case doctrines in remedial

7/25/2019 Case Doctrines in Remedial

1/36

2011 CASE DOCTRINES IN REMEDIAL LAW

Prepared by Glenn Rey Anino

Palaganas vs. Palaganas, 640 SCRA 538 , January 26, 2011

Civil Law; Probate Proceedings; Wills and Succession; Our laws do not prohibit the probate ofwills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and

allowed in the countries of their execution.But our laws do not prohibit the probate of willsexecuted by foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowedin the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction.Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in thePhilippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place wherehe resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country.

Same; Same; Same; The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already beenallowed and probated in the country of its execution.Our rules require merely that the petitionfor the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictionalfacts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testatoror decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name ofthe person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court,the name of the person having custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death ofthe decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court issitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province. Therules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in thecountry of its execution.

Bermudo vs. Tayag-Roxas, 641 SCRA 423 , February 02, 2011

Special Proceedings; Settlement of Estates; The rationale behind this multi-appeal mode is toenable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct issue is

resolved by the court and held to be final.Atty. Bermudo points out that Roxas remedy forcontesting the RTC order of execution against her should be an ordinary appeal to the CA. Heinvokes Section 1, Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court which enumerates the orders orjudgments in special proceedings from which parties may appeal. One of these is an order orjudgment which settles the account of an executor or administrator. The rationale behind thismulti-appeal mode is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate anddistinct issue is resolved by the court and held to be final. But the earlier award in Atty.Bermudos favor did not settle his account as administrator. Rather, it fixed his attorneys feesfor the legal services he rendered in the suit contesting Roxas right as sole heir. Consequently,Section 1 (d) of Rule 109 does not apply.

Do-All Metals Industries, Inc. vs. Security Bank Corp., 639 SCRA 39 , January 10, 2011Actions; Docket Fees; Plaintiffs failure to pay the additional filing fees due on additional claims does not divest the court of jurisdiction it already had over the case.On the issue ofjurisdiction, respondent Bank argues that plaintiffs failure to pay the filing fees on theirsupplemental complaint is fatal to their action. But what the plaintiffs failed to pay was merelythe filing fees for their Supplemental Complaint. The RTC acquired jurisdiction over plaintiffsaction from the moment they filed their original complaint accompanied by the payment of thefiling fees due on the same. The plaintiffs non-payment of the additional filing fees due ontheir additional claims did not divest the RTC of the jurisdiction it already had over the case.


2/36

Same; Ex Parte Hearings; Evidence; Witnesses; An ex parte hearing which had been properlyauthorized cannot be assailed as less credible.The Bank belittles the testimonies of thepetitioners witnesses for having been presented ex parte before the clerk of court. But the exparte hearing, having been properly authorized, cannot be assailed as less credible. It was theBanks fault that it was unable to attend the hearing. It cannot profit from its lack of diligence.

Lease; Damages; Even if the lease has already lapsed, the lessor has no business harassingand intimidating the lessee and its employees.While the lease may have already lapsed, theBank had no business harassing and intimidating the Lims and their employees. The RTC wastherefore correct in adjudging moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys feesagainst the Bank for the acts of their representatives and building guards.

Actions; Supplemental Complaint; Docket Fees; A supplemental complaint is like anycomplaint and the rule is that the filing fees due on a complaint need to be paid upon itsfilingthe rules do not require the court to make special assessments in cases of supplemental complaints.As to the damages that plaintiffs claim under their supplementalcomplaint, their stand is that the RTC committed no error in admitting the complaint even ifthey had not paid the filing fees due on it since such fees constituted a lien anyway on thejudgment award. But this after-judgment lien, which implies that payment depends on asuccessful execution of the judgment, applies to cases where the filing fees were incorrectlyassessed or paid or where the court has discretion to fix the amount of the award. None ofthese circumstances obtain in this case. Here, the supplemental complaint specified from thebeginning the actual damages that the plaintiffs sought against the Bank. Still plaintiffs paidno filing fees on the same. And, while petitioners claim that they were willing to pay theadditional fees, they gave no reason for their omission nor offered to pay the same. Theymerely said that they did not yet pay the fees because the RTC had not assessed them for it.But a supplemental complaint is like any complaint and the rule is that the filing fees due on acomplaint need to be paid upon its filing. The rules do not require the court to make specialassessments in cases of supplemental complaints. To aggravate plaintiffs omission, although

the Bank brought up the question of their failure to pay additional filing fees in its motion forreconsideration, plaintiffs made no effort to make at least a late payment before the casecould be submitted for decision, assuming of course that the prescription of their action hadnot then set it in. Clearly, plaintiffs have no excuse for their continuous failure to pay the feesthey owed the court. Consequently, the trial court should have treated their SupplementalComplaint as not filed.

Same; Same; Same; It is not for a party to a case, or even for the trial court, to waive thepayment of the additional filing fees due on the supplemental complaintonly the SupremeCourt can grant exemptions to the payment of the fees due the courts and these exemptionsare embodied in its rules.Plaintiffs of course point out that the Bank itself raised the issue ofnon-payment of additional filing fees only after the RTC had rendered its decision in the case.

The implication is that the Bank should be deemed to have waived its objection to suchomission. But it is not for a party to the case or even for the trial court to waive the payment ofthe additional filing fees due on the supplemental complaint. Only the Supreme Court cangrant exemptions to the payment of the fees due the courts and these exemptions areembodied in its rules.


3/36

Lu vs. Lu Ym, Sr., 643 SCRA 23 , February 15, 2011

Remedial Law; Certiorari; Proper mode to challenge an interlocutory order is through a specialcivil action for certiorari under Rule 65; The Urgent Motion cannot be a substitute for theremedy of a special civil action for certiorari.While it is true that the Lu Ym father and sonsquestioned the admission of the aforesaid amended complaint before this Court, the same

was done only through an Urgent Motion. Under the Rules of Court, the proper mode tochallenge such an order, which undoubtedly is interlocutory, is through a special civil actionfor certiorari under Rule 65. This procedural defect, therefore, bars the Court from ruling on thepropriety of such admission. We cannot take cognizance of proceedings before the RTCunless they are brought before us through the proper mode of review. To be sure, the UrgentMotion cannot be a substitute for the remedy of a special civil action for certiorari.Consequently, the amended complaint admitted by the RTC stands.

Same; Actions; Moot and Academic; Courts do not entertain a moot question; An issuebecomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that adeclaration on the issue would be of no practical use or value.It is settled that courts do notentertain a moot question. An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present ajusticiable controversy, so that a declaration on the issue would be of no practical use or value.This Court, therefore, abstains from expressing its opinion in a case where no legal relief isneeded or called for.

Same; Same; Same; Exceptions where courts will still decide moot and academic cases.It istrue that we have held in a number of cases that the moot and academic principle is not amagical formula that can automatically dissuade the courts from resolving a case. Courts willstill decide cases otherwise, moot and academic if: first, there is a grave violation of theConstitution; second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount publicinterest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires formulation ofcontrolling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and, fourth, the case is

capable of repetition yet evading review. However, not one of the enumerated exceptionsobtains in the instant case. Thus, a denial of the instant petition is warranted.

Same; Injunctions; Petition should be denied for the sole reason that the act sought to beenjoined is already fait accompli.The RTC decision on the merits of the case gives this Courtmore reasons to declare the mootness of the instant petition. It must be recalled that themotion to lift the receivership was filed before the RTC ancillary to the principal action, andwhat was sought to be enjoined was the hearing on that particular motion. With the decisionon the merits rendered by the RTC, albeit still on appeal, there is nothing more to be enjoined.More importantly, the RTC ordered that the receivers cease from performing their functionsand that a management committee be created. Clearly, these supervening events mooted thepetition. Time and again, we have declared that a petition should be denied for the sole reason

that the act sought to be enjoined is already fait accompli.

Same; Same; Every court should remember that an injunction is a limitation upon the freedomof action of the defendant and should not be granted lightly or precipitately; It should begranted only when the court is fully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergencydemands it.In the instant case, John and LLDC failed to satisfy the above requisites. Exceptfor their claim of nullity of the RTC decision because of insufficient payment of docket fees, noevidence was offered to establish the existence of a clear and unmistakable right on their partthat must be protected, as well as the serious damage or irreparable loss that they would


4/36

suffer if the writ is not granted. It has been consistently held that there is no power, theexercise of which is more delicate, which requires greater caution, deliberation and sounddiscretion, or more dangerous in a doubtful case than the issuance of an injunction. It is thestrong arm of equity that should never be extended unless to cases of great injury, wherecourts of law cannot afford an adequate or commensurate remedy in damages. Every courtshould remember that an injunction is a limitation upon the freedom of action of the defendant

and should not be granted lightly or precipitately. It should be granted only when the court isfully satisfied that the law permits it and the emergency demands it.

Same; Docket Fees; Court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of theprescribed fees.A court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of theprescribed fees. The importance of filing fees cannot be gainsaid for these are intended totake care of court expenses in the handling of cases in terms of costs of supplies, use ofequipment, salaries and fringe benefits of personnel, and others, computed as to man-hoursused in the handling of each case. Hence, the non-payment or insufficient payment of docketfees can entail tremendous losses to the government in general and to the judiciary inparticular.

Same; Same; The test in determining whether the subject matter of an action is incapable ofpecuniary estimation by ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought.TheCourt had, in the past, laid down the test in determining whether the subject matter of anaction is incapable of pecuniary estimation by ascertaining the nature of the principal action orremedy sought. If the action is primarily for recovery of a sum of money, the claim isconsidered capable of pecuniary estimation. However, where the basic issue is somethingother than the right to recover a sum of money, the money claim being only incidental to ormerely a consequence of, the principal relief sought, the action is incapable of pecuniaryestimation.

Same; Estoppel; If a party invokes the jurisdiction of a court, he cannot thereafter challenge

the courts jurisdiction in the same case; To rule otherwise would amount to speculating on thefortune of litigation which is against the policy of the Court.Well-established is the rule thatafter vigorously participating in all stages of the case before the trial court and even invokingthe trial courts authority in order to ask for affirmative relief, John and LLDC are barred byestoppel from challenging the trial courts jurisdiction. If a party invokes the jurisdiction of acourt, he cannot thereafter challenge the courts jurisdiction in the same case. To ruleotherwise would amount to speculating on the fortune of litigation, which is against the policyof the Court. Thus, even if, indeed, the docket fees paid were inadequate, this allegation havingbeen raised for the first time on appeal, should be disallowed.

Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, 643

SCRA 90, February 15, 2011

Courts; Separation of Powers; Mandamus; The issuance of subsequent resolutions by theCourt setting time frames be set for the executive agencies to perform their assigned tasks

pursuant to earlier decision of the Court is simply an exercise of judicial power under Art. VIIIof the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but an integral part of theadjudicative function of the Court, not an encroachment by the Court over executive powers


5/36

and functions.The case is now in the execution phase of the final and executory December18, 2008 Decision. The Manila Bay Advisory Committee was created to receive and evaluatethe quarterly progressive reports on the activities undertaken by the agencies in accordancewith said decision and to monitor the execution phase. In the absence of specific completionperiods, the Committee recommended that time frames be set for the agencies to performtheir assigned tasks. This may be viewed as an encroachment over the powers and functions

of the Executive Branch headed by the President of the Philippines. This view is misplaced.The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of judicial powerunder Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the Decision is but an integral partof the adjudicative function of the Court. None of the agencies ever questioned the power ofthe Court to implement the December 18, 2008 Decision nor has any of them raised the allegedencroachment by the Court over executive functions. While additional activities are required ofthe agencies like submission of plans of action, data or status reports, these directives are butpart and parcel of the execution stage of a final decision under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.

Same; Same; Same; With the final and executory judgment in Metropolitan ManilaDevelopment Authority (MMDA), the writ of continuing mandamus issued in MMDA meansthat until petitioner-agencies have shown full compliance with the Courts orders, the Courtexercises continuing jurisdiction over them until full execution of the judgment.Thesubmission of periodic reports is sanctioned by Secs. 7 and 8, Rule 8 of the Rules ofProcedure for Environmental cases: Sec. 7. Judgment.If warranted, the court shall grant theprivilege of the writ of continuing mandamus requiring respondent to perform an act or seriesof acts until the judgment is fully satisfied and to grant such other reliefs as may be warrantedresulting from the wrongful or illegal acts of the respondent. The court shall require therespondent to submit periodic reports detailing the progress and execution of the judgment,and the court may, by itself or through a commissioner or the appropriate government agency,evaluate and monitor compliance. The petitioner may submit its comments or observations onthe execution of the judgment. Sec. 8. Return of the writ.The periodic reports submitted bythe respondent detailing compliance with the judgment shall be contained in partial returns of

the writ. Upon full satisfaction of the judgment, a final return of the writ shall be made to thecourt by the respondent. If the court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, thesatisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket. (Emphasis supplied.) With thefinal and executory judgment in MMDA, the writ of continuing mandamus issued in MMDAmeans that until petitioner-agencies have shown full compliance with the Courts orders, theCourt exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until full execution of the judgment[Metropolitan Manila Development Authority vs. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, 643SCRA 90(2011)]

University of Mindanao, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 643 SCRA 562 , February 21, 2011

Remedial Law; Certiorari; Interlocutory Orders; Denial of a motion to dismiss or to quash, being

interlocutory, cannot be questioned by certiorari; An interlocutory order may be assailed bycertiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, Court however generally frowns upon thisremedial measure as regards interlocutory orders.The denial of a motion to dismiss or toquash, being interlocutory, cannot be questioned by certiorari. It cannot be the subject ofappeal, until a final judgment or order is rendered. An interlocutory order may be assailed bycertiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess ofjurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court generally frowns upon thisremedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing


6/36

interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari will not only delay theadministration of justice, but will also unduly burden the courts.

Same; Same; Same; Grave Abuse of Discretion; By grave abuse of discretion is meantcapricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; Mereabuse of discretion is not enough.By grave abuse of discretion is meant capricious and

whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse ofdiscretion is not enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercisedin an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be sopatent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal toperform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

Same; Appeals; Findings of the Court of Appeals (CA) that the Philippine Deposit InsuranceCompany (PDIC) substantially complied with the requirements for an appeal must berespected; with the exception of Section 1(b), the grounds for the dismissal of an appeal aredirectory and not mandatory, and it is not the ministerial duty of the court to dismiss theappeal.The findings of the CA that the PDIC substantially complied with the requirements foran appeal must be respected. There can be no grave abuse of discretion attributed to it moreso since the grounds for dismissing an appeal under Section 1 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Courtare discretionary upon the CA. This can be gleaned from the very language of the Rules whichuses the word may instead of shall. In De Leon v. Court of Appeals, 383 SCRA 216 (2002), weheld that Section 1, Rule 50, which provides specific grounds for dismissal of appeal,manifestly confers a power and does not impose a duty. Moreover, it is directory, notmandatory. With the exception of Section 1(b), the grounds for the dismissal of an appeal aredirectory and not mandatory, and it is not the ministerial duty of the court to dismiss theappeal. Based on the RTCs findings as well as its own independent assessment of the PDICsappeal, it was discretionary on the CA whether or not to dismiss the appeal. In ruling to acceptthe PDICs appeal, such action does not constitute capricious and whimsical exercise ofjudgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Same; Same; Time and again, the Court has ruled that dismissal of appeals on purely technicalgrounds is not encouraged.In sum, this Court finds that the CA did not act with grave abuseof discretion when it denied petitioners motion to dismiss. In the absence of abuse ofdiscretion, interlocutory orders such as a motion to dismiss are not the proper subject of apetition for certiorari. Time and again, this Court has ruled that dismissal of appeals on purelytechnical grounds is not encouraged. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a veryrigid and technical sense, for they have been adopted to help secure, not override, substantialjustice. Judicial action must be guided by the principle that a party-litigant should be given thefullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him tolose life, liberty, honor or property on technicalities. When a rigid application of the rules tendsto frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court is empowered to suspend their

operation.

Parel vs. Heirs of Simeon Prudencio, 644 SCRA 496 , March 02, 2011

Remedial Law; Judgments; Execution; Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a judgment setsat naught the role of courts in disposing justiciable controversies with finality.Unjustifieddelay in the enforcement of a judgment sets at naught the role of courts in disposingjusticiable controversies with finality. Once a judgment becomes final and executory, all theissues between the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest. All that remains is the


7/36

execution of the decision which is a matter of right.

Same; Same; Same; Instances Where a Writ of Execution may be Appealed.Banaga v.Majaducon, 494 SCRA 153 (2006), however, enumerates the instances where a writ ofexecution may be appealed: 1) the writ of execution varies the judgment; 2) there has been achange in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust; 3) execution is

sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution; 4) it appears that thecontroversy has never been subject to the judgment of the court; 5) the terms of the judgmentare not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof; or 6) it appears that thewrit of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or isissued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied,or the writ was issued without authority.

Same; Same; Same; The inherent power of the court carries with it the right to determine everyquestion of fact and law which may be involved in the execution.The Court ruled in Mejia v.Gabayan, 455 SCRA 499, 512 (2005): x x x The inherent power of the court carries with it theright to determine every question of fact and law which may be involved in the execution. Thecourt may stay or suspend the execution of its judgment if warranted by the higher interest ofjustice. It has the authority to cause a modification of the decision when it becomes imperativein the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it. The court is also vestedwith inherent power to stay the enforcement of its decision based on antecedent facts whichshow fraud in its rendition or want of jurisdiction of the trial court apparent on the record.(Emphasis supplied.)

Same; Same; Same; Exceptions that have been previously considered by the Court as meritinga relaxation of the rules in order to serve substantial justice.There are exceptions that havebeen previously considered by the Court as meriting a relaxation of the rules in order to servesubstantial justice. These are: (1) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (2) the existence ofspecial or compelling circumstances; (3) the merits of the case; (4) a cause not entirely

attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (5) alack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (6) the otherparty will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.

Air Ads, Incorporated vs. Tagum Agricultural Development Corporation TADECO , 646 SCRA

184 , March 23, 2011

Actions; Pleadings, Practice and Procedure; Forum Shopping; The plaintiff or petitioner is notprecluded from filing a similar action in order to rectify the defect in the certification againstforum shopping where the court states in its order that the action is dismissed due to suchdefect, unless the court directs that the dismissal is with prejudice, in which case the plaintiff

is barred from filing a similar action by res judicata.Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules ofCivil Procedure, defines the effect of the failure to comply with the requirements for thecertification against forum shopping, viz.: x x x The first sentence of the second paragraphexpressly provides that the dismissal of a petition due to failure to comply with therequirements therein is without prejudice unless otherwise provided by the court. Accordingly,the plaintiff or petitioner is not precluded from filing a similar action in order to rectify thedefect in the certification where the court states in its order that the action is dismissed due tosuch defect, unless the court directs that the dismissal is with prejudice, in which case theplaintiff is barred from filing a similar action by res judicata. In the context of the aforequoted


8/36


9/36

the Rules of Court.

Actions; Pleadings, Practice and Procedure; Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping; The settledrule is that the execution of the certification against forum shopping by the attorney-in-fact isnot a violation of the requirement that the parties must personally sign the samethe attorney-in-fact, who has authority to file, and who actually filed the complaint as the representative of

the plaintiff, is a party to the ejectment suit.It is true that the first paragraph of Section 5,Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, requires that the certification should be signed by the petitioneror principal party himself. The rationale behind this is because only the petitioner himself hasactual knowledge of whether or not he has initiated similar actions or proceedings in differentcourts or agencies. However, the rationale does not apply where, as in this case, it is theattorney-in-fact who instituted the action. Such circumstance constitutes reasonable cause toallow the attorney-in-fact to personally sign the Certificate of Non-Forum Shopping. Indeed, thesettled rule is that the execution of the certification against forum shopping by the attorney-in-fact is not a violation of the requirement that the parties must personally sign the same. Theattorney-in-fact, who has authority to file, and who actually filed the complaint as therepresentative of the plaintiff, is a party to the ejectment suit. In fact, Section 1, Rule 70 of theRules of Court includes the representative of the owner in an ejectment suit as one of theparties authorized to institute the proceedings. In the present case, there is no dispute thatOng is respondents attorney-in-fact. Hence, the Court finds that there has been substantialcompliance with the rules proscribing forum shopping.

Ejectment; Settled is the rule that the right of possession is a necessary incident of ownership.In any case, it can be inferred from the judgments of this Court in the twoaforementioned cases that respondent, as owner of the subject lots, is entitled to thepossession thereof. Settled is the rule that the right of possession is a necessary incident ofownership. Petitioners, on the other hand, are consequently barred from claiming that theyhave the right to possess the disputed parcels of land, because their alleged right is predicatedsolely on their claim of ownership, which is already effectively debunked by the decisions of

this Court affirming the validity of the deeds of sale transferring ownership of the subjectproperties to respondent.

Same; Unlawful Detainer; A person who occupies the land of another at the latters toleranceor permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promisethat he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the properremedy against him; The one-year period within which a complaint for unlawful detainer canbe filed should be counted from the date of demand, because only upon the lapse of that

period does the possession become unlawful.Respondent alleged in his complaint thatpetitioners occupied the subject property by his mere tolerance. While tolerance is lawful, suchpossession becomes illegal upon demand to vacate by the owner and the possessor bytolerance refuses to comply with such demand. Respondent sent petitioners a demand letter

dated December 1, 1999 to vacate the subject property, but petitioners did not comply with thedemand. A person who occupies the land of another at the latters tolerance or permission,without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he willvacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedyagainst him. Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the one-year period within which acomplaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should be counted from the date of demand,because only upon the lapse of that period does the possession become unlawful.Respondent filed the ejectment case against petitioners on March 29, 2000, which was lessthan a year from December 1, 1999, the date of formal demand. Hence, it is clear that the


10/36


11/36


12/36


13/36


14/36

imposed upon him by the Constitution necessarily impairs the operation of the Government.x x x Parenthetically, the petitions are bereft of any allegation that then President Arroyopermitted, condoned or performed any wrongdoing against the three missing persons.

Writs of Amparo; Command Responsibility; The evolution of the command responsibilitydoctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war and armed combats; Command

responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity, and thus a substantive rule that pointsto criminal or administrative liability.Rubrico v. Macapagal Arroyo, 613 SCRA 233 (2010),expounded on the concept of command responsibility as follows: The evolution of thecommand responsibility doctrine finds its context in the development of laws of war andarmed combats. According to Fr. Bernas, command responsibility, in its simplest terms,means the responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members ofthe armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domesticconflict. In this sense, command responsibility is properly a form of criminal complicity. TheHague Conventions of 1907 adopted the doctrine of command responsibility, foreshadowingthe present-day precept of holding a superior accountable for the atrocities committed by hissubordinates should he be remiss in his duty of control over them. As then formulated,command responsibility is an omission mode of individual criminal liability, whereby thesuperior is made responsible for crimes committed by his subordinates for failing to preventor punish the perpetrators (as opposed to crimes he ordered). (citations omitted; emphasis inthe original; underscoring supplied) It bears stressing that command responsibility is properlya form of criminal complicity, and thus a substantive rule that points to criminal oradministrative liability.

Same; Same; An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain the criminalliability of individuals or entities involved, and neither does it partake of a civil or administrativesuitrather, it is a remedial measure designed to direct specified courses of action togovernment agencies to safeguard the constitutional right to life, liberty and security of aggrieved individuals.An amparo proceeding is not criminal in nature nor does it ascertain

the criminal liability of individuals or entities involved. Neither does it partake of a civil oradministrative suit. Rather, it is a remedial measure designed to direct specified courses ofaction to government agencies to safeguard the constitutional right to life, liberty and securityof aggrieved individuals. Thus Razon Jr. v. Tagitis, 606 SCRA 598 (2009), enlightens: [Anamparo proceeding] does nor determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for thedisappearance [threats thereof or extrajudicial killings]; it determines responsibility, or at leastaccountability, for the enforced disappearancefor purposes of imposing the appropriateremedies to address the disappearance (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Responsibility and Accountability, Explained.Tagitisdefines what constitutes responsibility and accountability, viz.: x x x. Responsibility refersto the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in

whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of theremedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal andcivil cases against the responsible parties in the proper courts. Accountability, on the otherhand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who exhibitedinvolvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to thelevel of responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to theenforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but havefailed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforceddisappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our


15/36

primary goal of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved andhis liberty and security are restored. (emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

Same; Same; While the concept of command responsibility does not apply in amparo cases todetermine criminal liability, it may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify thoseaccountable individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an

amparo court would issuein such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position to protectthe rights of the aggrieved party.Rubrico categorically denies the application of commandresponsibility in amparo cases to determine criminal liability. The Court maintains itsadherence to this pronouncement as far as amparo cases are concerned. Rubrico, however,recognizes a preliminary yet limited application of command responsibility in amparo cases toinstances of determining the responsible or accountable individuals or entities that are duty-bound to abate any transgression on the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party. Ifcommand responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, atmost, be only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has theduty to address, the disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Courtto devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the premises to protect rightscovered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not bepursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as aprelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative issuances, ifthere be any. (emphasis and underscoring supplied) In other words, command responsibilitymay be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those accountable individuals thathave the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue. Insuch application, the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpointthe superiors it considers to be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.

Same; Same; Statutes; Republic Act No. 9851 (RA 9851); Republic Act No. 9851 is thesubstantive law that definitively imputes criminal liability to those superiors who, despite their

position, still fail to take all necessary and reasonable measures within their power to preventor repress the commission of illegal acts or to submit these matters to the competentauthorities for investigation and prosecution.The legislature came up with Republic Act No.9851 (RA 9851) to include command responsibility as a form of criminal complicity in crimesagainst international humanitarian law, genocide and other crimes. RA 9851 is thus thesubstantive law that definitively imputes criminal liability to those superiors who, despite theirposition, still fail to take all necessary and reasonable measures within their power to preventor repress the commission of illegal acts or to submit these matters to the competentauthorities for investigation and prosecution.

Same; Same; The appellate court erred when it did not specifically name the respondents thatit found to be responsible for the abduction and continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen and

Merino.The Court finds that the appellate court erred when it did not specifically name therespondents that it found to be responsible for the abduction and continued detention ofSherlyn, Karen and Merino. For, from the records, it appears that the responsible andaccountable individuals are Lt. Col. Anotado, Lt. Mirabelle, Gen. Palparan, Lt. Col. Boac, ArnelEnriquez and Donald Caigas. They should thus be made to comply with the September 17,2008 Decision of the appellate court to IMMEDIATELY RELEASE Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.The petitions against Generals Esperon, Razon and Tolentino should be dismissed for lack ofmerit as there is no showing that they were even remotely accountable and responsible for theabduction and continued detention of Sherlyn, Karen and Merino.


16/36


17/36

same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgentnecessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interestsof the Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d)where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) wherepetitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in acriminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial

court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of dueprocess; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte, or in which the petitioner had no opportunityto object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.

Same; Preliminary Injunction; The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in apending case rests on the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance thereof.It is wellto emphasize that the grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case restson the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance thereof. In the present case, however,where it is the Government which is being enjoined from implementing an issuance whichenjoys the presumption of validity, such discretion must be exercised with utmost caution.

Same; Same; Even if it is a temporary and ancillary remedy, its issuance should not be trifledwith, and an applicant must convincingly show its entitlement to the relief.Indeed, a writ ofpreliminary injunction is issued precisely to prevent threatened or continuous irremediableinjury to some of the parties before their claims can be thoroughly studied or adjudicatedtopreserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be heard fully. Still, even if it is atemporary and ancillary remedy, its issuance should not be trifled with, and an applicant mustconvincingly show its entitlement to the relief.

Same; Same; Association of Petrochemical Manufacturers of the Philippines (APMP) mustshow that it has a clear and unmistakable right that is violated and that there is an urgentnecessity for its issuance.It is thus ineluctable that for it to be entitled to the writ, the APMPmust show that it has a clear and unmistakable right that is violated and that there is an urgent

necessity for its issuance. That APMP had cause of action and the standing to interpose theaction for prohibition did not ipso facto call for the grant of injunctive relief in its favor withoutit proving its entitlement thereto.

Same; Same; Association of Petrochemical Manufacturers of the Philippines (APMP) wasseeking protection over future economic benefits which, at best, it had an inchoate right to;Tariff protection is not a right, but a privilege granted by the government and, therefore,Association of Petrochemical Manufacturers of the Philippines (APMP) cannot claim redressfor alleged violation thereof.Contrary to public respondents ruling, APMP failed to adduceany evidence to prove that it had a clear and unmistakable right which was or would beviolated by the enforcement of E.O. 486. The filing of the petition at the court a quo wasanchored on APMP and its members fear of loss or reduction of their income once E.O. 486 is

implemented and imported plastic and similar products flood the domestic market due toreduced tariff rates. As correctly posited by petitioner, APMP was seeking protection overfuture economic benefits which, at best, it had an inchoate right to. More importantly, tariffprotection is not a right, but a privilege granted by the government and, therefore, APMPcannot claim redress for alleged violation thereof.

Same; Same; Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule relative to the issuanceof injunction where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured withreasonable accuracy; What includes an irreparable injury.Respecting the element of


18/36


19/36

to ascertain or cut off the rights or interests of all possible claimants. The judgment therein isbinding only upon the parties who joined in the action.

Same; Same; Declaratory Relief; A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy forending controversies that have not reached the state where another relief is immediatelyavailable; and supplies the need for a form of action that will set controversies at rest before

they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.An action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach ofthe instruments involved or of the rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action fordeclaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of theparties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, orcompliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it maybe entertained before the breach or violation of the statute, deed or contract to which it refers.A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have notreached the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for aform of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations,an invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.

Same; Same; Same; The nature of the relief in an action for declaratory relief is that thejudgment in the case can be carried into effect without requiring the parties to pay damages orto perform any act.In the present case, petitioner filed a complaint for quieting of title after itwas served a notice to vacate but before it could be dispossessed of the subject properties.Notably, the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No. 43034, had earlier set aside the Order whichgranted partial partition in favor of Eleuteria Rivera and the Writ of Possession issued pursuantthereto. And although petitioners complaint is captioned as Quieting of Title and Damages, allthat petitioner prayed for, is for the court to uphold the validity of its titles as against that ofrespondents. This is consistent with the nature of the relief in an action for declaratory reliefwhere the judgment in the case can be carried into effect without requiring the parties to paydamages or to perform any act. Thus, while petitioner was not able to demonstrate that

respondents TCT No. C-314537 in the name of Eleuteria Rivera constitutes a cloud over itstitle, it has nevertheless successfully established its ownership over the subject properties andthe validity of its titles which entitles it to declaratory relief.

Lucas vs. Lucas, 650 SCRA 667, June 06, 2011

Actions; Pleadings, Practice and Procedure; An order denying a motion to dismiss is aninterlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of a case, as it leavessomething to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on the meritsas such,the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil

action for certiorari, which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not errorsof judgment.Primarily, we emphasize that the assailed Orders of the trial court were ordersdenying respondents motion to dismiss the petition for illegitimate filiation. An order denyinga motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which neither terminates nor finally disposes of acase, as it leaves something to be done by the court before the case is finally decided on themerits. As such, the general rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questionedin a special civil action for certiorari, which is a remedy designed to correct errors ofjurisdiction and not errors of judgment. Neither can a denial of a motion to dismiss be thesubject of an appeal unless and until a final judgment or order is rendered. In a number of


20/36

cases, the court has granted the extraordinary remedy of certiorari on the denial of the motionto dismiss but only when it has been tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lackor excess of jurisdiction. In the present case, we discern no grave abuse of discretion on thepart of the trial court in denying the motion to dismiss.

Same; Jurisdiction; A petition directed against the thing itself or the res, which concerns the

status of a person, like a petition for adoption, annulment of marriage, or correction of entriesin the birth certificate, is an action in rem.An action in personam is lodged against a personbased on personal liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of theperson; while an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its object is to subjectthat persons interest in a property to a corresponding lien or obligation. A petition directedagainst the thing itself or the res, which concerns the status of a person, like a petition foradoption, annulment of marriage, or correction of entries in the birth certificate, is an action inrem. In an action in personam, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is necessary forthe court to validly try and decide the case. In a proceeding in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdictionover the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court,provided that the latter has jurisdiction over the res. Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either(a) by the seizure of the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into actual custodyof the law, or (b) as a result of the institution of legal proceedings, in which the power of thecourt is recognized and made effective.

Same; Same; Filiation; Due Process; A petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action inremby the simple filing of the petition to establish illegitimate filiation before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), which undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition,the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case; If at all, service of summons or notice ismade to the defendant, it is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, butmerely for satisfying the due process requirements.The herein petition to establishillegitimate filiation is an action in rem. By the simple filing of the petition to establishillegitimate filiation before the RTC, which undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the subject matter

of the petition, the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case. An in rem proceeding isvalidated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that theproceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objectionof any sort to the right sought to be established. Through publication, all interested parties aredeemed notified of the petition. If at all, service of summons or notice is made to thedefendant, it is not for the purpose of vesting the court with jurisdiction, but merely forsatisfying the due process requirements. This is but proper in order to afford the personconcerned the opportunity to protect his interest if he so chooses. Hence, failure to servesummons will not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to try and decide the case. In such a case,the lack of summons may be excused where it is determined that the adverse party had, in fact,the opportunity to file his opposition, as in this case. We find that the due process requirementwith respect to respondent has been satisfied, considering that he has participated in the

proceedings in this case and he has the opportunity to file his opposition to the petition toestablish filiation.

Same; Same; Same; A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legalwarning to the other party and afforded the latter an opportunity to contest it.To addressrespondents contention that the petition should have been adversarial in form, we further holdthat the herein petition to establish filiation was sufficient in form. It was indeed adversarial innature despite its caption which lacked the name of a defendant, the failure to impleadrespondent as defendant, and the non-service of summons upon respondent. A proceeding is


21/36

adversarial where the party seeking relief has given legal warning to the other party andafforded the latter an opportunity to contest it. In this petitionclassified as an action inremthe notice requirement for an adversarial proceeding was likewise satisfied by thepublication of the petition and the giving of notice to the Solicitor General, as directed by thetrial court.

Same; Same; Pleadings, Practice and Procedure; Cause of Action; Elements; A fact is essentialif it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of actioninadequate.The petition to establish filiation is sufficient in substance. It satisfies Section 1,Rule 8 of the Rules of Court, which requires the complaint to contain a plain, concise, anddirect statement of the ultimate facts upon which the plaintiff bases his claim. A fact isessential if it cannot be stricken out without leaving the statement of the cause of actioninadequate. A complaint states a cause of action when it contains the following elements: (1)the legal right of plaintiff, (2) the correlative obligation of the defendant, and (3) the act oromission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.

Same; Same; Same; Paternity; Evidence; A party is confronted by the so-called procedural aspects in a paternity case during trial, when the parties have presented their respectiveevidencethey are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of the

proceedings; A prima facie case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations inthe initiatory pleading.The statement in Herrera v. Alba, 460 SCRA 197 (2005), that there arefour significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to facehas been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented their respectiveevidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of theproceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CAs observationthat petitioner failed to establish a prima facie casethe first procedural aspect in a paternitycaseis therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a partys evidence and not by mereallegations in the initiatory pleading. Clearly then, it was also not the opportune time to discuss

the lack of a prima facie case vis--vis the motion for DNA testing since no evidence has, asyet, been presented by petitioner. More essentially, it is premature to discuss whether, underthe circumstances, a DNA testing order is warranted considering that no such order has yetbeen issued by the trial court. In fact, the latter has just set the said case for hearing.

Same; Same; Same; Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Testing; Paternity; Searches and Seizures;In some foreign states, a court order for blood testing is considered a search, which, undertheir Constitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to bevalid, hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed incivil actions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause; The same condition precedentshould be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassmentsuitsthus, during the hearing on the motion for Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) testing, the

petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility ofpaternity.In some states, to warrant the issuance of the DNA testing order, there must be ashow cause hearing wherein the applicant must first present sufficient evidence to establish aprima facie case or a reasonable possibility of paternity or good cause for the holding of thetest. In these states, a court order for blood testing is considered a search, which, under theirConstitutions (as in ours), must be preceded by a finding of probable cause in order to be valid.Hence, the requirement of a prima facie case, or reasonable possibility, was imposed in civilactions as a counterpart of a finding of probable cause. The Supreme Court of Louisianaeloquently explainedAlthough a paternity action is civil, not criminal, the constitutional


22/36

prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a propershowing of sufficient justification under the particular factual circumstances of the case mustbe made before a court may order a compulsory blood test. Courts in various jurisdictionshave differed regarding the kind of procedures which are required, but those jurisdictions havealmost universally found that a preliminary showing must be made before a court canconstitutionally order compulsory blood testing in paternity cases. We agree, and find that, as

a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for compulsory blood testing, themoving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity. As explainedhereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses tovoluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court candetermine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrantsissuance of a court order for blood testing. The same condition precedent should be applied inour jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during thehearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence orestablish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

Del Rosario vs. Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc., 651 SCRA 414, June 08, 2011

Actions; Admissions; Judicial Admissions; Words and Phrases; A judicial admission is one somade in pleadings filed or in the progress of a trial as to dispense with the introduction ofevidence otherwise necessary to dispense with some rules of practice necessary to beobserved and complied with.A judicial admission is one so made in pleadings filed or in theprogress of a trial as to dispense with the introduction of evidence otherwise necessary todispense with some rules of practice necessary to be observed and complied with.Correspondingly, facts alleged in the complaint are deemed admissions of the plaintiff andbinding upon him. The allegations, statements or admissions contained in a pleading areconclusive as against the pleader.

Same; Ejectment; Words and Phrases; Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer,

Distinguished.This Court, in Sumulong v. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 372 (1994),differentiated the distinct causes of action in forcible entry vis--vis unlawful detainer, to wit:Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct causes of action defined in Section 1,Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of anyland or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth. In unlawful detainer,one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or termination of his right tohold possession under any contract, express or implied. In forcible entry, the possession isillegal from the beginning and the only issue is who has the prior possession de facto. Inunlawful detainer, possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the expiration ortermination of the right to possess and the issue of rightful possession is the one decisive, forin such action, the defendant is the party in actual possession and the plaintiff's cause ofaction is the termination of the defendant's right to continue in possession.

Same; Same; Same; Forcible Entry; The words by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealthshall include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully enter uponreal property and exclude another, who has had prior possession, therefrom.The words byforce, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth shall include every situation or condition underwhich one person can wrongfully enter upon real property and exclude another, who has hadprior possession, therefrom. The foundation of the action is really the forcible exclusion ofthe original possessor by a person who has entered without right. The act of going on theproperty and excluding the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily implies the exertion of


23/36

force over the property, and this is all that is necessary. The employment of force, in this case,can be deduced from petitioners allegation that respondent took full control and possessionof the subject property without their consent and authority.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Stealth and Strategy, Explained.Stealth, on the other hand, isdefined as any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid discovery and to gain entrance into or

remain within residence of another without permission, while strategy connotes theemployment of machinations or artifices to gain possession of the subject property. The CAfound that based on the petitioners allegations in their complaint, respondents entry on theland of the petitioners was by stealth x x x. However, stealth as defined requires a clandestinecharacter which is not availing in the instant case as the entry of the respondent into theproperty appears to be with the knowledge of the petitioners as shown by petitionersallegation in their complaint that [c]onsidering the personalities behind the defendantfoundation and considering further that it is plaintiffs nephew, then the vice-mayor, and nowthe Mayor of the City of Roxas Antonio A. del Rosario, although without any legal orcontractual right, who transacted with the foundation, plaintiffs did not interfere with theactivities of the foundation using their property. To this Courts mind, this allegation if true,also illustrates strategy.

Same; Same; Forcible Entry; Where the plaintiffs maintained that the defendant tookpossession and control of the subject property without any contractual or legal basis, thefoundation of their complaint is one for forcible entry. In forcible entry, one is deprived ofphysical possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat, strategy, orstealth. [W]here the defendants possession of the property is illegal ab initio, the summaryaction for forcible entry (detentacion) is the remedy to recover possession. In their Complaint,petitioners maintained that the respondent took possession and control of the subject propertywithout any contractual or legal basis. Assuming that these allegations are true, it hencefollows that respondents possession was illegal from the very beginning. Therefore, thefoundation of petitioners complaint is one for forcible entrythat is the forcible exclusion of

the original possessor by a person who has entered without right. Thus, and as correctlyfound by the CA, there can be no tolerance as petitioners alleged that respondents possessionwas illegal at the inception. Corollarily, since the deprivation of physical possession, as allegedin petitioners Complaint and as earlier discussed, was attended by strategy and force, thisCourt finds that the proper remedy for the petitioners was to file a Complaint for Forcible Entryand not the instant suit for unlawful detainer.

Same; Same; Same; Prescription; Where the action for forcible entry was filed beyond one yearfrom dispossession, the Complaint failed to state a valid cause of action.Petitioners likewisealleged in their Complaint that respondent took possession and occupancy of subject propertyin 1991. Considering that the action for forcible entry must be filed within one year from thetime of dispossession, the action for forcible entry has already prescribed when petitioners

filed their Complaint in 2003. As a consequence, the Complaint failed to state a valid cause ofaction against the respondent.

Home Guaranty Corporation vs. R-II Builders, Inc., 652 SCRA 649, June 22, 2011

Remedial Law; Actions; Jurisdiction; In Atwel v. Concepcion Progressive Association, Inc., 551SCRA 272 (2008), and Reyes v. Hon. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 142, 561 SCRA593 (2008), which involve SCCs trying and/or deciding cases which were found to be civil innature, this Court significantly ordered the dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction


24/36

instead of simply directing the re-raffle of the case to another branch.The record shows that,with the raffle of R-II Builders complaint before Branch 24 of the Manila RTC and said courtsgrant of the application for temporary restraining order incorporated therein, HGC sought apreliminary hearing of its affirmative defenses which included, among other grounds, lack ofjurisdiction and improper venue. It appears that, at said preliminary hearing, it was establishedthat R-II Builders complaint did not involve an intra-corporate dispute and that, even if it is,

venue was improperly laid since none of the parties maintained its principal office in Manila.While it is true, therefore, that R-II Builders had no hand in the raffling of the case, it cannot begainsaid that Branch 24 of the RTC Manila had no jurisdiction over the case. Rather thanordering the dismissal of the complaint, however, said court issued the 2 January 2008 ordererroneously ordering the re-raffle of the case. In Atwel v. Concepcion Progressive Association,Inc., 551 SCRA 272 (2008), and Reyes v. Hon. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 142, 561SCRA 593 (2008), which involved SCCs trying and/or deciding cases which were found to becivil in nature, this Court significantly ordered the dismissal of the complaint for lack ofjurisdiction instead of simply directing the re-raffle of the case to another branch.

Same; Same; Same; While it is, consequently, true that jurisdiction, once required, cannot beeasily ousted, it is equally settled that a court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the

payment of the prescribed filing and docket fees.Even then, the question of the Manila RTCsjurisdiction over the case is tied up with R-II Builders payment of the correct docket feeswhich should be paid in full upon the filing of the pleading or other application which initiatesan action or proceeding. While it is, consequently, true that jurisdiction, once acquired, cannotbe easily ousted, it is equally settled that a court acquires jurisdiction over a case only uponthe payment of the prescribed filing and docket fees. Already implicit from the filing of thecomplaint in the City of Manila where the realties comprising the Asset Pool are located, thefact that the case is a real action is evident from the allegations of R-II Builders originalComplaint, Amended and Supplemental Complaint and Second Amended Complaint which notonly sought the nullification of the DAC in favor of HGC but, more importantly, prayed for thetransfer of possession of and/or control of the properties in the Asset Pool. Its current

protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, no less than R-II Builders in its opposition toHGCs motion to dismissadmitted that the case is a real action as it affects title to orpossession of real property or an interest therein. Having only paid docket fees correspondingto an action where the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation, R-II Builders cannotexpediently claim that jurisdiction over the case had already attached.

Same; Same; Same; A case for rescission or annulment of contract is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation although it may eventually result in the recovery of real property; Indetermining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniaryestimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principalaction or remedy sought; Determination must be done on a case-to-case basis, depending onthe facts and circumstances of each.In De Leon v. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 94 (1998),

this Court had, of course, ruled that a case for rescission or annulment of contract is notsusceptible of pecuniary estimation although it may eventually result in the recovery of realproperty. Taking into consideration the allegations and the nature of the relief sought in thecomplaint in the subsequent case of Serrano v. Delica, 465 SCRA 82 (2005), however, thisCourt determined the existence of a real action and ordered the payment of the appropriatedocket fees for a complaint for cancellation of sale which prayed for both permanent andpreliminary injunction aimed at the restoration of possession of the land in litigation is a realaction. In discounting the apparent conflict in said rulings, the Court went on to rule as followsin Ruby Shelter Builders and Realty Development Corporation v. Hon. Pablo C, Formaran, 578


25/36

SCRA 283 (2009), to wit: The Court x x x does not perceive a contradiction between Serranoand the Spouses De Leon. The Court calls attention to the following statement in Spouses DeLeon: A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether anaction is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this Court hasadopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or remedy sought.Necessarily, the determination must be done on a case-to-case basis, depending on the facts

and circumstances of each. What petitioner conveniently ignores is that in Spouses De Leon,the action therein that private respondents instituted before the RTC was solely for annulmentor rescission of the contract of sale over a real property. There appeared to be no transfer oftitle or possession to the adverse party x x x. (Underscoring Supplied)

Same; Same; Same; Jurisdiction over any case is acquired only upon the payment of theprescribed docket fee which is both mandatory and jurisdictional.In obvious evasion of saiddirective to pay the correct docket fees, however, R-II Builders withdrew its Amended andSupplemental Complaint and, in lieu thereof, filed its Second Amended Complaint which, whiledeleting its causes of action for accounting and conveyance of title to and/or possession ofthe entire Asset Pool, nevertheless prayed for its appointment as Receiver of the propertiescomprising the same. In the landmark case of Manchester Development Corporation v. Courtof Appeals, 149 SCRA 562 (1987), this Court ruled that jurisdiction over any case is acquiredonly upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee which is both mandatory and jurisdictional.Although it is true that the Manchester Rule does not apply despite insufficient filing feeswhen there is no intent to defraud the government, R-II Builders evident bad faith shouldclearly foreclose the relaxation of said rule.

Republic vs. Peralta, 653 SCRA 629, July 06, 2011

Lease; Ejectment; Contractual stipulations empowering the lessor to repossess the leasedproperty extrajudicially from a lessee whose lease has expired are valid.Petitioner arguesthat a judicial action is not necessary to evict respondents and intervenors from the leased

military quarters because their contracts of lease have long expired. Petitioner adds that thecontracts of lease specifically authorized petitioner to extrajudicially take over the possessionof the leased military quarters after the expiration of their contracts. Contractual stipulationsempowering the lessor to repossess the leased property extrajudicially from a lessee whoselease has expired have been held to be valid. Being the law between the parties, they must berespected.

Same; Same; Military Personnel; Bonifacio Naval Station, a military facility or reservation thatis subject to special military regulations commensurate to the requirements of safety and

protection of military equipment and personnel, is outside the commerce of man and the leaseof quarters to military personnel in the service is merely incidental to their militaryservice.Respondents and intervenors, who are no longer in the military service, are

occupying quarters in the Bonifacio Naval Station, a military facility or reservation that issubject to special military regulations commensurate to the requirements of safety andprotection of military equipment and personnel. The naval facility is outside the commerce ofman and the lease of quarters to military personnel in the service is merely incidental to theirmilitary service. Such lease is not an ordinary lease of a residential or commercial building.Upon retirement of the military personnel, their quarters have to be occupied by the militarypersonnel in the active service who replace them.

Same; Same; There is considerable authority in American law upholding the validity of


26/36


27/36

otherwise disobeys or resists a lawful process or order of the court may be punished forcontempt, viz.: SEC. 16. Contempt.The court, justice or judge may order the respondentwho refuses to make a return, or who makes a false return, or any person who otherwisedisobeys or resists a lawful process or order of the court to be punished for contempt. Thecontemnor may be imprisoned or imposed a fine. Acting on the CHRs recommendation andbased on the above considerations, we resolve to require General Roa of TJAG, AFP, and the

Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, JI, AFP, at the time of our June 22, 2010 Resolution, andthen incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP, to show cause and explain, within a non-extendible periodof fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Resolution, why they should not be held in contempt ofthis Court for defying our June 22, 2010 Resolution.

Same; Habeas Corpus; In light of the new evidence obtained by the Commission on HumanRights (CHR) that positively identified Lt. Baliaga as one of the direct perpetrators in theabduction of Jonas and in the interest of justice, the Court resolved to set aside the Court ofAppeals (CAs) dismissal of the habeas corpus petition and issue anew the writ of habeascorpus returnable to the Presiding Justice of the CA who shall immediately refer the writ to thesame CA division that decided the habeas corpus petition.In light of the new evidenceobtained by the CHR, particularly the Cabintoy evidence that positively identified Lt. Baliaga asone of the direct perpetrators in the abduction of Jonas and in the interest of justice, weresolve to set aside the CAs dismissal of the habeas corpus petition and issue anew the writof habeas corpus returnable to the Presiding Justice of the CA who shall immediately refer thewrit to the same CA division that decided the habeas corpus petition (CA-GR SP No. 99839).For this purpose, we also order that Lt. Baliaga be impleaded as a party to the habeas corpuspetition and require himtogether with the incumbent Chief of Staff, AFP; the incumbentCommanding General, Philippine Army; and the Commanding Officer of the 56th IB at the timeof the disappearance of Jonas, Lt. Col. Felicianoto produce the person of Jonas and to showcause why he should not be released from detention.

Same; Same; Contempt; Types and Nature of Contempt; The charge of filing a false return

constitutes improper conduct that serves no other purpose but to mislead, impede and obstruct the administration of justice by the Court.In Montenegro v. Montenegro, 431 SCRA415 (2004), we explained the types and nature of contempt, as follows: Contempt of courtinvolves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an act, in such a manner as to create an affrontto the court and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed. It is defined as disobedience tothe court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. The power to punishcontempt is inherent in all courts, because it is essential to the preservation of order in judicialproceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of the courts; and,consequently, to the due administration of justice. x x x Contempt, whether direct or indirect,may be civil or criminal depending on the nature and effect of the contemptuous act. Criminalcontempt is conduct directed against the authority and dignity of the court or a judge actingjudicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court

into disrepute or disrespect. On the other hand, civil contempt is the failure to do somethingordered to be done by a court or a judge for the benefit of the opposing party therein and istherefore, an offense against the party in whose behalf the violated order was made. If thepurpose is to punish, then it is criminal in nature; but if to compensate, then it is civil.[emphasis supplied] We agree with the CA that indirect contempt is the appropriatecharacterization of the charge filed by the petitioner against the respondents and that thecharge is criminal in nature. Evidently, the charge of filing a false return constitutes improperconduct that serves no other purpose but to mislead, impede and obstruct the administrationof justice by the Court. In People v. Godoy, 243 SCRA 64 (1995), which the CA cited, we


28/36

specifically held that under paragraph (d) of Section 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, anyimproper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade theadministration of justice constitutes criminal contempt.

Same; Same; Same; Presumption of Innocence; A criminal contempt proceeding has beencharacterized as sui generis as it partakes some of the elements of both a civil and criminal

proceeding, without completely falling under either proceedingits identification with acriminal proceeding is in the use of the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, to theextent that criminal procedure is consistent with the summary nature of a contempt

proceeding; In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent and theburden is on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt.A criminalcontempt proceeding has been characterized as sui generis as it partakes some of theelements of both a civil and criminal proceeding, without completely falling under eitherproceeding. Its identification with a criminal proceeding is in the use of the principles and rulesapplicable to criminal cases, to the extent that criminal procedure is consistent with thesummary nature of a contempt proceeding. We have consistently held and established that thestrict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to a prosecution for criminal contempt;that the accused is afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases; andthat proceedings under statutes governing them are to be strictly construed. Contempt, too, isnot presumed. In proceedings for criminal contempt, the defendant is presumed innocent andthe burden is on the prosecution to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. Thepresumption of innocence can be overcome only by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt,which means proof to the satisfaction of the court and keeping in mind the presumption ofinnocence that precludes every reasonable hypothesis except that for which it is given. It isnot sufficient for the proof to establish a probability, even though strong, that the fact chargedis more likely true than the contrary. It must establish the truth of the fact to a reasonablecertainty and moral certaintya certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason andconscience of those who are to act upon it.

Montemayor vs. Millora, 654 SCRA 580, July 27, 2011Remedial Law; Judgments; Finality of Judgment; Well-settled is the rule that a decision thathas attained finality can no longer be modified even if the modification is meant to correcterroneous conclusions of fact or law.At the outset, it should be stressed that the October 27,1999 Decision of the RTC is already final and executory. Hence, it can no longer be the subjectof an appeal. Consequently, Jesus is bound by the decision and can no longer impugn thesame. Indeed, well-settled is the rule that a decision that has attained finality can no longer bemodified even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law.

Same; Same; Same; Principle of Immutability of Final Judgment; Except for correction of clerical errors or the making of nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, orwhere the judgment is void, the judgment can neither be amended nor altered after it has

become final and executory.To stress, the October 27, 1999 Decision of the RTC has alreadyattained finality. Such definitive judgment is no longer subject to change, revision,amendment or reversal. Upon finality of the judgment, the Court loses its jurisdiction to amend,modify or alter the same. Except for correction of clerical errors or the making of nunc pro tuncentries which cause no prejudice to any party, or where the judgment is void, the judgment canneither be amended nor altered after it has become final and executory. This is the principle ofimmutability of final judgment.

Civil Law; Debt; Liquidation of Debt; A debt is liquidated when its existence and amount are


29/36

determined; A debt is considered liquidated, not only when it is expressed already in definitefigures which do not require verification, but also when the determination of the exact amountdepends only on a simple arithmetical operation.A debt is liquidated when its existence andamount are determined. It is not necessary that it be admitted by the debtor. Nor is itnecessary that the credit appear in a final judgment in order that it can be considered asliquidated; it is enough that its exact amount is known. And a debt is considered liquidated, not

only when it is expressed already in definite figures which do not require verification, but alsowhen the determination of the exact amount depends only on a simple arithmetical operation.

Lorenzo Shipping Corporation vs. Distribution Management Association of the Philippines,

656 SCRA 331, August 31, 2011

Contempt; Words and Phrases; In its broad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedienceto, the rules or orders of a legislative or judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings bydisorderly behavior or insolent language in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its

proceedings or to impair the respect due to such a body, while in its restricted and more usualsense, contempt comprehends a despising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court; Thereought to be no question that courts have the power by virtue of their very creation to imposesilence, respect, and decorum in their presence, submission to their lawful mandates, and to

preserve themselves and their officers from the approach and insults of pollution.Contemptof court has been defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority. In itsbroad sense, contempt is a disregard of, or disobedience to, the rules or orders of a legislativeor judicial body or an interruption of its proceedings by disorderly behavior or insolentlanguage in its presence or so near thereto as to disturb its proceedings or to impair therespect due to such a body. In its restricted and more usual sense, contempt comprehends adespising of the authority, justice, or dignity of a court. The phrase contempt of court isgeneric, embracing within its legal signification a variety of different acts. The power to punishfor contempt is inherent in all courts, and need not be specifically granted by statute. It lies atthe core of the administration of a judicial system. Indeed, there ought to be no question thatcourts have the power by virtue of their very creation to impose silence, respect, and decorum

in their presence, submission to their lawful mandates, and to preserve themselves and theirofficers from the approach and insults of pollution. The power to punish for contemptessentially exists for the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and for the enforcementof judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, for the dueadministration of justice. The reason behind the power to punish for contempt is that respectof the courts guarantees the stability of their institution; without such guarantee, the institutionof the courts would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

Same; Kinds of Contempt.Contempt of court is of two kinds, namely: direct contempt, whichis committed in the presence of or so near the judge as to obstruct him in the administration ofjustice; and constructive or indirect contempt, which consists of willful disobedience of thelawful process or order of the court.

Same; Due Process; The inherent power of courts to punish contempt of court committed inthe presence of the courts without further proof of facts and without aid of a trial is not open toquestion, considering that this power is essential to preserve their authority and to prevent theadministration of justice from falling into disreputesuch summary conviction and

punishment accord with due process of law; In contrast, the proceedings for the punishmentof the contumacious act committed outside the personal knowledge of the judge generallyneed the observance of all the elements of due process of law, that is, notice, written charges,and an opportunity to deny and to defend such charges before guilt is adjudged and sentence


30/36

imposed.The punishment for the first is generally summary and immediate, and no processor evidence is necessary because the act is committed in facie curiae. The inherent power ofcourts to punish contempt of court committed in the presence of the courts without furtherproof of facts and without aid of a trial is not open to question, considering that this power isessential to preserve their authority and to prevent the administration of justice from fallinginto disrepute; such summary conviction and punishment accord with due process of law.

There is authority for the view, however, that an act, to constitute direct contempt punishableby summary proceeding, need not be committed in the immediate presence of the court, if ittends to obstruct justice or to interfere with the actions of the court in the courtroom itself.Also, contemptuous acts committed out of the presence of the court, if admitted by thecontemnor in open court, may be punished summarily as a direct contempt, although it isadvisable to proceed by requiring the person charged to appear and show cause why heshould not be punished when the judge is without personal knowledge of the misbehavior andis informed of it only by a confession of the contemnor or by testimony under oath of otherpersons. In contrast, the second usually requires proceedings less summary than the first. Theproceedings for the punishment of the contumacious act committed outside the personalknowledge of the judge generally need the observance of all the elements of due process oflaw, that is, notice, written charges, and an opportunity to deny and to defend such chargesbefore guilt is adjudged and sentence imposed.

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The word summary with respect to the punishment forcontempt refers not to the timing of the action with reference to the offense but to the

procedure that dispenses with the formality, delay, and digression that result from theissuance of process, service of complaint and answer, holding hearings, taking evidence,listening to arguments, awaiting briefs, submission of findings, and all that goes with aconventional court trial.The word summary with respect to the punishment for contemptrefers not to the timing of the action with reference to the offense but to the procedure thatdispenses with the formality, delay, and digression that result from the issuance of

case doctrines in remedial

Documents