prf original case doctrines

7/23/2019 Prf Original Case Doctrines

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Preliminary Titles (Articles 1-18)

G.R. No. L-63915 April !" 1985L#R$N%# &. TA'AA" ARA*A& +. ,AR&$NT#" an /$&$NT #+ ATT#RN$0, +#RR#T*$R*##" NT$GRT0 AN NAT#NAL,&" N. 2&AN" peti tioners,vs.*#N. 4AN . T/$RA" in is capacity as $7ectie Assistant to te Presient" *#N. 4#A:N/$N," in is capacity as epty $7ectie Assistant to te Presient " &$L:A$, P. $ LAR%" in is capacity as irector" &alaca;an< Recors #==ice" an +L#R$N# ,. PAL#" in

is capacity as irector" rea o= PrintinInvoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6,

Article IV of the 1!" #hilippine $onstitution, 1as %ell as the principle that la%s to be valid andenforceable must be published in the &fficial azette or other%ise effectivel( promulgated, petitionersseek a %rit of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and)or cause the publicationin the &fficial azette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,proclamations, e*ecutive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.Specificall(, the publication of the follo%ing presidential issuances is sought+a #residential -ecrees os. 1/, //, "!, "0, , 62, 13", 1!1, 1!, 102, 1!, /33, /"2, /6, /06, /0,"3", "1/, "/2, "/, "/6, ""!, ", "0, ", "63, "61, "60, 232, 236, 21, 2/!, 2/, 22, 22!, 2!",206, 21, 3", 32, /1, /0, 1, 66, !", !2, 2, , 622, 60, 661, !10, !"1, !"", !", 033,03/, 0", 0"6, /", ", 61, 131!413"3, 133, 136341361, 130, 112", 116, 1166, 1/2/, 1/26,1/3, 1/!0, 1/!, 1"33, 1622, 1!!/, 1030, 1013, 101"4101!, 101410/6, 10/41023, 102/4102!.

b 5etter of Instructions os.+ 13, ", 2, !/, 13!, 130, 116, 1"3, 1"6, 121, 13, 1", 1, 161, 1!",103, 10!, 100, 1/, 1", 1, /3/, /32, /3, /3, /114/1", /14//2, //64//0, /"14/", /214/2, /20,/1, /"4/61, /6"4/6, /!14/!", /!4/0", /04/0, /1, /", /!4/, "314"3", "3, "1/4"1, "/,"/!, "2", "26, "2, "!, "0, "6/, "6!, "!3, "0/, "0, "06, "64"!, 23, 2"04223, 2224 22, 2!",206, 200, 20, 31, ", /!, 61, !6, 0!, 2, , 633, 63/, 63, 613, 611, 61/, 61, 621, 62/,66, !3/, !1/4!1", !/6, 0"!40", 0!040!, 001, 00/, "423, 62,!,112411!0,110341/!0.c eneral &rders os.+ 12, /, 0, , 63, 6/, 6", 62 6.d #roclamation os.+ 11/6, 1122, 112!, 111, 116, 1/!3, 1/01, 1"141/6, 1/, 1"/, 1", 1"0,123412!, 13410, 1614100, 1341, 1241633, 16364163, 161/416/0, 16"34162, 162416, 16!41!31, 1!341!/", 1!"141!"2, 1!"!41!2/, 1!22, 1!2641!1, 1!/, 1!2, 1!6/, 1!6241!0!, 1!041!, 1!!, 1033, 103/41032, 10364103!, 101/41012, 1016, 10/410/6, 10/, 10"1410"/, 10"410"6, 10"41023, 102"41022, 10264102!, 102, 10"4100, 1063, 1066, 1060, 10!3,10!64100, 10/, 133, 110, 1/", 1"", 1/, 16", 164166, 1604102, 1064/3/0, /3"34/322, /3264/12, /12!4/161, /16"4//22.e 7*ecutive &rders os.+ 211, 21", 212, 2/!, 2/422, 2!4 2!1, 2!242/, 2243!, 3413, //,

/24/0, "14"/, "6, "0, 2"422, 2, 14", 63, 6", 6!460, !3, !2, ", 2, 04632,63, 6114 62!, 6246!!, 6!4!3", !34!3!, !1/4!06, !0040/, 0240!.f 5etters of Implementation os.+ !, 0, , 13, 114//, /4/!, ", 3, 1, , !6, 03401, /, 2, , 13!,1/3, 1//, 1/".g Administrative &rders os.+ "2!, "20, "/4"2, "634 "!0, "0342"", 2"642".8he respondents, through the Solicitor eneral, %ould have this case dismissed outright on the groundthat petitioners have no legal personalit( or standing to bring the instant petition. 8he vie% is submittedthat in the absence of an( sho%ing that petitioners are personall( and directl( affected or pre9udiced b(the alleged non4publication of the presidential issuances in :uestion said petitioners are %ithout there:uisite legal personalit( to institute this mandamus proceeding, the( are not being ;aggrievedparties; %ithin the meaning of Section ",


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re:uired so to be published b( la%E and @ such documents or classes of documents as the #residentof the #hilippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicabilit( and legal effect, or%hich he ma( authorize so to be published. ...8he clear ob9ect of the above4:uoted provision is to give the general public ade:uate notice of thevarious la%s %hich are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. >ithout such notice andpublication, there %ould be no basis for the application of the ma*im ;ignorantia legis non e*cusat.; It%ould be the height of in9ustice to punish or other%ise burden a citizen for the transgression of a la% of%hich he had no notice %hatsoever, not even a constructive one.#erhaps at no time since the establishment of the #hilippine hile the people are kept abreast b( the mass media ofthe debates and deliberations in the Batasan #ambansa=and for the diligent ones, read( access tothe legislative records=no such publicit( accompanies the la%4making process of the #resident. 8hus,%ithout publication, the people have no means of kno%ing %hat presidential decrees have actuall(been promulgated, much less a definite %a( of informing themselves of the specific contents and te*tsof such decrees. As the Supreme $ourt of Spain ruled+ ;Ba9o la denominacion generica de le(es, secomprenden tambien los reglamentos,


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that it re:uires notice before la%s become effective, for no person should be bound b( a la% %ithoutnotice. 8his is elementar( fairness. Co%ever, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shallbe b( publication in the &fficial azette.

". It suffices, as %as stated b( Dudge 5earned Cand, that la% as the command of the government;must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3It %ould indeed be to reduce it to thelevel of mere futilit(, as pointed out b( Dustice $ardozo, ;if it is unkno%n and unkno%able. !

#ublication, to repeat, is thus essential. >hat I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that itmust be in the &fficial azette. 8o be sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode ofdetermining the e*act date of its effectivit(. Still for me that does not dispose of the :uestion of %hat is

the 9ural effect of past presidential decrees or e*ecutive acts not so published. Gor prior thereto, itcould be that parties a%are of their e*istence could have conducted themselves in accordance %iththeir provisions. If no legal conse:uences could attach due to lack of publication in the &fficial azette,then serious problems could arise. #revious transactions based on such ;#residential Issuances;could be open to :uestion. atters deemed settled could still be in:uired into. I am not prepared tohold that such an effect is contemplated b( our decision. >here such presidential decree or e*ecutiveact is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its e* post facto character becomesevident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivit( as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect.8here must still be a sho%ing of arbitrariness. oreover, %here the challenged presidential decree ore*ecutive act %as issued under the police po%er, the non4impairment clause of the $onstitution ma(not al%a(s be successfull( invoked. 8here must still be that process of balancing to determine %hetheror not it could in such a case be tainted b( infirmit(. 6In traditional terminolog(, there could arise then a:uestion of unconstitutional application. 8hat is as far as it goes.2. 5et me make therefore that m( :ualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publicationis essential to the effectivit( of a legislative or e*ecutive act of a general application. I am not in

agreement %ith the vie% that such publication must be in the &fficial azette. 8he $ivil $ode itself inits Article / e*pressl( recognizes that the rule as to la%s taking effect after fifteen da(s follo%ing thecompletion of their publication in the &fficial azette is sub9ect to this e*ception, ;unless it is other%iseprovided.; oreover, the $ivil $ode is itself onl( a legislative enactment,


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,eparate #pinions+$RNAN#" C.J., concurring H%ith :ualification+8here is on the %hole acceptance on m( part of the vie%s e*pressed in the abl( %ritten opinion ofDustice 7scolin. I am unable, ho%ever, to concur insofar as it %ould un:ualifiedl( impose there:uirement of publication in the &fficial azette for unpublished ;presidential issuances; to havebinding force and effect.

I shall e*plain %h(.1. It is of course true that %ithout the re:uisite publication, a due process :uestion %ould arise if madeto appl( adversel( to a part( %ho is not even a%are of the e*istence of an( legislative or e*ecutive acthaving the force and effect of la%. ( point is that such publication re:uired need not be confined tothe &fficial azette. Grom the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces tocertaint(. 8hat is too be admitted. It does not follo%, ho%ever, that failure to do so %ould in all casesand under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or an( other e*ecutive act of thesame categor( being bereft of an( binding force and effect. 8o so hold %ould, for me, raise aconstitutional :uestion. Such a pronouncement %ould lend itself to the interpretation that such alegislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivit( unless published in the &fficialazette. 8here is no such re:uirement in the $onstitution as Dustice #lana so aptl( pointed out. It istrue that %hat is decided no% applies onl( to past ;presidential issuances;. onetheless, thisclarification is, to m( mind, needed to avoid an( possible misconception as to %hat is re:uired for an(statute or presidential act to be impressed %ith binding force or effectivit(./. It is :uite understandable then %h( I concur in the separate opinion of Dustice #lana. Its first

paragraph sets forth %hat to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. 8hus+ ;8he#hilippine $onstitution does not re:uire the publication of la%s as a prere:uisite for their effectivit(,unlike some $onstitutions else%here. It ma( be said though that the guarantee of due processre:uires notice of la%s to affected #arties before the( can be bound thereb(E but such notice is notnecessaril( b( publication in the &fficial azette. 8he due process clause is not that precise. 1I amlike%ise in agreement %ith its closing paragraph+ ;In fine, I concur in the ma9orit( decision to the e*tentthat it re:uires notice before la%s become effective, for no person should be bound b( a la% %ithoutnotice. 8his is elementar( fairness. Co%ever, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shallbe b( publication in the &fficial azette.

". It suffices, as %as stated b( Dudge 5earned Cand, that la% as the command of the government;must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3It %ould indeed be to reduce it to thelevel of mere futilit(, as pointed out b( Dustice $ardozo, ;if it is unkno%n and unkno%able. !

#ublication, to repeat, is thus essential. >hat I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that itmust be in the &fficial azette. 8o be sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode ofdetermining the e*act date of its effectivit(. Still for me that does not dispose of the :uestion of %hat is

the 9ural effect of past presidential decrees or e*ecutive acts not so published. Gor prior thereto, itcould be that parties a%are of their e*istence could have conducted themselves in accordance %iththeir provisions. If no legal conse:uences could attach due to lack of publication in the &fficial azette,then serious problems could arise. #revious transactions based on such ;#residential Issuances;could be open to :uestion. atters deemed settled could still be in:uired into. I am not prepared tohold that such an effect is contemplated b( our decision. >here such presidential decree or e*ecutiveact is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its e* post facto character becomesevident. 5 In civil cases though, retroactivit( as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect.8here must still be a sho%ing of arbitrariness. oreover, %here the challenged presidential decree ore*ecutive act %as issued under the police po%er, the non4impairment clause of the $onstitution ma(not al%a(s be successfull( invoked. 8here must still be that process of balancing to determine %hetheror not it could in such a case be tainted b( infirmit(. 6In traditional terminolog(, there could arise then a:uestion of unconstitutional application. 8hat is as far as it goes.2. 5et me make therefore that m( :ualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publicationis essential to the effectivit( of a legislative or e*ecutive act of a general application. I am not inagreement %ith the vie% that such publication must be in the &fficial azette. 8he $ivil $ode itself inits Article / e*pressl( recognizes that the rule as to la%s taking effect after fifteen da(s follo%ing thecompletion of their publication in the &fficial azette is sub9ect to this e*ception, ;unless it is other%iseprovided.; oreover, the $ivil $ode is itself onl( a legislative enactment,


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be said of this provision+ Girstl(, it obviousl( does not appl( to a la% %ith a built4in provision as to %henit %ill take effect. Secondl(, it clearl( recognizes that each la% ma( provide not onl( a different periodfor reckoning its effectivit( date but also a different mode of notice. 8hus, a la% ma( prescribe that itshall be published else%here than in the &fficial azette.$ommon%ealth Act o. 6"0, in m( opinion, does not support the proposition that for their effectivity$la%s must be published in the &fficial azette. 8he said la% is simpl( ;An Act to #rovide for the?niform #ublication and -istribution of the &fficial azette.; $onformabl( there%ith, it authorizes thepublication of the &fficial azette, determines its fre:uenc(, provides for its sale and distribution, anddefines the authorit( of the -irector of #rinting in relation thereto. It also enumerates %hat shall be

published in the &fficial azette, among them, ;important legislative acts and resolutions of a publicnature of the $ongress of the #hilippines; and ;all e*ecutive and administrative orders andproclamations, e*cept such as have no general applicabilit(.; It is note%orth( that not all legislativeacts are re:uired to be published in the &fficial azette but onl( ;important; ones ;of a public nature.;oreover, the said la% does not provide that publication in the &fficial azette is essential for theeffectivit( of la%s. 8his is as it should be, for all statutes are e:ual and stand on the same footing. Ala%, especiall( an earlier one of general application such as $ommon%ealth Act o. 6"0, cannot nullif(or restrict the operation of a subse:uent statute that has a provision of its o%n as to %hen and ho% it%ill take effect. &nl( a higher la%, %hich is the $onstitution, can assume that role.In fine, I concur in the ma9orit( decision to the e*tent that it re:uires notice before la%s becomeeffective, for no person should be bound b( a la% %ithout notice. 8his is elementar( fairness. Co%ever,I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be b( publication in the &fficial azette.Cuevas and #lam'ay$ %%.$ concur.GT$RR$%" 4r." J., concurring+

I concur insofar as publication is necessar( but reserve m( vote as to the necessit( of such publicationbeing in the &fficial azette.$ LA +$NT$" J., concurring+I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature orgeneral applicabilit( ineffective, until due publication thereof.

G.R. No. L-63915 ecemCer 9" 1986L#R$N%# &. TA'DAA" ARA*A& +. ,AR&$NT#" an /$&$NT #+ ATT#RN$0, +#RR#T*$R*##" NT$GRT0 AN NAT#NAL,&" N. (&AN)" peti tioners,vs.*#N. 4AN . T/$RA" in is capacity as $7ectie Assistant to te Presient" *#N. 4#A:N/$N," in is capacity as epty $7ectie Assistant to te Presient" &$L:A$, P. $ LAR%" $T." $T AL." respondents.

< 7 S & 5 ? 8 I &

R%" J.:-ue process %as invoked b( the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidentialdecrees %hich the( claimed had not been published as re:uired b( la%. 8he government argued that%hile publication %as necessar( as a rule, it %as not so %hen it %as ;other%ise provided,; as %hen thedecrees themselves declared that the( %ere to become effective immediatel( upon their approval. Inthe decision of this case on April /2, 10, the $ourt affirmed the necessit( for the publication of someof these decrees, declaring in the dispositive portion as follo%s+>C7


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present, directl( conferred b( the $onstitution. administrative rules and regulations must a also bepublished if their purpose is to enforce or implement e*isting la% pursuant also to a valid delegation.Interpretative regulations and those merel( internal in nature, that is, regulating onl( the personnel ofthe administrative agenc( and not the public, need not be published. either is publication re:uired ofthe so4called letters of instructions issued b( administrative superiors concerning the rules orguidelines to be follo%ed b( their subordinates in the performance of their duties.

Accordingl(, even the charter of a cit( must be published not%ithstanding that it applies to onl( aportion of the national territor( and directl( affects onl( the inhabitants of that place. All presidentialdecrees must be published, including even, sa(, those naming a public place after a favored individual

or e*empting him from certain prohibitions or re:uirements. 8he circulars issued b( the onetar(Board must be published if the( are meant not merel( to interpret but to ;fill in the details; of the$entral Bank Act %hich that bod( is supposed to enforce.Co%ever, no publication is re:uired of the instructions issued b(, sa(, the inister of Social >elfare onthe case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid do%n b( the head of agovernment agenc( on the assignments or %orkload of his personnel or the %earing of office uniforms.#arentheticall(, municipal ordinances are not covered b( this rule but b( the 5ocal overnment $ode.>e agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform thepublic of the contents of the la%s. As correctl( pointed out b( the petitioners, the mere mention of thenumber of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its %hereabouts He.g., ;%ith Secretar(8uvera;, the supposed date of effectivit(, and in a mere supplement of the &fficial azette cannotsatisf( the publication re:uirement. 8his is not even substantial compliance. 8his %as the manner,incidentall(, in %hich the eneral Appropriations Act for GK 1!, a presidential decree undeniabl( ofgeneral applicabilit( and interest, %as ;published; b( the arcos administration. ?8he evident purpose%as to %ithhold rather than disclose information on this vital la%.

$oming no% to the original decision, it is true that onl( four 9ustices %ere categoricall( for publication inthe &fficial azette 8and that si* others felt that publication could be made else%here as long as thepeople %ere sufficientl( informed. 9&ne reserved his vote 1@and another merel( ackno%ledged theneed for due publication %ithout indicating %here it should be made. 11It is therefore necessar( for thepresent membership of this $ourt to arrive at a clear consensus on this matter and to la( do%n abinding decision supported b( the necessar( vote.8here is much to be said of the vie% that the publication need not be made in the &fficial azette,considering its erratic releases and limited readership. ?ndoubtedl(, ne%spapers of general circulationcould better perform the function of communicating, the la%s to the people as such periodicals aremore easil( available, have a %ider readership, and come out regularl(. 8he trouble, though, is thatthis kind of publication is not the one re:uired or authorized b( e*isting la%. As far as %e kno%, noamendment has been made of Article / of the $ivil $ode. 8he Solicitor eneral has not pointed tosuch a la%, and %e have no information that it e*ists. If it does, it obviousl( has not (et been published.

At an( rate, this $ourt is not called upon to rule upon the %isdom of a la% or to repeal or modif( it if %efind it impractical. 8hat is not our function. 8hat function belongs to the legislature. &ur task is merel(

to interpret and appl( the la% as conceived and approved b( the political departments of thegovernment in accordance %ith the prescribed procedure. $onse:uentl(, %e have no choice but topronounce that under Article / of the $ivil $ode, the publication of la%s must be made in the &fficialazett and not else%here, as a re:uirement for their effectivit( after fifteen da(s from such publicationor after a different period provided b( the legislature.>e also hold that the publication must be made forth%ith or at least as soon as possible, to give effectto the la% pursuant to the said Article /. 8here is that possibilit(, of course, although not suggested b(the parties that a la% could be rendered unenforceable b( a mere refusal of the e*ecutive, for%hatever reason, to cause its publication as re:uired. 8his is a matter, ho%ever, that %e do not need toe*amine at this time.Ginall(, the claim of the former Solicitor eneral that the instant motion is a re:uest for an advisor(opinion is untenable, to sa( the least, and deserves no further comment.8he da(s of the secret la%s and the unpublished decrees are over. 8his is once again an open societ(,%ith all the acts of the government sub9ect to public scrutin( and available al%a(s to publiccognizance. 8his has to be so if our countr( is to remain democratic, %ith sovereignt( residing in thepeople and all government authorit( emanating from them.

Although the( have delegated the po%er of legislation, the( retain the authorit( to revie% the %ork oftheir delegates and to ratif( or re9ect it according to their lights, through their freedom of e*pressionand their right of suffrage. 8his the( cannot do if the acts of the legislature are concealed.

5a%s must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shado%s %iththeir dark, deep secrets. (sterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized asbinding unless their e*istence and contents are confirmed b( a valid publication intended to make fulldisclosure and give proper notice to the people. 8he furtive la% is like a scabbarded saber that cannotfeint parr( or cut unless the naked blade is dra%n.>C7


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took a strong stand against the insidious manner b( %hich the previous dispensation had promulgatedand made effective thousands of decrees, e*ecutive orders, letters of instructions, etc. ever has thela%4making po%er %hich traditionall( belongs to the legislature been used and abused to satisf( the%hims and caprices of a one4man legislative mill as it happened in the past regime. 8hus, in thoseda(s, it %as not surprising to %itness the sad spectacle of t%o presidential decrees bearing the samenumber, although covering t%o different sub9ect matters. In point is the case of t%o presidentialdecrees bearing number 1606 issued on arch 1, 103, one granting #hilippine citizenship toichael . Leon the then #resident's nephe% and the other imposing a ta* on ever( motor vehiclee:uipped %ith airconditioner. 8his %as further e*acerbated b( the i ssuance of #- o. 16064A also on

arch 1, 103 granting #hilippine citizenship to basketball pla(ers Deffre( oore and -ennis eorgeStill8he categorical statement b( this $ourt on the need for publication before an( la% ma( be madeeffective seeks prevent abuses on the part of the la%makers and, at the same time, ensures to thepeople their constitutional right to due process and to informationon matters of public concern.+$LAN#" J., concurring+I agree entirel( %ith the opinion of the court so elo:uentl( %ritten b( r. Dustice Isagani A. $ruz. At thesame time, I %ish to add a fe% statements to reflect m( understanding of %hat the $ourt is sa(ing.

A statute %hich b( its terms provides for its coming into effect immediatel( upon approval thereof, isproperl( interpreted as coming into effect immediatel( upon publication thereof in the &fficial azetteas provided in Article / of the $ivil $ode. Such statute, in other %ords, should not be regarded aspurporting literall( to come into effect immediatel( upon its approval or enactment and %ithout need ofpublication. Gor so to interpret such statute %ould be to collide %ith the constitutional obstacle posedb( the due process clause. 8he enforcement of prescriptions %hich are both unkno%n to andunkno%able b( those sub9ected to the statute, has been throughout histor( a common tool of

t(rannical governments. Such application and enforcement constitutes at bottom a negation of thefundamental principle of legalit( in the relations bet%een a government and its people.At the same time, it is clear that the re:uirement of publication of a statute in the &fficial azette, asdistinguished from an( other medium such as a ne%spaper of general circulation, is embodied in astatutor( norm and is not a constitutional command. 8he statutor( norm is set out in Article / of the$ivil $ode and is supported and reinforced b( Section 1 of $ommon%ealth Act o. 6"0 and Section "of the


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permitted b( la% falls on a holiday, the act ma( be done on the ne*t succeeding business da(.; 8hecourt a &uo, therefore, committed an error in declaring that the complaint %as filed out of time.8he ruling is on all fours on the issue before us, and against respondent4appellant.8he decision appealed from is affirmed. >ithout costs..

G.R. No. L-3116 April l" 1981RRAL AN #+ AL##AN" N. an 4#,$ #. $,$R#" 4R." petitioners,vs.

T*$ #RT #+ APP$AL, an &AE&A A,TR#" respondents.

$ A,TR#" B J.:8his is a petition for revie% b( %a( of certiorari of the decision 1of the $ourt of Appeals in $A4.


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finished second grade Ht.s.n., p. 2, -ecember 11, 162E that in -ecember 1, she needed mone( inthe amount of #",333.33 to invest in the business of the defendant spouses Valencia, %hoaccompanied her to the defendant bank for the purpose of securing a loan of #",333.33E that %hile atthe defendant bank, an emplo(ee handed to her several forms alread( prepared %hich she %as askedto sign on the places indicated, %ith no one e*plaining to her the nature and contents of thedocumentsE that she did not even receive a cop( thereofE that she %as given a check in the amount of#/,00/.0 %hich she delivered to defendant spousesE that sometime in Gebruar( 161, she received aletter from the Acting -eput( Sheriff of anila, regarding the e*tra9udicial foreclosure sale of herpropert(E that it %as then %hen she learned for the first time that the mortgage indebtedness secured

b( the mortgage on her propert( %as #6,333.33 and not #",333.33E that upon investigation of herla%(er, it %as found that the papers she %as made to sign %ere+Ha Application for a loan of #",333.33 dated -ecember !, 1 H7*h. B41 and 7*h. 1EHb #romissor( note dated -ecember 11, 1 for the said loan of #",333.33 H7*h4 B4/EHc #romissor( note dated -ecember 11, 1 for #",333.33 %ith the defendants Valencia spouses asborro%ers and appellee as co4maker H7*h. B42 or 7*h. /.8he auction sale set for arch 13, 161 %as postponed co April 13, 161 upon the re:uest ofdefendant spouses Valencia %ho needed more time %ithin %hich to pa( their loan of #",333.33 %iththe defendant bankE plaintiff claims that %hen she filed the complaint she deposited %ith the $lerk of$ourt the sum of #","0".33 in full pa(ment of her loan of #",333.33 %ith the defendant bank, plusinterest at the rate of 1/M per annum up to April ", 161 H7*h. - .

As additional evidence for the defendant bank, its manager declared that sometime in -ecember,1, plaintiff %as brought to the &ffice of the Bank b( an emplo(ee4 Ht.s.n., p 2, Danuar( /!, 166.She %ept, there to in:uire if she could get a loan from the bank. 8he claims he asked the amount andthe purpose of the loan and the securit( to he given and plaintiff said she %ould need #".333.33 to be

invested in a drugstore in %hich she %as a partner Ht.s.n., p. 011. She offered as securit( for the loanher lot and house at $arola St., Sampaloc, anila, %hich %as promptl( investigated b( the defendantbank's inspector. 8hen a fe% da(s later, plaintiff came back to the bank %ith the %ife of defendantValencia A date %as allegedl( set for plaintiff and the defendant spouses for the processing of theirapplication, but on the da( fi*ed, plaintiff came %ithout the defendant spouses. She signed theapplication and the other papers pertinent to the loan after she %as intervie%ed b( the manager of thedefendant. After the application of plaintiff %as made, defendant spouses had their application for aloan also prepared and signed Hsee 7*h. 1". In his intervie% of plaintiff and defendant spouses, themanager of the bank %as able to gather that plaintiff %as in 9oint venture %ith the defendant spouses%herein she agreed to invest #",333.33 as additional capital in the laborator( o%ned b( said spousesHt.s.n., pp. 1641! 3

8he $ourt of Appeals, upon evaluation of the evidence, affirmed in toto the decision of the $ourt ofGirst Instance of anila, the dispositive portion of %hich reads+G&< A55 8C7 G&


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concluded that respondent court erred in not giving effect to the promissor( note H7*hibit / insofar asthe( affect $astro and the bank and in declaring that the mortgage contract H7*hibit 6 %as valid onl(to the e*tent of $astro's personal loan of #",333.33.8he records of the case reveal that respondent court's findings of fraud against the Valencias is %ellsupported b( evidence. oreover, the findings of fact b( respondent court in the matter is deemedfinal. 9 8he decision declared the Valencias solel( responsible for the defraudation of $astro.#etitioners' contention that the decision %as silent regarding the participation of the bank in the fraudis, therefore, correct.>e cannot agree %ith the contention of petitioners that the bank %as defrauded b( the Valencias. Gor

one, no claim %as made on this in the lo%er court. Gor another, petitioners did not submit proof tosupport its contention.At an( rate, >e observe that %hile the Valencias defrauded $astro b( making her sign the promissor(note H7*hibit / and the mortgage contract H7*hibit 6, the( also misrepresented to the bank $astro'spersonal :ualifications in order to secure its consent to the loan. 8his must be the reason %hichprompted the bank to contend that it %as defrauded b( the Valencias. But to reiterate, >e cannotagree %ith the contention for reasons above4mentioned. Co%ever, if the contention deserves an(consideration at all, it is in indicating the admission of petitioners that the bank committed mistake ingiving its consent to the contracts.8hus, as a result of the fraud upon $astro and the misrepresentation to the bank inflicted b( theValencias both $astro and the bank committed mistake in giving their consents to the contracts. Inother %ords, substantial mistake vitiated their consents given. Gor if $astro had been a%are of %hatshe signed and the bank of the true :ualifications of the loan applicants, it is evident that the( %ouldnot have given their consents to the contracts.#ursuant to Article 1"2/ of the $ivil $ode %hich provides+

Art. 1"2/. isrepresentation b( a third person does not vitiate consent, unless such misrepresentationhas created substantial mistake and the same is mutual.>e cannot declare the promissor( note H7*hibit / valid bet%een the bank and $astro and themortgage contract H7*hibit 6 binding on $astro be(ond the amount of #",333.33, for %hile thecontracts ma( not be invalidated insofar as the( affect the bank and $astro on the ground of fraudbecause the bank %as not a participant thereto, such ma( ho%ever be invalidated on the ground ofsubstantial mistake mutuall( committed b( them as a conse:uence of the fraud and misrepresentationinflicted b( the Valencias. 8hus, in the case of 0ill vs. 2eloso, 1@this $ourt declared that a contract ma(be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent if deceit b( a third person, even %ithout connivance orcomplicit( %ith one of the contracting parties, resulted in mutual error on the part of the parties to thecontract.#etitioners argued that the amended complaint fails to contain even a general averment of fraud ormistake, and its mention in the pra(er is definitel( not a substantial compliance %ith the re:uirement ofSection , ith the recent occurrence of events that have supposedl(affected adversel( our banking s(stem, attributable to la*it( in the conduct of bank business b( itsofficials, the need of e*treme caution and prudence b( said officials and emplo(ees in the discharge oftheir functions cannot be over4emphasized.Fuestion is, like%ise, raised as to the propriet( of respondent court's decision %hich declared that$astro's consignation in court of the amount of #","0".33 %as validl( made. It is contended that theconsignation %as made %ithout prior offer or tender of pa(ment to the Bank, and it therefore, not valid.In holding that there is a substantial compliance %ith the provision of Article 1/6 of the $ivil $ode,respondent court considered the fact that the Bank %as holding $astro liable for the sum of #6,333.33plus 1/M interest per annum, %hile the amount consigned %as onl( #",333.33 plus 1/M interestE thatat the time of consignation, the Bank had long foreclosed the mortgage e*tra9udiciall( and the sale ofthe mortgage propert( had alread( been scheduled for April 13, 161 for non4pa(ment of theobligation, and that despite the fact that the Bank alread( kne% of the deposit made b( $astrobecause the receipt of the deposit %as attached to the record of the case, said Bank had not madean( claim of such deposit, and that therefore, $astro %as right in thinking that it %as futile and uselessfor her to make previous offer and tender of pa(ment directl( to the Bank onl( in the aforesaid amountof #",333.33 plus 1/M interest. ?nder the foregoing circumstances, the consignation made b( $astro%as valid. if not under the strict provision of the la%, under the more liberal considerations of e:uit(.8he final issue raised is the validit( or invalidit( of the e*tra9udicial foreclosure sale at public auction ofthe mortgaged propert( that %as held on April 11, 161.#etitioners contended that the public auction sale that %as held on April 11, 161 %hich %as the ne*tbusiness da( after the scheduled date of the sale on April 13, 161, a special public holida(, %aspermissible and valid pursuant to the provisions of Section "1 of the here the da(, or the last da(, for doing an( act re:uired or permitted b(la% falls on a holida(, the act ma( be done on the ne*t succeeding business da(.


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e agree %ith respondent court. 8he pretermission of a holida( applies onl( ;%here the da(, or the lastda( for doing an( act re&uired or 'ermitted "y la( falls on a holida(,; or %hen the last da( of a givenperiod for doing an act falls on a holida(. It does not appl( to a da( fi*ed b( an office or officer of the

government for an act to be done, as distinguished from a period of time %ithin %hich an act should bedone, %hich ma( be on an( da( %ithin that specified period. Gor e*ample, if a part( is re:uired b( la%to file his ans%er to a complaint %ithin fifteen H1 da(s from receipt of the summons and the last da(falls on a holida(, the last da( is deemed moved to the ne*t succeeding business da(. But, if the courtfi*es the trial of a case on a certain da( but the said date is subse:uentl( declared a public holida(, thetrial thereof is not automaticall( transferred to the ne*t succeeding business da(. Since April 13, 161%as not the da( or the last da( set b( la% for the e*tra9udicial foreclosure sale, nor the last da( of agiven period but a date fi*ed b( the deput( sheriff, the aforesaid sale cannot legall( be made on thene*t succeeding business da( %ithout the notices of the sale on that da( being posted as prescribed inSection , Act o. "1".>C7At around 1+"3 p.m., ovember /, 13, Dose Duego, a construction %orker of -. . $onsun9i, Inc., fell12 floors from the


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It is thus manifest that Dose A. Duego %as crushed to death %hen the @platform he %as then on boardand performing %ork, fell. And the falling of the @platform %as due to the removal or getting loose ofthe pin %hich %as merel( inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and @platform but %ithouta safet( lock.1

&n a( , 11, Dose DuegoQs %ido%, aria, filed in the ere there no e*ception for official statements, hosts of officials %ould be founddevoting the greater part of their time to attending as %itnesses in court or delivering deposition beforean officer. 8he %ork of administration of government and the interest of the public having business %ithofficials %ould alike suffer in conse:uence. Gor these reasons, and for man( others, a certain verit( isaccorded such documents, %hich is not e*tended to private documents. H" >igmore on 7vidence,Sec. 16"1.8he la% reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes the( %ill discharge theirseveral trusts %ith accurac( and fidelit(E and, therefore, %hatever acts the( do in discharge of theirdut( ma( be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of caution as to thenature and circumstances of each case ma( appear to re:uire.It %ould have been an entirel( different matter if a9or 7nri:uez %as not presented to testif( on hisreport. In that case the applicabilit( of Section 22 of


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elevator %as a result of the person having charge of the instrumentalit( %as negligent. As a rule ofevidence, the doctrine of res i'sa lo&uituris peculiar to the la% of negligence %hich recognizes that

'rima facie negligence ma( be established %ithout direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specificproof of negligence./3

8he concept of res i'sa lo&uitur has been e*plained in this %ise+>hile negligence is not ordinaril( inferred or presumed, and %hile the mere happening of an accidentor in9ur( %ill not generall( give rise to an inference or presumption that it %as due to negligence ondefendantQs part, under the doctrine of res ipsa lo:uitur, %hich means, literall(, the thing or transactionspeaks for itself, or in one 9urisdiction, that the thing or instrumentalit( speaks for itself, the facts or

circumstances accompan(ing an in9ur( ma( be such as to raise a presumption, or at least permit aninference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some other person %ho is charged %ithnegligence.* * * %here it is sho%n that the thing or instrumentalit( %hich caused the in9ur( complained of %asunder the control or management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the in9ur( %assuch as in the ordinar( course of things %ould not happen if those %ho had its control or managementused proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in theabsence of e*planation b( the defendant, that the in9ur( arose from or %as caused b( the defendantQs%ant of care./1

&ne of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its necessit(, i.e., that necessar( evidence is absent ornot available.//

8he res ipsa lo:uitur doctrine is based in part upon the theor( that the defendant in charge of theinstrumentalit( %hich causes the in9ur( either kno%s the cause of the accident or has the bestopportunit( of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such kno%ledge, and therefore is compelledto allege negligence in general terms and to rel( upon the proof of the happening of the accident in

order to establish negligence. 8he inference %hich the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact thatthe chief evidence of the true cause, %hether culpable or innocent, is practicall( accessible to thedefendant but inaccessible to the in9ured person.It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa lo:uitur furnishes a bridge b( %hich a plaintiff, %ithoutkno%ledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant %ho kno%s or should kno% the cause, for an(e*planation of care e*ercised b( the defendant in respect of the matter of %hich the plaintiff complains.8he res ipsa lo:uitur doctrine, another court has said, is a rule of necessit(, in that it proceeds on thetheor( that under the peculiar circumstances in %hich the doctrine is applicable, it is %ithin the po%erof the defendant to sho% that there %as no negligence on his part, and direct proof of defendantQsnegligence is be(ond plaintiffQs po%er. Accordingl(, some court add to the three prere:uisites for theapplication of the res ipsa lo:uitur doctrine the further re:uirement that for the res ipsa lo:uitur doctrineto appl(, it must appear that the in9ured part( had no kno%ledge or means of kno%ledge as to thecause of the accident, or that the part( to be charged %ith negligence has superior kno%ledge oropportunit( for e*planation of the accident./"

8he $A held that all the re:uisites of res i'sa lo&uiturare present in the case at bar+8here is no dispute that appelleeQs husband fell do%n from the 12 thfloor of a building to the basement%hile he %as %orking %ith appellantQs construction pro9ect, resulting to his death. 8he construction siteis %ithin the e*clusive control and management of appellant. It has a safet( engineer, a pro9ectsuperintendent, a carpenter leadman and others %ho are in complete control of the situation therein.8he circumstances of an( accident that %ould occur therein are peculiarl( %ithin the kno%ledge of theappellant or its emplo(ees. &n the other hand, the appellee is not in a position to kno% %hat causedthe accident. !es i'sa lo&uituris a rule of necessit( and it applies %here evidence is absent or notreadil( available, provided the follo%ing re:uisites are present+ H1 the accident %as of a kind %hichdoes not ordinaril( occur unless someone is negligentE H/ the instrumentalit( or agenc( %hich causedthe in9ur( %as under the e*clusive control of the person charged %ith negligenceE and H" the in9ur(suffered must not have been due to an( voluntar( action or contribution on the part of the personin9ured. * * *.o %orker is going to fall from the 12 thfloor of a building to the basement %hile performing %ork in aconstruction site unless someone is negligent@E thus, the first re:uisite for the application of the rule ofres i'sa lo&uitur is present. As e*plained earlier, the construction site %ith all its paraphernalia andhuman resources that likel( caused the in9ur( is under the e*clusive control and management ofappellant@E thus@, the second re:uisite is also present. o contributor( negligence %as attributed tothe appelleeQs deceased husband@E thus@, the last re:uisite is also present. All the re:uisites for the

application of the rule of res i'sa lo&uiturare present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference ofappellantQs negligence arises. * * *./2

#etitioner does not dispute the e*istence of the re:uisites for the application of res i'sa lo&uitur, butargues that the presumption or inference that it %as negligent did not arise since it ;proved that ite*ercised due care to avoid the accident %hich befell respondentQs husband.;#etitioner apparentl( misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine. As stated earlier, thedefendantQs negligence is presumed or inferred/%hen the plaintiff establishes the re:uisites for theapplication of res i'sa lo&uitur.&nce the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, theburden then shifts to defendant to e*plain./6 8he presumption or inference ma( be rebutted or

overcome b( other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances disputable presumption, such asthat of due care or innocence, ma( out%eigh the inference./!It is not for the defendant to e*plain orprove its defense to prevent the presumption or inference from arising. 7vidence b( the defendant ofsa(, due care, comes into pla( onl( after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine has beenestablished.


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Addressing the issue of %hether the heirs had a choice of remedies, ma9orit( of the $ourt En Banc,"1

follo%ing the rule in Paca5a vs. Ce"u #uto"us Com'any, held in the affirmative.>7 no% come to the :uer( as to %hether or not the in9ured emplo(ee or his heirs in case of deathhave a right of selection or choice of action bet%een availing themselves of the %orkerQs right underthe >orkmenQs $ompensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the $ivil $ode for higherdamages Hactual, moral and e*emplar( from the emplo(ers b( vir tue of the negligence or fault of theemplo(ers or %hether the( ma( avail themselves cumulativel( of both actions, i.e., collect the limitedcompensation under the >orkmenQs $ompensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regularcourts.

In disposing of a similar issue, this $ourt in #acaRa vs. $ebu Autobus $ompan(, "/ S$orkmenQs $ompensation Act or to prosecute an ordinar( civil action against the tortfeasor for higherdamages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneousl(. @?nderscoring supplied.evertheless, the $ourt allo%ed some of the petitioners in said case to proceed %ith their suit underthe $ivil $ode despite having availed of the benefits provided under the >orkmenQs $ompensation

Act. 8he $ourt reasoned+>ith regard to the other petitioners, it %as alleged b( #hile* in its motion to dismiss dated a( 12,160 before the court a &uo, that the heirs of the deceased emplo(ees, namel( 7merito &bra, 5arr(Villar, Dr., Aurelio 5anuza, 5orenzo Isla and Saturnino submitted notices and claims for compensationto the orkmenQs $ompensation Act before the( learned of the official report of the committee

created to investigate the accident %hich established the criminal negligence and violation of la% b(#hile*, and %hich report %as for%arded b( the -irector of ines to then 7*ecutive Secretar( 7 hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the >orkmenQs$ompensation Act, such m( not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular courtbecause the( became cognizant of the fact that #hile* has been remiss in its contractual obligations%ith the deceased miners onl( after receiving compensation under the Act. Cad petitioners beena%are of said violation of government rules and regulations b( #hile*, and of its negligence, the(%ould not have sought redress under the >orkmenQs $ompensation $ommission %hich a%arded alesser amount for compensation. 8he choice of the first remed( %as based on ignorance or a mistakeof fact, %hich nullifies the choice as it %as not an intelligent choice. 8he case should therefore beremanded to the lo%er court for further proceedings. Co%ever, should the petitioners be successful intheir bid before the lo%er court, the pa(ments made under the >orkmenQs $ompensation Act shouldbe deducted from the damages that ma( be decreed in their favor. @?nderscoring supplied.8he ruling in ,lorescaproviding the claimant a choice of remedies %as reiterated in -smael MaritimeCor'oration vs. #velino,"/ 2da. De Severo vs. ,eliciano/Go,"" and Marco''er Mining Cor'. vs.

#"eleda."2 In the last case, the $ourt again recognized that a claimant %ho had been paid under theAct could still sue under the $ivil $ode. 8he $ourt said+In the orkmenQs $ompensation 5a%, to the e*clusion of all furtherclaims under other la%s. In Gloresca, this doctrine %as abrogated in favor of the ne% rule that theclaimants ma( invoke either the >orkmenQs $ompensation Act or the provisions of the $ivil $ode,sub9ect to the conse:uence that the choice of one remed( %ill e*clude the other and that theacceptance of compensation under the remed( chosen %ill preclude a claim for additional benefitsunder the other remed(. 8he e*ception is %here a claimant %ho has alread( been paid under the>orkmenQs $ompensation Act ma( still sue for damages under the $ivil $ode on the basis ofsupervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remed(. H?nderscoringsupplied.Cere, the $A held that private respondentQs case came under the e*ception because privaterespondent %as una%are of petitionerQs negligence %hen she filed her claim for death benefits fromthe State Insurance Gund. #rivate respondent filed the civil complaint for damages after she received acop( of the police investigation report and the #rosecutorQs emorandum dismissing the criminalcomplaint against petitionerQs personnel. >hile stating that there %as no negligence attributable to the

respondents in the complaint, the prosecutor nevertheless noted in the emorandum that, ;if at all,;the ;case is civil in nature.; 8he $A thus applied the e*ception in ,loresca+* * * >e do not agree that appellee has kno%ledge of the alleged negligence of appellant as earl( asovember /, 13, the date of the police investigatorQs report. 8he appellee merel( e*ecuted hers%orn statement before the police investigator concerning her personal circumstances, her relation tothe victim, and her kno%ledge of the accident. She did not file the complaint for ;Simple egligenceaiver is the intentional relin:uishment of a no(nright."

@It is an act of understanding that presupposes that a part( has kno%ledge of its rights, but choosesnot to assert them. It must be generall( sho%n b( the part( claiming a %aiver that the person against%hom the %aiver is asserted had at the time kno%ledge, actual or constructive, of the e*istence of thepart(Qs rights or of all material facts upon %hich the( depended. >here one lacks kno%ledge of a right,
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there is no basis upon %hich %aiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates %aiver, and%aiver cannot be established b( a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.

A person makes a kno%ing and intelligent %aiver %hen that person kno%s that a right e*ists and hasade:uate kno%ledge upon %hich to make an intelligent decision.>aiver re:uires a kno%ledge of the facts basic to the e*ercise of the right %aived, %ith an a%arenessof its conse:uences. 8hat a %aiver is made kno%ingl( and intelligentl( must be illustrated on therecord or b( the evidence.23

8hat lack of kno%ledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remed( is the basis for the e*ception in,loresca.

It is in light of the foregoing principles that %e address petitionerQs contentions.>aiver is a defense, and it %as not incumbent upon private respondent, as plaintiff, to allege in hercomplaint that she had availed of benefits from the 7$$. It is, thus, erroneous for petitioner to burdenprivate respondent %ith raising %aiver as an issue. &n the contrar(, it is the defendant %ho ought toplead %aiver, as petitioner did in pages /4" of its Ans%erE 21other%ise, the defense is %aived. It is,therefore, perple*ing for petitioner to no% contend that the trial court had no 9urisdiction over the issue%hen petitioner itself pleaded %aiver in the proceedings before the trial court.-oes the evidence sho% that private respondent kne% of the facts that led to her husbandQs death andthe rights pertaining to a choice of remediesJIt bears stressing that %hat negates %aiver is lack of kno%ledge or a mistake of fact. In this case, the;fact; that served as a basis for nullif(ing the %aiver is the negligenceof petitionerQs emplo(ees, of%hich private respondent purportedl( learned onl( after the prosecutor issued a resolution stating thatthere ma( be civil l iabilit(. In ,loresca, it %as the negligenceof the mining corporation and its violationof government rules and regulations. egligence, or violation of government rules and regulations, forthat matter, ho%ever, is not a fact, but a conclusion of la(, over %hich onl( the courts have the final

sa(. Such a conclusion binds no one until the courts have decreed so. It appears, therefore, that theprinciple that ignorance or mistake of fact nullifies a %aiver has been misapplied in ,lorescaand in thecase at bar.In an( event, there is no proof that private respondent kne% that her husband died in the elevatorcrash %hen on ovember 1, 13 she accomplished her application for benefits from the 7$$. 8hepolice investigation report is dated ovember /, 13, 13 da(s after the accomplishment of the form.#etitioner filed the application in her behalf on ovember /!, 13.8here is also no sho%ing that private respondent kne% of the remedies available to her %hen the claimbefore the 7$$ %as filed. &n the contrar(, private respondent testified that she %as not a%are of herrights.#etitioner, though, argues that under Article " of the $ivil $ode, ignorance of the la% e*cuses no onefrom compliance there%ith. As 9udicial decisions appl(ing or interpreting the la%s or the $onstitutionform part of the #hilippine legal s(stem HArticle 0, $ivil $ode, private respondent cannot claimignorance of this $ourtQs ruling in ,lorescaallo%ing a choice of remedies.8he argument has no merit. 8he application of Article " i s limited to mandator( and prohibitor( la%s.2/

8his ma( be deduced from the language of the provision, %hich, not%ithstanding a personQs ignorance,does not e*cuse his or her com'liance%ith the la%s. 8he rule in ,lorescaallo%ing private respondenta choice of remedies is neither mandator( nor prohibitor(. Accordingl(, her ignorance thereof cannotbe held against her.Ginall(, the $ourt modifies the affirmance of the a%ard of damages. 8he records do not indicate thetotal amount private respondent ought to receive from the 7$$, although it appears from 7*hibit ;L; 2"

that she received #",01.0 as initial pa(ment representing the accrued pension from ovember 13to arch 11. Cer initial monthl( pension, according to the same 7*hibit ;L,; %as #6.! andpresent total monthl( pension %as #!16.23. >hether the total amount she %ill eventuall( receive fromthe 7$$ is less than the sum of #622,333.33 in total damages a%arded b( the trial court is sub9ect tospeculation, and the case is remanded to the trial court for such determination. Should the trial courtfind that its a%ard is greater than that of the 7$$, pa(ments alread( received b( private respondentunder the 5abor $ode shall be deducted from the trial court'Q a%ard of damages. $onsistent %ith ourruling in ,loresca, this ad9udication aims to prevent double compensation.*$R$+#R$"the case is REMANDEDto the Appeal b( plaintiff 7meterio $ui from a decision of the $ourt of Girst Instance of anila, absolvingdefendant Arellano ?niversit( from plaintiff's complaint, %ith costs against the plaintiff, and dismissingdefendant's counter claim, for insufficienc( of proof thereon.In the language of the decision appealed from+8he essential facts of this case are short and undisputed. As established b( the agreement of facts7*hibits N and b( the respective oral and documentar( evidence introduced b( the parties, it appearsconclusive that plaintiff, before the school (ear 120412 took up preparator( la% course in thedefendant ?niversit(. After finishing his preparator( la% course plaintiff enrolled in the $ollege of 5a%of the defendant from the school (ear 120412. #laintiff finished his la% studies in the defendantuniversit( up to and including the first semester of the fourth (ear. -uring all the school (ears in %hichplaintiff %as stud(ing la% in defendant la% college, Grancisco


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". Several complaints have actuall( been received from students %ho have en9o(ed scholarships, fullor partial, to the effect that the( could not transfer to other schools since their credentials %ould not bereleased unless the( %ould pa( the fees corresponding to the period of the scholarships. >here theBureau believes that the right of the student to transfer is being denied on this ground, it reserves theright to authorize such transfer.that defendant herein received a cop( of this memorandumE that plaintiff asked the Bureau of #rivateSchools to pass upon the issue on his right to secure the transcript of his record in defendant?niversit(, %ithout being re:uired to refund the sum of #1,3"".0!E that the Bureau of #rivate Schoolsupheld the position taken b( the plaintiff and so advised the defendantE and that, this not%ithstanding,

the latter refused to issue said transcript of records, unless said refund %ere made, and evenrecommended to said Bureau that it issue a %ritten order directing the defendant to release saidtranscript of record, ;so that the case ma( be presented to the court for 9udicial action.; As abovestated, plaintiff %as, accordingl(, constrained to pa(, and did pa( under protest, said sum of #1,3"".0!,in order that he could take the bar e*amination in 1". Subse:uentl(, he brought this action for therecover( of said amount, aside from #/,333 as moral damages, #33 as e*emplar( damages, #/,333as attorne('s fees, and #33 as e*penses of litigation.In its ans%er, defendant reiterated the stand it took, vis/a/visthe Bureau of #rivate Schools, namel(,that the provisions of its contract %ith plaintiff are valid and binding and that the memorandum above4referred to is null and void. It, like%ise, set up a counterclaim for #13,333.33 as damages, and #",333as attorne('s fees.8he issue in this case is %hether the above :uoted provision of the contract bet%een plaintiff and thedefendant, %hereb( the former %aived his right to transfer to another school %ithout refunding to thelatter the e:uivalent of his scholarships in cash, is valid or not. 8he lo%er court resolved this :uestionin the affirmative, upon the ground that the aforementioned memorandum of the -irector of #rivateSchools is not a la%E that the provisions thereof are advisor(, not mandator( in natureE and that,although the contractual provision ;ma( be unethical, (et it %as more unethical for plaintiff to :uitstud(ing %ith the defendant %ithout good reasons and simpl( because he %anted to follo% thee*ample of his uncle.; oreover, defendant maintains in its brief that the aforementionedmemorandum of the -irector of #rivate Schools is null and void because said officer had no authorit(to issue it, and because it had been neither approved b( the corresponding department head norpublished in the official gazette.>e do not deem it necessar( or advisable to consider as the lo%er court did, the :uestion %hetherplaintiff had sufficient reasons or not to transfer from defendant ?niversit( to the Abad Santos?niversit(. 8he nature of the issue before us, and its far reaching effects, transcend personale:uations and demand a determination of the case from a high impersonal plane. either do %e deemit essential to pass upon the validit( of said emorandum o. "0, for, regardless of the same, %e areof the opinion that the stipulation in :uestion is contrar( to public polic( and, hence, null and void. 8heaforesaid memorandum merel( incorporates a sound principle of public polic(. As the -irector of#rivate Schools correctl( pointed, out in his letter, 7*hibit B, to the defendant,8here is one more point that merits refutation and that is %hether or not the contract entered intobet%een $ui and Arellano ?niversit( on September 13, 11 %as void as against public polic(. In thecase of eigel vs. Illinois 8rust and Savings Bank, /2 Ill. 103, 1 Ann. $ase 1/!, the court said+ 'Indetermining a public polic( of the state, courts are limited to a consideration of the $onstitution, the

9udicial decisions, the statutes, and the 'ractice of government officers.' It might take more than agovernment bureau or office to la( do%n or establish a public polic(, as alleged in (our communication,but courts consider the practices of government officials as one of the four factors in determining apublic polic( of the state. It has been consistentl( held in America that under the principles relating tothe doctrine of public polic(, as applied to the la% of contracts, courts of 9ustice %ill not recognize oruphold a transaction %hich its ob9ect, operation, or tendenc( is calculated to be pre9udicial to the public%elfare, to sound morality or to civic honestyH


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the rules and regulations dul( promulgated b( the overnment pursuant thereto, allo%ed great amountof %ater and mud to accumulate in an open pit area at the mine above Block 2"4S41 %hich seepedthrough and saturated the 633 ft. column of broken ore and rock belo% it, thereb( e*erting tremendouspressure on the %orking spaces at its 2"33 level, %ith the result that, on the said date, at about 2o'clock in the afternoon, %ith the collapse of all underground supports due to such enormous pressure,appro*imatel( 33,333 cubic feet of broken ores rocks, mud and %ater, accompanied b( surfaceboulders, blasted through the tunnels and flo%ed out and filled in, in a matter of appro*imatel( five Hminutes, the underground %orkings, ripped timber supports and carried off materials, machines ande:uipment %hich blocked all avenues of e*it, thereb( trapping %ithin its tunnels of all its men above

referred to, including those named in the ne*t preceding paragraph, represented b( the plaintiffshereinE13. 8hat out of the 20 mine %orkers %ho %ere then %orking at defendant #CI57N's mine on the saiddate, five H %ere able to escape from the terrif(ing holocaustE // %ere rescued %ithin the ne*t !da(sE and the rest, /1 in number, including those referred to in paragraph ! hereinabove, %ere leftmercilessl( to their fate, not%ithstanding the fact that up to then, a great man( of them %ere still alive,entombed in the tunnels of the mine, but %ere not rescued due to defendant #CI57N's decision toabandon rescue operations, in utter disregard of its bounden legal and moral duties in the premisesE*** *** ***1". 8hat defendant #CI57N not onl( violated the la% and the rules and regulations dul( promulgatedb( the dul( constituted authorities as set out b( the Special $ommittee above referred to, in theirorkmen's$ompensation Act HAct "2/0, as amended b( orkmen's$ompensation Act but on the provisions of the $ivil $ode allo%ing the a%ard of actual, moral ande*emplar( damages, particularl(+

Art. /1!6. >hoever b( act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, isobliged to pa( for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre4 e*isting contractualrelation bet%een the parties, is called a :uasi4delict and is governed b( the provisions of this $hapter.

Art. /1!0. 8he provisions of articles 11!/ to 11!2 are also applicable to a :uasi4delict.Hb Art. 11!"=8he fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence %hich isre:uired b( the nature of the obligation and corresponds %ith the circumstances of the persons, of thetime and of the place. >hen negligence sho%s bad faith, the provisions of Articles 11!1 and //31,paragraph / shall appl(.

Art. //31. * * * * * * * * *In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or %anton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages%hich ma( be reasonabl( attributed to the non4performance of the obligation.

Art. //"1. In :uasi4delicts, e*emplar( damages ma( be granted if the defendant acted %ith grossnegligence.

After a repl( and a re9oinder thereto %ere filed, respondent Dudge issued an order dated Dune /!, 160dismissing the case on the ground that it falls %ithin the e*clusive 9urisdiction of the >orkmen's$ompensation $ommission. &n petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the said order, respondentDudge, on September /", 160, reconsidered and set aside his order of Dune /!, 160 and allo%ed#hile* to file an ans%er to the complaint. #hile* moved to reconsider the aforesaid order %hich %asopposed b( petitioners.&n -ecember 16, 160, respondent Dudge dismissed the case for lack of 9urisdiction and ruled that in

accordance %ith the established 9urisprudence, the >orkmen's $ompensation $ommission hase*clusive original 9urisdiction over damage or compensation claims for %ork4connected deaths orin9uries of %orkmen or emplo(ees, irrespective of %hether or not the emplo(er %as negligent, adding

that if the emplo(er's negligence results in %ork4connected deaths or in9uries, the emplo(er shall,pursuant to Section 24A of the >orkmen's $ompensation Act, pa( additional compensation e:ual to3M of the compensation fi*ed in the Act.#etitioners thus filed the present petition.In their brief, petitioners raised the follo%ing assignment of errors+I8C7 5&>7< $&?orkmen's $ompensationAct. 8he( point out that the complaint alleges gross and brazen negligence on the part of #hile* infailing to take the necessar( securit( for the protection of the lives of its emplo(ees %orkingunderground. 8he( also assert that since #hile* opted to file a motion to dismiss in the court a &uo, theallegations in their complaint including those contained in the anne*es are deemed admitted.In the second assignment of error, petitioners asseverate that respondent Dudge failed to see thedistinction bet%een the claims for compensation under the >orkmen's $ompensation Act and theclaims for damages based on gross negligence of #hile* under the $ivil $ode. 8he( point out that%orkmen's compensation refers to liabilit( for compensation for loss resulting from in9ur(, disabilit( ordeath of the %orking man through industrial accident or disease, %ithout regard to the fault ornegligence of the emplo(er, %hile the claim for damages under the $ivil $ode %hich petitionerspursued in the regular court, refers to the emplo(er's liabilit( for reckless and %anton negligenceresulting in the death of the emplo(ees and for %hich the regular court has 9urisdiction to ad9udicatethe same.&n the other hand, #hile* asserts that %ork4connected in9uries are compensable e*clusivel( under theprovisions of Sections and 26 of the >orkmen's $ompensation Act, %hich read+S7$. . Exclusive right to com'ensation.=8he rights and remedies granted b( this Act to anemplo(ee b( reason of a personal in9ur( entitling him to compensation shall e*clude all other rightsand remedies accruing to the emplo(ee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kinagainst the emplo(er under the $ivil $ode and other la%s because of said in9ur( ...S7$. 26. %urisdiction.= 8he >orkmen's $ompensation $ommissioner shall have e*clusive 9urisdictionto hear and decide claims for compensation under the >orkmen's $ompensation Act, sub9ect toappeal to the Supreme $ourt, ...#hile* cites the case of analo vs. Goster >heeler H0 #hil. 0 @16 %here it %as held that ;allclaims of %orkmen against their emplo(er for damages due to accident suffered in the course ofemplo(ment shall be investigated and ad9udicated b( the >orkmen's $ompensation $ommission,;sub9ect to appeal to the Supreme $ourt.#hile* maintains that the fact that an emplo(er %as negligent, does not remove the case from thee*clusive character of recoveries under the >orkmen's $ompensation ActE because Section 24A of the

Act provides an additional compensation in case the emplo(er fails to compl( %ith the re:uirements ofsafet( as imposed b( la% to prevent accidents. In fact, it points out that #hile* voluntaril( paid thecompensation due the petitioners and all the pa(ments have been accepted in behalf of the deceasedminers, e*cept the heirs of azarito Gloresca %ho insisted that the( are entitled to a greater amount ofdamages under the $ivil $ode.In the hearing of this case, then ?ndersecretar( of 5abor Israel Bocobo, then Att(. 7dgardo Angara,no% #resident of the ?niversit( of the #hilippines, Dustice anuel 5azaro, as corporate counsel and

Assistant eneral anager of the SIS 5egal Affairs -epartment, and $ommissioner on 7lections,formerl( ?# 5a% $enter -irector Groilan Bacungan, appeared as amici curiae and thereafter,submitted their respective memoranda.8he issue to be resolved as >7 stated in the resolution of ovember /6, 1!6, is+

>hether the action of an in9ured emplo(ee or %orker or that of his heirs in case of his death under the>orkmen's $ompensation Act is e*clusive, selective or cumulative, that is to sa(, %hether his or hisheirs' action is e*clusivel( restricted to seeking the limited compensation provided under the


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>orkmen's $ompensation Act or %hether the( have a right of selection or choice of action bet%eenavailing of the %orker's right under the >orkmen's $ompensation Act and suing in the regular courtsunder the $ivil $ode for higher damages Hactual, moral and)or e*emplar( from the emplo(er b( virtueof negligence Hor fault of the emplo(er or of his other emplo(ees or %hether the( ma( availcumulativel( of both actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the >orkmen's $ompensation

Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.8here are divergent opinions in this case. Dustice 5azaro is of the opinion that an in9ured emplo(ee or%orker, or the heirs in case of his death, ma( initiate a complaint to recover damages Hnotcompensation under the >orkmen's $ompensation Act %ith the regular court on the basis of

negligence of an emplo(er pursuant to the $ivil $ode provisions. Att(. Angara believes other%ise. Cesubmits that the remed( of an in9ured emplo(ee for %ork4connected in9ur( or accident is e*clusive inaccordance %ith Section of the >orkmen's $ompensation Act, %hile Att(. Bacungan's position is thatthe action is selective. Ce opines that the heirs of the emplo(ee in case of his death have a right ofchoice to avail themselves of the benefits provided under the >orkmen's $ompensation Act or to suein the regular court under the $ivil $ode for higher damages from the emplo(er b( virtue of negligenceof the latter. Att(. Bocobo's stand is the same as that of Att(. Bacungan and adds that once the heirselect the remed( provided for under the Act, the( are no longer entitled to avail themselves of theremed( provided for under the $ivil $ode b( filing an action for higher damages in the regular court,and vice versa.&n August ", 1!0, petitioners4heirs of deceased emplo(ee azarito Gloresca filed a motion to dismisson the ground that the( have amicabl( settled their claim %ith respondent #hile*. In the resolution ofSeptember !, 1!0, >7 dismissed the petition onl( insofar as the aforesaid petitioners are connected,it appearing that there are other petitioners in this case.>7 hold that the former $ourt of Girst Instance has 9urisdiction to tr( the case,It should be underscored that petitioners' complaint is not for compensation based on the >orkmen's$ompensation Act but a complaint for damages Hactual, e*emplar( and moral in the total amount ofeight hundred t%ent(4five thousand H#0/,333.33 pesos. #etitioners did not invoke the provisions ofthe >orkmen's $ompensation Act to entitle them to compensation thereunder. In fact, no allegationappeared in the complaint that the emplo(ees died from accident arising out of and in the course oftheir emplo(ments. 8he complaint instead alleges gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failureon the part of #hile* to protect the lives of its %orkers as a conse:uence of %hich a cave4in occurredresulting in the death of the emplo(ees %orking underground. Settled is the rule that in ascertaining%hether or not the cause of action is in the nature of %orkmen's compensation claim or a claim fordamages pursuant to the provisions of the $ivil $ode, the test is the averments or allegations in thecomplaint HBelandres vs. 5opez Sugar ill, $o., Inc., ! #hil. 133.In the present case, there e*ists bet%een #hile* and the deceased emplo(ees a contractualrelationship. 8he alleged gross and reckless negligence and deliberate failure that amount to bad faithon the part of #hile*, constitute a breach of contract for %hich it ma( be held liable for damages. 8heprovisions of the $ivil $ode on cases of breach of contract %hen there is fraud or bad faith, read+

Art. //"/. In contracts and :uasi4contracts, the court ma( a%ard e*emplar( damages if the defendantacted in a %anton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.

Art. //31. In contracts and :uasi4contracts, the damages for %hich the obligor %ho acted in good faithis able shall be those that are the natural and probable conse:uences of the breach of the obligation,and %hich the parties have foreseen or could have reasonabl( foreseen at the time the obligation %asconstituted.In cases of fraud, bad faith, malice or %anton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all damages%hich ma( be reasonabl( attributed to the non4performance of the obligation.Gurthermore, Articles //16 et se&., $ivil $ode, allo% the pa(ment of all kinds of damages, as assessedb( the court.8he rationale in a%arding compensation under the >orkmen's $ompensation Act differs from that ingiving damages under the $ivil $ode. 8he compensation acts are based on a theor( of compensationdistinct from the e*isting theories of damages, pa(ments under the acts being made as compensationand not as damages H $.D.S. ". $ompensation is given to mitigate the harshness and insecurit( ofindustrial life for the %orkman and his famil(. Cence, an emplo(er is liable %hether negligence e*ists ornot since liabilit( is created b( la%. $$, " S$$$, 63 S$orkmen's $ompensation $ommissionthen, no% 7mplo(ees $ompensation $ommission, is strengthened b( the fact that unlike in the $ivil$ode, the >orkmen's $ompensation Act did not contain an( provision for an a%ard of actual, moraland e*emplar( damages. >hat the Act provided %as merel( the right of the heirs to claim limitedcompensation for the death in the amount of si* thousand H#6,333.33 pesos plus burial e*penses oft%o hundred H#/33.33 pesos, and medical e*penses %hen incurred HSections 0, 1/ and 1",>orkmen's $ompensation Act, and an additional compensation of onl( 3M if the complaint allegesfailure on the part of the emplo(er to ;install and maintain safet( appliances or to take otherprecautions for the prevention of accident or occupational disease; HSection 24A, Ibid.. In the case atbar, the amount sought to be recovered is over and above that %hich %as provided under the>orkmen's $ompensation Act and %hich cannot be granted b( the $ommission.oreover, under the >orkmen's $ompensation Act, compensation benefits should be paid to anemplo(ee %ho suffered an accident not due to the facilities or lack of facilities in the industr( of hisemplo(er but caused b( factors outside the industrial plant of his emplo(er. ?nder the $ivil $ode, theliabilit( of the emplo(er, depends on breach of contract or tort. 8he >orkmen's $ompensation Act %asspecificall( enacted to afford protection to the emplo(ees or %orkmen. It is a social legislationdesigned to give relief to the %orkman %ho has been the victim of an accident causing his death orailment or in9ur( in the pursuit of his emplo(ment HAbong vs. >$$, 2 S$orkmen's$ompensation 5a%, and his claim Hcase o. 222 of the $ompensation $ommission %as beingprocessed at the time he filed this action in the $ourt of Girst Instance. It is argued for petitioner that asthe damages recoverable under the $ivil $ode are much more e*tensive than the amounts that ma(be a%arded under the >orkmen's $ompensation Act, the( should not be deemed incompatible. Asalread( indicated, the in9ured laborer %as initiall( free to choose either to recover from the emplo(erthe fi*ed amounts set b( the $ompensation 5a% or else, to prosecute an ordinar( civil action againstthe tortfeasor for higher damages. >hile perhaps not as profitable, the smaller indemnit( obtainable b(the first course is balanced b( the claimant's being relieved of the burden of proving the causal

connection bet%een the defendant's negligence and the resulting in9ur(, and of having to establish thee*tent of the damage sufferedE issues that are apt to be troublesome to establish satisfactoril(. Cavingstaked his fortunes on a particular remed(, petitioner is precluded from pursuing the alternate course,


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at least until the prior claim is re9ected b( the $ompensation $ommission. An(%a(, under the provisoof Section 6 afore:uoted, if the emplo(er Granklin Baker $ompan( recovers, b( derivative actionagainst the alleged tortfeasors, a sum greater than the compensation he ma( have paid the hereinpetitioner, the e*cess accrues to the latter.

Although the doctrine in the case of 7sguerra vs. unoz #alma H132 #hil. 0/, applies to third4part(tortfeasor, said rule should like%ise appl( to the emplo(er4tortfeasor.Insofar as the heirs of azarito Gloresca are concerned, as alread( stated, the petition has beendismissed in the resolution of September !, 1!0 in vie% of the amicable settlement reached b( #hile*and the said heirs.

>ith regard to the other petitioners, it %as alleged b( #hile* in its motion to dismiss dated a( 12,160 before the court a &uo, that the heirs of the deceased emplo(ees, namel( 7merito &bra, 5arr(Villar, Dr., Aurelio 5anuza, 5orenzo Isla and Saturnino artinez submitted notices and claims forcompensation to the orkmen's $ompensation Act before the( learned of theofficial report of the committee created to investigate the accident %hich established the criminalnegligence and violation of la% b( #hile*, and %hich report %as for%arded b( the -irector of ines tothe then 7*ecutive Secretar( 7 hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the >orkmen's$ompensation Act, such ma( not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular courtbecause the( became cognizant of the fact that #hile* has been remiss in its contractual obligations%ith the deceased miners onl( after receiving compensation under the Act. Cad petitioners beena%are of said violation of government rules and regulations b( #hile*, and of its negligence, the(%ould not have sought redress under the >orkmen's $ompensation $ommission %hich a%arded alesser amount for compensation. 8he choice of the first remed( %as based on ignorance or a mistakeof fact, %hich nullifies the choice as it %as not an intelligent choice. 8he case should therefore beremanded to the lo%er court for further proceedings. Co%ever, should the petitioners be successful intheir bid before the lo%er court, the pa(ments made under the >orkmen's $ompensation Act shouldbe deducted from the damages that ma( be decreed in their favor.B$ontrar( to the perception of the dissenting opinion, the $ourt does not legislate in the instant case.8he $ourt merel( applies and gives effect to the constitutional guarantees of social 9ustice thensecured b( Section of Article 11 and Section 6 of Article NIV of the 1" $onstitution, and no% b(Sections 6, !, and of Article 11 of the -7$5Aorkmen's$ompensation 5a% of the place %here the accident occurs, should such la% be more favorable tothem HAs amended b( section of


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,ernando$ C.%.$ +eehanee$ Plana$ Escolin$ De la ,uente$ Cuevas and #lam'ay %%.$ concur.Conce'cion$ %r.$ %.$ is on leave.

#"ad Santos and !elova$ %%.$ too no 'art.

,eparate #pinions&$L$N#-*$RR$RA"J., dissenting+

A8his case involves a complaint for damages for the death of five emplo(ees of #CI57N ining$orporation under the general provisions of the $ivil $ode. 8he $ivil $ode itself, ho%ever, provides forits non4applicabilit( to the complaint. It is specificall( provided in Article /16 of the $ode, found in 8itleNVIII4-amages that+$SA8I& G&< >&orkmen's$ompensation Act have alread( become the la% in regards to; the ;election of remedies;, becausethose proceedings had become a ;finished transaction;.In the second place, it should be plainl( e:uitable that, if a person entitled to an ;election of remedies;makes a first election and accepts the benefits thereof, he should no longer be allo%ed to avail himselfof the second option. At the ver( least, if he %ants to make a second election, in disregard of the firstelection he has made, %hen he makes the second election he should surrender the benefits he hadobtained under the first election, 8his %as not done in the case before the $ourt.B.

'8here is full concurrence on m( part %ith the dissenting opinion of r. Dustice utierrez upholding ;thee*clusor( provision of the >orkmen's $ompensation Act.; I ma( further add+1. 8he >orkmen's $ompensation Act HAct o. "2/0 %as approved on -ecember 13, 1/! and tookeffect on Dune 13, 1/0. It %as patterned from innesota and Ca%aii statutes.

Act o. "2/0 %as adopted b( the #hilippine legislature, in Spanish and some sections of the la% %eretaken from the statutes of innesota and Ca%aii, H$hapter /3 of the orkmen's $ompensation Act, p. /?nder the >orkmen's $ompensation Act of Ca%aii, %hen the Act is applicable, the remed( under the

Act is e*clusive 8he follo%ing is stated in 1 Schneider >orkmen's $ompensation 8e*t, pp. /66, /6!.Sec. 11/. Ca%aiiStatutor( S(nopsis. 8he act is compulsor( as to emplo(ees in 'all industrial emplo(ment' andemplo(ees of the territor( and its political subdivisions. HSections !2034!201, S.S., Vol. 1, p. !1".$ompensation is not pa(able %hen in9ur( is due to emplo(ee's %illful intention to in9ure himself oranother or to his into*ication. HSec. !20/, S.S., p. !1".>hen the act is applicable the remed( thereunder is e*clusive HSec. !20", S.S., p. !12.

/. In providing for e*clusiveness of the remed( under our >orkmen's $ompensation Act, the #hilippine5egislature %orded the first paragraph of Section of the Act as follo%s+S7$. . 7*clusive right to compensation.48he rights and remedies granted b( this Act to an emplo(ee

b( reason of a personal in9ur( entitling him to compensationshall e*clude all other rights and remedies accruing to the emplo(ee, his personal representatives,dependents or nearest of kin against the emplo(erunder the $ivil $ode and other la%s, because of said in9ur( H#aragraphing and emphasis suppliedIn regards to the intent of the 5egislature under the foregoing provision+

A cardinal rule in the interpretation of statutes is that the meaning and intention of the la%4making bod(must be sought, first of all in the %ords of the statute itself, read and considered in their natural,ordinar(, commonl(4accepted and most obvious significations, according to good and approved usageand %ithout resorting to forced or subtle construction $ourts, therefore, as a rule, cannot presume thatthe la%4making bod( does not kno% the meaning of %ords and the rules of grammar. $onse:uentl(,the grammatical reading of a statute must be presumed to (ield its correct sense. H7spino vs. $leofe/ S$


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In time, it must have been thought that it %as ine:uitable to have the amount of compensation, causedb( negligence on the part of the emplo(er, to be the same amount pa(able %hen the emplo(er %as notnegligent. Based on that thinking, Section 24A 1%as included into the Act, on Dune /3, 1/, through


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If this $ourt disregards this totalit( of the scheme and in a spirit of generosit( recasts some parts of thes(stem %ithout touching the related others, the entire structure is endangered. Gor instance, I ampersonall( against stretching the la% and allo%ing pa(ment of compensation for contingencies neverenvisioned to be compensable %hen the la% %as formulated. $ertainl(, onl( harmful results to theprinciple of %orkmen's compensation can arise if %orkmen, %hom the la% allo%s to receiveemplo(ment compensation, can still elect to file damage suits for industrial accidents. It %as precisel(for this reason that Section of the >orkmen's $ompensation Act, %hich reads+S7$. . 7*clusive right to compensation.48he rights and remedies granted b( this Act to an emplo(eeb( reason of a personal in9ur( entitling him to compensation shall e*clude all other rights and remediesaccruing to the emplo(ee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against theemplo(er under the $ivil $ode and other la%s because of said in9ur(. ...

Article 1!" of the labor $ode also provides+A&orkmen's $ompensation Act, and the( have alread( received compensation pa(able to them underthat Act. Stated differentl(, the remed( under the >orkmen's $ompensation Act had alread( become a;finished transaction;.8here are t%o considerations %h( it is believed petitioners should no longer be allo%ed to e*ercise theoption to sue under the $ivil $ode. In the first place, the proceedings under the >orkmen's$ompensation Act have alread( become the la% in regards to; the ;election of remedies;, becausethose proceedings had become a ;finished transaction;.In the second place, it should be plainl( e:uitable that, if a person entitled to an ;election of remedies;

makes a first election and accepts the benefits thereof, he should no longer be allo%ed to avail himselfof the second option. At the ver( least, if he %ants to make a second election, in disregard of the first

election he has made, %hen he makes the second election he should surrender the benefits he hadobtained under the first election, 8his %as not done in the case before the $ourt.B.'8here is full concurrence on m( part %ith the dissenting opinion of r. Dustice utierrez upholding ;thee*clusor( provision of the >orkmen's $ompensation Act.; I ma( further add+1. 8he >orkmen's $ompensation Act HAct o. "2/0 %as approved on -ecember 13, 1/! and tookeffect on Dune 13, 1/0. It %as patterned from innesota and Ca%aii statutes.

Act o. "2/0 %as adopted b( the #hilippine legislature, in Spanish and some sections of the la% %eretaken from the statutes of innesota and Ca%aii, H$hapter /3 of the orkmen's $ompensation Act, p. /?nder the >orkmen's $ompensation Act of Ca%aii, %hen the Act is applicable, the remed( under the

Act is e*clusive 8he follo%ing is stated in 1 Schneider >orkmen's $ompensation 8e*t, pp. /66, /6!.Sec. 11/. Ca%aiiStatutor( S(nopsis. 8he act is compulsor( as to emplo(ees in 'all industrial emplo(ment' andemplo(ees of the territor( and its political subdivisions. HSections !2034!201, S.S., Vol. 1, p. !1".$ompensation is not pa(able %hen in9ur( is due to emplo(ee's %illful intention to in9ure himself oranother or to his into*ication. HSec. !20/, S.S., p. !1".>hen the act is applicable the remed( thereunder is e*clusive HSec. !20", S.S., p. !12./. In providing for e*clusiveness of the remed( under our >orkmen's $ompensation Act, the #hilippine5egislature %orded the first paragraph of Section of the Act as follo%s+S7$. . 7*clusive right to compensation.48he rights and remed

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