CASE DOCTRINES IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERSPrepared by Glenn Rey D. Anino

Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP) vs. Romulo, 528 SCRA 673 , July 31, 2007

Administrative Law; Executive Branch; Reorganizations; The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of Health under the Constitution and statutory laws.—The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of Health under the Constitution and statutory laws. This authority is an adjunct of his power of control under Article VII, Sections 1 and 17 of the 1987 Constitution, viz.: Section 1. The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines. Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

Same; Same; Same; While the power to abolish an office is generally lodged with the legislature, the authority of the President to reorganize the executive branch, which may include such abolition, is permissible under our present laws.—In Canonizado v. Aguirre, 323 SCRA 312 [2000], we held that reorganization “involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.” It alters the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. While the power to abolish an office is generally lodged with the legislature, the authority of the President to reorganize the executive branch, which may include such abolition, is permissible under our present laws.

Same; Same; Same; President’s power to reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his residual powers under Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292; Nature of the President’s residual powers under said section explained in Larin v. Executive Secretary, 280 SCRA 713.—The President’s power to reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his residual powers under Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O. No. 292 which grants the President broad organization powers to implement reorganization measures, viz.: SEC. 20. Residual Powers.—Unless Congress provides otherwise, the President shall exercise such other powers and functions vested in the President which are provided for under the laws and which are not specifically enumerated above, or which are not delegated by the President in accordance with law. We explained the nature of the President’s residual powers under this section in the case of Larin v. Executive Secretary, 280 SCRA 713 (1997) viz.: This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the law. What law then gives him the power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials. The validity of these two decrees [is] unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides that “all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.” So far, there is yet no law amending or repealing said decrees.

Philippine Fisheries Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 528 SCRA 706 , July 31, 2007

Taxation; Court rules that the Authority is not a GOCC but an instrumentality of the national government which is generally exempt from payment of real property tax; The IFPC, being a property of public dominion cannot be sold at public auction to satisfy the tax delinquency.—The Court rules that the Authority is not a GOCC but an instrumentality of the national government which is generally exempt from payment of real property tax. However, said exemption does not apply to the portions of the IFPC which the Authority leased to private entities. With respect to these properties, the Authority is liable to pay real property tax. Nonetheless, the IFPC, being a property of public dominion cannot be sold at public auction to satisfy the tax delinquency.

Same; The Authority should be classified as an instrumentality of the national government; It is generally exempt from payment of real property tax, except those portions which have been leased to private entities.—On the basis of the parameters set in the MIAA case, the Authority should be classified as an instrumentality of the national government. As such, it is generally exempt from payment of real property tax, except those portions which have been leased to private entities.

Same; Applying Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code, the Court ruled that when an instrumentality of the national government grants to a taxable person the beneficial use of a real property owned by the Republic, said instrumentality becomes liable to pay real property tax.—The MIAA case held that unlike GOCCs, instrumentalities of the national government, like MIAA, are

exempt from local taxes pursuant to Section 133(o) of the Local Government Code. This exemption, however, admits of an exception with respect to real property taxes. Applying Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code, the Court ruled that when an instrumentality of the national government grants to a taxable person the beneficial use of a real property owned by the Republic, said instrumentality becomes liable to pay real property tax. Thus, while MIAA was held to be an instrumentality of the national government which is generally exempt from local taxes, it was at the same time declared liable to pay real property taxes on the airport lands and buildings which it leased to private persons. It was held that the real property tax assessments and notices of delinquencies issued by the City of Pasay to MIAA are void except those pertaining to portions of the airport which are leased to private parties.

Same; The real property tax assessments issued by the City of Iloilo should be upheld only with respect to the portions leased to private persons.—The real property tax assessments issued by the City of Iloilo should be upheld only with respect to the portions leased to private persons. In case the Authority fails to pay the real property taxes due thereon, said portions cannot be sold at public auction to satisfy the tax delinquency. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, 384 SCRA 152 it was held that reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain and cannot, without Congressional fiat, be subject of a sale, public or private. [Philippine Fisheries Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 528 SCRA 706(2007)]

Presidential Commission on Good Government vs. Sandiganbayan, 530 SCRA 13 , August 14, 2007

Remedial Law; Judgments; Res Judicata; The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand or cause of action; Requisites for the Preclusive Effect of Res Judicata to be Enforced.—Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment. The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. For the preclusive effect of res judicata to be enforced, the following requisites must obtain: (1) The former judgment or order must be final; (2) It must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the trial of the case; (3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and (4) There must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. This requisite is satisfied if the two actions are substantially between the same parties.

Same; Same; Same; Absolute identity of parties is not a condition sine qua non for res judicata to apply, a shared identity of interest being sufficient to invoke the coverage of the principle.—Absolute identity of parties is not a condition sine qua non for res judicata to apply, a shared identity of interest being sufficient to invoke the coverage of the principle. In this regard, petitioners claim that while “the Philippine government was not an impleaded party respondent in Switzerland,” it is undisputed that “the interest of the Philippine government is identical to the interest of the Swiss officials,” harping on the fact that the Swiss officials issued the freeze order on the basis of the IMAC request.

Same; Same; Same; A subject matter is the item with respect to which the controversy has arisen, or concerning which the wrong has been done, and it is ordinarily the right, the thing or the contract under dispute.—A subject matter is the item with respect to which the controversy has arisen, or concerning which the wrong has been done, and it is ordinarily the right, the thing, or the contract under dispute. In the case at bar, the subject matter in the Swiss Federal Court was described in the 31 May 1989 decision itself as “ruling on temporary measures (freezing of accounts) and of taking of evidence (gathering bank information).” It was thus concerned with determining (1) whether “there is a reason of exclusion as defined in Art. 2 lit. b and [Art.] 3 par. 1 IRSG or an applicable case of Art. 10 Par. 2 IRSG;” (2) whether legal assistance should be refused on the basis of Art. 2 lit. a IRSG; (3) whether Officeco should be regarded as a disinterested party owing to the fact that its name was not included in the list accompanying the IMAC request as well as in the order of the District Attorney of Zurich; and (4) whether the grant of legal assistance is proper considering the actions of Gapud. In short, the subject matter before the Swiss courts was the propriety of the legal assistance extended to the Philippine government. On the other hand, the issue in Civil Case No. 0164 is whether the PCGG may be compelled to officially advise the Swiss government to exclude or drop from the freeze or sequestration order the account of Officeco with BTAG and to release the said account to Officeco. In short, the subject matter in Civil Case No. 0164 is the propriety of PCGG’s stance regarding Officeco’s account with BTAG.

Same; Same; Same; Cause of Action; The test often used in determining whether causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same facts or evidence would support and establish the former and present causes of action.—A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other. Causes of action are identical when there is an identity in the facts essential to the maintenance of the two actions, or where the same evidence will sustain both actions. The test often used in determining whether causes of action are identical is to ascertain whether the same facts or evidence would support and establish the former and present causes of action. More significantly, there is identity of causes of action when the judgment sought will be inconsistent with the prior judgment. In the case at bar, allowing Civil Case No. 0164 to proceed to its logical conclusion will not result in any inconsistency with the 31 May 1989 decision of the Swiss Federal Court. Even if the Sandiganbayan finds for Officeco, the same will not automatically result in the lifting of the questioned freeze orders. It will merely serve as a basis for requiring the PCGG (through the OSG) to make the appropriate representations with the Swiss government agencies concerned.

Same; Same; Same; Act of State Doctrine; The act of state doctrine is one of the methods by which States prevent their national courts from deciding disputes which relate to the internal affairs of another State, the other two being immunity and non-justiciability.—The act of state doctrine is one of the methods by which States prevent their national courts from deciding disputes which relate to the internal affairs of another State, the other two being immunity and non-justiciability. It is an avoidance technique that is directly related to a State’s obligation to respect the independence and equality of other States by not requiring them to submit to adjudication in a national court or to settlement of their disputes without their consent. It requires the forum court to exercise restraint in the adjudication of disputes relating to legislative or other governmental acts which a foreign State has performed within its territorial limits. [Presidential Commission on Good Government vs. Sandiganbayan, 530 SCRA 13(2007)]

Frias, Sr. vs. People, 534 SCRA 654 , October 04, 2007Criminal Procedure; Informations; Defects; Waiver; The right to question the sufficiency of an Information is not absolute; An accused is deemed to have waived this right if he fails to object upon his arraignment.—We note that it is only now that petitioner is questioning the sufficiency of the Information against him. It is too late. The right to question the sufficiency of an Information is not absolute. An accused is deemed to have waived this right if he fails to object upon his arraignment or during trial. In either case, evidence presented during trial can cure the defect in the Information. Petitioner waived his right to assail the sufficiency of the Information when he voluntarily entered a plea when arraigned and participated in the trial. At any rate, the Information (quoted above) adequately informed petitioner of the charges against him. It clearly stated the elements which constituted the violation of Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code.

Public Officers; Public Officers are accountable if they, as part of their duties, receive public funds or property which they are bound to account for but fail to do so; Petitioner is undeniably an accountable officer.—In Barriga v. Sandiganbayan, 457 SCRA 301 (2005), we held that public officers are accountable if they, as part of their duties, receive public funds or property which they are bound to account for but fail to do so. Petitioner never denied that he received the checks representing the disallowed cash advances. He in fact admitted that the disallowed cash advances were made under his authority, that he was the payee of the checks and that he received them. Thus, it is clear that he, as municipal mayor, received and had possession of (and consequently was accountable for) the cash advances. Petitioner was undeniably an accountable officer.

Same; Petitioner is liable to restitute the P1,000,000 to the Government without prejudice however to his right to recover it from persons who were solidarily liable with him.—Inasmuch as the cash advances were disallowed and petitioner failed to return the P1,000,000 within the allowable period, the funds were deemed illegally or improperly used or applied. x x x Petitioner is liable to restitute the P1,000,000 to the Government without prejudice, however, to his right to recover it from persons who were solidarily liable with him.

Sangguniang Barangay of Don Mariano Marcos, Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya vs. Martinez, 547 SCRA 416 , March 03, 2008

Administrative Law; Local Government Code; Pertinent legal provisions and cases decided by the Court firmly establish that the Sangguniang Bayan is not empowered to remove an elective local official from office.—The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not the Sangguniang Bayan may remove Martinez, an elective local official, from office. The pertinent legal provisions and cases decided by this Court firmly establish that the Sangguniang Bayan is not empowered to do so.

Same; Same; The Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials, since the power is exclusively vested in the proper courts.—In Salalima v. Guingona, Jr., 257 SCRA 55 (1996), the Court en banc categorically ruled that the Office of the President is without any power to remove elected officials, since the power is exclusively vested in the proper courts as expressly provided for in the last paragraph of Section 60 of the Local Government Code. It further invalidated Article 125, Rule XIX of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991.

Same; Same; The Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan cannot order the removal of an erring elective barangay official from office, as the courts are exclusively vested with this power under Section 60 of the Local Government Code; The most extreme penalty that the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring elective barangay official is suspension.—As the law stands, Section 61 of the Local Government Code provides for the procedure for the filing of an administrative case against an erring elective barangay official before the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan. However, the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan cannot order the removal of an erring elective barangay official from office, as the courts are exclusively vested with this power under Section 60 of the Local Government Code. Thus, if the acts allegedly committed by the barangay official are of a grave nature and, if found guilty, would merit the penalty of removal from office, the case should be filed with the regional trial court. Once the court assumes jurisdiction, it retains jurisdiction over the case even if it would be subsequently apparent during the trial that a penalty less than removal from office is appropriate. On the other hand, the most extreme penalty that the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan may impose on the erring elective barangay official is suspension; if it deems that the removal of the official from service is warranted, then it can resolve that the proper charges be filed in court.

Same; Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review.—The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort first to the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice for review. Non-observance of the doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, which is one of the grounds allowed by the Rules of Court for the dismissal of the complaint.

Same; Same; Instances when the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately.—The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, which is based on sound public policy and practical consideration, is not inflexible. There are instances when it may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately. Among these exceptions are: 1) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine; 2) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to lack of jurisdiction; 3) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably prejudice the complainant; 4) where the amount involved is relatively small as to make the rule impractical and oppressive; 5) where the question raised is purely legal and will ultimately have to be decided by the courts of justice; 6) where judicial intervention is urgent; 7) where its application may cause great and irreparable damage; 8) where the controverted acts violate due process; 9) when the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been rendered moot; 10) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy; 11) when strong public interest is involved; and 13) in quo warranto proceedings.

Same; Same; Where the case involves only legal questions, the litigant need not exhaust all administrative remedies before such judicial relief can be sought; A legal question is properly addressed to a regular court of justice rather than to an administrative body.—This Court in Castro v. Gloria, 363 SCRA 417 (2001), declared that where the case involves only legal questions, the litigant need not exhaust all administrative remedies before such judicial relief can be sought. The reason behind providing an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that issues of law cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative officer. Appeal to the administrative officer would only be an exercise in futility. A legal question is properly addressed to a regular court of justice rather than to an administrative body.

Republic vs. T.A.N. Properties, Inc., 555 SCRA 477 , June 26, 2008Land Titles; Land Registration; The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably belong to the State.—The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion presumably belong to the State. The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable and disposable rests with the applicant.

Same; Same; Public Land; The applicant for land registration must prove that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) or Community Environment and Natural Resources Offices (CENRO).—It is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

Same; Documentary Evidence; The government officials who issued the certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein.—Only Torres, respondent’s Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by respondent. The government officials who issued the certifications were not presented before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not have accepted the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable.

Documentary Evidence; Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides: Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.—Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section 19(a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by his deputy x x x. The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The CENRO should have attached an official publication of the DENR Secretary’s issuance declaring the land alienable and disposable. Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence provides: Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. All other public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.

Same; The Court has also ruled that a document or writing admitted as part of the testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts stated therein.—The Court has also ruled that a document or writing admitted as part of the testimony of a witness does not constitute proof of the facts stated therein. Here, Torres, a private individual and respondent’s representative, identified the certifications but the government officials who issued the certifications did not testify on the contents of the certifications. As such, the certifications cannot be given probative value. The contents of the certifications are hearsay because Torres was incompetent to testify on the veracity of the contents of the certifications. Torres did not prepare the certifications, he was not an officer of CENRO or FMS-DENR, and he did not conduct any verification survey whether the land falls within the area classified by the DENR Secretary as alienable and disposable.

Land Registration; Public Lands; Documentary Evidence; It is true that the notation by a surveyor-geodetic engineer on the survey plan that the land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain is not sufficient proof of the land’s classification.—We agree with petitioner that while the certifications submitted by respondent show that under the Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1925, the blue print plan states that it became alienable and disposable on 31 December 1985. Respondent alleged that “the blue print plan merely serves to prove the precise location and the metes and bounds of the land described therein x x x and does not in any way certify the nature and classification of the land involved.” It is true that the notation by a surveyor-geodetic engineer on the survey plan that the land formed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain is not sufficient proof of the land’s classification. However, respondent should have at least presented proof that would explain the discrepancy in the dates of classification. Marquez, LRA Records Officer II, testified that the documents submitted to the court consisting of the tracing cloth plan, the technical description of Lot 10705-B, the approved subdivision plan, and the Geodetic Engineer’s certification were faithful reproductions of the original documents in the LRA office. He did not explain the

discrepancy in the dates. Neither was the Geodetic Engineer presented to explain why the date of classification on the blue print plan was different from the other certifications submitted by respondent.

Same; Ownership; The payment of the realty taxes starting 1955 gives rise to the presumption that the Dimayugas claimed ownership or possession of the land only in that year.—The tax declarations presented were only for the years starting 1955. While tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they constitute proof of claim of ownership. Respondent did not present any credible explanation why the realty taxes were only paid starting 1955 considering the claim that the Dimayugas were allegedly in possession of the land before 1945. The payment of the realty taxes starting 1955 gives rise to the presumption that the Dimayugas claimed ownership or possession of the land only in that year.

Land Registration; Public Lands; Under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations, even if wholly owned by Filipino citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain. The present 1987 Constitution continues the prohibition against private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.—The 1987 Constitution absolutely prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. In Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, the Court traced the law on disposition of lands of the public domain. Under the 1935 Constitution, there was no prohibition against private corporations from acquiring agricultural land. The 1973 Constitution limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to individuals who were citizens of the Philippines. Under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations, even if wholly owned by Filipino citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public domain. The present 1987 Constitution continues the prohibition against private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

Same; Same; The length of possession of the land by the corporation cannot be tacked on to complete the statutory 30 years acquisitive period.—What is determinative for the doctrine in Director of Lands to apply is for the corporate applicant for land registration to establish that when it acquired the land, the same was already private land by operation of law because the statutory acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years had already lapsed. The length of possession of the land by the corporation cannot be tacked on to complete the statutory 30 years acquisitive prescriptive period. Only an individual can avail of such acquisitive prescription since both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions prohibit corporations from acquiring lands of the public domain. Admittedly, a corporation can at present still apply for original registration of land under the doctrine in Director of Lands. Republic Act No. 9176 (RA 9176) further amended the Public Land Act and extended the period for the filing of applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain until 31 December 2020.

Same; Same; In applying for land registration, a private corporation cannot have any right higher than its predecessor-in-interest from whom it derived its right.—Under RA 9176, the application for judicial confirmation is limited only to 12 hectares, consistent with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that a private individual may only acquire not more than 12 hectares of alienable and disposable land. Hence, respondent, as successor-in-interest of an individual owner of the land, cannot apply for registration of land in excess of 12 hectares. Since respondent applied for 56.4007 hectares, the application for the excess area of 44.4007 hectares is contrary to law, and thus void ab initio. In applying for land registration, a private corporation cannot have any right higher than its predecessor-in-interest from whom it derived its right. This assumes, of course, that the corporation acquired the land, not exceeding 12 hectares, when the land had already become private land by operation of law. In the present case, respondent has failed to prove that any portion of the land was already private land when respondent acquired it from Porting in 1997.

GMA Network, Inc. vs. Movie and Television Review and Classification Board, 514 SCRA 191 , February 05, 2007

Mass Media; Freedom of the Press; Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB); The Movie and Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) is empowered to screen, review and examine all motion pictures and television programs including publicity materials.—Section 3 of PD 1986 empowers the MTRCB to screen, review and examine all motion pictures, television programs including publicity materials. This power of prior review is highlighted in its Rules and Regulations, particularly Section 7 thereof, which reads: SECTION 7. REQUIREMENT OF PRIOR REVIEW.—No motion picture, television program or related publicity material shall be imported, exported, produced, copied, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited or broadcasted by television without prior permit issued by the BOARD after review of the motion picture, television program or publicity material. The only exemptions from the MTRCB’s power of review are those expressly mentioned in Section 7, such as (1) television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or departments and agencies, and (2) newsreels.

Same; Same; Same; A public affairs program—described as a variety of news treatment, a cross between pure television news and news-related commentaries, analysis and/or exchange of opinions—is within the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board’s (MTRCB’s) power of review.—On the other hand, petitioner claims that “Muro Ami: The Making” was a public affairs program. Even if that were so, our resolution of this issue would not change. This Court has already ruled that a public affairs program—described as a variety of news treatment; a cross between pure television news and news-related commentaries, analysis and/or exchange of opinions—is within the MTRCB’s power of review. Clearly, “Muro Ami: The Making” (which petitioner claims to be a public affairs program) was well within the purview of MTRCB’s power of prior review.

Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; Right to Information; Administrative issuances which are not published or filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of the Philippines Law Center are ineffective and may not be enforced; Memorandum Circular No. 98-17, which provides for the penalties for the first, second and third offenses for exhibiting programs without valid permit to exhibit, has not been registered with the ONAR as of 27 January 2000—petitioner TV company was not bound by said circular and should not have been meted the sanction provided therein.—While MTRCB had jurisdiction over the subject program, Memorandum Circular 98-17, which was the basis of the suspension order, was not binding on petitioner. The Administrative Code of 1987, particularly Section 3 thereof, expressly requires each agency to file with the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of the Philippines Law Center three certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Administrative issuances which are not published or filed with the ONAR are ineffective and may not be enforced. Memorandum Circular No. 98-17, which provides for the penalties for the first, second and third offenses for exhibiting programs without valid permit to exhibit, has not been registered with the ONAR as of January 27, 2000. Hence, the same is yet to be effective. It is thus unenforceable since it has not been filed in the ONAR. Consequently, petitioner was not bound by said circular and should not have been meted the sanction provided thereunder.

Berdin vs. Mascariñas, 526 SCRA 592 , July 06, 2007Constitutional Law; Right to Information; While access to official records may not be prohibited, it certainly may be regulated.—The right of the people to information on matters of public concern is recognized under Sec. 7, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution and is subject to such limitations as may be provided by law. Thus, while access to official records may not be prohibited, it certainly may be regulated. The regulation may come either from statutory law and from the inherent power of an officer to control his office and the records under his custody and to exercise some discretion as to the manner in which persons desiring to inspect, examine, or copy the record may exercise their rights. The Municipal Treasurer in the case at bar exercised this discretion by requiring petitioners to pay for the cost of reproduction of Tax Ordinance No. 88-11-36. Such a requirement is reasonable under the circumstances considering that the ordinance is quite voluminous consisting of more than a hundred pages.

Taxation; Local Tax Code; Public hearing apparently is not necessary when the tax or fee is imposed on a tax base or subject specifically enumerated in the Local Tax Code.—A perusal of these provisions would yield a conclusion that the local board or council has the power to impose a tax or fee (1) on a tax base or subject specifically enumerated in the Local Tax Code, (2) on a tax base similar to those authorized in the Local Tax Code but which may not have been specifically enumerated therein, and (3) on a tax base or tax subject which is not similar or comparable to any tax base or subject specifically mentioned or otherwise provided for in the Local Tax Code. Public hearing apparently is not necessary when the tax or fee is imposed on a tax base or subject specifically enumerated in the Local Tax Code.

Same; Same; The same does not obtain in a situation where what is about to be taxed is not specifically enumerated in the Local Tax Code because in such a situation, the issues of whether to tax or not and at what rate a tax is to be imposed are crucial, consequently, a public hearing is necessary and vital.—The basis for the above distinction is that when a tax base or subject is specifically enumerated in the Local Tax Code, the existence of the power to tax is beyond question as the same is expressly granted. Even in the determination of the rates of the tax, a public hearing, even if ideal, is not necessary because the law itself provides for a ceiling on such rates. The same does not obtain in a situation where what is about to be taxed is not specifically enumerated in the Local Tax Code because in such a situation, the issues of whether to tax or not and at what rate a tax is to be imposed are crucial. Consequently, a public hearing is necessary and vital.Same; Same; Three Administrative Remedies Available to an Aggrieved Taxpayer.—A perusal of the applicable provisions of the Local Tax Code would show that there are three administrative remedies available to an aggrieved taxpayer. A tax ordinance may either be (1) reviewed or suspended by the Provincial Treasurer or the Secretary of Finance, (2) the subject of a formal

protest with the Secretary of Finance, or (3) questioned as to its legality and referred for opinion to the Provincial Fiscal.

Civil Service Commission vs. Nierras, 545 SCRA 316 , February 14, 2008Civil Service; Sexual Harassment; Misconduct Defined.—Misconduct refers to intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior, especially by a government official. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to, or be connected with, the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. Grave misconduct is distinguished from simple misconduct in that the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule must be manifest in grave misconduct.

Same; Same; Misconduct is grave if it involves corruption.—The misconduct is grave if it involves the additional element of corruption. Corruption as an element of grave misconduct consists of the act of an official or fiduciary person who unlawfully and wrongfully uses his station or character to procure some benefit for himself or for another person, contrary to duty and the rights of others.

Same; Same; Sexual harassment does not necessarily constitute grave misconduct particularly where complainant is not a subordinate or co-employee of respondent and there is only a single act of sexual harassment.—Under CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1994, sexual harassment does not necessarily or automatically constitute “grave misconduct.” Besides, under paragraph 2 of Section 1 thereof, sexual harassment constitutes a ground for disciplinary action under the offense of “Grave Misconduct, Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, or Simple Misconduct.”

Same; Same; Same.—Petitioner alleged that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the case of Veloso v. Caminade, 434 SCRA 1 (2004), in imposing the proper penalty on Nierras since the facts of the case are different. Indeed, it should be noted that in the instant case, Oña and Nierras are not co-employees while in the Caminade case, the complainants were the subordinates of the offender. Also, in the Caminade case, there were several incidents of sexual harassment by a judge from whom the expected standard of morality was more exacting. But here, there was only one incident of sexual harassment. If a six-month suspension can be meted to a judge from whom the expected standard of morality is more exacting, a fortiori, the same or lesser penalty should be meted to Nierras. Moreover, in the Caminade case, the offender actually forcefully kissed and grabbed the complainants. However, in this case, Oña was able to flee from the arms of Nierras even before he could cause more harm to her. Under the circumstances of the present case, we agree with the Court of Appeals that suspension of the offender for a period of six (6) months without pay is sufficient penalty.

Same; Same; In a first administrative offense, dismissal is not warranted.—Section 16, Rule XIV of the Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 provides that in the determination of penalties to be imposed, mitigating and aggravating circumstances may be considered. Considering the fact that this is the first time that Nierras is being administratively charged, it would be too harsh to impose on him the penalty of dismissal outright. Worth noting, in the case of Civil Service Commission v. Belagan, 440 SCRA 578 (2004), although the Court found that the act of the offending public official constituted grave misconduct, still it did not impose the penalty of dismissal on him, considering the fact that it was his first offense.

Domingo vs. Rayala, 546 SCRA 90 , February 18, 2008Administrative Law; Evidence; When supported by substantial evidence, factual findings made by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are accorded great respect and even finality by the courts.—That Rayala committed the acts complained of—and was guilty of sexual harassment—is, therefore, the common factual finding of not just one, but three independent bodies: the Committee, the OP and the CA. It should be remembered that when supported by substantial evidence, factual findings made by quasi-judicial and administrative bodies are accorded great respect and even finality by the courts. The principle, therefore, dictates that such findings should bind us.

Same; Public Officers; Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability.—Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can proceed independently of the others. This rule applies with full force to sexual harassment.

Sexual Harassment; Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995 (R.A. No. 7877); It is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written

statement—it may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender.—The CA, thus, correctly ruled that Rayala’s culpability is not to be determined solely on the basis of Section 3, RA 7877, because he is charged with the administrative offense, not the criminal infraction, of sexual harassment. It should be enough that the CA, along with the Investigating Committee and the Office of the President, found substantial evidence to support the administrative charge. Yet, even if we were to test Rayala’s acts strictly by the standards set in Section 3, RA 7877, he would still be administratively liable. It is true that this provision calls for a “demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor.” But it is not necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the offender. Holding and squeezing Domingo’s shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her money allegedly for school expenses with a promise of future privileges, and making statements with unmistakable sexual overtones—all these acts of Rayala resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual favor.

Same; Same; It is not essential that the demand, request or requirement be made as a condition for continued employment or for promotion to a higher position—it is enough that the respondent’s acts result in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the employee.—Contrary to Rayala’s claim, it is not essential that the demand, request or requirement be made as a condition for continued employment or for promotion to a higher position. It is enough that the respondent’s acts result in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the employee. That the acts of Rayala generated an intimidating and hostile environment for Domingo is clearly shown by the common factual finding of the Investigating Committee, the OP and the CA that Domingo reported the matter to an officemate and, after the last incident, filed for a leave of absence and requested transfer to another unit.

Same; Same; Since what is before the Court is an administrative case for sexual harassment, it is immaterial whether the crime of sexual harassment is malum in se or malum prohibitum.—Rayala alleges that the CA erred in holding that sexual harassment is an offense malum prohibitum. He argues that intent is an essential element in sexual harassment, and since the acts imputed to him were done allegedly without malice, he should be absolved of the charges against him. We reiterate that what is before us is an administrative case for sexual harassment. Thus, whether the crime of sexual harassment is malum in se or malum prohibitum is immaterial.

Same; Same; Conspiracy; A conspiracy must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.—We also reject Rayala’s allegations that the charges were filed because of a conspiracy to get him out of office and thus constitute merely political harassment. A conspiracy must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. His bare assertions cannot stand against the evidence presented by Domingo. As we have already ruled, the acts imputed to Rayala have been proven as fact. Moreover, he has not proven any ill motive on the part of Domingo and her witnesses which would be ample reason for her to conjure stories about him. On the contrary, ill motive is belied by the fact that Domingo and her witnesses—all employees of the NLRC at that time—stood to lose their jobs or suffer unpleasant consequences for coming forward and charging their boss with sexual harassment.

Same; Same; Administrative Law; Due Process; Requisites.—We hold that Rayala was properly accorded due process. In previous cases, this Court held that: [i]n administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.

Same; Same; Same; It is noteworthy that under AO 250, sexual harassment amounts to disgraceful and immoral conduct—any finding of liability for sexual harassment may also be the basis of culpability for disgraceful and immoral conduct.—This Court has held that, even in criminal cases, the designation of the offense is not controlling, thus: What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a

crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his defense. It is noteworthy that under AO 250, sexual harassment amounts to disgraceful and immoral conduct. Thus, any finding of liability for sexual harassment may also be the basis of culpability for disgraceful and immoral conduct.

Same; Same; Same; Presidency; Rule of Law; Even if the President found that a presidential appointee was indeed guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Chief Executive did not have unfettered discretion to impose a penalty other than the penalty provided by law for such offense.—In this case, it is the President of the Philippines, as the proper disciplining authority, who would determine whether there is a valid cause for the removal of Rayala as NLRC Chairman. This power, however, is qualified by the phrase “for cause as provided by law.” Thus, when the President found that Rayala was indeed guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Chief Executive did not have unfettered discretion to impose a penalty other than the penalty provided by law for such offense. As cited above, the imposable penalty for the first offense of either the administrative offense of sexual harassment or for disgraceful and immoral conduct is suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. Accordingly, it was error for the Office of the President to impose upon Rayala the penalty of dismissal from the service, a penalty which can only be imposed upon commission of a second offense.

Same; Same; Same; Aggravating Circumstances; Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, taking undue advantage of a subordinate may be considered as an aggravating circumstance and where only aggravating and no  mitigating circumstances are present, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.—Even if the OP properly considered the fact that Rayala took advantage of his high government position, it still could not validly dismiss him from the service. Under the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, taking undue advantage of a subordinate may be considered as an aggravating circumstance and where only aggravating and no mitigating circumstances are present, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. Hence, the maximum penalty that can be imposed on Rayala is suspension for one (1) year.

Same; Same; Same; Public Officers; Respondent holds the exalted position of National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Chairman, with the rank equivalent to a CA Justice—thus, it is not unavailing that rigid standards of conduct may be demanded of him.—Rayala holds the exalted position of NLRC Chairman, with the rank equivalent to a CA Justice. Thus, it is not unavailing that rigid standards of conduct may be demanded of him. In Talens-Dabon v. Judge Arceo, 259 SCRA 354 (1996), this Court, in upholding the liability of therein respondent Judge, said: The actuations of respondent are aggravated by the fact that complainant is one of his subordinates over whom he exercises control and supervision, he being the executive judge. He took advantage of his position and power in order to carry out his lustful and lascivious desires. Instead of he being in loco parentis over his subordinate employees, respondent was the one who preyed on them, taking advantage of his superior position. 

Civil Service Commission vs. Javier, 546 SCRA 485 , February 22, 2008Civil Service; Career and Non-Career Service Positions; Civil service positions are currently classified into either 1) career service and 2) non-career service positions; Career positions are characterized by: (1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications; (2) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) security of tenure; Positions that do not fall under the career service are considered non-career positions, which are characterized by: (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is co-terminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made.—Under Executive Order No. 292, or the Administrative Code of 1987, civil service positions are currently classified into either 1) career service and 2) non-career service positions. Career positions are characterized by: (1) entrance based on merit and fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examinations, or based on highly technical qualifications; (2) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3) security of tenure. In addition, the Administrative Code, under its Book V, sub-classifies career positions according to “appointment status,” divided into: 1) permanent—which is issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the positions to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed, in accordance with the provisions of law, rules and standards promulgated in pursuance thereof; and 2) temporary—which is issued, in the absence of appropriate eligibles and when it becomes necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil service eligibility; provided, that such temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months, and the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available. Positions that do not fall under the career service are considered non-career positions, which are characterized by: (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of

merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is co-terminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made.

Same; Same; Unlike career positions, primarily confidential and other non-career positions do not have security of tenure—the tenure of a confidential employee is co-terminous with that of the appointing authority, or is at the latter’s pleasure; Confidential employees may be appointed or remain in the position even beyond the compulsory retirement age.—A strict reading of the law reveals that primarily confidential positions fall under the non-career service. It is also clear that, unlike career positions, primarily confidential and other non-career positions do not have security of tenure. The tenure of a confidential employee is co-terminous with that of the appointing authority, or is at the latter’s pleasure. However, the confidential employee may be appointed or remain in the position even beyond the compulsory retirement age of 65 years.

Same; Same; Primarily Confidential Positions; At present, there is no law enacted by the legislature that defines or sets definite criteria for determining primarily confidential positions in the civil service, and neither is there a law that gives an enumeration of positions classified as primarily confidential; Jurisprudence establishes that the Court is not bound by the classification of positions in the civil service made by the legislative or executive branches, or even by a constitutional body like the petitioner—the Court is expected to make its own determination as to the nature of a particular position, such as whether it is a primarily confidential position or not, without being bound by prior classifications made by other bodies.—At present, there is no law enacted by the legislature that defines or sets definite criteria for determining primarily confidential positions in the civil service. Neither is there a law that gives an enumeration of positions classified as primarily confidential. What is available is only petitioner’s own classification of civil service positions, as well as jurisprudence which describe or give examples of confidential positions in government. Thus, the corollary issue arises: should the Court be bound by a classification of a position as confidential already made by an agency or branch of government? Jurisprudence establishes that the Court is not bound by the classification of positions in the civil service made by the legislative or executive branches, or even by a constitutional body like the petitioner. The Court is expected to make its own determination as to the nature of a particular position, such as whether it is a primarily confidential position or not, without being bound by prior classifications made by other bodies. The findings of the other branches of government are merely considered initial and not conclusive to the Court. Moreover, it is well-established that in case the findings of various agencies of government, such as the petitioner and the CA in the instant case, are in conflict, the Court must exercise its constitutional role as final arbiter of all justiciable controversies and disputes.

Same; Same; Presently, it is still the rule that executive and legislative identification or classification of primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical positions in government is no more than mere declarations, and does not foreclose judicial review, especially in the event of conflict.—Presently, it is still the rule that executive and legislative identification or classification of primarily confidential, policy-determining or highly technical positions in government is no more than mere declarations, and does not foreclose judicial review, especially in the event of conflict. Far from what is merely declared by executive or legislative fiat, it is the nature of the position which finally determines whether it is primarily confidential, policy determining or highly technical, and no department in government is better qualified to make such an ultimate finding than the judicial branch.

Same; Same; Primarily Confidential Positions; Words and Phrases; The phrase “primarily confidential” denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of discussion, delegation and reporting without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state; In classifying a position as primarily confidential, its functions must not be routinary, ordinary and day to day in character—a position is not necessarily confidential though the one in office may sometimes handle confidential matters or documents—more than ordinary confidence is required.—A position that is primarily confidential in nature is defined as early as 1950 in De los Santos v. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289 (1950), through the ponencia of Justice Pedro Tuason, to wit: x x x These positions (policy-determining, primarily confidential and highly technical positions), involve the highest degree of confidence, or are closely bound up with and dependent on other positions to which they are subordinate, or are temporary in nature. It may truly be said that the good of the service itself demands that appointments coming under this category be terminable at the will of the officer that makes them. x x x x Every appointment implies confidence, but much more than ordinary confidence is reposed in the occupant of a position that is primarily confidential. The latter phrase denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of [discussion, delegation and reporting] without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. x x x (Emphasis supplied) Since the definition in De los Santos came out, it has guided numerous other cases. Thus, it still stands that a position is primarily confidential when by

the nature of the functions of the office there exists “close intimacy” between the appointee and appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state. In classifying a position as primarily confidential, its functions must not be routinary, ordinary and day to day in character. A position is not necessarily confidential though the one in office may sometimes handle confidential matters or documents. Only ordinary confidence is required for all positions in the bureaucracy. But, as held in De los Santos, for someone holding a primarily confidential position, more than ordinary confidence is required.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Proximity Rule; A position is considered to be primarily confidential when there is a primarily close intimacy between the appointing authority and the appointee, which ensures the highest degree of trust and unfettered communication and discussion on the most confidential of matters—where the position occupied is already remote from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no longer predominant.—It is from De los Santos that the so-called “proximity rule” was derived. A position is considered to be primarily confidential when there is a primarily close intimacy between the appointing authority and the appointee, which ensures the highest degree of trust and unfettered communication and discussion on the most confidential of matters. This means that where the position occupied is already remote from that of the appointing authority, the element of trust between them is no longer predominant. On further interpretation in Griño, this was clarified to mean that a confidential nature would be limited to those positions not separated from the position of the appointing authority by an intervening public officer, or series of public officers, in the bureaucratic hierarchy.

Same; Same; Same; Government-Owned or Controlled Corporations; Government Service Insurance System; Board Secretaries; A primarily confidential position is characterized by the close proximity of the positions of the appointer and appointee as well as the high degree of trust and confidence inherent in their relationship; The position of Corporate Secretary of GSIS, or any Government-Owned or Controlled Corporation (GOCC), for that matter, is a primarily confidential position.— In fine, a primarily confidential position is characterized by the close proximity of the positions of the appointer and appointee as well as the high degree of trust and confidence inherent in their relationship. Ineluctably therefore, the position of Corporate Secretary of GSIS, or any GOCC, for that matter, is a primarily confidential position. The position is clearly in close proximity and intimacy with the appointing power. It also calls for the highest degree of confidence between the appointer and appointee.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Board members must have the highest confidence in the secretary to ensure that their honest sentiments are always and fully expressed, in the interest of the corporation—the nature of the corporate secretary’s work is akin to that of a personal secretary of a public official, a position long recognized to be primarily confidential in nature.—The nature of the duties and functions attached to the position points to its highly confidential character. The secretary reports directly to the board of directors, without an intervening officer in between them. In such an arrangement, the board expects from the secretary nothing less than the highest degree of honesty, integrity and loyalty, which is crucial to maintaining between them “freedom of intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings or betrayals of personal trust or confidential matters of state.” The responsibilities of the corporate secretary are not merely clerical or routinary in nature. The work involves constant exposure to sensitive policy matters and confidential deliberations that are not always open to the public, as unscrupulous persons may use them to harm the corporation. Board members must have the highest confidence in the secretary to ensure that their honest sentiments are always and fully expressed, in the interest of the corporation. In this respect, the nature of the corporate secretary’s work is akin to that of a personal secretary of a public official, a position long recognized to be primarily confidential in nature. The only distinction is that the corporate secretary is secretary to the entire board, composed of a number of persons, but who essentially act as one body, while the private secretary works for only one person. However, the degree of confidence involved is essentially the same.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The Board of Trustees could not be expected to function freely with a suspicious officer in its midst.—Not only do the tasks listed point to sensitive and confidential acts that the corporate secretary must perform, they also include “such other functions as the Board may direct and/or require,” a clear indication of a closely intimate relationship that exists between the secretary and the board. In such a highly acquainted relation, great trust and confidence between appointer and appointee is required. The loss of such trust or confidence could easily result in the board’s termination of the secretary’s services and ending of his term. This is understandably justified, as the board could not be expected to function freely with a suspicious officer in its midst. It is for these same reasons that jurisprudence, as earlier cited, has consistently characterized personal or private secretaries, and board secretaries, as positions of a primarily confidential nature.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; While the Court is aware that this decision has repercussions on the tenure of other corporate secretaries in various Government-Owned or Controlled Corporations (GOCCs), however, in the light of the instant controversy, the Court’s view is that the greater public interest is served if the position of a corporate secretary is classified as primarily confidential in nature.—The Court is aware that this decision has repercussions on the tenure of other corporate secretaries in various GOCCs. The officers likely assumed their positions on permanent career status, expecting protection for their tenure and appointments, but are now re-classified as primarily confidential appointees. Such concern is unfounded, however, since the statutes themselves do not classify the position of corporate secretary as permanent and career in nature. Moreover, there is no absolute guarantee that it will not be classified as confidential when a dispute arises. As earlier stated, the Court, by legal tradition, has the power to make a final determination as to which positions in government are primarily confidential or otherwise. In the light of the instant controversy, the Court’s view is that the greater public interest is served if the position of a corporate secretary is classified as primarily confidential in nature.

Public Officers; It is a basic tenet in the country’s constitutional system that “public office is a public trust,” and that there is no vested right in public office, nor an absolute right to hold office—no proprietary title attaches to a public office, as public service is not a property right.—It is a basic tenet in the country’s constitutional system that “public office is a public trust,” and that there is no vested right in public office, nor an absolute right to hold office. No proprietary title attaches to a public office, as public service is not a property right. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office. The rule is that offices in government, except those created by the constitution, may be abolished, altered, or created anytime by statute. And any issues on the classification for a position in government may be brought to and determined by the courts.

Municipality of Nueva Era, Ilocos Norte vs. Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte, 547 SCRA 71 , February 27, 2008

Municipal Corporations; Boundary Disputes; Courts; Jurisdictions; It is not only the Regional Trial Court that has appellate jurisdiction over judgment of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in a boundary dispute—B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which is supplemented by Rule 42 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, gives the CA the authority to entertain appeals of such judgments and final orders rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.—The CA erred in declaring that only the RTC has appellate jurisdiction over the judgment of the SP. True, appeal is a purely statutory right and it cannot be exercised unless it is expressly granted by law. Nevertheless, the CA can pass upon the petition for review precisely because the law allows it. Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by R.A. No. 7902, vests in the CA the appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, among others. B.P. Blg. 129 has been further supplemented by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides for the remedy of appeal via petition for review under Rule 42 to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. Thus, the CA need not treat the appeal via petition for review filed by Marcos as a petition for certiorari to be able to pass upon the same. B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which is supplemented by Rule 42 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, gives the CA the authority to entertain appeals of such judgments and final orders rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.

Same; Local Government Code; Creation of Local Government Units; Plebiscite; Statutory Construction; If at the time a local government unit was created a plebiscite was not required by law, then such local government unit is validly created even without conducting a plebiscite; It is the basic norm that provisions of the fundamental law should be given prospective application only, unless legislative intent for its retroactive application is so provided.—We agree with Nueva Era’s contention that Marcos’ claim over parts of its territory is not tenable. However, the reason is not the lack of the required plebiscite under the 1987 and 1973 constitutions and the Local Government Code of 1991 but other reasons as will be discussed below. At the time Marcos was created, a plebiscite was not required by law to create a local government unit. Hence, Marcos was validly created without conducting a plebiscite. As a matter of fact, no plebiscite was conducted in Dingras, where it was derived. Lex prospicit, non respicit. The law looks forward, not backward. It is the basic norm that provisions of the fundamental law should be given prospective application only, unless legislative intent for its retroactive application is so provided.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Expressio Unius; Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned—if a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and effect.—Since only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos’ source of territory, Nueva Era’s territory is, therefore, excluded. Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of

another thing not mentioned. If a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and effect. This rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and natural workings of the human mind. Had the legislature intended other barangays from Nueva Era to become part of Marcos, it could have easily done so by clear and concise language. Where the terms are expressly limited to certain matters, it may not by interpretation or construction be extended to other matters. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Cassus Omissus; Where the barangays of Nueva Era were not mentioned in the enumeration of barangays out of which the territory of Marcos shall be set, their omission must be held to have been done intentionally, a conclusion that finds support in the rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est which states that a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.—Since the barangays of Nueva Era were not mentioned in the enumeration of barangays out of which the territory of Marcos shall be set, their omission must be held to have been done intentionally. This conclusion finds support in the rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est, which states that a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.

Statutory Construction; Statutes; Explanatory Notes; Where there is ambiguity in a statute, courts may resort to the explanatory note to clarify the ambiguity and ascertain the purpose and intent of the statute.—This conclusion on the intention of the legislature is bolstered by the explanatory note of the bill which paved the way for the creation of Marcos. Said explanatory note mentioned only Dingras as the mother municipality of Marcos. Where there is ambiguity in a statute, as in this case, courts may resort to the explanatory note to clarify the ambiguity and ascertain the purpose and intent of the statute.

Same; Same; The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application.—Only Dingras is specifically named by law as source territory of Marcos. Hence, the said description of boundaries of Marcos is descriptive only of the listed barangays of Dingras as a compact and contiguous territory. Considering that the description of the eastern boundary of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 is ambiguous, the same must be interpreted in light of the legislative intent. The law must be given a reasonable interpretation, to preclude absurdity in its application. We thus uphold the legislative intent to create Marcos out of the territory of Dingras only.

Montemayor vs. Bundalian, 405 SCRA 264 , July 01, 2003Same; Res Judicata; The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings not to the exercise of administrative powers.—To be sure, the decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the PCAGC case subject of this review. The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers. Petitioner was investigated by the Ombudsman for his possible criminal liability for the acquisition of the Burbank property in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Revised Penal Code. For the same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as a presidential appointee, was investigated by the PCAGC by virtue of the administrative power and control of the President over him. As the PCAGC’s investigation of petitioner was administrative in nature, the doctrine of res judicata finds no application in the case at bar. [Montemayor vs. Bundalian, 405 SCRA 264(2003)]

Air Transportation Office vs. Ramos, 644 SCRA 36 , February 23, 2011Constitutional Law; State Immunity; The immunity of the state from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability of the State, is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution; The immunity from suit is based on the political truism that the State, as a sovereign, can do no wrong.—The immunity of the State from suit, known also as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or non-suability of the State, is expressly provided in Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, viz.: Section 3. The State may not be sued without its consent. The immunity from suit is based on the political truism that the State, as a sovereign, can do no wrong.Same; Same; Practical considerations dictate the establishment of an immunity from suit in favor of the State; Several justifications have been offered to support the adoption of the doctrine in the Philippines, but that offered in Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, 29 SCRA 589 (1969), is the most acceptable explanation.—Practical considerations dictate the establishment of an immunity from suit in favor of the State. Otherwise, and the State is suable at the instance of every other individual, government service may be severely obstructed and public safety endangered because of the number of suits that the State has to defend against. Several justifications have been offered to support the adoption of the doctrine in the Philippines, but that offered in Providence Washington Insurance Co. v. Republic of the Philippines, 29 SCRA 598 (1969), is “the most acceptable explanation,” according to Father Bernas, a recognized commentator on

Constitutional Law, to wit: [A] continued adherence to the doctrine of non-suability is not to be deplored for as against the inconvenience that may be caused private parties, the loss of governmental efficiency and the obstacle to the performance of its multifarious functions are far greater if such a fundamental principle were abandoned and the availability of judicial remedy were not thus restricted. With the well-known propensity on the part of our people to go to court, at the least provocation, the loss of time and energy required to defend against law suits, in the absence of such a basic principle that constitutes such an effective obstacle, could very well be imagined.

Same; Same; An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty.—An unincorporated government agency without any separate juridical personality of its own enjoys immunity from suit because it is invested with an inherent power of sovereignty. Accordingly, a claim for damages against the agency cannot prosper; otherwise, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is violated. However, the need to distinguish between an unincorporated government agency performing governmental function and one performing proprietary functions has arisen. The immunity has been upheld in favor of the former because its function is governmental or incidental to such function; it has not been upheld in favor of the latter whose function was not in pursuit of a necessary function of government but was essentially a business.

Same; Same;  The Court of Appeals (CA) correctly appreciated the juridical character of the Air Transportation Office (ATO) as an agency of the Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function.—In our view, the CA thereby correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as an agency of the Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was instead involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence, the ATO had no claim to the State’s immunity from suit. We uphold the CA’s aforequoted holding.

Same; Same; The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs’ property.—We further observe the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from the taking without just compensation and without the proper expropriation proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiffs’ property. Thus, in De los Santos v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 223 SCRA 11 (1993), the trial court’s dismissal based on the doctrine of non-suability of the State of two cases (one of which was for damages) filed by owners of property where a road 9 meters wide and 128.70 meters long occupying a total area of 1,165 square meters and an artificial creek 23.20 meters wide and 128.69 meters long occupying an area of 2,906 square meters had been constructed by the provincial engineer of Rizal and a private contractor without the owners’ knowledge and consent was reversed and the cases remanded for trial on the merits. The Supreme Court ruled that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was not an instrument for perpetrating any injustice on a citizen.

Same; Same; The issue of whether or not the Air Transportation Office (ATO) could be sued without the State’s consent has been rendered moot by the passage of Republic Act No. 9497, otherwise known as the Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008.—The issue of whether or not the ATO could be sued without the State’s consent has been rendered moot by the passage of Republic Act No. 9497, otherwise known as the Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008. [Air Transportation Office vs. Ramos, 644 SCRA 36(2011)]

Social Justice Society (SJS) vs. Atienza, Jr., 545 SCRA 92 , February 13, 2008Remedial Law; Actions; Interventions; Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such proceedings; Requisites for Intervention of a Non-Party.—Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such proceedings. The pertinent rules are Sections 1 and 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court: x x x Thus, the following are the requisites for intervention of a non-party: (1) Legal interest (a) in the matter in controversy; or (b) in the success of either of the parties; or (c) against both parties; or (d) person is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof; (2) Intervention will not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of rights of original parties; (3) Intervenor’s rights may not be fully protected in a separate proceeding and (4) The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court.

Same; Same; Same; The appropriate time to file the motions-in-intervention was before and not after resolution of the case.—For both the oil companies and DOE, the last requirement is definitely absent. As a rule, intervention is allowed “before rendition of judgment” as Section 2, Rule 19

expressly provides. Both filed their separate motions after our decision was promulgated. In Republic of the Philippines v. Gingoyon, 481 SCRA 457 (2006), a recently decided case which was also an original action filed in this Court, we declared that the appropriate time to file the motions-in-intervention was before and not after resolution of the case.

Same; Same; Same; Court has recognized exceptions to Section 2, Rule 19 in the interest of substantial justice.—The Court, however, has recognized exceptions to Section 2, Rule 19 in the interest of substantial justice: The rule on intervention, like all other rules of procedure, is intended to make the powers of the Court fully and completely available for justice. It is aimed to facilitate a comprehensive adjudication of rival claims overriding technicalities on the timeliness of the filing thereof.

Same; Same; Same; The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court before which the case is pending.—Be that as it may, although their motion for intervention was not filed on time, we will allow it because they raised and presented novel issues and arguments that were not considered by the Court in its March 7, 2007 decision. After all, the allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court before which the case is pending. Considering the compelling reasons favoring intervention, we do not think that this will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of rights of the original parties. In fact, it will be expedited since their intervention will enable us to rule on the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027 instead of waiting for the RTC’s decision.

Injunctions; Requisites for the Issuance of a Preliminary In-junction.—There are two requisites for the issuance of a preliminary injunction: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie and (2) the acts sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation sought to be prevented will cause an irreparable injustice.

Same; Statutes; Statutory Construction; It is a settled rule than an ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity and, as such cannot be restrained by injunction; When the validity of the ordinance is assailed, the courts are not precluded from issuing an injunctive writ against its enforcement.—The act sought to be restrained here was the enforcement of Ordinance No. 8027. It is a settled rule that an ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity and, as such, cannot be restrained by injunction. Nevertheless, when the validity of the ordinance is assailed, the courts are not precluded from issuing an injunctive writ against its enforcement. However, we have declared that the issuance of said writ is proper only when: . . . the petitioner assailing the ordinance has made out a case of unconstitutional-ity strong enough to overcome, in the mind of the judge, the presumption of validity, in addition to a showing of a clear legal right to the remedy sought . . . . (Emphasis supplied)

Same; Same; Same; The mere fact that the ordinance is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid will not entitle a party to have its enforcement enjoined.—Nowhere in the judge’s discussion can we see that, in addition to a showing of a clear legal right of Chevron and Shell to the remedy sought, he was convinced that they had made out a case of unconstitutionality or invalidity strong enough to overcome the presumption of validity of the ordinance. Statutes and ordinances are presumed valid unless and until the courts declare the contrary in clear and unequivocal terms. The mere fact that the ordinance is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid will not entitle a party to have its enforcement enjoined. The presumption is all in favor of validity.

Same; Same; Same; Courts will not invalidate an ordinance unless it clearly appears that it is unconstitutional.—Courts will not invalidate an ordinance unless it clearly appears that it is unconstitutional. There is no such showing here. Therefore, the injunctive writs issued in the Manila RTC’s May 19, 2003 order had no leg to stand on.

Same; Same; Same; While courts are required to take judicial notice of the laws enacted by Congress, the rule with respect to local ordinances is different.—The March 7, 2007 decision did not take into consideration the passage of Ordinance No. 8119 entitled “An Ordinance Adopting the Manila Comprehensive Land Use Plan and Zoning Regulations of 2006 and Providing for the Administration, Enforcement and Amendment thereto” which was approved by respondent on June 16, 2006. The simple reason was that the Court was never informed about this ordinance. While courts are required to take judicial notice of the laws enacted by Congress, the rule with respect to local ordinances is different. Ordinances are not included in the enumeration of matters covered by mandatory judicial notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court. Although, Section 50 of RA 409 provides that: SEC.50.Judicial notice of ordinances.—All courts sitting in the city shall take judicial notice of the ordinances passed by the [Sangguniang Panglungsod]. This cannot be taken to mean that this Court, since it has its seat in the City of Manila, should have taken steps to procure a copy of the ordinance on its own, relieving the party of any duty to inform the Court about it.

Same; Same; Same; The party asking the court to take judicial notice is obligated to supply the court with the full text of the rules the party desires it to have notice of.—Even where there is a statute that requires a court to take judicial notice of municipal ordinances, a court is not required to take judicial notice of ordinances that are not before it and to which it does not have access. The party asking the court to take judicial notice is obligated to supply the court with the full text of the rules the party desires it to have notice of. Counsel should take the initiative in requesting that a trial court take judicial notice of an ordinance even where a statute requires courts to take judicial notice of local ordinances.

Same; Same; Same; Judicial Admissions; To constitute a judicial admission, the admission must be made in the same case in which it is offered; Parties cannot take vacillating or contrary positions regarding the validity of a statute or ordinance.—While it is true that a party making a judicial admission cannot subsequently take a position contrary to or inconsistent with what was pleaded, the aforestated rule is not applicable here. Respondent made the statements regarding the ordinances in civil case nos. 03-106379 and 06-115334 which are not “the same” as this case before us. To constitute a judicial admission, the admission must be made in the same case in which it is offered. Hence, respondent is not estopped from claiming that Ordinance No. 8119 did not supersede Ordinance No. 8027. On the contrary, it is the oil companies which should be considered estopped. They rely on the argument that Ordinance No. 8119 superseded Ordinance No. 8027 but, at the same time, also impugn its (8119’s) validity. We frown on the adoption of inconsistent positions and distrust any attempt at clever positioning under one or the other on the basis of what appears advantageous at the moment. Parties cannot take vacillating or contrary positions regarding the validity of a statute or ordinance. Nonetheless, we will look into the merits of the argument of implied repeal.

Statutes; Statutory Construction; Repeals; Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals the intention of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect; Two Kinds of Implied Repeal; Implied repeals are not favored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest.—Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals the intention of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. There are two kinds of implied repeal. The first is: where the provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are irreconcilably contradictory, the latter act, to the extent of the conflict, constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The second is: if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law. The oil companies argue that the situation here falls under the first category. Implied repeals are not favored and will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest. As statutes and ordinances are presumed to be passed only after careful deliberation and with knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it follows that, in passing a law, the legislature did not intend to interfere with or abrogate a former law relating to the same subject matter. If the intent to repeal is not clear, the later act should be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the earlier act.Same; Same; Same; It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that a subsequent general law does not repeal a prior special law on the same subject unless it clearly appears that the legislature has intended by the latter general act to modify or repeal the earlier special law.— It is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that a subsequent general law does not repeal a prior special law on the same subject unless it clearly appears that the legislature has intended by the latter general act to modify or repeal the earlier special law. Generalia specialibus non derogant (a general law does not nullify a specific or special law). This is so even if the provisions of the general law are sufficiently comprehensive to include what was set forth in the special act.The special act and the general law must stand together, one as the law of the particular subject and the other as the law of general application. The special law must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to, or a qualification of, the general act or provision.

Same; Same; Substantive Requirements for an Ordinance to be Valid.—The tests of a valid ordinance are well-established. For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the LGU to enact and be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy and (6) must not be unreasonable.

Same; Same; Constitutional Law; Police Power; While police power rests primarily with the national legislature, such power may be delegated.—Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila in the exercise of its police power. Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. This power flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law). While police power

rests primarily with the national legislature, such power may be delegated. Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated police power to local governments.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites Before Local Governments may be Considered as Having Properly Exercised Their Police Power.—As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and a lawful method.

Same; Same; Same; Same; In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government.— In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government. Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the general welfare. However, the interference must be reasonable and not arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used to protect public health, morals, safety or welfare must have a reasonable relation to the end in view.

Same; Same; Same; Same; In the exercise of police power, there is a limitation on or restriction of property interests to promote public welfare which involves no compensable taking.—The oil companies aver that the ordinance is unfair and oppressive because they have invested billions of pesos in the depot. Its forced closure will result in huge losses in income and tremendous costs in constructing new facilities. Their contention has no merit. In the exercise of police power, there is a limitation on or restriction of property interests to promote public welfare which involves no compensable taking. Compensation is necessary only when the state’s power of eminent domain is exercised. In eminent domain, property is appropriated and applied to some public purpose. Property condemned under the exercise of police power, on the other hand, is noxious or intended for a noxious or forbidden purpose and, consequently, is not compensable. The restriction imposed to protect lives, public health and safety from danger is not a taking. It is merely the prohibition or abatement of a noxious use which interferes with paramount rights of the public.

Same; Same; Same; Same; An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law.—The oil companies take the position that the ordinance has discriminated against and singled out the Pandacan Terminals despite the fact that the Pandacan area is congested with buildings and residences that do not comply with the National Building Code, Fire Code and Health and Sanitation Code. This issue should not detain us for long. An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property.—Essentially, the oil companies are fighting for their right to property. They allege that they stand to lose billions of pesos if forced to relocate. However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to property. The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable, property is not. When the state or LGU’s exercise of police power clashes with a few individuals’ right to property, the former should prevail. [Social Justice Society (SJS) vs. Atienza, Jr., 545 SCRA 92(2008)]

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Listana, 654 SCRA 559 , July 27, 2011Agrarian Reform Law; Eminent Domain; Just Compensation; The valuation of property in expropriation cases pursuant to R.A. No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, is essentially a judicial function which is vested in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) acting as Special Agrarian Court and cannot be lodged with administrative agencies such as the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).—The valuation of property in expropriation cases pursuant to R.A. No. 6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, is essentially a judicial function which is vested in the RTC acting as Special Agrarian Court and cannot be lodged with administrative agencies such as the DAR.

Same; Same; Same; While a petition for the fixing of just compensation with the Special Agrarian Court (SAC) is not an appeal from the agrarian reform adjudicator’s decision but an original action, the same has to be filed within the 15-day period stated in the Department of Agrarian Reform

Adjudication Board (DARAB) Rules; otherwise, the adjudicator’s decision will attain finality.—To resolve the conflict in the rulings of the Court, we now declare herein, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, that the better rule is that stated in Philippine Veterans Bank, reiterated in Lubrica and in the August 14, 2007 Decision in this case. Thus, while a petition for the fixing of just compensation with the SAC is not an appeal from the agrarian reform adjudicator’s decision but an original action, the same has to be filed within the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules; otherwise, the adjudicator’s decision will attain finality. This rule is not only in accord with law and settled jurisprudence but also with the principles of justice and equity. Verily, a belated petition before the SAC, e.g., one filed a month, or a year, or even a decade after the land valuation of the DAR adjudicator, must not leave the dispossessed landowner in a state of uncertainty as to the true value of his property.

Same; Same; Same; There exists no compelling reason to justify relaxation of the rule on the timely availment of judicial action for the determination of just compensation.—Petitioner clearly slept on its rights by not filing the petition in the SAC within the prescribed fifteen-day period or a reasonable time after notice of the denial of its motion for reconsideration. Even assuming there was already a consummated sale with respect to the 151.1419 hectares and LBP’s valuation thereof had been fully paid to the respondent, the amount already paid by LBP shall be deducted from the total compensation as determined by the PARAD. Notably, LBP exhibited lack of interest in the discharge of its statutory functions as it failed to actively participate in the summary administrative proceeding despite due notice of the hearings. Clearly, there exists no compelling reason to justify relaxation of the rule on the timely availment of judicial action for the determination of just compensation.

Remedial Law; Judgments; Finality of Judgments; A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land; Exceptions.—It is a fundamental legal principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. The only exceptions to the general rule on finality of judgments are the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its execution unjust and inequitable. Indeed, litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, even at the risk of occasional errors.

New Sun Valley Homeowners' Association, Inc. vs. Sangguniang Barangay, Barangay Sun Valley, Parañaque City, 654 SCRA 438 , July 27, 2011

Administrative Law; Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence.—We have emphasized the importance of applying this doctrine in a recent case, wherein we held: The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicial system. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. The rationale for this doctrine is obvious. It entails lesser expenses and provides for the speedier resolution of controversies. Comity and convenience also impel courts of justice to shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative redress has been completed.

Evidence; Burden of Proof; In civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. Parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent.—Moreover, being the party asking for injunctive relief, the burden of proof was on petitioner to show ownership over the subject roads. This, petitioner failed to do. In civil cases, it is a basic rule that the party making allegations has the burden of proving them by a preponderance of evidence. Parties must rely on the strength of their own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defense offered by their opponent.

Local Government Code; Jurisdiction; The local government unit’s power to close and open roads within its jurisdiction is clear under the Local Government Code.—On the other hand, the local government unit’s power to close and open roads within its jurisdiction is clear under the Local Government Code, Section 21 of which provides: Section 21. Closure and Opening of Roads.—(a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily close or open any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction: Provided, however, That in case of permanent closure, such ordinance must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of all the

members of the sanggunian, and when necessary, an adequate substitute for the public facility that is subject to closure is provided.

City of Pasig vs. Republic, 656 SCRA 271 , August 24, 2011Taxation; Local Taxation; Real Estate Tax; Properties owned by the Republic of the Philippines are exempt from real property tax “except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person”—the portions of the properties not leased to taxable entities are exempt from real estate tax while the portions of the properties leased to taxable entities are subject to real estate tax.—Even as the Republic of the Philippines is now the owner of the properties in view of the voluntary surrender of MPLDC by its former registered owner, Campos, to the State, such transfer does not prevent a third party with a better right from claiming such properties in the proper forum. In the meantime, the Republic of the Philippines is the presumptive owner of the properties for taxation purposes. Section 234(a) of Republic Act No. 7160 states that properties owned by the Republic of the Philippines are exempt from real property tax “except when the beneficial use thereof has been granted, for consideration or otherwise, to a taxable person.” Thus, the portions of the properties not leased to taxable entities are exempt from real estate tax while the portions of the properties leased to taxable entities are subject to real estate tax. The law imposes the liability to pay real estate tax on the Republic of the Philippines for the portions of the properties leased to taxable entities. It is, of course, assumed that the Republic of the Philippines passes on the real estate tax as part of the rent to the lessees.

Same; Same; Same; Public Auctions; Properties of public dominion are not only exempt from real estate tax, they are exempt from sale at public auction—property of public dominion, which generally includes property belonging to the State, cannot be subject of the commerce of man.—Article 420 of the Civil Code classifies as properties of public dominion those that are “intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads” and those that “are intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.” Properties of public dominion are not only exempt from real estate tax, they are exempt from sale at public auction. In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, 587 SCRA 172 (2009), the Court held that, “It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property belonging to the State, cannot be x x x subject of the commerce of man.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the parcels of land owned by the Republic are not properties of public dominion, portions of the properties leased to taxable entities are not only subject to real estate tax, they can also be sold at public auction to satisfy the tax delinquency.—In the present case, the parcels of land are not properties of public dominion because they are not “intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads.” Neither are they “intended for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.” MPLDC leases portions of the properties to different business establishments. Thus, the portions of the properties leased to taxable entities are not only subject to real estate tax, they can also be sold at public auction to satisfy the tax delinquency. In sum, only those portions of the properties leased to taxable entities are subject to real estate tax for the period of such leases. Pasig City must, therefore, issue to respondent new real property tax assessments covering the portions of the properties leased to taxable entities. If the Republic of the Philippines fails to pay the real property tax on the portions of the properties leased to taxable entities, then such portions may be sold at public auction to satisfy the tax delinquency. [City of Pasig vs. Republic, 656 SCRA 271(2011)]

National Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, 656 SCRA 60 , August 24, 2011Same; Same; Inverse Condemnation; Damages; Words and Phrases; Inverse condemnation, or the action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency, is different from the action for damages—the former has the objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency, while the latter action seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through damages, which may be actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated, or exemplary.—The action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs from the action for damages. The former, also known as inverse condemnation, has the objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency. Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation in order to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample. On the other hand, the latter action seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through damages, which may be actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated, or exemplary. When a right is exercised in a manner not conformable with the norms

enshrined in Article 19 and like provisions on human relations in the Civil Code, and the exercise results to the damage of another, a legal wrong is committed and the wrongdoer is held responsible.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Prescription; The fact that the owner rather than the expropriator brings the action to recover just compensation does not change the essential nature of the suit as an inverse condemnation, for the suit is not based on tort, but on the constitutional prohibition against the taking of property without just compensation; It would very well be contrary to the clear language of the Constitution to bar the recovery of just compensation for private property taken for a public use solely on the basis of statutory prescription.—The two actions are radically different in nature and purpose. The action to recover just compensation is based on the Constitution while the action for damages is predicated on statutory enactments. Indeed, the former arises from the exercise by the State of its power of eminent domain against private property for public use, but the latter emanates from the transgression of a right. The fact that the owner rather than the expropriator brings the former does not change the essential nature of the suit as an inverse condemnation, for the suit is not based on tort, but on the constitutional prohibition against the taking of property without just compensation. It would very well be contrary to the clear language of the Constitution to bar the recovery of just compensation for private property taken for a public use solely on the basis of statutory prescription.

Same; Same; Same; Taking; Words and Phrases; It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation—the expropriator’s action may be short of acquisition of title, physical possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a taking; Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value.—We agree with both the RTC and the CA that there was a full taking on the part of NPC, notwithstanding that the owners were not completely and actually dispossessed. It is settled that the taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or appropriation. Indeed, the expropriator’s action may be short of acquisition of title, physical possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a taking. Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value. It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property, nor material whether the property is removed from the possession of the owner, or in any respect changes hands. As a result, NPC should pay just compensation for the entire land. In that regard, the RTC pegged just compensation at P500.00/square meter based on its finding on what the prevailing market value of the property was at the time of the filing of the complaint, and the CA upheld the RTC.

Same; Same; Same; Where the expropriator entered the property without the intention of formally expropriating the land, and without the prior knowledge and consent of the owners, reckoning just compensation, as a measure of simple justice and ordinary fairness to them, on the value at the time the owners commenced these inverse condemnation proceedings is entirely warranted—such manner of entry by the expropriator denied elementary due process of law to the owners since that time until the latter commenced the inverse condemnation proceedings.—The RTC based its fixing of just compensation ostensibly on the prevailing market value at the time of the filing of the complaint, instead of reckoning from the time of the taking pursuant to Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 6395. The CA did not dwell on the reckoning time, possibly because NPC did not assign that as an error on the part of the RTC. We rule that the reckoning value is the value at the time of the filing of the complaint, as the RTC provided in its decision. Compensation that is reckoned on the market value prevailing at the time either when NPC entered or when it completed the tunnel, as NPC submits, would not be just, for it would compound the gross unfairness already caused to the owners by NPC’s entering without the intention of formally expropriating the land, and without the prior knowledge and consent of the Heirs of Macabangkit. NPC’s entry denied elementary due process of law to the owners since then until the owners commenced the inverse condemnation proceedings. The Court is more concerned with the necessity to prevent NPC from unjustly profiting from its deliberate acts of denying due process of law to the owners. As a measure of simple justice and ordinary fairness to them, therefore, reckoning just compensation on the value at the time the owners commenced these inverse condemnation proceedings is entirely warranted.

Same; Same; The award of interest—fixed at 12% per annum—on the amount of just compensation renders the grant of back rentals unwarranted.—Granting rentals is legally and factually bereft of justification, in light of the taking of the land being already justly compensated. Conformably with the ruling in Manila International Airport Authority v. Rodriguez, 483 SCRA 619 (2006), in which the award of interest was held to render the grant of back rentals unwarranted, we delete the award of back rentals and in its place prescribe interest of 12% interest per annum from November 21, 1997, the date of the filing of the complaint, until the full liability is paid by NPC. The imposition of interest of 12% interest per annum follows a long line of pertinent jurisprudence, whereby the Court has

fixed the rate of interest on just compensation at 12% per annum whenever the expropriator has not immediately paid just compensation.

Judgments; Damages; Failure of both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals to render the factual and legal justifications for the moral and exemplary damages in the body of their decisions immediately demands the striking out of the awards for being in violation of the fundamental rule that the decision must clearly state the facts and the law on which it is based—without the factual and legal justifications, the awards are exposed as the product of conjecture and speculation, which have no place in fair judicial adjudication.—The RTC did not state any factual and legal justifications for awarding to the Heirs of Macabangkit moral and exemplary damages each in the amount of P200,000.00. The awards just appeared in the fallo of its decision. Neither did the CA proffer any justifications for sustaining the RTC on the awards. We consider the omissions of the lower courts as pure legal error that we feel bound to correct even if NPC did not submit that for our consideration. There was, to begin with, no factual and legal bases mentioned for the awards. It is never trite to remind that moral and exemplary damages, not by any means liquidated or assessed as a matter of routine, always require evidence that establish the circumstances under which the claimant is entitled to them. Moreover, the failure of both the RTC and the CA to render the factual and legal justifications for the moral and exemplary damages in the body of their decisions immediately demands the striking out of the awards for being in violation of the fundamental rule that the decision must clearly state the facts and the law on which it is based. Without the factual and legal justifications, the awards are exposed as the product of conjecture and speculation, which have no place in fair judicial adjudication.

Same; Same; Attorney’s Fees; Concepts; Ordinary and Extraordinary Concepts of Attorney’s Fees, Distinguished; Words and Phrases; The inclusion of the ordinary concept of attorney’s fees in the trial court’s judgment among the liabilities of National Power Corporation (NPC) converted the fees to extraordinary, and the Court expresses its discomfort that the Court of Appeals did not do anything to excise the clearly erroneous and unfounded grant.—In assessing attorney’s fees against NPC and in favor of the respondents, the RTC casually disregarded the fundamental distinction between the two concepts of attorney’s fees—the ordinary and the extraordinary. These concepts were aptly distinguished in Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC, 579 SCRA 509 (1997), huswise: There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorney’s fees, the so-called ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorney’s fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services he has rendered to the latter. The basis of this compensation is the fact of his employment by and his agreement with the client. In its extraordinary concept, an attorney’s fee is an indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party in a litigation. The basis of this is any of the cases provided by law where such award can be made, such as those authorized in Article 2208, Civil Code, and is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or as part thereof. By referring to the award as contingency fees, and reducing the award from 20% to 15%, the RTC was really referring to a supposed agreement on attorney’s fees between the Heirs of Macabangkit and their counsel. As such, the concept of attorney’s fees involved was the ordinary. Yet, the inclusion of the attorney’s fees in the judgment among the liabilities of NPC converted the fees to extraordinary. We have to disagree with the RTC thereon, and we express our discomfort that the CA did not do anything to excise the clearly erroneous and unfounded grant. [National Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, 656 SCRA 60(2011)]

Bureau of Customs Employees Association (BOCEA) vs. Teves, 661 SCRA 589 , December 06, 2011

Same; Statutes; Bill of Attainder; Republic Act No. 9335 is not a bill of attainder; A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial.—On this score, we hold that R.A. No. 9335 is not a bill of attainder. A bill of attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial.

Same; Same; Same; Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9335 merely lays down the grounds for the termination of a Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) or Bureau of Customs (BOC) official or employee and provides for the consequences thereof.—R.A. No. 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a judicial trial. R.A. No. 9335 merely lays down the grounds for the termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee and provides for the consequences thereof. The democratic processes are still followed and the constitutional rights of the concerned employee are amply protected.

Same; Same; Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9335 has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative.—As the Court is not a trier of facts, the investigation on the veracity of, and the proper action on these anomalies are in the hands of the Executive branch. Correlatively, the wisdom for the enactment of this law remains within the domain of the Legislative branch. We merely interpret the law as it is. The Court has no discretion to give statutes a meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language thereof. Just like any other law, R.A. No. 9335 has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution and not one that is doubtful, speculative, or argumentative. We have so declared in Abakada, and we now reiterate that R.A. No. 9335 and its IRR are constitutional.

Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System, The vs. Velasco, 641 SCRA 372 , February 02, 2011

Administrative Law; Civil Service; Not all rules and regulations adopted by every government agency are to be filed with the UP Law Center.—Not all rules and regulations adopted by every government agency are to be filed with the UP Law Center. Only those of general or of permanent character are to be filed. According to the UP Law Center’s guidelines for receiving and publication of rules and regulations, “interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the Administrative agency and not the public,” need not be filed with the UP Law Center.

Same; Same; Step Increment; A grant of step increment on the basis of length of service requires that an employee must have rendered at least three years of continuous and satisfactory service in the same position to which he is an incumbent.—A grant of step increment on the basis of length of service requires that an employee must have rendered at least three years of continuous and satisfactory service in the same position to which he is an incumbent. To determine whether service is continuous, it is necessary to define what actual service is. “Actual service” refers to the period of continuous service since the appointment of the official or employee concerned, including the period or periods covered by any previously approved leave with pay.

Same; Same; Same; Suspension; If an employee is suspended as a penalty, it effectively interrupts the continuity of his government service at the commencement of the service of the said suspension.—If an employee is suspended as a penalty, it effectively interrupts the continuity of his government service at the commencement of the service of the said suspension. This is because a person under penalty of suspension is not rendering actual service. The suspension will undoubtedly be considered a gap in the continuity of the service for purposes of the computation of the three year period in the grant of step increment.

Same; Same; Preventive Suspension; Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty.—Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a penalty. It is a measure intended to enable the disciplining authority to investigate charges against respondent by preventing the latter from intimidating or in any way influencing witnesses against him. If the investigation is not finished and a decision is not rendered within that period, the suspension will be lifted and the respondent will automatically be reinstated.

Same; Same; Same; Step Increment; The grant of step increment will only be delayed for the same number of days, which must not exceed 90 days, that an official or employee was serving the preventive suspension.—If an employee is preventively suspended, the employee is not rendering actual service and this will also effectively interrupt the continuity of his government service. Consequently, an employee who was preventively suspended will still be entitled to step increment after serving the time of his preventive suspension even if the pending administrative case against him has not yet been resolved or dismissed. The grant of step increment will only be delayed for the same number of days, which must not exceed 90 days, that an official or employee was serving the preventive suspension.

Vda. de Herrera vs. Bernardo, 650 SCRA 87 , June 01, 2011Administrative Agencies; Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP); The Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) is an administrative body established as a means of providing a mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems among small settlers, landowners and members of the cultural minorities to avoid social unrest.—The COSLAP was created by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 561, issued on September 21, 1979 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. It is an administrative body established as a means of providing a mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems among small settlers, landowners and members of the cultural minorities to avoid social unrest.

Same; Jurisdiction; Administrative agencies, like the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), are tribunals of limited jurisdiction that can only wield powers which are specifically granted to it by its enabling statute; The law does not vest jurisdiction on the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) over any land dispute or problem.—Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction that can only wield powers which are specifically granted to it by its enabling statute. Under Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP has two options in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, to wit: (a) refer the matter to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement/resolution; or (b) assume jurisdiction if the matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of the law, if such case is critical and explosive in nature, taking into account the large number of parties involved, the presence or emergence of social unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action. In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer the same to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP has to consider the nature or classification of the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the questions raised, and the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and damage or destruction to property. The law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land dispute or problem.

Same; Same; A judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction is void; It cannot be the source of any right or create any obligation; All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.—Since the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the action, all the proceedings therein, including the decision rendered, are null and void. A judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction is void. It cannot be the source of any right or create any obligation. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Having no legal effect, the situation is the same as it would be as if there was no judgment at all. It leaves the parties in the position they were before the proceedings.

Jurisdiction; Estoppel; The fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties.—Respondents’ allegation that petitioner is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP by reason of laches does not hold water. Petitioner is not estopped from raising the jurisdictional issue, because it may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. The fact that a person attempts to invoke unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties.

Same; Laches; Laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to apply.—In Regalado v. Go, 514 SCRA 616 (2007), the Court held that laches should be clearly present for the Sibonghanoy doctrine to apply, thus: Laches is defined as the “failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable length of time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.” The ruling in People v. Regalario that was based on the landmark doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 (1968), on the matter of jurisdiction by estoppel is the exception rather than the rule. Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should have been clearly present; that is, lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.

Land Titles; The issue on the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.—The issue of the validity of the Title was brought only during the proceedings before this Court as said title was issued in the name of petitioner’s husband only during the pendency of the appeal before the CA. The issue on the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose and the present appeal before us, is simply not the direct proceeding contemplated by law.

Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs. Commission on Audit, 651 SCRA 146 , June 07, 2011Corporation Law; Commission on Audit; Boy Scouts of the Philippines; The Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) is a public corporation and its funds are subject to the Commission on Audit’s (COA’s) audit jurisdiction.—After looking at the legislative history of its amended charter and carefully studying the applicable laws and the arguments of both parties, we find that the BSP is a public corporation and its funds are subject to the COA’s audit jurisdiction.

Same; Same; Same; Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) as presently constituted under Republic Act No. 7278, falls under the second classification of juridical persons under Article 44 of the Civil Code.—There are three classes of juridical persons under Article 44 of the Civil Code and the BSP, as presently constituted under Republic Act No. 7278, falls under the second classification. Article 44 reads: Art. 44. The following are juridical persons: (1) The State and its political subdivisions; (2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law; (3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or member.

Same; Same; Same; The Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) which was created by a special law to serve a public purpose in pursuit of a constitutional mandate, comes within the class of “public corporations” defined by paragraph 2, Article 44 of the Civil Code.—Evidently, the BSP, which was created by a special law to serve a public purpose in pursuit of a constitutional mandate, comes within the class of “public corporations” defined by paragraph 2, Article 44 of the Civil Code and governed by the law which creates it, pursuant to Article 45 of the same Code.

Same; Same; Same; The Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) is a public corporation or a government agency or instrumentality with judicial personality, which does not fall within the constitutional prohibition in Article XII, Section 16, notwithstanding the amendments to its charter; Not all corporations, which are not government owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be considered private corporations, as there exists another distinct class of corporations or chartered institutions which are otherwise known as “public corporations.”—The BSP is a public corporation or a government agency or instrumentality with juridical personality, which does not fall within the constitutional prohibition in Article XII, Section 16, notwithstanding the amendments to its charter. Not all corporations, which are not government owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be considered private corporations as there exists another distinct class of corporations or chartered institutions which are otherwise known as “public corporations.” These corporations are treated by law as agencies or instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to the tests of ownership or control and economic viability but to different criteria relating to their public purposes/interests or constitutional policies and objectives and their administrative relationship to the government or any of its Departments or Offices.

Same; Same; Same; The ownership and control test is likewise irrelevant for a public corporation like the Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP).—The ownership and control test is likewise irrelevant for a public corporation like the BSP. To reiterate, the relationship of the BSP, an attached agency, to the government, through the DECS, is defined in the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. The BSP meets the minimum statutory requirement of an attached government agency as the DECS Secretary sits at the BSP Board ex officio, thus facilitating the policy and program coordination between the BSP and the DECS.

Same; Same; Same; Boy Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) is subject to the exercise by the Commission on Audit (COA) of its audit jurisdiction in the manner consistent with the provisions of the BSP charter.—Since the BSP, under its amended charter, continues to be a public corporation or a government instrumentality, we come to the inevitable conclusion that it is subject to the exercise by the COA of its audit jurisdiction in the manner consistent with the provisions of the BSP Charter.

Ampatuan vs. Puno, 651 SCRA 228 , June 07, 2011Administrative Law; State of Emergency; The Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Secretary did not take over the administration or operations of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM).—The DILG Secretary did not take over control of the powers of the ARMM. After law enforcement agents took respondent Governor of ARMM into custody for alleged complicity in the Maguindanao massacre, the ARMM Vice-Governor, petitioner Ansaruddin Adiong, assumed the vacated post on December 10, 2009 pursuant to the rule on succession found in Article VII, Section 12, of RA 9054. In turn, Acting Governor Adiong named the then Speaker of the ARMM Regional Assembly, petitioner Sahali-Generale, Acting ARMM Vice-Governor. In short, the DILG Secretary did not take over the administration or operations of the ARMM.

Same; Same; The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned; the calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President; she did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.—The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers. The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the

Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.Same; Same; It is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence; Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the court will accord respect to the President’s judgment.—While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual bases for the President’s exercise of the above power, it would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. As the Court acknowledged in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81 (2000), it is clearly to the President that the Constitution entrusts the determination of the need for calling out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence. Unless it is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the President’s judgment.

Ong vs. Office of the President, 664 SCRA 413 , January 30, 2012Administrative Law; Civil Service; Termination of Employment; Public Officers; No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.— It is established that no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. However, this admits of exceptions for it is likewise settled that the right to security of tenure is not available to those employees whose appointments are contractual and co-terminous in nature. In the case at bar, Ong’s appointment as Director III falls under the classifications provided in (a) Section 14(2) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code, to wit, that which is “co-existent with the tenure of the appointing authority or at his pleasure;” and (b) Sections 13(b) and 14(2) of Rule V, CSC Resolution No. 91-1631, or that which is both a temporary and a co-terminous appointment. The appointment is temporary as Ong did not have the required CES eligibility.

Same; Same; Career Executive Service (CES); The appointment of non- Career Executive Service (CES) eligibles to CES positions in the government in the absence of appropriate eligibles and when there is necessity in the interest of public service to fill vacancies in the government.—The case of Amores v. Civil Service Commission, et al., 587 SCRA 160 (2009), is instructive anent the nature of temporary appointments in the CES to which the position of Director III held by Ong belonged. The Court declared: An appointment is permanent where the appointee meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed, and it is temporary where the appointee meets all the requirements for the position except only the appropriate civil service eligibility. x x x x x x x Verily, it is clear that the possession of the required CES eligibility is that which will make an appointment in the career executive service a permanent one. x x x Indeed, the law permits, on many occasions, the appointment of non-CES eligibles to CES positions in the government in the absence of appropriate eligibles and when there is necessity in the interest of public service to fill vacancies in the government. But in all such cases, the appointment is at best merely temporary as it is said to be conditioned on the subsequent obtention of the required CES eligibility. x x x x x x  Security of tenure in the career executive service, which presupposes a permanent appointment, takes place upon passing the CES examinations administered by the CES Board. x x x.

Same; Same; Temporary Appointments; Words and Phrases; Temporary appointments are made if only to prevent hiatus in the government’s rendition of public service.—The Court is categorical in the Amores case that an appointee without the requisite CES eligibility cannot hold the position in a permanent capacity. Temporary appointments are made if only to prevent hiatus in the government’s rendition of public service. However, a temporary appointee can be removed even without cause and at a moment’s notice. As to those with eligibilities, their rights to security of tenure pertain to ranks but not to the positions to which they were appointed.

Same; Same; Same; The acceptance of a temporary appointment divests an appointee of the right to security of tenure against removal without cause.—Both Section 14 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code and Section 14 (2) of Rule V, CSC Resolution No. 91-1631 define a co-terminous appointment as one co-existent with the tenure of the appointing authority or at his pleasure. In Mita Pardo de Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc., 112 SCRA 243 (1982), cited by the CA in its decision, we sustained the replacement of an incumbent, who held an appointment at the pleasure of the appointing authority. Such appointment was in essence temporary in nature. We categorized the incumbent’s replacement not as removal but rather as an expiration of term and no prior notice, due hearing or cause were necessary to effect the same. In Decano v. Edu, 99 SCRA 410 (1980), we ruled that the acceptance of a temporary appointment divests an appointee of the right to security of tenure against removal without cause. Further, in Carillo vs. CA, 77 SCRA 170 (1967), we stated that “one who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his employment can be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing authority, there being no need to show that the termination is for cause.”

Same; Same; Co-terminous Appointments; Words and Phrases; A co-terminous appointment is defined as one “co-existing with the tenure of the appointing authority or at his pleasure.”—Under the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Revised Administrative Code and CSC Resolution No. 91-1631, a co-terminous appointment is defined as one “co-existing with the tenure of the appointing authority or at his pleasure.” Neither law nor jurisprudence draws distinctions between appointments “co-existing with the term of the appointing authority” on one hand, and one “co-existing with the appointing authority’s tenure” on the other. In the contrary, under the aforecited rules, tenure and term are used rather loosely and interchangeably.

Osmeña vs. Commission on Audit, 649 SCRA 654 , May 31, 2011Government Audit; Ordaining and Instituting a Government Auditing Code of the Philippines; Section 103; The public official’s personal liability arises only if the expenditure of government funds was made in violation of law.—Section 103 of PD 1445 declares that “[e]xpenditures of government funds or uses of government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee found to be directly responsible therefor.” Notably, the public official’s personal liability arises only if the expenditure of government funds was made in violation of law. In this case, the damages were paid to WTCI and DCDC pursuant to final judgments rendered against the City for its unreasonable delay in paying its obligations. The COA, however, declared that the judgments, in the first place, would not be rendered against the City had it not been for the change and extra work orders that Osmeña made which (a) it considered as unnecessary, (b) were without the Sanggunian’s approval, and (c) were not covered by a supplemental agreement.

Bangayan, Jr. vs. Bangayan, 659 SCRA 590 , October 19, 2011Criminal Procedure; Appeals; In criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State.—This Court leans toward Resally’s contention that Sally Go had no personality to file the petition for certiorari before the CA. It has been consistently held that in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. The private complainant or the offended party may question such acquittal or dismissal only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned.

Same; Same; Double Jeopardy; Well-established is the rule that the Court cannot review an order granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused on the ground by insufficiency of evidence because to do so will place the accused in double jeopardy.—A demurrer to evidence is filed after the prosecution has rested its case and the trial court is required to evaluate whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If the court finds that the evidence is not sufficient and grants the demurrer to evidence, such dismissal of the case is one on the merits, which is equivalent to the acquittal of the accused. Well-established is the rule that the Court cannot review an order granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused on the ground of insufficiency of evidence because to do so will place the accused in double jeopardy.

Same; Same; Same; Elements of Double Jeopardy to Attach; Jurisprudence allows for certain exceptions when the dismissal is considered final even if it was made on motion of the accused.—Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. However, jurisprudence allows for certain exceptions when the dismissal is considered final even if it was made on motion of the accused, to wit: (1) Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution has rested, which has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal. (2) Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial which is in effect a failure to prosecute.

Same; Same; Same; The only instance when the accused can be barred from invoking his right against double jeopardy is when it can be demonstrated that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was not allowed the opportunity to make its case against the accused or where the trial was a sham.—The only instance when the accused can be barred from invoking his right against double jeopardy is when it can be demonstrated that the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was not allowed the opportunity to make its case against the accused or where the trial was a sham. For instance, there is no double jeopardy (1) where the trial court prematurely terminated the presentation of the prosecution’s

evidence and forthwith dismissed the information for insufficiency of evidence; and (2) where the case was dismissed at a time when the case was not ready for trial and adjudication.

Same; Same; Same; An acquittal by virtue of a demurer to evidence is not appealable because it will place the accused in double jeopardy.—As previously discussed, an acquittal by virtue of a demurrer to evidence is not appealable because it will place the accused in double jeopardy. However, it may be subject to review only by a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process.

Same; Same; Same; The party questioning the acquittal of an accused should be able to clearly establish that the trial court blatantly abused its discretion such that it was deprived of its authority to dispense justice.—Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as that capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. “The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.” The party questioning the acquittal of an accused should be able to clearly establish that the trial court blatantly abused its discretion such that it was deprived of its authority to dispense justice.

Constitutional Law; Due Process; Jurisprudence dictates that in order for a decision of the trial court to be declared null and void for lack of due process, it must be shown that a party was deprived of his opportunity to be heard.—As regards Sally Go’s assertion that she had been denied due process, an evaluation of the records of the case proves that nothing can be further from the truth. Jurisprudence dictates that in order for a decision of the trial court to be declared null and void for lack of due process, it must be shown that a party was deprived of his opportunity to be heard. Sally Go cannot deny that she was given ample opportunity to present her witnesses and her evidence against petitioners. Thus, her claim that she was denied due process is unavailing.

Veloso vs. Commission on Audit, 656 SCRA 767 , September 06, 2011Constitutional Commissions; Commission on Audit; The Commission on Audit’s (COA’s) audit jurisdiction extends to the government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.—The COA’s audit jurisdiction extends to the government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. Its jurisdiction likewise covers, albeit on a post-audit basis, the constitutional bodies, commissions and offices that have been granted fiscal autonomy, autonomous state colleges and universities, other government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, and such non-governmental entities receiving subsidy or equity from or through the government.

Same; Same; Pursuant to its mandate as the guardian of public funds, the Commission on Audit (COA) is vested with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property.—Pursuant to its mandate as the guardian of public funds, the COA is vested with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and expenditures and the uses of public funds and property. This includes the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods for such review, and promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations.

Same; Same; Judgments; It is the general policy to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce.—It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is constitutionally-created not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the COA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition questioning its rulings.

Local Government Units; There is nothing wrong with the local government granting additional benefits to the officials and employees. The laws even encourage the granting of incentive benefits aimed at improving the services of these employees. Considering, however, that the payment of these benefits constitute disbursement of public funds, it must not contravene the law on disbursement of public funds.—There is nothing wrong with the local government granting additional benefits to the officials and employees. The laws even encourage the granting of incentive benefits aimed at improving the services of these employees. Considering, however, that

the payment of these benefits constitute disbursement of public funds, it must not contravene the law on disbursement of public funds.

Constitutional Commissions; Commission on Audit; The Commission on Audit (COA) adheres to the policy that government funds and property should be fully protected and conserved and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of such funds and property should be prevented.—The COA’s assailed decisions were made in faithful compliance with its mandate and in judicious exercise of its general audit power as conferred on it by the Constitution. The COA adheres to the policy that government funds and property should be fully protected and conserved and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of such funds and property should be prevented.

City Government of Tuguegarao vs. Ting, 657 SCRA 760 , September 14, 2011Ombudsman; The Office of the Ombudsman has the sole power to investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient; Power to withdraw the Information already filed is a mere adjunct or consequence of the Ombudsman’s overall power to prosecute.—It is settled that the Office of the Ombudsman has the sole power to investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The power to withdraw the Information already filed is a mere adjunct or consequence of the Ombudsman’s overall power to prosecute.

Same; Once the case has been filed with the Sandiganbayan, it is the said court and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full control of the case so much so that the Information may not be dismissed without the approval of said court; It does not matter whether the filing of a motion to dismiss by the prosecution is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation.—While it is the Ombudsman who has the full discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full control of the case so much so that the Information may not be dismissed without the approval of said court. Further, it does not matter whether such filing of a motion to dismiss by the prosecution is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation.

Criminal Procedure; Parties; Petitioner is not the proper party to file the present action; A private complainant in a criminal case before the Sandiganbayan is allowed to appeal only the civil aspect of the criminal case after its dismissal by said court.—Petitioner is not the proper party to file the present action. Section 4 (c) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, clearly provides that “In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.” A private complainant in a criminal case before the Sandiganbayan is allowed to appeal only the civil aspect of the criminal case after its dismissal by said court. While petitioner’s name was included in the caption of the cases as private complainant during the preliminary investigation and re-investigation proceedings in the Office of the Ombudsman, he is not the offended party or private complainant in the main case. As evident from a reading of the informations, it is the City of Tuguegarao which suffered damage as a consequence of the subject purchase of lands by the respondent and hence is the private complainant in the main case.

Same; Same; The “party” referred to in the rule is the original party in the main case aggrieved by the order or decision in the main case.—The Court has previously held that the “party” referred to in the rule is the original party in the main case aggrieved by the order or decision in the main case. Hence, only the aggrieved original party in the main case is the only proper party as petitioner. One who has not been an original party in the main case has no personality to file a petition under said rule.

Agra vs. Commission on Audit, 661 SCRA 563 , December 06, 2011Commission on Audit; Jurisdiction; The Commission on Audit (COA) had exclusive jurisdiction to decide on the allowance or disallowance of money claims arising from the implementation of Republic Act No. 6758.—In National Electrification Administration v. Morales, 528 SCRA 79 (2007), the order of garnishment against the NEA funds to implement the RTC Decision was in issue, and we said that the COA had exclusive jurisdiction to decide on the allowance or disallowance of money claims arising from the implementation of Republic Act No. 6758. We observed therein that “the RTC acted prudently in halting implementation of the writ of execution to allow the parties recourse to the processes of the COA.” In fact, we even stated there that “it is not for this Court to

preempt the action of the COA on the post-audit to be conducted by it per its Indorsement dated March 23, 2000.”

Administrative Law; Public Officers; Definition of an “Incumbent”.—We have defined an incumbent as “a person who is in present possession of an office; one who is legally authorized to discharge the duties of an office.” There is no question that petitioners were not incumbents as of June 30, 1989. We have likewise characterized NEA as a GOCC in National Electrification Administration v. Morales, 528 SCRA 79 (2007). Thus, Section 5.5 quoted above, issued pursuant to the authority given to the DBM under Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758, was correctly applied by the COA.

Same; Same; Allowances and Fringe Benefits; Requirements for the continuous grant of allowances and fringe benefits on top of the standardized salary rates for employees of Government-Owned and/or Controlled Corporations (GOCCs) and Financial Institutions (GFIs).—As petitioners were hired after June 30, 1989, the COA was correct in disallowing the grant of the benefit to them, as they were clearly not entitled to it. As quoted above, we have repeatedly held that under Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6758, the only requirements for the continuous grant of allowances and fringe benefits on top of the standardized salary rates for employees of GOCCs and GFIs are as follows: (1) the employee must be an incumbent as of July 1, 1989; and (2) the allowance or benefit was not consolidated in the standardized salary rate as prescribed by Republic Act No. 6758.

Buklod nang Magbubukid sa Lupaing Ramos, Inc. vs. E.M. Ramos and Sons, Inc., 645 SCRA 401 , March 16, 2011

Constitutional Law; Local Government Units; Municipal Corporations; Zoning; Zoning classification is an exercise by the local government of police power, not the power of eminent domain.—Zoning classification is an exercise by the local government of police power, not the power of eminent domain. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines, and apportions a given political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of needs.

Same; Same; Same; Same; By virtue of a zoning ordinance, the local legislature may arrange, prescribe, define, and apportion the land within its political jurisdiction into specific uses based not only on the present, but also on the future projection of needs.—By virtue of a zoning ordinance, the local legislature may arrange, prescribe, define, and apportion the land within its political jurisdiction into specific uses based not only on the present, but also on the future projection of needs. To limit zoning to the existing character of the property and the structures thereon would completely negate the power of the local legislature to plan land use in its city or municipality. Under such circumstance, zoning would involve no planning at all, only the rubber-stamping by the local legislature of the current use of the land.

Agrarian Reform; Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP); Since the subject property had been reclassified as residential land, it is no longer agricultural land by the time the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) took effect and is, therefore, exempt from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP).—Since the subject property had been reclassified as residential land by virtue of Resolution No. 29-A dated July 9, 1972, it is no longer agricultural land by the time the CARL took effect on June 15, 1988 and is, therefore, exempt from the CARP.

Same; Same; To be exempt from Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), all that is needed is one valid reclassification of the land from agricultural to non-agricultural by a duly authorized government agency before June 15, 1988, when the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) took effect.—To be exempt from CARP, all that is needed is one valid reclassification of the land from agricultural to non-agricultural by a duly authorized government agency before June 15, 1988, when the CARL took effect. All similar actions as regards the land subsequently rendered by other government agencies shall merely serve as confirmation of the reclassification.

Civil Procedure; Appeals; As a rule, no issue may be raised on appeal unless it has been brought before the lower tribunal for its consideration.—As a rule, no issue may be raised on appeal unless it has been brought before the lower tribunal for its consideration. Higher courts are precluded from entertaining matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below, but ventilated for the first time only in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal.

Same; Same; Though not raised below, the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be considered by the reviewing court, as it may be raised at any stage.—There are exceptions to the aforecited rule that no question may be raised for the first time on appeal. Though not raised below, the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be considered by the reviewing court, as it may be raised at any stage. The said court may also consider an issue not properly raised during trial when there is plain error. Likewise, it may entertain such arguments when there

are jurisprudential developments affecting the issues, or when the issues raised present a matter of public policy. Buklod, however, did not allege, much less argue, that its case falls under any of these exceptions.

Constitutional Law; Social Justice; Never is it justified to give preference to the poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law.—It is true that, in case of reasonable doubt, the Court is called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to give preference to the poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law. Vigilance over the rights of the landowners is equally important because social justice cannot be invoked to trample on the rights of property owners, who under our Constitution and laws are also entitled to protection.

Samson vs. Restrivera, 646 SCRA 481 , March 28, 2011Administrative Complaints; Ombudsman; Even if the complaint concerns an act of the public official or employee which is not service-connected, the case is within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.—Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770 also states that the Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not limited, to acts or omissions which are unfair or irregular. Thus, even if the complaint concerns an act of the public official or employee which is not service-connected, the case is within the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from the performance of official duty.

Same; It is settled that administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings, and may continue despite the dismissal of the criminal charges.—It is wrong for petitioner to say that since the estafa case against her was dismissed, she cannot be found administratively liable. It is settled that administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings, and may continue despite the dismissal of the criminal charges.

Administrative Law; Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (R.A. 6713); Failure to abide by the norms of conduct under Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713 is not a ground for disciplinary action.—In Domingo v. Office of the Ombudsman, 577 SCRA 476 (2009), this Court had the occasion to rule that failure to abide by the norms of conduct under Section 4(A)(b) of R.A. No. 6713, in relation to its implementing rules, is not a ground for disciplinary actionSame; Misconduct; Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer.—Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law or to disregard established rules, which must be proved by substantial evidence. Otherwise, the misconduct is only simple.

Same; Conduct Unbecoming a Public Officer; Unbecoming conduct means improper performance and applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method.—For reneging on her promise to return aforesaid amount, petitioner is guilty of conduct unbecoming a public officer. x x x Recently, in Assistant Special Prosecutor III Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S. Ong, et al., 628 SCRA 626 (2010), we said that unbecoming conduct means improper performance and applies to a broader range of transgressions of rules not only of social behavior but of ethical practice or logical procedure or prescribed method. [Samson vs. Restrivera, 646 SCRA 481(2011)]

Philippine National Railways vs. Kanlaon Construction Enterprises Co., Inc., 647 SCRA 407 , April 06, 2011

Contracts; Commission on Audit (COA); Requirements before contracts involving the expenditure of public funds may be entered into; Failure to comply with any of these two requirements renders the contract void.—The Administrative Code of 1987 expressly prohibits the entering into contracts involving the expenditure of public funds unless two prior requirements are satisfied. First, there must be an appropriation law authorizing the expenditure required in the contract. Second, there must be attached to the contract a certification by the proper accounting official and auditor that funds have been appropriated by law and such funds are available. Failure to comply with any of these two requirements renders the contract void.

Same; Same; The two requirements—are conditions sine qua non for the execution of government contracts.—In several cases, the Court had the occasion to apply these provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 and the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines. In these cases, the Court clearly ruled that the two requirements—the existence of appropriation and the attachment of the certification—are “conditions sine qua non for the execution of government contracts.”

Same; Same; The clear purpose of these requirements is to insure that government contracts are never signed unless supported by the corresponding appropriation law and fund availability.—The law expressly declares void a contract that fails to comply with the two requirements, namely, an appropriation law funding the contract and a certification of appropriation and fund availability. The clear purpose of these requirements is to insure that government contracts are never signed unless supported by the corresponding appropriation law and fund availability.

Same; Same; The officer or officers entering into the contract shall be liable to the Government or other contracting party for any consequent damage to the same extent as if the transaction had been wholly between private parties.—Kanlaon is not left without recourse. The law itself affords it the remedy. Section 48 of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides that “the officer or officers entering into the contract shall be liable to the Government or other contracting party for any consequent damage to the same extent as if the transaction had been wholly between private parties.” Kanlaon could go after the officers who signed the contract and hold them personally liable.

General vs. Urro, 646 SCRA 567 , March 29, 2011Administrative Law; Appointments; Appointments may be classified into two: first, as to its nature; and second, as to the manner in which it is made.—Appointments may be classified into two: first, as to its nature; and second, as to the manner in which it is made. Under the first classification, appointments can either be permanent or temporary (acting). A basic distinction is that a permanent appointee can only be removed from office for cause; whereas a temporary appointee can be removed even without hearing or cause. Under the second classification, an appointment can either be regular or ad interim. A regular appointment is one made while Congress is in session, while an ad interim appointment is one issued during the recess of Congress. In strict terms, presidential appointments that require no confirmation from the Commission on Appointments cannot be properly characterized as either a regular or an ad interim appointment.

Same; Same; Constitutional Law; The power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to make temporary appointments, unless he is otherwise specifically prohibited by the Constitution or by the law.—Generally, the power to appoint vested in the President includes the power to make temporary appointments, unless he is otherwise specifically prohibited by the Constitution or by the law, or where an acting appointment is repugnant to the nature of the office involved. The President’s power to issue an acting appointment is particularly authorized by the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292).

Same; Same; The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official functions by authorizing a person to discharge those functions pending the selection of a permanent or another appointee.—The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official functions by authorizing a person to discharge those functions pending the selection of a permanent or another appointee. An acting appointee accepts the position on the condition that he shall surrender the office once he is called to do so by the appointing authority. Therefore, his term of office is not fixed but endures at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Same; Same; A staggered term of office is not a statutory prohibition against the issuance of acting or temporary appointment.—Generally, the purpose for staggering the term of office is to minimize the appointing authority’s opportunity to appoint a majority of the members of a collegial body. It also intended to ensure the continuity of the body and its policies. A staggered term of office, however, is not a statutory prohibition, direct or indirect, against the issuance of acting or temporary appointment. It does not negate the authority to issue acting or temporary appointments that the Administrative Code grants.

Same; Same; National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM); Nothing in the enumeration of functions of the members of the National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) would be subverted or defeated by the President’s appointment of an acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner pending the selection and qualification of a permanent appointee.—We find nothing in this enumeration of functions of the members of the NAPOLCOM that would be subverted or defeated by the President’s appointment of an acting NAPOLCOM Commissioner pending the selection and qualification of a permanent

appointee. Viewed as an institution, a survey of pertinent laws and executive issuances will show that the NAPOLCOM has always remained as an office under or within the Executive Department. Clearly, there is nothing repugnant between the petitioner’s acting appointment, on one hand, and the nature of the functions of the NAPOLCOM Commissioners or of the NAPOLCOM as an institution, on the other.

Quo Warranto; Quo warranto is a remedy to try disputes with respect to the title to a public office.—Quo warranto is a remedy to try disputes with respect to the title to a public office. Generally, quo warranto proceedings are commenced by the Government as the proper party-plaintiff. However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual may commence such action if he claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another.

Same; The petitioner in a quo warranto proceeding who seeks reinstatement to an office, on the ground of usurpation or illegal deprivation, must prove his clear right to the office for his suit to succeed; otherwise, his petition must fail.—Since the petitioner merely holds an acting appointment (and an expired one at that), he clearly does not have a cause of action to maintain the present petition. The essence of an acting appointment is its temporariness and its consequent revocability at any time by the appointing authority. The petitioner in a quo warranto proceeding who seeks reinstatement to an office, on the ground of usurpation or illegal deprivation, must prove his clear right to the office for his suit to succeed; otherwise, his petition must fail. [General vs. Urro, 646 SCRA 567(2011)]

Gamboa vs. Chan, 677 SCRA 385 , July 24, 2012Constitutional Law; Right to Privacy; Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom.—The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been recognized as a constitutional right. This Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1968), thus enunciated: The due process question touching on an alleged deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a long way in disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that the provision on the periodical submission of a sworn statement of assets and liabilities is violative of the constitutional right to privacy. There is much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas: “Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom.” As a matter of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr. Justice Brandeis “the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.” The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does not likewise compel respect for his personality as a unique individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect.

Same; Same; The right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from intrusion or constraint.—Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from intrusion or constraint. However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks, 541 SCRA 456 (2007), this Court underscored that the right to privacy is not absolute, viz.: With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated, suffice it to state that privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the rights of persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the right of the people to access information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In that case, we declared that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest. Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no infringement of the individual’s right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to ensure that the government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public who invest in foreign securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with the assailed legislative investigation.

Same; Writ of Habeas Data; The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy.—The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other.

Same; Private Armies; The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority.—The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority. It also provides for the establishment of one police force that is national in scope and civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national police commission.

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Estate of J. Amado Araneta, 665 SCRA 310 , February 08, 2012

Same; Same; The power to classify or reclassify lands is essentially an executive prerogative, albeit local government units, thru zoning ordinances.—The power to classify or reclassify lands is essentially an executive prerogative, albeit local government units, thru zoning ordinances, may, subject to certain conditions, very well effect reclassification of land use within their respective territorial jurisdiction. Reclassification decrees issued by the executive department, through its appropriate agencies, carry the same force and effect as any statute. As it were, PD 27 and Proclamation 1637 are both presidential issuances, each forming, by virtue of Sec. 3(2), Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution, a part of the law of the land. Sec. 3(2), Art. XVII of the 1973 Constitution provides that: [A]ll proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding and effective even after the lifting of Martial Law or the ratification of this Constitution unless modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions or unless expressly or impliedly modified or repealed by the regular Batasang Pambansa.

Same; Same; Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB); Jurisdiction; The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) has been created and designed to exercise the DAR’s adjudicating functions.—The DARAB has been created and designed to exercise the DAR’s adjudicating functions. And just like any quasi-judicial body, DARAB derives its jurisdiction from law, specifically RA 6657, which invested it with adjudicatory powers over agrarian reform disputes and matters related to the implementation of CARL. We need not belabor that DARAB’s jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Doronilla property, cannot be conferred by the main parties, let alone the intervening farmer-beneficiaries claiming to have “vested rights” under PD 27. As earlier discussed, the process of land reform covering the 1,266 hectares of the Araneta estate was not completed prior to the issuance of Proclamation 1637. So the intervenors, with the exception of the 79 tenant-beneficiaries who were granted CLTs, failed to acquire private rights of ownership under PD 27 before the effective conversion of the Doronilla property to non-agricultural uses. Hence, the Doronilla property, being outside of CARP coverage, is also beyond DARAB’s jurisdiction.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Parties; Relief cannot be granted to parties who seek to be relieved from the effects of a judgment when the loss of the remedy was due to their own negligence. Equity serves the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights.—Parties cannot blame their counsel for negligence when they themselves were guilty of neglect. Relief cannot be granted to parties who seek to be relieved from the effects of a judgment when the loss of the remedy was due to their own negligence. Equity serves the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights. Duran, et al., as are expected of prudent men concerned with their ordinary affairs, should have had periodically touched base at least to be apprised with the status of their case. Judiciousness in this regard would have alerted them about their counsel’s death, thus enabling them to take the necessary steps to protect their claimed right and interest in the case.

Agrarian Reform Law; Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657); Social Justice; While the concept of social justice is intended to favor those who have less in life, it should never be taken as a toll to justify let alone commit an injustice.—Agrarian reform finds context in social justice in tandem with the police power of the State. But social justice itself is not merely granted to the marginalized and the underprivileged. But while the concept of social justice is intended to favor those who have less in life, it should never be taken as a toll to justify let alone commit an injustice. To borrow from Justice Isagani A. Cruz: [S]ocial justice—or any justice for that matter—is for the deserving whether he be a millionaire in his mansion or a pauper in his hovel. It is true that, in a case of reasonable doubt, we are called upon to tilt the balance in favor of the poor simply because they are poor, to whom the Constitution fittingly extends its sympathy and compassion. But never is it justified to prefer the poor simply because they are poor, or to eject the rich simply because they are rich, for justice must always be served, for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law.

Ganzon vs. Arlos, 708 SCRA 115 , October 22, 2013

Administrative Law; Public Officers; Misconduct; To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer.―Misconduct is intentional wrongdoing or deliberate violation of a rule of law or standard of behavior. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. In grave misconduct, as distinguished from simple misconduct, the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law, or flagrant disregard of an established rule must be manifest. In accordance with Section 46 of Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292), misconduct is among the grounds for disciplinary action, but no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as provided by law and after due process. It is cogent to mention that the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, which governs the conduct of disciplinary and non-disciplinary proceedings in administrative cases, classifies grave misconduct as a grave administrative offense.

Same; Same; Same; An act is intimately connected to the office of the offender if it is committed as the consequence of the performance of the office by him, or if it cannot exist without the office even if public office is not an element of the crime in the abstract.―The Court stressed in Largo v. Court of Appeals, 537 SCRA 721 (2007), the criteria that an act, to constitute a misconduct, must not be committed in his private capacity and should bear a direct relation to and be connected with the performance of his official duties. Ganzon’s acts met the criteria in Largo v. Court of Appeals. To begin with, he was not acting in a private capacity when he acted menacingly towards Arlos, it being clear that his resentment of his poor performance rating, surely a matter that concerned his performance of duty, motivated his confronting the latter. Moreover, it did not matter that his acts were committed outside of office hours, because they were intimately connected to the office of the offender. An act is intimately connected to the office of the offender if it is committed as the consequence of the performance of the office by him, or if it cannot exist without the office even if public office is not an element of the crime in the abstract. This was the thrust in Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan, 338 SCRA 485 (2000), with the Court citing ample jurisprudence.

Same; Same; Same; Considering that Ganzon resented the poor performance rating he had received, and his resentment caused his aggressive confrontation of Arlos, it definitely appears that Ganzon’s offense could not be separated from his performance of duty.―Considering that Ganzon resented the poor performance rating he had received, and his resentment caused his aggressive confrontation of Arlos, it definitely appears that Ganzon’s offense could not be separated from his performance of duty. Indeed, under Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan, 338 SCRA 485 (2000), and its progenitor rulings, an act that is the consequence of the discharge of the employee’s official functions or the performance of his duties, or that is relevant to his office or to the discharge of his official functions is justly considered as service-related. The fact that the acts of Ganzon were committed within the premises of the DILG Regional Office No. 6 strengthens our view that such acts could not but be connected to Ganzon’s public employment. Verily, the Court has regarded the commission of offensive overt acts by public officials and employees within the premises of their public offices to be deserving of administrative reprobation.

Same; Same; It is almost superfluous to remind all public employees like Ganzon that the law of good manners and proper decorum was law during as well as outside office hours.―Even if the affair occurred outside of the regular work hours, Ganzon’s menacing attitude towards Arlos still had no excuse, particularly as Arlos was his superior in the office hierarchy. Section 4(c) of RA 6713 (Code of Conduct Standards for Public Officials and Employees) fittingly provides: (c) Justness and sincerity.—Public officials and employees shall remain true to the people at all times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the underprivileged. They shall at all times respect the rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public interest. (Emphasis supplied) It is almost superfluous to remind all public employees like Ganzon that the law of good manners and proper decorum was law during as well as outside office hours.

Administrative Case; The dismissal of a criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence or the acquittal of an accused who is also a respondent in an administrative case does not necessarily preclude the administrative proceeding nor carry with it relief from administrative liability.―An administrative case is, as a rule, independent from criminal proceedings. The dismissal of a criminal case on the ground of insufficiency of evidence or the acquittal of an accused who is also a respondent in an administrative case does not necessarily preclude the administrative proceeding nor carry with it relief from administrative liability. This is because the quantum of proof required in administrative proceedings is substantial evidence, unlike in criminal cases which require proof beyond reasonable doubt. Substantial evidence, according to Section 5 of Rule 133, Rules of Court, is “that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.” In contrast, proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as,

excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty; moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.

Administrative Law; Public Officers; Penalties; The penalty of dismissal shall result in the permanent separation of the respondent from the service, with or without prejudice to criminal or civil liability, and shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and the perpetual disqualification from re-employment in the government service, unless otherwise provided in the decision.―In this regard, Section 56 and Section 58 of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service respectively state that the penalty of dismissal shall result in the permanent separation of the respondent from the service, with or without prejudice to criminal or civil liability, and shall carry with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits and the perpetual disqualification from re-employment in the government service, unless otherwise provided in the decision. The Court deems it worthwhile to emphasize as a final word that the imposition of the correct disciplinary measures upon erring public officials and employees has the primary objective of the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the public’s faith and confidence in the Government. The punishment of the erring public officials and employees is secondary, but is nonetheless in accord with the Constitution, which stresses in Section 1 of its Article XI that a public office is a public trust, and commands that public officers must at all times be accountable to the people, whom they must serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency. [Ganzon vs. Arlos, 708 SCRA 115(2013)]

Cagas vs. Commission on Elections, 708 SCRA 672 , October 25, 2013Local Government Units; Plebiscite; The conduct of a plebiscite is necessary for the creation of a province.—The conduct of a plebiscite is necessary for the creation of a province. Sections 10 and 11 of Article X of the Constitution provide that: Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. Sec. 11. The Congress may, by law, create special metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be entitled to their own local executive and legislative assemblies. The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby be created shall be limited to basic services requiring coordination.

Constitutional Law; Local Elections; The Constitution recognizes that the power to fix the date of elections is legislative in nature, which is shown by the exceptions in previously mentioned Constitutional provisions, as well as in the election of local government officials.—The Constitution does not specify a date as to when plebiscites should be held. This is in contrast with its provisions for the election of members of the legislature in Section 8, Article VI and of the President and Vice President in Section 4, Article VII. The Constitution recognizes that the power to fix the date of elections is legislative in nature, which is shown by the exceptions in previously mentioned Constitutional provisions, as well as in the election of local government officials. Section 10 of R.A. No. 7160 furnishes the general rule as to when a plebiscite may be held: Sec. 10. Plebiscite Requirement.—No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixed another date.

Election Law; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); Jurisdiction; The Commission on Elections has “exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections.”—The Constitution, however, grants the COMELEC the power to “[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall.” The COMELEC has “exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections.” The text and intent of Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) is to give COMELEC “all the necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.”

Statutory Construction; It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution and that the spirit, rather than the letter of the law determines its construction; for that reason, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent.—This Court has rejected a too literal interpretation of election laws in favor of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. In Pangandaman v. COMELEC, 319 SCRA 283 (1999), Lining Pangandaman (Pangandaman) filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to challenge the Omnibus Order

of the COMELEC En Banc. The COMELEC En Banc ordered the conduct of special elections in certain municipalities in Lanao del Sur on 18 and 25 July 1998, or more than 30 days after the failure of elections on 11 May 1998. Like Cagas, Pangandaman insisted on a strict compliance with the schedule of the holding of special elections. Pangandaman asserted that COMELEC’s authority to call a special election was limited by the 30-day period and that Congress had the power to call a special election after the 30th day. We admonished Pangandaman against a too literal interpretation of the law, and protected COMELEC’s powers against the straitjacketing by procedural rules. It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution and that the spirit, rather than the letter of the law determines its construction; for that reason, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent.Election Law; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); Plebiscite; The Commission on Elections has residual power to conduct a plebiscite even beyond the deadline prescribed by law.— It is thus not novel for this Court to uphold the COMELEC’s broad power or authority to fix other dates for a plebiscite, as in special elections, to enable the people to exercise their right of suffrage. The COMELEC thus has residual power to conduct a plebiscite even beyond the deadline prescribed by law. The date 28 October 2013 is reasonably close to 6 April 2013, and there is no reason why the plebiscite should not proceed as scheduled by the COMELEC.

Del Castillo vs. People, 664 SCRA 430 , January 30, 2012Criminal Procedure; Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; Search Warrants; Requisites for the Issuance of a Search Warrant.—The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation, the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

Same; Probable Cause; Words and Phrases; Defined.—Probable cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence which would justify conviction. The judge, in determining probable cause, is to consider the totality of the circumstances made known to him and not by a fixed and rigid formula, and must employ a flexible, totality of the circumstances standard. The existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. This Court, therefore, is in no position to disturb the factual findings of the judge which led to the issuance of the search warrant. A magistrate’s determination of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that determination. Substantial basis means that the questions of the examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be seized are in the place sought to be searched. A review of the records shows that in the present case, a substantial basis exists.

Same; Constitutional Law; Search Warrants; The warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid.—The warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid. A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional requirement of definiteness. In the present case, Search Warrant No. 570-9-1197-24 specifically designates or describes the residence of the petitioner as the place to be searched. Incidentally, the items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from the residence of the petitioner. The confiscated items, having been found in a place other than the one described in the search warrant, can be considered as fruits of an invalid warrantless search, the presentation of which as an evidence is a violation of petitioner’s constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure. The OSG argues that, assuming that the items seized were found in another place not designated in the search warrant, the same items should still be admissible as evidence because the one who discovered them was a barangay tanod who is a private individual, the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure being applicable only against government authorities. The contention is devoid of merit.

Same; Same; Administrative Law; Agents of Persons in Authority; Barangay Tanods; The Local Government Code contains a provision which describes the function of a barangay tanod as an agent of persons in authority.—Having been established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was sought by the police authorities who effected the searched warrant, the same barangay tanods

therefore acted as agents of persons in authority. Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code defines persons in authority and agents of persons in authority as: x x x any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or governmental corporation, board or commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barangay captain and a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority. A person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property, such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed an agent of a person in authority. The Local Government Code also contains a provision which describes the function of a barangay tanod as an agent of persons in authority.

Criminal Law; Dangerous Drugs Act; Illegal Possession of Shabu, Elements of.—In every prosecution for the illegal possession of shabu, the following essential elements must be established: (a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug.

Criminal Procedure; Constitutional Law; Searches and Seizures; While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under appellant’s control or possession.—While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under appellant’s control or possession. The CA, in its Decision, referred to the possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner as a constructive one. Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. The records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it established that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to the presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by profession.

Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; Evidence; Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt; The accused, in all criminal prosecutions, is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt.—In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the law’s own starting perspective on the status of the accused—in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.