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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

R. No. 127255 August 14, 1997

KER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEA, WIGBERTO E. TAADA, AND RONALDO B.MORA, petitioner,

SE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA, RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINAND THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

NDOZA, J.:

s is a petition forcertiorariand/or prohibition challenging the validity of Republic Act No. 8240, which amends certainvisions of the National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called "sin taxes" (actually specific taxes) on the manufa sale of beer and cigarettes.

itioners are members of the House of Representatives. They brought this suit against respondents Jose de Venecia, Sphe House of Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano, the Executive Secretary, th
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cretary of Finance, and the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, charging violation of the rules of the House which petitiom are "constitutionally mandated" so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.

e law originated in the House of Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill was approved on third reading on September 6 and transmitted on September 16, 1996 to the Senate which approved it with certain amendments on third reading on

vember 17, 1996. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House a

nate versions of the bill.

e bicameral conference committee submitted its report to the House at 8 a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48 a.m., afteess, Rep. Exequiel Javier, chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver his sponsorship speecr which he was interpellate. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento was first to interpellate. He was interrupted when Rep. Arroyo mov

ourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio Cuenco objected to the motion and asked for a head count. After a roll call, the Chputy Speaker Raul Daza) declared the presence of a quorum. 1 Rep. Arroyo appealed the ruling of the Chair, but his mo

s defeated when put to a vote. The interpellation of the sponsor thereafter proceeded.

itioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered to interpellate. He was fourth in the order, following Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento, Rep. ELagman and Rep. Enrique Garcia. In the course of his interpellation, Rep. Arroyo announced that he was going to raise stion on the quorum, although until the end of his interpellation he never did. What happened thereafter is shown in the

owing transcript of the session on November 21, 1996 of the House of Representatives, as published by Congress in thewspaper issues of December 5 and 6, 1996:

MR. ALBANO. MR. Speaker, I move that we now approved and ratify the conference committee report.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). Any objection to the motion?

MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr. Speaker?

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). There being none, approved.

(Gavel)

MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I want to know what is the question that Chair asked the distinguished sponsor.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is suspended for one minute.

(It was 3:01 p.m.)

(3:40 p.m., the session was resumed)

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is resumed.

MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I move to adjourn until four o'clock, Wednesday, next week.

THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. Daza). The session is adjourned until four o'clock, Wednesday, next week.(It was 3:40 p.m.)

the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President of the Senate andified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress as having been finally passed by the House of

presentatives and by the Senate on November 21, 1996. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Fidel V. Ramvember 22, 1996.


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itioners claim that there are actually four different version of the transcript of this portion of Rep. Arroyo's interpellation: (script of audio-sound recording of the proceedings in the session hall immediately after the session adjourned at 3:40 p

vember 21, 1996, which petitioner Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from he operators of the sound system; (2) the transcproceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996, as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division o

vember 21, 1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3) the transcript of the proceedings from 3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. ofvember 21, 1996 as certified by the Chief of the Transcription Division on November 28, 1996, also obtained by Rep. La

(4) the published version abovequoted. According to petitioners, the four versions differ on three points, to wit: (1) in thio-sound recording the word "approved," which appears on line 13 in the three other versions, cannot be heard; (2) in thscript certified on November 21, 1996 the world "no" on line 17 appears only once, while in the other versions it is repe

ee times; and (3) the published version does not contain the sentence "(Y)ou better prepare for a quorum because I will question of the quorum," which appears in the other versions.

itioners' allegations are vehemently denied by respondents. However, there is no need to discuss this point as petitionee announced that, in order to expedite the resolution of this petition, they admit, without conceding, the correctness of thscripts relied upon by the respondents. Petitioners agree that for purposes of this proceeding the word "approved" appetranscripts.

y the proceedings of the House of Representatives on the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 are in questionitioners' principal argument is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the rules of the Ht these rules embody the "constitutional mandate" in Art. VI, 16(3) that "each House may determine the rules of itsceedings" and that, consequently, violation of the House rules is a violation of the Constitution itself. They contend that tification of Speaker De Venecia that the law was properly passed is false and spurious.

re specifically, petitioners charge that (1) in violation of Rule VIII, 35 and Rule XVII, 103 of the rules of the House, 2 thair, in submitting the conference committee report to the House, did not call for the years ornays,but simply asked for itsroval by motion in order to prevent petitioner Arroyo from questioning the presence of a quorum; (2) in violation of Rule 2, 3 the Chair deliberately ignored Rep. Arroyo's question, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" and did not repeat Rep. Albation to approve or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI, 97, 4the Chair refused to recognize Rep. Arroyo and instead proceect on Rep. Albano's motion and afterward declared the report approved; and (4) in violation of Rule XX, 121-122, Rul3, and Rule XVIII, 109, 5the Chair suspended the session without first ruling on Rep. Arroyo's question which, it is allegoint of order or a privileged motion. It is argued that Rep. Arroyo's query should have been resolved upon the resumptio

session on November 28, 1996, because the parliamentary situation at the time of the adjournment remained upon theumption of the session.

itioners also charge that the session was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on November 21, 1996 and the bill certified byeaker Jose De Venecia to prevent petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of a quorum and askinonsideration.

itioners urge the Court not to feel bound by the certification of the Speaker of the House that the law had been properlysed, considering the Court's power under Art. VIII, 1 to pass on claims of grave abuse of discretion by the other deparhe government, and they ask for a reexamination ofTolentino v. Secretary of Finance, 6 which affirmed the conclusiveneenrolled bill, in view of the changed membership of the Court.

e Solicitor General filed a comment in behalf of all respondents. In addition, respondent De Venecia filed a supplementamment. Respondents' defense is anchored on the principle of separation of powers and the enrolled bill doctrine. They at the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of the rules of the House and that there is no justification foronsidering the enrolled bill doctrine. Although the Constitution provides in Art. VI, 16(3) for the adoption by each Houses of proceedings, enforcement of the rules cannot be sought in the courts except insofar as they implement constitutionuirements such as that relating to three readings on separate days before a bill may be passed. At all events, respondetend that, in passing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240, the rules of the House, as well as parliamentary precedents roval of conference committee reports on mere motion, were faithfully observed.


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is supplemental comment, respondent De Venecia denies that his certification of H. No. 7198 is false and spurious andtends that under the journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry sought by the petitioners is barred. Indeed, Journal No. 39 of

use of Representatives, covering the sessions of November 20 and 21, 1996, shows that "On Motion of Mr. Albano, therng no objection, the Body approved the Conference Committee Report on House Bill No. 7198." 7 This Journal was appDecember 2, 1996 over the lone objection of petitioner Rep. Lagman. 8

er considering the arguments of the parties, the Court finds no ground for holding that Congress committed a grave abucretion in enacting R.A. No. 8240. This case is therefore dismissed.

st. It is clear from the foregoing facts that what is alleged to have been violated in the enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are mernal rules of procedure of the House rather than constitutional requirements for the enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, 2itioners do not claim that there was no quorum but only that, by some maneuver allegedly in violation of the rules of theuse, Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum.

itioners contend that the House rules were adopted pursuant to the constitutional provision that "each House may deterrules of its proceedings" 9 and that for this reason they are judicially enforceable. To begin with, this contention stands tciple on its head. In the decided cases, 10 the constitutional provision that "each House may determine the rules of itsceedings" was invoked by parties, although not successfully, precisely to support claims of autonomy of the legislative b

onduct its business free from interference by courts. Here petitioners cite the provision for the opposite purpose of invokcial review.

the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into allegatt, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing that there was aation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private individuals. In Osmea v.Pendatun, 11 it was held: "At any rate, e declared that 'the rules adopted by deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasurbody adopting them.' And it has been said that 'Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, trts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere failure to conforiamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when the requisite number of members haveed to a particular measure.'"

United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co.,12 the rules was stated thus: "The Constitution empowers each house to determine

s of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should bsonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to beined. But within these limitations all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachhe rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the validity of t a different one has been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which oncercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitationsgested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."

Crawford v. Gilchrist, 13 it was held: "The provision that each House shall determine the rules of its proceedings does notrict the power given to a mere formulation of standing rules, or to the proceedings of the body in ordinary legislative main the absence of constitutional restraints, and when exercised by a majority of a constitutional quorum, such authority

ends to a determination of the propriety and effect of any action as it is taken by the body as it proceeds in the exercise o

wer, in the transaction of any business, or in the performance of any duty conferred upon it by the Constitution."

State ex rel. City Loan & Savings Co. v. Moore, 14 the Supreme Court of Ohio stated: "The provision for reconsideration it of the Constitution and is therefore entirely within the control of the General Assembly.Having made the rule, it should arded, but a failure to regard it is not the subject-matter of judicial inquiry.It has been decided by the courts of last resorny states, and also by the United States Supreme Court, that a legislative act will not be declared invalid for noncompliah rules."

State v. Savings Bank, 15the Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut declared itself as follows: "The Constitution declare


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h house shall determine the rules of its own proceedings and shall have all powers necessary for a branch of the Legis free and independent state. Rules of proceedings are the servants of the House and subject to its authority. This autho

y be abused, but when the House has acted in a matter clearly within its power, it would be an unwarranted invasion of tependence of the legislative department for the court to set aside such action as void because it may think that the Houconstrued or departed from its own rules of procedure."

McDonald v. State,16

the Wisconsin Supreme Court held: "When it appears that an act was so passed, no inquiry will bemitted to ascertain whether the two houses have or have not complied strictly with their own rules in their procedure upointermediate its introduction and final passage. The presumption is conclusive that they have done so. We think no cour declared an act of the legislature void for non-compliance with the rules of procedure made by itself , or the respectivenches thereof, and which it or they may change or suspend at will. If there are any such adjudications, we decline to follm."

hweizer v. Territory17 is illustrative of the rule in these cases. The 1893 Statutes of Oklahoma provided for three readingarate days before a bill may be passed by each house of the legislature, with the proviso that in case of an emergency tse concerned may, by two-thirds vote, suspend the operation of the rule. Plaintiff was convicted in the district court ofation of a law punishing gambling. He appealed contending that the gambling statute was not properly passed by theslature because the suspension of the rule on three readings had not been approved by the requisite two-thirds vote.missing this contention, the State Supreme Court of Oklahoma held:

We have no constitutional provision requiring that the legislature should read a bill in any particular manner.may, then, read or deliberate upon a bill as it sees fit. either in accordance with its own rules, or in violationthereof, or without making any rules. The provision of section 17 referred to is merely a statutory provision fdirection of the legislature in its action upon proposed measures. It receives its entire force from legislativesanction, and it exists only at legislative pleasure. The failure of the legislature to properly weigh and considact, its passage through the legislature in a hasty manner, might be reasons for the governor withholding hisignature thereto; but this alone, even though it is shown to be a violation of a rule which the legislature hadto govern its own proceedings, could be no reason for the court's refusing its enforcement after it was actuapassed by a majority of each branch of the legislature, and duly signed by the governor. The courts cannotdeclare an act of the legislature void on account of noncompliance with rules of procedure made by itself togovern its deliberations.McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185; In re Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N.W. 18

State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11 S.E. 641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54 Ark. 101, 15 S.W. 18.

conclude this survey with the useful summary of the rulings by former Chief Justice Fernando, commenting on the powh House of Congress to determine its rules of proceedings. He wrote:

Rules are hardly permanent in character. The prevailing view is that they are subject to revocation, modification owaiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinary have no concwith their observance. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure toconform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members have agrea particular measure. The above principle is subject, however, to this qualification. Where the construction to be to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body the question presented is necessarily judicial character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are involved. 18

his case no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of seeking redress in the Hse to transfer the dispute to this Court. We have no more power to look into the internal proceedings of a House thanmbers of that House have to look over our shoulders, as long as no violation of constitutional provisions is shown.

itioners must realize that each of the three departments of our government has its separate sphere which the others maade without upsetting the delicate balance on which our constitutional order rests. Due regard for the working of our systernment, more than mere comity, compels reluctance on our part to enter upon an inquiry into an alleged violation of thhe House. We must accordingly decline the invitation to exercise our power.


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cond. Petitioners, quoting former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion's sponsorship in the Constitutional Commission, cont under Art. VIII, 1, "nothing involving abuse of discretion [by the other branches of the government] amounting to lack ess of jurisdiction is beyond judicial review." 19 Implicit in this statement of the former Chief Justice, however, is annowledgment that the jurisdiction of this Court is subject to the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII. 5 and,refore, to the requirement of a justiciable controversy before courts can adjudicate constitutional questions such as thosch arise in the field of foreign relations. For while Art. VIII, 1 has broadened the scope of judicial inquiry into areas norm

to the political departments to decide, such as those relating to national security,20

it has not altogether done away withtical questions such as those which arise in the field of foreign relations. As we have already held, under Art. VIII, 1, thurt's function

is merely [to] check whether or not the governmental branch or agency has gone beyond the constitutional limits jurisdiction, not that it erred or has a different view. In the absence of a showing . . . [of] grave abuse of discretionamounting to lack of jurisdiction, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power. . . . It has no to look into what it thinks is apparent error. 21

hen, the established rule is that courts cannot declare an act of the legislature void on account merely of noncompliances of procedure made by itself, it follows that such a case does not present a situation in which a branch of the governm"gone beyond the constitutional limits of its jurisdiction" so as to call for the exercise of our Art. VIII. 1 power.

rd. Petitioners claim that the passage of the law in the House was "railroaded." They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still mary to the Chair when the latter declared Rep. Albano's motion approved.

at happened is that, after Rep. Arroyo's interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Rodolfo Aved for the approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the motioen the Chair declared: "There being none, approved." At the same time the Chair was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyoing, "What is that . . . Mr. Speaker?" The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroysequently objected to the Majority Leader's motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then alreadn declared by the Chair, symbolized by its banging of the gavel.

itioners argue that, in accordance with the rules of the House, Rep. Albano's motion for the approval of the conferencemmittee report should have been stated by the Chair and later the individual votes of the members should have been tak

ey say that the method used in this case is a legislator's nightmare because it suggests unanimity when the fact was thaome legislators opposed the report.

rule of the House of Representative has been cited which specifically requires that in case such as this involving approvference committee report, the Chair must restate the motion and conduct a viva voce or nominal voting. On the other hahe Solicitor General has pointed out, the manner in which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 was approvano means a unique one. It has basis in legislative practice. It was the way the conference committee report on the bills wame the Local Government Code of 1991 and the conference committee report on the bills amending the Tariff and Cus

de were approved.

957, the practice was questioned as being contrary to the rules of the House. The point was answered by Majority Leaduro M. Tolentino and his answer became the ruling of the Chair Mr. Tolentino said:

Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the House. Insofar as the matprocedure is concerned, this has been a precedent since I came here seven years ago, and it has been theprocedure in this House that if somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the debate, then the votincomes in.

xxx xxx xxx

Mr. Speaker, a point of order was raised by the gentleman from Leyte, and I wonder what his attitude is nor on h


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of order. I should just like to state that I believe that we have had a substantial compliance with the Rules. The Ruinvoked is not one that refers to statutory or constitutional requirement, and a substantial compliance, to my mindsufficient. When the Chair announces the vote by saying "Is there any objection?" and nobody objects, then the Cannounces "The bill is approved on second reading." If there was any doubt as to the vote, any motion to divide whave been proper. So, if that motion is not presented, we assume that the House approves the measure. So I belthere is substantial compliance here, and if anybody wants a division of the House he can always ask for it, and tChair can announce how many are in favor and how many are against. 22

eed, it is no impeachment of the method to say that some other way would be better, more accurate and even more. 23 The advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a method do not present any matter for judicialsideration. 24 In the words of the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, "this Court cannot provide a second opinion on what is tht procedure. Notwithstanding the deference and esteem that is properly tendered to individual congressional actors, ourerence and esteem for the institution as a whole and for the constitutional command that the institution be allowed to maown affairs precludes us from even attempting a diagnosis of the problem." 25

does the Constitution require that the yeas and the nays ofMembers be taken every time a House has to vote, except only in the following instances; upon the last and third readinll, 26 at the request of one-fifth of the Members present, 27 and in repassing a bill over the veto of the President. 28 Indeedsidering the fact that in the approval of the original bill the votes of the members by yeas and nays had already been ta

uld have been sheer tedium to repeat the process.

itioners claim that they were prevented from seeking reconsideration allegedly as a result of the precipitate suspension sequent adjournment of the session. 29 It would appear, however, that the session was suspended to allow the parties tle the problem, because when it resumed at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo did not say anything anymore. While it ist the Majority Leader moved for adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could at leasected if there was anything he wanted to say. The fact, however, is that he did not. The Journal of November 21, 1996 ouse shows.

ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION

On motion of Mr. Albano, there being no objection, the Chair declared the session adjourned until four o'clo

the afternoon of Wednesday, November 27, 1996.

It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday, November 21, 1996. (emphasis added)

s Journal was approved on December 3, 1996. Again, no one objected to its approval except Rep. Lagman.

thus apparent that petitioners' predicament was largely of their own making. Instead of submitting the proper motions fouse to act upon, petitioners insisted on the pendency of Rep. Arroyo's question as an obstacle to the passage of the billp. Arroyo's question was not, in form or substance, a point of order or a question of privilege entitled to precedence. 30 An if Rep. Arroyo's question were so, Rep. Albano's motion to adjourn would have precedence and would have put an enfurther consideration of the question. 31

en this fact, it is difficult to see how it can plausibly be contended that in signing the bill which became R.A. No. 8240,pondent Speaker of the House be acted with grave abuse of his discretion. Indeed, the phrase "grave abuse of discretioounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" has a settled meaning in the jurisprudence of procedure. It means such capricio whimsical exercise of judgment by a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi judicial power as to amount to lack of power. Aef Justice Concepcion himself said in explaining this provision, the power granted to the courts by Art. VIII. 1 extends tes where "a branch of the government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or sriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction." 32

e, the matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not he


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cerned. To repeat, the claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented fromstioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo's earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeateroll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised repeatedly especially whenrum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the business of the House. 33 Rep. Arroyo waived his objection tinued interpellation of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect acknowledged the presence of a quorum. 34

any rate it is noteworthy that of the 111 members of the House earlier found to be present on November 21, 1996, only , i.e., petitioners in this case, are questioning the manner by which the conference committee report on H. No. 7198 wasroved on that day. No one, except Rep. Arroyo, appears to have objected to the manner by which the report was appro

p. John Henry Osmea did not participate in the bicameral conference committee proceedings. 35 Rep. Lagman and Repmora objected to the report 36 but not to the manner it was approved; while it is said that, if voting had been conducted. Rada would have voted in favor of the conference committee report. 37

urth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of H. No. 7198 by the Speaker of the House and the President of the Se the certification by the secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed on November 21, 1996 are conclusiv

due enactment. Much energy and learning is devoted in the separate opinion of Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide, puting this doctrine. To be sure, there is no claim either here or in the decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v. Secretaryance] that the enrolled bill embodies a conclusive presumption. In one case 38 we "went behind" an enrolled bill and conJournal to determine whether certain provisions of a statute had been approved by the Senate.

, where as here there is no evidence to the contrary, this Court will respect the certification of the presiding officers of bouses that a bill has been duly passed. Under this rule, this Court has refused to determine claims that the three-fourths vded to pass a proposed amendment to the Constitution had not been obtained, because "a duly authenticated bill or

olution imports absolute verify and is binding on the courts." 39This Court quoted from Wigmore on Evidence the followinerpt which embodies good, if old-fashioned, democratic theory:

The truth is that many have been carried away with the righteous desire to check at any cost the misdoings ofLegislatures. They have set such store by the Judiciary for this purpose that they have almost made them a secoand higher Legislature. But they aim in the wrong direction. Instead of trusting a faithful Judiciary to check an ineLegislature, they should turn to improve the Legislature. The sensible solution is not to patch and mend casual eby asking the Judiciary to violate legal principle and to do impossibilities with the Constitution; but to represent

ourselves with competent, careful, and honest legislators, the work of whose hands on the statute-roll may comereflect credit upon the name of popular government. 40

s Court has refused to even look into allegations that the enrolled bill sent to the President contained provisions which hn "surreptitiously" inserted in the conference committee:

[W]here allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not been observed have no mbasis than another allegation that the Conference Committee "surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill whichprepared, we should decline the invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bilin such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our government. 41

as refused to look into charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of a bill in violation of Art. VI. 26(2)Constitution that "upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment shall be allowed." 42

other cases, 43 this Court has denied claims that the tenor of a bill was otherwise than as certified by the presiding officerh Houses of Congress.

e enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of evidence, is well established. It is cited with approval by text writers here andoad. 44 The enrolled bill rule rests on the following considerations:

. . . As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled Act in the custody of


9/33

Secretary of State, and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the Preof the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislativexecutive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the lawsit was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial depato act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stateleaving the court to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the Act, so authenticated, is in conformwith the Constitution. 45

overrule the doctrine now, as the dissent urges, is to repudiate the massive teaching of our cases and overthrow anablished rule of evidence.

eed, petitioners have advanced no argument to warrant a departure from the rule, except to say that, with a change in thmbership of the Court, the three new members may be assumed to have an open mind on the question of the enrolled bually, not three but four (Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, and Quiason, JJ.) have departed from the Court since our decision in theAT cases and their places have since been taken by four new members (Francisco, Hermosisima, Panganiban, andres, JJ.) Petitioners are thus simply banking on the change in the membership of the Court.

reover, as already noted, the due enactment of the law in question is confirmed by the Journal of the House of Novembe6 which shows that the conference committee report on H. No. 7198, which became R.A. No. 8740, was approved on th

. The keeping of the Journal is required by the Constitution, Art. VI, 16(4) provides:

Each House shall keep a Journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting sucas may, in its judgment, affect national security; and the yeas and nays on any question shall, at the requesone-fifth of the Members present, be entered in the Journal.

Each House shall also keep a Record of its proceedings.

e Journal is regarded as conclusive with respect to matters that are required by the Constitution to be recorded therein.pect to other matters, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the Journals have also been accorded conclusive effeus, in United States v. Pons, 47 this Court spoke of the imperatives of public policy for regarding the Journals as "publicmorials of the most permanent character," thus: "They should be public, because all are required to conform to them; th

uld be permanent, that rights acquired today upon the faith of what has been declared to be law shall not be destroyedorrow, or at some remote period of time, by facts resting only in the memory of individuals." As already noted, the bill wame R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal. Hence its due enactment has been duly proven.

ould be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set aside a legislativon as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure, or to allow those defeated itical arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find their remedy in that department itself. The Cnot been invested with a roving commission to inquire into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It w

acting in excess of its power and would itself be guilty of grave abuse of its discretion were it to do so. The suggestion mcase 48 may instead appropriately be made here: petitioners can seek the enactment of a new law or the repeal or

endment of R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of anything to the contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any Houreof acted in the good faith belief that its conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due

gment of that body.

49

EREFORE, the petition forcertiorariand prohibition is DISMISSED.

ORDERED.

rvasa, C.J., Padilla, Melo, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

galado, J., concurs in the result.


10/33

losillo and Panganiban, JJ., took no part.

res, Jr., J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

UG, J., concurring:

When the 1987 Constitution has embodied, in its circumscription of judicial power under Section 1, Article Vthe Constitution, the determination of whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of any bror instrumentality of government, the Supreme Court, upon which that great burden has been imposed, couhave been thought of as likewise being thereby tasked with the awesome responsibility of overseeing the ebureaucracy. The term grave abuse of discretion has long been understood in our jurisprudence as, and coto, a capricious and whimsical or despotic exercise of judgment as amounting to lack or excess of jurisdictio

I see nothing of that sort in the case at bar. Absent a clear case of grave abuse of discretion, like the patentdisregard of a Constitutional proscription, I would respect the judgment of Congress under whose province specific responsibility falls and the authority to act is vested. To do otherwise would be an unwarranted intruinto the internal affairs of a co-equal, independent and coordinate branch of government. At no time, it wouseem to me, has it been intended by the framers of the fundamental law to cause a substantial deviation, lealone departure, from the time-honored and accepted principle of separation, but balanced, powers of the tbranches of government. There is, of course, a basic variant between the old rule and the new Charter on th

understanding of the term "judicial power." Now, the Court is under mandate to assume jurisdiction over, anundertake judicial inquiry into, what may even be deemed to be political questions provided, however, that gabuse of discretion the sole test of justiciability on purely political issues is shown to have attended thcontested act.

All taken, I most humbly reiterate my separate opinion in Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance and companioncases (G.R. No. 115455, etc., 235 SCRA 630) and vote to deny the instant petition.

MERO, J., separate opinion:

In filing this separate opinion for the dismissal of the instant petition, I am not backtracking from the dissent I expressed in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance. 1 I am somewhat bothered that if I do not elaborate, the vo

which I cast today might be wrongly construed as an implied abandonment of, and inconsistent with, my firmstance in Tolentino.

The landmark case ofTolentino, just like the one under consideration, involved a similar challenge to theconstitutionality of a significant tax measure namely, Republic Act No. 7716, otherwise known as the ExpanValue-Added Tax (EVAT) Law. There, a number of issues, both substantive and procedural, were posed bypetitioners, each of which was discussed by the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza who,incidentally, is also the ponente of instant decision. At any rate, it is worth noting that I did not entirely disagwith each and every argument of the opinion, most especially those touching upon substantive issues. My m


11/33

objection in Tolentino, it will be recalled, focused instead on what I perceived was a substantial breach anddisregard by the Legislature of vital constitutional requirements ordaining the procedures to be followed in thpassage of a bill which, in my opinion, the majority seemed to have cavalierly put to rest by hiding under theof the enrolled bill theory 2 and the precept that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of intelegislative rules allegedly violated. 3 To me, the position then taken by the majority exhibited blind adherencotherwise sound principles of law which did not, however, fit the facts as presented before the Court. Hence

objected, not so much because I found these principles unwise or obsolete, but rather because they wereapplied, or misapplied, to a case which I believe did not call for their application.

When I differed from the majority opinion which applied the enrolled bill theory, I was very careful to emphathat reliance thereon is not to be discontinued but that its application must be limited to minor matters relatinmore to form and factual issues which do not materially alter the essence and substance of the law itself. T

As applied to the instant petition, the issue posed is whether or not the procedural irregularities thatattended the passage of House Bill No. 11197 and Senate Bill No. 1630, outside of the reading andprinting requirements which were exempted by the Presidential certification, may no longer be impuhaving been "saved" by the conclusiveness on us of the enrolled bill. I see no cogent reason why wcannot continue to place reliance on the enrolled bill, but only with respect to matters pertaining to th

procedure followed in the enactment of bills in Congress and their subsequent engrossment, printinerrors, omission of words and phrases and similar relatively minor matters relating more to form andfactual issues which do not materially alter the essence and substance of the law itself .

Certainly, courts cannot claim greater ability to judge procedural legitimacy, since constitutional rulelegislative procedure are easily mastered. Procedural disputes are over facts whether or not the had enough votes, or three readings, or whatever not over the meaning of the constitution. Legisas eyewitnesses, are in a better position than a court to rule on the facts. The argument is also madlegislatures would be offended if courts examined legislative procedure.

Such a rationale, however, cannot conceivably apply to substantive changes in a bill introduced towthe end of its tortuous trip through Congress, catching both legislators and the public unawares andaltering the same beyond recognition even by its sponsors.

This issue I wish to address forthwith. 4

As regards the principle that the Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of internal legislative ruleboth the majority and I were actually of one mind such that I was quick to qualify the extent of the Court's repower in respect of internal procedures in this wise:

I wish to consider this issue in light of Article VIII, Sec. 1 of the Constitution which provides that "(j)udiciapower includes the duty of the courts of justice . . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abof discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of theGovernment." We are also guided by the principle that a court may interfere with the internal procedurescoordinate branch only to uphold the Constitution. 5

I differed, however, from the majority insofar as that principle was applied. In this respect, I showed that theintroduction of several provisions in the Bicameral Conference Committee Report did not only violate the peHouse and Senate Rules defining the limited power of the conference committee but that the Constitutionalproscription against any amendment upon the last reading of a bill was likewise breached. Hence, in view othese lapses, I thought that judicial review would have been proper in order to uphold the Constitution. Thismajority, however, disregarded invoking the same principle which should have justified the Court in questiothe actuations of the legislative branch.


12/33

At this juncture, I wish to reiterate my continuing adherence to the aforesaid reasons I cited inthe Tolentinodissent. At the same time, I realize that the arguments I raised in my dissent would not hold truthe instant petition.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24806 February 13, 1926

JULIO AGCAOILI, plaintiff-appellant,vs.ALBERTO SUGUITAN, defendant-appellee.

The appellant in his own behalf.The appellee in his own behalf.

JOHNSON, J .:

This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Ilocos Norte. Itspurpose was to obtain the extraordinary legal writ ofquo warranto. The petition was denied by thetrial court and the plaintiff appealed. The question presented by the appeal are:

(a) Is the provision of Act No. 3107, in so far as it provides that "justices of the peace shall beappointed to serve until they have reached the age of 65 years," valid and constitutional,

when applied to justices of the peace appointed under Act No. 2041, section 1, to serve"during good behavior?" And,

(b) Is the present action barred by the statutes of limitations?

The facts involved in the decision of those questions are as follows:

(a) That the said Julio Agcaoili was appointed as justice of the peace of the municipality ofLaoag, of the Province of Ilocos Norte, by His Excellency, Francis Burton Harrison, on the25th day of March, 1916, with authority "to have and to hold the said office with all thepowers, privileges, and emoluments thereunto of right appertaining unto him, subject to theconditions prescribed by law.

The conditions prescribed by law" to which the appointee was "subject" at the time of hisappointment, are found in section 1 of Act No. 2041 (vol. 8 Public Laws, 153). Said section isamendment to section 67 of Act No. 136, and provides among other things for the"appointment and term of the justices of the peace." It provides that one justice of the peaceand one auxiliary justice shall be appointed by the Governor-General, etc., for eachmunicipality organized according to the Municipal Code. Said section further provides that"All justices of the peace and auxiliary justices shall hold office during good behavior. . . ."
http://history.back%281%29/http://history.back%281%29/


13/33

Said Act No. 2041 was adopted, the Philippine Legislature was composed of the UnitedStates Commission and the House of Representatives.

(b) That on the 17th day of March, 1923, the Philippine Legislature, composed of the Senateand House of Representatives, adopted Act No. 3107, which was "an Act to amend andrepeal certain provisions of the Administrative Code relative to the judiciaryin order to

reorganize the latter; increasing the number of judges for certain judicial districts; increasingthe salaries of judges of Courts of First Instance; vesting the Secretary of Justice withauthority to detail a district judge temporarily to a district or province other than hisown; regulating the salaries of justices of the peace; abolishing the municipal court and

justice of the peace court of the City of Manila and creating in lieu thereof a municipal courtwith three branches; regulating the salaries of clerks of court and other subordinateemployees of Courts of First Instance, and for other purposes.

Notwithstanding the fact that the title of said Act No. (3107), so far as the same relates to justice ofthe peace, provides only for "regulating the salaries of justices of the peace," said Act in section 203provides for "the appointment and distribution of justices of the peace" with the proviso in saidsection ". . . That justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until theyhave reached the age of sixty-five years." Attention is here called to the fact again that there isnothing in the title of the Act, which, in the slightest degree, indicates that said Act containsprovisions for "appointment of justices of the of the peace" nor as to the period during which theymay serve after appointment. Attention is also invited to the fact that the same section (203) containsprovisions for the jurisdiction of justices of the peace while section 207 contains provisions definingthe"qualifications for justices of the peace."Section 210 of said Act provides for the "filling ofvacancies in the office of justices of the peace." There is nothing in the title of the Act which in anyway indicates that the Act contains said provisions. Attention is here called to the provision of the Actof Congress of the 29th day of August, 1916, and to section 3 thereof, which provides " That no billwhich may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject, and that the subject shall beexpressed in the title of the bill." The effect of a violation of said provision of said Act of Congress willbe discussed later.

(c) That on the 9th day of April, 1923, the Undersecretary of Justice sent the following letterto the said Julio Agcaoili, through the Judge of the Court of First Instance of the ThirdJudicial District, of the Province of Ilocos Sur. Said letter is in the words and figures following:

MANILA,April 9, 1923

SIR: In view of the provision of section 203 of the Administrative Code asamended by section 1 of Act No. 3107, which, in part, provides that justicesand auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they havereached the age of sixty-five years, and in view of the fact that the recordshows that you are over sixty-five years of age already, I have the honor tohereby advise you that, upon receipt hereof, you cease to be a justice of the

peace by operation of said amendment of the Administrative Code.

Respectfully,

(Sgd.) LUIS P. TORRESUndersecretary of Justice

Said letter was received by Julio Agcaoili, the justice of the peace, on the 26th day of April, 1923. Itwas handed to him by the clerk of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Ilocos Norte.


14/33

(d) It will be noted that in the letter of April 9, 1923, the Secretary of Justice directed or ordered JulioAgcaoili, then justice of the peace, "upon receipt of said letter, to cease to be a justice of the peace."Against the order contained in said letter of April 9th, Julio Agcaoili entered a protest dated April 28,1923, in the following language:

JUSTICE OF THE PEACE OF COURT OF LAOAG, ILOCOS NORTE

P. I.

April 28, 1923

The Hon. LUIS TORRESUndersecretary of Justice ofthe Philippine Islands

SIR: The undersigned, Julio Agcaoili, justice of the peace of Laoag, capital of theProvince of Ilocos Norte, has the honor to state that on April 26, 1923, he received,through the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, your communication of

April 9, 1923, informing the undersigned that, having attained the age of 65 years, he

ceased to be justice of the peace of Laoag under the provisions of section 1 of ActNo. 3107, amending section 203 of the Administrative Code, which is Act No. 2711enacted in the year 1919, and which section 1 of said Act No. 3107 provides in partthat the justices of the peace and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed toserve until they attain the age of 65 years.

With all due respect, the undersigned has the honor to state that he believes that theaforecited part of the provision of section 1 of Act No. 3107 does not include those

justices of the peace who had already been appointed justices of the peace, like theundersigned, before the passage and enactment of said Act No. 3107 and theamended Administrative Code, nor can this be the intention of the legislator, for if itwere so, it should have so stated in order that the justices of the peace alreadyappointed, who were discharging the functions of the office and who had attained the

age of 65 years when said Act was passed and enacted, should cease from theiroffice.

The undersigned was appointed of the peace of Laoag on March 25, 1916, andtherefore under Act No. 2041, enacted February 3, 1911. Section 1 of this Act, whichamended section 67 of Act No. 136, was not amended by any subsequent Act andprovides: All justices if the peace and auxiliary justices shall hold office during goodbehavior and those now in office who have not the qualifications required by this Actshall continue in office until their successors are appointed.

Has section 203 of the Administrative Code amended or repealed section 1 of ActNo. 2041? The undersigned believes that it has not, judging from the context of both

laws, nor was it repealed because if this were the case the Governor- General wouldhave renewed the appointments of all the justices of the peace and auxiliary justicesof the peace under said section 203 of the Administrative Code.

The undersigned was appointed justice of the peace of Laoag on March 25, 1916,under the said Act No. 2041 and continues in the discharge of the duties of the officeup to the present time, without the Governor-General having renewed hisappointment under said section 203 of the Administrative Code.


15/33

Then Act No. 3107 came, section 1 of which amends section 203 of theAdministrative Code.

Has this amendment retroactive effect? In the first place the legislature could not giveor have given this Act such a character, and if it had intended to do so, it would haveso stated; and in the second place, because not only is such express declaration

lacking in the law but Act No. 3107 very clearly provides that the justices of thepeace and auxiliary justices of the peace to be appointed shall hold office until theyattain the age of 65 years.

Very respectfully,

(Sgd.) JULIO AGCAOILIJustice of the Peace of Laoag, Ilocos Norte

A further protest against the said order of the Secretary of Justice was made by Julio Agcaoili on the7th day of July, 1923, and is couched in the following language:

I, Julio Agcaoili, Justice of the Peace of the Municipality of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, dohereby state that on this day, July 7, 1923, Mr. Buenaventura Ocampo, ProvincialFiscal of Ilocos Norte, appeared at my office and thereupon showed me the telegramof Undersecretary of Justice Torres, addressed to said provincial fiscal. After readingsaid telegram I asked the provincial fiscal to furnish me a copy thereof and hefurnished me a copy of the telegram.

Said telegram of the Undersecretary of Justice in substance orders the provincialfiscal; to cause me to deliver the office and all the documents and records thereof tothe auxiliary justice of the peace, because according to said Undersecretary ofJustice I must cease from the office under Act No. 3107, and that I be prosecuted forviolation of article 370 of the Penal Codeshould I fail to comply with the telegram sentto me on the 2d instant by the same Undersecretary of Justice.

I do also state that I have never had any malicious intention to disobey the orders ofthe Undersecretary of Justice, Hon. Torres, one given telegram and the other byletter. I only desired to study the spirit of the law and this is the reason why I did notleave the office until the present time, because I was from the office of the justice ofthe peace under the provision of Act No. 2041 under which I was appointed justice ofthe peace of the capital, and which Act was not repealed by any subsequent one, norby Act No. 3107, which Act No. 2041 provides that the justices of the peace to beappointed under it, should hold office during good behavior. This Act does not sayanything as to limitation of age, and therefore I believe myself entitled to continue in,and retain the office.

I do also state that lest the Undersecretary of Justice should think that I do not dulyrespect the constituted authorities, I now deliver under protest the office of the justiceof the peace of Laoag and all its documents and records, as well as the furnituretherein contained, to Mr. Alberto Suguitan, auxiliary justice of the peace, in thepresence of the provincial fiscal, in compliance with the telegram of theUndersecretary of Justice, Hon. Torres, received by me through the provincial fiscalof Ilocos Norte. I make under protest the delivery of the office and its documents andrecords because I think, as I have stated, that I must not cease from the office of


16/33

justice of the peace, and in order that my right may be defined, I shall institute anaction in the proper court of justice to decide the case.

(Sgd.) JULIO AGCAOILI

I received the things of the office.

(Sgd.) ALBERTO SUGUITAN

In the presence of:

(Sgd.) BUENA V. OCAMPO Provincial Fiscal

Julio Agcaoili patiently waited in vain for a resolution by the Secretary of Justice of the protest whichhe presented on the 28th day of April and on the 7th day of July, 1923; and not having received anyreply to his protest, filed a petition for a writ ofquo warranto in the Court of First Instance of theProvince of Ilocos Norte on the 23d day of April, 1925, which petition was amended by the filing ofanother petition in the same court on the 8th day of September, 1925.

A careful reading of the two protests (April 28, 1923, and July 7, 1923) shows that they containarguments in support thereof which, in all equity and justice, demanded a reply, but no reply wasforthcoming. The arguments in support of his protests find a counterpart and are fully supported inthe decision of this court in the case of Segovia vs. Noel, of March 4, 1925 (47 Phil., 543), whereinthe Supreme Court held that the Act No. 3107 could not be applied to and enforced against justicesof the peace who had been appointed prior to the 17th day of March, 1923. Had the Secretary ofJustice answered said protests, the great injustice which has been done to Julio Agcaoili perhapsmight have been avoided.

(e) That Julio Agcaoili being threatened with a criminal prosecution unless he turned his office overto the auxiliary justice of the peace, and to avoid scandal, disgrace and humiliation which might

come to him by virtue of said prosecution, on the 7th day of July, 1923, still protesting, delivered thepossession of his office, as justice of the peace, to the auxiliary justice of the peace of themunicipality of Laoag. It is a matter of common knowledge that Julio Agcaoili had been entrustedwith the highest office in his province which the people could confer upon him.

The petitions presented by Julio Agcaoili in the Court of First Instance, the first on the 23d day ofJuly, 1925, and the second on the 8th day of September, 1925, contain, in resume, the foregoingfacts. To the petition the respondent Alberto Suguitan answered and set up the defense ofprescription. Upon the issue thus presented, the Honorable Fermin Mariano, judge, sustained thedefense of prescription and denied the petition for the extraordinary legal remedy ofquo warranto.From that judgment Julio Agcaoili appealed, and now contends in a vigorous and logical argumentthat his remedy has not prescribed.

Considering the first question suggested above, attention is again called to one of the provisions ofsection 3 of the Jones Law (Act of Congress, August 29, 1916, vol. 12, Public Laws of the PhilippineIslands). The "Jones Law" is the constitution of the Philippine Islands providing a governmenttherefor. Subparagraph 16 of section 3 of the Jones law provides "That no bill which may be enactedinto law shall embrace more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in the title of thebill." Under said provision, may the legislature adopt a law which contains in the title of the Act? Theeffect of violating said provision of the Jones Law has been brought before the courts many times.The effect of violating said provision has already been passed upon by this court. (Central Capiz vs.Ramirez, 40 Phil., 883, 889.)


17/33

In the case of Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, supra, it was decided that said provision of the Jones Lawwas mandatory and not directory and its violation was fatal to any provision of the law to which noreference was made in the title. In the decision of this court in the case of Central Capiz vs. Ramirez,the decisions of the courts of many of the states of the Union were followed. Many of theconstitutions of the States of the Union contain similar provision to that quoted above from the JonesLaw. Among such states may be mentioned Alabama, California, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana,

Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Tennessee,Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming.

Mr. Justice Sutherland, now an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, in hisvaluable work on "Statutory Construction," vol. 1, 2nd ed.) at section 111, states the reason and thepurpose of such a constitutional provision. He says:

In the construction and application of this constitutional restriction the courts have keptsteadily in view the correction of the mischief against which it was aimed. The object is toprevent the practice, which was common in all legislative bodies where no such restrictionexisted, of embracing in the same bill incongruous matters having no relation to each other,or to the subject specified in the title, by which measures were often adopted withoutattracting attention. Such distinct subjects represented diverse interests, and were combinedin order to unite the members of the legislature who favor either in support of all. Thesecombinations were corruptive of the legislature and dangerous to the state.Such omnibus bills sometimes included more than a hundred sections on as many differentsubjects, with a title appropriate to the first section, and for other purposes.

The failure to indicate in the title of the bill the object intended to be accomplished by thelegislation often resulted in members voting ignorantly for measures which they would notknowingly have approved. And not only were legislators thus misled, but the public also; sothat legislative provisions were stealthily pushed through in the closing hours of a session,which, having no merit to commend them, would have been made odious by populardiscussion and remonstrance if their pendency had been seasonably announced. The

constitutional clause under discussion is intended to correct these evils; to prevent suchcorrupting aggregations of incongruous measures, by confining each act to one subject; toprevent surprise and inadvertence by requiring that subject or object to be expressed in thetitle.

The Supreme court of the State of Alabama, in discussing the effect of the violation of a similarprovision of the constitution of that state in the cases of Walker vs. State (49 Ala., 329) and Lindsayvs. United States Savings and Loan Association (120 Ala., 156), had the following to say, quotingwith approval, what Mr. Justice Cooley in his Constitutional Limitations, at page 143, had said uponthat question:

The object sought to be accomplished, and the mischief proposed to be remedied by this

provision, are well known. . . . Legislative assemblies for the dispatch of business often passbills by their titles only, without requiring them to be read. A specious title sometimes covereda legislation which, if its real character had been disclosed, would not have commandedassent. To prevent surprise and fraud on the legislature is one of the purposes this provisionwas intended to accomplish. Before the adoption of this provision, the title of a statute wasoften no indication of its subject or contents. . . .

An evil this constitutional requirement was intended to correct was the blending in one andthe same statute of such things as were diverse in their nature, and were connected only to


18/33

combine in favor of all the advocates of each, thus often securing the passage of severalmeasures, no one of which could have succeeded on its own merits. Mr. Cooley thus sumsup his review of the authorities, defining the objects of this provision: It may, therefore, beassumed as settled, that the purpose of these provisions was: First, to prevent hodge-podge,or log-rolling legislation; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature, by meansof provisions in bills of which the titles gave no information, and which might therefore be

overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and, third, to fairly apprise thepeople, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of thesubjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have opportunity ofbeing heard thereon, by petition or otherwise if they shall so desire. (49 Ala., 330, 331.)

The purposes of constitutional requirement must be borne steadily in mind, when it becomesnecessary to determine whether there has been legislative observance of it. The expositionof these purposes by Judge Cooley is accepted, we believe, in all the states in which a likelimitation prevails. . . . (120 Ala., 172.)

In the case of People vs. Parks (58 Cal., 624) the Supreme Court of the State of California hadoccasion to discuss the question now before us and said:

At the least, then two heterogeneous subjects are embraced in the act, one of which is notexpressed in the title, and they cannot be segregated. The title does not express the objectsof legislation embodied in the provisions of the act. It is, therefore, narrower than the body ofthe act, and fails to impart that notice of the measures enacted, which the Constitutionrequires. To prohibit such legislation was the sole end and aim of the constitutionalrequirement. The practice, says the Supreme Court of Missouri, of comprising in one billsubjects of a diverse and antagonistic nature, in order to combine in its support memberswho were in favor of particular measures, but neither of which could command the requisitemajority on its own merits, was found to be not a corruptive influence in the Legislature itself,but destructive of the best interests of the State. But this was not more detrimental than thatother pernicious practice, by which, through dexterous and unscrupulous management,designing men inserted clauses in the bodies of bills, of the true meaning of which the titles

gave no indication, and by skillful maneuvering urged them on to their passage. These thingsled to fraud and injury, and it was found necessary to apply a corrective in the shape of aconstitutional provision. (City of St. Louis vs. Tiefel, 42 Mo., 590.) The provision has beenframed in the constitutions of many of the States of the Union; and the courts, whenever ithas come before them, have liberally construed it as the will of the people in the interests ofhonest legislation.

Decisions to the same effect are found in the following cases: City of St. Louis vs. Tiefel (42 Mo.,578); Cannon vs. Mathes (8 Heisk [Tenn.], 504); Ryerson vs. Utley (16 Mich., 269); Board of PublicEducation for the City of Americus vs. Barlow (49 Ga., 232); Spier vs. Baker (120 Cal., 370).

Mr. Justice Sutherland, in a further discussion of the question, at section 112 of his work on

Statutory Construction, said:

The efficiency of this constitutional remedy to cure the evil and mischief which has beenpointed out depends on judicial enforcement; on this constitutional injunction being regardedas mandatory, and compliance with it essential to the validity of legislation. The mischiefexisted notwithstanding the sworn official obligation of legislators; it might be expected tocontinue notwithstanding that the obligation is formulated and emphasized in thisconstitutional injunction, if it be construed as addressed exclusively to them, and onlydirectory. It would, in a general sense, be a dangerous doctrine to announce that any of the


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provisions of the constitution may be obeyed or disregarded at the mere will or pleasure ofthe legislature, unless it is clear beyond all question that such was intention of the framers ofthat instrument. It would seem to be a lowering of the proper dignity of the fundamental lawto say that it descends to prescribing rules of order in unessential matters which may befollowed or disregarded at pleasure. The fact is this: That whatever constitutional provisioncan be looked upon as directory merely is very likely to be treated by the legislature as if it

was devoid of moral obligation, and to be therefore habitually disregarded.

In the case of Cannon vs. Mathes, supra, Mr. Chief Justice Nicholson, in discussing the effect of theviolation of a constitutional provision like the one before us, said:

* * * This is a direct, positive, and imperative limitation upon the power of the Legislature. Itmatters not that a bill has passed through three readings in each house, on three differentdays, and has received the approval of the Governor; still it is not a law of the State if itembraces more than one subject. . . .

The Supreme Court of Alabama, in the case of Walker vs. State, supra, said:

It is settled law of this court, founded on reasoning which seems to us unanswerable, thatthis provision of the Constitution is not a mere rule of legislative procedure, directory to thegeneral assembly, but that it is mandatory, and it is the duty of courts to declare void anystatute not conforming to it. . . .

Mr. Justice Cooley in his valuable work on Constitutional Limitations (pp. 179. 180) states that ourcourts have held, without exception, that such constitutional provision is mandatory.

Considering that the great weight of authority is to the effect that the provision like the one abovequoted from the Jones Law is mandatory; and considering that there is nothing in the title of Act No.3107 which indicates in the slightest degree that said Act contains a provision "that justices andauxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years," we are forced to the conclusions that, that provision is illegal, void and contrary to themandatory provision of the Jones Law, and that said law (3107) cannot be applied to justices andauxiliary justices of the peace who were appointed prior to the 17th day of March, 1923; and thatwhen Julio Agcaoili was forcibly, by means of threats and intimidation, ordered to leave his office as

justice of the peace, he was forced to do so illegally, without just cause, and should therefore berestored to his position as justice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag, without delay.

With reference to the second question above suggested, in re prescription or limitation of the action,it may be said that originally there was no limitation or prescription of action in an action forquowarranto, neither could there be, for the reason that it was an action by the Government andprescription could not be plead as a defense to an action by the Government. The ancient writ of quowarranto was a high prerogative writ in the nature of a writ of right by the King against any one whousurped or claimed any office, franchise or liberty of the crown, to inquire by what authority the

usurper supported his claim, in order to determine the right. Even at the present time in many of thecivilized countries of the world the action is still regarded as a prerogative writ and no limitation orprescription is permitted to bar the action. As a general principle it may be stated that ordinarystatutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding brought toenforce a public right. (McPhail vs. People ex rel. Lambert, 160 Ill., 77; 52 Am. St. Rep., 306;People ex rel. Moloney vs. Pullman's Palace Car Co., 175 Ill., 125; 64 L. R. A., 366.)

In all public matters a writ ofquo warranto is a writ of right at the suit of the state, and issues as amatter of course upon demand of the proper officer (State ex rel. Washington County vs. Stone, 25


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Mo., 555; Commonwealth vs. Allen, 128 Mass., 308), and the court has no authority to withholdleave to file a petition therefor.

If the statute of limitation or prescription cannot run against the state, it is difficult to understand howin the same action they may be used as a defense against a public officer who has been forcibly,with threats and intimidation, ousted from a public office by the Government itself as was done in the

present case. The principle that acts of limitation do not bind the King (the State) or the people,applies to proceeding by quo warranto, the rule being that the representative of the state may file aninformation on behalf of the people at any time; and the lapse of time constitutes no bar to theproceeding, in conformity with the maxim Nullum tempus occurrit regi. (Catlett vs. People ex rel.States's Attorney, 151 Ill., 16.) For the state to claim that the statutes of limitation do not apply to itand yet insist that it may plead such statutes to bar the action ofquo warranto brought by one of itspublic officials whom it itself has ousted from office, appears to us to be unjust, unfair, unreasonable,and not within the contemplation of sound jurisprudence.

So much of the general rule concerning limitation of action in quo warranto proceedings. Is there astatute in the Philippine Islands of limitation, limiting the action of a public official of the Governmentwho has been duly appointed and qualified, and who has, by force and intimidation, been oustedfrom such office, to defeat his action ofquo warranto?

On the 7th day of August, 1901, the United States Philippine Commission adopted Act No. 190which had been considered privately and publicly for several months theretofore. Its provisions werepublished throughout the Philippine Islands long prior to its adoption. While said Act was adopted onthe 7th day of August, 1901, it did not take effect, even though it had been published, until the 1stday of October, 1901. (Act No. 212.) An examination of said Act (190) shows that it providesremedies for the usurpation of office or franchise, etc. (secs. 197-216). Said Act No. 190 waspublished in both English and Spanish. Section 216, in English, provided that "Nothing hereincontained shall authorize an action against a corporation for forfeiture of charter, unless the same becommenced within five years after the act complained of was done or committed; nor shall an actionbe brought against an officer to be ousted from his office unless within one year after the cause ofsuch ouster, or the right to hold the office, arose." The same section (216), as published in Spanish,

reads as follows: "Ninguna de estas disposiciones facultara la iniciacion de un juicio contra unacorporacion por la perdida de sus derechos de concesion, a menos que el juicio se lleve a efectodento de los cinco aos siguente a la comision u omision del hecho objeto de la accion. Tampocose

podra iniciar un juicio la persona que ejerza un cargo en una corporaciuon para desposeerla, amenos que se lleve a efecto dentro del ao siguente a la fecha de la comision del hecho que diomotivo a su privacion, o que se puso en duda su derecho para ocupar el cargo ."

Said section (216), as published in Spanish and translated into English, reads as follows: "Nothingherein contained shall authorize an action against a corporation for forfeiture of its corporate rights,unless the same be commenced within five years after the commission or omission complained oftook place. Neither may an action be brought against an officer to oust him from office, unless thesame is commenced within one year after the commission of the act which caused the deprivationthereof, or after the right to hold the office arose."

Said section 216, as above quoted in Spanish, was published in vol. 1 of the Public Laws of thePhilippine Islands and distributed to the public officers throughout the Philippine Islands. It is a fact ofgeneral information that even now, in 1926, the Spanish copy of the Public Laws are consulted bythe people in remote parts of the Philippine Islands for the purpose of knowing what the law is. It isnot strange, therefore, that the appellant did not believe that said section 216 applied to publicofficers; that it only applied to officers of corporations as it appeared in the Spanish translation. Is it

just and fair and reasonable for the Government of the Philippine Islands to oust one of its officers


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from an office to which he had been legally appointed, by force and intimidation and without justcause, and then to defeat his action in quo warranto by invoking the provisions of a public statute,different from the one which the Government itself had furnished its public officers? The appellant isfamiliar with the Spanish but not with the English language. He naturally relied upon the Spanishversion of the law for his information as to what the law really was. Not only had the appellant theright to rely upon the provisions of section 216 as they appeared in Spanish in the Public Laws of the

Philippine Islands, but the reading of the three or four sections immediately preceding section 216will show that they refer specifically to corporations only. The appellant, therefore, was justified inbelieving that said section 216 as it appeared in Spanish was correct. At least the Governmentshould give him credit with having in good faith.

But, even granting that the appellant is bound by the provisions of section 216 as it appears inEnglish, is the same applicable to the appellant? By reference to said section above quoted inEnglish, it will be seen that after the word "committed" there is a semicolon. Does that which followsthe semicolon have reference to the same subject matter which precedes it? A semicolon is a markof grammatical punctuation, in the English language, to indicate a separation in the relation of thethought, a degree greater than that expressed by a comma, and what follows that semicolon musthave relation to the same matter which precedes it. A semicolon is not used for the purpose ofintroducing a new idea. A semicolon is used for the purpose of continuing the expression of athought, a degree greater than that expressed by a mere comma. It is never used for the purpose ofintroducing a new idea. The comma and semicolon are both used for the same purpose, namely, todivide sentences and parts of the sentences, the only difference being that the semicolon makes thedivision a little more pronounced than the comma. The punctuation used in a law may always bereferred to for the purpose of ascertaining the true meaning of a doubtful statute. It follows thereforethat, inasmuch as all of the provisions of said section 216 which precede the semicolon refer tocorporations only, that which follows the semicolon has reference to the same subject matter, or toofficers of a corporation.

But even granting, for the sake of the argument, that the word "officer" as used in the latter part ofsaid section applies to public officers who have been ousted from their position, and not only toofficers of corporations, then we have the question presented: Had the one year mentioned in said

section expired on the 23d day of April, 1925, when the first complaint, was filed in the presentaction? When did the year begin to run if said section is applicable to the appellant?

It will be remembered that on the 7th day of July, 1923, the appellant was ousted from his office asjustice of the peace of the municipality of Laoag. Not only did he surrender his office on that dateunder protest, but also on the 28th day of April, 1923, when he was notified by the Secretary ofJustice that he cease to be a justice of the peace of his municipality, he then protested and gave along and lucid argument in support of his protest. In all justice to him, did he not have a right, withoutany legal action to protect his right, to await the solution of his protest of the 28th day of April, 1923?He had a right to believe that the grounds upon which his protest was based would be convincing tothe Secretary of Justice and that he would not be removed. Until this very hour the record containsno reply from the Secretary of Justice and no answer whatever to the legal grounds presented by theappellant upon his right to continue as justice of the peace and not to be ousted.

In our opinion even granting that section 216 is applicable to the appellant, the period of prescriptionhad not begun and run at the time of the commencement of the present action. He was justified indelaying the commencement of his action until an answer to his protest had been made. He hadright to await the answer to his protest, in the confident belief that it would be resolved in his favorand that action would unnecessary.


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It is contended, however, that the question before us was answered and resolved against thecontention of the appellant in the case of Bautista vs. Fajardo (38 Phil., 624). In that case noquestion was raised nor was it even suggested that said section 216 did not apply to a public officer.That question was not discussed nor referred to by any of the parties interested in that case. It hasbeen frequently decided that the fact that a statute has been accepted as valid, and invoked andapplied for many years in cases where its validity was not raised or passed on, does not prevent a

court from later passing on its validity, where the question is squarely and properly raised andpresented, Where a question passes the court sub silentio, the case in which the question was sopassed is not binding on the Court (McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil., 563), nor should it beconsidered as a precedent. (U. S. vs. Noriega and Tobias, 31 Phil., 310; Chicote vs. Acasio, 31 Phil.,401; U. S. vs. More, 3 Cranch [U. S.], 159, 172; U. S. vs. Sanges, 144 U. S., 310, 319; Cross vs.Burke, 146 U. S., 82.) For the reasons given in the case of McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, supra,the decision in the case of Bautista vs. Fajardo, supra, can have no binding force in theinterpretation of the question presented here.

The present case is anomalous under American sovereignty. An officer was appointed inaccordance with the law to the judiciary to serve "during good behavior." After he had faithfully andhonestly served the Government for a number of years the legislature adopted a new law whicharbitrarily, without giving any reason therefore, provided that said officer cease to be such when heshould reach the age of 65 years. Said law contained no express provision or method for itsenforcement. The Executive Department, through its Undersecretary of Justice, without any authoritygiven in said law, notified the said officer that he was no longer an officer in the judicial departmentof the Government and must vacate his office and turn the same over to another, who wasdesignated by said Undersecretary. When the officer protested against such arbitrary action, givingreasons therefor, and without answering said protest, he was threatened with a criminal prosecutionif he did not immediately vacate his office. The history of this case reads more like a story of the

Arabian Nights than like a procedure under a well-organized Government. It seems impossible tobelieve, and we could not believe it, were the facts not actually supported by the record.

Why the Undersecretary of Justice did not follow the orderly procedure marked out by Act No. 190 isnot explained. The appellant was given no hearing. Even his protest, couched in most humble and

respectful language, fell upon deaf ears. Absolute indifference was shown to the respectful protestand the able argument given in support thereof. The only answer to his protest was a threat of acriminal prosecution if he did not vacate his office. His humility was met with austereness. Hishumble petition was met with a threat. His patient waiting for a reply to his protest was ended by ademand that he be prosecuted for refusing to comply with an order by one who was not willing tofollow the well-defined and well-beaten road of "due process of law" by preferring charges and givingthe appellant an opportunity to be heard and to defend his right. Nothing of that character took place.The whole procedure, from beginning to end, in ousting the appellant from an office to which he hadbeen legally appointed and against whom no complaint has been made, is anomalous in the

jurisprudence under the American flag.

Believing as I do, that the success of free institutions depends upon a rigid adherence to thefundamentals of the law, I have never yielded, and I hope that I may never yield, to considerations ofexpediency in expounding it. There is also some plausible reason for the latitudinarian constructionswhich are resorted to for the purpose of acquiring power some evil to be avoided, or some goodto be attained by pushing the powers of the Gover

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