. Nothing interruptedthe offender while he was passing through the subjective phase. The crime,however, is not consummated by reason of the intervention of causesindependent of the will of the offender. He did all that was necessary tocommit the crime. If the crime did not result as a consequence it was dueto something beyond his control.

It also can not be denied that the crime is a frustratedfelony not an attempted offense considering thatafter being stabbed and clubbed twice in the head asa result of which he lost consciousness and fell,Marlons attackers apparently thought he was already

dead and fled.12. PPL V.CAMPUHAN

MILO. Mom saw Primo Campuhan insideher children's room kneeling before Crysthelwhose pajamas or "jogging pants" and pantywere already removed, while his short pantswere down to his knees.

RTC: guilty of STATUTORY RAPE

W/N accused is guilty of attempted orconsummated rape.

HELD: Only ATTEMPTED RAPE. the meretouching of the external genitalia by thepenis capable of consummating the sexualact is sufficient to constitute carnalknowledge. But the act of touching should beunderstood here as inherently part of theentry of the penis into the labias of thefemale organ and not mere touching aloneof the mons pubis or the pudendum.

Jurisprudence dictates that the labia majora must be enteredfor rape to be consummated, and not merely for the penis tostroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing ofthe surface of the female organ or touching the monspubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constituteconsummated rape. Absent any showing of theslightest penetration of the female organ, i.e.,touching of either labia of the pudendum by thepenis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, itcan only be attempted rape, if not acts oflasciviousness.

Crysthel's testimony that Primos penis did not penetrateher organ should dissipate the mist of confusion thatenshrouds the question of whether rape in this case wasconsummated. It has foreclosed the possibility of Primo'spenis penetrating her vagina, however slight. Corazon evennarrated that Primo had to hold his penis with his right hand,thus showing that he had yet to attain an erection to be ableto penetrate his victim.

13. PPL V. ORITA NO FRUSTRATED RAPE. Balisong stillpoked to her neck, they entered

Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment theoffender has carnal knowledge of his victim he


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complainant's room. Orita laid down on hisback and commanded her to mount him. Inthis position, only a small part again ofhis penis was inserted into her vagina.At this stage, appellant had both his hands

flat on the floor. Complainant thought ofescaping, and was able to do so.

RTC: guilty of FRUSTRATED RAPE.

actually attains his purpose and, from that momentalso all the essential elements of the offense havebeen accomplished . Nothing more is left to be done by theoffender, because he has performed the last act necessaryto produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. In a

long line of cases we have set the uniform rule that for theconsummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential.Any penetration of the female organ by the male organ issufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ,without rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina issufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape isattempted if there is no penetration of the female organbecause not all acts of execution was performed. Theoffender merely commenced the commission of a felonydirectly by overt acts. Taking into account the nature,elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape andjurisprudence on the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the

frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed.14.PPL V. DELACRUZ

KIDNAPPING OF WHIAZEL. Accused:Whiazel was not led out of the school;in fact they never got out of the schoolcompound.

RTC: guilty- crime of kidnapping and seriousillegal detention of a minor.

W/N accused is guilty of kidnapping in theconsummated stage.

In a prosecution for kidnapping, the intent of the accused to deprive thevictim of the latter's liberty, in any manner, needs to be established byindubitable proof.

To our mind, the felony committed is kidnapping and seriousillegal detention of a minor in the attempted stage only. The attempted phase of a felony is defined as when theoffender commences the commission of a felony, directly byovert acts, and does not perform all the acts of executionwhich should produce the felony by reason of some cause oraccident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

In the case at bar, accused-appellant already commencedher criminal scheme by taking hold of Whiazel by the handand leading her out of the school premises. As mentionedearlier, these do not sufficiently establish that kidnappinghad been consummated.

5. ART. 8. CONSPIRACY15. PPL V.COMADRE

Drinking session@ terrace. GRENADEON ROOF.While his companions (George & Danilo)looked on, Antonio suddenly lobbed agrenade which fell on the roof of the terrace.

RTC: 3 accused guilty of complex crime of

Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, theelements of conspiracy must be proven beyondreasonable doubt. Settled is the rule that to establishconspiracy, evidence of actual cooperation rather thanmere cognizance or approval of an illegal act isrequired.


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Murder w/ Multiple Attempted Murder.-the mere presence of George & Daniloprovided the encouragement and a sense of

security to Antonio Comadre provingCONSPIRACY.

w/n mere presence in the scene of the crimeproves conspiracy. NO CONSPIRACY HERE.

The evidence shows that George Comadre and Danilo Lozanodid not have any participation in the commission of the crimeand must therefore be set free. Their mere presence atthe scene of the crime as well as their closerelationship with Antonio are insufficient to establish

conspiracy considering that they performed nopositive act in furtherance of the crime.Neither was it proven that their act of running away withAntonio was an act of giving moral assistance to his criminalact. The ratiocination of the trial court that "their presenceprovided encouragement and sense of security to Antonio,"is devoid of any factual basis. Such finding is not supportedby the evidence on record and cannot therefore be a validbasis of a finding of conspiracy.

Time and again we have been guided by the principle that it would be betterto set free ten men who might be probably guilty of the crime charged thanto convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit. There being noconspiracy, only Antonio Comadre must answer for the crime.

16. LI V. PPL Indecorous bath in public. Li andSangalang Arugay

RTC: Sangalang stabbed Arugay, not Li, butboth were held guilty of HOMICIDE groundedon CONSPIRACY.

HELD: The RTCs conclusion that there wasa conspiracy was drawn from thesecircumstances, namely: that Li andSangalang were in the same house at thesame time; and that they both armed

themselves before going out to meetArugay. The fact that they were in the samehouse at the same time is not in itselfsufficient to establish conspiracy.Conspiracy transcends companionship,and mere presence at the scene of thecrime does not in itself amount toconspiracy.

The other circumstance that Li and Sangalang had emergedfrom Lis house, both armed, to face Arugay has to beweighed against other facts also relied upon by the RTC. Asthe RTC held, Sangalang stabbed Arugay only afterpetitioner had become unconscious. Before that point, evenas Li struck Arugay with a baseball bat, it was not proventhat Li had asked for, or received, any assistance fromSangalang. Based on these circumstances, the Court is hardput to conclude that Sangalang and Li had acted in concertto commit the offense. In fact, the stabbing of Arugaycould very well be construed as a spur-of-the-momentreaction by Sangalang upon seeing that his friend Li

was struck on the head by Arugay. From such aspontaneous reaction, a finding of conspiracy cannot arise.

What transpired during the dawn hours of 19 April 1993 wasan artless, spontaneous street fight devoid of any methodicalplan for consummation. It arose not because of any long-standing grudge or an appreciable vindication of honor, butbecause the actors were too quick to offense and imperviousto reason. absent any clear showing of conspiracy, as in thiscase, Kingstone Li cannot answer for the crime of EduardoSangalang.

17. GARCIA V. CA Witness saw petitioner, Wilfredo and But we agree with appellant that here the information


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Leopoldo, ganging up on Paulino Rodolfo.While Leopoldo held the victim, petitionerhit him with an empty bottle. Wilfredothen stabbed the victim once with a stainlesssteel fan knife (balisong). Rodolfo died.

RTC: 3 accused guilty of HOMICIDE. CAaffirmed.

Pet: CA erred in affirming his conviction forconspiracy when it was NEVER alleged in theinformation nor proven during trial.

does not satisfy the requirement that the conspiracymust be conveyed in "appropriate language." Thewords "conspired," "confederated," or the phrase "acting inconcert" or "in conspiracy," or their synonyms or derivativesdo not appear in the indictment. The language used by the

prosecution in charging the three accused contains noreference to conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, notmerely inferred, in the information. Absence of aparticular statement in the accusatory portion of thecharge sheet concerning any definitive actconstituting conspiracy in Criminal Case No. 2307-Grenders the indictment insufficient to hold oneaccused liable for the individual acts of his co-accused. In our view, petitioner Fidelino Garcia cannot beconvicted as a conspirator in the killing of Paulino Rodolfo,for the simple reason that the information against theaccused contained no clear and definite allegation of

conspiracy.

It follows that petitioner can only be held responsible for anact as could be proved to have been committed by himpersonally. Stated otherwise, his criminal accountability,if any, should be determined on an individual ratherthan on a collective basis. Responsibility for acts done byhis co-accused could not be heaped on the shoulders ofappellant unless it be shown that he participated directly andpersonally in the commission of those acts.

18. PPL V.TABUSO

Tabuso allegedly acted as a LOOKOUT.Nandyan na si Dagul

Witness Datingginoo heard Tabuso utternandiyan na si Dagul deceased. Heheard two (2) gunshots coming from thedirection of the said alley. He went back tothe alley and met one Banong who uttered,"Utol, wala iyon, binanatan lang si Dagul".He then went to the place where the incidenthappened, near his house, and he saw Dagullying prostrate on the ground, stiffening, andlater died.

Another witness saw Arnold Mendoza shoot

Conspiracy certainly transcends companionship. Settled isthe rule that to establish conspiracy, evidence of actual

cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval of anillegal act is required.

The Court is not convinced that Tabuso acted as a lookoutwhen he uttered "Nandiyan na si Dagul". Mere utteranceof Tabuso of "nandiyan na si Dagul" did not evincecommonality in criminal intent. There is a scant scintillaof proof of Tabuso's alleged role as a lookout. It was neverproven by the People. Obviously, that Tabuso acted as alookout is just a conclusion arrived at by Renato Datingginoo.It is barren of any factual or legal basis.


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Accused: there was no prior agreement tokill, and, that there was absolutely noshowing that appellants cooperated in theshooting of the victim despite their proximity

at the time to Edilberto.

priest. They surrounded the house of Domingo Gomez tostop Robles and the other occupants from leaving so that thewounded Robles may die of hemorrhage. Undoubtedly, thesewere overt acts to ensure success of the commissionof the crimes and in furtherance of the aims of the

conspiracy. The appellants acted in concert in themurder of Fr. Favali and in the attempted murder ofRufino Robles. While accused-appellants may nothave delivered the fatal shots themselves, theircollective action showed a common intent to committhe criminal acts.

20. PPL V. PUGAY 25 y/o retardate. Town fiesta. FerrisWheel. Human torch.Accused Pugay and Samson with severalcompanions appeared to be drunk, startedmaking fun of Miranda by making him dance.Not content with what they were doing with

the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenlytook a can of gasoline from under the engineof the ferris wheel and poured its contentson the body of the former, while accusedSamson set Miranda on fire making a humantorch out of him.

RTC: Pugay and Samson guilty of MURDER.

NO CONSPIRACY.

There is nothing in the records showing that there wasprevious conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose andintention between the two accused-appellants immediatelybefore the commission of the crime. There was no animosity

between the deceased and the accused Pugay or Samson.Their meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. Itis also clear that the accused Pugay and his groupmerely wanted to make fun of the deceased. Hence,the respective criminal responsibility of Pugay and Samsonarising from different acts directed against the deceased isindividual and not collective, and each of them is liable onlyfor the act committed by him.

7. ART. 11. SELF-DEFENSE/DEFENSE OF RIGHTS21. SOPLENTE V.PPL

FIESTA. SINGING CONTEST.Leyson & Notarte against cousins Rogelio &

Nicanor Soplentesurrounded by the former

and companions,some were armed.Rogelio stabbed Leyson & Notartedied.

RTC: Nicanor acquitted, petitioner guilty ofhomicide for Notartes death. CA affirmed.

W/N Soplente is justified in stabbing thedeceased Notarte.

YES. In order for self-defense to prosper, the followingrequisites must be present: (1) unlawful aggression; (2)reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or

repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part ofthe person defending himself.

(1)There was indeed unlawful aggression on the part ofNotarte. Rogelio was kicked by Notarte immediately after hestabbed Leyson.the Soplente cousins were surrounded by Leyson and hiscompanions, some of whom were armed Animosity betweenthese two sets had been fostered just a few hours earlier.Leyson had drawn first and fired first. At this juncture,Rogelio had every reason to believe that it was not onlyLeyson who meant him harm, but that Leysons companions


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were of the same mindset. The fact that Leysons aggressionhad already been repelled did not eliminate the threat toRogelios well-being in the hands of Leysons companions. The kicks employed by Notarte did nothing but remindRogelio that the threats to his life or limb had not ceased,

even if those from Leysons had.

(2) The knife Rogelio habitually carried was the only weaponhe had in his person.[40] It was but logical that the knifewould be the only thing he could use against his attackerssince the latter were collectively armed with canes and ahandgun.

(3) there was no evidence to show that Rogelio had provokedNotarte into a fight.

22. PPL V.GENOSA

Parricide. Battered-Wife Syndrome.Marivic,then 8months pregnant and the

battered-wife of Ben, killed the latter bysmahing his head with a lead pipe and latershot him while asleep.

RTC: self-defense not present. CONVICTED.

W/N Marivic acted in self-defense and indefense of her fetus.

Nota Bene: SC appreciated 2 mitigatingcircumstances in favor of Marivic:1. a resulting dimunition of her freedom of

action, intelligence or intent; and2. passion and obfuscation

NO. Unlawful aggression is the most essential element ofself-defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected

attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life orsafety of a person. In the present case, however, accordingto the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficienttime interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben andher fatal attack upon him. She had already been able towithdraw from his violent behavior and escape to theirchildren's bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceasedhis attack and went to bed. The reality or even theimminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. Hewas no longer in a position that presented an actual threaton her life or safety.

We reiterate the principle that aggression, if notcontinuous, does not warrant self-defense. In theabsence of such aggression, there can be no self-defense -- complete or incomplete -- on the part of thevictim. Thus, Marivic's killing of Ben was not completelyjustified (but mitigated) under the circumstances.

(to prove self-defense arising from BWS: First, each of the phases of thecycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least twobattering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner.Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of thebatterer must have produced in the battered person's mind an actual fear ofan imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed

to use force in order to save her life. Third, at the time of the killing, the


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batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate and actual-- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetratedby the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstancescould satisfy the requisites of self-defense. Under the existing facts of thepresent case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.)

23. PPL V.

TANGAN

FIRECRACKERS. OVERTAKING. UTURN.

ROXAS BLVD.Generoso moving ahead of Tangan.Firecrackers were thrown in Generoso's way,causing him to swerve to the right and cutTangan's path. Tangan blew his horn severaltimes. Generoso, slowed down to let Tanganpass. Tangan accelerated and overtookGeneroso, but when he got in front, Tanganreduced speed. Generoso tried 4 or 5 timesto overtake on the right lane but Tangankept blocking his lane. Tangan slowed downto make a U-tum. Generoso passed him,

pulled over and got out of the car with hisuncle. Tangan also stopped his car and gotout. An exchange of insulting words andinvectives ensued resulting to the shootingof Generoso by Tangan.RTC: Tangan guilty of homicide w/privilegedmit of INCOMPLETE self-defense+ordinarymit of sufficient provocation. CA affirmed.

W/N Tangan acted in incomplete self-defense.

NO. The element of unlawful aggression in self-defense must

not come from the person defending himself but from thevictim. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is notsufficient. Likewise, the exchange of insulting words andinvectives between Tangan and Generoso Miranda, nomatter how objectionable, could not be considered asunlawful aggression, except when coupled withphysical assault. There being no lawful aggression on thepart of either antagonists, the claim of incomplete self-defense falls. Tangan undoubtedly had possession of thegun, but the Mirandas tried to wrestle the gun from him. Itmay be said that the former had no intention of killing thevictim but simply to retain possession of his gun. However,

the fact that the victim subsequently died as a result of thegunshot wound, though the shooter may not have theintention to kill, does not absolve him from culpability.Having caused the fatal wound, Tangan is responsible for allthe consequences of his felonious act.

The third requisite oflack of sufficient provocation on thepart of the person defending himself is not supported byevidence. By repeatedly blocking the path of the Mirandasfor almost five times, Tangan was in effect the one whoprovoked the former. The repeated blowing of horns,assuming it was done by Generoso, may be irritating to an

impatient driver but it certainly could not be considered ascreating so powerful an inducement as to incite provocationfor the other party to act violently.

Tangan's acts were done in the spirit of revenge andlawlessness, for which no mitigating circumstance of passionor obfuscation can arise.

24. PPL V.NARVAEZ

Fencing. Celebes Plantation. Fleischer& Company. Defense of PropertyRights.Narvaez was taking his rest, but when heheard that the walls of his house were being

YES, but INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE ONLY. (1) Unlawfulaggression: the deceased had no right to destroy or causedamage to appellant's house, nor to close his accessibility tothe highway while he was pleading with them to stop andtalk things over with him. The assault on appellant's


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chiselled, he arose and there he saw thefencing going on. If the fencing would go on,appellant would be prevented from gettinginto his house and the bodega of his ricemill.Upon asking to talk things over, deceased

Fleischer, however, answered: 'No, gademit,proceed, go ahead.' Appellant apparentlylost his equilibrium and he got his gun andshot Fleischer, hitting him. As Fleischer felldown, Rubia ran towards the jeep, andknowing there is a gun on the jeep, appellantfired at Rubia, likewise hitting him.CFI: guilty of Murder.

W/N Narvaezs act of killing the 2 deceasedis justified for having acted in defense of hisrights.

property, therefore, amounts to unlawful aggressionas contemplated by law.

(2) Reasonable necessity: When the appellant fired hisshotgun from his window, killing his two victims, his

resistance was disproportionate to the attack.

(3) Lack of sufficient provocation: there was no provocationat all on his part, since he was asleep at first and wasonly awakened by the noise produced by the victims andtheir laborers. His plea for the deceased and their men tostop and talk things over with him was no provocation at all.

Narvaez guilty of homicide on 2 counts and mitigated bythe privileged extenuating circumstance of incomplete self-defense.

25. PPL V.FERNANDEZ

Ako ang Sasagupa film shooting.Fernandez lead mans role. RosannaOrtiz leading lady.Deceased Pangilinan, with bodyguard Siguaand driver Lopez, arrived at the locationshoot to visit Rosanna who have arrived halfa day late for the shoot. Fernandez andLabra were drinking and invited thedeceased to join them. Later, policemencame to look for a group of men carryingfirearms. Fernandez pointed to Pangilinan,who was invited to the police station. Upon

being cleared, they left the station, Rosannaboarded Pangilinans car w/c was followed bya jeep boarded by Fernandez and otheraccused. Traffic jam gave Fernandez toapproach deceaseds car, thereafter, anexchange of shots ensued, killing Pangilinanand fatally wounding the driver Lopez, andFernandez.CCC: accused guilty of murder and frustratedmurder (Lopez).

Accused: justified for having acted in self-

INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE.

Fernandez & Antido (driver of jeep) gave sufficientprovocation: both of them brandished their respectivefirearms while Fernandez said, "Walang kikilos sa inyo, angkikilos tatamaan and even berated Rosanna for takingFrench leave and not going back to their work. Such acts ofFernandez and Antido constituted sufficient provocation forPangilinan and his companions to react, and, accordingly,We give credence to the testimony of Fernandez thatPangilinan did say, "Talagang asar and tarantadong ito.Sigue, Totoy, tirahin mo na." And ready as he was, Sigua

fired at Fernandez from his .32 caliber gun. Fernandez washit and must have instantly tried to retaliate, but there is noclear evidence in what direction he succeeded in firing, notraces of the bullets of the nature of those that could havecome from the kind of firearm he used having beenpresented at the trial. For sure, it was not Fernandez who hitPangilinan. It was Antido who must have fired through theglass rear window of the car in an obvious effort to avoidPangilinan from joining Sigua's assault upon Fernandez.

Antido is guilty of homicide and frustrated homicide. But Weappreciate in his favor the mitigating circumstance of having


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defense. The thrust of the defense ofFernandez is that he was not the offenderbut, on the contrary, the victim of aggressionon the part of Pangilinan as instigator andSigua as the actual aggressor with his.32

caliber colt revolver.

acted in incomplete defense of Fernandez. He only reactedto the assault upon Fernandez by Sigua, sensing evidentlythat Pangilinan and Lopez might join Sigua. Of course therewas sufficient provocation on the part of Fernandez andAntido. But there was unlawful aggression on the part of

Sigua and by and large, taking all circumstances intoaccount, We cannot hold that the means used by Antido torepel the aggression were entirely unwarranted.Decision modified, guilty, but mitigated by mit circumstance of incompleteself-defense.

26. PPL V.BOHOLST-CABALLERO

PARRICIDE. CAROLLING. Where haveyou gone prostituting?Accused, separated from husband, went outcarolling with friends. On her way home, shemet her husband Francisco, who uponseeing her, held her by the collar of herdress and asked her: "Where have you beenprostituting? You are a son of a bitch."Francisco then held her by the hair, slappedher face until her nose bled, and pushed hertowards the ground, to keep herself fromfalling she held on to his waist and as shedid so her right hand grasped the knifetucked inside the belt line on the left side ofhis body; her husband then knelt over her,held her neck, and choked her saying. "Nowis the time I can do whatever I want. I will killyou"; because she had "no other recourse"as she was being choked she pulled out theknife of her husband and thrust it at himhitting the left side of his body near the "beltline" just above his left thigh.

W/N accused stabbed her husband in thelegitimate defense of her peson.

YES. (1) Unlawful aggression: Meeting his wife unexpectedlyat past midnight on the road, Francisco reacted angrily, andsuspecting that she was out for some bad purpose he heldher by the collar of her dress and was followed by a slappingon the face until Cunigunda's nose bled, pulling of her hair,pushing her down to the ground, and strangling her all ofwhich constituted the unlawful aggression against whichappellant had to defend herself.

(2) Reasonable necessity: Here we have a woman who beingstrangled and choked by a furious aggressor and renderedalmost unconscious by the strong pressure on her throat hadno other recourse but to get hold of any weapon within herreach to save herself from impending death. Earlyjurisprudence of this Court has followed the principle that thereasonable necessity of the means employed in self-defensedoes not depend upon the harm done but rests upon theimminent danger of such injury.

(3) Lack of sufficient provocation: appellant herein did notgive sufficient provocation to warrant the aggression orattack on her person by her husband, Francisco. While it wasunderstandable for Francisco to be angry at his wife forfinding her on the road in the middle of the night, however,he was not justified in inflicting bodily punishment with anintent to kill by choking his wife's throat. All that appellantdid was to provoke an imaginary commission of a wrong inthe mind of her husband, which is not a sufficientprovocation under the law of self-defense.

27. PPL V. CHUAHIONG

SELF-DEFENSE IN LIBEL.Accuseds uncle published a libellous article,

accused is a shrewd businessman, his

CA: Chua Hiong acted in self-defense.(1) Unlawful aggression: when uncle caused the publication

of the defamatory letter against accused. UA still existing at


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naturalization should not be granted.Chua Hiong caused the publication ofanother letter, his uncle is more shrewd thanhim, and his naturalization should not alsobe granted. Uncle filed libel against accused,

chua hiong claimed to have acted in self-defense.

RTC: convicted. CA differed.*landmark case w/c has yet to be adopted bythe SC. CA decision pa lang to :D

the time Chua Hiong wrote another letter reputing theallegation of his uncle. In libel, once the aspersion iscast, it stings, and the person defamed may avail ofall remedies to shake the moth.

(2) Reasonable necessity: sirs words: reasonably necessarykasi ang sinagot lang niya yung mga paratang ng tiyo niyalaban sa kanya, but CA said, had Chua Hiong consideredother matters in his letter supposedly in reply to the letter ofhis uncle, sabihin nating hindi lang siya shrewdbusinessman, kundi rapist, manyak, hindi na yun, iba nay un,hindi na reasonably necessary under the circumstances.

7.4. ART. 11 DEFENSE OF STRANGERS.28. PPL V.TORING

Benefit Dance. Kwaknit Gang v.Samuels Group. Running feud.Samuel stepped out of the dancing area toanswer the call of nature.At that moment,

barangay tanod Felix Berdin saw Luis Toring,Carmelo Berdin and Diosdado Berdonproceed to a dark area while whispering toeach other. Diosdado Berdon handed a knifeto Luis Toring, who then approached Samuelfrom behind, held Samuel's left hand with hisleft hand, and with his right hand, stabbedwith the knife the right side of Samuel'sabdomen.CCC: Toring guilty of MURDER by directparticipation.

Toring claiming to have acted in defense ofstranger/relative (Joel Escobia).

No defense of stranger/relative was appreciated.

The presence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victimand the lack of proof of provocation on the part of Toring

notwithstanding, full credence cannot be given, to Toring'sclaim of defense of a relative. Toring himself admitted incourt as well as in his sworn statement that in 1979, he wasshot with a .22 caliber revolver by Edgar Augusto, Samuel'sbrother. It cannot be said, therefore, that in attackingSamuel, Toring was impelled by pure compassion orbeneficence or the lawful desire to avenge the immediatewrong inflicted on his cousin. Rather, he was motivated byrevenge, resentment or evil motive because of a"running feud" between the Augusto and the Toring brothers.As the defense itself claims, after the incident subject of theinstant case occurred, Toring's brother, Arsenio, was shot on

the leg by Edgar Augusto. Indeed, vendetta appears to havedriven both camps to commit unlawful acts against eachother. Hence, under the circumstances, to justify Toring's actof assaulting Samuel Augusto would give free rein tolawlessness.(Sirs note: the Court erred in mixing the requisites for a defense of arelative and a defense of a stranger. In defense of a relative, the thirdrequisite states that the person making defense had no part therein, NOTthat he not be induced by revenge,resentment or ill-motive)

7.5 ART. 11 STATE OF NECESSITY29. TY V. PPL 7 BOUNCED CHECKS. VIOLATION OF BP

22.Tys mother confined at Mla Doctors. To

We do not agree. The law prescribes the presence of threerequisites to exempt the actor from liability under thisparagraph: (1) that the evil sought to be avoided actually


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assure payment of the obligation, she drew 7postdated checks payable to the hospital.The seven (7) checks, each covering theamount of P30,000.00, were all deposited ontheir due dates. But they were all dishonored

by the drawee bank and returned unpaid tothe hospital due to insufficiency of funds,with the "Account Closed" advice.

the demand letters were not heeded,complainant filed the seven (7) Informationssubject of the instant case.

RTC: guilty for violation of BP 22.

Ty: suggested that the justifyingcircumstance of state of necessity may find

application in this case.

exists; (2) that the injury feared be greater than the onedone to avoid it; (3) that there be no other practical and lessharmful means of preventing it.

In the instant case, the evil sought to be avoided is

merely expected or anticipated. If the evil sought tobe avoided is merely expected or anticipated or mayhappen in the future, this defense is not applicable. Ty could have taken advantage of an available option toavoid committing a crime. By her own admission, she hadthe choice to give jewelry or other forms of security insteadof postdated checks to secure her obligation.

Moreover, for the defense of state of necessity to beavailing, the greater injury feared should not havebeen brought about by the negligence or imprudence,more so, the willful inaction of the actor. In this case,

the issuance of the bounced checks was brought about byTys own failure to pay her mothers hospital bills.

7.6 ART. 11 FULFILLMENT OF DUTY30. BAXINELA V.PPL

Superstar Disco Pub.Baxinela was already in the pub drinkingwith Regimen and Legarda for more than acouple of hours prior to the shootingincident. After witnessing an altercationbetween Lajo and another customer,Baxinela decided to confront Lajo on why hehad a gun with him. Baxinela approachedLajo from behind and held the latter on the

left shoulder with one hand while holding onto his .45 caliber service firearm with theother. As Lajo was turning around, to seewho was confronting him, Baxinela shot him.Baxinela then got Lajos wallet and fled thescene with Regimen.

RTC: guilty of homicide. CA affirmed.W/N Baxinela can claim the justifyingcircumstance of self-defense andfulfilment of a duty or lawful exercise ofa right or office.

NO. alternative defense of fulfillment of a duty. In orderto avail of this justifying circumstance it must be shown that:1) the accused acted in the performance of a duty orin the lawful exercise of a right or office; and 2) theinjury caused or the offense committed is thenecessary consequence of the due performance ofduty or the lawful exercise of a right or office. Whilethe first condition is present, the second is clearly lacking.Baxinelas duty was to investigate the reason why Lajo had a

gun tucked behind his waist in a public place. This was whatBaxinela was doing when he confronted Lajo at the entrance,but perhaps through anxiety, edginess or the desire to takeno chances, Baxinela exceeded his duty by firing upon Lajowho was not at all resisting. The shooting of Lajo cannotbe considered due performance of a duty if at thattime Lajo posed no serious threat or harm to Baxinelaor to the civilians in the pub.

Bax guilty of Homicide, mitigated by the incomplete defenseof fulfilment of a duty.


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31. POMOY v. PPL Deceased teacher Balboa. PNP memberPomoy. Grappling of gun.Pomoy got Tomas Balboa from theirstockade for tactical interrogation; as he wasalready holding the door knob of their

investigation room and about to open andenter it, all of a sudden he saw TomasBalboa approach him and take hold or grabthe handle of his gun, both were thengrappling for the said gun when it firedTWICE and Balboa was killed.

RTC & CA: Pomoy guilty of HOMICIDE.

Pomoy: defences accident and self-defense.

Balboa was killed by an accidental firing of the gun w/cresulted in the course of scuffling for the gun.

Self-defense is inconsistent with the exemptingcircumstance of accident, in which there is no intent

to kill. On the other hand, self-defense necessarilycontemplates a premeditated intent to kill in order to defendoneself from imminent danger. Apparently, the fatal shots inthe instant case did not occur out of any conscious orpremeditated effort to overpower, maim or kill the victim forthe purpose of self-defense against any aggression; rather,they appeared to be the spontaneous and accidental resultof both parties attempts to possess the firearm.

Since the death of the victim was the result of an accidentalfiring of the service gun of petitioner -- an exemptingcircumstance as defined in Article 12 of the Revised Penal

Code -- a further discussion of whether the assailed acts ofthe latter constituted lawful self-defense is unnecessary.

32. ANGCACO V.PPL

Angcaco member of the Integrated NationalPolice of Taytay, Palawan. Freddie Ganancial deceased.

Angcaco and other members of INP wento toRestituo Bergantes house to serve thelatter a warrant of arrest. The wife repliedthat Bergante have gone to Puerto Princesa.A commotion then took place inside thehouse and, shortly after, petitioner saw a

man coming down the house. They firedwarning shots to stop the man, butpetitioner saw another person with a bolonear Edep. He shouted, "Sarge, this is theman who tried to hack you!," and shot theunidentified man, who later turned out to beBergantes nephew Ganancial.

RTC: guilty of MURDER. CA modified, penaltymitigated by incomplete fulfilment of alawful duty.

Nor can petitioner's claim that the killing was done infulfillment of a lawful duty be sustained, as the Court ofAppeals ruled. For this justifying circumstance to beappreciated, the following must be established: (1) that theoffender acted in the lawful exercise of a right or aduty; and (b) that the injury or offense committed bethe necessary consequence of the due performance ofsuch right or office.

In this case, the mission of petitioner and his colleagues

was to effect the arrest of Restituto Bergante. As Edephimself explained, the standard procedure in making anarrest was, first, to identify themselves as police officers andto show the warrant to the arrestee and to inform him of thecharge against him, and, second, to take the arrestee undercustody. But, it was not shown here that the killing ofGanancial was in furtherance of such duty. No evidence waspresented by the defense to prove that Ganancial attemptedto prevent petitioner and his fellow officers from arrestingRestituto Bergante. There was in fact no clear evidence as tohow Freddie Ganancial was shot. Indeed, as already stated,any attempt by the victim to arrest the wanted person was


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pointless as Restituto Bergante was not in his house. Asregards the second requisite, there can be no questionthat the killing of Freddie Ganancial was not a necessaryconsequence of the arrest to be made on Restituto Bergante.

7.7 ART. 11 OBEDIENCE TO AN ORDER

33. TABUENA V.SANDIGANBAYAN MALVERSATIONPres. Marcos instructed Tabuena, then GenManager of MIAA, to pay directly to thePresidents Office and in cash what the MIAAowes the Phil. National ConstructionCorporatio (PNCC), a PresidentialMemorandum was served to Tabuenareiterating such verbal order. Tabuena w/thehelp of Dabao and Peralta caused therelease of P55M of MIAA funds thru 3withdrawals (25, 25, 5). Upon delivery of thelast withdrawal to Malacanang, a receipt

was issued therefor.

3 criminal cases for malversation were thenfiled against Tabuena for intending todefraud the government, take andmisappropriate the amount of P25M fromMIAA funds by applying for the issuance of amanager's check for said amount in thename of accused Luis A. Tabuenachargeable against MIAA's Savings Accountin the PNB Extension Office at the ManilaInternational Airport in Pasay City,

purportedly as partial payment to thePhilippine National Construction Corporation(PNCC), the mechanics of which saidaccused Tabuena would personally take careof, when both accused well knew that therewas no outstanding obligation of MIAA infavor of PNCC.

SB: guilty of having malversed the totalamount of P55M of MIAA funds.

Petitioners defense: GOOD FAITH in merely

Pets have meritoriously shown that they acted in GF and thatthey had NO INTENTION to convert.

Tabuena had no choice but to make withdrawals as requiredof him by the Marcos Memorandum. He could not be faultedif he had to obey and strictly comply with the presidentialdirective, and to argue otherwise is something easier saidthan done. Marcos was undeniably Tabuena's superior theformer being then the President of the Republic whounquestionably exercised control over government agenciessuch as the MIAA and PNCC. In other words, Marcos had asay in matters involving inter-government agency affairs and

transactions, such as for instance, directing payment ofliability of one entity to another and the manner in which itshould be carried out. And as a recipient of such kind of adirective coming from the highest official of the land no less,good faith should be read on Tabuena's compliance, withouthesitation nor any question, with the MARCOS Memorandum.Tabuena therefore is entitled to the justifyingcircumstance of "Any person who acts in obedience toan order issued by a superior for some lawful

purpose. The subordinate-superior relationship betweenTabuena and Marcos is clear.

What is more significant to consider is that the MARCOSMemorandum is patently legal (for on its face it directspayment of an outstanding liability) and that Tabuena actedunder the honest belief that the P55 million was a due anddemandable debt and that it was just a portion of a biggerliability to PNCC. Thus, even if the order is illegal if it ispatently legal and the subordinate is not aware of itsillegality, the subordinate is not liable, for then therewould only be a mistake of fact committed in goodfaith.

Tabuena and Peralta ACQUITTED.


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complying with the MARCOS Memorandumwhich ordered him to forward immediately tothe Office of the President P55 Million in cashas partial payment of MIAA's obligations toPNCC, and that he (Tabuena) was of the

belief that MIAA indeed had liabilities toPNCC. Peralta for his part shared the samebelief and so he heeded the request ofTabuena, his superior, for him (Peralta) tohelp in the release of P5 Million.

18160109 crim law review case doctrines midterms

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