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I. FILING FEES

1. Do-All Metals Industries vs. Security Bank Corporation Whether or not the RTC acquired jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff’s supplemental complaint against the Bank considering their failure to pay the filing fees on the amounts of damages they claim in it? Yes. In this case, the plaintiff failed to pay the filing fees only on the Supplemental complaint. Thus, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s principal complaint from the moment they filed their original complaint accompanied by the payment of the filing fees on the same. Non-payment of filing fees due on their additional claims did not divest the RTC of the jurisdiction it already had over the main case. A supplemental complaint is like any complaint and the file is that the filing fees due on a complaint need to be paid upon its filing. Because of their continued failure to pay the filing fees on the Supplemental Complaint, this should be treated as not filed. The failure of the Bank to raise the issue of nonpayment of the filing fees before the RTC rendered its decision cannot be interpreted that the Bank is deemed to waive its objection to such omission. It is not for the party to the case or for the trial court to waive the payment of the additional filing fees due on the supplemental complaint. Only the SC can grant exemptions to he payment of these fees. 2. Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development vs. Formaran

Petitioner filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of deeds of sale and damages, with issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. The Clerk of Court considered her complaint as incapable of pecuniary estimation and assessed filing fees on the basis thereof. RTC ruled complaint is a real action and ordered payment of additional filing fees. Petitioner’s complaint involves not only the annulment of the seeds of sale, but also the recovery of the real properties. The objectives of the petitioner in filing the complaint were to ultimately recover possession of the properties. Thus, it is a real action. The additional filing fees cannot be assessed in accordance with Sec 7(b) of Rule 141, which provides for a flat rate for action incapable of pecuniary estimation. It must be assessed according to Sec 7(a) which is based on the FMV of the real property in litigation stated in the current tax declaration or current zonal valuation of the BIR, whichever is higher, or if there is none, the stated value of the property in litigation. To determine whether an action is real or not, look into the allegations in the complaint. The denomination is not controlling. Manchester Doctrine: The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.” Hence, the payment of docket fees is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. Sun Insurance Doctrine: 1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading, but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature

of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may also allow payment of said fee within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.

3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess and collect the additional fee A prayer for annulment or rescission of contract does not operate to efface the true objectives and nature of the action which is to recover real property. An action for the annulment or rescission of a sale of real property is a real action. Its prime objective is to recover said real property An action to annul a real estate mortgage foreclosure sale is no different from an action to annul a private sale of real property 3. Philippine First Insurance vs. Pyramid First Logistics Plaintiff filed an action for specific performance with damages. Plaintiff paid filing fees on the basis of the attorney’s fees contained in the prayer only without mentioning the value of the goods and damages incurred. Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages, the docket fees are assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount claimed, exclusive only of interests and costs. The complaint, therefore, should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of filing fees in any case. While it is true that the determination of certain damages is left to the sound discretion of the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such damages to specify the amount sought on the basis of which the court may make a proper determination, and for the proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees. The exception contemplated as to claims not specified or to claims although specified are left for determination of the court is limited only to any damages that may arise after the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof. Where the complaint or similar pleading sets out a claim purely for money and damages and there is no statement of the amounts being claimed, the pleading will not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record. In other words, the complaint or pleading may be dismissed, or the claims as to which amounts are unspecified may be expunged, although as

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aforestated the Court may, on motion, permit amendment of the complaint and payment of the fees provided the claim has not in the meantime become time-barred. This is particularly true when the court finds that there is a deliberate intent to evade the payment of proper docket fees. Where the pleading does specify the amount of every claim, but the fees paid are insufficient, the court may allow a reasonable time for the payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and upon such payment, the defect is cured and the court may properly take cognizance of the action, unless in the meantime prescription has set in and consequently barred the right of action. 4. Proton Pilipinas vs. Banque Nacional de Paris Private respondent filed a complaint against petitioners praying for the amount of actual damages plus accrued interest and attorney’s fees. Do the computation of thee filing fees include the interest accruing from the principal being claimed the in pleading? All complaints, petitions, answers and other similar pleadings should specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case. Any pleading that fails to comply with this requirement shall not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record. The clerk of court should thus have assessed the filing fee by taking into consideration “the total sum claimed, inclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs, or the stated value of the property in litigation.” 5. Request of National Committee on Legal Aid to Exempt Legal Aid and Clients from Paying

Filing, Docket and Other Fees. 6. Re: Query of Mr. Roger Prioreschi in re exemption from legal and filing fees of the Good

Shepherd Foundation Sec 21, Rule 3 and Sec 19 Rule 141 of the Rules of Court indicated that only natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested by the State with a juridical personality separate and distinct from that of its members, is a juridical person. As a juridical person, therefore, it cannot be accorded the exemption from legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigants. That the Good Shepherd Foundation, Inc. is working for indigent and underprivileged people is of no moment. Clearly, the Constitution has explicitly premised the free access clause on a person’s poverty, a condition that only a natural person can suffer.

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II. JURISDICTION 1. Juana Complex Homeoweners Association vs. Fil Estate Land

Whether or not the complaint states a cause of action; (2) whether the complaint has been properly filed as a class suit; and (2) whether or not a WPI is warranted. A cause of action as an act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three (3) essential elements of a cause of action, namely:

(1) the legal right of the plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right

Whether a complaint states a cause of action is determined by its averments regarding the acts committed by the defendant. Thus, the complaint must contain concise statement of the ultimate or essential facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action. To be taken into account are only the material allegations in the complaint; extraneous facts and circumstances or other matters aliunde are not considered. The test of sufficiency of facts alleged in the complaint as constituting a cause of action is whether or not admitting the facts alleged, the court could render a valid verdict in accordance with the prayer of said complaint. The necessary elements for the maintenance of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.

In this case, the suit is clearly one that benefits all commuters and motorists who use La Paz Road. 2. In the Matter of Application for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus. Thornton vs.

Thornton. Whether the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions? The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. Otherwise, it would result in a situation wherein claimants are without any legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions. The use of the word “exclusive” in RA 8369 did not divest the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of minors. 3. FEBTC vs. Shemberg Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Injunction, Damages, Annulment of Promissory Notes, Document, REM: Respondent contends that the complaint is primarily for the cancellation of mortgages, an

action incapable of pecuniary estimation. Thus, RTC has jurisdiction. Petitioner aver that the complaint is a real action. Is an action for cancellation of mortgage incapable of pecuniary estimation? Does the RTC have jurisdiction over the complaint? The test for determining whether the subject matter of an action is incapable of pecuniary estimation: If the action is primarily for recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation. Whether the trial court has jurisdiction would depend upon the amount of the claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim is only incidental or a consequence of the principal relief sought, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation. In this case, the complaint is considered as a real action, and jurisdiction is therefore determined by the assessed value of the properties involved. 4. Arriola vs. Nabor Did the court have jurisdiction over the contempt proceedings? NO. The contempt proceedings initiated by the respondent was one for indirect contempt. Sec. 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of court on indirect contempt provides that may be initiated motu propio by the court. In all other cases, the requirements for initiating an indirect contempt proceeding are a) that it be initiated by way of a verified petition and b) that it should fully comply with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions. In other words, the filing of a verified petition that has complied with the requirements for the filing of initiatory pleading, is mandatory. Even if the contempt proceedings stemmed from the main case over which the court already acquired jurisdiction, the petition for contempt must be treated independently of the principal action. Thus, the necessary prerequisites for the filing of initiatory pleadings, such as the filing of a verified petition, attachment of a certification on non-forum shopping, and the payment of the necessary docket fees, must be faithfully observed. In this case, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the indirect contempt proceeding because respondent did not comply with any of the mandatory requirements of Section 4, Rule 71. He filed a mere Urgent Manifestation and Motion for Contempt of Court, and not a verified petition. He likewise did not conform with the requirements for the filing of initiatory pleadings such as the submission of a certification against forum shopping and the payment of docket fees. Thus, his unverified motion should have been dismissed outright by the RTC. 5. Figueroa vs. People

When is a litigant estopped by laches from assailing the jurisdiction of a tribunal? The jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof.

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In this case, at the time the complaint for reckless imprudence resulting to the violation of the Automobile Law was filed, BP 129 stated that the MTCs have exclusive original jursidcition over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties. Thus, RTC does not have jurisdiction because the imposable penalty for the crime charged herein is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods or imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years. The general rule is that the issue of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by waiver or by estoppel. Estoppel by laches, to bar a litigant from asserting the court's absence or lack of jurisdiction, only supervenes in exceptional cases similar to the factual milieu of Tijam v. Sibonghanoy. Thus, that a person attempts to invoke the unauthorized jurisdiction of a court does not estop him from thereafter challenging its jurisdiction over the subject matter, since such jurisdiction must arise by law and not by mere consent of the parties. True, delay alone, though unreasonable, will not sustain the defense of "estoppel by laches" unless it further appears that the party, knowing his rights, has not sought to enforce them until the condition of the party pleading laches has in good faith become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the rights be then enforced, due to loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities, and other causes. Estoppel, being in the nature of a forfeiture, is not favored by law. It is to be applied rarely--only from necessity, and only in extraordinary circumstances. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or subject matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act or omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over the cause of action

6. De Barrera vs. Heirs of Legaspi

With the modifications introduced by R.A. No. 7691 in 1994, the jurisdiction of the first level courts has been expanded to include jurisdiction over other real actions where the assessed value does not exceed P20,000, P50,000 where the action is filed in Metro Manila. The first level courts thus have exclusive original jurisdiction over accion publiciana and accion reivindicatoria where the assessed value of the real property does not exceed the aforestated amounts. Accordingly, the jurisdictional element is the assessed value of the property. Assessed value is understood to be the worth or value of property established by taxing authorities on the basis of which the tax rate is applied. In other words, it does not represent the true or market value of the property. The estimated value, commonly referred to as fair market value is entirely different from the assessed value of the property. In this case, the subject land has an assessed value of P11,160 as reflected in Tax Declaration. The case, therefore, falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC. Thus, RTC erred in taking cognizance of the complaint based on the bare allegation that the present estimated value [of the land is] P50K. Lack of jurisdiction is one of those excepted grounds where the court may dismiss a claim or a case at any time when it appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that any of those grounds exists, even if they were not raised in the answer or in a motion to dismiss. That the issue

of lack of jurisdiction was raised by petitioners only in their Memorandum filed before the trial court did not thus render them in estoppel. 7. Malana vs. Tapa Petitioners filed before the RTC their Complaint for Reivindicacion, Quieting of Title, and Damages against respondents. Petitioners contend that their principal cause of action was for quieting of title; the accion reivindicacion was included merely to enable them to seek complete relief from respondents. Thus, it is the RTC which has jurisdiction pursuant to Sec 1 of Rule 63.

Sec 1, Rule 63 is composed of 2 paragraphs. The first paragraph refers to an action for declaratory relief, which should be brought before the RTC. The second paragraph, however, refers to a different set of remedies, which includes an action to quiet title to real property. This paragraph must be read in relation to Republic Act No. 7691, which vests the MTC with jurisdiction over real actions, where the assessed value of the real property involved does not exceedP50,000.00 in

Metro Manila and P20,000.00 in all other places.

As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration No. 02-48386 is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners’ Complaint involving title to and possession of the

said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC.

Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. But where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. A court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has already been infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action.

In

this case, petitioners’ Complaint for quieting of title was filed after petitioners already demanded and respondents refused to vacate the subject property. Petitioners’ Complaint contained sufficient allegations for an accion reivindicatoria. Jurisdiction over such an action would depend on the value of the property involved. Given that the subject property herein is valued only at P410.00, then the MTC, not the RTC, has jurisdiction over an action to recover the same

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III. CAUSE OF ACTION (RULE 2)

1. Mindanao Terminal vs. Phoenix Assurance

Private respondent filed an action for damages against. Petitioner contends that the complaint stated no cause of action because petitioner, whose services were contracted by Del Monte, a distinct corporation from Del Monte Produce, had no contract with the assured Del Monte Produce. Whether Phoenix and McGee has a cause of action against Mindanao Terminal under Article 2176 of the Civil Code on quasi-delict? The complaint filed by private respondents against petitioner states a cause of action. The present action is based on quasi-delict, arising from the negligent and careless loading and stowing of the cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce. A liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. In this case, private respondent are not suing for damages for injuries arising from the breach of the contract of service but from the alleged negligent manner by which petitioner handled the cargoes belonging to Del Monte Produce. Despite the absence of contractual relationship between Del Monte Produce and Mpetitioner, the allegation of negligence on the part of the defendant should be sufficient to establish a cause of action arising from quasi-delict.

2. Philip Turner vs. Lorenzo Shipping In this case, the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction in entertaining petitioner’s complaint for lack of cause of action. The Corporation Code provides that a stockholder who dissents from certain corporate actions has the right to demand payment of the fair value of his or her shares (right of appraisal). However, no payment by the corporation shall be made to any dissenting stockholder unless the corporation has unrestricted retained earnings in its books to cover the payment. In this case, petitioners’ cause of action was premature. Section 1, Rule 2, of the Rules of Court requires that every ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action, otherwise the complaint is dismissible. At the time the complaint was filed, the respondent corporation had no unrestricted retained earnings in its books. Thus, its legal obligation to pay the value of the petitioners’ shares did not yet arise. The subsequent existence unrestricted retained earnings after the filing of the complaint did not cure the lack of cause of action. Petitioners’ right of action could only spring from an existing cause of action. Thus, a complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured by an amended or supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action during the pendency of the action. Only when there is an invasion of primary rights, not before, does the adjective or remedial law become operative.

The petitioners did not meet the requirement of the

Rules of Court that a cause of action must exist at the commencement of an action, which is "commenced by the filing of the original complaint in court." Rule summarized as follows:

Except as otherwise provided by law, an action commenced before the cause of action has accrued is prematurely brought and should be dismissed. The fact that the cause of action accrues after the action is commenced and while the case is pending is of no moment. An action prematurely brought is a groundless suit. Unless the plaintiff has a valid and subsisting cause of action at the time his action is commenced, the defect cannot be cured or remedied by the acquisition or accrual of one while the action is pending. What is a cause of action: it is an act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. The essential elements of a cause of action are: (a) the existence of a legal right in favor of the plaintiff; (b) a correlative legal duty of the defendant to respect such right; and (c) an act or omission by such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff with a resulting injury or damage to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for the recovery of relief from the defendant.

28 Although the first two elements may exist, a cause of action arises only upon the

occurrence of the last element, giving the plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief. 3. Chua vs. Metrobank Whether or not successively filing Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 and Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 amounts to forum shopping? YES. In the present case, petitioners committed forum shopping by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, although with different prayers. There is forum shopping when a party repeatedly avails himself of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court. Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, but with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata). There is forum shopping occurs although the actions seem to be different, when it can be seen that there is a splitting of a cause of action. A cause of action is the delict or wrongful act or omission committed by the defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. It is true that a single act or omission can violate various rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation of several separate and distinct legal obligations. However, where there is only one delict or wrong, there is but a single cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have been violated belonging to one person.

In this case, the claims of petitioners for damages in the amended complaint and for injunction in the original complaint are premised on the same cause of action, i.e., the wrongful conduct of respondents in conducting the foreclosure sale of the subject properties. Even if it were assumed that the two cases contain two separate remedies that are both available to petitioners, these two remedies that arose from one wrongful act cannot be pursued in two different cases pursuant to the maxim nemo debet bis vexari, pro una et eadem causa (no man shall be twice vexed for one and the same cause).

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Further, If the forum shopping is not considered willful and deliberate, the subsequent case shall be dismissed without prejudice, on the ground of either litis pendentia or res judicata. However, if the forum shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two) actions shall be dismissed with prejudice. 4. Pantranco vs. Standard Insurance Private respondent Gicale demanded reimbursement from the petitioner for the repair of the jeepney the latter collided with amounting to 13k. Private respondent insurance company also filed a claim against petitioner for reimbursement for the amount it paid to Gicale amounting to 8k. Respondents contend that their individual claims arose out of the same vehicular accident and involve a common question of fact and law. Hence, the RTC has jurisdiction over the case based on the Totality Rule, not the MTC. Permissive joinder of parties requires that: (a) the right to relief arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions; (b) there is a question of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or defendants; and (c) such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the Rules on jurisdiction and venue.

In this case, there is a single transaction common to all: Pantranco’s bus hitting the rear side of the jeepney. There is also a common question of fact, that is, whether petitioners are negligent. There being a single transaction common to both respondents, consequently, they have the same cause of action against petitioners. In determining the identity of cause of action, it must be ascertained whether the same evidence which is necessary to sustain the second cause of action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery in the first. Here, the same evidence by the respondents is sufficient to sustain the same cause of action. In addition, Section 5(d), Rule provides for the "totality rule" as exemplified by Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129 which states, that "where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions." Thus, in this case the amount which determines which court has jurisdiction is the total of 13k and 8k, or 21k which is within the exclusive jurisdiction fo the RTC. 5. Spouses Perez vs. Antonio Hermano Petitioners presented three causes of action in their complaint, the first for enforcement of contract to sell entered into between petitioners and Zescon Land, Inc., the second for annulment or rescission of two contracts of mortgage entered into between petitioners and respondent Hermano and the third for damages against all defendants. Respondent Hermano was dropped from the complaint on the ground of misjoinder of causes of action. Petitioners, on the other hand, insist that there was no misjoinder in this case. A joinder of actions, or a joinder of causes of action, is the unity of two or more demands or rights of action in one action; the union of two or more civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the same complaint, declaration or petition.

Generally, a party is not required to join in one suit several distinct causes of action. The joinder of separate causes of action, where allowable, is permissive and not mandatory, even though the causes of action arose from the same factual setting. Rules on joinder are intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits and thus are liberally construed.

While joinder of causes of action is largely left to the option of a party litigant, Section 5, Rule 2 of our present Rules allows causes of action to be joined in one complaint conditioned upon the following requisites: (a) it will not violate the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties; and (b) the causes of action arise out of the same contract, transaction or relation between the parties, or are for demands for money or are of the same nature and character.Our rule on permissive joinder of causes of action, with the proviso subjecting it to the correlative rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties and requiring a conceptual unity in the problems presented, effectively disallows unlimited joinder. There is misjoinder of causes of action when the conditions for joinder under Section 5, Rule 2 are not met. The joinder of causes of action may involve the same parties or different parties. If the joinder involves different parties, as in this case, there must be a question of fact or of law common to both parties joined, arising out of the same transaction or series of transaction. In this case, the averments in the complaint shows that there are questions of fact and law common to both Zescon Land, Inc., and respondent Hermano arising from a series of transaction over the same properties. Bearing in mind that the joinder of causes of action should be liberally construed as to effect in one action a complete determination of all matters in controversy involving one subject matter, we hold that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in severing from the complaint petitioners’ cause of action against respondent Hermano.

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IV. PARTIES (RULE 3)

1. Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa and Helen Valenzuela vs. Keihin Phils. Petitioner Union filed a complaint against respondent company for illegal dismissal, in behalf of Helen, one of the employees of respondent company. Complaint was dismissed by CA for not having been filed by an indispensable party in interest. Dismissal was correct. Petitioners failed to include the name of the dismissed employee Helen Valenzuela in the caption of their petition for certiorari filed with the CA as well as in the body of the said petition. Instead, they only indicated the name of the labor union as the party acting on behalf of Helen. As a result, the CA rightly dismissed the petition based on a formal defect. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides that parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants. f there is a failure to implead an indispensable party, any judgment rendered would have no effectiveness. Thus, when an indispensable party is not before the court, the action should be dismissed. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even to those present. The purpose of the rules on joinder of indispensable parties is a complete determination of all issues not only between the parties themselves, but also as regards other persons who may be affected by the judgment. A decision valid on its face cannot attain real finality where there is want of indispensable parties.

2. Republic vs. Coalbrine Respondents argue that the Republic was not a party to the civil case because it is only against Administrator Quindoza solely, hence it has not personality to file the instant petition for review. On the other hand, Petitioner argues that it has personality to file this petitioner since Administrator Quindoza is being sued for damages for acts performed in his official capacity. Petitioner claims that respondent Neri's signature in the verification and certification against non-forum shopping attached to the complaint filed by respondents in the RTC was defective, since there was no proof of her authority to institute the complaint on behalf of the corporation; and that respondent Neri is not a real party-in-interest. Is the complaint fatally defective for being filed by respondent who is unauthorized? Is petitioner Republic the real-party-in-interest? The Court agrees with the contention of the Petitioner. In the verification and certification against non-forum shopping, respondent Neri signed as one of the plaintiffs. However, Neri is not the real party in interest. A party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. (Sec. 2, Rule 3). “Interest," within the meaning of the rule, means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. In other words, the true meaning of real party-in-interest may be summarized as follows: An action shall be prosecuted in the name of the party who, by the substantive law, has the right sought to be enforced. The finding of the RTC that respondent Neri has a cause of action against petitioner based on the allegations of the complaint is erroneous. A reading of the allegations in the complaint shows that

the acts complained of and said to have been committed by petitioner against respondents have solely affected the hotel's operations where respondent Neri was the hotel's Managing Director and whose interest in the suit was incidental. Thus, we find that respondent Neri has no cause of action against petitioner. Consequently, the plaintiff in this case would only be respondent Coalbrine. Similarly, the Corporation Code provides that the power of a corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the board of directors that exercises its corporate powers. In this case, respondent Coalbrine is a corporation. However, when respondent Neri filed the complaint in the RTC, there was no proof that she was authorized to sign the verification and the certification against non-forum shopping in the name of Coalbrine. Generally, the requirement regarding verification of a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional, non-compliance with which does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The court may order that it be corrected. However, lack of certification against non-forum shopping is generally not curable by mere amendment of the complaint, and but shall be a cause for the dismissal of the case. The same rule applies to certifications against non-forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file the complaint on behalf of the corporation. Thus, only individuals vested with authority by a valid board resolution may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping on behalf of a corporation. The authority of respondent Neri to file the complaint in the RTC had not been proven. As to respondents' claim that petitioner Republic of the Philippines was not a party to the civil case subject of this petition since Administrator Quindoza was the sole defendant therein and, thus, has no personality to file this petition, their claim is not persuasive. Notably, Administrator Quindoza was sued for damages for certain acts that he allegedly committed while he was the Zone Administrator of the Bataan Export Processing Zone. Therefore, the complaint is in the nature of suit against the State, and the Republic has the personality to file the petition.

3. Cua Jr. et. al. as Directors of the Philippine, Racing Club vs. Miguel Ocampo Tan et. al. Minority stockholders filed derivative suits with prayer for TRO against petitioner, directors of the corporation. TRO was granted by the court. Derivative suit vs. Individual and Representative or Class suits –

Suits by stockholders or members of a corporation based on wrongful or fraudulent acts of directors or other persons may be classified into individual suits, class suits, and derivative suits. a) Where a stockholder or member is denied the right of inspection, his suit would

be individual because the wrong is done to him personally and not to the other stockholders or the corporation.

b) Where the wrong is done to a group of stockholders, a class or representative suit will be proper for the protection of all stockholders belonging to the same group.

c) Where the acts complained of constitute a wrong to the corporation itself, the cause of action belongs to the corporation and not to the individual stockholder. However, although in essence, a wrong against the corporation affects each stockholder, this fact in itself is not sufficient to give him an individual cause of action since the corporation is a person distinct and separate from him, and can and should itself sue the wrongdoer. Otherwise, there would be multiplicity of suits.

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d) In cases of mismanagement where the wrongful acts are committed by the directors or trustees themselves, a stockholder or member may find that he has no redress because the former are vested by law with the right to decide whether or not the corporation should sue. In these cases, a stockholder has the right to sue on behalf of a corporation or the “derivative suit.” This is usually avail of by the minority against the abuses of management. In such actions, the suing stockholder is regarded as the nominal party, with the corporation as the party in interest

In derivative suits, it is a condition sine qua non that the corporation be impleaded as a party because it is an indispensable party. The judgment must be made binding upon the corporation in order that the corporation may get the benefit of the suit and may not bring subsequent suit against the same defendants for the same cause of action. Corporations must be joined as party because it is its cause of action that is being litigated and because judgment must be a res ajudicata against it. With the corporation as the real party-in-interest and the indispensable party, any ruling in one of the derivative suits should already bind the corporation as res judicata in the other. Allowing two different minority stockholders to institute separate derivative suits arising from the same factual background, alleging the same causes of action, and praying for the same reliefs, is tantamount to allowing the corporation, the real party-in-interest, to file the same suit twice, resulting in the violation of the rules against a multiplicity of suits and even forum-shopping. It is also in disregard of the separate-corporate-entity principle, because it is to look beyond the corporation and to give recognition to the different identities of the stockholders instituting the derivative suits. It is for these reasons that the derivative suit, Civil Case No. 08-458, although filed by a different set of minority stockholders from those in Civil Case No. 07-610, should still not be allowed to proceed

In this case, respondent Miguel et. al. file the complaint not just as a derivative suit, but also an intracorporate action arising from devices or schemes employed by the PRCI Board of Directors amounting to fraud or misrepresentation. However, the Court ruled that there is no actual distinction as the devices or schemes employed by the Board amounting to fraud or misrepresentation are the very same bases for the derivative suit. They are the very same acts of the PRCI Board of Directors that have supposedly caused injury to the corporation. In addition, respondents alleged that they are filing the complaint as “shareholders, for and in behalf of the Corporation, in order to redress the wrongs committed against the Corporation”. Although respondents Miguel, et al., also aver that they are seeking “redress for the injuries of the minority stockholders against the wrongdoings of the majority,” the rest of the Complaint does not bear this out, and is utterly lacking any allegation of injury personal to them or a certain class of stockholders to which they belong.

The Court ruled that a derivative suit, on one hand, and individual and class suits, on the other, are mutually exclusive. In the former, the gravamen of the suit is injury to the corporation, or to the whole body of its stock and property without any severance or distribution among individual holders. On the other hand, a a direct action is filed by the shareholder individually or on behalf of a class of shareholders to which he or she belongs for injury to his or her interest as a shareholder. In this case, the Court determines that there is only a derivative suit, based on the devices and schemes employed by the PRCI Board of Directors that amounts to mismanagement, misrepresentation, fraud, and bad faith.

4. Banda vs. Ermita Does the complaint qualify as a class suit? Courts must exercise utmost caution before allowing a class suit, which is the exception to the requirement of joinder of all indispensable parties. For a class suit to prosper, the requisites are: 1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned. (sec. 12, Rule 3) An action does not become a class suit merely because it is designated as such in the pleadings. Whether the suit is or is not a class suit depends upon the attending facts, and the complaint, or other pleading initiating the class action should allege the existence of the necessary facts, to wit, the existence of a subject matter of common interest, and the existence of a class and the number of persons in the alleged class,

in order that the court might be enabled to determine whether the

members of the class are so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, to contrast the number appearing on the record with the number in the class and to determine whether claimants on record adequately represent the class and the subject matter of general or common interest

An element of a class suit or representative suit is the adequacy of representation. In determining the question of fair and adequate representation of members of a class, the court must consider (a) whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with the interest of the other members of the class; (b) the proportion of those made a party, as it so bears, to the total membership of the class; and (c) any other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the class. here the interests of the plaintiffs and the other members of the class they seek to represent are diametrically opposed, the class suit will not prosper

In this case, a Manifestation of Desistance was filed by the President of the National Printing Office Workers Association (NAPOWA), expressing its opposition to the filing of the instant petition in any court. The said pleading is a clear indication that there is a divergence of opinions and views among the members of the class sought to be represented, and not all are in favor of filing the present suit. There is here an apparent conflict between petitioners’ interests and those of the persons whom they claim to represent. Since it cannot be said that petitioners sufficiently represent the interests of the entire class, the instant case cannot be properly treated as a class suit.

5. MIAA vs. Rivera Lessee Homeowners Association MIAA alleged that respondent homeowners association does not have the personality to sue in behalf of the individual employee-lessee. RTC ruled that respondent homeowners association is not the real party-in-interest, the individual members of the association being the ones who have possessory rights over their respective premises. CA ruled that the case can be construed as a class suit instituted by the Rivera Village lessees. The homeowners association, considered as the representative of the lessees, merely instituted the suit for the benefit of its members. It does not claim to have any right or interest in the lots occupied by the lessees, nor seeks the registration of the titles to the land in its name.

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The Rules require that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, i.e., the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Otherwise, a case can be dismissed. In this case, the petition was filed by the homeowners association, represented by its President, upon authority of a Board Resolution. However, the petitioner cannot be considered as a class suit because requisites are absent – the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court, and because it was brought only by one party. The petitioner, however, should be construed as a suit brought by the homeowners association as the representative of the members thereof(Sec. 3, Rule 3). It is settled that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. Where the action is allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary must be included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real party-in-interest. The name of such beneficiaries shall, likewise, be included in the complaint. In addition, facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued, or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity must be averred in the complaint. The party bringing suit has the burden of proving the sufficiency of the representative character that he claims. Thus, if a complaint is filed by one who claims to represent a party as plaintiff but who, in fact, is not authorized to do so, such complaint is not deemed filed and the court does not acquire jurisdiction over the complaint. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect.

]

In this case, the petition sufficiently avers that the homeowners association, through its President, is suing in a representative capacity as authorized under the Board Resolution attached. Although the names of the individual members of the homeowners association who are the beneficiaries and real parties-in-interest in the suit were not indicated in the title of the petition, this defect can be cured by the simply requiring the association to disclose the names of the principals and to amend the title and averments of the petition accordingly. Dismissal of this case based on the lack of personality to sue of petitioner-association will only result in the filing of multiple suits by the individual members of the association.

6. Napere vs. Barbarona Petitioner alleges that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the persons of the heirs because of its failure to order their substitution pursuant Hence, the proceedings conducted and the decision rendered by the trial court are null and void. Whether or not the RTC decision is void for lack of jurisdiction over the heirs of Juan Napere. When a party to a pending case dies and the claim is not extinguished by such death, the Rules require the substitution of the deceased party by his legal representative or heirs. The counsel is obliged to inform the court of the death of his client and give the name and address of the latter’s legal representative. The complaint for recovery of possession, quieting of title and damages is an action that survives the death of the defendant. In this case, the counsel of Juan Napere complied with his duty to inform the court of his client’s death and the names and addresses of the heirs. The TC, however,

failed to order the substitution of the heirs. Nonetheless, despite this oversight, the proceedings conducted and the judgment rendered by the trial court are valid. Failure of the counsel to comply with his duty to inform the court of the death of his client, such that no substitution is effected, will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment rendered thereon if the action survives the death of such party.In other words, mere failure to substitute a deceased party is not sufficient ground to nullify a trial court’s decision. The party alleging nullity must prove that there was an undeniable violation of due process.

Strictly speaking, the rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. It was designed to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through his heirs or the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. Thus, it is only when there is a denial of due process, as when the deceased is not represented by any legal representative or heir, that the court nullifies the trial proceedings and the resulting judgment therein. In addition, formal substitution by heirs is not necessary when they themselves voluntarily appear, participate in the case, and present evidence in defense of the deceased since in such cases, there is really no violation of the right to due process. When due process is not violated, as when the right of the representative or heir is recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision. In this case, the proceeding before the trial court was valid because the petitioner, who was, in fact, a co-defendant of the deceased, actively participated in the case. Petitioner, who had every opportunity and who took advantage of such opportunity, through counsel, to participate in the trial court proceedings, cannot claim denial of due process.

7. Sumaljag vs. Sps. Literato

a. Survival of the pending action The criteria for determining whether an action survives the death of a plaintiff or petitioner not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive, the wrong complained of affects primarily property and property rights, the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental. In this case, since the question involved relate to property and property rights, it is considered as an action that survive so that Section 16, Rule 3 must necessarily apply.

b. Duty of Counsel under the Rule The duty of counsel in case of death of his client during the pendency of a case wherein the latter is a party to is to inform the court within thirty (30) days after the death of his client of the fact of death, and to give the name and address of the deceased's legal representative or representatives. This is the only representation that a counsel can undertake after the death of a client as the fact of death terminated any further lawyer-client relationship. In this case the counsel for Josefa notified the lower court, although belatedly, of the fact of her death. This notification, although filed late, frees the counsel of any liability for failure to make a report of death under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.

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Notwithstanding the proper notification of the death of the deceased, the Court believes that the counsel did not give the court the name and address of the legal representative of the deceased that Section 16, Rule 3 specifies. The "legal representatives" that the provision speaks of, refer to those authorized by law - the administrator, executor or guardian who, under the rule on settlement of estate of deceased persons, is constituted to take over the estate of the deceased. Further, Section 16, Rule 3 provides that "the heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator”. Thus, the person, the petitioner that the counsel gave as substitute was not one of those mentioned because he is merely a counterclaim co-defendant of the deceased. The reason therefore is to protect all concerned who may be affected by the intervening death, particularly the deceased and her estate. In previous cases, the Court has recognized the heirs as proper representatives of the decedent, even when there is already an administrator appointed by the court. When no administrator has been appointed, there is all the more reason to recognize the heirs as the proper representatives of the deceased. In this case, Josefa's death certificate

shows

that she was single at the time of her death. Therefore, as correctly in applying Section 16, Rule 3, her heirs are her surviving sisters and the children of her deceased sister, Lourdes who should be her legal representatives. Menendez, although also a sister, should be excluded for being one of the adverse parties in the cases before the RTC.

8. Algura vs. LGU of the City of Naga

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V. VENUE (RULE 4)

1. Paglaum Management vs. Unionbank

2. Lantin vs. lantion Petitioners contend that, since the validity of the loan documents were squarely put in issue, this meant that the validity of the venue stipulation also was at issue. Petitioner also aver that the venue stipulation in the loan documents is not an exclusive venue stipulation under Section 4(b) of Rule 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure because the venue in the loan agreement was not specified with particularity. The general rules on venue of actions shall not apply where the parties, before the filing of the action, have validly agreed in writing on an exclusive venue. The mere stipulation on the venue of an action, however, is not enough to preclude parties from bringing a case in other venues. The parties must be able to show that such stipulation is exclusive. In the absence of qualifying or restrictive words, the stipulation should be deemed as merely an agreement on an additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place In this case, the real estate mortgages and promissory notes executed by the petitioner provide that the parties agree to bring their causes of auction exclusively in the proper court of Makati, Metro Manila or at such other venue chosen by the Mortgagee, the Mortgagor waiving for this purpose any other venue. Clearly, the words “exclusively” and “waiving for this purpose any other venue” are restrictive and used advisedly to meet the requirement. On the argument that effecting the venue stipulation would be tantamount to a prejudgment on the validity of the loan documents, the Court ruled that petitioners never assailed the validity of the mortgage contracts They only assailed the terms and coverage of the mortgage contracts.

3. SMC vs. Monasterio On disputes relating to the enforcement of the rights and duties of the contracting parties, the venue stipulation in the EWA should be construed as mandatory. Nothing therein being contrary to law, morals, good custom or public policy, this provision is binding upon the parties. The EWA stipulation on venue is clear and unequivocal, thus it ought to be respected. However, in this case, the cause of action in the complaint filed by the respondent before the RTC of Naga was not based on the EWA, but concern services not enumerated in the EWA. In the amended complaint, the respondent’s cause of action was specifically limited to the collection of the sum for his cashiering service in favor of SMC. He already omitted petitioner’s non-payment of warehousing fees. Thus, the Court ruled that it would be erroneous to rule, that the collection suit of the respondent did not pertain solely to the unpaid cashiering services but pertain likewise to the warehousing services. Exclusive venue stipulation embodied in a contract restricts or confines parties thereto when the suit relates to breach of the said contract. But where the exclusivity clause does not make it necessarily all encompassing, such that even those not related to the enforcement of the contract should be subject to the exclusive venue, the stipulation designating exclusive venues should be strictly confined to the specific undertaking or agreement. The restriction should be strictly

construed as relating solely to the agreement for which the exclusive venue stipulation is embodied. Moreover, since convenience is the raison d’etre of the rules on venue, venue stipulation should be deemed merely permissive, and that interpretation should be adopted which most serves the parties’ convenience. Otherwise, the Rules of Court should govern. In this case, since the case for a collection of sum of money filed by herein respondent is a personal action, the Court finds no compelling reason why it could not be instituted in the RTC of Naga City, the place where plaintiff resides.

4. Irene Marcos Araneta vs. CA

a) Private Respondents did not Waive Improper Venue In this case, petitioner maintain that Julita and Francisca were barred from raising the matter of improper venue by their subsequent acts of filing numerous pleadings. Petitioners claim that these pleadings signify a a waiver of private respondents' initial objection to improper venue. No. Venue essentially concerns a rule of procedure which, in personal actions, is fixed for the greatest convenience possible of the plaintiff and his witnesses. The ground of improperly laid venue must be raised seasonably, else it is deemed waived. Where the defendant failed to either file a motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue or include the same as an affirmative defense, he is deemed to have waived his right to object to improper venue. In this case, Benedicto and Francisca raised at the earliest time possible, meaning "within the time for but before filing the answer to the complaint the matter of improper venue.

b) The RTC Has No Jurisdiction on the Ground of Improper Venue

Julita and Francisca maintains that the venue was improperly laid since the suit is a real action involving properties outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC in Batac. No. In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract, or the recovery of damages. Real actions, on the other hand, are those affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein. In accordance with the wordings of Sec. 1 of Rule 4, the venue of real actions shall be the proper court which has territorial jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion thereof, is situated. The venue of personal actions is the court where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff. In this case, the complaint is an action in personam, it being a suit against Francisca and the late Benedicto on the basis of their alleged personal liability to Irene upon an alleged trust constituted in 1968 and/or 1972. They are not actions in rem where the actions are against the real properties. In this connection, Sec. 2 of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court indicates quite clearly that when there is more than one plaintiff in a personal action case, the residences of the principal parties should be the basis for determining proper venue. The word principal has been added to prevent the plaintiff from choosing the residence of a minor plaintiff or defendant as the venue.

c) Principal Plaintiff not a Resident in Venue of Action

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In this case, Irene stands to be the real party-in-interest. Thus, the cases should be prosecuted where she resides. However, the RTC in Batac declared Irene as not a resident of Batac. Thus, that court was an improper venue. The Court can concede that Irene's three co-plaintiffs are all residents of Batac, Ilocos Norte. But it ought to be stressed in this regard that not one of the three can be considered as principal party-plaintiffs. The Court found that Irene was a resident during the period material of Forbes Park, Makati City.

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VI. SUMMARY PROCEDURE

1. Republic vs. Sunvar Development

Petitioner Republic filed unlawful detainer case against respondent Sunvar, who leased the properties through a sublease, the principal lease having expired. Respondent Sunvar moved to dismiss on the grounds that the allegations in the complaint did not constitute an action for unlawful detainer, since no privity of contract existed between them; that the proper action should have been an accion publiciana which is within the jurisdiction of RTC because petitioners’ supposed dispossession of the subject property by respondent had already lasted for more than one year. Dismissed. Despite the filing of its Answer in the summary proceedings for ejectment, respondent Sunvar filed a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari with the RTC of Makati City to assail the denial by the MeTC of respondent’s Motion to Dismiss. In answer to the Rule 65 Petition of respondent, petitioners placed in issue the jurisdiction of the RTC and reasoned that the Rules on Summary Procedure expressly prohibited the filing of a petition for certiorari against the interlocutory orders of the MeTC

a. Propriety of a Rule 65 Petition in Summary Proceedings RTC should not have taken cognizance of the Rule 65 Petition for certiorari of respondent Sunvar because the Rules on Summary Procedure prohibits this relief for unfavorable interlocutory orders of the MeTC. Under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a certiorari petition under Rule 65 against an interlocutory order issued by the court in a summary proceeding is a prohibited pleading. Respondent Sunvar’s reliance on Bayog v. Natino and Go v. Court of Appeals to justify a certiorari review by the RTC owing to “extraordinary circumstances” is misplaced. In both cases, there were peculiar and specific circumstances that justified the filing of the mentioned prohibited pleadings under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, which are not availing in the case of respondent Sunvar. In the Bayog case, Magdato, an illiterate farmer, was stricken with tubercolosis before he filed his answer. His house was subsequently demolished. Magdato filed a Petition for Relief with the RTC-San Jose, Antique. In that case, the Court ruled that although a petition for relief from judgment was a prohibited pleading under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the Court nevertheless allowed the filing of the Petition pro hac vice, since Magdato would otherwise suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury through no fault or negligence on his part. In the Go case, the preliminary conference in the subject ejectment suit was held in abeyance by MTCC of Iloilo City until after the case for specific performance involving the same parties shall have been finally decided by the RTC. Affected party appealed the suspension order. The adverse party moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it concerned an interlocutory order in a summary proceeding that was not the subject of an appeal. The Court allowed the filing of a petition for certiorari against an interlocutory order in an ejectment suit, considering that the affected party was deprived of any recourse to the MTCC’s erroneous suspension of a summary proceeding Under these extraordinary circumstances, the Court is constrained to provide it with a remedy consistent with the objective of speedy resolution of cases. The purpose of the Rules on Summary Procedure is ‘to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases without regard to technical rules. Pursuant to this objective, the Rules prohibit petitions for certiorari, like a number of other pleadings, in order to prevent unnecessary delays and to expedite the disposition of cases.

In this case, the factual circumstances in the two cases mentioned is not present and the ruling of the Court therein inapplicable. No circumstances similar to the situation of the agricultural tenant-lessee in Bayog are present to support the relaxation of the general rule in the instant case. Respondent cannot claim to have been deprived of reasonable opportunities to argue its case before a summary judicial proceeding. Moreover, there exists no procedural void akin to that in Go that would justify respondent’s resort to a certiorari Petition. The general rule is that no special civil action for certiorari may be filed with a superior court from cases covered by the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. The certiorari Petition was already a superfluity on account of respondent’s having already taken advantage of a speedy and available remedy by filing an Answer with the MeTC. Otherwise, it the rules on prohibited pleadings under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure is to be relaxed by the Court, the RTCs may be flooded with inundated with similar prayers from adversely affected parties questioning every order of the lower court and completely dispensing with the goal of summary proceedings.

b. Reckoning the One-Year Period in Unlawful Detainer Cases

Petitioners correctly availed themselves of an action for unlawful detainer. Unlawful detainer is an action to recover possession of real property from one who illegally withholds possession after the expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or implied. The possession by the defendant in unlawful detainer is originally legal but became illegal due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess. The proceeding is summary in nature, jurisdiction over which lies with the proper MTC. The action must be brought up within one year from the date of last demand, in case there are several demands, and the issue in the case must be the right to physical possession. On the other hand, accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted for more than one year. It is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. In other words, if at the time of the filing of the complaint, more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant’s possession had become illegal, the action will be, not one of forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an accion publiciana From the time that the main lease contract and sublease agreements expired, respondent Sunvar no longer had any possessory right over the subject property. Absent any express contractual renewal of the sublease agreement or any separate lease contract, it illegally occupied the land or, at best, was allowed to do so by mere tolerance of the registered owners – petitioners herein. Hence, as an unlawful occupant of the land of petitioners, and without any contract between them, respondent is “necessarily bound by an implied promise” that it “will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.”[70] Upon service of the final notice of demand, respondent Sunvar should have vacated the property and, consequently, petitioners had one year to resort to the summary action for unlawful detainer. In the instant case, their Complaint was filed with the MeTC within the one-year period. Subsequent demands that are merely in the nature of reminders of the original demand do not operate to renew the one-year period within which to commence an ejectment suit, considering that the period will still be reckoned from the date of the original demand.[71] If the subsequent demands were merely in the nature of reminders of the original demand, the one-year period to commence an ejectment suit would be counted from the first demand.

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2. Macadangdang vs. Gaviola

Petitioners allege that CA erred when it allowed the filing of a MR before the RTC. Petitioners allege that the case stemmed from an unlawful detainer case where the Rules on Summary Procedure apply. Petitioners allege that under the Rules on Summary Procedure, a motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading. Jurisdiction over forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases falls on the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Since the case before the MTCC was an unlawful detainer case, it was governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure. The purpose of the Rules on Summary Procedure is to prevent undue delays in the disposition of cases and to achieve this, the filing of certain pleadings is prohibited, including the filing of a MR. However, the MR that petitioners allege to be a prohibited pleading was filed before the RTC acting as an appellate court. The appeal before the RTC is no longer covered by the Rules on Summary Procedure. The Rules on Summary Procedure apply before the appeal to the RTC. Hence, respondents’ motion for reconsideration filed with the RTC is not a prohibited pleading.

3. Bongato vs. Malvar Petitioner claims that the MTCC had no jurisdiction, because the Complaint for forcible entry was filed beyond the one-year period provided under the Rules of Civil Procedure. On the other hand, respondents contend that the subject of the anti-squatting case filed against him by the petitioner is different from the parcel of land involved her

a. On the issue of prescription

In forcible entry, one employs force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth to deprive another of physical possession of land or building. Thus, the plaintiff must allege and prove prior physical possession of the property, implying that the possession of the disputed land by the defendant was unlawful from the beginning. The sole question for resolution hinges on the physical or material possession (possession de facto) of the property. Neither a claim of juridical possession (possession de jure) nor an averment of ownership by the defendant can prevent the court from taking cognizance of the case. Ejectment cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership, and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession de facto and undue deprivation thereof. Forcible entry is a quieting process, and that the restrictive time bar is prescribed to complement the summary nature of such process. The one-year period within which to bring an action for forcible entry is generally counted from the date of actual entry to the land. However, when entry is made through stealth, then the one-year period is counted from the time the plaintiff learned about it. After the lapse of the one-year period, the party dispossessed of a parcel of land may file either an accion publiciana, which is a plenary action to recover the right of possession; or an accion reivindicatoria, which is an action to recover ownership as well as possession In this case, petitioner proved that there is only one house involved in these three cases. Based on these factual antecedents, there is cogent basis for petitioner’s contention that the MTCC lacked jurisdiction in this case.

The cause of action for forcible entry filed by respondents had already prescribed when they filed the Complaint for ejectment. Hence, even if respondent Malvar may be the owner of the land, possession thereof cannot be wrested through a summary action for ejectment of petitioner, who had been occupying it for more than one (1) year. Respondents should have presented their suit before the RTC in an accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria, not before the MTCC in summary proceedings for forcible entry.

b. On the issue of motion to dismiss as a prohibited pleading

Petitioner is correct is stating a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is not a prohibited pleading under Sec. 19(a) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Pursuant to Section 36 of BP 129, the Court on June 16, 1983, promulgated the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases. Under this Rule, a motion to dismiss or quash is a prohibited pleading. Under the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, however, a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is an exception to the rule on prohibited pleadings. Further, a court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived by the parties or cured by their silence, acquiescence or even express consent. A party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. That the MTCC can take cognizance of a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, even if an answer has been belatedly filed

4. Banares vs. Balising Petitioners contend that an order dismissing a case or action without prejudice may attain finality if not appealed within the reglementary period of 15 days, and may be revived only by the filing of a new complaint or information.Petitioners further argue that after the order of dismissal of a case attains finality, the court which issued the same loses jurisdiction thereon and, thus, does not have the authority to act on any motion of the parties with respect to said case. Respondents submit that cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure such as the criminal cases against petitioners are not covered by the rule regarding finality of decisions; and that cases dismissed without prejudice for non-compliance with the requirement of conciliation before the Lupong Tagapamayapa may be revived summarily by the filing of a motion to revive regardless of the number of days which has lapsed after the dismissal of the case. A "final order" issued by a court is one which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court. ON the other hand, an "interlocutory order" is one which does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be adjudicated upon. An order dismissing a case without prejudice is a final order if no motion for reconsideration or appeal therefrom is timely filed. After the order of dismissal of a case without prejudice has become final, and therefore becomes outside the court’s power to amend and modify, a party wishes to reinstate the case has no other remedy but to file a new complaint. The dismissal of the case, and the lapse of the reglementary period to reconsider or set aside the dismissal, effectively operated to remove the case from the Court’s docket. Even assuming the dismissal to be without prejudice, the case could no longer be reinstated or "revived" by mere motion in the original docketed action, but only by the filing of another complaint accompanied, of course, by the payment of the corresponding filing fees prescribed by law.

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In this case, the RTC erred when it denied the petition for certiorari, injunction and prohibition and ruled that the order of the MTC dismissing without prejudice the criminal cases against petitioners had not attained finality and hence, could be reinstated by the mere filing of a motion to revive. Equally erroneous is private respondents’ contention that the rules regarding finality of judgments under the Revised Rules of Court do not apply to cases covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. There is nothing in Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure which supports private respondents’ view. Sec 18 merely states that Section 18 merely states that when a case covered by the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure is dismissed without prejudice for non-referral of the issues to the Lupon, the same may be revived only after the dispute subject of the dismissed case is submitted to barangay conciliation as required under the Local Government Code. There is no declaration to the effect that said case may be revived by mere motion even after the fifteen-day period within which to appeal or to file a motion for reconsideration has lapsed. Moreover, the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure expressly provides that the Rules of Court applies suppletorily to cases covered by the former. Nothing in Section 18 of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary Procedure conflicts with the prevailing rule that a judgment or order which is not appealed or made subject of a motion for reconsideration within the prescribed fifteen-day period attains finality. It is well-settled that the non-referral of a case for barangay conciliation when so required under the law is not jurisdictional in nature and may therefore be deemed waived if not raised seasonably in a motion to dismiss. Although petitioners could have invoked the ground of prematurity of the causes of action against them due to the failure to submit the dispute to Lupon prior to the filing of the cases as soon as they received the complaints against them, petitioners raised the said ground only after their arraignment.

5. Maderada vs. Mediodea

Actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer, regardless of the amount of damages or unpaid rentals sought to be recovered, shall be governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. Designed as special civil actions, they are governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure to disencumber the courts from the usual formalities of ordinary actions. Thus, technicalities of procedure that may cause unnecessary delays should be carefully avoided. The actions for forcible entry and unlawful detainer are designed to provide In an action for forcible entry, parties are entitled to the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction. A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of court actions or proceedings prior to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, an agency or a person to refrain from doing a particular act or acts. It may also require the performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it is known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. Since this remedy is granted prior to the judgment or final order, a prayer for preliminary injunction should first be resolved before the main case of forcible entry is decided. However, respondent should have resolved the Motion for Preliminary Injunction within 30 days from its filing, pursuant to the clear command of Section 15 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Preliminary injunctions and TROs are extraordinary remedies provided by law for the speedy

adjudication of an ejectment case in order to save the dispossessed party from further damage during the pendency of the original action. Although respondent is correct in asserting that he is mandated to rule on every motion, he cannot use this excuse to evade the clear command of the rule that cases should be decided within the prescribed period. This Court notes the plethora of motions and pleadings filed in this case, which should have been tried under the Rules of Summary Procedure. Yet, even after four months had lapsed since the filing of the original Complaint for forcible entry, the prayer for preliminary injunction and the main case remained unresolved. Failure to decide cases and other matters within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions against erring judges.

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VII. PLEADINGS (RULE 6 TO 8)

1. Jocson vs. CA In this case, the petition filed by petitioner was not signed by Jocson’s counsel, but Tuising’s counsel in behalf of Jocson’s counsel. Tuising’s counsel had no authority to sign the petition in behalf of Jocson since Tuising’s counsel to be her counsel or to act in her behalf. Sec 3, Rule 7 of the provides that every pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him, otherwise the pleading produces no legal effect. Also, only Tuising signed the Verification and Certification for Non-Forum Shopping. Jocson did not sign. A Petition for Review of Certiorari must be verified. A pleading required to be verified which lacks proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. In addition,the certificate of non-forum shopping should be signed by all the petitioners or plaintiffs in a case, and that the signing by only one of them is insufficient. The attestation on non-forum shopping requires personal knowledge by the party executing the same, and the lone signing petitioner cannot be presumed to have personal knowledge of the filing or non-filing by his co-petitioners of any action or claim the same as similar to the current petition. In this case, the SPA allegedly signed by Jocson authorizing Tuising to file the petition and verify and to certify it was filed 4 months after the petition was filed. The lack of a certification against forum shopping or a defective certification is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction, unless there is a need to relax the rule under special circumstances or for compelling reasons, which are not present herein. It must be noted also that Jocson was the principal party in the original case. Jocson was the plaintiff in the trial court who sought reconveyance of her properties while her co-petitioner Tuising was not a party in the original case but was merely the highest bidder in the execution sale which was declared void by the trial court.

2. Agana vs. Lagman

a. Can a compulsory counterclaim pleaded in an Answer be dismissed on the ground of a failure to accompany it with a certificate of non-forum shopping?

Administrative Circular No. 04-94 with respect to counterclaims is intended primarily to cover "an initiatory pleading or an incipient application of a party asserting a claim for relief." It does not include a claim which, by its very nature is auxiliary to the proceedings in the suit and which derives its substantive and jurisdictional support therefrom, The second paragraph of Section 5, Rule 8 , i.e., that the violation of the anti-forum shopping rule "shall not be curable by mere amendment but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice” does not include a claim which cannot be independently set up. In other words, Administrative Circular No. 04-94 does not apply to compulsory counterclaims, as it applies only to initiatory and similar pleadings. A compulsory counterclaim set up in the answer is not an "initiatory" or similar pleading. The initiatory pleading is the plaintiff's complaint. A respondent has no choice but to raise a compulsory counterclaim the moment the plaintiff files the complaint. Otherwise, respondent waives the compulsory counterclaim

b. What is the difference between a permissive counterclaim and a compulsory counterclaim in relation to the filing of a certificate of non-forum shopping?

In a permissive counterclaim, the lack of a certificate of non-forum shopping is fatal. If it is a compulsory counterclaim, the lack of a certificate of non-forum shopping is immaterial. A compulsory counterclaim is any claim for money or other relief, which a defending party may have against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily connected with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of plaintiff's complaint. It is compulsory in the sense that it is within the jurisdiction of the court, does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and will be barred in the future if not set up in the answer to the complaint in the same case. Any other counterclaim is permissive. In this case, the counterclaim set up by respondent arises from the filing of plaintiff's complaint. The counterclaim is so intertwined with the main case that it is incapable of proceeding independently. The counterclaim will require a re-litigation of the same evidence if the counterclaim is allowed to proceed in a separate action. Even petitioner recognizes that respondent's counterclaim is compulsory. A compulsory counterclaim does not require a certificate of non-forum shopping because a compulsory counterclaim is not an initiatory pleading

3. Iglesia ni Kristo vs. Ponferrada Petitioner averred that, of the plaintiffs below, only plaintiff Enrique Santos signed the verification and certification of non-forum shopping. According to petitioner, under Sec. 5, Rule 7 all the plaintiffs must sign, unless one of them is authorized by a special power of attorney to sign for and in behalf of the others. Thus, the bare claim of Enrique Santos that he signed the verification and certification in his behalf and of the other plaintiffs who are his co-heirs/co-owners of the property does not even constitute substantial compliance of the rule. CA held that the certification signed by one with respect to a property over which he shares a common interest with the rest of the plaintiffs (respondents herein) substantially complied with the Rules. Whether or not the certification of non-forum shopping signed by respondent Santos alone is a substantial compliance with Sec. 5, Rule 7 and the case of Gudoy vs. Guadalquiver? The general rule is that certification must be signed by all plaintiffs in a case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient. However, the Court has also stressed in a number of cases that the rules on forum shopping were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and thus should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and legitimate objective. The rule of substantial compliance may be availed of with respect to the contents of the certification. In the case of verification, verification requirement is deemed substantially complied with when, as in the present case, only one of the heirs-plaintiffs, who has sufficient knowledge and belief to swear to the truth of the allegations in the petition (complaint), signed the verification attached to it. Such verification is deemed sufficient assurance that the matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and correct, not merely speculative. The same liberality should likewise be applied to the certification against forum shopping.

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The Court applied the rule on substantial compliance because of the commonality of interest of all the parties with respect to the subject of the controversy In this case, as one of the heirs and principal party, the lone signature of Enrique G. Santos in the verification and certification is sufficient for the RTC to take cognizance of the case. The commonality of their interest gave Enrique G. Santos the authority to inform the RTC on behalf of the other plaintiffs therein that they have not commenced any action or claim involving the same issues in another court or tribunal, and that there is no other pending action or claim in another court or tribunal involving the same issues Anent the issue of the authority of Enrique G. Santos to represent his co-heirs/co-plaintiffs, there is no necessity to show such authority. Respondents herein are co-owners of the subject property. As such co-owners, each of the heirs may properly bring an action for ejectment, forcible entry and detainer, or any kind of action for the recovery of possession of the subject properties. Thus, a co-owner may bring such an action, even without joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all

4. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

a. Propriety of Summary Judgment Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of fact requiring the presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Summary judgment is a procedural device for the prompt disposition of actions in which the pleadings raise only a legal issue, not a genuine issue as to any material fact. Even if on their face the pleadings (or answer) appear to raise issue, if the affidavits, depositions and admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as prescribed by the rules must ensue as a matter of law. Mere denials, if unaccompanied by any fact which will be admissible in evidence at a hearing, are not sufficient to raise genuine issues of fact and will not defeat a motion for summary judgment. A summary judgment is one granted upon motion of a party for an expeditious settlement of the case, it appearing from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits that there are no important questions or issues of fact posed and, therefore, the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Summary judgment is a judgment which a court may render before trial but after both parties have pleaded. It is ordered by the court upon application by one party, supported by affidavits, depositions or other documents, with notice upon the adverse party who may in turn file an opposition supported also by affidavits, depositions or other documents. This is after the court summarily hears both parties with their respective proofs and finds that there is no genuine issue between them. The court ruled that under the circumstances, summary judgment is proper. In this case, the Court finds that respondent Mrs. Marcos and the Marcos children failed to tender genuine issues in their answer to the petition for forfeiture. A genuine issue is an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of evidence as distinguished from an issue which is fictitious and contrived, set up in bad faith or patently lacking in substance so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Respondents' defenses of "lack of knowledge for lack of privity" or "(inability to) recall because it happened a long time ago" or, on the part of Mrs. Marcos, that "the funds were lawfully acquired" are fully insufficient to tender genuine issues.

On the other hand, petitioner Republic in its petition for forfeiture attached worn statements of witnesses who had personal knowledge of the Marcoses' participation in the illegal acquisition of funds deposited in the Swiss accounts. In their answer and other subsequent pleadings, however, the Marcoses merely made general denials of the allegations against them without stating facts admissible in evidence at the hearing, thereby failing to raise any genuine issues of fact. Under these circumstances, a trial would have served no purpose at all and would have been totally unnecessary, thus justifying a summary judgment on the petition for forfeiture. There were no opposing affidavits to contradict the sworn declarations of the witnesses of petitioner Republic, leading to the inescapable conclusion that the matters raised in the Marcoses' answer were false.

b. Specification of Material Allegation Section 10, Rule 8 provides that a defendant must specify each material allegation of fact the truth of which he does not admit and, whenever practicable, shall set forth the substance of the matters upon which he relies to support his denial. Where a defendant desires to deny only a part of an averment, he shall specify so much of it as is true and material and shall deny the remainder. The purpose of requiring respondents to make a specific denial is to make them disclose facts which will disprove the allegations of petitioner at the trial, together with the matters they rely upon in support of such denial. The question is whether the kind of denial in respondents' answer qualifies as the specific denial called for by the rules. If an allegation directly and specifically charges a party with having done, performed or committed a particular act which the latter did not in fact do, perform or commit, a categorical and express denial must be made. In this case, the Court does not believe that the respondents did not made a specific denial. Here, despite the serious and specific allegations against them, the Marcoses responded by simply saying that they had no knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of such allegations. Such a general, self-serving claim of ignorance of the facts alleged in the petition for forfeiture was insufficient to raise an issue. Respondent Marcoses should have positively stated how it was that they were supposedly ignorant of the facts alleged.

5. Juaban vs. Espina

a. Authority of Rene Espina to File the case and the Jurisdiction of the RTC Only respondent Espina signed the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping attached to the complaint in the third case before the RTC of Lapu-lapu City apart therefrom there was no signatory on behalf of respondent CDPI. Rene Espina has personality to sue in his personal capacity on the basis of the Agreement to Sell and to Buy executed between the Heirs of Bancale and respondent Espina. The said Agreement is the very source of the rights, the violation of which constituted the cause of action in respondents’ complaint for injunction. It was respondent Espina who entered into the Agreement, and his rights as a party to the said contract were not extinguished just because he designated his co-respondent CDPI as vendee of the subject properties. The public auction sale of the subject properties to petitioners would not only prevent the intended transfer of ownership under the Agreement, but would also render inutile respondent Espina’s designation of respondent CPDI as a vendee . Thus, he has personal interest in the case.

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Being a real party in interest, respondent Espina had the personality both to file the complaint, and the authority to sign the certification against forum shopping as a plaintiff therein. Jurisprudence provides that the certification against forum shopping must be signed by the plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by counsel. Generally, the certificate of non-forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case and the signature of only one of them is insufficient. Nevertheless, the rules on forum shopping, which were designed to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice, should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert their own ultimate and legitimate objective. Under justifiable circumstances, the Court has relaxed the rule requiring the submission of such certification considering that although it is obligatory, it is not jurisdictional. When all the petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the rules. Thus, the certificate against forum shopping is not rendered invalid by the absence of the signature of an authorized official of respondent CDPI. The signature of respondent Espina as one of the plaintiffs therein suffices.

b. Defect in the Certification against Forum Shopping versus Forum Shopping/ Litis Pendencia

The allegation concerning the defect in the Certificate against Forum Shopping was raised for the first time on appeal. Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. However, forum shopping as a ground for the dismissal of actions is distinct and separate from the failure to submit a proper Certificate against Forum Shopping. One need not be held liable for forum shopping for his complaint to be dismissed on the ground of an absence or a defect in the Certificate against Forum Shopping. Conversely, one can be liable for forum shopping regardless of the presence or absence of a Certification against Forum Shopping. In this case, there was no allegation of a defect in the Certification against Forum Shopping on the part of respondents. Thus, the lower courts only rules on issues concerning litis pendecncia. Appellees’ charge that appellants are guilty of forum shopping is without legal basis. Litis pendentia is not present in this case vis-à-vis Civil Case No. 2309-L. The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; (c) identity with respect to the two (2) preceding particulars in the two (2) cases is such that any judgment that may be rendered in the present case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in another case. Here, the appellants herein are not parties in Civil Case No. 2309-L, thus no identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for. Civil Case No. 2309 is for recovery of ownership and possession; while the instant case is for injunction and damages. The judgment in one will not be a bar to the other case. These cases were conjoined only because of the incident in Civil Case No. 2309-L, i.e. the fixing of the attorney’s fees and the subsequent execution on the subject properties which

c. Propriety of the Mode of Appeal

Petitioners also claim that since only questions of law were raised in respondents’ appeal to the Court of Appeals, the proper remedy should have been a Petition for Review filed directly with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Questions of law versus Questions of fact – A question of law exists when the doubt or difference centers on what the law is on a certain state of facts. There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the probative value of the evidence. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on a given set of circumstances. A question of fact exists if the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. If the query requires a re-evaluation of the credibility of witnesses, or the existence or relevance of surrounding circumstances and their relation to each other, the issue in that query is factual. Ordinarily, the determination of whether an appeal involves only questions of law or both questions of law and fact is best left to the appellate court. All doubts as to the correctness of the conclusions of the appellate court will be resolved in favor of the CA unless it commits an error or commits a grave abuse of discretion.In case of doubt, therefore, the determination of the Court of Appeals of whether an appeal involves only questions of law or both questions of law and fact shall be affirmed. In this case, the CA found that respondents’ appeal before the it involved not only questions of law, because for the determination thereof, the appellate court was first called upon to make its own findings of facts which were significant to its complete and judicious resolution of the appeal.

d. Lack of Prayer for the Issuance of a Permanent Injunction Petitioners argue that the respondents did not make any allegation in their Complaint that they were the owners of the disputed properties and there was no prayer in their Complaint for the issuance of a permanent injunction against petitioners prohibiting them from exercising acts of ownership. Respondents’ Complaint, however, reveals that petitioners actually alleged ownership of the property in dispute. The issuance by the Court of Appeals of a permanent injunction prohibiting petitioners from exercising acts of ownership is included in respondent’s prayer for such orders as may be just and equitable under the circumstances. Such a prayer in the complaint justifies the grant of a relief not otherwise specifically prayed for. It is the allegations in the pleading which determine the nature of the action and the Court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and proof even if no such relief is prayed for. It is the material allegations of the fact in the complaint, not the legal conclusions made in the prayer, that determine the relief to which the plaintiff is entitled. If respondents were seeking to enjoin the sale of the subject properties, in effect, to prevent the transfer of ownership of the subject properties to others, then such prayer must be deemed to logically and reasonably include the prayer to enjoin others from exercising rights of ownership over the subject properties, for if the ownership of the subject properties are not transferred to anyone else, then no one else has the right to exercise the rights appurtenant thereto.

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6. Korean Technologies vs. Alberto Lerma

a. Interlocutory Orders as Subject of Certiorari

The general rule is that interlocutory orders cannot be challenged by an appeal. Appeals from interlocutory orders would open the floodgates to endless occasions for dilatory motions. The proper remedy in such cases is an ordinary appeal from an adverse judgment on the merits, incorporating in said appeal the grounds for assailing the interlocutory orders. However, where the assailed interlocutory order was issued with grave abuse of discretion or patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief, the Court allows certiorari as a mode of redress. In this case, the alleged grave abuse of discretion of the respondent court in the issuance of the two assailed orders coupled with the fact that there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law amply provides the basis for allowing the resort to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Also, KOGIES was not guilty of forum shopping in filing the petition for certiorari. KOGIES’ MR of the RTC decision which denied the issuance of the injunctive writ had already been denied. Thus, KOGIES’ only remedy was to assail the RTC’s interlocutory order via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. Moreover, there is an urgent necessity to resolve the issue on the dismantling of the facilities and any further delay would prejudice the interests of KOGIES. Indeed, there is real and imminent threat of irreparable destruction or substantial damage to KOGIES’ equipment and machineries.

7. Filipinas Textile vs. Court of Appeals Whether or not the letters of credit, sight drafts, trust receipts and comprehensive surety agreement are admissible in evidence despite the absence of documentary stamps thereon as required by the Internal Revenue Code? YES. The Answer with Counterclaim and Answer of Filtex and Villanueva did not contain any specific denial under oath of the letters of credit, sight drafts, trust receipts and comprehensive surety agreement upon which SIHI’s Complaint was based, thus giving rise to the implied admission of the genuineness and due execution of these documents. When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts.Admission of the genuineness and due execution of a document means that the party whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the document or it was signed by another for him and with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him. Here, petitioners questioned the admissibility of these documents already at the appeal stage. The rule is well-settled that points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the

attention of the trial court need not, and ordinarily will not, be considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal because this would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due process. Hence, the petitioners can no longer dispute the admissibility of the letters of credit, sight drafts, trust receipts and comprehensive surety agreement. However, this does not preclude the petitioners from impugning these documents by evidence of fraud, mistake, compromise, payment, statute of limitations, estoppel and want of consideration.

8. Sy Tiong vs. Sy Chim

a. Issue of Prejudicial question Sy Tiong Shiou, et al. argue that findings of the DOJ the recommendations of the public prosecutor cannot be the subject of certiorari of the CA because the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body. True, a preliminary proceeding is not a quasi-judicial function and that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause. And as such, the court does not interfere thereto. However, there are exceptions. Hence, the principle of non-interference does not apply when there is grave abuse of discretion which would authorize the aggrieved person to file a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65. CA correctly found that he DOJ gravely abused its discretion when it suspended the hearing of the charges for violation of the Corporation Code on the ground of prejudicial question and when it dismissed the criminal complaints There is a prejudicial question where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed since howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The reason behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. In this case, the civil action and the criminal cases do not involve any prejudicial question. The civil action for accounting and damages pending before the RTC Manila seeks the issuance of an order compelling the Spouses Sy to render a full, complete and true accounting of all the amount the Spouses Sy have misappropriated. The criminal cases, on the other hand, charge that the Spouses Sy were illegally prevented from getting inside company premises and from inspecting company records, and that Sy Tiong Shiou falsified the entries in the GIS. The civil case presents no prejudicial question to the criminal cases since a finding that the Spouses Sy mishandled the funds will have no effect on the determination of guilt in the complaint for violation of Section 74 in relation to Section 144 of the Corporation Code;

b. Issue of third party complaint Sy Chim and Felicidad Chan Sy argue that a third-party complaint is not excluded or prohibited by the Interim Rules, and that the CA erred in ruling that their third- party complaint is not actionable because their action is not in respect of the corporation’s claims. They add that the disallowance of the third-party complaint will result in multiplicity of suits.

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The Court also rules that the third-party complaint of the Spouses Sy should be admitted. There is a conflict between Rule 1, Sec. 8 (Prohibited pleadings) and Rule 2, Sec.2 (Pleadings allowed) for while a third-party complaint is not included in the allowed pleadings, neither is it among the prohibited ones. However, under the rule on statutory construction, every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment A third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action, called the third-party defendant, for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent’s claim. It is actually a complaint independent of, and separate and distinct from the plaintiff’s complaint.Were it not for Rule 6, Section 11, and such third-party complaint would have to be filed independently and separately from the original complaint by the defendant against the third-party defendant. The purpose of a third-party complaint is to avoid circuitry of action and unnecessary proliferation of law suits. Summary nature of the proceedings governed by the Interim Rules, and the allowance of the filing of third-party complaints is premised on one objective—the expeditious disposition of cases. Under Rule 1, Sec. 2 of the Interim Rules, the Court finds that a third-party complaint is not, and should not be prohibited in controversies governed by the Interim Rules. A prerequisite to the exercise of such right is that some substantive basis for a third-party claim be found to exist, whether the basis be one of indemnity, subrogation, contribution or other substantive right. The bringing of a third-party defendant is proper if he would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant or both for all or part of the plaintiff’s claim against the original defendant, although the third-party defendant’s liability arises out of another transaction. The defendant may implead another as third-party defendant: (a) on an allegation of liability of the latter to the defendant for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief; (b) on the ground of direct liability of the third-party defendant to the plaintiff; or (c) the liability of the third-party defendant to both the plaintiff and the defendant. In determining the sufficiency of the third-party complaint, the allegations in the original complaint and the third-party complaint must be examined. A third-party complaint must allege facts which prima facie show that the defendant is entitled to contribution, indemnity, subrogation or other relief from the third-party defendant. In this case, the complaint alleges that the Spouses Sy, as officers of the corporation, have acted illegally in raiding its corporate funds, hence they are duty bound to render a full, complete and true accounting of all the amounts. On the other hand, in the third-party complaint, the Spouses Sy claim that it is Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan who had full and complete control of the day-to day operations and complete control and custody of the funds of the corporation, and hence they are the ones liable for any shortfall or unaccounted difference of the corporation’s cash account. In their prayer, the Spouses Sy moved that Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan be declared as directly and solely liable in respect of the corporation’s claim for accounting and damages. The allegations in the third-party complaint impute direct liability on the part of Sy Tiong Shiou and Juanita Tan to the corporation for the very same claims which the corporation interposed against the Spouses Sy. It is clear therefore that the Spouses Sy’s third-party complaint is in respect of the plaintiff corporation’s claims, and thus the allowance of the third-party complaint is warranted.

9. PTA of St. Matthew Academy vs. Metrobank

a. Petitioners are not “Third Parties” against whom the writ of possession cannot be issued and implemented

As a rule, it is ministerial upon the court to issue a writ of possession after the foreclosure sale and during the period of redemption. However, admits of an exception. The obligation of a court to issue an ex parte writ of possession in favor of the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once it appears that there is a third party in possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to that of the debtor/mortgagor. Where such third party exists, the trial court should conduct a hearing to determine the nature of his adverse possession In this case, petitioners cannot be considered as third parties because they are not claiming a right adverse to the judgment debtor. Petitioner-teachers and students did not claim ownership of the properties, but merely averred actual “physical possession of the subject school premises” based on the employment contracts they have with the school. Since petitioners’ possession of the subject school premises stemmed from their employment or enrollment contracts with the school, their right to possess the subject school premises cannot be adverse to that of the school and of its owners.

b. The lack of authority to sign the certificate of non-forum shopping attached to the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Possession was an insignificant lapse

A certification on non-forum shopping is required only in a complaint or a petition which is an initiatory pleading. In this case, the subject petition for the issuance of a writ of possession filed by private respondent is not an initiatory pleading. Although private respondent denominated its pleading as a petition, it is more properly a motion. What distinguishes a motion from a petition or other pleading is not its form or the title given by the party executing it, but its purpose. The purpose of a motion is not to initiate litigation, but to bring up a matter arising in the progress of the case where the motion is filed. In this case, it is not necessary to initiate an original action in order for the purchaser at an extrajudicial foreclosure of real property to acquire possession. Even if the application for the writ of possession was denominated as a “petition”, it was in substance merely a motion. Thus, any insignificant lapse in the certification on non-forum shopping filed by the MBTC did not render the writ irregular. After all, no verification and certification on non-forum shopping need be attached to the motion. Hence, it is immaterial that the certification on non-forum shopping in the MBTC’s petition was signed by its branch head. Such inconsequential oversight did not render the said petition defective in form

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10. Permanent Savings Bank vs. Velarde

a. Denial of due execution and admissibility of documents The Rule on actionable documents is found in Rule 8, Section 7 of the Rules of Court which provides that when the cause of action is anchored on a document, the genuineness or due execution of the instrument shall be deemed impliedly admitted unless the defendant, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts In this case, Respondent’s denials do not constitute an effective specific denial as contemplated by law. To deny the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document, the defendant must declare under oath that he did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or fabricated. Thus, a statement of the answer that the instrument was procured by fraudulent representation does not raise any issue as to its genuineness or due execution. On the contrary such a plea is an admission both of the genuineness and due execution thereof, since it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a ground not affecting either. In this case, respondent’s allegations amount to an implied admission of the due execution and genuineness of the promissory note. The admission of the genuineness and due execution of a document means that the party whose signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the document or it was signed by another for him and with his authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived by him. While Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court requires that private documents be proved of their due execution and authenticity before they can be received in evidence, i.e., presentation and examination of witnesses to testify on this fact; in the present case, there is no need for proof of execution and authenticity with respect to the loan documents because of respondent’s implied admission thereof.

b. Issue that petitioner’s claim is barred by prescription The Court a finds that petitioner’s claim is not barred by prescription. Petitioner’s action for collection of a sum of money was based on a written contract and prescribes after ten years from the time its right of action arose. The prescriptive period is interrupted when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors. The interruption of the prescriptive period by written extrajudicial demand means that the such period would commence anew from the receipt of the demand. A written extrajudicial demand wipes out the period that has already elapsed and starts anew the prescriptive period. In this case, , when petitioner sent another demand letter, the action still had not yet prescribed as only 5 years, 6 months and 17 days had lapsed.

c. Demurrer to evidence If a demurrer to evidence is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed, the movant shall be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. The movant who presents a demurrer to the plaintiff’s evidence retains the right to present their own evidence, if the trial

court disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate court disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal order, the defendants lose the right to present their own evidence. The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case and render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to discourage prolonged litigations.42Thus, respondent may no longer offer proof to establish that he has no liability under the loan documents sued upon by petitioner . The promissory note signed and admitted by respondent provides for the loan amount of P1,000,000.00, to mature on October 13, 1983, with interest at the rate of 25% per annum. The note also provides for a penalty charge of 24% per annum of the amount due and unpaid, and 25% attorney’s fees. Hence, respondent should be held liable for these sums.

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VIII. DEFAULT (RULE 9)

1. Anuncacion vs. Bocanegra

a. Respondent, through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the complaint does not state a cause of action. Does the filing of the MTD confer upon the court jurisdiction over the person of the defendant?

YES. The filing of the above-mentioned Motion to Dismiss, without invoking the lack of jurisdiction over the person of the respondents, is deemed a voluntary appearance on the part of the respondents. The same can be said from the filing of the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Reply to the Comment on the Motion to Dismiss which alleged, as an additional ground for the dismissal of petitioners’ complaint, the failure of plaintiffs to pay the required filing fee again but failed to raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the court over the person of the respondents. It was only in respondents’ Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss that respondents for the first time raised the court’s lack of jurisdiction over their person as defendants. The filing of the said Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss did not divest the court of its jurisdiction over the person of the respondents who had earlier voluntarily appeared before the trial court by filing their motion to dismiss and the supplemental motion to dismiss.

b. Did the lower court abuse its discretion when it entertained the supplemental motions to dismiss which raise grounds that were not brought in the first MTD?

YES. Respondents’ Supplemental Motion to Dismiss and Second Supplemental Motion to Dismiss violated Rule 9, Section 1. The first MTD was on the ground that the complaint stated no cause of action. Their Supplemental Motion to Dismiss was on an addition ground that petitioners failed to pay the required filing fee. Because of respondents’ failure to raise the alleged lack of jurisdiction over their persons in their very first motion to dismiss, they are already deemed to have waived that particular ground for dismissal of the complaint. Thus, the TC should not have entertained the supplemental motions to dismiss which raise grounds that are already deemed waived. Under the Rules, the only grounds the court could take cognizance of, even if not pleaded in the motion to dismiss or answer, are: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (b) existence of another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; and (c) bar by prior judgment or by statute of limitations.

2. Martinez vs. Repubilc

a. Did the lower court properly issued an order of default even if the OSG already filed its opposition to Martinez’s petition long before the hearing?

NO. The opposition or answer, which is based on substantial grounds, having been formally filed, it was improper for the respondent Judge taking cognizance of such registration case to declare the oppositor in default simply because he failed to appear on the day set for the initial healing. The

rule that “"If no person appears and answers within the time allowed, the court may at once upon motion of the applicant order a general default to be recorded . . . ," cannot be interpreted to mean that the court can just disregard the answer before it, which has long been filed. The law did not intend that failure of the oppositor to appear on the date of the initial hearing would be a ground for default despite his having filed an answer

b. Whether an order of general default issued by a TC in a land registration case bars the Republic from interposing an appeal from the TC’s subsequent decision in favor of the applicant? Can the OSG still appeal even after it had been declared in default?

YES. A defaulted defendant has the right to appeal the adverse decision of the trial court even without seeking to set aside the order of default. a) The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has meritorious defenses; (Sec 3, Rule 18) b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37; c) If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41 e) The fourth remedy, that of appeal, is anchored on Section 2, Rule 41 of the 1964 Rules, the pronouncement that a defaulted defendant may appeal from the judgment rendered against him. 3. Santos vs. PNOC Exploration If the defendant fails to file his answer on time, he may be declared in default upon motion of the plaintiff with notice to the said defendant. In case he is declared in default, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the plaintiff such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion requires the plaintiff to submit evidence. The defaulting defendant may not take part in the trial but shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings. However, the court can issue an order of default only upon motion of the claiming party. Absent such motion, the court cannot, motu propio, issue such order of default. In this case, since no motion to declare petitioner in default was filed, no default order should have been issued. 4. Aquino vs. Aure Aquino cannot be allowed to attack the jurisdiction of the MeTC after having submitted herself voluntarily. Aquino herself did not raise in defense the aforesaid lack of conciliation proceedings in her answer. The fact that Aquino raised such objection during the pre-trial and in her Position Paper is of no moment, for the issue of non-recourse to barangay mediation proceedings should be

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impleaded in her Answer.By this acquiescence, defendant Aquino is deemed to have waived such objection. While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from exercising jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking exception thereto, they instead invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an answer and seeking affirmative relief from it. Petitioners cannot now be allowed belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the court to which they had submitted themselves voluntarily. It is clear and Section 1, Rule 9 that failure to raise defenses and objections in a motion to dismiss or in an answer is deemed a waiver thereof. Thus, although Aquino’s defense of non-compliance with Presidential Decree No. 1508 is meritorious, procedurally, such defense is no longer available for failure to plead the same in the Answer as required by the omnibus motion rule.

IX. AMENDMENT AND SUPPLEMENT (RULE 10)

1. Pagcor VS. Lopez The original complaint filed by the plaintiffs was for specific performance and injunction with prayer for damages and for TRO and writ of preliminary injunction against complainant while the amended complaint was for recovery of sum of money. Under the new rules, "the amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense." This should only be true, however, when despite a substantial change or alteration in the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. In this case, although the amended complaint substantially changed the cause of action of plaintiffs FILGAME and BELLE, the admission thereof by respondent is allowed under Section 3, Rule 10 and jurisprudence. Did the court acquire jurisdiction over the amended complaint? YES. The court had jurisdiction over the amended complaint as it had acquired jurisdiction over the case when the original complaint was filed and the corresponding docket fee was paid thereon.

2. ASEAN Pacific vs. City of Urdaneta If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues raised by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be subserved thereby. In addition, necessary amendments to pleadings may be made to cause them to conform to the evidence.

3. Tiu vs. PBCOM PBCOM argues that since the complaint is based on an actionable document, i.e., the surety agreement, the original or a copy thereof should be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed part of the pleading. Considering that the surety agreement is annexed to the

complaint, it is an integral part thereof and its substitution with another copy is in the nature of a substantial amendment, which is allowed by the Rules, but with prior leave of court. The RTC did not err in allowing the substitution. With respect to PBCOM’s right to amend its complaint, including the documents annexed thereto, after petitioners have filed their answer, Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court specifically allows amendment by leave of court. Under the new rules, the amendment may now substantially alter the cause of action or defense. The granting of leave to file amended pleading is a matter particularly addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court; and that discretion is broad, subject only to the limitations that the amendments should not delay the action. Even if the amendment substantially alters the cause of action or defense, such amendment could still be allowed when it is sought to serve the higher interest of substantial justice; prevent delay; and secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of actions and proceedings. In the present case, there was no fraudulent intent on the part of PBCOM in submitting the altered surety agreement.

X. BILL OF PARTICULARS (RULE 12)

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1. Baritua vs. Mercader Whether or not the CA is allowed to pass sub silencio on the trial court's failure to rule frontally on petitioners' plea for a bill of particulars? YES. Petitioners' counsel manifested in open court his desire to file a motion for a bill of particulars. RTC gave him ten days within which to do so. He, however, filed the aforesaid motion only eleven days past the deadline set by the trial court. Moreover, such motion was already moot and academic because, prior to its filing, petitioners had already filed their answer and several other pleadings to the amended Complaint. The Rules of Court provide that a party may move for a more definite statement or for a bill of particulars of any matter which is not averred with sufficient definiteness or particularity to enable him properly to prepare his responsive pleading before responding to a pleading

2. Reyes vs. RTC of Makati The rule is that a complaint must contain a plain, concise, and direct statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s cause of action and must specify the relief sought. Particularly, Section 5, Rule 8 provides that in all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with particularity. In ordinary cases, the failure to specifically allege the fraudulent acts does not constitute a ground for dismissal since such defect can be cured by a bill of particulars. In cases governed by the Interim Rules of Procedure on Intra-Corporate Controversies, however, a bill of particulars is a prohibited pleading. It is essential, therefore, for the complaint to show on its face what are claimed to be the fraudulent corporate acts if the complainant wishes to invoke the court’s special commercial jurisdiction. Whether an action involves intra-corporate controversies, the Court ruled that jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status or relationship of the parties, but also the nature of the question under controversy. In this case, the court ruled that this does not involve an intra-corporate controversy because the transfer of shares between the decedent and Rodrigo was not registered in the books of the corporation. Hence, he cannot be considered as a stockholder yet.

3. Republic vs. Sandiganbayan

In this case, President Marcos was declared in default for failure to file an answer. He died. Nevertheless, respondent, as executor of his father's estate, filed a motion for leave to file a responsive pleading, three motions for extensions to file an answer, and a motion for bill of particulars all of which were granted by the anti-graft court. Given the existence of the default order then, what is the legal effect of the granting of the motions to file a responsive pleading and bill of particulars? The effect is that the default order against the former president is deemed lifted. While it is true that there was no positive act on the part of the court to lift the default order because there was no motion nor order to that effect, the anti-graft court's act of granting respondent the opportunity

to file a responsive pleading meant the lifting of the default order on terms the court deemed proper in the interest of justice. However, the pendency of the motion for a bill of particulars interrupts the period to file a responsive pleading. Thus, that he filed a motion for a bill of particulars instead of an answer does not pose an issue because he, as party defendant representing the estate, is allowed to do so under the Rules of Court to be able to file an intelligent answer. Petitioner's filing of a bill of particulars in this case is merely a condition precedent to the filing of an answer. Judicial experience shows that resort to motions for bills of particulars actually result in delay since the reglementary period for filing a responsive pleading is suspended and the subsequent proceedings are likewise set back in the meantime. Thus, it must be noted, that the motion for a bill of particulars must be filed within the reglementary period for the filing of a responsive pleading to the pleading sought to be clarified. This contemplates pleadings which are required by the Rules to be answered under pain of procedural sanctions, such as default or implied admission of the facts not responded to.

XI. SERVICE AND FILING (RULE 13)

1. Domingo vs. CA

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Service and filing of pleadings and other papers must, whenever practicable, be done personally; and if made through other modes, the party concerned must provide a written explanation as to why the service or filing was not done personally. This is mandatory. The court is given the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the other modes of service or filing were resorted to and no written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the first place. Personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to other modes of service and filing, the exception. Thus, whenever personal service or filing is practicable, in light of the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not practicable to begin with. Strictest compliance hereto is mandated.

2. Romulo vs. Peralta Where service of a pleading is by registered mail, proof of such service consists of the following: (1) an affidavit of the person mailing the pleading containing a full statement of the date, place, and manner of service; and (2) the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. Actual knowledge of a decision cannot be attributed to the addressee of a registered matter where there is no showing that the registry notice itself or the envelope or the return card for that matter contains any indication that the registered matter is a copy of the decision or that the registry notice refers to the case being ventilated. In this case, the registry return receipt does not indicate that what was mailed to Atty. Bacugan, counsel for respondent labor unions, was a copy of petitioners motion to dismiss In addition, rule requires that the affidavit must be executed by the person mailing the motion. In this case however, Bayongans affidavit shows she was not the one who mailed such copy as she merely directed that the motion be served by registered mail. She did not actually post the motion by registered mail.

3. Sps. Topacio vs. Banco Filipino As a rule, judgments are sufficiently served when they are delivered personally, or through registered mail to the counsel of record, or by leaving them in his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. After service, a judgment or order which is not appealed nor made subject of a motion for reconsideration within the prescribed 15-day period attains finality. In other words, a judgment or resolution cannot be deemed to have become final and executory if there is no conclusive proof of service of the said resolution.

4. Atlantic Erectors vs. Herbal Cove Petitioner avers that its money claim on the cost of labor and materials for the townhouses it constructed on the respondent's land is a proper lien that justifies the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the land titles.

Generally, the only instances in which a notice of lis pendens may be availed of are as follows: (a) an action to recover possession of real estate; (b) an action for partition; and (c) any other court proceedings that directly affect the title to the land or the building thereon or the use or the occupation thereof. In addition, resorting to lis pendens is not necessarily confined to cases that involve title to or possession of real property. This annotation also applies to suits seeking to establish a right to, or an equitable estate or interest in, a specific real property; or to enforce a lien, a charge or an encumbrance against it. In this case, however, petitioner’s complaint reveals that no such lien or interest over the property was ever alleged. The Complaint merely asked for the payment of construction services and materials without mentioning a lien or an encumbrance over the property. It was a purely personal action and a simple collection case. It did not contain any material averment of any enforceable right, interest or lien in connection with the subject property. As it is not an action that involves the enforcement of a lien or an encumbrance, the annotation of the Notice of Lis Pendens is uncalled for. The doctrine of lis pendens has no application to a proceeding in which the only object sought is the recovery of a money judgment, though the title or right of possession to property be incidentally affected. It is essential that the property bedirectly affected, as where the relief sought in the action or suit includes the recovery of possession, or the enforcement of a lien, or an adjudication between conflicting claims of title, possession, or the right of possession to specific property, or requiring its transfer or sale

5. St. Mary of the Woods School vs. Office of the Registry of Deeds of Makati Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment. Founded upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens is intended (1) to keep the properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is terminated and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by subsequent alienation; and (2) to announce to the whole world that a particular property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an interest over said property does so at his own risk, or that he gambles on the result of the litigation over said property. A trial court has, however, the inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens, under the express provisions of law. A notice of lis pendens may be cancelled on two grounds: (1) if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the adverse party; or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded.

6. Vicente vs. Avera Petitioners maintain that as the registered owners and actual possessors of the property in dispute, they are entitled to a writ of injunction that will prevent the implementation of the writ of execution corresponding to the JDRC case. Respondents assert that petitioners are not entitled to the writ of injunction, because the petitioners are subject to the outcome of the JDRC case and

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thus the implementation of the writ of execution due to the notice of lis pendens annotated on their TCT. Whether injunction lies in favor of the petitioners to prevent the respondents from interfering in the exercise of their rights over the property in dispute? In the case at bar, petitioners are the registered owners and actual possessors of the subject property. As the registered owners, petitioners have the right to the possession of the property. Petitioners’ title to the property in dispute is not subject to the outcome of the litigation covered by the notice of lis pendens annotated. The notice of lis pendens does not affect petitioners’ title to the property in dispute. A purchaser who buys registered land with full notice of the fact that it is in litigation between the vendor and a third party stands in the shoes of his vendor and his title is subject to the incidents and result of the pending litigation. A notice of lis pendens concerns litigation between a transferor and a third party, where the transferee who acquires land with a notice of lis pendens annotated on the corresponding certificate of title stands in the shoes of his predecessor and in which case the transferee’s title is subject to the results of the pending litigation. The notice of lis pendens does not concern litigation involving Rebuquiao, who transferred his title to the property in dispute to petitioners, and his title. The notice of lis pendenspertains to the JDRC case, an action for nullity of the marriage between Avera and Domingo. Since Rebuquiao’s title to the property in dispute is not subject to the results of the JDRC case, petitioners’ title to the same property is also not subject to the results of the JDRC case. A purchaser of the property affected by the notice of lis pendens is deemed to have constructive notice of the pendency of the action only from the time of filing such notice.T hus, a notice of lis pendens affects a transferee pendente lite, who by virtue of the notice, is bound by any judgment, which may be rendered for or against the transferor, and his title is subject to the results of the pending litigation. A notice of lis pendens neither affects the merits of a case nor creates a right or a lien. It serves to protect the real rights of the registrant while the case involving such rights is pending resolution. While the notice of lis pendens remains on a certificate of title, the registrant could rest secure that he would not lose the property or any part of it during the litigation. Once a notice of lis pendens has been duly registered, any subsequent transaction affecting the land involved would have to be subject to the outcome of the litigation.

7. Heirs of Lopez vs. Enriquez Lis pendens literally means a pending suit. The doctrine of lis pendens refers to the jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment. The purposes of lis pendens are (1) to protect the rights of the party causing the registration of the lis pendens, and (2) to advise third persons who purchase or contract on the subject property that they do so at their peril and subject to the result of the pending litigation The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect. First, it keeps the subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by successive alienations. Second, it binds a purchaser, bona fide or not, of the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court will promulgate

subsequently. However, the filing of a notice of lis pendensdoes not create a right or lien that previously did not exist. Without a notice of lis pendens, a third party who acquires the property after relying only on the certificate of title is a purchaser in good faith. Against such third party, the supposed rights of a litigant cannot prevail, because the former is not bound by the property owner’s undertakings not annotated in the transfer certificate of title. The notice of lis pendens is ordinarily recorded without the intervention of the court where the action is pending. The notice is but an incident in an action, an extrajudicial one, to be sure. It does not affect the merits thereof. It is intended merely to constructively advise, or warn, all people who deal with the property that they so deal with it at their own risk, and whatever rights they may acquire in the property in any voluntary transaction are subject to the results of the action, and may well be inferior and subordinate to those which may be finally determined and laid down therein. The cancellation of such a precautionary notice is therefore also a mere incident in the action, and may be ordered by the Court having jurisdiction of it at any given time. And its continuance or removal x x x is not contingent on the existence of a final judgment in the action, and ordinarily has no effect on the merits thereof. A notice of lis pendens may involve actions that deal not only with title or possession of a property, but also with the use or occupation of a property. The litigation must directly involve a specific property which is necessarily affected by the judgment. A notice of lis pendens is proper in the following cases, viz:

a) An action to recover possession of real estate; b) An action to quiet title thereto; c) An action to remove clouds thereon; d) An action for partition; and e) Any other proceedings of any kind in Court directly affecting the title to the land or the use or occupation thereof or the buildings thereon.

On the other hand, the doctrine of lis pendens has no application in the following cases:

a) Preliminary attachments; b) Proceedings for the probate of wills; c) Levies on execution; d) Proceedings for administration of estate of deceased persons; and e) Proceedings in which the only object is the recovery of a money judgment.

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As decreed by Section 76 of PD 1529, a notice of lis pendens should contain a statement of the institution of an action or proceeding, the court where the same is pending, and the date of its institution. A notice of lis pendens should also contain a reference to the number of the certificate of title of the land, an adequate description of the land affected and its registered owner. Petitioners’ enumeration readily reveals that they have not complied with the requisites. Both the LRA and the appellate court denied the application for a notice of lis pendens because petitioners are mere movants, and not original parties, in LRC No. N-18887. As petitioners are not parties to an action as contemplated in Section 76 of PD 1529, they failed to present the requisite pleading to the Register of Deeds of Marikina City.

8. FEU NRMF vs. FEU NRMF AFW

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Whether the service of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order was validly effected by the process server so as to bind the respondent union and hold them liable for the acts committed subsequent to the issuance of the said Order? In this case, the process merely posted posting the Order when personal service was rendered impossible since the striking employees were not present at the strike area. This mode of service, however, is not sanctioned by either the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure or the Revised Rules of Court. Under the NLRC Revised Rules of Procedure, service of copies of orders should be made by the process server either personally or through registered mail. However, due to the urgent nature of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order and the public policy underlying the injunction carried by the issuance of the said Order, service of copies of the same should be made in the most expeditious and effective manner, without any delay, ensuring its immediate receipt by the intended parties as may be warranted under the circumstances. Accordingly, in this case, personal service is the proper mode of serving the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order.

It is also provided under the same rules that in special circumstances, service of summons may be effected in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court. Clearly, personal service effectively ensures that the notice desired under the constitutional requirement of due process is accomplished. If, however, efforts to find the party concerned personally would make prompt service impossible, service may be completed by substituted service, that is, by leaving a copy, between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the party’s or counsel’s residence, if known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion then residing therein. Substituted service derogates the regular method of personal service. It is therefore required that statutory restrictions for effecting substituted service must be strictly, faithfully and fully observed. Failure to comply with this rule renders absolutely void the substituted service along with the proceedings taken thereafter. Applying this principle in the case at bar, presumption of receipt of the copies of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order could not be lightly inferred from the circumstances.

Due process here would demand that the respondent union be properly notified of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order of the Secretary of Labor enjoining the strike and requiring its members to return to work. Thus, there must be a clear and unmistakable proof that the requirements prescribed by the Rules in the manner of effecting personal or substituted service had been faithfully complied with. Merely posting copies of the Assumption of Jurisdiction Order does not satisfy the rigid requirement for proper service outlined by the above stated rules. Needless to say, the manner of service made by the process server was invalid and irregular. Respondent union could not therefore be adjudged to have defied the said Order since it was not properly apprised thereof. Accordingly, the strike conducted by the respondent union was valid under the circumstances.

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XII. SUMMONS

1. Cada vs. Time Saver

Whether there had been improper service of summons upon respondent Perez which renders the judgment by the NLRC against her null and void? No. Based on the foregoing rules, notices or summonses shall be served on the parties to the case personally. The same rule allows under special circumstances, that service of summons may be effected in accordance with the provisions of the Rules of Court. bviously, in this case, personal service of summons was not practicable. By respondent Perez’s own admission, she was out of town during the entire proceedings before the Labor Arbiter.

34 Given this

admission, she would be unable to personally receive the summons and later the notices from the Labor Arbiter. While we are not unmindful of the NLRC rules which state that service of summons should be made personally, considering the circumstances in the instant case, we find that service of summons at TSL, respondent Perez’s place of business,

36 amounts to substantial compliance with

the Rules.

2. Pascual vs. Pascual Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of summons may be done by personal or substituted service as laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. personal service of summons should and always be the first option, and it is only when the said summons cannot be served within a reasonable time can the process server resort to substituted service. In this case, he Return of Summons shows no effort was actually exerted and no positive step taken by either the process server or petitioners to locate and serve the summons personally on respondents. At best, the Return merely states the alleged whereabouts of respondents without indicating that such information was verified from a person who had knowledge thereof. Certainly, without specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a general statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service of summons

3. Manotoc vs. CA (1) Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service

The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service.

[23]Section 8, Rule 14 provides that the

plaintiff or the sheriff is given a “reasonable time” to serve the summons to the defendant in person, but no specific time frame is mentioned. “Reasonable time” is defined as “so much time as is necessary under the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be done, having a regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any, to the other party.”

[24]Under the Rules, the service of summons has no

set period. However, when the court, clerk of court, or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return of the summons and the latter submits the return of summons, then the validity of the summons lapses. The plaintiff may then ask for an alias summons if the service of summons has

failed.[25]

What then is a reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a personal service in order to demonstrate impossibility of prompt service? To the plaintiff, “reasonable time” means no more than seven (7) days since an expeditious processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff, “reasonable time” means 15 to 30 days because at the end of the month, it is a practice for the branch clerk of court to require the sheriff to submit a return of the summons assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriff’s Return provides data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to be submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator within the first ten (10) days of the succeeding month. Thus, one month from the issuance of summons can be considered “reasonable time” with regard to personal service on the defendant.

Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons with due care, utmost diligence, and reasonable promptness and speed so as not to prejudice the expeditious dispensation of justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try their best efforts to accomplish personal service on defendant. On the other hand, since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade service of summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in serving the process on the defendant. For substituted service of summons to be available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the summons within a reasonable period [of one month] which eventually resulted in failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. “Several attempts” means at least three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibil ity of service can be confirmed or accepted.

(2) Specific Details in the Return

The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service.

[26] The efforts made to find the

defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return. The date and time of the attempts on personal service, the inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the Return to justify substituted service. The form on Sheriff’s Return of Summons on Substituted Service prescribed in the Handbook for Sheriffs published by the Philippine Judicial Academy requires a narration of the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the fact of failure.

[27] Supreme Court Administrative

Circular No. 5 dated November 9, 1989 requires that “impossibility of prompt service should be shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the failure of such efforts,” which should be made in the proof of service.

(3) A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion

If the substituted service will be effected at defendant’s house or residence, it should be left with a person of “suitable age and discretion then residing therein.”

[28]A person

of suitable age and discretion is one who has attained the age of full legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have enough discernment to understand the importance of a summons. “Discretion” is defined as “the ability to make decisions which represent a responsible choice and for which an understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed”.

[29] Thus, to be of sufficient discretion, such person must know how to

read and understand English to comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the need to deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible time for the person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the

Atty. Tranquil Salvador Remedial Law Case Doctrines. Geoanne Battad Page 29

“relation of confidence” to the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or at least be notified of the receipt of the summons. The sheriff must therefore determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant is of legal age, what the recipient’s relationship with the defendant is, and whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least notify the defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters must be clearly and specifically described in the Return of Summons.

(4) A Competent Person in Charge

If the substituted service will be done at defendant’s office or regular place of business, then it should be served on a competent person in charge of the place. Thus, the person on whom the substituted service will be made must be the one managing the office or business of defendant, such as the president or manager; and such individual must have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons. Again, these details must be contained in the Return.

4. Sansio vs. Mogol A summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought against him or her. In a civil action, jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of summons or the defendant's voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the court's jurisdiction, or when there is no valid service of summons, any judgment of the court, which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, is null and void. Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, the service of summons may be made through personal or substituted service. Summons upon a respondent or a defendant must be served by handing a copy thereof to him in person or, if he refuses to receive it, by tendering it to him. The essence of personal service is the handing or tendering of a copy of the summons to the defendant himself,

30 wherever he may be found; that is, wherever he may be,

provided he is in the Philippines. In the instant case, the Court finds that there was already a valid service of summons in the persons of respondent spouses Mogol. the act of the counsel of respondent spouses Mogol of receiving the summons and the copy of the complaint already constituted receipt on the part of his clients, for the same was done with the latter’s behest and consent. Already accomplished was the operative act of "handing" a copy of the summons to respondent spouses in person. Thus, jurisdiction over the persons of the respondent spouses Mogol was already acquired by the MeTC. the subsequent act of the counsel of respondent spouses of returning the summons and the copy of the complaint to the process server was no longer material. Section 6, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court does not require that the service of summons on the defendant in person must be effected only at the latter’s residence as stated in the summons

5. Republic vs. Glasglow

Forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem. As an action in rem, it is a proceeding against the thing itself instead of against the person.

20 In actions in remor quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the person

of the defendant is not a prerequisite to conferring jurisdiction on the court, provided that the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.

21 Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the

defendant in order to satisfy the requirements of due process.22

For this purpose, service may be made by publication as such mode of service is allowed in actions in rem and quasi in rem.

23

6. Palma vs. Galvez

The RTC found that since private respondent was abroad at the time of the service of summons, she was a resident who was temporarily out of the country; thus, service of summons may be made only by publication. No. Section 16 of Rule 14 uses the words “may” and “also,” it is not mandatory. Other methods of service of summons allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving officer on a defendant-resident who is temporarily out of the Philippines. Thus, if a resident defendant is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in section 7 ( formerly Section 8), Rule 14; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) in any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Substituted service of summons under the present Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court in a suit in personam against residents of the Philippines temporarily absent therefrom is the normal method of service of summons that will confer jurisdiction on the court over such defendant.

7. Acance vs. CA The petitioners are citizens of the United States and residents thereof. Further, the suit against them involves real property wherein the petitioners, as defendants therein, have an interest. These facts clearly warranted extraterritorial service of summons in accordance with Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Service of summons on a nonresident defendant who is not found in the country is required, not for purposes of physically acquiring jurisdiction over his person but simply in pursuance of the requirements of fair play, so that he may be informed of the pendency of the action against him and the possibility that the property in the Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of a resident, and that he may thereby be accorded an opportunity to defend in the action, if he be so minded. The only relief that may be granted in such an action against such a nonresident defendant, who does not choose to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the Philippine court, is limited to the res. The failure to strictly comply correctly with the requirements of the rules regarding the mailing of copies of the summons and the order for its publication is a fatal defect in the service of summons.

Atty. Tranquil Salvador Remedial Law Case Doctrines. Geoanne Battad Page 30

XIII. MOTIONS

1. Republic vs. Peralta A motion for reconsideration or a motion for a new trial shall be made in writing stating the ground or grounds therefor, a written notice of which shall be served by the movant on the adverse party. the requirements entombed in Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court are mandatory and non-compliance therewith is fatal and renders the motion pro forma; a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and which the court has no authority to act upon.

[10] In cases of motions for a new trial or for the reconsideration of a judgment, the running of

the period for appeal is not tolled by the mere filing or pendency of said motion.

2. Preysler vs. Manila Southcoast The three-day notice rule is not absolute. A liberal construction of the procedural rules is proper where the lapse in the literal observance of a rule of procedure has not prejudiced the adverse party and has not deprived the court of its authority. There was substantial compliance of the rule on notice of motions even if the first notice was irregular because no prejudice was caused the adverse party since the motion was not considered and resolved until after several postponements of which the parties were duly notified. he requirement of notice of time and hearing in the pleading filed by a party is necessary only to apprise the other of the actions of the former.

3. Bacelonia vs. CA

It is clear then that the scheduled hearing of the said motion for reconsideration was beyond the period specified by the Revised Rules of Court which was not later than ten (10) days after the filing of the motion. Significantly, the above provision of Rule 15, Section 5 uses the mandatory term “must” in fixing the period within which the motion shall be scheduled for hearing. A motion that fails to religiously comply with the mandatory provision of Rule 15, Section 5 is pro forma and presents no question which merits the attention and consideration of the court.

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XIV. MOTION TO DISMISS

1. Heirs of Loreto Maramag vs. Maramag A cause of action is the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains the three (3) elements of a cause of action—(1) the legal right of the plaintiff; (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant; and (3) the act or omission of the defendant in violation of the legal right. If any of these elements is absent, the complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of action. When a motion to dismiss is premised on this ground, the ruling thereon should be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint. The test of sufficiency of a cause of action rests on whether, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged in the complaint to be true, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same, in accordance with the prayer in the complaint. This is the general rule. However, this rule is subject to well-recognized exceptions, such that there is no hypothetical admission of the veracity of the allegations if:

1. the falsity of the allegations is subject to judicial notice; 2. such allegations are legally impossible; 3. the allegations refer to facts which are inadmissible in evidence; 4. by the record or document in the pleading, the allegations appear

unfounded; or 5. there is evidence which has been presented to the court by stipulation of the

parties or in the course of the hearings related to the case In this case, it is clear from the petition filed before the trial court that, although petitioners are the legitimate heirs of Loreto, they were not named as beneficiaries in the insurance policies issued by Insular and Grepalife. It is evident from the face of the complaint that petitioners are not entitled to a favorable judgment.

2. UCPB vs. Beluso When an action is dismissed on the motion of the other party, it is only when the ground for the dismissal of an action is found in paragraphs (f), (h) and (i) that the action cannot be refiled. As regards all the other grounds, the complainant is allowed to file same action, but should take care that, this time, it is filed with the proper court or after the accomplishment of the erstwhile absent condition precedent, as the case may be. It is indeed the general rule that in cases where there are two pending actions between the same parties on the same issue, it should be the later case that should be dismissed. However, this rule is not absolute. Even if this is not the purpose for the filing of the first action, it may nevertheless be dismissed if the later action is the more appropriate vehicle for the ventilation of the issues between the parties.

3. Manila Banking vs. University of Baguio Did the trial court err in dismissing the amended complaint, without trial, upon motion of respondent university?

We distinguished a motion to dismiss for failure of the complaint to state a cause of action from a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action. The first is governed by Section 1 (g),

26 Rule 16,

while the second by Rule 33. The first [situation where the complaint does not allege a sufficient cause of action] is raised in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 before a responsive pleading is filed and can be determined only from the allegations in the initiatory pleading and not from evidentiary or other matters aliunde. The second [situation where the evidence does not sustain the cause of action alleged] is raised in a demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 after the plaintiff has rested his case and can be resolved only on the basis of the evidence he has presented in support of his claim. The first does not concern itself with the truth and falsity of the allegations while the second arises precisely because the judge has determined the truth and falsity of the allegations and has found the evidence wanting. Hence, a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action is filed by the defendant after the plaintiff has presented his evidence on the ground that the latter has shown no right to the relief sought. While a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 is based on preliminary objections which can be ventilated before the beginning of the trial, a motion to dismiss under Rule 33 is in the nature of a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is presented only after the plaintiff has rested his case

4. Strongworld Construction vs. Perello If the suit is not brought in the name of, or against, the real party in interest, a Motion to Dismiss may be filed on the ground that the Complaint states no cause of action. Dismissals that are based on the following grounds, to wit: (1) that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment or by the statute of limitations; (2) that the claim or demand set forth in the plaintiff’s pleading has been paid, waived, abandoned or otherwise extinguished; and (3) that the claim on which the action is founded is unenforceable under the provisions of the statute of frauds, bar the refiling of the same action or claim. Logically, the nature of the dismissal founded on any of the preceding grounds is “with prejudice” because the dismissal prevents the refiling of the same action or claim. Ergo, dismissals based on the rest of the grounds enumerated are without prejudice because they do not preclude the refiling of the same action. Section 1(h), Rule 41, no appeal may be taken from an order dismissing an action without prejudice. We distinguish a dismissal with prejudice from a dismissal without prejudice. The former disallows and bars the refiling of the complaint; whereas, the same cannot be said of a dismissal without prejudice.

[38] Likewise, where the law permits, a dismissal with prejudice is subject to the right of

appeal.

Atty. Tranquil Salvador Remedial Law Case Doctrines. Geoanne Battad Page 32

XV. DISMISSALS BY PLAINTIFF

1. Limaco vs. Gakuen There are two ways by which an action may be dismissed upon the instance of the plaintiff. First, dismissal is a matter of right when a notice of dismissal is filed by the plaintiff before an answer or a motion for summary judgment has been served on him by the defendant. Second, dismissal is discretionary on the court when the motion for the dismissal of the action is filed by the plaintiff at any stage of the proceedings other than before service of an answer or a motion for summary judgment. While the dismissal in the first mode takes effect upon the mere notice of plaintiff without need of a judicial order,

[28] the second mode requires the authority of the court before

dismissal of the case may be effected.

2. Pinga vs. Heirs of Santiago Whether the dismissal of the complaint necessarily carries the dismissal of the compulsory counterclaim? Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the complaint due to the fault of plaintiff does not necessarily carry with it the dismissal of the counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of defendants to prosecute the counterclaim. The dismissal of the complaint due to the plaintiff’s fault, as in the case for failure to prosecute, is without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or separate action.

XVI. PRE-TRIAL

1. Diaz vs. CA The notice of pre-trial shall be served on counsel, or on the party who has no counsel. The counsel served with such notice is charged with the duty of notifying the party represented by him. In this case, Petitioner was represented by Atty. Cipriano Lupeba to whom the notice was sent.

[18] It

was incumbent on the latter to advise petitioner accordingly. His failure to do so constituted negligence which bound petitioner. The failure of the plaintiff to appear when so required pursuant to the next preceding section shall be cause for the dismissal of the action. The dismissal shall be with prejudice, unless otherwise ordered by the court. A similar failure on the defendant shall be cause to allow the plaintiff to present his evidence ex parte and the court to render judgment on the basis thereof.

Consequently, it was no error for the trial court to allow private respondents to present their evidence ex parte when petitioner and her counsel failed to appear for the scheduled pre-trial conference.

2. Alcaraz vs. CA After several postponements of the pretrial conference, the trial court declared petitioner Alcaraz as in default upon motion of private respondent Equitable and allowed the latter to present its evidence ex parte. Whether the trial court violated the petitioner’s right to due process when the private respondent was allowed to present its evidence ex parte? The trial court clearly has the discretion on whether to grant or deny a motion to postpone and/or reschedule the pretrial conference in accordance with the circumstances then obtaining in the case. Under the Rules of Court, both the parties and their counsels are mandated to appear in the pretrial conference.

[15] If the parties opt not to be present, their counsel must be armed with a

special power of attorney specifically for the purpose. This must be so as the pretrial conference is primarily for the purpose of exploring the possibility of a compromise, or on the failure thereof, for the parties to make certain admissions and stipulations in order to facilitate a more efficient proceeding at the trial proper. In the case at bar, both petitioner Alcaraz and his counsel did not appear at the scheduled pretrial. Instead, it was the petitioner’s wife alone who made the verbal manifestation on behalf of her husband and his counsel while presenting an unverified medical certificate on the latter’s behalf.

3. Macasaet vs. Macasaet Section 8 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court requires the appearance of the plaintiff and the defendant during the preliminary conference. On the basis of this provision, petitioners claim that the MTCC should have dismissed the case upon the failure of respondents to attend the conference. However, petitioners do not dispute that an attorney-in-fact with a written authorization from respondents appeared during the preliminary conference.

[57] The issue then is whether the rules on ejectment allow a representative to

substitute for a party’s personal appearance. The nonappearance of a party may be excused by the showing of a valid cause; or by the appearance of a representative, who has been fully authorized in writing to enter into an amicable settlement, to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution, and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents. If there are valid reasons or if a representative has a “special authority,” a party’s appearance may be waived.

Atty. Tranquil Salvador Remedial Law Case Doctrines. Geoanne Battad Page 33

XVII. INTERVENTION

1. Looyuko vs. CA Was the motion for intervention filed by the Spouses Gutang and Looyuko et al. in Civil Case No. 82-9760 proper considering that the case was already final and executoyr? The present Rules have clarified that the motion should be filed “any time before rendition of judgment.

In the present case, the motions for intervention were filed after judgment had already been rendered, indeed when the case was already final and executory. Certainly, intervention can no longer be allowed in a case already terminated by final judgment.

[15]

Intervention is merely collateral or accessory or ancillary to the principal action, and not an independent proceeding; it is an interlocutory proceeding dependent on or subsidiary to the case between the original parties.

[16] Where the main action ceases to exist, there is no pending

proceeding wherein the intervention may be based.

2. Limpo vs. CA

ntervention may be granted only where its allowance will not unduly delay or prejudice the rights of the original parties to a case. Generally, it will be allowed "before rendition of judgment by the trial court," as Rule 19, §2 expressly provides. After trial and decision in a case, intervention can no longer be permitted.

[6] Certainly it cannot be allowed on appeal

[7] without unduly delaying the

disposition of the case and prejudicing the interest of the parties.

3. Asian Terminals vs. Ricafort

The RTC cannot be faulted for dismissing petitioner’s complaint-in-intervention. Considering that it had no jurisdiction over respondents’ action and over the shipment subject of the complaint, all proceedings before it would be void. The RTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint-in-intervention and act thereon except to dismiss the same. Moreover, considering that intervention is merely ancillary and supplemental to the existing litigation and never an independent action, the dismissal of the principal action necessarily results in the dismissal of the complaint-in-intervention. Likewise, a court which has no jurisdiction over the principal action has no jurisdiction over a complaint-in-intervention. Intervention presupposes the pendency of a suit in a court of competent jurisdiction. Jurisdiction of intervention is governed by jurisdiction of the main action.

XVIII. SUBPOENA

1. Collado vs. Bravo

Respondent’s act of issuing the subpoena to complainant was evidently not directly or remotely connected with respondent’s judicial or administrative duties. It appears that she merely wanted to

act as a mediator or conciliator in the dispute between complainant and the Baterinas, upon the request of the latter. “A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or the trial of an action, or at any investigation conducted by competent authority, or for the taking of his deposition. It is a process “the means whereby a court compels the appearance of the defendant before it, or a compliance with its demands.” Hence, absent any proceedings, suit, or action commenced or pending before a court, a subpoena may not issue. In this case, respondent knew there was no case filed against complainant. Neither had complainant commenced any proceeding against the Baterinas for whose benefit the subpoena was issued. Respondent, then, had absolutely neither the power nor the authority nor the duty to issue a subpoena to the complainant.

2. Roco vs. Contreras There are two (2) kinds of subpoena, to wit: subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum. The first is used to compel a person to testify, while the second is used to compel the production of books, records, things or documents therein specified. Well-settled is the rule that before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must first be satisfied that the following requisites are present: (1) the books, documents or other things requested must appear prima facie relevant to the issue subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and (2) such books must be reasonably described by the parties to be readily identified (test of definiteness)

XIX. DEPOSITION XX. TRIAL XXI. DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE XXII. JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT