statcon chapter 3 cases

7/28/2019 Statcon Chapter 3 Cases

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G.R. No. L-15045 January 20, 1961

IN RE: PETITION FOR EXEMPTION FROM COVERAGE BY THE

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM. ROMAN CATHOLIC

ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, petitioner-appellant,

vs.SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee.

Feria, Manglapus and Associates for petitioner-appellant.

Legal Staff, Social Security System and Solicitor General for respondent-

appellee.

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

On September 1, 1958, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, thru

counsel, filed with the Social Security Commission a request that "Catholic

Charities, and all religious and charitable institutions and/or organizations,which are directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by the Roman

Catholic Archbishop of Manila," be exempted from compulsory coverage of

Republic Act No. 1161, as amended, otherwise known as the Social

Security Law of 1954. The request was based on the claim that the said Act

is a labor law and does not cover religious and charitable institutions but is

limited to businesses and activities organized for profit. Acting upon the

recommendation of its Legal Staff, the Social Security Commission in its

Resolution No. 572, series of 1958, denied the request. The Roman Catholic

Archbishop of Manila, reiterating its arguments and raising constitutional

objections, requested for reconsideration of the resolution. The request,

however, was denied by the Commission in its Resolution No. 767, series of

1958; hence, this appeal taken in pursuance of section 5(c) of Republic Act

No. 1161, as amended.

Section 9 of the Social Security Law, as amended, provides that coverage

"in the System shall be compulsory upon all members between the age of

sixteen and sixty rears inclusive, if they have been for at least six months a

the service of an employer who is a member of the System, Provided, that

the Commission may not compel any employer to become member of the

System unless he shall have been in operation for at least t wo years and has

at the time of admission, if admitted for membership during the first year of

the System's operation at least fifty employees, and if admitted for

membership the following year of operation and thereafter, at least six

employees x x x." The term employer" as used in the law is defined as any

person, natural or juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries in the

Philippines any trade, business, industry, undertaking, or activity of any

kind and uses the services of another person who is under his orders as

regards the employment, except the Government and any of its politicalsubdivisions, branches or instrumentalities, including corporations owned or

controlled by the Government" (par. [c], see. 8), while an "employee" refers

to "any person who performs services for an 'employer' in which either orboth mental and physical efforts are used and who receives compensation

for such services" (par. [d], see. 8). "Employment", according to paragraph

[i] of said section 8, covers any service performed by an employer except

those expressly enumerated thereunder, like employment under the

Government, or any of its political subdivisions, branches or

instrumentalities including corporations owned and controlled by the

Government, domestic service in a private home, employment purely

casual, etc.

From the above legal provisions, it is apparent that the coverage of the

Social Security Law is predicated on the existence of an employer-

employee relationship of more or less permanent nature and extends to

employment of all kinds except those expressly excluded.

Appellant contends that the term "employer" as defined in the law shouldfollowing the principle ofejusdem generisbe limited to those who carry

on "undertakings or activities which have the element of profit or gain, or

which are pursued for profit or gain," because the phrase ,activity of any

kind" in the definition is preceded by the words "any trade, business,

industry, undertaking." The contention cannot be sustained. The

rule ejusdem generisapplies only where there is uncertainty. It is notcontrolling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would

thereby be hindered and defeated. (Grosjean vs. American Paints Works

[La], 160 So. 449). In the case at bar, the definition of the term "employer"

is, we think, sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and

charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit, like herein

appellant, within its meaning. This is made more evident by the fact that itcontains an exception in which said institutions or entities are not included.

And, certainly, had the Legislature really intended to limit the operation of

the law to entities organized for profit or gain, it would not have defined an


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"employer" in such a way as to include the Government and yet make an

express exception of it.

It is significant to note that when Republic Act No. 1161 was enacted,

services performed in the employ of institutions organized for religious or

charitable purposes were by express provisions of said Act excluded fromcoverage thereof (sec. 8, par. [j] subpars. 7 and 8). That portion of the law,

however, has been deleted by express provision of Republic Act No. 1792,

which took effect in 1957. This is clear indication that the Legislature

intended to include charitable and religious institutions within the scope of

the law.

In support of its contention that the Social Security Law was intended to

cover only employment for profit or gain, appellant also cites the

discussions of the Senate, portions of which were quoted in its brief. There

is, however, nothing whatsoever in those discussions touching upon the

question of whether the law should be limited to organizations for profit or

gain. Of course, the said discussions dwelt at length upon the need of a lawto meet the problems of industrializing society and upon the plight of an

employer who fails to make a profit. But this is readily explained by the fact

that the majority of those to be affected by the operation of the law are

corporations and industries which are established primarily for profit or

gain.

Appellant further argues that the Social Security Law is a labor law and,

consequently, following the rule laid down in the case ofBoy Scouts of the

Philippines vs. Araos (G.R. No. L-10091, January 29, 1958) and other

cases1, applies only to industry and occupation for purposes of profit and

gain. The cases cited, however, are not in point, for the reason that the law

therein involved expressly limits its application either to commercial,industrial, or agricultural establishments, or enterprises. .

Upon the other hand, the Social Security Law was enacted pursuant to the

"policy of the Republic of the Philippines to develop, establish gradually

and perfect a social security system which shall be suitable to the needs of

the people throughout the Philippines and shall provide protection to

employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death."

(See. 2, Republic Act No. 1161, as amended.) Such enactment is a

legitimate exercise of the police power. It affords protection to labor,

especially to working women and minors, and is in full accord with the

constitutional provisions on the "promotion of social justice to insure the

well-being and economic security of all the people." Being in fact a social

legislation, compatible with the policy of the Church to ameliorate living

conditions of the working class, appellant cannot arbitrarily delimit the

extent of its provisions to relations between capital and labor in industryand agriculture.

There is no merit in the claim that the inclusion of religious organizations

under the coverage of the Social Security Law violates the constitutional

prohibition against the application of public funds for the use, benefit or

support of any priest who might be employed by appellant. The funds

contributed to the System created by the law are not public funds, but funds

belonging to the members which are merely held in trust by the

Government. At any rate, assuming that said funds are impressed with the

character of public funds, their payment as retirement death or disability

benefits would not constitute a violation of the cited provisions of the

Constitution, since such payment shall be made to the priest not because heis a priest but because he is an employee.

Neither may it be validly argued that the enforcement of the Social Security

Law impairs appellant's right to disseminate religious information. All that

is required of appellant is to make monthly contributions to the System for

covered employees in its employ. These contributions, contrary toappellant's contention, are not in the nature of taxes on employment."

Together with the contributions imposed upon the employees and the

Government, they are intended for the protection of said employees against

the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death in line with the

constitutional mandate to promote social justice to insure the well-being and

economic security of all the people.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Resolutions Nos. 572 kind 767, series of

1958, of the Social Security Commission are hereby affirmed. So ordered

with costs against appellant.

Paras, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Barrera, JJ., concur in the result.

Bengzon, J., reserves his vote.


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G.R. No. 127116 April 8, 1997

ALEX L. DAVID, in his own behalf as Barangay Chairman of

Barangay 77, Zone 7, Kalookan City and as President of the LIGA NG

MGA BARANGAY SA PILIPINAS,petitioner,

vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Department of Interior and Local

Government, and THE HONORABLE SECRETARY, Department ofBudget and Management, respondents.

G.R. No. 128039 April 8, 1997

LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY QUEZON CITY CHAPTER,

Represented by BONIFACIO M. RILLON,petitioner,

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET

AND MANAGEMENT, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The two petitions before us raise a common question: How long is the term

of office of barangay chairmen and other barangay officials who were

elected to their respective offices on the second Monday of May 1994? Is it

three years, as provided by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code) or five

years, as contained in RA 6679? Contending that their term is five years,

petitioners ask this Court to order the cancellation of the scheduled

barangay election this coming May 12, 1997 and to reset it to the secondMonday of May, 1999.

The Antecedents

G.R.No. 127116

In his capacity as barangay chairman of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Kalookan

City and as president of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas, Petitioner

Alex L. David filed on December 2, 1996 a petition for prohibition

docketed in this Court as G.R. No. 127116, under Rule 65 of the Rules of

Court, to prohibit the holding of the barangay election scheduled on the

second Monday of May 1997. On January 14, 1997, the Court resolved to

require the respondents to comment on the petition within a non-extendible

period of fifteen days ending on January 29, 1997.

On January 29, 1997, the Solicitor General filed his four-page Comment

siding with petitioner and praying that "the election scheduled on May 12,

1997 be held in abeyance." Respondent Commission on Elections filed a

separate Comment, dated February 1, 1997 opposing the petition. On

February 11, 1997, the Court issued a Resolution giving due course to the

petition and requiring the parties to file simultaneous memoranda within a

non-extendible period of twenty days from notice. It also requested former

Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.1

to act as amicus curiae and to file a

memorandum also within a non-extendible period of twenty days. It noted

but did not grant petitioner's Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary

Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated January 31,

1997 (as well as his UrgentEx-Parte Second Motion to the same effect,dated March 6, 1997). Accordingly, the parties filed their respective

memoranda. The Petition for Leave to Intervene filed on March 17, 1997 by

Punong Barangay Rodson F. Mayor was denied as it would just unduly

delay the resolution of the case, his interest like those of all other barangay

officials being already adequately represented by Petitioner David who filed

this petition as "president of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas."

G.R.No. 128039

On February 20, 1997, Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City

Chapter represented by its president Bonifacio M. Rillon filed a petition,

docketed as G.R. No. 128039, "to seek a judicial review by certiorari todeclare as unconstitutional:

1. Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160 which reads as follows:

(c) The term of office of barangay officials and members

of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3) years,

which shall begin after the regular election of barangay

officials on the second Monday of May 1994.


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2. COMELEC Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 fixing the

date of the holding of the barangay elections on May 12,

1997 and other activities related thereto;

3. The budgetary appropriation of P400 million contained

in Republic Act No. 8250 otherwise known as the GeneralAppropriations Act of 1997 intended to defray the costs

and expenses in holding the 1997 barangay elections:2

Comelec Resolution 2880,3

promulgated on December 27, 1996 and

referred to above, adopted a "Calendar of Activities and List and Periods of

Certain Prohibited Acts for the May 12, 1997 Barangay Elections." On the

other hand, Comelec Resolution 2887 promulgated on February 5, 1997

moved certain dates fixed in Resolution 2880.4

Acting on the petition, the Court on February 25, 1997 required respondents

to submit their comment thereon within a non-extendible period of ten days

ending on March 7, 1997. The Court further resolved to consolidate the twocases inasmuch as they raised basically the same issue. Respondent

Commission filed its Comment on March 6, 19975

and the Solicitor

General, in representation of the other respondent, filed his on March 6,

1997. Petitioner's Urgent Omnibus Motion for oral argument and temporary

restraining order was noted but not granted. The petition was deemed

submitted for resolution by the Court without need of memoranda.

The Issues

Both petitions though worded differently raise the same ultimate issue: How

long is the term of office of barangay officials?

Petitioners6

contend that under Sec. 2 of Republic Act No. 6653, approved

on May 6, 1988, "(t)he term of office of barangay officials shall be for five(5) years . . ." This is reiterated in Republic Act No. 6679, approved on

November 4, 1988, which reset the barangay elections from "the second

Monday of November 1988" to March 28, 1989 and provided in Sec. 1

thereof that such five-year term shall begin on the "first day of May 1989

and ending on the thirty-first day of May 1994." Petitioners further

aver7

that although Sec. 43 of RA 7160 reduced the term of office of all

local elective officials to three years, such reduction does not apply to

barangay officials because (1) RA 6679 is a special law applicable only to

barangays while RA 7160 is a general law which applies to all other local

government units; (2) RA 7160 does not expressly or impliedly repeal RA

6679 insofar as the term of barangay officials is concerned; (3) while Sec. 8

of Article X of the 1987 constitution fixes the term of elective local officials

at three years, the same provision states that the term of barangay officials"shall be determined by law"; and (4) thus, it follows that the constitutional

intention is to grant barangay officials any term, except three years;

otherwise, "there would be no rhyme or reason for the framers of theConstitution to except barangay officials from the three year term found in

Sec. 8 (of) Article X of the Constitution." Petitioners conclude (1) that the

Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion when it

promulgated Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 because it "substituted its own

will for that of the legislative and usurped the judicial function . . . by

interpreting the conflicting provisions of Sec. 1 of RA 6679 and Sec. 43 (c)

of RA 7160; and (2) that the appropriation of P400 million in the General

Appropriation Act of 1997 (RA 8250) to be used in the conduct of the

barangay elections on May 12, 1997 is itself unconstitutional and a waste ofpublic funds.

The Solicitor General agrees with petitioners, arguing that RA 6679 was not

repealed by RA 7160 and thus "he believes that the holding of the barangay

elections (o)n the second Monday of May 1997 is without sufficient legal

basis."

Respondent Commission on Elections, through Chairman Bernardo P.

Pardo, defends its assailed Resolutions and maintains that the repealing

clause of RA 7160 includes "all laws, whether general or special,

inconsistent, with the provisions of the Local Government Code," citing this

Court's dictum inParasvs. Comelec8

that "the next regular electioninvolving the barangay office is barely seven (7) months away, the same

having been scheduled in May 1997." Furthermore, RA 8250 (the General

Appropriations Act for 1997) and RA 8189 (providing for a general

registration of voters) both "indicate that Congress considered that the

barangay elections shall take place in May, 1997, as provided for in RA

7160, Sec. 43 (c)."9

Besides, petitioners cannot claim a term of more thanthree years since they were elected under the aegis of the Local Government

Code of 1991 which prescribes a term of only three years. Finally,

Respondent Comelec denies the charge of grave abuse of discretion stating

that the "question presented . . . is a purely legal one involving no exercise


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of an act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of

discretion."10

As amicus curiae, former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. urges the Court

to deny the petitions because (1) the Local Autonomy Code repealed both

RA 6679 and 6653 "not only by implication but by design as well"; (2) thelegislative intent is to shorten the term of barangay officials to three years;

(3) the barangay officials should not have a term longer than that of their

administrative superiors, the city and municipal mayors; and (4) barangay

officials are estopped from contesting the applicability of the three-year

term provided by the Local Government Code as they were elected under

the provisions of said Code.

From the foregoing discussions of the parties, the Court believes that the

issues can be condensed into; three, as follows:

1. Which law governs the term of office of barangay

official: RA 7160 or RA 6679?

2. Is RA 7160 insofar as it shortened such term to only

three years constitutional?

3. Are petitioners estopped from claiming a term other

than that provided under RA 7160?.

The Court's Ruling

The petitions are devoid of merit.

Brief Historical Background

of Barangay Elections

For a clear understanding of the issues, it is necessary to delve briefly into

the history of barangay elections.

An a unit of government, the barangay antedated the Spanish conquest of

the Philippines The word "barangay" is derived from the Malay "balangay,"

a boat which transported them (the Malays) to these shores.11

Quoting from

Juan de Plasencia, a Franciscan missionary in 1577, Historian Conrado

Benitez12

wrote that the barangay was ruled by a datowho exercised

absolute powers of government. While the Spaniards kept the barangay as

the basic structure of government, they stripped the dato orrajah, of his

powers.13

Instead, power was centralized nationally in the governor general

and locally in the encomiendero and later, in the alcalde mayorandthegobernadorcillo. The dato orrajah was much later renamed cabeza de

barangay, who was elected by the local citizens possessing property. The

position degenerated from a title of honor to that of a "mere governmentemployee. Only the poor who needed a salary, no matter how low, accepted

the post."14

After the Americans colonized the Philippines, the barangays became

known as "barrios."15

For some time, the laws governing barrio

governments were found in the Revised Administrative Code of 1916 and

later in the Revised Administrative Code of 1917.16

Barrios were granted

autonomy by the original Barrio Charter, RA 2370, and formally recognized

as quasi-municipal corporations17

by the Revised Barrio Charter, RA 3590.During the martial law regime, barrios were "declared" or renamed

"barangays"a reversion really to their pre-Spanish namesby PD. No.

86 and PD No. 557. Their basic organization and functions under RA 3590,

which was expressly "adopted as the Barangay Charter, were retained.

However, the titles of the officials were changed to "barangay captain,"

"barangay councilman," "barangay secretary" and "barangay treasurer."

Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Batas Pambansa Big. 222,18

"a Punong Barangay

(Barangay Captain) and six Kagawads ng Sangguniang Barangay

(Barangay Councilmen), who shall constitute the presiding officer and

members of the Sangguniang Barangay (Barangay Council) respectively"

were first elected on May 17, 1982. They had a term of six years whichbegan on June 7, 1982.

The Local Government Code of 198319

also fixed the term of office of local

elective officials at six years.20

Under this Code, the chief officials of the

barangay were the punong barangay, six elective sangguniang barangay

members, the kabataang barangay chairman, a barangay secretary and a

barangay treasurer.21

B.P. Blg. 881, the Omnibus Election

Code,22

reiterated that barangay officials "shall hold office, for six years,"

and stated that their election was to be held "on the second Monday of May


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nineteen hundred and eighty eight and on the same day every six years

thereafter."23

This election scheduled by B.P. Blg. 881 on the second Monday of May

1988 was reset to "the second Monday of November 1988 and every five

years thereafter24

by RA 6653. Under this law, the term of office of thebarangay officials was cut to five years

25and the punong barangay was to

be chosen from among themselves by seven kagawads, who in turn were to

be elected at large by the barangay electorate.26

But the election date set by RA 6653 on the second Monday of November

1988 was again "postponed and reset to March 28, 1989" by RA

6679,27

and the term of office of barangay officials was to begin on May 1,

1989 and to end on May 31, 1994. RA 6679 further provided that "there

shall be held a regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday

of May 1994 and on the same day every five (5) years thereafter Their term

shall be for five years . . . "28

Significantly, the manner of election of the

punong barangay was changed. Sec. 5 of said law ordained that while theseven kagawads were to be elected by the registered voters of the barangay,

"(t)he candidate who obtains the highest number of votes shall be the

punong barangay and in the event of a tie, there shall be a drawing of lots

under the supervision of the Commission on Elections."

Under the Local Government Code of 1991, RA 7160,29

several provisions

concerning barangay official were introduced:

(1) The term of office was reduced to three years, as

follows:

Sec. 43. Term of Office.

xxx xxx xxx

(c) The term of office of barangay officials and members

of the sangguniang kabataan shall be for three (3)years,

which shall begin after the regular election of barangay

officials on the second Monday of May, 1994 (Emphasis

supplied.)

(2) The composition of the Sangguniang Barangay and the manner of

electing its officials were altered, inter alia, the barangay chairman was to

be elected directly by the electorate, as follows:

Sec. 387. Chief Officials and Offices.(a) There shall

be in each barangay a punong barangay, seven (7)sanggunian barangay members, the sanggunian kabataan

chairman, a barangay secretary and a barangay treasurer.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 390. Composition.The Sangguniang barangay,

the legislative body of the barangay, shall be composed of

the punong barangay as presiding officer, and the seven

(7) regular sangguniang barangay members elected at

large and the sangguniang kabataan chairman as

members.

Sec. 41.Manner of Election.(a) The . . . punong

barangay shall be elected at large . . . by the qualified

voters in the barangay. (Emphasis supplied.)

Pursuant to the foregoing mandates of the Local Autonomy Code, the

qualified barangay voters actually votedfor one punong barangay and seven

(7) kagawads during the barangay elections held on May 9, 1994. In other

words, the punong barangay was elected directly and separately by the

electorate, and not by the seven (7) kagawads from among themselves.

The First Issue: Clear Legislative Intentand Design to Limit Term to Three Years

In light of the foregoing brief historical background, the intent and design of

the legislature to limit the term of barangay officials to only three (3) years

as provided under the Local Government Code emerges as bright as the

sunlight. The cardinal rule in the interpretation of all laws is to ascertain and

give effect to the intent of the law.30

And three years is the obvious intent.


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First. RA 7160, the Local Government Code, was enacted later than RA

6679. It is basic that in case of an irreconciliable conflict between two laws

of different vintages, the later enactment prevails.31

Legis posteriores

priores contrarias abrogant. The rationale is simple: a later law repeals an

earlier one because it is the later legislative will. It is to be presumed that

the lawmakers knew the older law and intended to change it. In enacting theolder law, the legislators could not have known the newer one and hence

could not have intended to change what they did not know. Under the Civil

Code, laws are repealed only by subsequent ones32

and not the otherway around.

Under Sec. 43-c of RA 7160, the term of office of barangay officials was

fixed at "three (3) years which shall begin after the regular election of

barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994." This provision is

clearly inconsistent with and repugnant to Sec. 1 of RA 6679 which states

that such "term shall be for five years." Note that both laws refer to the

same officials who were elected "on the second Monday of May 1994."

Second. RA 6679 requires the barangay voters to elect seven kagawads and

the candidate obtaining the highest number of votes shall automatically be

the punong barangay. RA 6653 empowers the seven elected barangay

kagawads to select the punong barangay from among themselves. On the

other hand, the Local Autonomy Code mandates a direct vote on the

barangay chairman by the entire barangay electorate, separately from theseven kagawads. Hence, under the Code, voters elect eight barangay

officials, namely, the punong barangay plus the seven kagawads. Under

both RA 6679 and 6653, they vote for only seven kagawads, and not for the

barangay chairman.

Third. During the barangay elections held on May 9, 1994 (secondMonday), the voters actually and directly elected one punong barangay and

seven kagawads. If we agree with the thesis of petitioners, it follows that all

the punong barangays were elected illegally and thus, Petitioner Alex David

cannot claim to be a validly elected barangay chairman, much less president

of the national league, of barangays which he purports to represent in this

petition. It then necessarily follows also that he is not the real party-in-

interest and on that ground, his petition should be summarily dismissed.

Fourth. In enacting the general appropriations act of 1997,33

Congress

appropriated the amount of P400 million to cover expenses for the holding

of barangay elections this year. Likewise, under Sec. 7 of RA 8189,

Congress ordained that a general registration of voters shall be held

"immediately after the barangay elections in 1997." These are clear and

express contemporaneous statements of Congress that barangay officialsshall be elected this May, in accordance with Sec. 43-c of RA 7160.

Fifth. InParasvs. Comelec,34

this Court said that "the next regular election

involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away,

the same having been scheduled in May, 1997." This judicial decision, per

Article 8 of the Civil Code, is now a "part of the legal system of the

Philippines."

Sixth. Petitioners pompously claim that RA 6679, being a special law,

should prevail over RA 7160, all alleged general law pursuant to the

doctrine ofgeneraila specialibus non derogant. Petitioners are wrong. RA.

7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically applies to local governmentunits. It specifically and definitively provides in its Sec. 43-c that " the term

of office of barangay officials . . . shall be for three years." It is a special

provision that applies only to the term of barangay officials who were

elected on the second Monday of May 1994. With such particularity, the

provision cannot be deemed a general law. Petitioner may be correct in

alleging that RA 6679 is a special law, but they are incorrect in stating(without however giving the reasons therefor) that RA 7160 is necessarily a

general law.35

It is a special law insofar as it governs the term of office of

barangay officials. In its repealing clause,36

RA 7160 states that "all general

and special laws . . . which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of

this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly." There being a clear

repugnance and incompatibility between the two specific provisions, theycannot stand together. The later law, RA 7160, should thus prevail in

accordance with its repealing clause. When a subsequent law encompasses

entirely the subject matter of the former enactments, the latter is deemed

repealed.37

The Second Issue: Three-Year Term

Not Repugnant, to Constitution

Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution states:


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Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials,

except barangay officials, which shall be determined by

law, shall be three years, and no such official shall serve

for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary

renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not

be considered as an interruption in the continuity of hisservice for the full term for which he was elected.

Petetioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter posits that by

excepting barangay officials whose "term shall be determined by law" from

the general provision fixing the term of "elective local officials" at three

years, the Constitution thereby impliedlyprohibits Congress from

legislating a three year term for such officers. We find this theory rather

novel but nonetheless logically and legally flawed.

Undoubtedly, the Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from

fixing any term of office for barangay officials. It merely left the

determination of such term to the lawmaking body, without any specificlimitation or prohibition, thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion to

fix such term in accordance with the exigencies of public service. It must be

remembered that every law has in its favor the presumption of

constitutionality.38

For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a

clear and unequivocal (not just implied) breach of the Constitution.39

To

strike down a law as unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocalshowing that what the fundamental law prohibits, the statute permits.

40The

petitioners have miserably failed to discharge this burden and to show

clearly the unconstitutionality they aver.

There is absolutely no doubt in our mind that Sec. 43-c of RA 7160 is

constitutional. Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitutionlimiting the term ofall elective local officials to three years, except that of barangay officials

which "shall be determined by law"was an amendment proposed by

Constitutional Commissioner (now Supreme Court Justice) Hilario G.

Davide, Jr. According to Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., the amendment was

"readily accepted without much discussion and formally approved." Indeed,

a search into the Record of the Constitutional Commission yielded only a

few pages41

of actual deliberations, the portions pertinent to the

Constitutional Commission's intent being the following:

MR. NOLLEDO. One clarificatory question, Madam

President. What will be the term of the office of barangay

officials as provided for?

MR. DAVIDE. As may be determined by law..

MR. NOLLEDO. As provided for in the Local

Government Code?

MR. DAVIDE. Yes.

xxx xxx xxx

THE PRESIDENT. Is there any other comment? Is there

any objection to this proposed new section as submitted

by Commissioner Davide and accepted by the

Committee?

MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, does this prohibition

to serve for more than three consecutive terms apply to

barangay officials?

MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, the voting that we had

on the terms of office did not include the barangay

officials because it was then the stand of the Chairman of

the Committee on Local Governments that the term of

barangay officials must be determined by law. So it is

now for the law to determine whether the restriction on

the number of reelections will be included in the LocalGovernment Code.

MR. RODRIGO. So that is up to Congress to decide.

MR. DAVIDE. Yes.

MR. RODRIGO. I just wanted that clear in the record.


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Although the discussions in the Constitutional Commission were very brief,

they nonetheless provide the exact answer to the main issue. To the question

at issue here on how long the term of barangay officials is, the answer of the

Commission was simple, clear and quick: "As may be determined by law";

more precisely, "(a)s provided for in the Local Autonomy Code." And the

Local Autonomy Code, in its Sec. 43-c, limits their term to three years.

The Third Issue: Petitioners Estopped From

Challenging Their Three-Year Terms

We have already shown that constitutionally, statutorily, logically,

historically and commonsensically, the petitions are completely devoid of

merit. And we could have ended our Decision right here. But there is one

last point why petitioners have no moral ascendancy for their dubious claim

to a longer term of office: the equities of their own petition militate against

them. As pointed out byAmicus Curiae Pimentel,42

petitioners are barred

by estoppel from pursuing their petitions.

Respondent Commission on Elections submitted as Annex "A" of its

memorandum,43

a machine copy of the certificate of candidacy of

Petitioner Alex L. David in the May 9, 1994 barangay elections, the

authenticity of which was not denied by said petitioner. In said certificate of

candidacy, he expressly stated under oath that he was announcing his

"candidacy for the office of punong barangay for Barangay 77, Zone 7" of

Kalookan City and that he was "eligible for said office." The Comelec also

submitted as Annex "B"44

to its said memorandum, a certified statement of

the votes obtained by the candidates in said elections, thus:

BARANGAY 77

CERTIFIED LIST OF CANDIDATESVOTES OBTAINED

May 9, 1994 BARANGAY ELECTIONS

PUNONG BARANGAY VOTES OBTAINED

1. DAVID, ALEX L. 112

KAGAWAD

1. Magalona, Ruben 150

2. Quinto, Nelson L. 130

3. Ramon, Dolores Z. 120

4. Dela Pena, Roberto T. 115

5. Castillo, Luciana 114

6. Lorico, Amy A. 1077. Valencia, Arnold 102

8. Ang, Jose 97

9. Dequilla, Teresita D. 5810. Primavera, Marcelina 52

If, as claimed by petitioners, the applicable law is RA 6679, then (1)

Petitioner David should not have run and could not have been elected

chairman of his barangay because under RA 6679, there was to be no direct

election for the punong barangay; the kagawad candidate who obtained the

highest number of votes was to be automatically elected barangay

chairman; (2) thus, applying said law, the punong barangay should have

been Ruben Magalona, who obtained the highest number of votes amongthe kagawads150, which was much more than David's 112; (3) the

electorate should have elected only seven kagawads and not one punong

barangay plus seven kagawads.

In other words, following petitioners' own theory, the election of Petitioner

David as well as all the barangay chairmen of the two Liga petitioners wasillegal.

The sum total of these absurdities in petitioners' theory is that barangay

officials are estopped from asking for any term other than that which they

ran for and were elected to, under the law governing thie very claim to such

offices: namely, RA 7160, the Local Government Code. Petitioners' belatedclaim of ignorance as to what law governed their election to office in 1994

is unacceptable because under Art. 3 of the Civil Code, "(i)gnorance of the

law excuses no one from compliance therewith."

Epilogue

It is obvious that these two petitions must fail. The Constitution and the

laws do not support them. Extant jurisprudence militates against them.

Reason and common sense reject them. Equity and morality abhor them.


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They are subtle but nonetheless self-serving propositions to lengthen

governance without a mandate from the governed. In a democracy, elected

leaders can legally and morally justify their reign only by obtaining the

voluntary consent of the electorate. In this case however, petitioners

propose to extend their terms not by seeking the people's vote but by faulty

legal argumentation This Court cannot and will not grant its imprimatur tosuch untenable proposition. If they want to continue serving, they must get

a new mandate in the elections scheduled on May 12, 1997.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED for being completely devoid of

merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,

Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., reserves his vote.

Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.

G.R. No. 107797 August 26, 1996

PURITA SALVATIERRA, ELENITA SALVATIERRA NUNEZ,

ANSELMO SALVATIERRA, JR., EMELITA SALVATIERRA, and

ROMEL SALVATIERRA,petitioners,

vs.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. LINO

LONGALONG and PACIENCIA MARIANO, respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR. J.:p

The intricate yet timeworn issue of prescription has come to the

fore in this case. Which prescriptive period for actions for

annulment should prevail, Art. 1391 of the New Civil Code which

limits the filing of actions to four (4) years or Art. 1144 of the

same Code which limits the period of the filing of actions on

certain grounds to ten years? Likewise, at issue is whether or not

there was a double sale to a party or parties under the facts

obtaining.

The petitioners in this case filed the herein petition forcertiorari,assailing as they do the decision of the Court of Appeals which

held1:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is herein

REVERSED, defendants-appellees are ordered to

reconvey to plaintiffs-appellants the 149-sq. m. portion of

Lot. 26 registered in the name of Anselmo Salvatierra

under OCT 0-4221 as described in the deed of sale Exh.

"A" or "1" of this case; and defendants-appellees are

furthermore ordered to pay plaintiffs-appellants the

amount of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.

The antecedent facts are not disputed:

In 1930, Enrique Salvatierra died intestate and without any issue.

He was survived by his legitimate

brothers:Tomas,Bartolome, Venancio andMacario, and

sisterMarcela, all surnamed Salvatierra. His estate consisted of

three (3) parcels of land, more particularly described in the

following manner:

Cad. Lot No. 25 covered by Tax Declaration No. 11950

A parcel of land Lot No. 25, situated at Poblacion, San

Leonardo, Nueva Ecija. Bounded on the NE-Lots Nos. 26

& 27; on the SE-Rizal St., SW-Lot No. 24; and on theNW-Bonifacio Street. Containing an area of ONE

THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTEEN (1,116)

sq. m. more or less and assessed at P1,460.00.

Cad. Lot No. 26 covered by Tax Decl. No. 11951


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the latter's heirs and successors-in-interest, for he,

Anselmo Salvatierra, knew that he was entitled to only

405 sq. mts. out of the whole Lot No. 26 with an area of

749 sq. mts. In fact, a closer look at the deed of sale Exh.

"7" dated May 4, 1966 between father and son, Macario

and Anselmo, reveals that the word and figure "SEVEN

HUNDRED FORTY NINE (749)" sq. mts. written therein

appear to have been only superimposed over another word

and figure that had been erased, and even the word"FORTY NINE" was merely inserted and written above

the regular line, thereby creating the strong conviction

that said word and figure were altered to suit Anselmo's

fraudulent design (p. 12, Rec.).

Apparently, the lower court failed to examine carefully

the deed of extrajudicial partition Exh. "B" or "2" and the

deed of sale Exh. "7" between Macario Salvatierra and his

son Anselmo Salvatierra, for had it done so, it could nothave failed to notice that Anselmo Salvatierra received

only 405 sq. mts. out of Lot No. 26 from his father

Macario Salvatierra, not the whole Lot No. 26 measuring

749 sq. mts. The lower court was also of the mistaken

impression that this case involves a double sale of Lot No.

26, when the truth is that Macario Salvatierra could only

sell and, therefore, sold only 405 sq. mts. out of Lot No.

26 to his son Anselmo by virtue of the deed of sale Exh.

"7", not the whole 749 sq. mts. of said lot, and plaintiffs

in turn bought by virtue of the deed of sale Exh. "A" 149

sq. mts. out of the remaining area of 344 sq. mts. of Lot

No. 26 from Venancio Salvatierra, to whom said 344-sq.mt. portion of Lot No. 26 was given under the deed of

partition Exh. "B" or "2".

Neither can we agree with the lower court that even if

plaintiffs-appellants had established their ownership over

the 149-sq. mt. portion of Lot No. 26 in question, they arealready barred by prescription to recover said portion

from defendants. In this connection, the lower court

ratiocinated that an action for reconveyance should be

filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud,

citingEsconde v.Barlongay, 152 SCRA 603, which in

turn citedBabin v.Medalla, 108 SCRA 666, so that since

plaintiffs-appellants filed their action for reconveyance

only on November 22, 1985 or five years after the

issuance of Anselmo Salvatierra's title over Lot No. 26 on

May 20, 1980, said court held that appellant's action for

reconveyance against defendants has already prescribed.

At this juncture, we find the need to remind the court a

quo as well as other trial courts to keep abreast with the

latest jurisprudence so as not to cause possible

miscarriages of justice in the disposition of the cases

before them. In the relatively recent case ofCaro v. CA,

180 SCRA 401, the Supreme Court clarified the

seemingly confusing precedents on the matter of

prescription of actions for reconveyance of real property,

as follows:

We disagree. The case ofLiwalug

Amerold, et al. v.Molok Bagumbaran,

G.R. L-33261, September 30, 1987, 154

SCRA 396 illuminated what used to be

a gray area on the prescriptive period

for an action to reconvey the title to realproperty and corrollarily, its point of

reference:

. . . It must be remembered that before

August 30, 1950, the date of the

effectivity of the new Civil Code, theOld Code of Civil Procedure (Act No.

190) governed prescription. It provided:

Sec. 43. Other civil actions; how

limited.Civil actions other than for

the recovery of real property can only

be brought within the following periods

after the right of action accrues:


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paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree

No. 1529 and Article 1456 of the Civil

Code with Article 1144 (2) of the Civil

Code, supra, the prescriptive period for

the reconveyance of fraudulently

registered real property is ten (10)

years reckoned from the date of the

issuance of the certificate of title. In the

present case, therefore, inasmuch asCivil Case No. 10235 was filed on June

4, 1975, it was well-within the

prescriptive period of ten (10) years

from the date of the issuance of

"Original Certificate of Title No. 0-

6836 on September 17, 1970."

(All Emphasis Supplied).

And the above ruling was re-affirmed in the very recent

case ofTale vs. C.A. G.R.No. 101028, promulgated only

last April 23, 1992.

Guided by the above clarificatory doctrine on prescription

of actions for reconveyance of real property, it is obvious

that the lower court erred in relying on the discredited

ruling in Esconde v. Barlongay,supra, which case in turn

relied on the earlier discredited case ofBalbin v. Medalla,

alsosupra, which mistakenly limited the running of the

prescriptive period in an action for reconveyance of real

property to only four (4) years form the issuance of thecertificate of title.

Since OCT No. 0-4221 over Lot No. 26 was issued to

Anselmo Salvatierra onMay 20, 1980, appellants' filing

of the instance action for reconveyance onNovember 22,

1985 was well within the ten (10) year prescriptive period

provided by law for such action.

A motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners

brought this petition to set aside the decision of the respondent

appellate court and to affirm in toto the decision of the trial court.

Petitioners assail the decision of the respondent appellate court for

its failure to consider the application and interpretation of certainprovisions of the New Civil Code in the case at bar, namely

Articles 1134, 493, 1088, 1544, 1431, 1396, and 1391.4

Since petitioners invoke the abovementioned provisions of law, it

is apparent that they rely on the theory that this is a case of double

sale of Lot No. 26 to both petitioners and respondents Longalong,

et al. A perusal of the records and evidence (exhibits and annexes),

however, reveals otherwise. Both parties did not dispute the

existence and contents of the Extrajudicial Partition with

Confirmation of Sale, as both presented them as their respective

exhibits (Exh. "B-1" and "2"). The parties may not have realized it,

but the deciding factor of this dispute is this very document itself.It is very clear therein that Macario Salvatierra's share in the estate

of the deceased Enrique Salvatierra is only 405 sq. m. out of the

749 sq. m. comprising Lot No. 26. Since Venancio Salvatierra,

under this document, is to get a portion of Lot No. 26 in addition to

Lot No. 27, then it follows that Venancio is entitled to the

remaining 344 sq. m. of Lot No. 26, after deducting the 405 sq. m.share of Macario.

We find no ambiguity in the terms and stipulations of the

extrajudicial partition. The terms of the agreement are clear and

unequivocal, hence the literal and plain meaning thereof should be

observed.5

The applicable provision of law in the case at bar isArticle 1370 of the New Civil Code which states:

Art. 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no

doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the

literal meaning of its stipulation shall control.

Contracts which are the private laws of the contracting parties,

should be fulfilled according to the literal sense of their

stipulations, if their terms are clear and leave no room for doubt as


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WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed. No pronouncement as to

costs.

Barredo, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Santos and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., took no part.

G.R. No. L-27760 May 29, 1974

CRISPIN ABELLANA and FRANCISCO ABELLANA,petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE GERONIMO R. MARAVE, Judge, Court of First

Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch II; and GERONIMO

CAMPANER, MARCELO LAMASON, MARIA GURREA,

PACIENCIOSA FLORES and ESTELITA NEMEN0, respondents.

Prud. V. Villafuerte for petitioners.

Hon. Geronimo R. Marave in his own behalf.

FERNANDO, J.:p

This petition forcertiorari is characterized by a rather vigorous insistence

on the part of petitioners Crispin Abellana and Francisco Abellana that an

order of respondent Judge was issued with grave abuse of discretion. It is

their contention that he ought to have dismissed an independent civil action

filed in his court, considering that the plaintiffs, as offended parties, privaterespondents here,

1failed to reserve their right to institute it separately in the

City Court of Ozamis City, when the criminal case for physical injuries

through reckless imprudence was commenced. Such a stand of petitioners

was sought to be bolstered by a literal reading of Sections 1 and 2 of Rule

111.2

It does not take into account, however, the rule as to a trial de

novo found in Section 7 of Rule 123.3

What is worse, petitioners appear to

be oblivious of the principle that if such an interpretation were to be

accorded the applicable Rules of Court provisions, it would give rise to a

grave constitutional question in view of the constitutional grant of power to

this Court to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure

being limited in the sense that they "shall not diminish, increase, or modify

substantive rights."4

It thus appears clear that the petition forcertiorari is

without merit.

The relevant facts were set forth in the petition and admitted in the answer.The dispute had its origins in a prosecution of petitioner Francisco Abellana

of the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence in driving his

cargo truck, hitting a motorized pedicab resulting in injuries to its

passengers, namely, private respondents Marcelo Lamason, Maria Gurrea,

Pacienciosa Flores, and Estelita Nemeo. The criminal case was filed with

the city court of Ozamis City, which found the accused Francisco Abellana

guilty as charged, damages in favor of the offended parties likewise being

awarded. The accused, now petitioner, Francisco Abellana appealed such

decision to the Court of First Instance.5At this stage, the private

respondents as the offended parties filed with another branch of the Court of

First Instance of Misamis Occidental, presided by respondent Judge, a

separate and independent civil action for damages allegedly suffered bythem from the reckless driving of the aforesaid Francisco Abellana.6

In

such complaint, the other petitioner, Crispin Abellana, as the alleged

employer, was included as defendant. Both of them then sought the

dismissal of such action principally on the ground that there was no

reservation for the filing thereof in the City Court of Ozamis. It was argued

by them that it was not allowable at the stage where the criminal case was

already on appeal.7

Respondent Judge was not persuaded. On April 28, 1967, he issued the

following order: "This is a motion to dismiss this case on the ground that in

Criminal Case No. OZ-342 which was decided by the City Court and

appealed to this Court, the offended parties failed to expressly waive thecivil action or reserve their right to institute it separately in said City Court,

as required in Section 1, Rule 111, Rules of Court. From the Records of

Criminal Case No. OZ-342, it appears that the City Court convicted the

accused. On appeal to this Court, the judgment of the City Court was

vacated and a trial de novo will have to be conducted. This Court has not as

yet begun trying said criminal case. In the meantime, the offended partiesexpressly waived in this Court the civil action impliedly instituted with the

criminal action, and reserve their right to institute a separate action as in

fact, they did file. The Court is of the opinion that at this stage, the offended

parties may still waive the civil action because the judgment of the City


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to be fastened on a legal norm, particularly a procedural rule, there is placed

an impediment to a litigant being given an opportunity of vindicating an

alleged right.23

The commitment of this Court to such a primordial

objective has been manifested time and time again.24

WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari is dismissed.

Costs against petitioners.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Antonio, J., concurs on the bases of par. nos. 2 & 3 of opinion.

G.R. No. 123169 November 4, 1996

DANILO E. PARAS,petitioner,

vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

FRANCISCO, J.:

Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula,

Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994.

A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered

voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent

Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition,

scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall

election on November 13,

1995.1

At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well

above the 25% requirement provided by law. The COMELEC, however,

deferred the recall election in view of petitioner's opposition. On December

6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on December

16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed

before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for

injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action No. 2254-AF, with the trial court

issuing a temporary restraining order. After conducting a summary hearing,

the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and

required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited

for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was

without COMELEC approval.2

In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re -

scheduled the recall election an January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition

forcertiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. On January 12, 1996, the

Court issued a temporary restraining order and required the Office of the

Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment on the

petition. In view of the Office of the Solicitor General's manifestation

maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the COMELEC, the latter through

its law department filed the required comment. Petitioner thereafter filed a

reply.3

Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) ofRepublic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code,

which states that "no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the

date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately

preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled

January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan

(SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday ofMay 1996, and every three years thereafter. In support thereof, petitioner

citesAssociated Labor Union v.Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where

the Court considered the SK election as a regular local election. Petitioner

maintains that as the SK election is a regular local election, hence no recall

election can be had for barely four months separate the SK election from the

recall election. We do not agree.

The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:

Sec. 74.Limitations on Recall.(a) Any elective local

official may be the subject of a recall election only once

during his term of office for loss of confidence.


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(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the

date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year

immediately preceding a regular local election.

[Emphasis added]

It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be

interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute

must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the

general intent of the whole enactment.4The evident intent of Section 74 is

to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of

office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely

designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a

recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office. Thus,

subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular local

election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel

provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of

public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And ifthe SK election which is set by R.A No. 7808 to be held every three years

from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase

"regular local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall

election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local

Government Code.

In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption

that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is

not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute.5An

interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or

provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified,

destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant,meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.

6

It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should

be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution.7

Thus, the interpretation of

Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b)

thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section

3 of Article X of the Constitution to "enact a local government code which

shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government

structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective

mechanism of recall, initiative, and referendum . . . ."

Moreover, petitioner's too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity

which we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the

following admonition:

We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as

this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and

defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually

found not in "the letter that killeth but in the spirit that

vivifieth". . .8

The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its

construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read

according to its spirit and intent.

Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of thelocal government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the

prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately

preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the

proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective

official concerned. The electorate could choose the official's replacement in

the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor

elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping

with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local

election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local

elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the

electorate.

Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the

limitation stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next

regular election involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7)

months away, the same having been scheduled on May 1997.9

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot

and academic. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on

January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall election should be as it is hereby

made permanent.


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On February 13, 1978, the petitioner filed a complaint dated February 10,

1978 for unfair labor practice and violation of the CBA against the

respondent company [pp. 13-16, rec.]. On May 30, 1978, an Order [p. 18,

rec.] was issued by Labor Arbiter Conrado B. Maglaya, the dispositive

portion of which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, and by authority of Article263 of the Labor Code as amended, let this case be, as it is hereby,

DISMISSED and the same is referred to the parties or disputants

for them to resolve their disputes, grievances or matters arising

from the implementation, application or interpretation of their

Collective Bargaining Agreement in accordance with the

Machinery established in the CBA.

From this order, both parties appealed to the respondent Commission.

Petitioner filed its appeal on June 28, 1978 [pp. 31-34, rec.] assailing the

order of Labor Arbiter Maglaya as contrary to law and the evidence

adduced during the hearing, which constitutes grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack of jurisdiction. It avers that the matter had already beentaken up on grievance but the respondent company refused to implement the

P0.80 wage increase under the CBA, and that it further refuses to submit to

voluntary arbitration. Hence, it prays for the setting aside of the Labor

Arbiters Order and for the parties to submit to voluntary arbitration as

provided for in their CBA and the provisions of the Labor Code.

On the other hand, respondent company filed on July 5, 1978 a partial

appeal [pp. 19-27, rec.], accepting the dismissal of the complaint but

assailing that portion of the Labor Arbiters Order declaring the subject

matter as grievable and therefore threshable under the parties CBA. Its

prayer was for affirmance of the dismissal, reversal of the referral to the

parties for threshing out under their CBA, and for a declaration that it has

not committed an unfair labor practice nor violated the CBA.

On September 1, 1978, the respondent Commission cranad(Second

Division) promulgated its decision, setting aside the order appealed from

and entering a new one dismissing the case for obvious lack of merit. The

dismissal is predicated on the opinion [p. 45, rec.] of the Undersecretary of

Labor when he said:

x x x

If as you said, management and labor had agreed on April 2, 1977

to grant an amount of P27.00 cranad(roughly) per month to its

employees retroactive to April 1, 1977, then the exemption is

squarely in point, notwithstanding that the CBA was signed in May

or June. This must be so for reason that on April 7, 1977, there was

already the meeting of the minds of the parties and for legal

purposes, the contract was already perfected as of said date.

Said the respondent Commission:

We fully subscribe to this view. It needs no further elaboration to

demonstrate that by the facts and the terms of the law, the

respondent has to pay each of the employees concerned a total of

P60.00 monthly for it to satisfy payment of both the wage increase

and the allowance.

In resume, we find the refusal of the respondent to submit to

voluntary arbitration to be validly grounded and, therefore, not

constitutive of unfair labor practice. We further find to be

untenable the complainants claim for full payment of both the

P0.80 daily wage increase under the CBA and the P60 allowance

under P.D. 1123 [pp. 45-46, rec.].Petitioner than filed its motion for reconsideration but the NLRC en banc

dismissed the same in its resolution of February 8, 1979 [pp. 48-54, rec.],

pursuant to Section 7, Rule II of the Rules and Regulations Implementing

P.D. No. 1391, which became effective on September 15, 1978 and

provides thus

Sec. 7. Decisions of the Commissions. There shal l henceforth be

no appeal from such decisions to the Minister of Labor except as

provided in P.D. 1367 and its implementing rules concerning

appeals to the Prime Minister, and the decisions of the

Commission en banc or any of its Decisions shall be final and

executory.Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner maintains that private respondent violated the CBA and

committed an ULP when it refused to pay the negotiated wage increase of

P0.80 daily effective April 1, 1977, to the employees within the bargaining

unit. Private respondents, however, contend that there was no violation of

the CBA and that its application of the negotiated wage increase as partial

compliance with P.D. 1123 is well within the provisions of the latter.


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A perusal of the CBA shows that it was made and entered into on the 3rd

day of September, 1977 by and between the parties herein cranad(pl. see p.

1 of Annex B at p. 7 of NLRC rec.) although the first year of its increase

was retroactive to April 1, 1977. At the time it was perfected and signed by

the parties, P.D. 1123 was already in force and effect. A sample pay advice

[p. 11 insert, rec.] and the Memorandum No. 6-77 dated April 23, 1977

[p. 12, rec.] signed by the General Manager of respondent company showthat the said P.D. was implemented by respondent company on May 1,

1977.

On the other hand, there is nothing in the records to indicate that the

negotiated wage increases were granted or paid before May, 1977. Hence, it

cannot be said that the respondent Company falls within the exceptions

provided for in paragraph cranad(k) of the rules implementing P.D. 1123.

At the time the said P.D. took effect, there was neither a perfected contract

nor an actual payment of the said increase. There was therefore no grant of

said increases as yet, despite the contrary opinion expressed in the letter of

Undersecretary of Labor Amado G. Inciong.

The said letter dated May 13, 1977 [p. 33, NLRC rec.] of UndersecretaryInciong is based on a wrong premise and misrepresentation on the part of

respondent company. It was alleged in the letter of respondent company that

the wage increases were agreed upon by the company and the bargaining

union on April 2, 1977 in recognition of the imperative need for employees

to cope up with inflation brought about by, among others, another increase

in oil price [p. 31, NLRC rec.]. It was not, however stated that at the time

the said letter was written, negotiations were still being held on other

unresolved economic and non-economic bargaining items and it was only

on September 3, 1977 when they reached agreement thereon [pl. see p. 7 of

private respondents Memorandum, p. 107, rec.].

There was therefore no binding contract between the parties beforeSeptember 3, 1977. For if any essential item is left open for future

consideration, there is no binding contract, and an agreement to reach an

agreement imposes no obligation on the parties thereto [17 Am. Jur., 2d

362].

Such being the case, and without actual payment of the agreed P0.80 wage

increase, there could have been no grant of wage increases within the

contemplation of paragraph K, Section 1 of the Rules Implementing P.D.

1123 to place the respondent company within the purview of the exemption

provided for in the said rules.

Consequently, its refusal to implement the P0.80 wage increase for the first

year of the CBA constitutes a violation thereof and makes the respondent

company guilty of unfair labor practice.

The respondent company is also guilty of bad faith when it signed the CBA

on September 3, 1977 without in any way letting the petitioner union know

that it was going to apply part of the allowances being paid under P.D. 1123to the wage increases provided for in the CBA. Between the time of the

implementation of P.D. 1123 on May 1, 1977 and the signing of the CBA

on September 3, 1977, nothing was said between the parties about the wage

increase despite the fact that negotiations were still going on between the

parties. The exchange of letters between the respondent company and Labor

Undersecretary Inciong appears to have been concealed from the union.

According to the respondent Commission, the wage

increase cranad(however) was not immediately implemented because Mr.

Alfred Flug who was to bring home funds was still in the United States [p.

40, rec.]. It was only upon arrival from the U.S.A. on January 19, 1978 of

Robert Flug, son of said Alfred Flug, that the union had an inkling that the

company will not pay the negotiated wage increase. At this point the CBAwas already perfected and signed by the parties, so that its terms and

stipulations have the force of law between them.

A collective bargaining agreement is the law between the

parties cranad(Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa La Suerte-FOITAF vs.

Noriel, 77 SCRA 414). In the construction or interpretation of such a

contract, the primary purpose and guideline and indeed the very foundation

of all the rules for such construction or interpretation is the intention of the

parties cranad(17 Am. Jur. 2d., 631).

What was the intention of the parties relative to the wage increases? A

cursory reading of the CBA indicates that the benefits provided therein are

not exclusive of other benefits, as may be gleaned from the provisions of itsSection 4, Article XIV [p. 42 of the CBA at p. 6, NLRC rec.], which speaks

of any other benefits or privileges which are not expressly provided in this

Agreement, even if now accorded or hereafter accorded to the employees

and workers, shall be deemed purely acts of grace . cra .

Likewise, in the accompanying Memorandum of Understanding [pp. 82-83,

NLRC rec.] dated September 3, 1977, the parties have agreed as follows:

1. As long as it does not contravene the law and its implementing

rules and regulations the COMPANY agrees to effect a uniform

and indiscriminate wage increase in the salaries of its employees


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within the bargaining unit represented by the UNION regardless of

their position and pay rates, in the event that the government shall

direct another increase(s) in the statutory minimum wage fixed

under P.D 928 within the period of three years from the signing of

this instrument. The uniform increase contemplated in this

instrument will be equivalent to the amount of the statutory wage

increase or adjustment.

The bases of the dissent of Madame Justice Herrera are that:

I. The P0.80 per day increase was already granted as early as April

2, 1977 when the company agreed to give wage increases to its

employees effective April 1, 1977. Hence, such grant should be

credited against the emergency cost of living

allowance cranad(ECOLA) provided for by P.D. 1123.

II. The Departments cranad(Labor) view on the matter of

exemptions from P.D. 1123 should be given weight since it was

not interpreting or construing a statute but explaining the extent of

its own rule.III. It is inequitable that an employer who has granted increases in

pay to his employees on a given day is further ordered to give

additional increases one, two or three days thereafter.

IV. Social justice requires that the broader requirements of a stableeconomy should be taken into account in resolving conflicts

between labor and management.

I

There is no controversy that the first years wage increase under the CBA

was supposed to retroact to April 1, 1977. There is likewise no question that

had the company paid the eighty centavos daily increase in April 1977, theconclusion would have been unquestionable that such negotiated wage

increase cranad(NWI) should be credited against the emergency cost of

living allowance cranad(ECOLA) under P.D. 1123.

The question arose because, first, there was no such payment either before

or after the effectivity of P.D. 1123 on May 1, 1977; and second, because

there was no binding contract to speak of on May 1, 1977.

It is conceded that the word grant in its broader sense may include to

agree or assent to; to allow to be fulfilled; to accord; to bestow or confer;

and is synonymous with concede which means to agree on the idea of

bestowal or acknowledgment especially of a right or

privilege chanroblesvirtualawlibrary(Woods vs. Reilly, 211 S.W. 2d 591,

597). Such being the case, the grant could be said to have been made at

the time of the agreement, although there may not have been payment as

yet.

But the question is, when was the inception or actual birth of theagreement? The company contends that it was on April 2, 1977, whereas

the Union alleges that it was only on September 3, 1977, the date of the

CBA.

Paragraph 1 of the CBA reads:

This agreement, made and entered into this 3rd day of September

1977 . cra . chanroblesvirtualawlibrary(p. 7, NLRC rec.).

On the other hand, there is nothing in the record to indicate that the P0.80

wage increase was indeed agreed upon on April 2, 1977. Aside from the

self-serving statements of the company in its various

communications cranad(pp. 121, 125 and 128, rec.) and

pleadings cranad(pp. 73 and 102, rec.), the only other reference to said dateis found on the second paragraph of page 1 of the Memorandum of

Understanding dated September 3, 1977 cranad(p. 82, NLRC rec.) which,

however, does not mention anything about the 80-centavo increase effective

April 1, 1977. In fact, the said paragraph speaks of the companys

commitment to effect uniform and indiscriminate wage increases among its

employees within the bargaining unit represented by the union in the event

that the government shall, within a period of three cranad(3) years from

execution hereof, direct additional increases in the statutory minimum wage

fixed under P.D. 928. In other words, what was agreed upon on April 2,

1977, was a conditional increase contingent upon the governments

increasing of the statutory minimum wage then prevailing. Is it not possible

that the companys decision to give the P0.80 daily increase effective April1, 1977 was influenced by the knowledge that it could be absorbed by the

additional ECOLA provided for by P.D. 1123, and that such decision was

definitely made after receipt of the letter dated July 15, 1977 of then

Undersecretary Inciong cranad(p. 130, rec.)?

In any case, the company admits that after April 1977 there were

negotiations on other unresolved economic and non-economic bargaining

items and it was only on September 3, 1977 when they reached agreement

thereon. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary(p. 107, rec.).


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4. Sy Man vs. Jacinto & Fabros cranad(93 Phil. 1093):

. cra . We also find and hold that the memorandum order of the

Insular Collector of Customs of August 18, 1947, is void and of no

effect, not only because it has not been duly approved by the

Department Head and fully published as required by Section 551

of the Revised Administrative Code but also because it isinconsistent with law . cra .

chanroblesvirtualawlibrary(Emphasis supplied).

5. Olsen & Co., Inc. vs. Aldenese and Trinidad cranad(43 Phil. 259):

The important question here involved is the construction of

Sections 6, 7 and 11 of Act No. 2613 of the Philippine Legislature,

and Section 9 of the Tobacco Inspection Regulations,

promulgated by Administrative Order No. 35. It must be conceded

that the authority of the Collector of Internal Revenue to make any

rules and regulations must be founded upon some legislature act,

and that they must follow and be within the scope and purview of

the act.In the light of the foregoing, paragraph cranad(k) of the Rules

Implementing P.D. 1123 must be declared void. Consequently, the

argument about crediting the NWI against the ECOLA has no more leg to

stand on and must perforce fall.

It is also obvious that the negotiated wage increases provided for in the

CBA are intended to be distinct and separate from any other benefit or

privilege that may be forthcoming to the workers.

The respondent company must perforce pay both the benefits under P.D.

1123 and the CBA. Its refusal to pay the wage increase provided for in the

latter constitutes a question that should have been settled before a voluntary

arbitrator.

Moreover, in case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall

be construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the

laborer cranad(Insular Lumber Co. vs. CA, 80 SCRA 28, citing Art. 1702,

Civil Code of the Philippines).

Consequently, We find that the respondent Commission acted with grave

abuse of discretion when it dismissed petitioners case and upheld the

private respondents posture in the absence of substantial evidence in

support thereof.

WHEREFORE, THE WRIT OF CERTIORARIIS HEREBY GRANTED,

THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COMMISSION IS HEREBY

SET ASIDE, AND PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS HEREBY DIRECTED

TO PAY, IN ADDITION TO THE INCREASED ALLOWANCE

PROVIDED FOR IN P.D. 1123, THE NEGOTIATED WAGE INCREASE

OF P0.80 DAILY EFFECTIVE APRIL 1, 1977 AS WELL AS ALL

OTHER WAGE INCREASES EMBODIED IN THE COLLECTIVEBARGAINING AGREEMENT, TO ALL COVERED EMPLOYEES.

COSTS AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENT.

THIS DECISION IS IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.

SO ORDERED.

Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-52415 October 23, 1984

INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA EMPLOYEES' UNION

(IBAAEU),petitioner,

vs.

HON. AMADO G. INCIONG, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Labor and

INSULAR BANK OF ASIA AND AMERICA,respondents.

Sisenando R. Villaluz, Jr. for petitioner.

Abdulmaid Kiram Muin colloborating counsel for petitioner.

The Solicitor General Caparas, Tabios, Ilagan Alcantara & Gatmaytan

Law Office and Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano & Hernandez Law Office forrespondents.

MAKASIAR, J.:+. wph!1

This is a petition for certiorari to set as ide the order dated November 10,

1979, of respondent Deputy Minister of Labor, Amado G. Inciong, in


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corresponding unworked holiday pay in accordance with the award of

Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano dated August 25, 1975, is based on and

justified by Policy Instruction No. 9 which interpreted the rules

implementing P. D. 850; and (b) that the said award is already repealed by

P.D. 850 which took effect on December 16, 1975, and by said Policy

Instruction No. 9 of the Department of Labor, considering that its monthly

paid employees are not receiving less than P240.00 and their monthly pay isuniform from January to December, and that no deductions are made from

the monthly salaries of its employees on account of holidays in monthswhere they occur (pp. 64-65, NLRC rec.).

On October 18, 1976, Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano, instead of issuing a

writ of execution, issued an order enjoining the respondent bank to continue

paying its employees their regular holiday pay on the following grounds: (a)

that the judgment is already final and the findings which is found in the

body of the decision as well as the dispositive portion thereof is res

judicata or is the law of the case between the parties; and (b) that since the

decision had been partially implemented by the respondent bank, appeal

from the said decision is no longer available (pp. 100-103, rec.).

On November 17, 1976, respondent bank appealed from the above-cited

order of Labor Arbiter Soriano to the National Labor Relations

Commission, reiterating therein its contentions averred in its opposition to

the motion for writ of execution. Respondent bank further alleged for thefirst time that the questioned order is not supported by evidence insofar as it

finds that respondent bank discontinued payment of holiday pay beginning

January, 1976 (p. 84, NLRC rec.).

On June 20, 1978, the National Labor Relations Commission promulgated

its resolution en banc dismissing respondent bank's appeal, the dispositiveportion of which reads as follows: t.hqw

In view of the foregoing, we hereby resolve to dismiss, as

we hereby dismiss, respondent's appeal; to set aside Labor

Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano's order of 18 October 1976

and, as prayed for by complainant, to order the issuance

of the proper writ of execution (p. 244, NLRC rec.).

Copies of the above resolution were served on the petitioner only on

February 9, 1979 or almost eight. (8) months after it was promulgated,

while copies were served on the respondent bank on February 13, 1979.

On February 21, 1979, respondent bank filed with the Office of the Minister

of Labor a motion for reconsideration/appeal with urgent prayer to stay

execution, alleging therein the following: (a) that there isprima

facie evidence of grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of

jurisdiction on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission, in

dismissing the respondent's appeal on pure technicalities without passing

upon the merits of the appeal and (b) that the resolution appealed from is

contrary to the law and jurisprudence (pp. 260-274, NLRC rec.).

On March 19, 1979, petitioner filed its opposition to the respondent bank's

appeal and alleged the following grounds: (a) that the office of the Minister

of Labor has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant appeal pursuant to the

provisions of P. D. 1391; (b) that the labor arbiter's decision being final,

executory and unappealable, execution is a matter of right for the petitioner;

and (c) that the decision of the labor arbiter dated August 25, 1975 is

supported by the law and the evidence in the case (p. 364, NLRC rec.).

On July 30, 1979, petitioner filed a second motion for execution pending

appeal, praying that a writ of execution be issued by the National Labor

statcon chapter 3 cases

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