evidence case doctrines

7/24/2019 Evidence Case Doctrines

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PEOPLE v. ALEMAN A deaf-mute is not incompetent as a witness. All persons who can perceive, andperceiving, can make known their perception to others, ma !e witnesses. Deaf-mutes are competent witnesses where they (1) can understand andappreciate the sanctity of an oath; (2) can comprehend facts they aregoing to testify on; and (3) can communicate their ideas through aqualied interpreter.

"hen a deaf-mute testi#es in court, $the manner in which the e%amination of adeaf-mute should !e conducted is a matter to !e regulated and controlled ! the

trial court in its discretion, and the method adopted will not !e reviewed ! theappellate court in the a!sence of a showing that the complaining part was insome wa in&ured ! reason of the particular method adopted.$

MA'(O) v. *E+') ofNAA''O

s a handwriting e!pert of the "#"$ "%2 l&are' can surely percei&e andmae nown her perception to others. e ha&e no dou*t that she isqualied as a witness. +he cannot *e disqualied as a witness since shepossesses none of the disqualications specied under the ,ules.

)ection , 'ule /01 of the 'ules of Evidence2

)E(. . Opinion of e%pert witness.34he opinion of a witness on amatter re5uiring special knowledge, skill, e%perience or trainingwhich he is shown to possess, ma !e received in evidence.

rue$ the use of the word may in +ection /0$ ,ule 13 of the ,ules on&idence signies that the use of opinion of an e!pert witness ispermissi&e and not mandatory on the part of the courts.urisprudence isalso replete with instances wherein this 4ourt dispensed with thetestimony of e!pert witnesses to pro&e forgeries. 5owe&er$ we ha&e alsorecogni'ed that handwriting e!perts are often o6ered as e!pertwitnesses considering the technical nature of the procedure ine!amining forged documents.More important, analsis of the 5uestionedsignature in the deed of donation e%ecuted ! the late Andres Navarro, )r. incrucial to the resolution of the case.

A6P ')7) v. 'EP87L+( here is no su*stanti&e or procedural rule which requires a witness for aparty to present some form of authori'ation to testify as a witness for theparty presenting him or her. #o law or 7urisprudence would support theconclusion that such omission can *e considered as a failure toprosecute on the part of the party presenting such witness. ll that the

,ules require of a witness is that the witness possesses all thequalications and none of the disqualications pro&ided therein.

he %+8 and the court a quo did not question the9erication:4ertication of the application$ and neither did theyquestion the authority of r. 'cueta to le the su*7ect application on*ehalf of the petitioner.(ase records would reveal that the application wassigned and #led ! Mr. A9cueta in his capacit as the E%ecutive ice Presidentand (hief Operating O:icer of the petitioner, as authori9ed ! petitioner;s 7oardof 4rustees. 4he authorit of Mr. A9cueta to #le the su!&ect application wasesta!lished ! a )ecretar;s (erti#cate attached to the said application. 4heasseveration that the su!&ect case was not prosecuted ! a dul authori9edrepresentative of the petitioner is thus unfounded.

PEOPLE v. O7O.

A mental retardate can !e a witness, depending on his or her a!ilit to relatewhat he or she knows. +f his or her testimon is coherent, the same isadmissi!le.

Modern rules on evidence have downgraded mental incapacit as a ground todis5ualif a witness. Mc(ormick provides that the remed of e%cluding such awitness who ma !e the onl person availa!le who knows the facts, seems ineptand primitive. 4he (ourt follows the modern trend of evidence.


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ALA'E? v. 'AM+'E? 4he reasons given for the rule2/ +dentit of interest !etween hus!and and wife

@ 4here is a conse5uent danger of per&ur if one testi#es for or againstanother

0 Polic of law is to guard the securit and con#dences of private life, evenat the risk of an occasional failure of &ustice, and to prevent domesticdisunion and unhappiness

"here there is want of domestic tran5ulit there is danger of punishingone spouse through the hostile testimon of the other.

E%ceptions in !oth civil and criminal cases"hen relations are so strained there is no more harmon to !e preserved -in this case identit of interests disappear and conse5uent danger ofper&ur is non-e%istent.

(iting Ordoo v. Daquigan-

'ule that in&ur from other spouseB must amount to a phsicalwrong upon the person is too narrow

'ule that an o:ense remotel or indirectl a:ecting domesticharmon is too !road

7etter rule - when an o:ense directl attacks, or directl and vitall

impairs, the con&ugal relation

PEOPLE v. PAN)EN)OC 4he legitimate spouse of an accused (ANNO4 testif against the accusedunder the marital disqualication ruleED(EP42

aB "here there is consent of the spouse !eing testi#ed against, O'!B +t is a civil case ! one against the other, O'cB +t is a criminal case for a crime committed ! the one against the other

who is testifing, O'dB "rocedural e!ception2 "here the accused waives hisher right to

invoke the rule ! failing to make a timel o!&ection.

)( #rst said that the entire testimon of Analie ma have !een e%cluded underthe marital disqualifcation rule. *O"EE', due to the failure of the defenseto timel o!&ect to said testimon, he is deemed to have waived such right.


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*arred *y the sur&i&ing parties rule$ or the dead mans statute$ in the,ules of 4ourt

PEOPLE v. 7OG+N


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likewise inadmissi!le against (ol, speci#call where he implicated the latter as acohort. 8nder )ection @H, 'ule /01 of the 'ules of (ourt, the rights of a part cannot!e pre&udiced ! an act, declaration or omission of another. 'es inter alios acta alterinocere non de3et. 4onsequently$ an e!tra7udicial confession is *inding only onthe confessant$ is not admissi*le against his or her co-accused$ and isconsidered as hearsay against them. n e!ception to the res inter aliosactarule is an admission made *y a conspirator.

+ection 3$ ,ule 13 of the ,ules of 4ourtprovides that the act or declaration ofthe conspirator relating to the conspirac and during its e%istence ma !e given inevidence against the co-conspirator provided that the conspirac is shown ! evidenc

other than ! such act or declaration.

=n order that the admission of a conspirator may *e recei&ed against his orher co-conspirators$ it is necessary thats ngara>s acts on 3ehalf of President 2strada:According to theAngara Fiar, the petitioner told )ecretar Angara2 Mula umpisa pa lang ngkampana, Ed, ikaw na lang pinakikinggan ko. At hanggang sa huli, ikaw pa rin. 4hisstatement of full trust was made ! the petitioner after )ecretar Angara !riefed hima!out the progress of the #rst negotiation. 4rue to this trust, the petitioner had to ask)ecretar Angara if he would alread leave Malacaang after taking their #nal lunch onanuar @1, @11/ at a!out /211 p.m. 4he Angara Fiar 5uotes the petitioner as saingto )ecretar Angara2 ed, kailangan ko na !ang umalisY )ecretar Angara told him togo and he did. Petitioner cannot den that )ecretar Angara headed his team ofnegotiators that met with the team of the respondent Arroo to discuss the peacefuland orderl transfer of power after his relin5uishment of the powers of the presidenc

4he Fiar shows that petitioner was alwas !riefed ! )ecretar Angara on theprogress of their negotiations. )ecretar Angara acted for and in !ehalf of thepetitioner in the crucial das !efore respondent Arroo took her oath as President.(onse5uentl, petitioner is !ound ! the acts and declarations of )ecretar Angara.

PEOPLE v. (A(*8ELA Na!ilgas; e%tra&udicial confession is also inadmissi!le in evidence against theappellants in view of the res inter alios acta rule.

4he res inter alios acta rule provides that the rights of a part cannot !e pre&udiced !an act, declaration, or omission of another. (onse5uentl, an e%tra&udicial confession i!inding onl on the confessant and is not admissi!le against his or her co-accused!ecause it is considered as hearsa against them.

An e%ception to the res inter alios acta rule is an admission made ! a conspiratorunder )ection 01, 'ule /01 of the 'ules of (ourt. 4his provision states that the act or


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declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspirac, and during its e%istence, ma!e given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspirac is shown !evidence other than such act or declaration.

+n order that the admission of a conspirator ma !e received against his or her co-conspirators, it is necessar that2

a. the conspirac !e #rst proved ! evidence other than the admission itselfI

!. the admission relates to the common o!&ectI and

c. it has !een made while the declarant was engaged in carring out the

conspirac.4his e%ception, however, does not appl in the present case since there was no otherpiece of evidence presented, aside from the e%tra&udicial confession, to prove thatNa!ilgas conspired with the appellants in committing the crime charged. (onspiraccannot !e presumed and must !e shown as distinctl and conclusivel as the crimeitself. Na!ilgas, in fact, was ac5uitted ! the trial court due to insu:icienc ofevidence to prove his participation in the crime.

People v. Algarme2

+n resolving the admissi!ilit of and reling on out-of-court identi#cation of suspects,courts have adopted the totalit of circumstances test where the consider thefollowing factors, vi9.2

/. the witnessK opportunit to view the criminal at the time of the crimeI

@. the witnessK degree of attention at that timeI

0. the accurac of an prior description, given ! the witnessI

. the level of certaint demonstrated ! the witness at the identi#cationI

J. the length of time !etween the crime and the identi#cationI and,

. the suggestiveness of the identi#cation procedure.

Lino;s failure to state relevant details surrounding the police line-up is a glaringomission that renders unrelia!le ?ald;s out-of-court identi#cation. No wa e%ists forthe courts to evaluate the factors used in determining the admissi!ilit and relia!ilitof out-of-court identi#cations. 4he a!sence of an independent in-court identi#cation !?ald additionall &usti#es our strict treatment and assessment of Lino;s testimon.

Lino merel stated that ?ald, during a police line-up, identi#ed the appellants as thepersons involved in the ro!!er of ")( and in the killing of 'e%. *e did not statewhen the line-up took placeI how this line-up had !een conductedI who were thepersons in the line-up with the appellants if there were indeed other persons includedin the line-upBI and whether the line-up was con#ned to persons of the same heightand !uilt as the appellants. Lino likewise did not indicate who accompanied ?ald!efore and during the line-up, and whether there had !een the possi!ilit of prior orcontemporaneous improper insinuations on ?ald regarding the appearance of theappellants.

'EP87L+( v. )7 4he Marcoses admitted that the owned the Z0J million funds in the )wiss !anks. +ntheir Answer, the averred that the funds were lawfull ac5uired, hence unwittingladmitting that the owned the same. +melda also failed to den under oath thegenuineness and due e%ecution of actiona!le documents attached to the petition for

forfeiture. Meanwhile, the stipulations in the Agreements undenia!l indicated theirmanifest intent to enter into a compromise with 'epu!lic. (orollaril, their willingnessto agree to an amica!le settlement with the 'epu!lic onl a:irmed their ownership ofthe )wiss deposits for the simple reason that no person would ac5uiesce to anconcession over such huge dollar deposits if he did not in fact own them.

8nder 'ule /@., an admission made in the pleadings cannot !e controverted ! thepart making such admission and !ecomes conclusive on him, and all proofs su!mitte! him contrar thereto or inconsistent therewith should !e ignored, whether ano!&ection is interposed ! the adverse part or not.

Ender ,13.20 and ,13.31$ the indi&idual and separate admissions of eachrespondent *ind all of them. he declarations of a person are admissi*leagainst a party whene&er a pri&ity of estate e!ists *etween the declarant andthe party$ the term pri&ity of estate generally denoting a succession in


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rights. 4onsequently$ an admission of one in pri&ity with a party to the recordis competent. ithout dou*t$ pri&ity e!ists among the respondents arcosesin this case. nd where se&eral co-parties to the record are 7ointly interestedin the su*7ect matter of the contro&ersy$ the admission of one is competentagainst all.

*ence, given the manifest disproportion !etween the Marcoses; lawful income ofZ01,[email protected] and the deposits of Z0J million which the admittedl own, forfeiturewas proper.

O(A v. AMO' 'espondent;s failure to #le a comment despite all the opportunities a:orded him

constituted a waiver of his right to defend himself. +n the natural order of things, aman would resist an unfound claim or imputation against him. +t is generall contrarto human nature to remain silent and sa nothing in the face of false accusations. Assuch, respondents silence ma !e construed as an implied admission andacknowledgement of the veracit of the allegations against him.

O(A v. )AAFE'A Fespite a directive from the (ourt for him to restitute the shortages and account forthe missing O's discovered for the period over which he was accounta!le, he did not!other to #le a comment to dispute the same. 4he natural instinct of man impels himto resist an unfounded claim or imputation and defend himself. =t is against humannature to 7ust remain reticent and say nothing in the face of false accusations+ilence in such cases is almost always construed as implied admission of thetruth thereof.

Att. Apusen;s continued silence is interpreted as an acknowledgment of thetruthfulness of the charges against him. 5is failure to remit collections upondemand *y the 4ourt constitutes prima facie e&idence that he has put suchmissing funds to personal use. Att. Apusen;s failure to compl with the order ofrestitution constitutes gross dishonest.

4E


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'ule /0JB.

+LLAN8EA v. 7ALA


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Appellant cross-e%amined prosecution witness Anna. *er testimon a!out appellant;sconfession to her is not thus hearsa.

)uch confession is in fact corro!orated ! the evidence for the prosecution.

4here !eing no eewitness to the commission of the crime, the following provision of)ection of 'ule /00 of the 'ules of (ourt on circumstantial evidence applies2

)E(. . (ircumstantial evidence, when su:icient. 3 (ircumstantial evidence issu:icient for conviction if2

aB 4here is more than one circumstanceI

!B 4he facts from which the inferences are derived are provenI and

cB 4he com!ination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction !eondreasona!le dou!t.

(onviction !ased on circumstantial evidence can !e sustained, provided thecircumstances proven constitute an un!roken chain which lead to one fair andreasona!le conclusion that points to the accused, to the e%clusion of all others, as theguilt person.

PEOPLE v. )A4O'E 4he )upreme (ourt ac5uitted *erminiano on the !asis that the voluntariness of theconfession cannot !e conclusivel esta!lished due to the personal circumstances of*erminiano. 4he (ourt stated that 'ule /01, )ection 00 of the 'ules of (ourt makesno distinction whether the confession is &udicial or e%tra&udicial. 4he rationale for theadmissi!ilit of a confession is that if it is made freel and voluntaril, a confessionconstitutes evidence of a high order since it is supported ! the strong presumptionthat no sane person or one of normal mind will deli!eratel and knowingl confesshimself to !e the perpetrator of a crime, unless prompted ! truth and conscience.

Accordingl, the !asic test for the validit of a confession is was it voluntaril andfreel made. 4he term voluntar means that the accused speaks of his free will andaccord, without inducement of an kind, and with a full and complete knowledge of thnature and conse5uences of the confession, and when the speaking is so free frominuences a:ecting the will of the accused, at the time the confession was made, thatit renders it admissi!le in evidence against him.

Plainl, the admissi!ilit of a confession in evidence hinges on its voluntariness. 4heproof of voluntariness cannot !e inferred from the testimon of a witness whoallegedl heard the confessant since there is no written proof that such confession wavoluntaril made. Neither can the confessant !e appraised ! the court since,

precisel, it was made outside the &udicial proceeding. 4he pro!lem posed therefore !an oral e%tra&udicial confession is not onl the admissi!ilit of the testimon assertingor certifing that such confession was indeed made, !ut more signi#cantl whether itwas made voluntaril.

On the 5uestion of whether a confession is made voluntaril, the age, character, andcircumstances prevailing at the time it was made must !e considered. Much dependsupon the situation and surroundings of the accused. 4his is the position taken ! thecourts, whatever the theor of e%clusion of incriminating statements ma !e. 4heintelligence of the accused or want of it must also !e taken into account. +t must !eshown that the defendant reali9ed the import of his confession.

+n the case at !ar, appellant was a /- ear old farmer who did not even #nish #rstgrade.


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ME4'O7ANG v. (8)4OF+O #o. 4he general evidentiar rule is that evidence that one did or did not do a certainthing at one time is not admissi"le to prove that one did or did not do the same or asimilar thing at another time. *owever, evidence of similar acts ma !e received toprove a speci#c intent or knowledge, identit, plan sstem, scheme, ha!it, custom orusage and the like.

=4he rule is founded upon reason, pu!lic polic, &ustice and &udicial convenience. 4hefact that a person has committed the same or similar acts at some prior time a:ords,as a general rule, no logical guarant that he committed the act in 5uestion. 4his is so!ecause, su!&ectivel, a manKs mind and even his modes of life ma changeI and,o!&ectivel, the conditions under which he ma #nd himself at a given time ma

likewise change and thus induce him to act in a di:erent wa. 7esides, if evidence ofsimilar acts are to !e invaria!l admitted, the will give rise to a multiplicit ofcollateral issues and will su!&ect the defendant to surprise as well as confuse the courand prolong the trial.> W+iti3an8 C.., Eorerly Eirst Cational +ity !an8 v.$a3enianoX

Evidence of similar acts ma fre5uentl !ecome relevant, especiall to actions !asedon fraud and deceit, !ecause it sheds light on the state of mind or knowledge of apersonI it provides insight into such personKs motive or intentI it uncovers a scheme,design or plan, or it reveals a mistake. +n this case however, (ustodio;s priorinvolvement in a cash shortage in the !ank;s (u!ao !ranch does not conclusivelprove that she is responsi!le for the loss of PhP11,111 in the Laoag (it !ranch,su!&ect of the instant case. +f the prior cash shortage in (u!ao showed a reasona!leintent or ha!it on her part, then there was no reason for Metro!ank to continue toemplo her, considering the degree of trust and con#dence re5uired of a !ank teller.

Nevertheless, (ustodio continued to serve the !ank even after the case in petitionerMetro!ank;s (u!ao !ranch. *er continued emploment was an a:irmation that shewas still worth of the !ank;s trust, insofar as she was allowed to continue to handlesums of mone in the Laoag (it !ranch.

7O)4ON 7ANG v. PE'LAand MANALO '. 8nder )ection 0, 'ule /01 of the 'evised 'ules of (ourt, evidence that one did a

certain thing at one time is not admissi!le to prove that he did the same or similarthing at another time, although such evidence ma !e received to prove ha!it, usage,pattern of conduct or the intent of the parties.

)imilar acts as evidence. 3 Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thingat one time is not admissi!le to prove that he did or did not do the same or asimilar thing at another timeI !ut it ma !e received to prove a speci#c intentor knowledge, identit, plan, sstem, scheme, ha!it, custom or usage, and the

like.

)pouses failed to allege and prove that2

/. as a matter of !usiness, usage, ha!it or pattern of coduct, DE+ granted to alllot !uers the right to pa in installments of /@1 months of #%ed amounts, andthat

@. the parties intended to adopt such terms of pament relative to the sale of thetwo lots in 5uestion.

4he 0 deeds of conditional sale held ! )oller, Aguila, and 'o5ue were adduced inevidence ! the spouses to prove that DE+ continued to sell lots in the su!division asagents of O7M after it ac5uired the lots, not to prove usage, ha!it or pattern ofconduct. 4he likewise failed to prove that the '4( admitted the deeds as part of thetestimon of Manalo, r.

4here is no evidence that DE+ or O7M and all the lot !uers in the su!division,

including lot !uers who pa part of the downpament of the propert purchased !

them in the form of service, had e%ecuted contracts of conditional sale containing

uniform terms and conditions. Moreover, under the terms of the contracts of

conditional sale e%ecuted ! DE+ and three lot !uers in the su!division, DE+ agreed to

grant /@1 months within which to pa the !alance of the purchase price to two of

them, !ut granted one /H1 months to do so. 4here is no evidence on record that DE+

granted the same right to !uers of two or more lots.

4he letter agreement made no direct or implied reference to the manner and schedule

of pament of the !alance of the purchase price of the lots covered ! the deeds of


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conditional sale e%ecuted ! DE+ and that of the other lot !uers as !asis for or mode

of determination of the schedule of the pament ! the spouses.

o$ to %rove a"it# custom# usa!e or %attern o conduct

4he o:ering part must esta!lish the degree of speci#cit and fre5uenc ofuniform response that ensures more than a mere tendenc to act in a givenmanner !ut rather, conduct that is semi-automatic in nature.

4he must allege and prove speci#c, repetitive conduct that might constitute

evidence of ha!it.

4he e%amples o:ered in evidence to prove ha!it, or pattern of evidence must!e numerous enough to !ase on inference of sstematic conduct, with the kecriteria of ade5uac of sampling and uniformit of response.

Mere similarit of contracts does not present the kind of su:icientl similarcircumstances to outweigh the danger of pre&udice and confusion.

8sage in a particular trade or market or profession must !e considered.

+t is also well-settled that parties who contract on a su!&ect matter concerning whichknown usage prevail, incorporate such usage ! implication into their agreement, ifnothing is said to !e contrar.

PEOPLE v. MANALO Although showing mug shots of suspects is one of the esta!lished methods ofidentifing criminals, the procedure used in this case is unaccepta!le. 4he #rst rule inproper photographic identi#cation procedure is that a series of photographs must !eshown, and not merel that of the suspect. 4he second rule directs that when awitness is shown a group of pictures, their arrangement and displa should in no wasuggest which one of the pictures pertains to the suspect. +n the present case, thepolice o!viousl suggested the identit of Pineda ! showing onl the photographs ofPineda and )ison. 4he testimon of 6errer fails the totalit of circumstances test.

PEOPLE v. E)4+7AL ,es gestae< literall means $things done.$ +t is provided for in +ec. /2 of ,ule 13as $)tatements made ! a person while a startling occurrence is taking place oimmediatel prior or su!se5uent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereofma !e given in evidence as part of the res gestae. )o, also, statements accompaninan e5uivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal signi#cance ma !received as part of the res gestae.$4he rule on res gestae encompasses the e%clamations and statements made ! eithethe participants, victis, or spectators to a crie immediatel !efore, during, oimmediatel after the commission of the crime when the circumstances are such thathe statements were made as a spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired ! the%citement of the occasion and there was no opportunit for the declarant tdeli!erate and to fa!ricate a false statement.+t is one of the //e!ceptions to the hearsay rule in )ec. 0 of 'ule /01 whicprovides that a witness can onl testif as to facts which he knows of personaknowledge, that is, which are derived from his own perception.,ationale< 4his e%ception is !ased on the !elief that such statements are trustworth!ecause the were made instinctivel, $while the declarant;s mental powers fodeli!eration are stilled ! the shocking inuence of a startling occurrence, so that alhis utterances at the time are the re1e9 products of immediate sensual impressionsunaided ! retrospective mental action.$ )aid natural and spontaneous utterances ar

perceived to !e ore convincingthan the testimon of the same person on the witnesstand.$ People vs MorenoBwo tests in applying the res gestae rule ("eople &s +alafranca)2aB the act, declaration or e%clamation is so intiately interwovenor connected witthe principal fact or event that it characteri9es as to !e regarded as a part of thtransaction itselfI and!B the said evidence clearly negatesan premeditation or purpose to manufacturtestimon.3 essential requisites to admit e&idence as part of res gestaeprincipal act the res gestaeB is a startling occurence@B statements made under the inuence of a startling event were made !efordeclarant had time to contrive or devise a falsehood spontaneit of declarationB0B statements must concern the occurrence in 5uestion and its immediate attendincircumstances/pp//lili itemprop="text"p7/24/2019 Evidence Case Doctrines/pp 20/51/pp> factors to determine spontaneity of declaration ("eople &s Dianos)time lapse !etween the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of thestatement,@B place where the statement is made0B the condition of the declarant when the utterance is givenB the presence or a!sence of intervening events !etween the occurrence and thstatement relative thereto, and4here must !e no intervening circumstance !etween the res gestae occurrence anthe time the statement was made as could have a:orded the declarant an opportunitfor deli!eration or reection People vs orolanBJB the nature and the circumstances of the statement itself.Denition of spontaneous declaration< a statement or e%clamation madimmediatel after some e%citing occasion ! a participant or spectator and assertinthe circumstances of that occasion as it is o!served ! him./pp=# 5=+ 4+< 4he element of spontaneit is critical, and "A) NO4 P'E)EN4 in this case./pp 4here was nothing spontaneous, unreected or instinctive a!out AAAdeclarations to the !aranga tanod and to the police. *er statements were infact a re-telling of what she had alread confessed to her mother earlier thaafternoonI this time however, her stor to the tanods and the police was iclear, conscious pursuit of a newly fored resolve, e%horted ! her mother, tsee her father #nall e%posed and put !ehind !ars/ppo AAA #rst revealed the se%ual a!use to her cousin, FFF, in thafternoon of 6e!. J, @11, the same da when the rape took place. +/ppwas FFF who relaed to AAAKs mom that AAA had a pro!lem. 4hmom then confronted her, and she was the one who lead AAA to seekthe help of the !aranga tanod to arrest the dad/pp '4( and (A erred in holding AAAKs statements as part of the res gestae of theoccurrence of rape. 7 the time those statements have !een made, AAA hadalread undergone a serious deli!eration and was now led ! new-founresolve to punish her father./pp%n 5earsay/pp Denition evidence not of what the witness knows himself !ut of what he haheard from others/pp eight no pro!ative value/pp ,ationale !ecause the testimon derives its value not from the credit of thwitness uttering the hearsa, !ut from the veracit and competenc of th/ppe%tra&udicial source of her information. As such, the person from whom thwitness derived the information is not in court and under oath to !e e%amined+t is the right of the opposing part to cross e%amine the other partKs witnessas it is the onl means to test the latterKs credi!ilit, and is thus essential to thadministration of &ustice./pp 5earsay rule (,ule 13$ +ec. 3B) witness can testif onl to those factwhich she knows of her personal knowledge, that is, derived from her owperception./pppersonal knowledge is a su!stantive prere5uisite for acceptintestimonial evidence/pp 4a&eat +f an e%tra&udicial utterance is o:ered, not as an assertion to provthe matter asserted !ut without reference to the truth of the atter assertedthe hearsa rule does not appl. 6or e%ample, in a slander case, if prosecution witness testi#es that he heard the accused sa that th/ppcomplainant was a thief, this testimon is admissi!le not to prove that thcomplainant was reall a thief, !ut merel to show that the accused utteredthose words./ppPEOPLE v. L8MA*O JJJCs (cousinGs) testimony is not hearsay e&idence and is thus admissi*le./pp,atioFefense emphasi9ed 777Ks answer during cross e%amination that the #rst part of thtestimon was related onl ! (((./ppAn evidence is considered hearsa if its pro!ative value is not !ased on persona/ppknowledge of the witness !ut on the knowledge of some other person not on th/ppwitness stand.@A witness can testif onl to those facts which he knows of hi/pp/http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/sep2014/gr_208716_2014.html#fnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/sep2014/gr_208716_2014.html#fnt24/lili itemprop="text"p7/24/2019 Evidence Case Doctrines/pp 21/51/pppersonal knowledge and derived from his own perception./pp8pon review of the records, 777 indeed testi#ed that the #rst portion of her statemen/ppwas related onl ! (((. *owever, the defense failed to specify with particularit/ppwhich of the rst portion was hearsay. (ontrar to the allegation of the defense, wha/ppis apparent is the narration of 777 that she personally heard fro herself,durin/pppolice investigation, that she was a!used ! her father. And this statement o!viousl/ppdoes not fall within the am!it of hearsa./ppOther issues/ppwhether or not the crime of rape was committed. F2$, rape was coitted4he prosecution esta!lished all the elements of 5uali#ed rape. AAAKs narration wafurther strengthened ! Fr. Fia9Ks #nding of a month-old laceration in AAAKs hmen"here a victim;s testimon is corro!orated ! the phsical #ndings of penetrationthere is su:icient !asis for concluding that se%ual intercourse did take place.whether or not the witness was not credi*le since her answers were elicite/ppfrom leading questions.CO, the witness was credi3le."hile some of AAAKs responses were elicited from leading 5uestions, these must !accepted as credi!le ! virtue of li!eralit. "hile li!eralit is more of an e%ception, thcourt #nds that it applies in this case given the circumstances of a child testifing inopen court at age /1 to narrate the she was raped ! her father at age . AAA waa!le to conve, despite her tender age, essential details to convict the accused./ppE)P+NEL+ v. PEOPLE 4he hearsa evidence rule as provided under )ection 0, 'ule /01 of the 'ules of(ourt states2 )ec. 0. 4estimon generall con#ned to personal knowledgeI hearsa e%cluded/pp3 A witness can testif onl to those facts which he knows of his personalknowledgeI that is, which are derived from his own perception, e%cept asotherwise provided in these rules./ppEvidence is hearsa when its pro!ative force depends in whole or in part onthe competenc and credi!ilit of some persons other than the witness ! whomit is sought to produce./pp 2uch is not the case $hen the %ur%ose o %lacin! the statement on the/pprecord is merel' to esta"lish the act that the statement# or the tenor osuch statement# $as made+/pp *e!ardless o the truth or alsit' o a statement# $hen $hat is relevant is/ppthe act that such statement has "een made# the hearsa' rule does nota%%l' and the statement ma' "e sho$n+/ppApplied in this case2 Testimon' $as %resented not to %rove the truth o such statement "ut/pponl' or the %ur%ose o esta"lishin! that on Fe"ruar' 13# 15# *e'ese6ecuted a s$orn statement containin! such narration o acts+/pp the testimon of N7+ Agent )egunial is in the nature of an independentlrelevant statement where what is relevant is the fact that 'ees made suchstatement and the truth and falsit thereof is immaterial./ppNotarial 'elevant +ssueB 4he written statement of 'ees is a notari9ed document having !een dul/ppsu!scri!ed and sworn to !efore Att. (esar A. 7acani, a supervising agent of theN7+./pp +t ma !e presented in evidence without further proof, the certi#cate of/ppacknowledgment !eing a prima facie evidence of the due e%ecution of thisinstrument or document involved pursuant to )ection 01 of 'ule /0@ of the 'uleof (ourt./pp a notari7ed document en-o's a %rima acie %resum%tion o authenticit'/ppand due e6ecution $hich must "e re"utted "' clear and convincin!evidence+/pp+ircustantial 2vidence/pp4rul, $direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the onl !asis fromwhich a court ma draw its #nding of guilt.>

(ircumstantial evidence ma !e relied ! the trial court8nder )ection , 'ule /00 of the 'ules of (ourt, circumstantial evidence


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would !e su:icient to convict the o:ender $if iBthere is more than onecircumstanceI iiB the facts from which the inference is derived are provenI and iiithe com!ination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction !eondreasona!le dou!t.

All the circumstances must !e consistent with one another and with thehpothesis

petitioner was heard telling his co-accused )otero Paredes )oteroB $aaw konang a!utin pa ng !ukas ang si 7er!on$ and was armed

red car was identi#ed or recogni9ed ! prosecution witness 'odolfo Al!erto was fatall shot later in the da and ed riding a red car

4hus, circumstantial evidence are su:icient to warrant a conviction of murderPA48LA v. PEOPLE 4he Prosecution presented the testimonies of


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%erce%tion# memor'# veracit' and articulateness o the out9o9courtdeclarant or actor u%on $hose relia"ilit' the $orth o the out9o9courtstatement de%ends+

)ection /. (lasses of documents. 3 6or the purpose of their presentation inevidence, documents are either pu!lic or private. Pu!lic documents are2

aB 4he written o:icial acts, or records of the o:icial acts of thesovereign authorit, o:icial !odies and tri!unals, and pu!lico:icers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign countrI

!B Focuments acknowledged !efore a notar pu!lic e%cept last

wills and testaments, and cB Pu!lic records, kept in the Philippines, of private documentsre5uired ! law to !e entered therein.

Thus# All other $ritin!s are %rivate+A %u"lic documentis sel9authenticatin! and requires no urther

authentication in order to "e %resented as evidence in court+A private document is an other writing, deed, or instrument e%ecuted ! a

private person without the intervention of a notar or other person legallauthori9ed ! which some disposition or agreement is proved or set forth.

Lac:in! the o&icial or soverei!n character o a %u"lic document# or thsolemnities %rescri"ed "' la$# a %rivate document requiresauthentication in the manner allo$ed "' la$ or the *ules o ,ourt "eoreits acce%tance as evidence in court+

4he re5uirement of authentication of a private document is e%cused onl in

four instances, speci#call2 aB when the document is an ancient one within the conte%t of )ection@/,@H 'ule /0@ of the 'ules of (ourtI

!B when the genuineness and authenticit of an actiona!le document havnot !een speci#call denied under oath ! the adverse partI

cB when the genuineness and authenticit of the document have !eenadmittedI or

dB when the document is not !eing o:ered as genuine.

E%hi!its 7 to CC and their derivatives were private documents !ecause privateindividuals e%ecuted or generated them for private or !usiness purposes or uses.4hus, the are re5uired to !e authenticated in the manner provided in )ection@1of 'ule /0@ of the 'ules of (ourt2 )ection @1. Proof of private documents. 3 7efore an private document

o:ered as authentic is received in evidence, its due e%ecution andauthenticit must !e proved either2aB 7 anone who saw the document e%ecuted or writtenI or!B 7 evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of themaker.

Applied in this case2 4he Prosecution attempted to have


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propounded to anuario. 4he rule is that, in order to make a ding declaratio

admissi!le, a #%ed !elief in inevita!le and imminent death must !e entered ! th

declarant. +t is the !elief in impending death and not the rapid succession of death in

point of fact that renders a ding declaration admissi!le. 4he test is whether th

declarant has a!andoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as certainl

impending. 4hus, the utterances made ! anuario could not !e considered as a din

declaration.

anuario;s statements ma still !e appreciated as part of the res gestae.

'es gestae refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of th

main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so spontaneous an

contemporaneous with the main fact as to e%clude the idea of deli!eration an

fa!rication.

4he test of admissi!ilit of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whethe

the act, declaration, or e%clamation, is so interwoven or connected with the principa

fact or event that it characteri9es as to !e regarded as a part of the transaction itself

and also whether it clearl negates an premeditation or purpose to manufactur

testimon.

4he re5uisites for admissi!ilit of a declaration as part of the res gestae concu

herein. "hen anuario gave the identit of the assailants to )PO0 Mendo9a, he wareferring to a startling occurrence which is the sta!!ing ! appellant and his co

accused.

At that time, anuario and the witness were in the vehicle that would !ring him to th

hospital, and thus, had no time to contrive his identi#cation of the assailant. *i

utterance a!out appellant and his co-accused having sta!!ed him, in answer to th

5uestion of )PO0 Mendo9a, was made in spontaneit and onl in reaction to th

startling occurrence. Fe#nitel, the statement is relevant !ecause it identi#ed th

accused as the authors of the crime. eril, the killing of anuario, perpetrated !

appellant, is ade5uatel proven ! the prosecution.

PEOPLE v. 'A'8


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/B the declaration is made ! the deceased under the consciousness of his impendindeathI @B the deceased was at the time competent as a witnessI 0B the declarationconcerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant;s deathI and the declaration is o:ered in a criminal case wherein the declarant;s death is thsu!&ect of in5uir.4he fact that the victim was sta!!ed on Fecem!er , / and died onl on anuar H/H does not prove that the victim made the statement or declaration under thconsciousness of an impending death. 4he rule is that, in order to make a dindeclaration admissi!le, a #%ed !elief in inevita!le and imminent death must !entered ! the declarant. +t is the !elief in impending death and not the rapisuccession of death in point of fact that renders the ding declaration admissi!le. +t inot necessar that the approaching death !e presaged ! the personal feelings of thdeceased. 4he test is whether the declarant has a!andoned all hopes of survival anlooked on death as certainl impending. As such, the (A incorrectl ruled that therwere ding declarations.4he (A should have admitted the statement made ! the victim to eronica Facir righafter he was sta!!ed as part of the res gestae and not a ding declaration as stated in)ection @ of 'ule /01 of the 'ules of (ourt.All that is re5uired for the admissi!ilit of a given statement as part of the res gestaeis that it !e made under the inuence of a startling event witnessed ! the person whmade the declaration !efore he had time to think and make up a stor, or to concoct ocontrive a falsehood, or to fa!ricate an account, and without an undue inuence ino!taining it, aside from referring to the event in 5uestion or its immediate attendingcircumstances. +n sum, there are three re5uisites to admit evidence as part of the regestae2 /B that the principal act, the res gestae, !e a startling occurrenceI @B the

statements were made !efore the declarant had the time to contrive or devise falsehoodI and 0B that the statements must concern the occurrence in 5uestion and itimmediate attending circumstances.+t goes without saing that the element of spontaneit is critical. 4he following factorare then considered in determining whether statements o:ered in evidence as part othe res gestae have !een made spontaneousl, vi9., /B the time that lapsed !etweenthe occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of the statementI @B the placwhere the statement was madeI 0B the condition of the declarant when he made thstatementI B the presence or a!sence of intervening events !etween the occurrencand the statement relative theretoI and JB the nature and circumstances of thstatement itself.

(learl, the statement made ! the victim identifing his assailants was mad

immediatel after a startling occurrence which is his !eing sta!!ed, precluding an

chance to concoct a lie as shown in the testimon of eronica.

)A7+L+ v. (OMELE( hether or not common-law wifeGs ("alomares) a6ida&it is a declaratioagainst her interest

A declaration against interest, refers to a $declaration made ! a person deceased, o

una!le to testif against the interest of a declarant, if the fact asserted in th

declaration was at the time it was made so far contrar to declarant;s own interest

that a reasona!le man in his position would not have made the declaration unless h

!elieved it to !e true.$ A declaration against interest is an e%ception to the hearsa

rule. As such, it pertains onl to the admissi!ilit of, not the weight accorded to

testimonial evidence.

Nevertheless, we see the logic in petitioner;s claim that the (OMELE( had committe

grave a!use of discretion in !eing inconsistent in its stand regarding Palomaresparticularl regarding her assertion that the Lipa propert had !een purchased solel

with petitioner;s mone. +f the (OMELE( accepts the registration of the Lipa propert

in her name to !e accurate, her a:idavit disavowing ownership thereof in favor o

petitioner was far from self-serving as it ran counter to her and her children;s

propert interest.

4he Fissent states that it was not unreasona!le for the (OMELE( to !elieve tha

Palomares ma have committed misrepresentations in her a:idavit considering tha

she had per&ured herself as an informant on the !irth certi#cates of her children wit

respect to the supposed date and place of her marriage to petitioner. *owever, thi

was not the reason propounded ! the (OMELE( when it re&ected Palomare


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a:idavit.

Moreover, it is nota!le that Palomares; assertion in her a:idavit that she anpetitioner have !een living in the Pinagtong-ulan propert since April @11 icorro!orated ! other evidence, including the a:idavits of Pinagtong-ulan !arangao:icials and neigh!ors.

LA?A'O v. A


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that the thum!mark appearing on the document sought to !e notari9ed was noa:i%ed in his presence. 7ut he did not. 4hus, the lower courts did not commitan error in not giving evidentiar weight to the su!&ect sworn statement.

8N(*8AN v. LO?AFA

As to the validit of the donation2"hen the law re5uires that a contract !e in some form in order that it ma !e valid oenforcea!le, or that a contract !e proved in a certain wa, that re5uirement is a!solutand indispensa!le.*ere, the Feed of Fonation does not appear to !e dul notari9ed. +n page three of thdeed, the stamped name of (resencio 4omakin appears a!ove the words Notar Pu!li

until Fecem!er 0/, /H0 !ut !elow it were the tpewritten words Notar Pu!liuntil Fecem!er 0/, /H. A closer e%amination of the document further reveals that thnum!er Gin (AGand $eries of (AGwere merel superimposed. 4his was con#rmed !petitioners nephew 'ichard 8nchuan who testi#ed that he saw petitioners hus!anwrite over /H0 to make it appear that the deed was notari9ed in /H. Moreover, (erti#cation from (lerk of (ourt eo:re ). oa5uino of the Notarial 'ecords Fivisiodisclosed that the Feed of Fonation purportedl identi#ed in 7ook No. , Focument NoH, and Page No. 0J )eries of /H was not reported and #led with said o:ice. Pertinento this, the 'ules re5uire a part producing a document as genuine which has !eealtered and appears to have !een altered after its e%ecution, in a part material to th5uestion in dispute, to account for the alteration. *e ma show that the alteration wamade ! another, without his concurrence, or was made with the consent of the partiea:ected ! it, or was otherwise properl or innocentl made, or that the alteration dinot change the meaning or language of the instrument. +f he fails to do that, th

document shall, as in this case, not !e admissi!le in evidence.'emarka!l, the lands descri!ed in the Feed of Fonation are covered ! 4(4 Nos0J and 0, !oth of which had !een previousl cancelled ! aOrder dated April H, /H/ in L'( 'ecord No. JHH. "e #nd it e5uall pu99ling thaon August /1, /H, or si% months after Anita supposedl donated her undivided sharin the lots to petitioner, the 8nchuan Fevelopment (orporation, which warepresented ! petitioners hus!and, #led suit to compel the Lo9ada sisters tsurrender their titles ! virtue of a sale. 4he sum of all the circumstances in this cascalls for no other conclusion than that the Deed of Donation allegedly in fa&or opetitioner is &oid.6inall, we note that petitioner faults the appellate court for not e%cluding thvideotaped statement of Anita as hearsa evidence. &idence is hearsa'when itpro!ative force depends, in whole or in part, on the competenc and credi!ilit of somepersons other than the witness ! whom it is sought to !e produced. 4here are threreasons for e!cluding hearsay e&idence


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hearsaysince !oth are alread dead.4he three could not longer testif that the were ordered ! Marcos.

Per +ec. 3B of ,ule 13 of the ,%4 , An evidence is 5,+L if its pro!ativvalue is not *ased on personal nowledge of the witness3ut on the 8nowledge osoe other person not on the witness stand.$

urisprudence instructs that e&idence of statement made or testimony is 5,+L if o6ered against a party who has nopportunity to cross-e!amine the witness. )uch evidence is e%cludeprecisel !ecause it deprives the part against whom it is presented thopportunit to !e cross-e%amined.ith the deaths of


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private handwritten instrument and signed ! the parent concerned.+n the a!sence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate #liation shall !e prove!2

/B 4he open and continuous possession of the status of legitimate childI or

@B An other means allowed ! the 'ules of (ourt and specialaws.

4he 'ules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. 4he relevant sections are in)ections 0 and 1 of the 'ules of (ourt.

+n assessing the pro!ative value of FNA evidence, therefore, courts should consideramong other things, the following data2

/ how the samples were collected,@ how the were handled,0 the possi!ilit of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in anal9ing the samples,J whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting th

tests, the 5uali#cation of the analst who conducted the tests

('+)4O7AL v. ('8? 4he initial fact that needs to !e esta!lished is the #liation of petitioners with thdeceased 7uenaventura (risto!al. Article /@ of the 6amil (ode provides2

o Art. /@. 4he #liation of legitimate children is esta!lished ! an of th

following2

/B 4he record of !irth appearing in the civil register or a #na&udgmentI or@B An admission of legitimate #liation in a pu!lidocument or a private handwritten instrument and signed ! thparent concerned.

+n the a!sence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate #liationshall !e proved !2

/B the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimatchildI or

@B An other means allowed ! the 'ules of (ourt and specialaws.

$An other means allowed ! the 'ules of (ourt and )pecial Laws,$ ma consist othe child;s !aptismal certi#cate, a &udicial admission, a famil !i!le in which thchild;s name has !een entered, common reputation respecting the childpedigree, admission ! silence, the testimon of witnesses, and other kinds oproof of admission under 'ule /01 of the 'ules of (ourt.+n the present case, the !aptismal certi#cates of Elisa, Anselmo, and the lat)ocorro were presented. 7aptismal certi#cate is one of the accepta!ldocumentar evidence to prove #liation in accordance with the 'ules of (ourt an&urisprudence. +n the case of Mercedes, who was !orn on 0/ anuar /1, shproduced a certi#cation issued ! the O:ice of the Local (ivil 'egistrar of )auan, Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that records of !irth for the ears /1//1, /0@ to /0, /1, /0, and /H were all destroed due to ordinarwear and tear.Petitioners likewise presented Ester )antos as witness who testi#ed thapetitioners en&oed that common reputation in the communit where the residas !eing the children of 7uevaventura (risto!al with his #rst wife. 4estimonies owitnesses were also presented to prove #liation ! continuous possession of thstatus as a legitimate child.

+n contrast, it !ears to point out that private respondents were una!le to presenan proof to refute the petitioners; claim and evidences of #liation t7uenaventura (risto!al.4he foregoing evidence thus su:ice to convince this (ourt that petitioners areindeed, children of the late 7uenaventura (risto!al during the #rst marriage.

L7P v. ONA4E L7P failed to prove that the [miscredited; funds came from proceeds of the preterminated loans of corporate !orrowers. L7P argument that the entries in thpass!ook were made in the regular course of !usiness and should !e accepted aprima facie evidence of facts is 5uali#ed as hearsa, and the should esta!lish the%ceptions of the hearsa rule, which are2

/. Person who made entries is dead, outside of the countr, or una!le ttestifI

@. Entries were made at or near the time of the transaction to which thereferI


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0. Entrant was in a position to know the facts stated thereinI. Entries were made in the professional capacit or in the course of dut

of the entrantI and,J. Entries were made in the ordinar course of !usiness or dut.

L7P has neither identi#ed the persons who made the entries in the pass!ooks noesta!lished that the are alread dead or una!le to testif as re5uired ! )ection 0 o'ule /01 of the '(.

L7P failed to prove that the amount allegedl [miscredited; to Onate;s account camfrom the proceeds of the pre-terminated loans of its clients. +t is worth emphasi9inthat in civil cases, the part making allegations has the !urden of proving them !preponderance of evidence. Mere allegation is not su:icient.

)P) \8+'+NO v. PLAN4E')P'OF8(4) +N(.

Petitioners insist that the could not !e held lia!le for the !alance stated in E%hi!it due to such document !eing hearsa as a =mere statement of account>

4he argue that (ristina Llanera, the witness of PP+ on the matter, was onl warehouse assistant who was not shown to !e either an accountant o!ookkeeper or a person with knowledge in accounting.4he said that the testimon was limited to stating that she had prepared thstatement of account contained therein, and that she did not a:irm thcorrectness or veracit of the contents of the documents.

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