Case Doctrines:1. De Leon vs. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602 (1987)

Supreme Court declared that the Memoranda issued by respondent OIC Gov on Feb 8, 1987 designating respondents as Barangay Captain and Barangay Councilmen of Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal has no legal force and effect.

The 1987 Constitution was ratified in a plebiscite on Feb 2, 1987, therefore, the Provisional Constitution must be deemed to have superseded. Having become inoperative, respondent OIC Gov could no longer rely on Sec 2, Art 3, thereof to designate respondents to the elective positions occupied by petitioners. Relevantly, Sec 8, Art 1 of the 1987 Constitution further provides in part:

"Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three years x x x."

Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by aw, therefore, the term of office of 6 years provided for in the Barangay Election Act of 1982 should still govern.Was the provision under the Barangay Election Act (fixing the term for 6 years) inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution?There is NO INCONSISTENCY between the two and the same should be considered as still operative pursuant to Sec. 3, Art. XVIII of the 1987 Constitution:

Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations letters of instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent, with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.

2. San Juan vs. Civil Service Commission, 196 SCRA 69 (1991)DBM has no power to the appoint Almajose as PBO of Rizal

since the DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the Governor .

This case involves the most important constitutional policy and principle, that of LOCAL AUTONOMY. Where a law is capable of two interpretations, one in favor of centralized power in Malacañang and the other beneficial to local autonomy, the scales must be weighed in favor of autonomy.

The Constitution clearly limited the executive power over local governments to "general supervision. The exercise of greater local autonomy is even more marked in the present Constitution. Article II, Section 25 on State Policies provides:

Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governmentsThe 14 sections in Article X on Local Government not only reiterate earlier doctrines but give in greater detail the provisions making local autonomy more meaningful. Thus, Sections 2 and 3 of Article X provide:

Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.

When the Civil Service Commission interpreted the recommending power of the Provincial Governor as purely directory, it went against the letter and spirit of the constitutional provisions on local autonomy and the right given by Local Budget Circular No. 31 giving DBM the right to fill up an existing vacancy where none of the nominees of the local chief executive were qualifies is ULTRA VIRES.

Can the DBM Head appoint on its own an officer to the said position in the event that none of the nominees of the Governor were qualified?

NO, If none is qualified, he must return the list of nominees to the Governor explaining why no one meets the legal requirements and ask for new recommendees who have the necessary eligibilities and qualifications.

What is the DIFFERENCE between the President’s powers of CONTROL vs. SUPERVISION?SUPERVISION (exercised over local governments)- It goes no further than "overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter

fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties

CONTROL (exercised over all executive departments, bureaus and offices)- "Means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate had done in the performance of their duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter."

3. Ganzon vs. CA, 200 SCRA 271 (1991)Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's alter ego, can suspend and/or remove local officials.Held: (Atty. DBL: Note that this was the ruling before where the president still has the power to remove local officials under the previous LGC (BP 337). However, under Sec. 60 of the present LGC, the president can no longer remove local officials. Such power is already lodged to the regular courts.)

Yes! (However, SC said this was exercised with grave abuse of discretion by the respondent) It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline.

Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local government units, as in the federal governments of the United States of America (or Brazil or Germany), although Jefferson is said to have compared municipal corporations euphemistically to "small republics." Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest-is to wean local government units from over-dependence on the central government.

The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority as this Court has held,   thus:

xxx xxx xxx

...As we held, however, "investigating" is not inconsistent with "overseeing", although it is a lesser power than "altering". The impression is apparently exacerbated by the Court's pronouncements in at least three cases, Lacson v. Roque,  Hebron v. Reyes,  and Mondano v. Silvosa, and possibly, a fourth one, Pelaez v. Auditor General.  In Lacson, this Court said that the President enjoyed no control powers but only supervision "as may be provided by law,"  a rule we reiterated in Hebron, and Mondano. In Pelaez, we stated that the President "may not . . . suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board.” However, neither Lacson nor Hebron Mondano categorically banned the Chief Executive from exercising acts of disciplinary authority because she did not exercise control powers, but because now allowed her to exercise disciplinary authority.

The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local Government Code, Batas Blg. 37. As we said, "supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite of the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect.

4. Basco vs. Pagcor, 197 SCRA 52 (1991)Contentions are without merit for the following reasons:a.) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes

a. Its "power to tax" therefore must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which has the "inherent power to taxb.) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress

a. Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.

b. stressed that "municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress" (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18, 1957) which has the power to "create and abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general legislative powersc.) The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked

a. . As early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Governmentd.) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government

PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes.

Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization (decentralization as being a political Question)

5. Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., 234 SCRA 255 (1994)Issue: Whether or not the Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are valid.Held: NO. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows:

Sec. 16. — General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support, among other things, the

preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions 9 has held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following substantive requirements:1) It must not contravene the constitution or any statute.2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.5) It must be general and consistent with public policy.6) It must not be unreasonable.

Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. The morality of gambling is not justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient.

6. Abbas vs. COMELEC, 179 SCRA 287 (1989)

Issue: Whether or not certain provisions of the Organic Act are unconstitutional.Held: The petition has no merit and the law is constitutional.

1. Petitioner contends that the tenor of a provision in the Organic Act makes the creation of an autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an autonomous region would still be created composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes were obtained. there is a specific provision in the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which incorporates substantially the same requirements embodied in the Constitution and fills in the details, thus:

SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall take effect when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this Act in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred twenty (120) days after the approval of this Act: Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain the existing administrative determination, merge the existing regions.

Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it.

2. The question has been raised as to what this majority means. Does it refer to a majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all the constituent units, or a majority in each of the constituent units, or both?The 1987 Constitution provides: The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2]. It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this.

3. Petitioner avers that not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities included in the Organic Act, possess such concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other relevant characteristics. By including areas, which do not strictly share the same characteristic as the others, petitioner claims that Congress has expanded the scope of the autonomous region which the constitution itself has prescribed to be limited.Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards by which Congress shall determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the law.

4. Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it violates the constitutional guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection centers on a provision in the Organic Act which mandates that should there be any conflict between the Muslim Code and the Tribal Code on the one had, and the national law on the other hand, the Shari'ah courts created under the same Act should apply national law. Petitioners maintain that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran, which makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to any "man-made" national law. Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by enumerating possible instances of conflict between provisions of the Muslim Code and national law, wherein an application of national law might be offensive to a Muslim's religious convictions.

In the present case, no actual controversy between real litigants exists. There are no conflicting claims involving the application of national law resulting in an alleged violation of religious freedom. This being so, the Court in this case may not be called upon to resolve what is merely a perceived potential conflict between the provisions the Muslim Code and national law.

5. According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to merge regions, a power which is not conferred by the Constitution upon the President.While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments. There is no conflict between the power of the President to merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions.6. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of these two petitions is, therefore, inevitable.

7. Chiongbian vs. Orbos, 245 SCRA 253 (1995)Issue: whether the power to "merge" administrative regions is legislative or administrative in character, and, in any event, whether Art. XIX, §13 is invalid because it unduly delegates legislative power to the PresidentANS: It is ADMINISTRATIVE in nature.

Historically, the creation and subsequent reorganization of administrative regions have been by the President pursuant to authority granted to him by law. In conferring on the President the power "to merge [by administrative determination] the existing regions" following the establishment of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Congress merely followed the pattern set in previous legislation dating back to the initial organization of administrative regions in 1972. The choice of the President as delegate is LOGICAL because the division of the country into regions is intended TO FACILITATE not

only THE ADMINISTRATION of local governments but ALSO THE DIRECTION OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS which the law requires SHOULD HAVE REGIONAL OFFICES. As this Court observed in Abbas , "while the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a POWER WHICH HAS TRADITIONALLY BEEN LODGED WITH THE PRESIDENT to facilitate the exercise of the power of general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, §4 of the Constitution]."

The regions themselves are not territorial and political divisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays but are "mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, not for political representation." 7 The power conferred on the President is similar to the power to adjust municipal boundaries 8which has been described in Pelaez v. Auditor General 9 or as "administrative in nature."

The regrouping is done only on paper. It involves no more than are definition or redrawing of the lines separating administrative regions for the purpose of facilitating the administrative supervision of local government units by the President and insuring the efficient delivery of essential services. There will be no "transfer" of local governments from one region to another except as they may thus be regrouped so that a province like Lanao del Norte, which is at present part of Region XII, will become part of Region IX.There is, therefore, no abdication by Congress of its legislative power in conferring on the President the power to merge administrative regions.

Sidenote: The Law in question has SUFFICIENT LEGISLATIVE STANDARDA legislative standard need not be expressed. It may simply be gathered or implied. 10 Nor need it be found in the law challenged because it may be embodied in other statutes on the same subject as that of the challenged legislation. 11With respect to the power to merge existing administrative regions, the standard is to be found in the same policy underlying the grant to the President in R.A. No. 5435 of the power to reorganize the Executive Department, to wit: "to promote simplicity, economy and efficiency in the government

Issue: whether or not the power granted authorizes the reorganization even of regions the provinces and cities in which either did not take part in the plebiscite on the creation of the Autonomous Region or did not vote in favor of it; ANS: Yes, power to merge granted authorizes the reorganization even of regions the provinces and cities in which did not vote for inclusion.While Art. XIX, §13 provides that "The provinces and cities which do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions," this provision is subject to the qualification that "the President may by administrative determination merge the existing regions." Moreover, President's power cannot be so limited without neglecting the necessities of administration. In fact, as petitioners admit, the reorganization of administrative regions in E.O. No. 429 is based on relevant criteria, to wit: (1) contiguity and geographical features; (2) transportation and communication facilities; (3) cultural and language groupings; (4) land area and population; (5) existing regional centers adopted by several agencies; (6) socio-economic development programs in the regions and (7) number of provinces and cities.

Issue: Whether or not the power granted to the President includes the power to transfer the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian CityANS: YES, the power granted to the President includes the power to transfer the regional center of Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian CityThe Court said in Abbas, 16 administrative regions are mere "groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes, . . . There is, therefore, no basis for contending that only Congress can change or determine regional centers. To the contrary, the examples of P.D. Nos. 1, 742, 773 and 1555 suggest that the power to reorganize administrative regions carries with it the power to determine the regional center.It may be that the transfer of the regional center in Region IX from Zamboanga City to Pagadian City may entail the expenditure of large sums of money for the construction of buildings and other infrastructure to house regional offices. That contention is addressed to the wisdom of

the transfer rather than to its legality and it is settled that courts are not the arbiters of the wisdom or expediency of legislation.

8. Cordillera Broad Coalition vs. COA, 181 SCRA 495 (1990)Issue: WON EO 220 pre-empted the enactment of an organic act by the Congress and the creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras?Held: NO. It DOES NOT create the autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It merely provides for transitory measures – consolidation and coordination of the delivery of services of line departments and agencies of the National Government in the areas covered – to prepare the ground for autonomy. NEITHER does the transitory nature of the CAR mean that it is "the interim autonomous region in the Cordilleras”.

The Constitution provides for a basic structure of government in the autonomous region composed of an elective executive and legislature and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction [Art. X, sec. 18]. Here, E.O. No. 220 did not establish an autonomous regional government. It created a region, covering a specified area, FOR ADMINISTRATIVE PURPOSES with the main objective of coordinating the planning and implementation of programs and services [secs. 2 and 5]. To determine policy, it created a representative assembly. To serve as an implementing body, it created the Cordillera Executive Board composed of the Mayor of Baguio City, provincial governors and representatives of the Cordillera Bodong Administration, ethno-linguistic groups and non-governmental organizations as regular members and all regional directors of the line departments of the National Government as ex-officiomembers and headed by an Executive Director [secs. 10 and 11].

The bodies created by E.O. No. 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental structure, nor are they autonomous government agencies. They merely constitute the mechanism for an "umbrella" that brings together the existing local governments, the agencies of the National Government, the ethno-linguistic groups or tribes, and non-governmental organizations in a concerted effort to spur development in the Cordilleras.The Constitution outlines a complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous region in the Cordilleras which would UNDOUBTEDLY

TAKE TIME. The President, in 1987 still exercising legislative powers, as the first Congress had not yet convened, saw it fit to provide for some measures to address the urgent needs of the Cordilleras in the meantime that the organic act had not yet been passed and the autonomous region created.

Issue: WON EO 220 created a new territorial and political subdivision, or merged existing ones into a larger subdivision not in accordance with the law?

NO, it did not create a new territorial and political subdivision or merge existing ones into a larger subdivision.The Constitution provides in Article X:

Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras as hereinafter provided.xxx xxx xxxSec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

However, in the instant case, CAR is NOT a public corporation or a territorial and political subdivision. It DOES NOT have a separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities and municipalities. Neither is it vested with the powers that are normally granted to public corporations, e.g. the power to sue and be sued, the power to own and dispose of property, the power to create its own sources of revenue, etc. As stated earlier, the CAR was created primarily to coordinate the planning and implementation of programs and services in the covered areas.Considering the control and supervision exercised by the President over the CAR and the offices created under E.O. No. 220, and considering further the indispensable participation of the line departments of the National Government, the CAR may be considered more than anything else AS A REGIONAL COORDINATING AGENCY of the National Government, SIMILAR TO THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COUNCILS

which the President may create under the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 14]. These councils are "composed of local government officials, regional heads of departments and other government offices, and representatives from non-governmental organizations within the region for purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and development of the units in the region." [Ibid.] In this wise, the CAR may be considered as a more sophisticated version of the regional development council.

Issue: WON the creation of the car contravened the constitutional guarantee of the local autonomy for the provinces (Abra, Benguet, Ifugao, Kalinga-Apayao and Mountain Province) and city (Baguio City) which compose the CAR? NO. It must be clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X, sec. 2] refers to the administrative   autonomy of local government units or, cast in more technical language, the decentralization of government authority [Villegas v. Subido, G.R. No. L-31004, January 8, 1971, 37 SCRA 1]. On the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution contemplates the grant of political   autonomy, and not just administrative autonomy these regions, with an autonomous regional government with a basic structure consisting of an executive department and a legislative assembly and special courts with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each of the autonomous regions [Art. X, sec. 18].As already establihed, the CAR is a MERE TRANSITORY COORDINATING AGENCY that would prepare the stage for political autonomy for the Cordilleras. It fills in the resulting gap in the process of transforming a group of adjacent territorial and political subdivisions already enjoying local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested with political autonomy.

9. Ordillo vs. COMELEC, 192 SCRA 100 (1990)Issue: WON the province of Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such region.

Held: NO- The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region.

The keyword ins Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution – provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connote that “region” is to be made up of more than one constituent unit. The term “region” used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces.- rule in statutory construction must be applied here: the language of the Constitution, as much as possible should be understood in the sense it has in common use and that the words used in constitutional provisions areto be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.

The entirety of Republic Act No. 6766 creating the Cordillera Autonomous Region is infused with provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao constituting the Region.- It can be gleaned that Congress never intended that a single province may constitute the autonomous region.- If this were so, we would be faced with the absurd situation of having two sets of officials: a set of provincial officials and another set of regional officials exercising their executive and legislative powers over exactly the same small area. (Ifugao is one of the smallest provinces in the Philippines, population-wise) (Art III sec 1 and 2; Art V, sec 1 and 4; Art XII sec 10 of RA 6766)- Allotment of Ten Million Pesos to Regional Government for its initial organizational requirements can not be construed as funding only a lone and small province [Art XXI sec 13(B)(c)]- Certain provisions of the Act call for officials “coming from different provinces and cities” in the Region, as well as tribal courts and the development of a common regional language. (Art V sec 16; Art VI sec 3; Art VII; Art XV RA 6766)- Thus, to contemplate the situation envisioned by the COMELEC would not only violate the letter and intent of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6766 but would be impractical and illogical.

10. Bagabuyo vs. COMELEC, 573 SCRA 290 (2008)ISSUE: WoN RA. No. 9371 merely provide for the legislative reapportionment of Cagayan de Oro City, or does it involve the division and conversion of a local government unit?HELD: RA. No. 9371 is, on its face, purely and simply a reapportionment legislation passed in accordance with the authority granted to Congress under Article VI, Section 5(4) of the Constitution. Its core provision – Section 1 – provides:

SECTION 1. Legislative Districts. — The lone legislative district of the City of Cagayan de Oro is hereby apportioned to commence in the next national elections after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Bonbon, Bayabas, Kauswagan, Carmen, Patag, Bulua, Iponan, Baikingon, San Simon, Pagatpat, Canitoan, Balulang, Lumbia, Pagalungan, Tagpangi, Taglimao, Tuburan, Pigsag-an, Tumpagon, Bayanga, Mambuaya, Dansulihon, Tignapoloan and Bisigan shall comprise the first district while barangays Macabalan, Puntod, Consolacion, Camaman-an, Nazareth, Macansandig, Indahag, Lapasan, Gusa, Cugman, FS Catanico, Tablon, Agusan, Puerto, Bugo and Balubal and all urban barangays from Barangay 1 to Barangay 40 shall comprise the second district.Under these wordings, no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political and corporate entity takes place or is mandated. Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a single unit and its administration is not divided along territorial lines. Its territory remains completely whole and intact; there is only the addition of another legislative district and the delineation of the city into two districts for purposes of representation in the House of Representatives.ISSUE: Whether or not a plebiscite was required in the case at bar.HELD: No, a plebiscite is not required in the case at bar. RA 9371 merely increased the representation of Cagayan de Oro City in the House of Representatives and Sangguniang Panglungsod pursuant to Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution; the criteria established under Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution only apply when there is a creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of a province, city, municipality, or barangay; in this case, no such creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundaries of a local government unit took place; and R.A. No. 9371 did not bring about any change in Cagayan de Oro’s territory, population and income classification; hence, no plebiscite is required.11. The Province of North Cotabato vs. The GRP Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, 568 SCRA 402 (2008)

Main Issue: WON the MOA-AD is constitutional?

RULING:

The MOA-AD is UNCONSTITUTIONAL since the powers granted to the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) exceeds those granted to local governments and even go beyond

those of the present ARMM. It cannot be reconciled with the Constitution and existing laws.

Sub-issues: A. Is the “associative” relationship envisioned between the GRP and BJE unconstitutional?

YES, the “associative” relationship between the GRP and the BJE is UNCONSTITUTIONAL since the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that same is on its way to independence and the concept of “association” is NOT RECOGNIZED UNDER THE CONSTITUTION

An ASSOCIATION is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground between integration and independence. 

In international practice, the associated state arrangement has usually been used as a transitional device   of former colonies on their way to full independence.

MOA-AD, it contains many provisions which are consistent with the international legal concept of   association:

BJEs capacity to enter into economic and trade relations with foreign countries, the commitment of the Central Government to ensure the BJEs participation in meetings and events in the ASEAN and the specialized UN agencies, and the continuing responsibility of the Central Government over external defense

These provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating it.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an associative relationship with the national government.

The Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this

jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it

provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of

Philippine territory for independence.

B. Can the BJE be considered a state under international law?

YES, the BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention: permanent population, defined territory, government & capacity to enter into relations with other state.

The BJE is a far MORE POWERFUL ENTITY than the ARMM recognized under the Constitution. The spirit animating it RUNS COUNTER to national sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

C. Does the MOA-AD violate Article X, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution on the creation of Autonomous Regions?

YES, the MOA-AD violated Article X, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution on the creation of autonomous regions since the BJE is MORE OF A STATE than an autonomous region.

Even assuming that it can be covered by the term “autonomous region”, it would still be contrary to the Constitution.

Article X, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that [t]he creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.

Under paragraph 2(c) on TERRITORY in relation to 2(d) and 2(e), the

present geographic area of the ARMM and, in addition, the municipalities

of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the

2001 plebiscite Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tangkal are

automatically part of the BJE without need of another plebiscite, in

contrast to the areas under Categories A and B mentioned earlier in the

overview. That the present components of the ARMM and the above-

mentioned municipalities voted for inclusion therein in 2001, however,

does   not   render another plebiscite unnecessary under the

Constitution, precisely because what these areas voted for then was

their inclusion in the ARMM,   not the BJE .

D. Does the MOA-AD violate Section 20, Article X of the 1987 Constitution on the Powers of Autonomous Regions?

YES, the MOA-AD does not comply with Section 20, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. The MOA-AD would require an AMENDMENT that would EXPAND the powers granted to autonomous regions under the Constitution.

SECTION 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over: (1) Administrative organization;(2) Creation of sources of revenues;(3) Ancestral domain and natural resources;(4) Personal, family, and property relations;(5) Regional urban and rural planning development;(6) Economic, social, and tourism development;(7) Educational policies;(8) Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and

(9) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people of the region. 

The mere passage of new legislation pursuant to sub-paragraph No. 9 of said constitutional provision would not suffice, since any new law that might vest in the BJE the powers found in the MOA-AD must, itself, comply with other provisions of the Constitution.   It would not do, for instance, to merely pass legislation vesting the BJE with treaty-making power in order to accommodate paragraph 4 of the strand on RESOURCES which states: The BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries: provided, however, that such relationships and understandings do not include aggression against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines since only the President has the sole authority to negotiate with other states.

Article II, Section 22 of the Constitution must also be amended if the

scheme envisioned in the MOA-AD is to be effected. That constitutional

provision states: The State recognizes and promotes the rights

of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national

unity   and development. (Underscoring

supplied) An   associative   arrangement does not uphold national unity.

While there may be a semblance of unity because of the associative ties

between the BJE and the national government, the act of placing a portion

of Philippine territory in a status which, in international practice, has

generally been a   preparation for independence , is certainly not conducive

to   national   unity .

12. Evardone vs. COMELEC, 204 SCRA 464 (1991)ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 is void for being unconstitutional?

RULING: NO, Resolution No. 2722 is VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL.Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that all existing laws not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution SHALL REMAIN OPERATIVE, UNTIL amended, REPEALED or revoked.

It is true that Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991), approved by the President on 10 October 1991, specifically repeals B.P. Blg. 337 as provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act. But, the Local Government Code of 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992. Therefore, the old Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) IS STILL THE LAW applicable to the present case. Prior to the enactment of the new Local Government Code, the effectiveness of B.P. Blg. 337 was expressly recognized in the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Chapter 3 (Sections 54 to 59) of B.P. Blg. 337 provides for the MECHANISM FOR RECALL OF LOCAL ELECTIVE OFFICIALS.

Section 59 expressly authorizes the respondent COMELEC to conduct and supervise the process of and election on recall and IN THE EXERCISE OF SUCH POWERS , PROMULGATE THE NECESSARY RULES AND REGULATIONS.

The ELECTION CODE CONTAINS NO SPECIAL PROVISIONS on the manner of conducting elections for the recall of a local official. Any such election shall be conducted in the manner and under the rules on special elections, unless otherwise provided by law or rule of the COMELEC. 5 Thus, pursuant to the rule-making power vested in respondent COMELEC, it promulgated Resolution No. 2272 on 23 May 1990.Therefore, Resolution No. 2272 is VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the respondent COMELEC had the authority to approve the petition for recall and set the date for the signing of said petition.However, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation provided in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P. Blg, 337, which states:

Sec. 55. Who May Be Recalled; Ground for Recall; When Recall May not be Held.— . . .(2) No recall shall take place within two years from the date of the official's assumption of office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election.

The Constitution has mandated a synchronized national and local election prior to 30 June 1992, or more specifically, as provided for in Article XVIII, Sec. 5 — on the second Monday of May, 1992. 11 Thus, to hold an election on recall approximately seven (7) months before the regular local election will be violative of the above provisions of the applicable Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337)ACCORDINGLY, both petitions are DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

13. Secretary of Health vs. CA, 241 SCRA 688 (1995)ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Health exercises jurisdiction over private respondent?

RULING: YES, the Secretary of Health exercises jurisdiction over private respondent.it is well-settled that jurisdiction is determined BY THE STATUTE IN FORCE AT THE TIME OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTION (Philippine Singapore Ports Corporation v. NLRC, 218 SCRA 77 [1993]).In the case at bar, respondent Fe Sibbaluca was administratively charged before petitioner department IN 1991. The case was docketed as Administrative Case No. 000023 S. 1991 and the suspension order was issued by petitioner Secretary of Health on December 17, 1991. At the time of the commencement of the administrative action, the operative laws are the Administrative Code of 1987 and Executive Order No. 119. Under the said laws, the SECRETARY OF HEALTH EXERCISES control, direction and supervision over his subordinates, which INCLUDE PRIVATE RESPONDENT. Consequently, since jurisdiction has been acquired by the Secretary of Health over the person of private respondent before the effectivity of the Local Government Code on January 1, 1992, it continues until the final disposition of the administrative case.This Court already ruled in a number of cases that jurisdiction once acquired by a court over a case remains with it until the full termination of the case, unless a law provides the contrary (Bueno Industrial and Development Corporation v. Enage, 104 SCRA 600 [1981]).Contrary to private respondent’s contention, it cannot be said that the Local Government Code of 1991 is applicable her case which commenced in 1991.It is EXPLICIT in the abovestated law that the Local Government Code of 1991 shall take effect on January 1, 1992. It is an elementary principle of statutory construction that where the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure and ambiguous, the meaning and intention of the legislature should be determined from the language employed, and where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction (Allarde v. Commission on Audit, 218 SCRA 227 [1993]).

14. PIMENTEL, JR. vs OCHOA G.R. No. 195770 July 17, 2012Issue: WON the disbursement of public funds and implementation of the CCTP encroached into the local autonomy of LGUs. Held: In order to fully secure to the LGUs the genuine and meaningful autonomy that would develop them into self-reliant communities and effective partners in the attainment of national goals,16 Section 17 of the Local Government Code vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities.

The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.

The Court held in Ganzon v. Court of Appeals17 that while it is through a system of decentralization that the State shall promote a more responsive and accountable local government structure, the concept of local autonomy does not imply the conversion of local government units into "mini-states."18 We explained that, with local autonomy, the Constitution did nothing more than "to break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of the local government" and, thus, did not intend to sever "the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local government units."19 In Pimentel v. Aguirre,20 the Court defined the extent of the local government's autonomy in terms of its partnership with the national government in the pursuit of common national goals, referring to such key concepts as integration and coordination. Thus:Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the national government has not completely relinquished all its powers over local governments, including autonomous regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the delegation is to make governance more directly responsive and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political and social development at the smaller political units are expected to propel social and economic growth and development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole, the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus, policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President and Congress.

Certainly, to yield unreserved power of governance to the local government unit as to preclude any and all involvement by the national government in programs implemented in the local level would be to shift the tide of monopolistic power to the other extreme, which would amount to a decentralization of power explicated in Limbona v. Mangelin21 as beyond our constitutional concept of autonomy, thus:Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power.1âwphi1 There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments ‘more responsive and accountable’ and ‘ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress.’ At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises ‘general supervision’ over them, but only to ‘ensure that local affairs are administered according to law.’ He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.

Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the [sic] favor of local governments [sic] units declared to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to ‘self-immolation,’ since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its constituency.22

Indeed, a complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it. The national government is, thus, not precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation and implementation of national development programs especially where it is implemented locally in coordination with the LGUs concerned.

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one.23 Petitioners have failed to discharge the burden of proving the invalidity of the provisions under the GAA of 2011. The allocation of a P21 billion budget for an intervention program formulated by the national government itself

but implemented in partnership with the local government units to achieve the common national goal development and social progress can by no means be an encroachment upon the autonomy of local governments.

Reading Assignment 21. Greater Balanga Development Corporation v. Municipality of Balanga, Bataan (1998)Issue: W/N the revocation of the Mayor's permit was valid.

Held: NO. The powers of municipal corporations are to be construed

in strictissimi juris and any doubt or ambiguity must be construed against the municipality. The authority of the Mayor to revoke permits is premised on a violation by the grantee of any of its conditions for its grant. For revocation to be justified under the Balanga Revenue Code, there must be: 1) proof of willful misrepresentation, and 2) deliberate intent to make a false statement. Good faith is always presumed.◦ In this case, the application for Mayor's permit requries the

applicant to state the “type of business, profession, occupation, privileges applied for.” Petitioner left this entry bank in its application form. It is only in the Mayor's permit itself that petitioner's lines of business appear. Revocation is not justified because Petitioner did not make any false statement therein.

◦ Neither was petitioner's applying for two businesses in one permit a ground for revocation. The second paragraph of Section 3A-06(b) does not expressly require two permits for their conduct of two or more businesses in one place, but only that separate fees be paid for each business. Granting, however, that separate permits are actually required, the application form does not contain any entry as regards the number of businesses the applicant wishes to engage in.

The SB's Resolution merely mentioned the plan to acquire the Lot for expansion of the Balanga Public Market adjacent thereto. The SB doesn't actually maintain a public market on the area. Until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court, thelandowner cannot be deprived of its right over the land.

Of course, the SB has the duty in the exercise of its police powers to regulate any business subject to municipal license fees and prescribe the conditions under which a municipal license already

issued may be revoked (B.P. Blg. 337, Sec. 149 [1] [r]), but the "anxiety, uncertainty, restiveness" among the stallholders and traders doing business on a property not owned by the Municipality cannot be a valid ground for revoking the permit of Petitioner.

Also, the manner by which the Mayor revoked the permit transgressed petitioner's right to due process. The alleged violation of Section 3A-06(b) of the Balanga Revenue Code was not stated in the order of revocation, and neither was petitioner informed of this specific violation. Moreover, Respondent Municipality isn't the owner of Lot 261 B-6-A-3, and thus cannot collect market fees, which only an owner can do.

2. Tano v Socrates  GR No. 110249 August 21, 1997 Lgus may enact police power measures pursuant to the general welfare clause.

The sangguniang panlungsod of Puerto Princesa City enacted an ordinance banning shipment of all live fish and lobster outside the said city and prohibiting the catching, gathering, possessing, buying, selling and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms.

Petitioners were charged criminally for violation of such ordinance. They invoke the preferential right of marginal fishermen under Sec. 149 of the LGC.

The so-called “preferential right” of subsistence or marginal-fishermen to the use of marine resources is not at all absolute.

The LGC provisions invoked by public respondents seek to give flesh and blood to the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. In fact, the general welfare clause, expressly mentions this right. The LGC explicitly mandates that the general welfare provisions of the LGC shall be liberallym interpreted to give more powers to the lgus in accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people of the community.

One of the devolved powers enumerated in the LGC on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves. This necessarily includes the enactment of

ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters.

3. PADILLA vs. COMELEC GR No. 103328 October 19, 1992Issue: Is the plebiscite conducted in the barangay areas comprising the proposed municipality AND the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo valid?

YES, the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo is VALID.

Did the deletion of the phrase “unit or” in Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution affected the ruling in TAN vs COMELEC?

NO. As can be gleaned during the debates in the 1986 Constitution Commission, the deletion of the words “unit or” was intended because in the plebiscite to be conducted, IT MUST INVOLVE ALL UNITS AFFECTED. If it the creation of a barangay plebiscite because it is affected, IT WOULD MEAN A LOSS OF TERRITORY.

So what is meant by the law that the plebiscite shall be conducted “in the political units directly affected”?

It means that residents of the political entity who would be ECONOMICALLY DISLOCATED by the separation of a portion thereof have a RIGHT TO VOTE in the said plebiscite.

What is contemplated by the phrase “political units directly affected” is the PLURALITY OF POLITICAL UNITS WHICH WOULD PARTICIPATE IN THE PLEBISCITE.

Therefore, those to be included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa + those living in the parent municipality of Labo.

4. CAWALING vs. COMELEC GR No. 146319; 146342 October 26, 2001

Issue: WON a component city may be created by merging two municipalities.

Held: Yes. Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The phrase "A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city" is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution allows the merger of local government units to create a province city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria established by the Code. the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division or a merger of existing local government units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code.

Issue: (2) WON there exist a "compelling" reason for merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in order to create the City of SorsogonHeld: This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which we are not competent to rule. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, this Court, made it clear that "the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." In the exercise of judicial power, we are allowed only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," and "may not annul an act of the political departments simply because we feel it is unwise or impractical.”

Issue (3) WON R.A. No. 8806 violatethe "one subject-one bill" rule enunciated in Section 26 (1), Article VI of the ConstitutionHeld: No. There is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon due to their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable consequence of the merger. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.

Issue (4) WON R.A No 8806 is unconstitutionalHeld: No. Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation

of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts. The theory is that every law, being the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord with the fundamental law. This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one. In other words the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt, for to doubt is to sustain. We hold that petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. No. 8806.

5. PELAEZ vs. AUDITOR GENERALIssue (1): Whether or not the President has the power to create municipalities. NO

Held: Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities under this section does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power. Such claim is untenable. When RA 2370 became effective, barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." This statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios.

The power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative nature — involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities — the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other courts, it is "strictly a legislative function" or "solely and exclusively the exercise of legislative power".

Issue (2): Whether or not the executive orders are valid. NO

Held: According to the SC, under RA 2370, barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names be changed except by act of congress or of the corresponding provincial board upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected and the recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated. The SC further said that the authority to create municipal corporation is legislative in nature.

WHEREFORE, the EOs in question are declared null and void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities above referred to.

6. TAN vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986

Issue:WON the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the Consititution, which states that — “Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected”? NO.

Held:Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, “the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected” must first be obtained. The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent province).

Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.

Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to wit:

“…when the Constitution speaks of “the unit or units affected” it means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger.”

The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners.”

SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity

7. TORRALBA vs. MUNICIPALITY OF SIBAGAT

Issue: Whether or not BP 56 is invalid. NO

Held: The absence of the Local Government Code at the time of its enactment did not curtail nor was it intended to cripple legislative competence to create municipal corporations. Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution does not proscribe nor prohibit the modification of territorial and political subdivisions before the enactment of the LGC. It contains no requirement that the LGC a condition sine qua non for the creation of a municipality, in much the same way that the creation of a new municipality does not preclude the enactment of a LGC. What the Constitutional provision means is that once said Code is enacted, the creation, modification or dissolution of local government units should conform with the criteria thus laid down. In the interregnum, before the enactment of such Code, the legislative power remains plenary except that the creation of the new local government unit should be approved by the people concerned in a plebiscite called for the purpose.

The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed to said requisite. A plebiscite was conducted and the people of the unit/units affected endorsed and approved the creation of the new local government

unit. The officials of the new Municipality have effectively taken their oaths of office and are performing their functions. A de jure entity has thus been created.

It is a long-recognized principle that the power to create a municipal corporation is essentially legislative in nature. In the absence of any constitutional limitations, a legislative body may create any corporation it deems essential for the more efficient administration of government. The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat was a valid exercise of legislative power then vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Interim Batasang Pambansa.

There are significant differences, however, in Tan vs Comelec and in this case: in the Tan case, the LGC already existed at the time that the challenged statute was enacted on 3 December 1985; not so in the case at bar. Secondly, BP 885 in the Tan case confined the plebiscite to the "proposed new province" to the exclusion of the voters in the remaining areas, in contravention of the Constitutional mandate and of the LGC that the plebiscite should be held "in the unit or units affected." In contrast, BP 56 specifically provides for a plebiscite "in the area or areas affected." Thirdly, in the Tan case, even the requisite area for the creation of a new province was not complied with in BP Blg. 885. No such issue in the creation of the new municipality has been raised here. And lastly, "indecent haste" attended the enactment of BP Blg. 885 and the holding of the plebiscite thereafter in the Tan case; on the other hand, BP 56 creating the Municipality of Sibagat, was enacted in the normal course of legislation, and the plebiscite was held within the period specified in that law.

8. SEMA vs. COMELECIssue: Whether or not RA 9054 is unconstitutional. Whether or not ARMM can create validly LGUs.

HELD: RA 9054 is unconstitutional. The creation of local government units is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and

subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

Thus, the creation of any of the four local government units province, city, municipality or barangay must comply with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government unit must follow the criteria fixed in the Local Government Code. Second, such creation must not conflict with any provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected.

There is neither an express prohibition nor an express grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create local government units. However, under its plenary legislative powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the power to create local government units, subject to reasonable standards and provided no conflict arises with any provision of the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Hence, ARMM cannot validly create Shariff Kabunsuan province.

Note that in order to create a city there must be at least a population of at least 250k, and that a province, once created, should have at least one representative in the HOR. Note further that in order to have a legislative district, there must at least be 250k (population) in said district. Cotabato City did not meet the population requirement so Sema’s contention is untenable. On the other hand, ARMM cannot validly create the province of S. Kabunsuan without first creating a legislative district. But this can never be legally possible because the creation of legislative districts is vested solely in Congress. At most, what ARMM can create are barangays not cities and provinces.

9. Municipality of Nueva Era vs Municipality of Marcos G.R. No. 169435ISSUE: whether or not the eastern boundary of Marcos extends over and covers a portion of Nueva Era.

HELD: No part of Nueva Era’s territory was taken for the creation of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753. Only the barrios (now barangays) of Dingras from which Marcos obtained its territory are named in R.A. No. 3753. Since only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos’ source of territory, Nueva Era’s territory is, therefore, excluded. Only Dingras is specifically named by law as source territory of Marcos.  Hence, the said description of boundaries of Marcos is descriptive only of the listed barangays of Dingras as a compact and contiguous territory. Considering that the description of the eastern boundary of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 is ambiguous, the same must be interpreted in light of the legislative intent.

10. LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES vsCOMELEC,supra (2008,2009,2010,2011 decisions)(see Karla Matrix)11. NAVARRO vs. EXEC. SEC. ERMITA, GR No. 180050, February 10, 2010Issue: Is R.A. No. 9355 constitutional?Ruling: No. The SC ruled that the population of 120,813 is below the Local Government Code (LGC) minimum population requirement of 250,000 inhabitants. Neither did Dinagat Islands, with an approximate land area of 802.12 square kilometers meet the LGC minimum land area requirement of 2,000 square kilometers. The Court reiterated its ruling that paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the   Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code,  which exempts proposed provinces composed of one or more islands from the land area requirement, was null and void as the said exemption is not found in Sec. 461 of the LGC. “There is no dispute that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and the rules and regulations implementing the said law, the basic law prevails, because the rules and regulations cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law,” held the Court. (GR No. 180050, Navarro v. Ermita, May 12, 2010)The Republic, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, and Dinagat filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the Decision. In its Resolution dated May 12, 2010, the Supreme Court denied the said motions.

NAVARRO vs. EXEC. SEC. ERMITA, GR No. 180050, April 12, 2011Yes. Republic Act No. 9355 is as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are declared VALID.

The SC also ruled that the provision in Article 9(2) of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 stating, “The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands,” is declared   VALID. According to the SC, “with respect to the creation of barangays, land area is not a requisite indicator of viability. However, with respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are provided for.”“But it must be pointed out that when the local government unit to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government unit to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively. This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.”xxx “There appears neither rhyme nor reason why this exemption should apply to cities and municipalities, but not to provinces.In fact, considering the physical configuration of the Philippine archipelago, there is a greater likelihood that islands or group of islands would form part of the land area of a newly-created province than in most cities or municipalities. It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but fellester.blogspot.com was inadvertently omitted in Section 461 (for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGC – and to reflect the true legislative intent. It would, then, be in order for the Court to uphold the validity of Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.”

11. SULTAN USMAN SARANGANI, SORAIDA M. SARANGANI and HADJI NOR HASSAN, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HADJI ABOLAIS R. OMAR, MANAN OSOP and ATTY. NASIB D. YASSIN,respondents. June 26, 2000Issue: whether or not the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in declaring Padian-Torogan as ghost precinct.Ruling: No.It must be noted that under the Omnibus Election Code, there should be at least one precinct per barangay.[13] In designating election precincts, the COMELEC usually refers to them by number. Nevertheless, the

determination of whether a certain election precinct actually exists or not and whether the voters registered in said precinct are real voters is a factual matter. On such issue, it is a time-honored precept that factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own assessments and duly supported by evidence, are conclusive upon this Court, more so, in the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same.[14] Upon review of the records, the Court finds that the COMELEC had exerted efforts to investigate the facts and verified that there were no public or private buildings in the said place, hence its conclusion that there were no inhabitants. If there were no inhabitants, a fortiori, there can be no registered voters, or the registered voters may have left the place.Issue: WON the barangay had been abolished-NOIt is not impossible for a certain barangay not to actually have inhabitants considering that people migrate. A barangay may officially exist on record and the fact that nobody resides in the place does not result in its automatic cessation as a unit of local government. Under the Local Government Code of 1991, the abolition of a local government unit (LGU) may be done by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political subdivision.[15] In the case of a barangay, except in Metropolitan Manila area and in cultural communities, it may be done by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panglungsod concerned subject to the mandatory requirement of a plebiscite[16]conducted for the purpose in the political units affected.The findings of the administrative agency cannot be reversed on appeal or certiorari particularly when no significant facts and circumstances are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have substantially affected the outcome of the case.The assailed order having been issued pursuant to COMELECs administrative powers and in the absence of any finding of grave abuse of discretion in declaring a precinct as non-existent, said order shall stand. Judicial interference is unnecessary and uncalled for. The sacred right of suffrage guaranteed by the Constitution[19] is not tampered when a list of fictitious voters is excluded from an electoral exercise.12. Salva v. Makalintal G.R. No. 132603. September 18, 2000ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to rule on the validity of Resolution 2987

RULING: YES. COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the COMELECs quasi-judicial functions but merely

as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not be deemed as a final order reviewable by certiorari by this Court. Any question pertaining to the validity of said resolution may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.

In Garces vs. Court of Appeals (259 SCRA 99 [1996]) and Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer (135 SCRA 25 [1985]), we found occasion to interpret the foregoing provision in this wise:xxx. What is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.

After the COMELEC ascertained the issuance of the ordinance and resolution declaring the abolition of barangay San Rafael, it issued COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 calling for a plebiscite to be held in the affected barangays, pursuant to the provisions of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7160.  The issuance of [COMELEC] Resolution No. 2987 is thus a ministerial duty of the COMELEC that is enjoined by law and is part and parcel of its administrative functions. It involves no exercise of discretionary authority on the part of respondent COMELEC; let alone an exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power to hear and resolve controversies defining the rights and duties of party-litigants, relative to the conduct of elections of public officers and the enforcement of the election laws.

Disposition: The Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI is ordered to proceed with dispatch in resolving Civil Case No. 3442. The execution of the result of the plebiscite held on February 28, 1998 shall be deferred depending on the outcome of Civil Case No. 3442.

13. LOPEZ V COMELECISSUE: WON PD 824 was validRULING: YES. IT WAS VALID1. In Presidential Decree No 824 reference was made to "the referendum held on February 27, 1975 [wherein] the residents of the Greater Manila Area authorized the President to restructure the local governments of the four cities and 13 municipalities thereof into an integrated unit of the

manager or commission form of government," with the terms and conditions being left to the discretion of the President.2. Nor is there any question as to the Presidential authority to issue Presidential Decree No. 824 creating Metropolitan Manila in 1975. There was at the time no interim Batasang Pambansa. It was the President who was then entrusted with such responsibility. So it was held in Aquino, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 21 decided in January of 1975. The ponencia of Justice Makasiar dispelled "all doubts as to the legality of such law-making authority by the President during the period of Martial Law, * * *." 22 As the opinion went on to state: "The entire paragraph of Section 3(2) is not a grant of authority to legislate, but a recognition of such power as already existing in favor of the incumbent President during the period of Martial Law3. Reference was made earlier to Article VIII, Section 2 of the Constitution where there is express recognition of the juridical entity known as Metropolitan Manila.

14. MMDA vs. BEL-AIRIn Metro Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc.,14 we categorically stated that Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are administrative in nature. We restate here the doctrine in the said decision as it applies to the case at bar: police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same.

Having been lodged primarily in the National Legislature, it cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the president and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units (LGUs). Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body.

[T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration.

There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself.