statcon cases week 4

8/12/2019 Statcon Cases Week 4

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BENJAMIN CO., petitioner and appellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

oppositor and appellant.

1960-05-26 | G.R. No. L-12150

D E C I S I O N

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

This is a petition for naturalization which, after hearing was granted, the court ordering that after the

lapse of two years from the date the decision becomes final and all the requisites provided for in

Republic Act No. 503 have been complied with, a certificate of naturalization be issued to petitioner.

Petitioner was born on March 13, 1931 in Bangued, Abra. He is the son of Go Cham and Yu Suan, both

Chinese. He owes his allegiance to the Nationalist Government of China. He is married to Leonor Go,

the marriage having been celebrated in the Catholic church of Bangued, Abra. He speaks and writes

English as well as the Ilocano and Tagalog dialects. He graduated from the Abra Valley College, and

finished his primary studies in the "Colegio" in Bangued, Abra, both schools being recognized by the

government. He has a child two months old. He has never been accused of any crime involving moral

turpitude. He is not opposed to organized government, nor is he a member of any subversive

organization. He does not believe in, nor practice, polygamy. Since his birth, he has never gone abroad.

He mingles with the Filipinos. He prefers a democratic form of government and stated that if his petition

is granted he would serve the government either in the military or civil department.

He is a merchant dealing in the buy and sell of tobacco. He also is part owner of a store known as "Go

Tian Store" in Bangued, Abra. In his tobacco business, he has a working capital of P10,000.00 which he

claims to have been accumulated thru savings. He contributes to civic and charitable organizations like

the Jaycees, Rotary, Red Cross and to town fiestas. He likes the customs of the Filipinos because he

has resided in the Philippines for a long time. During the year 1956, he claims to have earned P1,000.00

in his tobacco business. He expects to make P2,000.00 more from the same business without however

specifying to what years said income would correspond. With respect to the store of which he claims to

be a part owner, he stated that his father gave him a sum of less than P3,000.00 representing one-fourth

of the sales. Aside from being a co-owner of said store, he receives a monthly salary of P120,00 as a

salesman therein.

He took a course in radio mechanics and completed the same in 1955. He has no vice of any kind. He

claims that he has never been delinquent in the payment of taxes. But he admitted that he did not file his

income tax return when he allegedly received an amount of not less than P3,000 from his father whichhe claims to have invested in his tobacco business. On cross-examination, when the fiscal asked him if

he believed in the principle underlying the Philippine constitution, he answered that "He believes in the

laws of the Philippines." However, he did not state what principles of the Constitution he knew, although

when asked what laws of the Philippines he believes in, he answered "democracy". Asked why he did

not file his income tax return, he stated that his father had already filed his income tax return. He merely

promised, that he would file his. He presented his alien certificate of registration, but did not present the

alien certificates of registration of his wife and child.

The government is now appealing the decision of the trial court on the ground that it erred in finding that

petitioner has all the qualifications for naturalization and none of the disqualifications mentioned in the

law.

The government contends that from the evidence itself introduced by petitioner it would appear that he

failed to comply with some of the requirements prescribed by law in order to qualify him to become a

Filipino citizen. Thus, it is claimed, he has not stated that he believes in the principles underlying the

constitution and that it was only on cross-examination, when the fiscal asked him whether he believed in

the principles underlying the constitution, that he answered that "He believes in the laws of the

Philippines", and that when he was asked what those laws he believes in, he gave an answer which

conveys the meaning that he believes in democracy or in a democratic form of government. It is

contended that such belief is not sufficient to comply with the requirement of the law that one must

believe in the principles underlying our constitution.

There is merit in this claim. Indeed, the scope of the word law in ordinary legal parlance does not

necessarily include the constitution which is the fundamental law of the land, nor does it cover all the

principles underlying our constitution. Thus, our constitution expressly declares as one of its fundamental

policies that the Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, that the defense of the

State is the prime duty of the government, that the duty and right of the parents to rear their children for

civic efficiency shall receive the support of the State, and that the promotion of social justice shall be its

main concern. In so stating that he believes merely in our laws, he did not necessarily refer to those

principles embodied in our constitution which are referred to in the law.

Our law also requires that petitioner must have conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner

during the entire period of his residence in the Philippines in his relation with the constituted government

as well as with the community in which he is living. It is contended that petitioner has also failed to

comply with this legal requirement for he failed to show that he has complied with his obligation to

register his wife and child with the Bureau of Immigration as required by the Alien Registration Act. Hehas, therefore, failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner in his relation with our

government.

It furthermore appears that he failed to file his income tax return despite the fact that he has a fixed

salary of P1,440.00 a year and made a profit of P1,000.00 in his tobacco business, and received an

amount less than P3,000 from his father as one-fourth of the proceeds of the sale of the store, the total

of which is more than what is required by law for one to file an income tax return, a fact which indicates

that he has not also conducted himself properly in his relation with our government. His reasoning that

he made that earning during the year in which this case was being heard is not convincing.

Considering that "naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the

government and against the applicant" (Co Quing Reyes vs. Republic, 104 Phil., 889), we are

constrained to hold that the trial court erred in granting the petition for naturalization.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.


2/33

RICHARD VELASCO, petitioner and appellant, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

oppositor and appellee.

1960-05-25 | G.R. No. L-14214

D E C I S I O N

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

This is a petition for naturalization filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila which, after trial, was

denied for failure of petitioner to meet the requirements of the law. Petitioner has appealed.

Petitioner was born in the Philippines on May 12, 1932 of spouses Peter Velasco and Miguela Tiu who

became naturalized citizens in 1956. He alleges that since his birth in Manila on May 12, 1932 he

continuously resided in the Philippines, particularly at 1441 Magdalena St., Manila; that he finished his

elementary education at the Francisco Balagtas Elementary School, and his high school at the Arellano

University; that he pursued his collegiate studies at the University of the East where he graduated in

dentistry in 1954; that he is a citizen of the Republic of China in Formosa; that he has not followed the

citizenship of his father when the latter became naturalized as he was then already 23 years old; that he

is single, although he is engaged to be married to a Filipino girl by the name of Noemi Eugenia; that he is

at present employed at the Wilson Drug Store since February, 1957 with a monthly salary of P150.00;

that previously he worked as a salesman of his father with a salary of P2,400.00 per annum, even if his

father was only an agent of Elizalde and Co.; that he knows how to speak and write English and Tagalog;that he is a Catholic by faith; and he has never been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude;

that he does not believe in polygamy or in anarchy or the use of violence for the predominance of men's

ideas; that he does not own any real property although he allegedly has cash savings amounting to

P3,500.00 at the Republic Savings Bank, P1,000.00 worth of shares of stocks of the Far Eastern

University, P2,000.00 shares of stock of the Marinduque Iron Mines, and P1,000.00 in cash; that he is

not suffering from any contagious disease; that he has mingled socially with the Filipinos; that he has

shown a desire to embrace the customs and traditions of the Filipinos; and that he desires to become a

Filipino citizen because he considered the Philippines as his country and the Filipinos as his countrymen.

His qualifications as to moral character were attested by Santiago Mariano, a sergeant of the Manila

Police Department, and Mrs. Paz J. Eugenio, a housekeeper, who admitted that she is the prospective

mother-in-law of petitioner.

The trial court found that there are three names mentioned in the petition and in the documentary

evidence submitted in support thereof, namely, Richard Velasco, Richard C. Velasco, and Richard Chua

Velasco, and that while petitioner states in his petition that his full name is Richard Velasco, thesignature thereon is Richard C. Velasco. Again, the court found that the joint affidavit of said witnesses

states that the affiants personally know and are acquainted with Richard Velasco while the documentary

evidence shows that his name is Richard Chua Velasco. On the other hand, petitioner testified that he

has no alias nor other names and has always been known as Richard Velasco. No evidence was

submitted to prove that they are one and the same person.

The trial court likewise found that Mrs. Paz J. Eugenio, a character witness, is the prospective

mother-in-law of petitioner, and as such her testimony is biased. It also found that she and her

companion witness Santiago Mariano were also the character witnesses of a brother of petitioner in his

petition for naturalization, a circumstance which in its opinion indicates that petitioner has a limited circle

of Filipino friends. The court finally found that the present income of petitioner is only P150.00 a month

which, considering the present high cost of living and the low purchasing power of our peso, is neither

lucrative nor substantial to meet the requirement of the law.

Because of the above facts and circumstances, the trial court declared petitioner not qualified to become

a Filipino citizen.

We agree to the foregoing finding. Indeed, it appears from the evidence that petitioner was employed at

the Wilson Drug Store only on February, 1957 with a salary of P150.00 a month, or barely a month

before he filed the instant petition, and that said store is partly owned by his mother who has one-fifth

capital investment therein. This leads one to believe that petitioner's employment, even if true, is but a

convenient arrangement planned out by him and his family in order to show a token compliance with therequirement of the law that to become a Filipino citizen one must have a lucrative income or occupation.

Considering that "naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the

government and against the applicant" (Co Quing Y Reyes vs. Republic, 104 Phil., 889), we are

constrained to hold that the trial court did not err in denying the petition for naturalization.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Bengzon, Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.


3/33

In the matter of the petition of CELESTINO CO Y QUING REYES to be admitted a

citizen of the Philippines. CELESTINO CO Y QUING REYES, petitioner-appellee, vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

1958-11-29 | G.R. No. L-10761

D E C I S I O N

CONCEPCION, J.:

This is an appeal, taken by the Office of the Solicitor General, from a decision, of the Court of First

Instance of Manila, granting the petition for naturalization, as citizen of the Philippines, of appellee

Celestino Co y Quing Reyes.

Appellant maintains that:

"1. The lower court erred in not finding that the petitioner appellee has failed to comply with all the

requisites prescribed by the law to acquire Philippine citizenship.

"2. The lower court erred in finding that the petitioner-appellee possesses all the qualifications

prescribed by Revised Naturalization Law.

"3. The lower court erred in granting Philippine citizenship to the herein petitioner-appellee."

From the viewpoint of this Court, the question raised in the first assignment of error is the only one that

requires consideration, namely: did the Court of First Instance of Manila erred in hearing this case and

granting the petition in the case at bar, despite the undisputed fact that said petition was publish in the

Official Gazette only once, instead of three (3) times, as required in section 9 of Commonwealth Act 473.

This provision reads:

"Immediately upon the filing of a petition, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the court to publish the

same at petitioner's expense, once a week for three consecutive weeks, in the Official Gazette,

and in one of the newspapers of general circulation in the province where the petitioner resides,

and to have copies of said petition and a general notice of the hearing posted in a public and

conspicuous place in his office or in the building where said office is located, setting forth in such

notice the name, birthplace and residence of the petitioner, the date and place of his arrival in the

Philippines, the names of the witnesses whom the petitioner proposes to introduce in support of

his petition, and the date of the hearing of the petition, which hearing shall not be held within ninetydays from the date of the last publication of the notice. The clerk shall, as soon as possible,

forward copies of the petition, the sentence, the naturalization certificate, and other pertinent data

to the Department of the Interior, the Bureau of Justice, the Provincial Inspector of the Philippine

Constabulary of the province and the justice of the peace of the municipality wherein the petitioner

resides."

This section was squarely construed and applied in Ong Son Cui vs. Republic of the Philippines, 101

Phil,, 649, in which we said:

"It could be seen that, under the aforequoted section of the Revised Naturalization Law, the notice

of hearing of the application for citizenship should be published three times in the Official Gazette,

or, in the language of the law, 'once a week for three consecutive weeks, and so in the order of

publication of the notice of hearing of the present case it was enjoined that the same be made

'once a week for three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette and in the Voz de Manila.' The

notice of hearing of this case should therefore have been published three times not only in the Voz

de Manila but in the Official Gazette as well. And there being only one publication of said notice of

hearing in this case in the Official Gazette, the same is clearly incomplete and therefore insufficient

to confer jurisdiction to the court a quo to try the case and grant the petition. It is argued, however,

that there has been a substantial compliance with law because the notice of hearing in question

was published three times in the Voz de Manila and once in the Official Gazette; but since the law

expressly provides that the notice of hearing be published three times, this should be strictlyobserved; for, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General in his brief,

'The publication required by law in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general

circulation is a means of screening aliens applying for Filipino citizenship by giving the public

a chance to come forward and protest the grant of such citizenship if they possess any

information derogatory to the applicant. The official organ of the government caters to the

officials and employees of the government and to the lawyers as well. These people, by

reason of their occupation are in a better position to acquire knowledge of aliens running

afoul of the law than the average reader who scans the newspapers for news. If the law was

not after the number of times the notice is published in the Official Gazette, it could have

expressed in words that a single publication in the Official Gazette would suffice; but when

the law expressly provides its publication 'once a week for 3 consecutive weeks' the

intention to give the reading public 3 chances to read that item is very clear. A single

publication therefore of the notice where the law requires 3 is an incomplete publication, and

an incomplete publication is not a valid publication. The grant of citizenship is only a mereprivilege, and a strict compliance with law on the part of the applicant is essential.'

"Petitioner may contend, however, that the law provides that the publication of the notice of

hearing should be made for three consecutive weeks and as the Official Gazette is now being

published monthly, and not weekly as it was before, petitioner cannot actually comply with law;

and because he had the notice of hearing in question published, once, in the Official Gazette, he

should be given the benefit of having followed the law. This contention does not merits serious

consideration. While it is true that the notice of hearing in question cannot actually be published for

three consecutive weeks in the Official Gazette, it is no less true that said notice may be published

three times consecutively, altho not weekly, in the Official Gazette, and because the true intent of

the law is that the said notice be published 3 times, it is our considered opinion that in the instant

case the single publication of the notice of hearing in question is not a sufficient compliance with

law."

We find no valid reason to depart from such view. Indeed, said section 9 requires that the petition for

naturalization be published "once a week, for three (3) consecutive weeks, in the Official Gazette." This

provision demands compliance with the following requirements, namely: (1) the publication must be

weekly; (2) it must be made three (3) times; (3) and these must be "consecutive".

Compliance with the first condition was, admittedly, impossible, inasmuch as, until recently, the Official

Gazette was not published weekly. Petitioner could have, and, hence, he should have, complied,

however, with the second and third conditions. Hence, the publication once in the Official Gazette is not

a substantial compliance with the provisions of the aforementioned section 9.

Appellee alleges, however, that the sufficiency of said publication was not questioned in the lower court

and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; that the duty to publish the petition is imposed by law

upon the clerk of court, not upon petitioner; and that non-compliance with said section 9 "is not a fatal

defect unless it is actually established that it prejudices the opposition to the application."


4/33

This pretense is untenable. The decision of the lower court granting appellee's petition for naturalization

affected his personal status and accordingly, it "is in the nature of a judgment in rem" (2 C. J. 1123; U. S.

vs. Gleason [C.C.N.Y.] 78 Fed. 396 [aff. 90 Fed. 778, 33 CCA 272]; In re O'Sullivan, 137 Mo. A. 214, 117

S.W. 651; Esker vs. McCoy, 5 Oh. Dec. [Reprint] 573; 6 Am. L. Rec. 694; 3 C.J.S. 853; 31 Am. Jur. 98).

As stated in Scott vs. Stroback (49 Ala. 477, 490): "A judgment admitting an alien to citizenship has none

of the properties or qualities of a judicial proceeding in personam. It is rather in rem."

"A proceeding in rem is not confined to the status of things, but extends to the status of individualsand their relation to others." (I Am. Jur., p. 436.)

"Proceedings in rem include not only those instituted to obtain decrees or judgments against

property as forfeited in the admiralty or the English exchequer, or as a prize, but also suits against

property to enforce a lien or privilege in the admiralty courts, and suits to obtain a sentence

judgment, or decree of other upon the personal status or r elations of the party, such as marriage,

divorce, bastardy settlement, or the like. Cunningham vs. Shanklin, 60 Cal. 118, 125, citing Bouv."

(21 Words and Phrases [Permanent Edition] p. 542.)

Accordingly, the decision of the lower court, in the case a t bar, if valid, would be binding upon "all the

world" (Smith vs. Smith, W. Va. 83 S.E. 2d. 923, 926). In the language of the Court in Bartero vs. Real

Estate Savings Bank (10 Mo. App. 76, 78):

"A judgment in rem is generally said to be a judgment declaratory of the status of some

subject-matter, whether this be a person, or a thing. Thus the probate of a will fixes the status ofthe document as a will; so a decree establishing or dissolving a marriage is a judgment in rem,

because it fixes the status of the person. A judgment or forfeiture against specified articles of

goods for violation of the revenue laws is a judgment in rem. In such case the judgment is

conclusive against all the world, . . ." (21 Words and Phrases [Permanent Edition] p. 540.)

Upon the other hand, in order that a court could validly try and decide any case, "it must have jurisdiction

both over the subject- matter and over the persons of the parties" (Comments on the Rules of Court, by

Moran, Vol. I [1957 ed.] p. 128). Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner is acquired by his voluntary

submission to the authority of the Court, resulting from the filing of the complaint or petition. Jurisdiction

over other parties may be obtained, either by their voluntary appearance or by service of summons (42

Am. Jur. p. 7).In a proceeding in rem, which binds the "whole w orld", the latter is, in legal contemplation,

a party therein, for, otherwise, it could not be bound by the result thereof. It being impossible to serve

summons personally upon every human being in this world, the summons must be published as

provided by law. Otherwise, the court would have no jurisdiction over all parties concerned and, as a

consequence, any decision rendered in the case would be a nullity (42 Am. Jur. 8; Scott vs. McNeal, 154

U.S. 34, 38 L. ed. 896, 14 S. Ct. 1108; Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 24 L. ed. 565; Earle vs. McVeigh,

91 U.S. 503, 23 L. ed. 398; Hobby vs. Bunch, 83 Ga. 1, 10 S.E. 113, 20 Am. St. Rep. 301; Davies vs.

Thompson, 61 Okla. 21, 160 P. 75, LRA 1917-B 395; Greenwood vs. Furr [Tex Civ. App.] 251 S.W. 332;

44 Am. Jur. 98). For this reason, it is well settled that the procedure prescribed by law for the

naturalization of an alien "should be strictly followed" (2 C.J. 1120, citing In re Hollo, 206 Fed. 852; Ex

parte Lange, 197 Fed. 769; In re Liberman, 193 Fed. 301; State vs. King County Superior Ct., 75 Wash.

239, 134 P. 916; see, also, 3 C.J.S. 844). In the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, naturalization laws

"should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against applicant for

citizenship" (3 C.J.S. 833).And such, accordingly, has been the criterion adopted by this Court in the

interpretation and application of our naturalization laws. (Pardo vs. Republic, 85 Phil., 323; 47 Off. Gaz.,

3447-3450; Ng vs. Republic, 94 Phil., 366; 50 Off. Gaz., 1599; Yu vs. Republic, L-3808, July 29, 1952;

Bautista vs. Republic, 87 Phil., 818; De la Cruz vs. Republic, 49 Off. Gaz. [3] 958; Tiao vs. Republic, 95

Phil., 709; Sam vs. Republic, 98 Phil., 592; 53 Off. Gaz., [1] 145; Ong Son Cui vs. Republic, 101 Phil.,

649; 55 Off. Gaz. [22] 4044.)

As the Supreme Court of th e U.S. has aptly put it in U.S. vs. Gingsberg (243 U.S. 472, 61 L. ed. 8 53,

856), and quoted, approvingly, by this Court in Bautista vs. Republic of the Philippines (supra):

"An alien who seeks political rights as a member of this nation can rightfully obtain them only upon

terms and conditions specified by Congress. Courts are without authority to sanction changes or

modifications; their duty is rigidly to enforce the legislative will in respect of the matters so vital tothe public welfare."

In the language of the editors of the American Jurisprudence:

". . . It is not within the province of the courts to make bargains with applicants for

naturalization. The courts have no choice but to require that there be a full compliance with

the statutory provision." (2 Am. Jur. p. 577.)

Referring, specifically to service of notice by publication, American Jurisprudence has this to say:

"Substituted service and service by publication was unknown to the common law but depends

upon statutory authorization, and the principle of statutory construction that there must be strict

compliance with enactments modifying the course of common law in regard to legal proceedings is

exemplified in the cases involving the construction and application of provisions authorizing

substituted and constructive service. When, by the local law, substituted or constructive service isin certain situations submitted in the place of personal service when the latter is inconvenient or

impossible, a strict and literal compliance with the provisions of the law must be shown in order to

support the judgment based on such substituted or constructive service. Jurisdiction is not to be

assumed and exercised on the general ground that the subject matter of the suit is within the

power of the court. The inquiry must be as to whether the requisites of the statute have been

complied with, and such compliance must appear on the record. The fact that the defendant had

actual knowledge of attempted service does not render the service effectual if in fact the process

was not served in accordance with the requirements of the statute." (42 Am. Jur. pp. 55-56.)

In short, non-compliance with the requirements thereof, relative to the publication of the petition, affects

the jurisdiction of the court. It constitutes a fatal defect, for it impairs the very root or foundation of the

authority to decide the case, regardless of whether the one to blame therefor is the clerk of court or the

petitioner or his counsel. Failure to raise this question in the lower court would not cure such defect.

Upon the other hand, for obvious reasons, public interest demands that the courts of justice refrain from

performing invalid acts. Consequently, it is not only proper, but, also, advisable, and, even, necessary,

that the issue raised in appellant's first assignment of error be considered and decided by us. In any

event, the provisions of section 10, Rule 9, of the Rules of Court, relative to the implied waiver of

defenses not pleaded in the answer or motion to dismiss," shall not apply to . . . naturalization . . .

proceedings, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient" -

pursuant to Rule 132 of said Rules of Court - and it is, neither "practicable", nor "convenient", to do so in

the case at bar.

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, with costs against petitioner-appellee. It is so

ordered.

Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions


5/33

PARAS, C.J., dissenting:

I consider that the judgment appealed from is in accordance with law.

Section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 requires that the clerk of court publish the petition for

naturalization at the petitioner's expense, once a week for three consecutive weeks, in the Official

Gazette, a publication undertaken by the Government through the Bureau of Printing, and in one of thenewspapers of general circulation in the province where the petitioner resides. It is admitted that at the

time the petition was filed the Official Gazette was being published once a month. It is on account of the

failure to have published the petition for naturalization in the Official Gazette once a wekk for three

consecutive weeks that the majority voted to reverse the judgment of the lower court granting the petition

for naturalization. I regret to be unable to subscribe to their view.

The majority admits that compliance was impossible and suggests that Section 9 of Commonwealth Act

No. 473 must be construed to mean that the publication in the Official Gazette should be made once a

month for three consecutive months. I cannot, however, persuade myself to believe that this construction

could have been the intention of the legislature. An obligation based on an impossible condition is void

(Art. 1183, New Civil Code). Had the legislature merely provided in said act that such petitions should be

published in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette, or had it been a fact that the Official

Gazette was being published at the time of the passage of said act once a week, then I shall have been

coinvinced by the majority view. The significant fact of which we may take judicial notice and whichI

cannot lose sight of is that at the time of the passage of Commonwealth Act No. 473, the Official Gazettewas being regularly published three times a week - every Tuesday, Thursday, and Saturday, so that the

legislative could not have intended that the publication of the petition for naturalization be simply made in

three consecutive issues of the Gazette. The legislature clearly meant what the law provides -

publication in the Official Gazette, once a week for three consecutive weeks.

"Where an act is free from ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing

its spirit." (Gooden vs. Police Jury of Lincoln Parish, 48 So. 196, 122 La. 755; Flanagan vs. City of New

Orleans, 9 Orleans App. 19.)

"Courts may not look beyond letter of unambiguous statute in pretended attempt to ascertain reason

prompting enactment." (Item Co. vs. National Dyers & Cleaners, 130 So. 879, 15 La App. 108, followed

in Deverges vs. National Dyers & Cleaners, 130 So. 882 15 La. App. 339.)

"Where an act is free from ambiguity, the court will not give its language a different interpretation from

that which the words used clearly impost." (Denton vs. Reading, 22 La Ann. 607.)

"Where language is clear and unambiguous a statute must be held to mean what it plainly expresses,

and no room is left for construction." (Walker vs. Vicksburg, S. & P. Ry. Co., 34 So. 749, 110 La. 718.)

When the Government no longer published the Official Gazette three times a week, but monthly, such

that one of the conditions imposed by the statute became impossible of compliance without the fault of

the appellee, I am of the opinion that such condition ceases to be mandatory or obligatory, and should

be dispensed with.

"A statute should be interpreted in a way that will make it practically workable without doing violence to

other rules of construction." (Nevada vs. Slemmons, 43 ALR (2d) 693, 244 Iowa 1068, 59 N. W. (2d)

793.)

". . . Hence if a statute apparently requires the performance of things which cannot be performed, or

apparently bases its commands upon the assumption of an impossible state of affairs, the courts must

seek for some interpretation of its terms, not too strained or fantastic, which will avoid these results. But

yet they are not at liberty to reconstruct the statute, or to import into it, on merely conjectural grounds, a

meaning which its terms will not warrant. . . ." (Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., p. 121.)

In Anti-Chinese League of the Philippines vs. Felix, et al., 77 Phil., 1012; 44 Off. Gaz. 1480, 1483, we

have said that the purpose and intention of the legislature in requiring the publication of the petition fornaturalization in the Official Gazette and in one newspaper of general circulation, among other

requirements, was to inform the officers concerned and the public in general of the filing of such petition

in order that the public officers and private citizens supposed to be acquainted with the petitioner may

furnish the Solicitor General or the provincial fiscal with such information and evidence as there may be

against the petitioner. This purpose has been accomplished in the instant case by the publication of

appellee's petition for naturalization once in the Official Gazette and once a week for three consecutive

weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. As a matter of fact, an opposition to the application was

interposed by the Provincial Fiscal who appeared at the trial. And yet it is to be noted that the record of

this case is silent as to hos the opposition has been prejudiced by the non-publication of the petition in

two more issues of the Official Gazette. (Delgado vs. Republic of the Philippines, G. R. No. L-2546, Jan.

28, 1950; Barreto vs. Republic of the Philippines, 87 Phil., 731; Bautista vs. Republic of the Philippines,

87 Phil., 818.)

Montemayor, J., concurs.


6/33

HEIRS OF NICOLAS JUGALBOT, Represented by LEONILA B. JUGALBOT,

Petitioners, versus COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF VIRGINIA A. ROA,

Represented by LOLITA R. GOROSPE, Administratrix, Respondents.

2007-03-12 | G.R. No. 170346

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Petitioners, Heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot, represented by their attorney-in-fact Leonila Jugalbot, assail the

Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated October 19, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 81823 where the

petitioners' title to the disputed property, as evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. E-103,

was cancelled and the previous title, TCT No. T-11543, was reinstated in the name of Virginia A. Roa.

The appellate court reversed the Decision[2] and Resolution[3] of the Department of Agrarian Reform

Adjudication Board (DARAB) Central Office in DARAB Case No. 7966, affirming the Decision[4] of the

Provincial Adjudicator and the Order[5] denying the motion for reconsideration in DARAB Case No. X

(06-1358) filed in Misamis Oriental, for Cancellation of TCT No. E-103, Recovery of Possession and

Damages.

On September 28, 1997, an Emancipation Patent (EP) was issued to N icolas Jugalbot based on thelatter's claim that he was the tenant of Lot 2180-C of the Subdivision plan (LRC) TSD-10465, subject

property of the case at bar, with an area of 6,229 square meters, located at Barangay Lapasan, Cagayan

de Oro City. The subject property was registered in the name of Virginia A. Roa under Transfer

Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-11543, the same being issued on April 1, 1970 in the name of "Virginia A.

Roa married to Pedro N. R oa." The property was originally registered in the name of Marcelino Cabili

from whom Virginia A. Roa purchased the same sometime in 1966.[6]

Nicolas Jugalbot alleged that he was a tenant of the property continuously since the 1950s. On a

Certification dated January 8, 1988 and issued by Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Team Leader

Eduardo Maandig, the subject property was declared to be tenanted as of October 21, 1972 and

primarily devoted to rice and corn. On March 1, 1988, the Emancipation Patent was registered with the

Register of Deeds and Nicolas Jugalbot was issued TCT No. E-103.[7]

On August 10, 1998, the heirs of Virginia A. Roa, herein private respondents, filed before the DARAB

Provincial Office of Misamis Oriental a Complaint for Cancellation of Title (TCT No. E-103), Recovery ofPossession and Damages against Nicolas Jugalbot, docketed as DARAB Case No. X (06-1358).[8]

On October 23, 1998, a Decision was rendered by the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator dismissing private

respondents' complaint and upholding the validity of the Emancipation Patent. Private respondents'

motion for reconsideration was denied.[9]

On appeal, the DARAB Central Office affirmed the Provincial Adjudicator's decision on the sole ground

that private respondents' right to contest the validity of Nicolas Jugalbot's title was barred by prescription.

It held that an action to invalidate a certificate of title on the ground of fraud prescribes after the

expiration of one year from the decree of registration.[10]

On November 10, 2003, the DARAB denied private respondents' motion for reconsideration,[11] hence

they filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals which was granted. The appellate court

reversed the Decision and Resolution of the DARAB Central Office on four grounds: (1) the absence of a

tenancy relationship; (2) lack of notice to Virginia Roa by the DAR; (3) the area of the property which was

less than one hectare and deemed swampy, rainfed and kangkong-producing; and (4) the classification

of the subject property as residential, which is outside the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 27.

Hence, this petition for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45.

The sole issue for determination is whether a tenancy relationship exists between petitioners Heirs ofNicolas Jugalbot, and private respondents, Heirs of Virginia A. Roa, under Presidential Decree No. 27.

Simply stated, are petitioners de jure tenants of private respondents?

As clearly laid down in Qua v. Court of Appeals[12] and subsequently in Benavidez v. Court of Appeals

,[13] the doctrine is well-settled that the allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled the land in question

does not automatically make the case an agrarian dispute. It is necessary to first establish the existence

of a tenancy relationship between the party litigants. The following essential requisites must concur in

order to establish a tenancy relationship: (a) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (b) the subject

matter is agricultural land; (c) there is consent; (d) the purpose is agricultural production; (e) there is

personal cultivation by the tenant; and (f) there is a sharing of harvests between the parties.[14]

Valencia v. Court of Appeals[15] further affirms the doctrine that a tenancy relationship cannot be

presumed. Claims that one is a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. The elements

of tenancy must first be proved in order to entitle the claimant to security of tenure. There must be

evidence to prove the allegation that an agricultural tenant tilled the land in question. Hence, a perusal ofthe records and documents is in order to determine whether there is substantial evidence to prove the

allegation that a tenancy relationship does exist between petitioner and private respondents. The

principal factor in determining whether a tenancy relationship exists is intent.[16]

Tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the land. It

is also a legal relationship, as ruled in Isidro v. Court of Appeals.[17] The intent of the parties, the

understanding when the farmer is installed, and their written agreements, provided these are complied

with and are not contrary to law, are even more important.[18]

Petitioners allege that they are bona fidetenants of private respondents under Presidential Decree No.

27. Private respondents deny this, citing inter alia, that Virginia A. Roa w as not given a notice of

coverage of the property subject matter of this case; that Virginia A. Roa and the private respondents did

not have any tenant on the same property; that the property allegedly covered by Presidential Decree No.

27 was residential land; that the lot was paraphernal property of Virginia A. Roa; and the landholding

was less than seven (7) hectares.

The petition is devoid of merit.

The petitioners are not de jure tenants of private respondents under Presidential Decree No. 27 due to

the absence of the essential requisites that establish a tenancy relationship between them.

Firstly, the taking of subject property was done in violation of constitutional due process. The Court of

Appeals was correct in pointing out that Virginia A. Roa was denied due process because the DAR failed

to send notice of the impending land reform coverage to the proper party. The records show that notices

were erroneously addressed and sent in the name of Pedro N. Roa who was not the owner, hence, not

the proper party in the instant case. The ownership of the property, as can be gleaned from the records,

pertains to Virginia A. Roa. Notice should have been therefore served on her, and not Pedro N. Roa.


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Spouses Estonina v. Court of Appeals[19] held that the presumption under civil law that all property of

the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership applies only when there is proof that the property was

acquired during the marriage. Otherwise stated, proof of acquisition during the marriage is a condition

sine qua non for the operation of the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.[20] In Spouses

Estonina, petitioners were unable to present any proof that the property in question was acquired during

the marriage of Santiago and Consuelo Garcia. The fact that when the title over the land in question was

issued, Santiago Garcia was already married to Consuelo as evidenced by the registration in the name

of "Santiago Garcia married to Consuelo Gaza," does not suffice to establish the conjugal nature of theproperty.[21]

In the instant case, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the phrase "married to" appearing in

certificates of title is no proof that the properties were acquired during the spouses' coverture and are

merely descriptive of the marital status of the person indicated therein. The clear import from the

certificate of title is that Virginia is the owner of the property, the same having been registered in her

name alone, and being "married to Pedro N. Roa" was merely descriptive of her civil status.[22] Since no

proof was adduced that the property was acquired during the marriage of Pedro and Virginia Roa, the

fact that when the title over the land in question was issued, Virginia Roa was already married to Pedro

N. Roa as evidenced by the registration in the name of "Virginia A. Roa married to Pedro N. Roa," does

not suffice to establish the conjugal nature of the property.

In addition, the defective notice sent to Pedro N. Roa was followed by a DAR certification signed by team

leader Eduardo Maandig on January 8, 1988 stating that the subject property was tenanted as of

October 21, 1972 and primarily devoted to rice and corn despite the fact that there was no ocularinspection or any on-site fact-finding investigation and report to verify the truth of the allegations of

Nicolas Jugalbot that he was a tenant of the property. The absence of such ocular inspection or on-site

fact-finding investigation and report likewise deprives Virginia A. Roa of her right to property through the

denial of due process.

By analogy,Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals[23] applies to the case at bar since there was likewise

a violation of due process in the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law when the

petitioner was not notified of any ocular inspection and investigation to be conducted by the DAR before

acquisition of the property was to be undertaken. Neither was there proof that petitioner was given the

opportunity to at least choose and identify its retention area in those portions to be acquired.[24] Both in

the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and Presidential Decree No. 27, the right of retention and how

this right is exercised, is guaranteed by law.

Since land acquisition under either Presidential Decree No. 27 and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform

Law govern the extraordinary method of expropriating private property, the law must be strictly construed.

Faithful compliance with legal provisions, especially those which relate to the procedure for acquisition of

expropriated lands should therefore be observed. In the instant case, no proper notice was given to

Virginia A. Roa by the DAR. Neither did the DAR conduct an ocular inspection and investigation. Hence,

any act committed by the DAR or any of its agencies that results from its failure to comply with the

proper procedure for expropriation of land is a violation of constitutional due process and should be

deemed arbitrary, capricious, whimsical and tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Secondly, there is no concrete evidence on record sufficient to establish that Nicolas Jugalbot or the

petitioners personally cultivated the property under question or that there was sharing of harvests,

except for their self-serving statements. Clearly, there is no showing that Nicolas Jugalbot or any of his

farm household cultivated the land in question. No proof was presented except for their self-serving

statements that they were tenants of Virginia A. Roa. Independent evidence, aside from their self-serving

statements, is needed to prove personal cultivation, sharing of harvests, or consent of the landowner,

and establish a tenancy relationship.

Furthermore, in the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals, it was undisputed that Nicolas Jugalbot was

a soldier in the United States Army from June 15, 1946 to April 27, 1949[25] and upon retirement,

migrated to the United States and returned to the Philippines sometime in 1998.[26] It was established

that Jugalbot's wife Miguela and daughter Lilia P. Jugalbot are residents of 17623 Grayland Avenue,

Artesia, California, U.S.A., where Nicolas Jugalbot spent his retirement.[27] Thus, the DAR, in particular

its team leader Eduardo Maandig, haphazardly issued a certification dated January 8, 1988 that thesubject property was tenanted as of October 21, 1972 by Nicolas Jugalbot and primarily devoted to rice

and corn without the benefit of any on-site fact-finding investigation and report. This certification became

the basis of the emancipation patent and subsequently, TCT No. E-103 issued on March 1, 1988, which

was less than two months from the issuance of the unsubstantiated DAR certification. Coincidentally,

October 21, 1972 is the date Presidential Decree No. 27 was signed into law.

Neither was there any evidence that the landowner, Virginia A. Roa, freely gave her consent, whether

expressly or impliedly, to establish a tenancy relationship over her paraphernal property.

As declared in Castillo v. Court of Appeals,[28] absent the element of personal cultivation, one cannot be

a tenant even if he is so designated in the written agreement of the parties.[29]

In Berenguer, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[30] we ruled that the respondents' self-serving statements

regarding their tenancy relations could not establish the claimed relationship. The fact alone of working

on another's landholding does not raise a presumption of the existence of agricultural tenancy.Substantial evidence does not only entail the presence of a mere scintilla of evidence in order that the

fact of sharing can be established; there must be concrete evidence on record adequate enough to

prove the element of sharing.[31] We further observed in Berenguer, Jr.:

With respect to the assertion made by respondent Mamerto Venasquez that he is not only a tenant of a

portion of the petitioner's landholding but also an overseer of the entire property subject of this

controversy, there is no evidence on record except his own claim in support thereof. The witnesses who

were presented in court in an effort to bolster Mamerto's claim merely testified that they saw him working

on the petitioner's landholding. More importantly, his own witnesses even categorically stated that they

did not know the relationship of Mamerto and the petitioner in relation to the said landholding. x x x The

fact alone of working on another's landholding does not raise a presumption of the existence of

agricultural tenancy. Other factors must be taken into consideration like compensation in the

form of lease rentals or a share in the produce of the landholding involved.(Underscoring supplied)

x x x x

In the absence of any substantial evidence from which it can be satisfactorily inferred that a sharing

arrangement is present between the contending parties, we, as a court of last resort, are duty-bound to

correct inferences made by the courts below which are manifestly mistaken or absurd. x x x

Without the essential elements of consent and sharing, no tenancy relationship can exist

between the petitioner and the private respondents.(Underscoring supplied)[32]

Bejasa v. Court of Appeals[33] likewise held that to prove sharing of harvests, a receipt or any other

evidence must be presented as self-serving statements are deemed inadequate. Proof must always be

adduced.[34] In addition -


8/33

The Bejasas admit that prior to 1984, they had no contact with Candelaria. They acknowledge that

Candelaria could argue that she did not know of Malabanan's arrangement with them. True enough

Candelaria disavowed any knowledge that the Bejasas during Malabanan's lease possessed the land.

However, the Bejasas claim that this defect was cured when Candelaria agreed to lease the land to the

Bejasas for P20,000.00 per annum, when Malabanan died in 1983. We do not agree. In a tenancy

agreement, consideration should be in the form of harvest sharing. Even assuming that Candelaria

agreed to lease it out to the Bejasas for P20,000 per year, such agreement did not create a tenancy

relationship, but a mere civil law lease.[35]

Thirdly, the fact of sharing alone is not sufficient to establish a tenancy relationship. In Caballes v.

Department of Agrarian Reform,[36] we restated the well-settled rule that all the requisites must concur

in order to create a tenancy relationship between the parties and the absence of one or more requisites

does not make the alleged tenant ade factotenant as contradistinguished from a de jure tenant. This is

so because unless a person has established his status as a de juretenant he is not entitled to security of

tenure nor is he covered by the Land Reform Program of the Government under existing tenancy

laws.[37] The security of tenure guaranteed by our tenancy laws may be invoked only by tenants de jure,

not by those who are not true and lawful tenants.[38]

As reiterated in Qua,[39] the fact that the source of livelihood of the alleged tenants is not derived from

the lots they are allegedly tenanting is indicative of non-agricultural tenancy relationship.[40]

Finally, it is readily apparent in this case that the property under dispute is residential property and notagricultural property. Zoning Certification No. 98-084 issued on September 3, 1998 clearly shows that

the subject property Lot 2180-C covered by TCT No. T-11543 with an area of 6,229 square meters and

owned by Virginia A. Roa is located within the Residential 2 District in accordance with paragraph (b),

Section 9, Article IV of Zoning Ordinance No. 880, Series of 1979 issued by the City Planning and

Development Office of Cagayan de Oro City.[41] To bolster the residential nature of the property, it must

also be noted that no Barangay Agrarian Reform Council was organized or appointed by the DAR

existed in Barangay Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, as all lands have been classified as residential or

commercial, as certified by Barangay Captain of Lapasan.[42]

In Gonzales v. Court of Appeals,[43] we held that an agricultural leasehold cannot be established on

land which has ceased to be devoted to cultivation or farming because of its conversion into a residential

subdivision. Petitioners were not agricultural lessees or tenants of the land before its conversion into a

residential subdivision in 1955. Not having been dispossessed by the conversion of the land into a

residential subdivision, they may not claim a right to reinstatement.[44]

This Court in Spouses Tiongson v. Court of Appeals[45] succinctly ruled that the land surrounded by a

residential zone is always classified as residential. The areas surrounding the disputed six hectares are

now dotted with residences and, apparently, only this case has kept the property in question from being

developed together with the rest of the lot to which it belongs. The fact that a caretaker plants rice or

corn on a residential lot in the middle of a residential subdivision in the heart of a metropolitan area

cannot by any strained interpretation of law convert it into agricultural land and subject it to the agrarian

reform program.[46]

Despite the apparent lack of evidence establishing a tenancy relationship between petitioners and

private respondents, the DARAB improperly recognized the existence of such a relationship in complete

disregard of the essential requisites under Presidential Decree No. 27. DARAB committed grave abuse

of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing an Emancipation Patent to Nicolas Jugalbot.

Once again, Benavidez v. Court of Appeals[47] is illustrative in its pronouncement that an alleged

agricultural tenant tilling the land does not automatically make the case an agrarian dispute which calls

for the application of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and the assumption of jurisdiction by the DARAB. It is

absolutely necessary to first establish the existence of a tenancy relationship between the party litigants.

In Benavidez,there was no showing that there existed any tenancy relationship between petitioner and

private respondent. Thus, the case fell outside the coverage of the Agricultural Tenancy Act;

consequently, it was the Municipal Trial Court and not the DARAB which had jurisdiction over the

controversy between petitioner and private respondent.[48]

Verily,Morta, Sr. v. Occidental[49] ruled that for DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must

exist a tenancy relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a

dispute, it would be essential to establish all the indispensable elements of a landlord-tenant relationship:

The regional trial court ruled that the issue involved is tenancy-related that falls within the exclusive

jurisdiction of the DARAB. It relied on the findings in DARAB Case No. 2413 that Josefina

Opiana-Baraclan appears to be the lawful owner of the land and Jaime Occidental was her recognized

tenant. However, petitioner Morta claimed that he is the owner of the land. Thus, there is even a dispute

as to who is the rightful owner of the land, Josefina Opiana-Baraclan or petitioner Morta. The issue of

ownership cannot be settled by the DARAB since it is definitely outside its jurisdiction. Whatever findings

made by the DARAB regarding the ownership of the land are not conclusive to settle the matter. The

issue of ownership shall be resolved in a separate proceeding before the appropriate trial court between

the claimants thereof.[50]

At any rate, whoever is declared to be the rightful owner of the land, the case cannot be considered as

tenancy-related for it still fails to comply with the other requirements. Assuming arguendothat Josefina

Opiana-Baraclan is the owner, then the case is not between the landowner and tenant. If, however,

Morta is the landowner, Occidental cannot claim that there is consent to a landowner-tenant relationship

between him and Morta. Thus, for failure to comply with the above requisites, we conclude that the issue

involved is not tenancy-related cognizable by the DARAB. [51]

In Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals,[52] the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform is

limited to the following: (a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform; (b)

resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems; and (c) approval and disapproval of the

conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial and

other non-agricultural uses.[53]

To recapitulate, petitioners are not de jure tenants of Virginia A. Roa, to which Presidential Decree No.

27 is found to be inapplicable; hence, the DARAB has no jurisdiction over this case. The DARAB not

only committed a serious error in judgment, which the Court of Appeals properly corrected, but the

former likewise committed a palpable error in jurisdiction which is contrary to law and jurisprudence. For

all the foregoing reasons, we affirm the appellate court decision and likewise hold that the DARAB

gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the subject matter of

the present action is residential, and not agricultural, land, and that all the essential requisites of a

tenancy relationship were sorely lacking in the case at bar.

On one final note, it may not be amiss to stress that laws which have for their object the preservation and

maintenance of social justice are not only meant to favor the poor and underprivileged. They apply with

equal force to those who, notwithstanding their more comfortable position in life, are equally deserving of

protection from the courts. Social justice is not a license to trample on the rights of the rich in the guise of


9/33

defending the poor, where no act of injustice or abuse is being committed against them.[54]

As the court of last resort, our bounden duty to protect the less privileged should not be carried out to

such an extent as to deny justice to landowners whenever truth and justice happen to be on their side.

For in the eyes of the Constitution and the statutes, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER THE LAW remains the

bedrock principle by which our Republic abides.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81823promulgated on October 19, 2005 is AFFIRMED. The Register of Deeds of Cagayan de Oro City is

ordered to CANCELTransfer Certificate of Title No. E-103 for having been issued without factual and

legal basis, and REINSTATETransfer Certificate of Title No. T-11543 in the name of Virginia A. Roa.

The city Assessor's Office of Cagayan de Oro is likewise directed to CANCELTax Declaration No.

80551 issued to Nicolas Jugalbot and RESTORETax Declaration No. 270922 in the name of Virginia

Angcod Roa. The heirs of Nicolas Jugalbot, represented by Leonila B. Jugalbot or any other person

claiming a right or interest to the disputed lot through the latter's title are directed to VACATEthe

premises thereof and peaceably turn over its possession to petitioners Heirs of Virginia A. Roa,

represented by Lolita R. Gorospe. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was

assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice

Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, it is

hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case

was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

[1] Rollo, pp. 28-41. Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo F. Lim, Jr. and concurred in by Associate

Justices Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores and Ramon R. Garcia.

[2] Id. at 44-49. Penned by DAR Assistant Secretary Lorenzo R. Reyes, DARAB Vice-Chairman, and

concurred in by Undersecretary Federico A. Poblete, Assistant Secretary Augusto P. Quijano, Assistant

Secretary Wilfredo M. Peaflor and Assistant Secretary Edwin C. Sales, Members. DAR Secretary

Horacio R. Morales, Jr., Chairman and Undersecretary Conrado S. Navarro, Member, did not take part.

[3] Id. at 60-61. Penned by DAR Assistant Secretary Lorenzo R. Reyes, DARAB Vice-Chairman, and

concurred in by Undersecretary Rolando G. Mangulabnan, Assistant Secretary Augusto P. Quijano,

Assistant Secretary Edgar A. Igano, and Assistant Secretary Rustico T. de Belen, Members. DAR

Secretary Roberto M. Pagdanganan, Chairman and Undersecretary Ricardo S. Arlanza, Member, did not

take part.

[4] Id. at 55-58. Penned by Provincial Adjudicator Leandricia M. Monsanto.

[5] Id. at 59. Penned by Adjudicator Abeto A. Salcedo, Jr.

[6] Id. at 29-30.

[7] Id. at 30.

[8] Id.

[9] Id. at 31.

[10] Id.

[11] Id.

[12] G.R. No. 95318, June 11, 1991, 198 SCRA 236.

[13] G.R. No. 125848, September 6, 1999, 313 SCRA 714.

[14] Id. at 719.

[15] 449 Phil. 711 (2003).

[16] Id. at 736.

[17] G.R. No. 105586, December 15, 1993, 228 SCRA 503.

[18] Id. at 511.


10/33

[19] 334 Phil. 577 (1997).

[20] Id. at 586.

[21] Id.

[22] Rollo, p. 39.

[23] G.R. No. 127876, December 17, 1999, 321 SCRA 106.

[24] Id. at 147.

[25] Rollo, p. 102.

[26] Id. at 37.

[27] Id.

[28] G.R. No. 98028, January 27, 1992, 205 SCR A 529.

[29] Id. at 536.

[30] G.R. No. L-60287, August 17, 1988, 164 SCRA 431.

[31] Id. at 439.

[32] Id. at 439-440.

[33] G.R. No. 108941, July 6, 2000, 335 SCRA 190.

[34] Id. at 199.

[35] Id.

[36] G.R. No. L-78214, December 5, 1998, 168 SC RA 247.

[37] Id. at 254.

[38] Philippine National Railways v. Del Valle, G.R. No. L-29381, September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 573,

580.

[39] Supra note 13.

[40] Id. at 239-240.

[41] Rollo, p. 143.

[42] Id. at 145.

[43] G.R. No. 36213, June 29, 1989, 174 SCRA 398.

[44] Id. at 401.

[45] 215 Phil. 430 (1984).

[46] Id. at 438.

[47] Supra note 14.

[48] Id. at 719-720.

[49] 367 Phil. 438 (1999).

[50] Id. at 446.

[51] Id. at 447.

[52] UDK No. 9864, December 3, 1990, 191 SCRA 885.

[53] Id. at 889.

[54] Roxas & Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra note 24 at 176. Ynares-Santiago, J., concurring and

dissenting.


11/33

In the matter of the TESTATE ESTATE of PETRONILA TAMPOY, deceased, vs.

DIOSDADA ALBERASTINE, petitioner and appellant.

1960-02-25 | G.R. No. L-14322

D E C I S I O N

This concerns the probate of a document which purports to be the last will and testament of onePetronila Tampoy. After the petition was published in accordance with law and petitioner had presented

oral and documentaryevidence, the trial court denied the petition on the ground that the left hand margin

of the first of the w ill does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix. Petitioner appealed from this ruling

but the Court of Appeals certified the case to us because it involves purely a question of law.

The facts of this case as found by the trial court as follows:

De las pruebas resulta que Petronila Tampoy, ya viuda y sin hijos, rogo a Bonigfacio Mioza que la

leyera el testamento Exhibito A y la expicara su contenido en su casa en al calle San Miguel, del

municipio de Argao, provincia de Cebu, en 19 de noviember de 1939, y lasi lo hizo Bonifacio Mioza en

presencia de los tres testigos instrumentales, Rosario K. Chan, Mauricio de la Pea y Simeon Omboy, y

despues de conformarse con el contendido del testamento, ella rogo a Bonifacio Mioza, que escribiera

su nombre al pie del testamento, en la pagina segunda, y asi lo hizo Bonifacio Mioza, y despues ella

estampo su marca digital entra su nombre y apelido en presencia de todos y cada uno de los tres

testigos instrumentales, Rosario K. Chan, Mauricio de la Pea y Simeon Omboy y de Bonifacio Mioza,y despues, Bonifacio Mioza firmo tambien al pie del todos y cada uno de lo tres testigos arriba

nombrados. La testadora asi como Bonifacio Mioza parte de la primera pagina del testamento qeu se

halla compuesto de dos paginas. Todos y cada uno de los tres testigos instrumentales, Rosario K. Chan,

Mauricio de la Pea y Simeon Omboy, firmaron al pie de la clausula de atestiguamiento que esta escrita

en la pagina segunda del testamento y en la margen izquierda de la misma pagina 2 y de la pagina

primera en presencia de la testadora, de Bonifacio Mioza, del abogado Kintanar y de todos y cada uno

de ellos. El testamento fue otorgado por la testadora libre y expontaneament, sin haber sido amenazada,

forzada o intimidada, y sin haberse ejercido sobre ella influencia indebida, estando la misma en pleno

uso de sus facultades mentales y disfrutando de buena salud. La testadore fallecio en su case en Argao

en 22 de febrero de 1957 (Vease certificado de defuncion Exhibito B). La heredera instituida en el

testamento, Carmen Alberastine, murio dos semanas despues que la testadora, o sea en 7 de Marzo de

1957, dejando a su madre, la solicitante Diosdada Alberastine.

The above facts are not controverted, there being no opposition to the probate of the will. However, the

trial court denied the petition on the ground that the first page of the will does not bear the thumbmark of

the testatrix. Petitioner now prays that this ruling be set aside for the reason that, although the first page

of the will does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix, the same however expresses her true intention

to givethe property to her whose claims remains undisputed. She wishes to emphasize that no one has

filed any to the opposition to the probate of the will and that while the first page does not bear the

thumbmark of the testatrix, the second however bears her thumbmark and both pages were signed by

the three testimonial witnesses. Moreover, despite the fact that the petition for probate is unoppossed,

the three testimonial witnesses testified and manifested to the court that the document expresses the

true and voluntary will of the deceased.

This contention cannot be sustained as it runs counter to the express provision of the law. Thus, Section

618 of Act 190, as amended, requires that the testator sign the will and each and every page thereof in

the presence of the witnesses, and that the latter sign the will and each and every page thereof in the

presence of the testator and of each other, which requirement should be expressed in the attestation

clause. This requirement is mandatory, for failure to comply with it is fatal to the validity of the will

(Rodriguez vs. Alcala, 55 Phil., 150). Thus, it has been held that "Statutes prescribing the formalities to

be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly construed. As stated in 40 Cyc., at page 1097, 'A

will must be executed in accordance with the statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely void.' All

these requirements stand as of equal importance and must be observed, and courts cannot supply the

defective execution of a will. No power or discretion is vested in them, either to superadd other

conditions or dispence with those enumerated in the statutes" (Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil.,

405, 407; See also Sao vs. Quintana, 48 Phil., 506; Gumban vs. Gorecho, 50 Phil., 30; Quinto vs.Morata, 54 Phil., 481).

Since the will in question suffers from the fatal defect that it does not bear the thumbmark of the testatrix

on its first page even if it bears the signature of the three instrumental witnesses, we cannot escape the

conclusion that the same fails to comply with the law and therefore, cannot be admitted to probate.

Wherefore, the order appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, Barrera

and Gutierrez, David, JJ.,concur.


12/33

RUFINO RODRIGUEZ, petitioner-appellant, vs. CAYETANO ALCALA ET AL.,

opponents-appellants, AQUILINA MINAS, wife of the opponent Isaac Reynoso, now

deceased, opponent-appellee.

1930-11-05 | G.R. No. 32672

D E C I S I O N

JOHNSON, J.:

This case relates to the probate of the will of the deceased Marta Alcantara. On or about March 26, 1929,

a petition was filed by Rufino R. Rodriguez in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas,

praying (1) that the will of the deceased Marta Alcantara be admitted to probate, and (2) that he be

appointed special administrator of the estate of the deceased. The petition was accompanied by the will

(Exhibit A) written in Tagalog, with its translation into English (Exhibit A-1).

To said petition Cayetano Alcala, husband of the deceased, filed an opposition. Oppositions were also

filed by the spouses Maximino de Luna and Petra Rodriguez, and by Isaac R eynoso, all of them relatives

of the deceased. The oppositions were based on the following grounds: (1) That the will was not

executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by Act No. 190, and (2) that the signatures of the

testatrix were not authentic and were procured through fraud and undue influence.

Upon the issue thus presented, the cause was brought on for trial before Francisco Enage, judge. Afterhearing the evidence adduced by the petitioner and the opponents in support of their respective claims,

the trial court denied the petition for the probate of the will, and rendered a judgment in favor of the

opponents declaring the will invalid on the ground that the attestation clause thereof was not in

conformity with the requirements of section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended. The pertinent parts of the

decision read as follows:

"Aunque en realidad la testadora y los testigos instrumentales firmaron todas las paginas del

testamento de autos en su margen izquierdo, no se ha hecho constar, sin embargo, este hecho en

la clausula de atestiguamiento arriba transcrita. La frase que dice: y lo firmamos nosotros los tres

testigos y la testadora en cada una de las paginas de este testamento,' no cumple con la ley.

Deberia expresarse en dicha clausula, de que los testigos firmaron en

`todas y cada una de las hojas del testamento en su margen izquierdo,' como requiere la ley.

xxx xxx xxx

"Por todo lo expuesto, se deniega la legalizacion del testamento objeto de la solicitud de autos,

con las costas al solicitante."

From that judgment both the petitioner and the opponents, with the exception of Isaac Reynoso,

appealed.

The petitioner-appellant now contends that the lower court erred in not admitting the will to probate

because of the alleged defect of the attestation clause in not expressly stating that the testatrix and

witnesses signed each and every page of the will "on the left margin." It is contended that the omission in

the attestation clause of the phrase "on the left margin" is not fatal because the will itself shows that each

and every page thereof was signed on the left margin, and that this failure of the attestation clause to

specifically state the particular location of the signatures on each page is not sufficient to invalidate the

will.

The opponents-appellants contend that the lower court erred in not finding that the signatures of the

testatrix were procured through fraud and undue influence. The lower court deemed it unnecessary to

make specific finding as to this feature of the case, and denied admission of the will to probate on the

other ground alleged by the opponents, namely, that the attestation clause is not in conformity with

section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended.

The portion of said section 618, pertinent to the case, reads as follows:

". . . The attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written,

and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person

to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter

witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of eachother."

The attestation clause in question, as translated into Spanish, reads as follows:

"Este testamento o ultima voluntad se compone de ocho paginas todas validas y eficaces, sin

tacha de ninguna clase, lo ha leido la testadora Sra. Marta Alcantara, en presencia de nosotros

los tres testigos, y al terminar de leerlo la testadora, ella estampo su nombre y apellido en

presencia de nosotros los tres testigos presentes y cada uno de nosotros lo firmamos tambien en

presencia de la testadora y en presencia unos de los otros, y lo firmamos nosotros los tres

testigos y la testadora en cada una de las paginas de este testamento."

The foregoing attestation clause expressly states that the testatrix signed the will in the presence of the

witnesses and that the latter signed it in the presence of the testatrix and of each other, and that both

testatrix and witnesses signed each and every page of the will. It will be noted, however, that the

attestation fails to state that the testatrix signed each and every page of the will in the presence of thewitnesses and that the latter signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the testatrix and

of each other.

We are unable to agree with the lower court that the omission alone of the phrase "on the left margin" in

the attestation clause, in the absence of any other defect, is fatal to the validity of the will. Section 618 of

Act No. 190, as amended, quoted above, does not expressly provide that the phrase "on the left margin"

must necessarily be inserted in the attestation clause. And in our opinion the reason is obvious, because

the will itself, as in the present case, will show that all the pages thereof were signed on the left margin.

Furthermore, in the case of Avera vs. Garcia and Rodriguez (42 Phil., 145, 146) this court held: "A will

otherwise properly executed in accordance with the requirements of existing law is not rendered invalid

by the fact that the paginal signatures of the testator and attesting witnesses appear in the right margin

instead of the left." This ruling shows that the inclusion of the phrase "on the left margin" in the

attestation is not indispensable to the validity of the will.

In the case of Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476, 479) this court, speaking of the object of the formal

requisites prescribed by law in the execution of wills, said:

"The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad

faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee their truth and

authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain

these primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not

the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an

interpretation already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds

nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's

last will, must be disregarded."

We may conclude, therefore, that a mere omission in the attestation clause of the phrase "on the left

margin," which is not expressly required by the statute, when said clause is otherwise in strict conformity

with the requirements of section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, does not render a will invalid.


13/33

The cases cited by the lower court in its decision denying probate of the will (Uy Coque vs. Navas L.

Sioca, 43 Phil., 405; Fernandez vs. Vergel de Dios, 46 Phil., 922; Sano vs. Quintana, 48 Phil., 506), do

not support the proposition that the omission in the attestation clause of the phrase "on the left margin,"

in the absence of any other defect, is fatal to the validity of the will.

We are of the opinion, however, that the will should not be admitted to probate on another ground. There

is a fatal defect in the attestation clause which escaped the attention of the lower court. As pointed out

above, said defect consists in the failure of the attestation clause to specifically state that the testatrixsigned each and every page of the will in the presence of the witnesses and that the witnesses signed

each and every page thereof in the presence of the testatrix and of each other. The attestation clause

simply recites that the testatrix and the witnesses signed all the pages of the will ("y lo firmamos nosotros

los tres testigos y la testadora en cada una de las paginas de este testamento"). In the presence of

whom they signed each and every page of the will, the attestation fails to state, in violation of the

express requirements of section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, to wit: "The attestation clause shall

state . . . that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, . . . in the presence of three witnesses,

and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of

each other." This defect of the attestation clause is fatal to the validity of the will.

In the case of Uy C oque vs. Navas L. Sioca (43 Phil., 405, 407) the court said:

"Statutes prescribing the formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very strictly

construed. As stated in 40 Cyc., at page 1097, `A will must be executed in accordance with the

statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely void. All these requirements stand as of equalimportance and must be observed, and courts cannot supply the defective execution of a will. No

power or discretion is vested in them, either to superadd other conditions or dispense with those

enumerated in the statutes.'

"The provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, that

the attestation clause of a will must state the number of pages in the will, and that the witnesses

signed in the presence of each other, are mandatory and non-compliance therewith invalidates the

will."

In the case of Sano vs. Quintana (48 Phil., 506) this court held that:

"An attestation clause which does not recite that the witnesses signed the will and each and every

page thereof on the left margin in the presence of the testator is defective, and such a defect

annuls the will."

This doctrine was restated and reaffirmed in the case of Gumban vs. Gorecho (50 Phil., 30).

In the case of Quinto vs. Morata (54 Phil., 481) this court, following the doctrine laid down in the cases

above cited, held that:

"The attestation clause must be made in strict conformity with the requirements of section 618 of

Act No. 190, as amended. Where said clause fails to show on its face a full compliance with those

requirements, the defect constitutes sufficient ground for the disallowance of the will.

"Section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, should be given a strict interpretation in order to give

effect to the intention of the Legislature. Statutes prescribing formalities to be observed in the

execution of wills are very strictly construed. Courts cannot supply the defective execution of a

will."

For all of the foregoing, it is held that the will in question is invalid because of the failure of the attestation

clause to state in whose presence the pages of the will were signed by the testatrix and the witnesses.

The judgment appealed from, denying probate of the will, should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs.

So ordered.

Street, Ostrand, Johns and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

VILLAMOR, J., with whom concurs MALCOLM, J., dissenting:

The will in question was not admitted to probate by the court below for the reason that the attestation

clause did not state that all the witnesses signed on the left-hand margin of each and every page of the

will.

The petitioner Rufino R. Rodriguez appealed from this decision and alleged that the court below erred: (1)

In declining to admit the will to probate on account of the single defect believed to be in the attestation

clause; and (2) in denying the motion for a new trial and the reconsideration of said ruling.

Cayetano Alcala and others, opponents, likewise appealed from the decision of the court below alleging

that the court erred only in not holding that the alleged will of Marta Alcantara had been obtained through

fraud and undue influence.

Accord ing to the major ity opini on, the mere omissi on of the words "on the left margi n" from theattestation clause, words which are not expressly required by the law, when said clause otherwise strictly

conforms to all the requirements set forth in section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, does not nullify the

will.

I agree with this conclusion of the majority, which is indeed the doctrine laid down in Avera vs. Garcia

and Rodriguez (42 Phil., 145), and Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476).

But the majority affirms the judgment appealed from on another ground, namely, that the attestation

clause does not specifically state that the testatrix signed each and every page of the will in the presence

of the witnesses and that the witnesses signed each and every page thereof in the presence of the

testatrix and of each other.

It seems to me extremely doubtful that in a civil cause the court on appeal should have authority to

decide any question not raised by assignment of error. The only question which the petitioner has raised

is the nullity or validity of an attestation clause which does not state that the witnesses signed all the

pages of the will on the left margin. The appeal taken by the opponents is based upon alleged fraud or

undue influence used in preparing the will. The court below made no pronouncement upon this point,

and neither does this court now.

But apart from this aspect of the case, I believe that the declaration made by the majority that "said

defect" (of the will) "consists in the failure of the attestation clause to specifically state that the testatrix

signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the witnesses and that the witnesses signed

each and every page thereof in the presence of the testatrix and of each other," is not supported even by

the very terms of the clause in question.

The attestation clause here spoken of reads word for word as follows:

"Este testamento o ultima voluntad se compone de ocho paginas todas validas y eficaces, sin

tacha de ninguna clase, lo ha leido la testadora Sra. Marta Alcantara, en presencia de nosotros


14/33


15/33

DOUGLAS F. ANAMA, Petitioner, vs PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK, SPOUSES

SATURNINA BARIA &TOMAS CO and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, METRO MANILA,

DISTRICT II, Respondents.

2012-01-25 | G.R. No. 187021

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 assailing the March 31, 2008 Decision1of the Court of

Appeals (CA)and its February 27, 2009 Resolution,2in CA G.R. No. SP-94771, which affirmed the

November 25, 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 167, Pasig City (RTC),granting the

motion for issuance of a writ of execution of respondents.

The Facts

The factual and procedural backgrounds of this case were succinctly recited by the CA in its decision as

follows:

Sometime in 1973, the Petitioner, Douglas F. Anama (Anama), and the Respondent, Philippine Savings

Bank (PSB), entered into a "Contract to Buy," on installment basis, the real property owned and covered

by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 301276 in the latter's name. However, Anama defaulted in

paying his obligations thereunder, thus, PSB rescinded the said contract and title to the property

remained with the latter. Subsequently, the property was sold by PSB to the Spouses Saturnina Baria

and Tomas Co (Co Spouses) who, after paying the purchase price in full, caused the registration of the

same in their names and were, thus, issued TCT N o. 14239.

Resultantly, Anama filed before the Respondent Court a complaint for declaration of nullity of the deed of

sale, cancellation of transfer certificate of title, and specific performance with damages against PSB, the

Co Spouses, and the Register of Deeds of Metro Manila, District II.

On August 21, 1991 and after trial on the merits, the Respondent Court dismissed Anama's complaint

and upheld the validity of the sale

statcon cases week 4

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