Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-6355-56             August 31, 1953

PASTOR M. ENDENCIA and FERNANDO JUGO, plaintiffs-appellees, vs.SATURNINO DAVID, as Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Jose P. Alejandro for appellant.Manuel O. Chan for appellees.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is a joint appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring section 13 of Republic Act No. 590 unconstitutional, and ordering the appellant Saturnino David as Collector of Internal Revenue to re-fund to Justice Pastor M. Endencia the sum of P1,744.45, representing the income tax collected on his salary as Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals in 1951, and to Justice Fernando Jugo the amount of P2,345.46, representing the income tax collected on his salary from January 1,1950 to October 19, 1950, as Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, and from October 20, 1950 to December 31,1950, as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, without special pronouncement as to costs.

Because of the similarity of the two cases, involving as they do the same question of law, they were jointly submitted for determination in the lower court. Judge Higinio B. Macadaeg presiding, in a rather exhaustive and well considered decision found and held that under the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, the collection of income taxes from the salaries of Justice Jugo and Justice Endencia was a diminution of their compensation and therefore was in violation of the Constitution of the Philippines, and so ordered the refund of said taxes.

We see no profit and necessity in again discussing and considering the proposition and the arguments pro and cons involved in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, which are raised, brought up and presented here. In that case, we have held despite the ruling enunciated by the United States Federal Supreme Court in the case of O 'Malley vs. Woodrought 307 U. S., 277, that taxing the salary of a judicial officer in the Philippines is a diminution of such salary and so violates the Constitution. We shall now confine our-selves to a discussion and determination of the remaining question of whether or not Republic Act No. 590, particularly section 13, can justify and legalize the collection of income tax on the salary of judicial officers.

According to the brief of the Solicitor General on behalf of appellant Collector of Internal Revenue, our decision in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, was not received favorably by Congress, because immediately after its promulgation, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 590. To bring home his point, the Solicitor General reproduced what he considers the pertinent discussion in the Lower House of House Bill No. 1127 which became Republic Act No. 590.

For purposes of reference, we are reproducing section 9, Article VIII of our Constitution:.

SEC. 9. The members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior, until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office. They shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office. Until the Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos, and each Associate Justice, fifteen thousand pesos.

As already stated construing and applying the above constitutional provision, we held in the Perfecto case that judicial officers are exempt from the payment of income tax on their salaries, because the collection thereof by the Government was a decrease or diminution of their salaries during their continuance in office, a thing which is expressly prohibited by the Constitution. Thereafter, according to the Solicitor General, because Congress did not favorably receive the decision in the Perfecto case, Congress promulgated Republic Act No. 590, if not to counteract the ruling in that decision, at least now to authorize and legalize the collection of income tax on the salaries of judicial officers. We quote section 13 of Republic Act No. 590:

SEC 13. No salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic of the Philippines shall be considered as exempt from the income tax, payment of which is hereby declared not to be dimunition of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law.

So we have this situation. The Supreme Court in a decision interpreting the Constitution, particularly section 9, Article VIII, has held that judicial officers are exempt from payment of income tax on their salaries, because the collection thereof was a diminution of such salaries, specifically prohibited by the Constitution. Now comes the Legislature and in section 13, Republic Act No. 590, says that "no salary wherever received by any public officer of the Republic (naturally including a judicial officer) shall be considered as exempt from the income tax," and proceeds to declare that payment of said income tax is not a diminution of his compensation. Can the Legislature validly do this? May the Legislature lawfully declare the collection of income tax on the salary of a public official, specially a judicial officer, not a decrease of his salary, after the Supreme Court has found and decided otherwise? To determine this question, we shall have to go back to the fundamental principles regarding separation of powers.

Under our system of constitutional government, the Legislative department is assigned the power to make and enact laws. The Executive department is charged with the execution of carrying out of the provisions of said laws. But the interpretation and application of said laws belong exclusively to the Judicial department. And this authority to interpret and apply the laws extends to the Constitution. Before the courts can determine whether a law is constitutional or not, it will have to interpret and ascertain the meaning not only of said law, but also of the pertinent portion of the Constitution in order to decide whether there is a conflict between the two, because if there is, then the law will have to give way and has to be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

Defining and interpreting the law is a judicial function and the legislative branch may not limit or restrict the power granted to the courts by the Constitution. (Bandy vs. Mickelson et al., 44N. W., 2nd 341, 342.)

When it is clear that a statute transgresses the authority vested in the legislature by the Constitution, it is the duty of the courts to declare the act unconstitutional because they cannot shrink from it without violating their oaths of office. This duty of the courts to maintain the Constitution as the fundamental law of the state is imperative and unceasing; and, as Chief Justice Marshall said, whenever a statute is in violation of the fundamental law, the courts must so adjudge and thereby give effect to the Constitution. Any other course would lead to the destruction of the Constitution. Since the question as to the constitutionality of a statute is a judicial matter, the courts will not decline the exercise of jurisdiction upon the suggestion that action might be taken by political agencies in disregard of the judgment of the judicial tribunals. (11 Am. Jur., 714-715.)

Under the American system of constitutional government, among the most important functions in trusted to the judiciary are the interpreting of Constitutions and, as a closely connected power, the determination of whether laws and acts of the legislature are or are not contrary to the provisions of the Federal and State Constitutions. (11 Am. Jur., 905.).

By legislative fiat as enunciated in section 13, Republic Act NO. 590, Congress says that taxing the salary of a judicial officer is not a decrease of compensation. This is a clear example of interpretation or ascertainment of the meaning of the phrase "which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office," found in section 9, Article VIII of the Constitution, referring to the salaries of judicial officers. This act of interpreting the Constitution or any part thereof by the Legislature is an invasion of the well-defined and established province and jurisdiction of the Judiciary.

The rule is recognized elsewhere that the legislature cannot pass any declaratory act, or act declaratory of what the law was before its passage, so as to give it any binding weight with the courts. A legislative definition of a word as used in a statute is not conclusive of its meaning as used elsewhere; otherwise, the legislature would be usurping a judicial function in defining a term. (11 Am. Jur., 914, emphasis supplied)

The legislature cannot, upon passing a law which violates a constitutional provision, validate it so as to prevent an attack thereon in the courts, by a declaration that it shall be so construed as not to violate the constitutional inhibition. (11 Am. Jur., 919, emphasis supplied)

We have already said that the Legislature under our form of government is assigned the task and the power to make and enact laws, but not to interpret them. This is more true with regard to the interpretation of the basic law, the Constitution, which is not within the sphere of the Legislative department. If the Legislature may declare what a law means, or what a specific portion of the Constitution means, especially after the courts have in actual case ascertain its meaning by interpretation and applied it in a decision, this would surely cause confusion and instability in judicial processes and court decisions. Under such a system, a final court determination of a case based on a judicial interpretation of the law of the Constitution may be undermined or even annulled by a subsequent and different interpretation of the law or of the Constitution by the Legislative department. That would be neither wise nor desirable,

besides being clearly violative of the fundamental, principles of our constitutional system of government, particularly those governing the separation of powers.

So much for the constitutional aspect of the case. Considering the practical side thereof, we believe that the collection of income tax on a salary is an actual and evident diminution thereof. Under the old system where the in-come tax was paid at the end of the year or sometime thereafter, the decrease may not be so apparent and clear. All that the official who had previously received his full salary was called upon to do, was to fulfill his obligation and to exercise his privilege of paying his income tax on his salary. His salary fixed by law was received by him in the amount of said tax comes from his other sources of income, he may not fully realize the fact that his salary had been decreased in the amount of said income tax. But under the present system of withholding the income tax at the source, where the full amount of the income tax corresponding to his salary is computed in advance and divided into equal portions corresponding to the number of pay-days during the year and actually deducted from his salary corresponding to each payday, said official actually does not receive his salary in full, because the income tax is deducted therefrom every payday, that is to say, twice a month. Let us take the case of Justice Endencia. As Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, his salary is fixed at p12,000 a year, that is to say, he should receive P1,000 a month or P500 every payday, — fifteenth and end of month. In the present case, the amount collected by the Collector of Internal Revenue on said salary is P1,744.45 for one year. Divided by twelve (months) we shall have P145.37 a month. And further dividing it by two paydays will bring it down to P72.685, which is the income tax deducted form the collected on his salary each half month. So, if Justice Endencia's salary as a judicial officer were not exempt from payment of the income tax, instead of receiving P500 every payday, he would be actually receiving P427.31 only, and instead of receiving P12,000 a year, he would be receiving but P10,255.55. Is it not therefor clear that every payday, his salary is actually decreased by P72.685 and every year is decreased by P1,744.45?

Reading the discussion in the lower House in connection with House Bill No. 1127, which became Republic Act No. 590, it would seem that one of the main reasons behind the enactment of the law was the feeling among certain legislators that members of the Supreme Court should not enjoy any exemption and that as citizens, out of patriotism and love for their country, they should pay income tax on their salaries. It might be stated in this connection that the exemption is not enjoyed by the members of the Supreme Court alone but also by all judicial officers including Justices of the Court of Appeals and judges of inferior courts. The exemption also extends to other constitutional officers, like the President of the Republic, the Auditor General, the members of the Commission on Elections, and possibly members of the Board of Tax Appeals, commissioners of the Public Service Commission, and judges of the Court of Industrial Relations. Compares to the number of all these officials, that of the Supreme Court Justices is relatively insignificant. There are more than 990 other judicial officers enjoying the exemption, including 15 Justices of the Court of Appeals, about 107 Judges of First Instance, 38 Municipal Judges and about 830 Justices of the Peace. The reason behind the exemption in the Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Federal Supreme Court and this Court, is to preserve the independence of the Judiciary, not only of this High Tribunal but of the other courts, whose present membership number more than 990 judicial officials.

The exemption was not primarily intended to benefit judicial officers, but was grounded on public policy. As said by Justice Van Devanter of the United States Supreme Court in the case of Evans vs. Gore (253 U. S., 245):

The primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was not to benefit the judges, but, like the clause in respect of tenure, to attract good and competent men to the bench and to promote that independence of action and judgment which is essential to the maintenance of the guaranties, limitations and pervading principles of the Constitution and to the administration of justice without respect to person and with equal concern for the poor and the rich. Such being its purpose, it is to be construed, not as a private grant, but as a limitation imposed in the public interest; in other words, not restrictively, but in accord with its spirit and the principle on which it proceeds.

Having in mind the limited number of judicial officers in the Philippines enjoying this exemption, especially when the great bulk thereof are justices of the peace, many of them receiving as low as P200 a month, and considering further the other exemptions allowed by the income tax law, such as P3,000 for a married person and P600 for each dependent, the amount of national revenue to be derived from income tax on the salaries of judicial officers, were if not for the constitutional exemption, could not be large or substantial. But even if it were otherwise, it should not affect, much less outweigh the purpose and the considerations that prompted the establishment of the constitutional exemption. In the same case of Evans vs. Gore, supra, the Federal Supreme Court declared "that they (fathers of the Constitution) regarded the independence of the judges as far as greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries.

When a judicial officer assumed office, he does not exactly ask for exemption from payment of income tax on his salary, as a privilege . It is already attached to his office, provided and secured by the fundamental law, not primarily for his benefit, but based on public interest, to secure and preserve his independence of judicial thought and action. When we come to the members of the Supreme Court, this excemption to them is relatively of short duration. Because of the limited membership in this High Tribunal, eleven, and due to the high standards of experience, practice and training required, one generally enters its portals and comes to join its membership quite late in life, on the aver-age, around his sixtieth year, and being required to retire at seventy, assuming that he does not die or become incapacitated earlier, naturally he is not in a position to receive the benefit of exemption for long. It is rather to the justices of the peace that the exemption can give more benefit. They are relatively more numerous, and because of the meager salary they receive,

they can less afford to pay the income tax on it and its diminution by the amount of the income tax if paid would be real, substantial and onerous.

Considering exemption in the abstract, there is nothing unusual or abhorrent in it, as long as it is based on public policy or public interest. While all other citizens are subject to arrest when charged with the commission of a crime, members of the Senate and House of Representatives except in cases of treason, felony and breach of the peace are exempt from arrest, during their attendance in the session of the Legislature; and while all other citizens are generally liable for any speech, remark or statement, oral or written, tending to cause the dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridical person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead, Senators and Congressmen in making such statements during their sessions are extended immunity and exemption.

And as to tax exemption, there are not a few citizens who enjoy this exemption. Persons, natural and juridical, are exempt from taxes on their lands, buildings and improvements thereon when used exclusively for educational purposes, even if they derive income therefrom. (Art. VI, Sec. 22 [3].) Holders of government bonds are exempted from the payment of taxes on the income or interest they receive therefrom (sec. 29 (b) [4], National Internal Revenue Code as amended by Republic Act No. 566). Payments or income received by any person residing in the Philippines under the laws of the United States administered by the United States Veterans Administration are exempt from taxation. (Republic Act No. 360). Funds received by officers and enlisted men of the Philippine Army who served in the Armed Forces of the United States, allowances earned by virtue of such services corresponding to the taxable years 1942 to 1945, inclusive, are exempted from income tax. (Republic Act No. 210). The payment of wages and allowances of officers and enlisted men of the Army Forces of the Philippines sent to Korea are also exempted from taxation. (Republic Act No. 35). In other words, for reasons of public policy and public interest, a citizen may justifiably by constitutional provision or statute be exempted from his ordinary obligation of paying taxes on his income. Under the same public policy and perhaps for the same it not higher considerations, the framers of the Constitution deemed it wise and necessary to exempt judicial officers from paying taxes on their salaries so as not to decrease their compensation, thereby insuring the independence of the Judiciary.

In conclusion we reiterate the doctrine laid down in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, supra, to the effect that the collection of income tax on the salary of a judicial officer is a diminution thereof and so violates the Constitution. We further hold that the interpretation and application of the Constitution and of statutes is within the exclusive province and jurisdiction of the Judicial department, and that in enacting a law, the Legislature may not legally provide therein that it be interpreted in such a way that it may not violate a Constitutional prohibition, thereby tying the hands of the courts in their task of later interpreting said statute, specially when the interpretation sought and provided in said statute runs counter to a previous interpretation already given in a case by the highest court of the land.

In the views of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with no pronouncement as to costs.

Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason, Reyes, and Labrador, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J., concurring:

Without expressing any opinion on the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Perfecto vs. Meer, G. R. No. L-2314, in view of the part I had in that case as former Solicitor General, I wish however to state that I concur in the opinion of the majority to the effect that section 13, Republic Act No. 590, in so far as it provides that taxing of the salary of a judicial officer shall be considered "not to be a diminution of his compensation fixed by the Constitution or by law", constitutes an invasion of the province and jurisdiction of the judiciary. In this sense, I am of the opinion that said section is null and void, it being a transgression of the fundamental principle underlying the separation of powers.

PARAS, C.J., concurring and dissenting:

I dissent for the same reasons stated in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Ozaeta in Perfecto vs. Meer, 85 Phil., 552, in which I concurred. But I disagree with the majority in ruling that no legislation may provide that it be held valid although against a provision of the Constitution.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-22291 November 15, 1976

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.JESUS SANTAYANA Y ESCUDERO, defendant-appellant.

Ernesto C. Hidalgo and Enrique Jocson for appellant.

Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Trial Attorney Josefina Domingo de Leon for appellee.

 

CONCEPCION, JR., J:

Accused, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was found guilty of the crime of illegal possesion of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years and to pay the costs.

The essential facts are not in dispute. On February 19, 1962, accused Jesus Santayana, was appointed as "Special Agent" 1 by then Colonel Jose C. Maristela, Chief of the CIS. On March 9, 1962, a Memorandum Receipt 2 for equipment was issued in the name of the accused regarding one pistol Melior SN-122137 with one (1) mag and stock. Col. Maristela likewise issued an undated certification 3 to the effect that the accused was an accredited member of the CIS and the pistol described in the said Memorandum Receipt was given to him by virtue of his appointment as special agent and that he was authorized to carry and possess the same in the performance of his official duty and for his personal protection. On October 29, 1962, the accused was found in Plaza Miranda in possession of the above-described pistol with four rounds of ammunition, cal. 25, without a license to possess them. An investigation was conducted and thereupon, a corresponding complaint was filed against the accused. The case underwent trial after which the accused was convicted of the crime charged with its corresponding penalty. Hence, the case was appealed to US and the accused assigned three errors allegedly committed by the trial court in disposing of this case.

Of these assigned errors, the two main issued posed are whether or not the present subject matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal court pursuant to Republic Act No. 2613; and whether or not the appointment of the appellant as special agent of the CIS which apparently authorizes him to carry and posses firearms exempts him from securing a license or permit corresponding thereto.

Resolving the issue of jurisdiction, there is no doubt that under Section 87 of Republic Act No. 286, as amended by Republic Act No. 2613, the justice over cases of illegal possession of firearms. But equally the Court of First Instance of Manila, which took cognizance of this case had jurisdiction over the offense charged because under Section 44 of Republic Act No. 296, Court of First Instance have original jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six (6) months, or a fine of more than two hundred pesos (P200.00)"; and the offense charged in the information is punishable by imprisonment for a period of not less than one (1) year and one (1) day nor more than five (5) years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or more than five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).

From the foregoing, it is evident that the jurisdiction of the Municipal Courts over Criminal Cases in which the penalty provided by law is imprisonment for not more than six (6) months or fine of not more than two hundred (P200.00) pesos or both such imprisonment and fine is exclusive and original to said courts. But considering that the offense of illegal possession of firearms with which the appellant was charged is penalized by imprisonment for a period of not less than one (1) year and one (1) day or more than five (5) years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less than one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos or more than five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos (Republic Act No. 4), the offense, therefore, does not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal Court. The Court of First Instance has concurrent jurisdiction over the same.

As to the second issue to be resolved, there is no question that appellant was appointed as CIS secret agent with the authority to carry and possess firearms. 4 Indeed, appellant was issued a firearm in the performance of his official duties and for his personal protection. 5 It also appears that appellant was informed by Col. Maristela that it was not necessary for him to apply for a license or to register the said firearm because it was government property and therefore could not legally be registered or licensed in appellant's name. 6 Capt. Adolfo M. Bringas from whom appellant received the firearm also informed the latter that no permit to carry the pistol was necessary "because you are already appointed as CIS agent."

At the time of appellant's apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing is enunciated in the case of People vs. Macarandang 7 wherein We held that the appointment of a civilian as "secret agent to assist in the maintenace of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of a 'peace officer' equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by Section 879." The case of People vs. Mapa 8 revoked the doctrine in the Macarandang case only on August 30, 1967. Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of appellant's appointment as secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for possession of the pistol in question.

Wherefore, and conformably with the recommendation of the Solicitor General, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and appellant Jesus Santayana y Escudero is hereby acquitted. The bond for his provisional release is cancelled. Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 Exhibit 1, p. 52, Rollo.

2 Exhibit 2, p. 53, Rollo.

3 Exhibit 3, p. 54, Rollo.

4 Exhibit 1 reads:

You are hereby accredited as Special Agent without regular compensation. This designation does not confer upon you police powers and authority to make investigations provided by Section 848 of the Revised Administrative Code nor does it entitled you to (possess and carry firearms or) take free rides in any public conveyances. ..." (The parentheses are ours and the words within were crossed out and initialed by Col. Jose C. Maristela, Chief, CIS, who signed appellant's appointment.)

5 Exhibit 2 reads:

I akcnowledged to have received from Captain Adolfo M. Bringas, Inf (PC) ASO, CIS, HPC, the following property for which I am responsible, subject to the provisions of the Accounting Law, and will be used in the office of CIS, HPC: 1 Pistol Melior SN-122137 with one (1) mag & stock Total value P40.00 Note: For the use of Agt. Jesus E. Santayana while in the performance of his official duties. Approved: t/s/ Jose C. Maristela, Colonel, Inf (GSC) Chief, CIS, HPC. ...

6 T.S.N., p. 4, July 30, 1963.

7 L-12088, December 23, 1959, 106 Phil. 713. See also People vs. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 607.

8 L-22301, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

ManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-22301     August 30, 1967

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, Defendant-Appellant.

FERNANDO, J.: chanrobles virtual law library

The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the lower court is whether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. We hold that it does not.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an information dated August 14, 1962 reading as follows: "The undersized accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic Act No. 4, committed as follows: That on or about the 13th day of August, 1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities. Contrary to law." chanrobles virtual law library

When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower court at the outset asked the counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate that the accused was found in possession of the gun involved in this case, that he has neither a permit or license to possess the same and that we can submit the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor can hold a firearm without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary." After counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he would not question the authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being that only a question of law would be submitted for decision, he explicitly specified such question to be "whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his firearm." chanrobles virtual law library

Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the document so that he could pass on their authenticity, the fiscal asked the following question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information was found in his possession on August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having secured the necessary license or permit thereof from the corresponding authority?" The accused, now the appellant, answered categorically: "Yes, Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a statement: "The accused admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused admits." chanrobles virtual law library

Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same for decision." Counsel for the accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits consisting of his appointment "as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste," then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962;1 another document likewise issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential mission;2 the oath of office of the accused as such secret agent,3 a certificate dated March 11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov. Leviste.4 Counsel for the accused then stated that with the presentation of the above exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on the question of whether or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the provincial governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm." The exhibits were admitted and the parties were given time to file their respective memoranda.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him are forfeited in favor of the Government." chanrobles virtual law library

The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court. The decision must be affirmed.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition."5 The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties."6

chanrobles virtual law library

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without them."7 The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set aside.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang,8 where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts with what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-2348             February 27, 1950

GREGORIO PERFECTO, plaintiff-appellee, vs.BIBIANO MEER, Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.

First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Francisco Carreon for oppositor and appellant.Gregorio Perfecto in his own behalf.

BENGZON, J.:

In April, 1947 the Collector of Internal Revenue required Mr. Justice Gregorio Perfecto to pay income tax upon his salary as member of this Court during the year 1946. After paying the amount (P802), he instituted this action in the Manila Court of First Instance contending that the assessment was illegal, his salary not being taxable for the reason that imposition of taxes thereon would reduce it in violation of the Constitution.

The Manila judge upheld his contention, and required the refund of the amount collected. The defendant appealed.

The death of Mr. Justice Perfecto has freed us from the embarrassment of passing upon the claim of a colleague. Still, as the outcome indirectly affects all the members of the Court, consideration of the matter is not without its vexing feature. Yet adjudication may not be declined, because (a) we are not legally disqualified; (b) jurisdiction may not be renounced, ad it is the defendant who appeals to this Court, and there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be referred; (c) supreme courts in the United States have decided similar disputes relating to themselves; (d) the question touches all the members of the judiciary from top to bottom; and (e) the issue involves the right of other constitutional officers whose compensation is equally protected by the Constitution, for instance, the President, the Auditor-General and the members of the Commission on Elections. Anyway the subject has been thoroughly discussed in many American lawsuits and opinions, and we shall hardly do nothing more than to borrow therefrom and to compare their conclusions to local conditions. There shall be little occasion to formulate new propositions, for the situation is not unprecedented.

Our Constitution provides in its Article VIII, section 9, that the members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts "shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office." It also provides that "until Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos". When in 1945 Mr. Justice Perfecto assumed office, Congress had not "provided otherwise", by fixing a different salary for associate justices. He received salary at the rate provided by the Constitution, i.e., fifteen thousand pesos a year.

Now, does the imposition of an income tax upon this salary in 1946 amount to a diminution thereof?.

A note found at page 534 of volume 11 of the American Law Reports answers the question in the affirmative. It says:

Where the Constitution of a state provides that the salaries of its judicial officers shall not be dismissed during their continuance in office, it had been held that the state legislature cannot impose a tax upon the compensation paid to the judges of its court. New Orleans v. Lea (1859) 14 La. Ann. 194; Opinion of Attorney-General if N. C. (1856) 48 N. C. (3 Jones, L.) Appx. 1; Re Taxation of Salaries of Judges (1902) 131 N. C. 692, 42 S. E. 970; Com. ex. rel. Hepburn v. Mann (1843) 5 Watts & S,. (Pa.) 403 [but see to the contrary the earlier and much criticized case of Northumberland county v. Chapman (1829) 2 Rawle (Pa.) 73]*

A different rule prevails in Wisconsin, according to the same annotation. Another state holding the contrary view is Missouri.

The Constitution of the United States, likes ours, forbids the diminution of the compensation of Judges of the Supreme Court and of inferior courts. The Federal Governments has an income tax law. Does it embrace the salaries of federal judges? In answering this question, we should consider four periods:

First period. No attempts was made to tax the compensation of Federal judges up to 1862 1.

Second period. 1862-1918. In July, 1862, a statute was passed subjecting the salaries of "civil officers of the United States" to an income tax of three per cent. Revenue officers, construed it as including the compensation of all judges; but Chief Justice Taney, speaking for the judiciary, wrote to the Secretary of the Treasury a letter of protest saying, among other things:

The act in question, as you interpret it, diminishes the compensation of every judge 3 per cent, and if it can be diminished to that extent by the name of a tax, it may, in the same way, be reduced from time to time, at the pleasure of the legislature.

The judiciary is one of the three great departments of the government, created and established by the Constitution. Its duties and powers are specifically set forth, and are of a character that requires it to be perfectly independent of the two other departments, and in order to place it beyond the reach and above even the suspicion of any such influence, the power to reduce their compensation is expressly withheld from Congress, and excepted from their powers of legislation.

Language could not be more plain than that used in the Constitution. It is, moreover, one of its most important and essential provisions. For the articles which limits the powers of the legislative and executive branches of the government, and those which provide safeguards for the protection of the citizen in his person and property, would be of little value without a judiciary to uphold and maintain them, which was free from every influence, direct and indirect, that might by possibility in times of political excitement warp their judgments.

Upon these grounds I regard an act of Congress retaining in the Treasury a portion of the Compensation of the judges, as unconstitutional and void2.

The protest was unheeded, although it apparently bore the approval of the whole Supreme Court, that ordered it printed among its records. But in 1869 Attorney-General Hoar upon the request of the Secretary of the Treasury rendered an opinion agreeing with the Chief Justice. The collection of the tax was consequently discontinued and the amounts theretofore received were all refunded. For half a century thereafter judges' salaries were not taxed as income.3

Third period. 1919-1938. The Federal Income Tax Act of February 24, 1919 expressly provided that taxable income shall include "the compensation of the judges of the Supreme Court and inferior courts of the United States". Under such Act, Walter Evans, United States judge since 1899, paid income tax on his salary; and maintaining that the impost reduced his compensation, he sued to recover the money he had delivered under protest. He was upheld in 1920 by the Supreme Court in an epoch-making decision.*, explaining the purpose, history and meaning of the Constitutional provision forbidding impairment of judicial salaries and the effect of an income tax upon the salary of a judge.

With what purpose does the Constitution provide that the compensation of the judges "shall not be diminished during their continuance in office"? Is it primarily to benefit the judges, or rather to promote the public weal by giving them that independence which makes for an impartial and courageous discharge of the judicial function? Does the provision merely forbid direct diminution, such as expressly reducing the compensation from a greater to a less sum per year, and thereby leave the way open for indirect, yet effective, diminution, such as withholding or calling back a part as tax on the whole? Or does it mean that the judge shall have a sure and continuing right to the compensation, whereon he confidently may rely for his support during his continuance in office, so that he need have no apprehension lest his situation in this regard may be changed to his disadvantage?

The Constitution was framed on the fundamental theory that a larger measure of liberty and justice would be assured by vesting the three powers — the legislative, the executive, and the judicial — in separate departments, each relatively independent of the others and it was recognized that without this independence — if it was not made both real and enduring — the separation would fail of its purpose. all agreed that restraints and checks must be imposed to secure the requisite measure of independence; for otherwise the legislative department, inherently the strongest, might encroach on or even come to dominate the others, and the judicial, naturally the weakest, might be dwarf or swayed by the other two, especially by the legislative.

The particular need for making the judiciary independent was elaborately pointed our by Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist, No. 78, from which we excerpt the following:

x x x           x x x           x x x

At a later period John Marshall, whose rich experience as lawyer, legislator, and chief justice enable him to speak as no one else could, tersely said (debates Va. Gonv. 1829-1831, pp. 616, 619): . . . Our courts are the balance wheel of our whole constitutional system; and our is the only constitutional system so balanced and controlled. Other constitutional systems lacks complete poise and certainly of operation because they lack the support and interpretation of authoritative, undisputable courts of law. It is clear beyond all need of exposition that for the definite maintenance of constitutional understandings it is indispensable, alike for the preservation of the liberty of the individual and for the preservation of the integrity of the powers of the government, that there should be some nonpolitical forum in which those understandings can be impartially debated and determined. That forum our courts supply. There the individual may assert his rights; there the government must accept definition of its authority. There the individual may challenge the legality of governmental action and have it adjudged by the test of fundamental principles, and that test the government must abide; there the government can check the too aggressive self-assertion of the individual and establish its power upon lines which all can comprehend and heed. The constitutional powers of the courts constitute the ultimate safeguard alike of individual privilege and of governmental prerogative. It is in this sense that our judiciary is the balance wheel of our entire system; it is meant to maintain that nice adjustment between individual rights and governmental powers which constitutes political liberty. Constitutional government in the United States, pp. 17, 142.

Conscious in the nature and scope of the power being vested in the national courts, recognizing that they would be charge with responsibilities more delicate and important than any ever before confide to judicial tribunals, and appreciating that they were to be, in the words of George Washington, "the keystone of our political fabric", the convention with unusual accord incorporated in the Constitution the provision that the judges "shall hold their offices during good behavior, and shall at stated times receive for their services a compensation which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office." Can there be any doubt that the two things thus coupled in place — the clause in respect of tenure during good behaviour and that in respect of an undiminishable compensation-were equally coupled in purpose? And is it not plain that their purposes was to invest the judges with an independence in keeping with the delicacy and importance of their task, and with the imperative need for its impartial and fearless performance? Mr. Hamilton said in explanation and

support of the provision (Federalist No. 79): "Next to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support. . . . In the general course of human nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will.

x x x           x x x           x x x

These considerations make it very plain, as we think, that the primary purpose of the prohibition against diminution was not to benefit the judges, but, like the clause in respect of tenure, to attract good and competent men to the bench, and to promote that independence of action and judgment which is essential to the maintenance of the guaranties, limitations, and pervading principles of the constitution, and to the admiration of justice without respect to persons, and with equal concern for the poor and the rich.

x x x           x x x           x x x

But it is urged that what plaintiff was made to pay back was an income tax, and that a like tax was exacted of others engaged in private employment.

If the tax in respect of his compensation be prohibited, it can find no justification in the taxation of other income as to which there is no prohibition, for, of course, doing what the Constitution permits gives no license to do what it prohibits.

The prohibition is general, contains no excepting words, and appears to be directed against all diminution, whether for one purpose or another; and the reason for its adoption, as publicly assigned at the time and commonly accepted ever since, make with impelling force for the conclusion that the fathers of the Constitution intended to prohibit diminution by taxation as well as otherwise, that they regarded the independence of the judges as of far greater importance than any revenue that could come from taxing their salaries. (American law Reports, annotated, Vol. 11, pp. 522-25; Evans vs. Gore, supra.)

In September 1, 1919, Samuel J. Graham assumed office as judge of the Unites States court of claims. His salary was taxed by virtue of the same time income tax of February 24, 1919. At the time he qualified, a statute fixed his salary at P7,500. He filed action for reimbursement, submitting the same theory on which Evans v. Gore had been decided. The Supreme Court of the United States in 1925 reaffirmed that decision. It overruled the distinction offered by Solicitor-General Beck that Judge Graham took office after the income tax had been levied on judicial salaries, (Evans qualified before), and that Congress had power "to impose taxes which should apply to the salaries of Federal judges appointed after the enactment of the taxing statute." (The law had made no distinction as to judges appointed before or after its passage)

Fourth period. 1939 — Foiled in their previous attempts, the Revenue men persisted, and succeeded in inserting in the United States Revenue Act of June, 1932 the modified proviso that "gross income" on which taxes were payable included the compensation "of judges of courts of the United States taking office after June 6, 1932". Joseph W. Woodrough qualified as United States circuit judge on May 1, 1933. His salary as judge was taxed, and before the Supreme Court of the United States the issue of decrease of remuneration again came up. That court, however, ruled against him, declaring (in 1939) that Congress had the power to adopt the law. It said:

The question immediately before us is whether Congress exceeded its constitutional power in providing that United States judges appointed after the Revenue Act of 1932 shall not enjoy immunity from the incidence of taxation to which everyone else within the defined classes of income is subjected. Thereby, of course, Congress has committed itself to the position that a non-discriminatory tax laid generally on net income is not, when applied to the income of federal judge, a diminution of his salary within the prohibition of Article 3, Sec. 1 of the Constitution. To suggest that it makes inroads upon the independence of judges who took office after the Congress has thus charged them with the common duties of citizenship, by making them bear their aliquot share of the cost of maintaining the Government, is to trivialize the great historic experience on which the framers based the safeguards of Article 3, Sec. 1. To subject them to a general tax is merely to recognize that judges also are citizens, and that their particular function in government does not generate an immunity from sharing with their fellow citizens the material burden of the government whose Constitution and laws they are charged with administering. (O'Malley vs. Woodrough, 59 S. Ct. 838, A. L. R. 1379.)

Now, the case for the defendant-appellant Collector of Internal Revenue is premised mainly on this decision (Note A). He claims it holds "that federal judges are subject to the payment of income taxes without violating the constitutional prohibition against the reduction of their salaries during their continuance in office", and that it "is a complete repudiation of the ratio decidenci of Evans vs. Gore". To grasp the full import of the O'Malley precedent, we should bear in mind that:

1. It does not entirely overturn Miles vs. Graham. "To the extent that what the Court now says is inconsistent with what said in Miles vs. Graham, the latter can not survive", Justice Frankfurter announced.

2. It does not expressly touch nor amend the doctrine in Evans vs, Gore, although it indicates that the Congressional Act in dispute avoided in part the consequences of that case.

Carefully analyzing the three cases (Evans, Miles and O'Malley) and piecing them together, the logical conclusion may be reached that although Congress may validly declare by law that salaries of judges appointed thereafter shall be taxed as income (O'Malley vs. Woodrough) it may not tax the salaries of those judges already in office at the time of such declaration because such taxation would diminish their salaries (Evans vs. Gore; Miles vs. Graham). In this manner the rationalizing principle that will harmonize the allegedly discordant decision may be condensed.

By the way, Justice Frankfurter, writing the O'Malley decision, says the Evans precedent met with disfavor from legal scholarship opinion. Examining the issues of Harvard Law review at the time of Evans vs. Gore (Frankfurter is a Harvard graduate and professor), we found that such school publication criticized it. Believing this to be the "inarticulate consideration that may have influenced the grounds on which the case went off"4, we looked into the criticism, and discovered that it was predicated on the position that the 16th Amendment empowered Congress "to collect taxes on incomes from whatever source derived" admitting of no exception. Said the Harvard Law Journal:

In the recent case of Evans vs. Gore the Supreme Court of the United States decided that by taxing the salary of a federal judge as a part of his income, Congress was in effect reducing his salary and thus violating Art. III, sec. 1, of the Constitution. Admitting for the present purpose that such a tax really is a reduction of salary, even so it would seem that the words of the amendment giving power to tax 'incomes, from whatever source derived', are sufficiently strong to overrule pro tanto the provisions of Art. III, sec. 1. But, two years ago, the court had already suggested that the amendment in no way extended the subjects open to federal taxation. The decision in Evans vs. Gore affirms that view, and virtually strikes from the amendment the words "from whatever source derived". (Harvard law Review, vol. 34, p. 70)

The Unites States Court's shift of position5 might be attributed to the above detraction which, without appearing on the surface, led to Frankfurter's sweeping expression about judges being also citizens liable to income tax. But it must be remembered that undisclosed factor — the 16th Amendment — has no counterpart in the Philippine legal system. Our Constitution does not repeat it. Wherefore, as the underlying influence and the unuttered reason has no validity in this jurisdiction, the broad generality loses much of its force.

Anyhow the O'Malley case declares no more than that Congress may validly enact a law taxing the salaries of judges appointed after its passage. Here in the Philippines no such law has been approved.

Besides, it is markworthy that, as Judge Woodrough had qualified after the express legislative declaration taxing salaries, he could not very well complain. The United States Supreme Court probably had in mind what in other cases was maintained, namely, that the tax levied on the salary in effect decreased the emoluments of the office and therefore the judge qualified with such reduced emoluments.6

The O'Malley ruling does not cover the situation in which judges already in office are made to pay tax by executive interpretation, without express legislative declaration. That state of affairs is controlled by the administrative and judicial standards herein-before described in the "second period" of the Federal Government, namely, the views of Chief Justice Taney and of Attorney-General Hoar and the constant practice from 1869 to 1938, i.e., when the Income Tax Law merely taxes "income" in general, it does not include salaries of judges protected from diminution.

In this connection the respondent would make capital of the circumstance that the Act of 1932, upheld in the O'Malley case, has subsequently been amended by making it applicable even to judges who took office before 1932. This shows, the appellant argues, that Congress interprets the O'Malley ruling to permit legislative taxation of the salary of judges whether appointed before the tax or after. The answer to this is that the Federal Supreme Court expressly withheld opinion on that amendment in the O'Malley case. Which is significant. Anyway, and again, there is here no congressional directive taxing judges' salaries.

Wherefore, unless and until our Legislature approves an amendment to the Income Tax Law expressly taxing "that salaries of judges thereafter appointed", the O'Malley case is not relevant. As in the United States during the second period, we must hold that salaries of judges are not included in the word "income" taxed by the Income Tax Law. Two paramount circumstances may additionally be indicated, to wit: First, when the Income Tax Law was first applied to the Philippines 1913, taxable "income" did not include salaries of judicial officers when these are protected from diminution. That was the prevailing official belief in the United States, which must be deemed to have been transplanted here;7 and second, when the Philippine Constitutional Convention approved (in 1935) the prohibition against diminution off the judges' compensation, the Federal principle was known that income tax on judicial salaries really impairs them. Evans vs. Gore and Miles vs. Graham were then outstanding doctrines; and the inference is not illogical that in restraining the impairment of judicial compensation the Fathers of the Constitution intended to preclude taxation of the same.8

It seems that prior to the O'Malley decision the Philippine Government did not collect income tax on salaries of judges. This may be gleaned from General Circular No. 449 of the Department of Finance dated March 4, 1940, which says in part:

x x x           x x x           x x x

The question of whether or not the salaries of judges should be taken into account in computing additional residence taxes is closely linked with the liability of judges to income tax on their salaries, in fact, whatever resolution is adopted with respect to either of said taxes be followed with respect to the other. The opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of O'Malley v. Woodrough, 59 S. Ct. 838, to which the attention of this department has been drawn, appears to have enunciated a new doctrine regarding the liability of judges to income tax upon their salaries. In view of the fact that the question is of great significance, the matter was taken up in the Council of State, and the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice was requested to give an opinion on whether or not, having in mind the said decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of O'Malley v. Woodrough, there is justification in reversing our present ruling to the effect that judges are not liable to tax on their salaries. After going over the opinion of the court in the said case, the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice, stated that although the ruling of the Supreme Court of the United States is not binding in the Philippines, the doctrine therein enunciated has resolved the issue of the taxability of judges' salaries into a question of policy. Forthwith, His Excellency the President decided that the best policy to adopt would be to collect income and additional residence taxes from the President of the Philippines, the members of the Judiciary, and the Auditor General, and the undersigned was authorized to act accordingly.

In view of the foregoing, income and additional residence taxes should be levied on the salaries received by the President of the Philippines, members of the Judiciary, and the Auditor General during the calendar year 1939 and thereafter. . . . . (Emphasis ours.)

Of course, the Secretary of Justice correctly opined that the O'Malley decision "resolved the issue of taxability of judges' salaries into a question of policy." But that policy must be enunciated by Congressional enactment, as was done in the O'Malley case, not by Executive Fiat or interpretation.

This is not proclaiming a general tax immunity for men on the bench. These pay taxes. Upon buying gasoline, or other commodities, they pay the corresponding duties. Owning real property, they pay taxes thereon. And on incomes other than their judicial salary, assessments are levied. It is only when the tax is charged directly on their salary and the effect of the tax is to diminish their official stipend — that the taxation must be resisted as an infringement of the fundamental charter.

Judges would indeed be hapless guardians of the Constitution if they did not perceive and block encroachments upon their prerogatives in whatever form. The undiminishable character of judicial salaries is not a mere privilege of judges — personal and therefore waivable — but a basic limitation upon legislative or executive action imposed in the public interest. (Evans vs. Gore)

Indeed the exemption of the judicial salary from reduction by taxation is not really a gratuity or privilege. Let the highest court of Maryland speak:

The exemption of the judicial compensation from reduction is not in any true sense a gratuity, privilege or exemption. It is essentially and primarily compensation based upon valuable consideration. The covenant on the part of the government is a guaranty whose fulfillment is as much as part of the consideration agreed as is the money salary. The undertaking has its own particular value to the citizens in securing the independence of the judiciary in crises; and in the establishment of the compensation upon a permanent foundation whereby judicial preferment may be prudently accepted by those who are qualified by talent, knowledge, integrity and capacity, but are not possessed of such a private fortune as to make an assured salary an object of personal concern. On the other hand, the members of the judiciary relinquish their position at the bar, with all its professional emoluments, sever their connection with their clients, and dedicate themselves exclusively to the discharge of the onerous duties of their high office. So, it is irrefutable that they guaranty against a reduction of salary by the imposition of a tax is not an exemption from taxation in the sense of freedom from a burden or service to which others are liable. The exemption for a public purpose or a valid consideration is merely a nominal exemption, since the valid and full consideration or the public purpose promoted is received in the place of the tax. Theory and Practice of Taxation (1900), D. A. Wells, p. 541. (Gordy vs. Dennis (Md.) 1939, 5 Atl. Rep. 2d Series, p. 80)

It is hard to see, appellants asserts, how the imposition of the income tax may imperil the independence of the judicial department. The danger may be demonstrated. Suppose there is power to tax the salary of judges, and the judiciary incurs the displeasure of the Legislature and the Executive. In retaliation the income tax law is amended so as to levy a 30 per cent on all salaries of government officials on the level of judges. This naturally reduces the salary of the judges by 30 per cent, but they may not grumble because the tax is general on all receiving the same amount of earning, and affects the Executive and the Legislative branches in equal measure. However, means are provided thereafter in other laws, for the increase of salaries of the Executive and the Legislative branches, or their perquisites such as allowances, per diems, quarters, etc. that actually compensate for the 30 per cent reduction on their salaries. Result: Judges compensation is thereby diminished during their incumbency thanks to the income tax law. Consequence: Judges must "toe the line" or else. Second consequence: Some few judges might falter; the great majority will not. But knowing the frailty of human nature, and this chink in the judicial armor, will the parties losing their cases against the Executive or the Congress believe that the judicature has not yielded to their pressure?

Respondent asserts in argumentation that by executive order the President has subjected his salary to the income tax law. In our opinion this shows obviously that, without such voluntary act of the President, his salary would not be taxable, because of constitutional protection against diminution. To argue from this executive gesture that the judiciary could, and should act in like manner is to assume that, in the matter of compensation and power and need of security, the judiciary is on a par with the Executive. Such assumption certainly ignores the prevailing state of affairs.

The judgment will be affirmed. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Pablo, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

OZAETA., J., dissenting:

It is indeed embarrassing that this case was initiated by a member of this Court upon which devolves the duty to decide it finally. The question of whether the salaries of the judges, the members of the Commission on Elections, the Auditor General, and the President of the Philippines are immune from taxation, might have been raised by any interested party other than a justice of the Supreme Court with less embarrassment to the latter.

The question is simple and not difficult of solution. We shall state our opinion as concisely as possible.

The first income tax law of the Philippines was Act No. 2833, which was approved on March 7, 1919, to take effect on January 1, 1920. Section 1 (a) of said Act provided:

There shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid annually upon the entire net income received in the preceding calendar year from all sources by every individual, a citizen or resident of the Philippine Islands, a tax of two per centum upon such income. . . . (Emphasis ours.)

Section 2 (a) of said Act provided:

Subject only to such exemptions and deductions as are hereinafter allowed, the taxable net income of a person shall include gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages or compensation for personal service of whatever kind and is whatever form paid, or from professions, vocations, businesses, trade, commerce, sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in real or personal property, also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the transaction of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains, profits, and income derived from any source whatever.

That income tax law has been amended several times, specially as to the rates of the tax, but the above-quoted provisions (except as to the rate) have been preserved intact in the subsequent Acts. The present income tax law is Title II of the National Internal Revenue Code, Commonwealth Act No. 466, sections 21, 28 and 29 of which incorporate the texts of the above-quoted provisions of the original Act in exactly the same language. There can be no dispute whatsoever that judges (who are individuals) and their salaries (which are income) are as clearly comprehended within the above-quoted provisions of the law as if they were specifically mentioned therein; and in fact all judges had been and were paying income tax on their salaries when the Constitution of the Philippines was discussed and approved by the Constitutional Convention and when it was submitted to the people for confirmation in the plebiscite of May 14, 1935.

Now, the Constitution provides that the members of the Supreme Court and all judges of inferior courts "shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office." (Section 9, Article VIII, emphasis ours.)a

The simple question is: In approving the provisions against the diminution of the compensation of judges and other specified officers during their continuance in office, did the framers of the Constitution intend to nullify the then existing income tax law insofar as it imposed a tax on the salaries of said officers ? If they did not, then the income tax law, which has been incorporated in the present National Internal Revenue Code, remains in force in its entirety and said officers cannot claim exemption therefrom on their salaries.

Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution provides that all laws of the Philippine Islands shall remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until amended, altered, modified. or repealed by the Congress of the Philippines.

In resolving the question at bar, we must take into consideration the following well-settled rules:

"A constitution shall be held to be prepared and adopted in reference to existing statutory laws, upon the provisions of which in detail it must depend to be set in practical operation" (People vs. Potter, 47 N. Y. 375; People vs. Draper, 15 N. Y. 537; Cass vs. Dillon, 2 Ohio St. 607; People vs. N. Y., 25 Wend. (N. Y. 22). (Barry vs. Traux, 3 A. & E. Ann. Cas 191, 193.).

Courts are bound to presume that the people adopting a constitution are familiar with the previous and existing laws upon the subjects to which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its adoption (Baltimore vs. State, 15 Md. 376, 480; 74 Am. Dec. 572; State vs. Mace, 5 Md. 337; Bandel vs. Isaac, 13 Md. 202; Manly vs. State, 7 Md. 135; Hamilton vs. St. Louis County Ct., 15 Mo. 5; People vs. Gies, 25 Mich. 83; Servis vs. Beatty, 32 Miss. 52; Pope vs. Phifer, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 686; People vs. Harding, 53 Mich. 48, 51 Am. Rep. 95; Creve Coeur Lake Ice Co. vs. Tamm, 138 Mo. 385, 39 S. W. Rep. 791). (Idem.)

A constitutional provision must be presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and existing laws and with reference to them. Constitutions, like statutes, are properly to be expounded in the light of conditions existing at the time of their adoption, the general spirit of the times, and the prevailing sentiments among the people. Reference may be made to the historical facts relating to the original or political institutions of the community or to prior well-known practices and usages. (11 Am. Ju., Constitutional Law, 676-678.)

The salaries provided in the Constitution for the Chief Justice and each associate Justice, respectively, of the Supreme Court were the same salaries ]which they were receiving at the time the Constitution was framed and adopted and on which they were paying income tax under the existing income tax law. It seems clear to us that for them to receive the same salaries, subject to the same tax, after the adoption of the Constitution as before does not involve any diminution at all. The fact that the plaintiff was not a member of the Court when the Constitution took effect, makes no difference. The salaries of justices and judges were subject to income tax when he was appointed in the early part of 1945. In fact he must have declared and paid income tax on his salary for 19454 — he claimed exemption only beginning 1946. It seems likewise clear that when the framers of the Constitution fixed those salaries, they must have taken into consideration that the recipients were paying income tax thereon. There was no necessity to provide expressly that said salaries shall be subject to income tax because they knew that already so provided. On the other hand, if exemption from any tax on said salaries had been intended, it would have been specifically to so provide, instead of merely saying that the compensation as fixed "shall not be diminished during their continuance in office."

In the light of the antecedents, the prohibition against diminution cannot be interpreted to include or refer to general taxation but to a law by which said salaries may be fixed. The sentence in question reads: "They shall receive such compensation as may be fixed by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office." The next sentence reads: "Until the Congress shall provide otherwise, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall receive an annual compensation of P16,000, and each associate Justice, P15,000." It is plain that the Constitution authorizes the Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation, but that such rate must be higher than that which the justices receive at he time of its enactment or, if lower, it must not affect those justice already in office. In other words, Congress may approve a law increasing the salaries of the

justices at any time, but it cannot approve a law decreasing their salaries unless such law is made effective only as to justices appointed after its approval.

It would be a strained and unreasonable construction of the prohibition against diminution to read into it an exemption from taxation. There is no justification for the belief or assumption that the framers of the Constitution intended to exempt the salaries of said officers from taxes. They knew that it was and is the unavoidable duty of every citizen to bear his aliquot share of the cost of maintaining the Government; that taxes are the very blood that sustains the life of the Government. To make all citizens share the burden of taxation equitably, the Constitution expressly provides that "the rule of taxation shall be uniform." (Section 22 [1], Article VI.) We think it would be a contravention of this provision to read into the prohibition against diminution of the salaries of the judges and other specified officers an exemption from taxes on their salaries. How could the rule of income taxation be uniform if it should not be applied to a group of citizens in the same situation as other income earners ? It is to us inconceivable that the framers ever intended to relieve certain officers of the Government from sharing with their fellows citizens the material burden of the Government — to exempt their salaries from taxes. Moreover, the Constitution itself specifies what properties are exempt from taxes, namely: "Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes." (Sec. 22 [3], Article VI.) The omission of the salaries in question from this enumeration is in itself an eloquent manifestation of intention to continue the imposition of taxes thereon as provided in the existing law. Inclusio est exclusio alterius.

We have thus far read and construed the pertinent portions of our own Constitution and income tax law in the light of the antecedent circumstances and of the operative factors which prevailed at the time our Constitution was framed, independently of the construction now prevailing in the United States of similar provisions of the federal Constitution in relation to the present federal income tax law, under which the justices of the Supreme Court, and the federal judges are now, and since the case of O'Malley vs. Woodrough was decided on May 22, 1939, have been, paying income tax on their salaries. Were this a majority opinion, we could end here with the consequent reversal of the judgment appealed from. But ours is a voice in the wilderness, and we may permit ourselves to utter it with more vehemence and emphasis so that future players on this stage perchance may hear and heed it. Who knows? The Gospel itself was a voice in the wilderness at the time it was uttered.

We have to comment on Anglo-American precedents since the majority decision from which we dissent is based on some of them. Indeed, the majority say they "hardly do nothing more than to borrow therefrom and to compare their conclusions to local conditions." which we shall presently show did not obtain in the United States at the time the federal and state Constitutions were adopted. We shall further show that in any event what they now borrow is not usable because it has long been withdrawn from circulation.

When the American Constitution was framed and adopted, there was no income tax law in the United States. To this circumstance may be attributed the claim made by some federal judges headed by Chief Justice Taney, when under the Act of Congress of July 1, 1862, their salaries were subjected to an income tax, that such tax was a diminution of their salaries and therefore prohibited by the Constitution. Chief Justice Taney's claim and his protest against the tax were not heeded, but no federal judge deemed it proper to sue the Collector of Internal Revenue to recover the taxes they continued to pay under protest for several years. In 1869, the Secretary of the Treasury referred the question to Atty. General Hoar, and that officer rendered an opinion in substantial accord with Chief Justice Taney's protest, and also advised that the tax on the President's compensation was likewise invalid. No judicial pronouncement, however, was made of such invalidity until June 1, 1920, when the case of Evans vs. Gore (253 U.S. 245, 64 L. ed. 887) was decided upon the constitutionality of section 213 of the Act of February 24, 1919, which required the computation of incomes for the purpose of taxation to embrace all gains, profits, income and the like, "including in the case of the President of the United States, the judges of the Supreme and inferior courts of the United States, [and others] . . . the compensation received as such." The Supreme Court of the United States, speaking through Mr. Justice Van Devanter, sustained the suit with the dissent of Justice Holmes and Brandeis. The doctrine of Evans vs. Gore holding in effect that an income tax on a judge's salary is a diminution thereof prohibited by the Constitution, was reaffirmed in 1925 in Miles vs. Graham, 69 L. ed 1067.

In 1939, however, the case of O'Malley vs. Woodrough (59 S. Ct. 838, 122 A. L. R. 1379) was brought up to the test the validity of section 22 of the Revenue Act of June 6, 1932, which included in the "gross income," on the basis of which taxes were to be paid, the compensation of "judges of courts of the United States taking office after June 6, 1932." And in that case the Supreme Court of the United States, with only one dissent (that of Justice Butler), abandoned the doctrine of Evans vs. Gore and Miles vs. Graham by holding:

To subject them [the judges] to a general tax is merely to recognize that judges are also citizens, and that their particular function in government does not generate an immunity from sharing with their fellow citizens the material burden of the government whose Constitution and laws they are charged with administering.

The decision also says:

To suggest that it [the law in question] makes inroads upon the independence of judges who took office after Congress had thus charged them with the common duties of citizenship, by making them bear their aliquot share of the cost of maintaining the Government, is to trivialize the great historic experience on which the framers based the safeguard of Article 3, section 1.

Commenting on the above-quoted portions of the latest decision of the Supreme Court of the United States on the subject, Prof. William Bennett, Munro, in his book, The Government of the United States, which is used as a text in various universities, says: ". . .

All of which seems to be common sense, for surely the framers of the Constitution from ever cutting a judge's salary, did not intend to relieve all federal judges from the general obligations of citizenship. As for the President, he has never raised the issue; every occupant of the White House since 1913 has paid his income tax without protest. (Pages 371-372.)

We emphasize that the doctrine of Evans vs. Gore and Miles vs. Graham is no longer operative, and that all United States judges, including those who took office before June 6, 1932, are subject to and pay income tax on their salaries; for after the submission of O'Malley vs. Woodrough for decision the Congress of the United States, by section 3 of the Public Salary Act of 1939, amended section 22 (a) of the Revenue Act of June 6, 1932, so as to make it applicable to "judges of courts of the United States who took office on or before June 6, 1932." And the validity of that Act, in force for more than a decade, has not been challenged.

Our colleagues import and transplant here the dead limbs of Evans vs. Gore and Miles vs. Graham and attempt to revive and nurture them with painstaking analyses and diagnoses that they had not suffered a fatal blow from O'Malley vs. Woodrough. We refuse to join this heroic attempt because we believe it is futile.

They disregard the actual damage and minimize it by trying to discover the process by which it was inflicted and he motivations that led to the infliction. They say that the chief axe-wielder, Justice Frankfurter, was a Harvard graduate and professor and that the Harvard Law Journal had criticized Evans vs. Gore; that the dissenters in said case (Holmes and Brandeis) were Harvard men like Frankfurter; and that they believe this to be the "inarticulate consideration that may have influenced the grounds on which the case [O'Malley vs. Woodrough] went off." This argument is not valid, in our humble belief. It was not only the Harvard Law Journal that had criticized Evans vs. Gore. Justice Frankfurter and his colleagues said that the decision in that case "met with wide and steadily growing disfavor from legal scholarship and professional opinion," and they cited the following: Clark, Furthermore Limitations Upon Federal Income Taxation, 30 Yale L. J. 75; Corwin, Constitutional Law in 1919-1920, 15 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 635, 641-644; Fellman, Diminution of Judicial Salaries, 24 Iowa L. Rev. 89; Lowndes, Taxing Income of Federal Judiciary, 19 Va. L. Rev. 153; Powell, Constitutional Law in 1919-1920, 19 Mich. L. Rev. 117, 118; Powell, The Sixteenth Amendment and Income from State Securities, National Income Tax Magazine (July, 1923), 5, 6; 20 Columbia L. Rev. 794; 43 Harvard L. Rev. 318; 20 Ill. L. Rev. 376; 45 Law Quarterly Rev. 291; 7 Va. L. Rev. 69; 3 University of Chicago L. Rev. 141. Justice Frankfurter and his colleagues also said that "Evans vs. Gore itself was rejected by most of the courts before whom the matter came after that decision." Is not the intention to throw Evans vs. Gore into the graveyard of abandoned cases manifest from all this and from the holding that judges are also citizens, liable to income tax on their salaries?

The majority say that "unless and until our legislature approves an amendment to the income tax law expressly taxing 'the salaries of judges thereafter appointed,' the O'Malley case is not relevant." We have shown that our income tax law taxes the salaries of judges as clearly as if they are specifically mentioned therein, and that said law took effect long before the adoption of the Constitution and long before the plaintiff was appointed.

We agree that the purpose of the constitutional provision against diminution of the salaries of judges during their continuance in office is to safeguard the independence of the Judicial Department. But we disagree that to subject the salaries of judges to a general income tax law applicable to all income earners would in any way affect their independence. Our own experience since the income tax law went effect in 1920 is the best refutation of such assumption.

The majority give an example by which the independence of judges may be imperiled thru the imposition of a tax on their salaries. They say: Suppose there is power to tax the salaries of judges and the judiciary incurs the displeasure of the Legislature and the Executive. In retaliation the income tax law is amended so as to levy a 30 per cent tax on all salaries of government officials on the level of judges, and by means of another law the salaries of the executive and the legislative branches are increased to compensate for the 30 per cent reduction of their salaries. To this we reply that if such a vindictive measure is ever resorted to (which we cannot imagine), we shall be the first ones to vote to strike it down as a palpable violation of the Constitution. There is no parity between such hypothetical law and the general income tax law invoked by the defendant in this case. We believe that an income tax law applicable only against the salaries of judges and not against those or all other income earners may be successfully assailed as being in contravention not only of the provision against diminution of the salaries of judges but also of the uniformity of the rule of taxation as well as of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. So the danger apprehended by the majority is not real but surely imaginary.

We vote for the reversal of the judgment appealed from the dismissal of plaintiff's complaint.

Paras J., concurs.

Footnotes

* Evans vs. Gore, 253 U. S. 245 and Gordy v. Dennis, 5 Atl. (2d) 69, hold identical view.

1 Evans vs. Gore, 253 U. S. 254, 64 L. ed. 887.

2 157 U. S. 701, Evans vs. Gore, supra.

3 See Evans vs. Gore, supra.

* Evans vs. Gore, supra.

(Note A) The defendant also relies on the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Holmes in Evans vs. Gore, supra, forgetting that subsequently Justice Holmes did not dissent in Miles vs. Graham, and apparently accepted Evans vs. Gore as authority in writing

his opinion in Gillespie vs. Oklahoma, 257 U. S. 501, 66 Law ed. 338. This remark applies to Taylor vs. Gehner (1931), No. 45 S. W. (2d) 59, which merely echoes Holmes dissent.

State vs. Nygaard, 159, Wisc. 396 and the decision of English courts invoked by appellant, are refuted or distinguished in Gordy vs. Dennis, 5 Alt. (2d) 68, known to him since he invokes the minority opinion therein.

4 Frankfurter, The Administrative Side of Chief Justice Hughes, Harvard Law Review, November, 1949.

5 It was a coincidence that the dissenters (Holmes and Brandeis) were Harvard men like Frankfurter. It is not unlikely that the Harvard professor and admirer of Justice Holmes (whose biography he wrote in 1938) noted and unconsciously absorbed the dissent.

6 Baker vs. C.I.R. 149 Fed. (2d) 342.

7 It requires a very clear case to justify changing the construction of a constitutional provision which has been acquiesced in for so long a period as fifty years. (States vs. Frear, 138 Wisc. 536, 120 N. W. 216. See also Hill vs. Tohill, 225 Ill. 384, 80 NE, 253.

8 On persuasive weight of contemporary construction of constitutional provision, see generally Cooley, Constitutional Limitation 98th Ed.) Vol. I pp. 144 et seq.

a The Constitution also provides that the President shall "receive a compensation to be ascertained by law which shall be neither increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected" (section 9, Article VII); that the Auditor General "shall receive an annual compensation to be fixed by law which shall not be diminished during his continuance in office" (section 1, Article XI); and that the salaries of the chairman and the members of the Commission on Elections "shall be neither increased nor diminished during their term of office" (section 1, Article X).\

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-12088           December 23, 1959

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.MORO SUMAGUINA MACARANDANG, defendant-appellant.

Valeriano V. Rovira for appellant.Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Assistant Solicitor General Florencio Villamor for appellee.

 

PARAS, C. J.:

Moro Sumaguina Macarandang was accused an, after trial, convicted of the crime of illegal possesion of fire-arms in the Court of First Instance of Lanao under the following information:

That on or about June 8, 1954, in the Municipality of Marantao, Province of Lanao, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep and have his custody and control one Riot Gun, Winchester, 12 GA. SN-924131 and (8) rounds of ammunitions, without firs having obtained in proper license or permit therefore from competent authority.

In the present appeal the accused, admitting the ownership and of the firearm and ammunitions in question, invokes as his legal excuse or authority therefor, the appointment issued him by Governor Dimakuta as secret agent on October 1, 1953, which reads as follows:1awphi1.net

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

For having shown good faith by previously surrending to this Office a firearm, Datu Sumaguina Macarandang of Kamalig, Marantao, Lanao, has been appointed SECRET AGENT of peace and order campaigns and detention of crimes. Accordingly, he is hereby authorized to hold and carry in his possession one (1) Riot Winchester Shotgun, 12 GA. Serial No. 942131 with twenty(20) rounds of ammunitions for the successful execution of his hazardous mission.

Datu Sumaguina Macarandang shall personally report to me from time to time all activities and whereabouts of lawless and wanted elements roaming in the Municipal District of Marantoa, as well as all matters affecting tranquility therein existing. lawphi1.net

It may be true that, as held by the trial court, the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit; but section 879 of the Revise Administrative Code provides, as shown at lease by the subject matter therefor, that "peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. The appointment of the accused as secret agent to the assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detention of crimes, sufficiently put him within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 879.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and accused acquitted, with costs de officio. So ordered.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo. Labrador and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

Nitafan vs. Commissioner

GR L-78780, 23 July 1987

Resolution

En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (J): 12 concur, 1 on leave

Facts: The Chief Justice has previously issued a directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office to continue to deduct withholding taxes from

the salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court and other members of the judiciary. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court En Banc on 4

December 1987. RTC judges seek to prohibit or enjoin the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court

from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.

Issue: Whether the salaries of judges are subject to tax.

Held: The salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. Although such intent was somehoe and

inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the 1987 Constitution, the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission negate the

contention that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of “non-diminution” of salaries of judicial officers. Hence, the doctrine in

Perfecto v. Meere and Endencia vs. David do not apply anymore. Justices and judges are not only the citizens whose income have been reduced in

accepting service in government and yet subjecte to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet members and all other employees.

Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue [GR L-78780, 23 July 1987]; ResolutionEn Banc, Melencio-Herrera (p): 12 concur, 1 on leave

Facts: The Chief Justice has previously issued a directive to the Fiscal Management and Budget Office to continue the deduction of withholding taxes from salaries of the Justices of the Supreme Court and other members of the judiciary. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court en banc on 4 December 1987.

Petitioners are the duly appointed and qualified Judges presiding over Branches 52, 19 and 53, respectively, of the RTC, National Capital Judicial Region, all with stations in Manila. They seek to prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries.  With the filing of the petition, the Court deemed it best to settle the issue through judicial pronouncement, even if it had dealt with the matter administratively.

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for prohibition.

1.    Intent to delete express grant of exemption of income taxes to members of JudiciaryThe salaries of members of the Judiciary are subject to the general income tax applied to all taxpayers. This intent was somehow and inadvertently not clearly set forth in the final text of the Constitution as approved and ratified in February, 1987 (infra, pp. 7-8). Although the intent may have been obscured by the failure to include in the General Provisions a proscription against exemption of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, from payment of income tax, the Court since then has authorized the continuation of the deduction of the withholding tax from the salaries of the members of the Supreme Court, as well as from the salaries of all other members of the Judiciary. The Court hereby makes of record that it had then discarded the ruling in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David.The 1973 Constitution has provided that “no salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income tax (Section 6, Article XV)” which was not present in the 1987 Constitution. The deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission relevant to Section 10, Article VIII (The salary of the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law. During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be decreased), negate the contention that the intent of the framers is to revert to the original concept of “non-diminution” of salaries of judicial officers.

2.    Equality of branches of government effected by modifications in provisionThe term “diminished” be changed to “decreased” and that the words “nor subjected to income tax” be deleted so as to give substance to equality among the three branches in the government. A period (.) after “decreased” was made on the understanding that the salary of justices is subject to tax. With the period, the doctrine in Perfecto vs. Meer and Endencia vs. David is understood not to apply anymore. Justices and judges are not only the citizens whose income have been reduced in accepting service in government and yet subjected to income tax. Such is true also of Cabinet members and all other employees.

3.    Constitutional construction adopts the intent of the framers and people adopting the lawThe ascertainment of the intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect.  The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers. In the case at bar, Section 10, Article VIII is plain that the Constitution authorizes Congress to pass a law fixing another rate of compensation of Justices and Judges but such rate must be higher than that which they are receiving at the time of enactment, or if lower, it would be applicable only to those appointed after its approval. It would be a strained construction to read into the provision an exemption from taxation in the light of the discussion in the Constitutional Commission.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION 

G.R. No. L-30061 February 27, 1974

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellees, vs.JOSE JABINAL Y CARMEN, defendant-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Antonio M. Martinez for plaintiff-appellee. Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for defendant-appellant.

ANTONIO, J.:p

Appeal from the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas (provincial capital), Batangas, in Criminal Case No. 889, finding the accused guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years imprisonment, with the accessories provided by law, which raises in issue the validity of his conviction based on a retroactive application of Our ruling in People v. Mapa. 1

The complaint filed against the accused reads:

That on or about 9:00 o'clock, p.m., the 5th day of September, 1964, in the poblacion, Municipality of Batangas, Province of Batangas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a person not authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously keep in his possession, custody and direct control a revolver Cal. .22, RG8 German Made with one (1) live ammunition and four (4) empty shells without first securing the necessary permit or license to possess the same.

At the arraignment on September 11, 1964, the accused entered a plea of not guilty, after which trial was accordingly held.

The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.

Indeed, the accused had appointments from the above-mentioned officials as claimed by him. His appointment from Governor Feliciano Leviste, dated December 10, 1962, reads:

Reposing special trust and confidence in your civic spirit, and trusting that you will be an effective agent in the detection of crimes and in the preservation of peace and order in the province of Batangas, especially with respect to the suppression of trafficking in explosives, jueteng, illegal cockfighting, cattle rustling, robbery and the detection of unlicensed firearms, you are hereby appointed a SECRET AGENT of the undersigned, the appointment to take effect immediately, or as soon as you have qualified for the position. As such Secret Agent, your duties shall be those generally of a peace officer and particularly to help in the preservation of peace and order in this province and to make reports thereon to me once or twice a month. It should be clearly understood that any abuse of authority on your part shall be considered sufficient ground for the automatic cancellation of your appointment and immediate separation from the service. In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have the right to bear a firearm, particularly described below, for use in connection with the performance of your duties.

By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of your duties by taking your oath of office and filing the original thereof with us.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) FELICIANO LEVISTEProvincial Governor

FIREARM AUTHORIZED TO CARRY:

Kind: — ROHM-Revolver Make: — German SN: — 64 Cal:— .22

On March 15, 1964, the accused was also appointed by the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas as Confidential Agent with duties to furnish information regarding smuggling activities, wanted persons, loose firearms, subversives and other similar subjects that might affect the peace and order condition in Batangas province, and in connection with these duties he was temporarily authorized to possess a ROHM revolver, Cal. .22 RG-8 SN-64, for his personal protection while in the performance of his duties.

The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court's decision in People vs. Macarandang 2 and People vs. Lucero. 3 The trial court, while conceding on the basis of the evidence of record the accused had really been appointed Secret Agent and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Governor and the PC Provincial Commander of Batangas, respectively, with authority to possess and carry the firearm described in the complaint, nevertheless held the accused in its decision dated December 27, 1968, criminally liable for illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the ground that the rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa, supra. The court considered as mitigating circumstances the appointments of the accused as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent.

Let us advert to Our decisions in People v. Macarandang, supra, People v. Lucero, supra, and People v. Mapa, supra. In Macarandang, We reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction against the accused because it was shown that at the time he was found to possess a certain firearm and ammunition without license or permit, he had an appointment from the Provincial Governor as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and in the detection of crimes, with authority to hold and carry the said firearm and ammunition. We therefore held that while it is true that the Governor has no authority to issue any firearm license or permit, nevertheless, section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "peace officers" are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms; and Macarandang's appointment as Secret Agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order and detection of crimes, sufficiently placed him in the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police who under section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code are exempted from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. In Lucero, We held that under the circumstances of the case, the granting of the temporary use of the firearm to the accused was a necessary means to carry out the lawful purpose of the batallion commander to effect the capture of a Huk leader. In Mapa, expressly abandoning the doctrine in Macarandang, and by implication, that in Lucero, We sustained the judgment of conviction on the following ground:

The law is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed, "it shall be unlawful for any person to ... possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition." (Sec. 878, as amended by Republic Act No. 4, Revised Administrative Code.) The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the Armed Forces of the Philippines], the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors, lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered "when such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in the performance of their official duties." (Sec. 879, Revised Administrative Code.)

The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such he is not exempt. ... .

It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People v. Lucero (1958). Our decision in People v. Mapa reversing the aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal is: Should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa? The Solicitor General is of the first view, and he accordingly recommends reversal of the appealed judgment.

Decisions of this Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, and this is the reason why under Article 8 of the New Civil Code "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system ... ." The interpretation upon a law by this Court constitutes, in a way, a part of the law as of the date that law originally passed, since this Court's construction merely establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of legal maxim "legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet" — the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the firearm in question and when he arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.

It follows, therefore, that considering that appellant conferred his appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby reversed, and appellant is acquitted, with costs de oficio.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Fernando, J., took no part

People vs. JabinalFebruary 27, 1974

Facts:

On September 5, 1964, the accused was found to be in possession of a revolver without the requisite license or

permit. He claimed to be entitled to exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had appointments as

Secret Agent from the Provincial Governor of Batangas and as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander,

and the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the said firearm. The accused

further contended that in view of his appointments, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme Court’s

decisions in People vs. Macarandang and in People vs. Lucero.

The trial court found the accused criminally liable for illegal possession of firearm and ammunition on the ground

that the rulings in Macarandang* and in Lucero* were reversed and abandoned in People vs. Mapa**.The case was elevated to the Supreme Court.

Issue:Whether or not the appellant should be acquitted on the basis of the Supreme Court’srulings in the cases of Macarandang and of Lucero.

Ruling:The appellant was acquitted.

Decisions of the Supreme Court, although in themselves not laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the law

means; this is the reason why Article 8 of the New Civil Code provides that, “Judicial decisions applying and interpreting

the laws or the constitution shall form part of the legal system.” The interpretation upon a law by the Supreme Court

constitutes in a way a part of the law as of the date the law was originally passed, since the court’s construction merely

establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the law thus construed intends to effectuate. The settled rule

supported by numerous authorities is a restatement of the legal maxim “legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet”—the

interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law. The doctrine laid down in Lucero and

in Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law of the land, at the time appellant was found in

possession of the firearm and when he was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa

case in 1967, but when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine

should be applied prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith

thereof.

Considering that the appellant possessed a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in

Macarandang and in Lucero, under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm, the appellant

should be absolved. The appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be

punishable._____________________

*The accused were acquitted for through their appointment as confidential/secret agent they were deemed to be “peace

officers”. Peace officers had the privilege of carrying firearms without license.

**Mapa was convicted although he was a secret/confidential agent. The court ruled that the law did not explicitly provide

that secret/confidential agents are among those who are exempted from acquiring a license to carry a firearm.