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G.R. No. 72005 May 29, 1987

PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE CO., INC., petitioner,vs.HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT; SYCWIN COATING & WIRES, INC., andDOMINADOR CACPAL, CHIEF DEPUTY SHERRIF OF MANILA, respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Resolution dated September 12, 1985 of theIntermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. CR-05409 1granting private respondent's motion for execution pendingappeal and ordering the issuance of the corresponding writ of execution on the counterbond to lift attachment filed by petitioner. The focalissue that emerges is whether an order of execution pending appeal of a judgment maybe enforced on the said bond. In the Resolution of

September 25, 19852this Court as prayed for, without necessarily giving due course to the petition, issued a

temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents from enforcing the order complaint of.

The records disclose that private respondent Sycwin Coating & Wires, Inc., filed a complaint for

collection of a sum of money against Varian Industrial Corporation before the Regional Trial Court ofQuezon City. During the pendency of the suit, private respondent succeeded in attaching some ofthe properties of Varian Industrial Corporation upon the posting of a supersedeas bond. 3The latter inturn posted a counterbond in the sum of P1,400, 000.00 4thru petitioner Philippine British Assurance Co.,Inc., so the attached properties were released.

On December 28, 1984, the trial court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED, andjudgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant VarianIndustrial Corporation, and the latter is hereby ordered:

1. To pay plaintiff the amount of P1,401,468.00, the principal obligation with 12%interest per annum from the date of default until fully paid;

2. To pay plaintiff 5% of the principal obligation as liquidated damages;

3. To pay plaintiff P30,000.00 as exemplary damages;

4. To pay plaintiff 15% of P1,401,468.00, the principal obligation, as and forattorney's fees; and

5. To pay the costs of suit.

Accordingly, the counterclaim of the defendant is hereby DISMISSED for lack ofmerit.

SO ORDERED. 5

Varian Industrial Corporation appealed the decision to the respondent Court. Sycwin then filed apetition for execution pending appeal against the properties of Varian in respondent Court. Varianwas required to file its comment but none was filed. In the Resolution of July 5, 1985, respondentCourt ordered the execution pending appeal as prayed for. 6However, the writ of execution was


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returned unsatisfied as Varian failed to deliver the previously attached personal properties upon demand.In a Petition dated August 13, 1985 filed with respondent Court Sycwin prayed that the surety (hereinpetitioner) be ordered to pay the value of its bond. 7In compliance with the Resolution of August 23, 1985of the respondent Court herein petitioner filed its comment. 8In the Resolution of September 12,1985, 9the respondent Court granted the petition. Hence this action.

It is the submission of private respondent Sycwin that without a previous motion for reconsiderationof the questioned resolution, certiorari would not lie. While as a general rule a motion forreconsideration has been considered a condition sine qua nonfor the granting of a writ of certiorari,this rule does not apply when special circumstances warrant immediate or more direct action. 10It hasbeen held further that a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with in cases like this where execution had been ordered and the needfor relief was extremely urgent. 11

The counterbond provides:

WHEREAS, in the above-entitled case pending in the Regional Trial Court, NationalCapital Judicial Region, Branch LXXXV, Quezon City, an order of Attachment wasissued against abovenamed Defendant;

WHEREAS, the Defendant, for the purpose of lifting and/or dissolving the order ofattachment issued against them in the above-en-titled case, have offered to file acounterbond in the sum of PESOS ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSANDONLY (P1,400,000.00), Philippine Currency, as provided for in Section 5, Rule 57 ofthe Revised Rules of Court.

NOW, THEREFORE, we, VARIAN INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, as Principal andthe PHILIPPINE BRITISH ASSURANCE COMPANY, INC., a corporation dulyorganized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Philippines, as Surety,in consideration of the above and of the lifting or dissolution of the order ofattachment, hereby jointly and severally, bind ourselves in favor of the above Plaintiffin the sum of PESOS ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND ONLY(P1,400,000.00), Philippine Currency, under the condition that in case the Plaintiffrecovers judgment in the action, and Defendant will, on demand, re-deliver theattached property so released to the Officer of the Court and the same shall beapplied to the payment of the judgment, or in default thereof, the defendant andSurety will, on demand, pay to the Plaintiff the full value of the property released.

EXECUTED at Manila, Philippines, this 28th day of June, 1984. 12

Sections 5, 12, and 17 of Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court also provide:

SEC. 5. Manner of attaching property. The officer executing the order shall withoutdelay attach, to await judgment and execution in the action, all the properties of theparty against whom the order is issued in the province, not exempt from execution, orso much thereof as may be sufficient to satisfy the applicant's demand, unless theformer makes a deposit with the clerk or judge of the court from which the orderissued, or gives a counter-bond executed to the applicant, in an amount sufficient tosatisfy such demand besides costs, or in an amount equal to the value of theproperty which is about to be attached, to secure payment to the applicant of any

judgement ment which he may recover in the action.The officer shall also forthwithserve a copy of the applicant's affidavit and bond, and of the order of attachment, onthe adverse party, if he be found within the province.


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SEC. 12. Discharge of attachment upon giving counterbond. At any time after anorder of attachment has been granted, the party whose property has been attached,or the person appearing on his behalf, may, upon reasonable notice to the applicant,apply to the judge who granted the order, or to the judge of the court in which theaction is pending, for an order discharging the attachment wholly or in part on thesecurity given. The judge shall, after hearing, order the discharge of the attachment if

a cash deposit is made, or a counter-bond executed to the attaching creditor is filed,on behalf of the adverse party, with the clerk or judge of the court where theapplication is made, in an amount equal to the value of the property attached asdetermined by the judge, to secure the payment of any judgment that the attachingcreditor may recover in the action.Upon the filing of such counter-bond, copy thereofshall forthwith be served on the attaching creditor or his lawyer. Upon the dischargeof an attachment in accordance with the provisions of this section the propertyattached, or the proceeds of any sale thereof, shall be delivered to the party makingthe deposit or giving the counterbond aforesaid standing in place of the property soreleased. Should such counterbond for any reason be found to be, or become,insufficient, and the party furnishing the same fail to file an additional counterbond,the attaching creditor may apply for a new order of attachment.

SEC. 17. When execution returned unsatisfied, recovery had upon bond. If theexecution be returned unsatisfied in whole or in part, the surety or sureties on anycounter-bond given pursuant to the provisions of this rule to secure the payment ofthe judgment shall become charged on such counterbond, and bound to pay to the

judgement creditor upon demand, the amount due under the judgment,whichamount may be recovered from such surety or sureties after notice and summaryhearing in the same action. (Emphasis supplied.)

Under Sections 5 and 12, Rule 57 above reproduced it is provided that the counterbond is intendedto secure the payment of"any judgment"that the attaching creditor may recover in the action. UnderSection 17 of same rule it provides that when "the execution be returned unsatisfied in whole or inpart" it is only then that "payment of thejudgmentshall become charged on such counterbond."

The counterbond was issued in accordance with the provisions of Section 5, Rule 57 of the Rules ofCourt as provided in the second paragraph aforecited which is deemed reproduced as part of thecounterbond. In the third paragraph it is also stipulated that the counterbond is to be "applied for thepayment of the judgment." Neither the rules nor the provisions of the counterbond limited itsapplication to a final and executory judgment. Indeed, it is specified that it applies to the paymentof any judgment that maybe recovered by plaintiff. Thus, the only logical conclusion is that anexecution of any judgment including one pending appeal if returned unsatisfied maybe chargedagainst such a counterbond.

It is well recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish. Ubilex non distinguish nec nos distinguere debemos. 13"The rule, founded on logic, is a corollary of the principle thatgeneral words and phrases in a statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general s ignificance. 14The rule requires that a

general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part distinguished from the other so as to justify its exclusion from theoperation of the law. 15 In other words, there should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is indicated.16 For courts arenot authorized to distinguish where the law makes no distinction. They should instead administer the law not as they think it ought to be butas they find it and without regard to consequences. 17

A corollary of the principle is the rule that where the law does not make any exception, courts maynot except something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to justifyit.18Thus where a statute grants a person against whom possession of "any land" is unlawfully withheld the right to bring an action forunlawful detainer, this Court held that the phrase "any land" includes all kinds of land, whether agricultural, residential, or mineral. 19Sincethe law in this case does not make any distinction nor intended to make any exception, when it speaks of "any judgment" which maybe


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charged against the counterbond, it should be interpreted to refer not only to a final and executory judgment in the case but also a judgmentpending appeal.

All that is required is that the conditions provided for by law are complied with, as outlined in thecase of Towers Assurance Corporation v. Ororama Supermart,20

Under Section 17, in order that the judgment creditor might recover from the suretyon the counterbond, it is necessary (1) that the execution be first issued against theprincipal debtor and that such execution was returned unsatisfied in whole or in part;(2) that the creditor make a demand upon the surety for the satisfaction of the

judgment, and (3) that the surety be given notice and a summary hearing on thesame action as to his liability for the judgment under his counterbond.

The rule therefore, is that the counterbond to lift attachment that is issued in accordance with theprovisions of Section 5, Rule 57, of the Rules of Court, shall be charged with the payment of any

judgmentthat is returned unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and executory judgement but also theexecution of a judgment pending appeal.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the restraining order issued

on September 25, 1985 is hereby dissolved with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 115245 July 11, 1995

JUANITO C. PILAR, petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

QUIASON, J .:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the Resolutiondated April 28, 1994 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in UND No. 94-040.

I

On March 22, 1992, petitioner Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position ofmember of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Isabela.

On March 25, 1992, petitioner withdrew his certificate of candidacy.

In M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 dated November 3, 1993 and February 13, 1994 respectively,the COMELEC imposed upon petitioner the fine of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) for failure tofile his statement of contributions and expenditures.

In M.R. No. 94-0594 dated February 24, 1994, the COMELEC denied the motion for reconsiderationof petitioner and deemed final M.R. Nos. 93-2654 and 94-0065 (Rollo, p. 14).


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Petitioner went to the COMELEC En Banc(UND No. 94-040), which denied the petition in aResolution dated April 28, 1994 (Rollo, pp. 10-13).

Hence, this petition for certiorari.

We dismiss the petition.

II

Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 entitled "An Act Providing for Synchronized National and LocalElections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations Therefor, and for Other Purposes"provides as follows:

Statement of Contributions and Expenditures: Effect of Failure to File Statement.Every candidateand treasurer of the political party shall, within thirty (30) days afterthe day of the election, file in duplicate with the offices of the Commission the full,true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in connection withthe election.

No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until hehas filed the statement of contributions and expenditures herein required.

The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the winningcandidate fails to file the statement required herein within the period prescribed bythis Act.

Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file the statements orreports in connection with electoral contributions and expenditures as required hereinshall constitute an administrative offense for which the offenders shall be liable topay an administrative fine ranging from One Thousand Pesos ( P1,000.00) to Thirty

Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission.

The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure;otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commissionagainst the properties of the offender.

It shall be the duty of every city or municipal election registrar to advise in writing, bypersonal delivery or registered mail, within five (5) days from the date of election allcandidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply with their obligation to file theirstatements of contributions and expenditures.

For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this Section, the

administrative fine shall be from Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) to SixtyThousand Pesos (P60,000.00), in the discretion of the Commission. In addition, theoffender shall be subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office (Emphasissupplied).

To implement the provisions of law relative to election contributions and expenditures, theCOMELEC promulgated on January 13, 1992 Resolution No. 2348 (Re: Rules and RegulationsGoverning Electoral Contributions and Expenditures in Connection with the National and Local


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Elections onMay 11, 1992). The pertinent provisions of said Resolution are:

Sec. 13. Statement of contributions and expenditures: Reminders to candidates tofile statements. Within five (5) days from the day of the election, the Law Departmentof the Commission, the regional election director of the National Capital Region, the

provincial election supervisors and the election registrars shall advise in writing bypersonal delivery or registered mail all candidates who filed their certificates ofcandidacy with them to comply with their obligation to file their statements ofcontributions and expenditures in connection with the elections. Every electionregistrar shall also advise all candidates residing in his jurisdiction to comply withsaid obligation (Emphasis supplied).

Sec. 17. Effect of failure to file statement. (a) No person elected to any public officeshall enter upon the duties of his office until he has filed the statement ofcontributions and expenditures herein required.

The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the winning

candidates fails to file the statement required within the period prescribed by law.

(b) Except candidates for elective barangay office, failure to file statements or reportsin connection with the electoral contributions and expenditures as required hereinshall constitute an administrative offense for which the offenders shall be liable topay an administrative fine ranging from One Thousand Pesos (P1,000) to ThirtyThousand Pesos (P30,000), in the discretion of the Commission.

The fine shall be paid within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice of such failure;otherwise, it shall be enforceable by a writ of execution issued by the Commissionagainst the properties of the offender.

For the commission of a second or subsequent offense under this section, theadministrative fine shall be from Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000) to Sixty ThousandPesos (P60,000), in the discretion of the Commission. In addition, the offender shallbe subject to perpetual disqualification to hold public office.

Petitioner argues that he cannot be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions andexpenditures because he was a "non-candidate," having withdrawn his certificates of candidacythree days after its filing. Petitioner posits that "it is . . . clear from the law that candidate must haveentered the political contest, and should have either won or lost" (Rollo, p. 39).

Petitioner's argument is without merit.

Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 states that "every candidate" has the obligation to file his statement of

contributions and expenditures.

Well-recognized is the rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish, Ubilex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos (Philippine British Assurance Co. Inc. v. Intermediate

Appellate Court, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]; cf Olfato v. Commission on Elections, 103 SCRA 741[1981]). No distinction is to be made in the application of a law where none is indicated (Lo Cham v.Ocampo, 77 Phil. 636 [1946]).


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In the case at bench, as the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidatepursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be deemed to refernot only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy.

The COMELEC, the body tasked with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulationsrelative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall (The Constitution ofthe Republic of the Philippines, Art. IX(C), Sec. 2[1]), issued Resolution No. 2348 in implementationor interpretation of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7166 on election contributions andexpenditures. Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to "all candidates who filed theircertificates of candidacy."

Furthermore, Section 14 of the law uses the word "shall." As a general rule, the use of the word"shall" in a statute implies that the statute is mandatory, and imposes a duty which may be enforced ,particularly if public policy is in favor of this meaning or where public interest is involved. We applythe general rule (Baranda v. Gustilo, 165 SCRA 757 [1988]; Diokno v. Rehabilitation FinanceCorporation, 91 Phil. 608 [1952]).

The state has an interest in seeing that the electoral process is clean, and ultimately expressive ofthe true will of the electorate. One way of attaining such objective is to pass legislation regulatingcontributions and expenditures of candidates, and compelling the publication of the same.

Admittedly, contributions and expenditures are made for the purpose of influencing the results of theelections (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 94; Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 1). Thus, laws and regulations prescribewhat contributions are prohibited (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 95, Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 4), or unlawful(B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 96), and what expenditures are authorized (B.P. Blg. 881, Sec. 102; R.A. No.7166, Sec. 13; Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 7) or lawful (Resolution No. 2348, Sec. 8).

Such statutes are not peculiar to the Philippines. In "corrupt and illegal practices acts" of severalstates in the United States, as well as in federal statutes, expenditures of candidates are regulatedby requiring the filing of statements of expenses and by limiting the amount of money that may bespent by a candidate. Some statutes also regulate the solicitation of campaign contributions (26 AmJur 2d, Elections 287). These laws are designed to compel publicity with respect to matterscontained in the statements and to prevent, by such publicity, the improper use of moneys devotedby candidates to the furtherance of their ambitions (26 Am Jur 2d, Elections 289). These statutesalso enable voters to evaluate the influences exerted on behalf of candidates by the contributors,and to furnish evidence of corrupt practices for annulment of elections (Sparkman v. Saylor [Court of

Appeals of Kentucky], 180 Ky. 263, 202 S.W. 649 [1918]).

State courts have also ruled that such provisions are mandatory as to the requirement of filing (Stateex rel. Butchofsky v. Crawford [Court of Civil Appeals of Texas], 269 S.W. 2d 536 [1954]; Best v.Sidebottom, 270 Ky. 423,109 S.W. 2d 826 [1937]; Sparkman v. Saylor, supra.)

It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions andincurred expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented bythe law is not all too remote.

It is notesworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the situation where a candidate maynot have received any contribution or made any expenditure. Such a candidate is not excused fromfiling a statement, and is in fact required to file a statement to that effect. Under Section 15 ofResolution No. 2348, it is provided that "[i]f a candidate or treasurer of the party has received no


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contribution, made no expenditure, or has no pending obligation, the statement shall reflect suchfact."

Lastly, we note that under the fourth paragraph of Section 73 of the B.P. Blg. 881 or the OmnibusElection Code of the Philippines, it is provided that "[t]he filing or withdrawal of certificate ofcandidacy shall not affect whatever civil, criminal or administrative liabilities which a candidate may

have incurred." Petitioner's withdrawal of his candidacy did not extinguish his liability for theadministrative fine.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza andFrancisco, JJ., concur.

Kapunan, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

MELO, J., dissenting:

The majority opinion is to the effect that every candidate, including one who has withdrawn hiscertificate of candidacy, is obliged to file his statement of contributions and expenditures in line with

Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 vis-a-vis the pertinent portions of Comelec Resolution No.2348. I must concede that the use of the word "shall" in the main statute as well as the implementingrules generally suggest mandatoriness as to cover all candidates.

But is an anspirant for public office who had a sudden change of heart, so to speak, still considereda candidate to begin with? I am of the impression that he is not and is thus not bound to render anaccounting subsequent to election for the simple reason that the term 'candidate' is used todesignate a person who actually submits himself and is voted for at our election (Santos vs.Miranda, 35 Phil. 643, 648 (1916) citing State vs. Hirsch, 125 Ind., 207; 9 L.R.A. 107; Moreno,Philippine Law Dictionary, 1972 2nd ed., p. 84) Certainly, one who withdraws his certificate ofcandidacy 3 days after the filing thereof, can not be voted for at an election. And considering theshortness of the period of 3 days from the filing to the withdrawal of the certificate of candidacy,

petitioner cannot be accused, as indeed there is no such charge, of utilizing his aborted candidacyfor purposes to raise funds or to extort money from other candidates in exchange for the withdrawal.

I, therefore, vote to grant the petition.

Padilla, J., concurs.

G.R. No. 110898 February 20, 1996


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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,petitioner,vs.HON. JUDGE ANTONIO C. EVANGELISTA, as Presiding Judge of Branch XXI, 10th JudicialRegion, RTC of Misamis Oriental, Cagayan de Oro City, and GRILDO S.TUGONON, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:

Private respondent Grildo S. Tugonan was charged with frustrated homicide in the Regional TrialCourt of Misamis Oriental (Branch 21), the information against him alleging

That on or about the 26th day of May, 1988, at more or less 9:00 o'clock in the evening atBarangay Publican+.3, Municipality of Villanueva, Province of Misamis Oriental, Republic ofthe Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accusedwith intent to kill and with the use of a knife, which he was then conveniently provided of, didthen and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab Roque T. Bade

thereby inflicting upon him the following injuries, to wit:

Stab wound, right iliac area,0.5 cm. penetrating nonperforating lacerating posteriorperitoneum, 0,5 cm.

thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Homicide as aconsequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent ofthe will of the accused, that is by timely medical attendance which prevented his death.

CONTRARY TO and in violation of Article 249 in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal

Code.

After trial he was found guilty and sentenced to one year ofprision correccionalin its minimumperiod and ordered to pay to the offended party P5,000.00 for medical expense, without subsidiaryimprisonment, and the costs. The RTC appreciated in his favor the privileged mitigatingcircumstances of incomplete self-defense and the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed private respondent's conviction but modified his sentenceby imposing on him an indeterminate penalty of 2 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 2 yearsand 4 months ofprision correccional, as maximum.1

On December 21, 1992, respondent Judge Antonio C. Evangelista of the RTC set the case forrepromulgation on January 4, 1993.

On December 28, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for probation,2alleging that (1) hepossessed all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for probation under P.D. No. 968,as amended; (2) the Court of Appeals has in fact reduced the penalty imposed on him by the trialcourt; (3) in its resolution, the Court of Appeals took no action on a petition for probation which hehad earlier filed with it so that the petition could be filed with the trial court; (4) in the trial court'sdecision, two mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-defense and voluntarily surrender wereappreciated in his favor; and (5) in Santos To v. Pao,3the Supreme Court upheld the right of the
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accused to probation notwithstanding the fact that he had appealed from his conviction by the trialcourt.

On February 2, 1993, the RTC ordered private respondent to report for interview to the ProvincialProbation Officer. The Provincial Probation Officer on the other hand was required to submit hisreport with recommendation to the court within 60 days.4

On February 18, 1993, Chief Probation and Parole Officer Isias B. Valdehueza recommended denialof private respondent's application for probation on the ground that by appealing the sentence of thetrial court, when he could have then applied for probation, private respondent waived the right tomake his application. The Probation Officer thought the present case to be distinguishablefrom Santos To v. Paoin the sense that in this case the original sentence imposed on privaterespondent by the trial court (1 year of imprisonment) was probationable and there was no reasonfor private respondent not to have filed his application for probation then, whereas in Santos Tov. Paothe penalty only became probationable after it had been reduced as a result of the appeal.

On April 16, 1993 Valdehueza reiterated5his "respectful recommendation that private respondent'sapplication for probation be denied and that a warrant of arrest be issued for him to serve his

sentence in jail."

The RTC set aside the Probation Officer's recommendation and granted private respondent'sapplication for probation in its order of April 23, 1993,6Hence this petition by the prosecution.

The issue in this case is whether the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion by grantingprivate respondent's application for probation despite the fact that he had appealed from the

judgment of his conviction of the trial court.

The Court holds that it did.

Until its amendment by P.D. No. 1990 in 1986, it was possible under P.D. No. 986, otherwise known

as the Probation Law, for the accused to take his chances on appeal by allowing probation to begranted even after an accused had appealed his sentence and failed to obtain an acquittal, just solong as he had not yet started to serve the sentence.7Accordingly, in Santos Tov. Pao, it was heldthat the fact that the accused had appealed did not bar him from applying for probation especiallybecause it was as a result of the appeal that his sentence was reduced and made the probationablelimit.

The law was, however, amended by P.D. No. 1990 which took effect on January 15, 19868preciselyto put a stop to the practice of appealing from judgments of conviction even if the sentence isprobationable for the purpose of securing an acquittal and applying for probation only if the accusedfails in his bid. Thus, as amended by P.D. No, 1990, 4 of the Probation Law now reads:

4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court may, after it

shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application by saiddefendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution of the sentenceand place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions asit may deem best; Provided, Thatno application for probation shall be entertained or grantedif the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction .

Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or a fineonly. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of the applicationshall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.
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An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphasis added).

Since private respondent filed his application for probation on December 28, 1992, after P.D. No.1990 had taken effect,9it is covered by the prohibition that "no application for probation shall beentertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction"and that "the filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal," Having

appealed from the judgment of the trial court and having applied for probation only after the Court ofAppeals had affirmed his conviction, private respondent was clearly precluded from the benefits ofprobation.

Private respondent argues, however, that a distinction should be drawn between meritorious appeals(like his appeal notwithstanding the appellate court's affirmance of his conviction) and unmeritoriousappeals. But the law does not make any distinction and so neither should the Court. In fact if anappeal is truly meritorious the accused would be set free and not only given probation. Privaterespondent's original sentence (1 year ofprision correccionalin its minimum period) and themodified sentence imposed by the Court of Appeals (2 months ofarresto mayor, as minimum, to 2years and 4 months ofprision correccional, as maximum) are probationable. Thus the fact that heappealed meant that private respondent was taking his chances which the law precisely frownsupon. This is precisely the evil that the amendment in P.D. No. 1990 sought to correct, since in thewords of the preamble to the amendatory law, "probation was not intended as an escape hatch andshould not be used to obstruct and delay the administration of justice, but should be availed of at thefirst opportunity by offenders who are willing to be reformed and rehabilitated."

The ruling of the RTC that "[h]aving not perfected an appeal against the Court of Appeals decision,[private respondent] is, therefore, not covered by [the amendment in] P.D. 1990" is an obviousmisreading of the law. The perfection of the appeal referred in the law refers to the .appeal takenfrom a judgment of conviction by the trial court and not that of the appellate court, since under thelaw an application for probation is filed with the trial court which can only grant the same "after itshall have convicted and sentenced [the] defendant, and upon application by said defendant withinthe period for perfecting an appeal. "Accordingly, in Llamado v. Court of Appeals,10it was held thatthe petitioner who had appealed his sentence could not subsequently apply for probation.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the order of April 23, 1993 of the Regional Trial Courtof Misamis Oriental (Branch 21) granting probation to private respondent Grildo S. Tugonon is SET

ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 87416 April 8, 1991

CECILIO S. DE VILLA, petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HONORABLE JOB

B. MADAYAG, and ROBERTO Z. LORAYES, respondents.

San Jose Enriquez, Lacas Santos & Borje for petitioner.

Eduardo R. Robles for private respondent.
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PARAS, J .:p

This petition for review on certiorariseeks to reverse and set aside the decision *of the Court ofAppeals promulgated on February 1, 1989 in CA-G.R. SP No. 16071 entitled "Cecilio S. de Villa vs.Judge Job B. Madayag, etc. and Roberto Z. Lorayes," dismissing the petition for certiorarifiledtherein.

The factual backdrop of this case, as found by the Court of Appeals, is as follows:

On October 5, 1987, petitioner Cecilio S. de Villa was charged before the RegionalTrial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region (Makati, Branch 145) with violationof Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 3rd day of April 1987, in the municipality ofMakati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of thisHonorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and therewillfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue toROBERTO Z. LORAYEZ, to apply on account or for value a

Depositors Trust Company Check No. 3371 antedated March 31,1987, payable to herein complainant in the total amount of U.S.$2,500.00 equivalent to P50,000.00, said accused well knowing thatat the time of issue he had no sufficient funds in or credit with draweebank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment whichcheck when presented to the drawee bank within ninety (90) daysfrom the date thereof was subsequently dishonored for the reason"INSUFFICIENT FUNDS" and despite receipt of notice of suchdishonor said accused failed to pay said ROBERTO Z. LORAYEZ theamount of P50,000.00 of said check or to make arrangement for fullpayment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving saidnotice.

After arraignment and after private respondent had testified on direct examination,petitioner moved to dismiss the Information on the following grounds: (a) Respondentcourt has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (b) That no offense wascommitted since the check involved was payable in dollars, hence, the obligationcreated is null and void pursuant to Republic Act No. 529 (An Act to Assure UniformValue of Philippine Coin and Currency).

On July 19, 1988, respondent court issued its first questioned orders stating:

Accused's motion to dismiss dated July 5, 1988, is denied for lack ofmerit.

Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks,provided they are either drawn and issued in the Philippines thoughpayable outside thereof, or made payable and dishonored in thePhilippines though drawn and issued outside thereof, are within thecoverage of said law. The law likewise applied to checks drawnagainst current accounts in foreign currency.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was subsequently denied byrespondent court in its order dated September 6, 1988, and which reads:


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Accused's motion for reconsideration, dated August 9, 1988, whichwas opposed by the prosecution, is denied for lack of merit.

The Bouncing Checks Law is applicable to checks drawn againstcurrent accounts in foreign currency (Proceedings of the BatasangPambansa, February 7, 1979, p. 1376, cited in Makati RTC Judge

(now Manila City Fiscal) Jesus F. Guerrero's The Ramifications of theLaw on Bouncing Checks, p. 5). (Rollo, Annex "A", Decision, pp. 20-22).

A petition for certiorariseeking to declare the nullity of the aforequoted orders dated July 19, 1988and September 6, 1988 was filed by the petitioner in the Court of Appeals wherein he contended:

(a) That since the questioned check was drawn against the dollar account ofpetitioner with a foreign bank, respondent court has no jurisdiction over the same orwith accounts outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines and that BatasPambansa Bilang 22 could have not contemplated extending its coverage over dollaraccounts;

(b) That assuming that the subject check was issued in connection with a privatetransaction between petitioner and private respondent, the payment could not belegally paid in dollars as it would violate Republic Act No. 529; and

(c) That the obligation arising from the issuance of the questioned check is null andvoid and is not enforceable with the Philippines either in a civil or criminal suit. Uponsuch premises, petitioner concludes that the dishonor of the questioned checkcannot be said to have violated the provisions of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. (Rollo,

Annex "A", Decision, p. 22).

On February 1, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby dismissed. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, Annex "A", Decision, p. 5)

A motion for reconsideration of the said decision was filed by the petitioner on February 7, 1989(Rollo, Petition, p. 6) but the same was denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated March3, 1989 (Rollo, Annex "B", p. 26).

Hence, this petition.

In its resolution dated November 13, 1989, the Second Division of this Court gave due course to the

petition and required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda (Rollo,Resolution, p. 81).

The sole issue in this case is whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Makati has jurisdiction overthe case in question.

The petition is without merit.


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Jurisdiction is the power with which courts are invested for administering justice, that is, for hearingand deciding cases (Velunta vs. Philippine Constabulary, 157 SCRA 147 [1988]).

Jurisdiction in general, is either over the nature of the action, over the subject matter, over theperson of the defendant, or over the issues framed in the pleadings (Balais vs. Balais, 159 SCRA 37[1988]).

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force at the time ofcommencement of the action (De la Cruz vs. Moya, 160 SCRA 538 [1988]).

The trial court's jurisdiction over the case, subject of this review, can not be questioned.

Sections 10 and 15(a), Rule 110 of the Rules of Court specifically provide that:

Sec. 10. Place of the commission of the offense. The complaint or information issufficient if it can be understood therefrom that the offense was committed or someof the essential ingredients thereof occured at some place within the jurisdiction ofthe court, unless the particular place wherein it was committed constitutes an

essential element of the offense or is necessary for identifying the offense charged.

Sec. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. (a) Subject to existing laws, in allcriminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of themunicipality or territory where the offense was committed or any of the essentialingredients thereof took place.

In the case of People vs.Hon. Manzanilla(156 SCRA 279 [1987] cited in the case of Lim vs.Rodrigo, 167 SCRA 487 [1988]), the Supreme Court ruled "that jurisdiction or venue is determinedby the allegations in the information."

The information under consideration specifically alleged that the offense was committed in Makati,

Metro Manila and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction upon theRegional Trial Court of Makati. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person ofthe accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal action(Republic vs. Sunga, 162 SCRA 191 [1988]).

Moreover, it has been held in the case of Que v. People of the Philippines (154 SCRA 160 [1987]cited in the case of People vs. Grospe, 157 SCRA 154 [1988]) that "the determinative factor (indetermining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check."

On the matter of venue for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, the Ministry of Justice, citingthecase of People vs. Yabut (76 SCRA 624 [1977], laid down the following guidelines in MemorandumCircular No. 4 dated December 15, 1981, the pertinent portion of which reads:

(1) Venue of the offense lies at the place where the check was executed anddelivered; (2) the place where the check was written, signed or dated does notnecessarily fix the place where it was executed, as what is of decisive importance isthe delivery thereof which is the final act essential to its consummation as anobligation; . . . (Res. No. 377, s. 1980, Filtex Mfg. Corp. vs. Manuel Chua, October28, 1980)." (SeeThe Law on Bouncing Checks Analyzed by Judge Jesus F.Guerrero, Philippine Law Gazette, Vol. 7. Nos. 11 & 12, October-December, 1983, p.14).


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It is undisputed that the check in question was executed and delivered by the petitioner to hereinprivate respondent at Makati, Metro Manila.

However, petitioner argues that the check in question was drawn against the dollar account ofpetitioner with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg.22).

But it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case. As the trialcourt correctly ruled in its order dated July 5, 1988:

Under the Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. Blg. 22), foreign checks, provided they areeither drawn and issued in the Philippines though payable outside thereof . . . arewithin the coverage of said law.

It is a cardinal principle in statutory construction that where the law does not distinguish courtsshould not distinguish. Parenthetically, the rule is that where the law does not make any exception,courts may not except something unless compelling reasons exist to justify it (Phil. British AssuranceCo., Inc. vs. IAC, 150 SCRA 520 [1987]).

More importantly, it is well established that courts may avail themselves of the actual proceedings ofthe legislative body to assist in determining the construction of a statute of doubtful meaning(Palanca vs. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 125 [1920]). Thus, where there is doubts as to what a provisionof a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberation or discussionon the bill may be adopted (Arenas vs. City of San Carlos, 82 SCRA 318 [1978]).

The records of the Batasan, Vol. III, unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmakers is toapply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof. The discussion on the floor of thethen Batasang Pambansa fully sustains this view, as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman from Basilan is recognized.

MR. TUPAY. Parliamentary inquiry, Mr. Speaker.

THE SPEAKER. The Gentleman may proceed.

MR. TUPAY. Mr. Speaker, it has been mentioned by one of theGentlemen who interpellated that any check may be involved, likeU.S. dollar checks, etc. We are talking about checks in our country.There are U.S. dollar checks, checks, in our currency, and manyothers.

THE SPEAKER. The Sponsor may answer that inquiry.

MR. MENDOZA. The bill refers to any check, Mr.Speaker, and thischeck may be a check in whatever currency.This would not even belimited to U.S. dollar checks. The check may be in French francs orJapanese yen or deutschunorhs.(sic.) If drawn, then this bill willapply.


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MR TUPAY. So it include U.S. dollar checks.

MR. MENDOZA. Yes, Mr. Speaker.

xxx xxx xxx

(p. 1376, Records of the Batasan, Volume III; Emphasis supplied).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-14787 January 28, 1961

COLGATE-PALMOLIVE PHILIPPINE, INC.,petitioner,vs.HON. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ as Auditor General and ISMAEL MATHAY as AUDITOR OF THECENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,respondents.

Ross, Selph and Carrascoso for petitioner.Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.

GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:

The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. is a corporation duly organized and existing underPhilippine laws engaged in the manufacture of toilet preparations and household remedies. Onseveral occasions, it imported from abroad various materials such as irish moss extract, sodiumbenzoate, sodium saccharinate precipitated calcium carbonate and dicalcium phosphate, for use as

stabilizers and flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures. For every importation made of thesematerials, the petitioner paid to the Central Bank of the Philippines the 17% special excise tax on theforeign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges incidentthereto, pursuant to Republic Act No. 601, as amended, commonly known as the Exchange TaxLaw.

On March 14, 1956, the petitioner filed with the Central Bank three applications for refund of the 17%special excise tax it had paid in the aggregate sum of P113,343.99. The claim for refund was basedon section 2 of Republic Act 601, which provides that "foreign exchange used for the payment of thecost, transportation and/or other charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of . . .stabilizer and flavors . . . shall be refunded to any importer making application therefor, uponsatisfactory proof of actual importation under the rules and regulations to be promulgated pursuant

to section seven thereof." After the applications were processed by the officer-in-charge of theExchange Tax Administration of the Central Bank, that official advised, the petitioner that of the totalsum of P113,343.99 claimed by it for refund, the amount of P23,958.13 representing the 17%special excise tax on the foreign exchange used to import irish moss extract, sodium benzoate andprecipitated calcium carbonate had been approved. The auditor of the Central Bank, however,refused to pass in audit its claims for refund even for the reduced amount fixed by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax Administration, on the theory that toothpaste stabilizers and flavors arenot exempt under section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law.


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Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the latter or, December 4, 1958 affirmed the ruling ofthe auditor of the Central Bank, maintaining that the term "stabilizer and flavors" mentioned insection 2 of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in the preparation or manufacture offood or food products. Not satisfied, the petitioner brought the case to this Court thru the presentpetition for review.

The decisive issue to be resolved is whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for theimportation of dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise taximposed by the Exchange Tax Law, (Republic Act No. 601) so as to entitle it to refund under section2 thereof, which reads as follows:

SEC, 2. The tax collected under the preceding section on foreign exchange used for thepayment of the cost, transportation and/or other charges incident to importation into thePhilippines of rice, flour, canned milk, cattle and beef, canned fish, soya beans, butterfat,chocolate, malt syrup, tapioca, stabilizer and flavors, vitamin concentrate, fertilizer, poultryfeed; textbooks, reference books, and supplementary readers approved by the Board ofTextbooks and/or established public or private educational institutions; newsprint imported byor for publishers for use in the publication of books, pamphlets, magazines and newspapers;book paper, book cloth, chip board imported for the printing of supplementary readers(approved by the Board of Textbooks) to be supplied to the Government under contractsperfected before the approval of this Act, the quantity thereof to be certified by the Director ofPrinting; anesthetics, anti-biotics, vitamins, hormones, x-ray films, laboratory reagents,biologicals, dental supplies, and pharmaceutical drugs necessary for compoundingmedicines; medical and hospital supplies listed in the appendix to this Act, in quantities to becertified by the Director of Hospitals as actually needed by the hospitals applying therefor;drugs and medicines listed in the said appendix; and such other drugs and medicines asmay be certified by the Secretary of Health from time to time to promote and protect thehealth of the people of the Philippines shall be refunded to any importer making applicationtherefor, upon satisfactory proof of actual importation under the rules and regulations to bepromulgated pursuant to section seven thereof." (Emphasis supplied.)

The ruling of the Auditor General that the term "stabilizer and flavors" as used in the law refers onlyto those materials actually used in the preparation or manufacture of food and food products isbased, apparently, on the principle of statutory construction that "general terms may be restricted byspecific words, with the result that the general language will be limited by the specific languagewhich indicates the statute's object and purpose." (Statutory Construction by Crawford, 1940 ed. p.324-325.) The rule, however, is, in our opinion, applicable only to cases where, except for onegeneral term, all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one specific class. In the case atbar, it is true that the term "stabilizer and flavors" is preceded by a number of articles that may beclassified as food or food products, but it is likewise true that the other items immediately following itdo not belong to the same classification. Thus "fertilizer" and "poultry feed" do not fall under thecategory of food or food products because they are used in the farming and poultry industries,respectively. "Vitamin concentrate" appears to be more of a medicine than food or food product, for,as matter of fact, vitamins are among those enumerated in the list of medicines and drugs appearingin the appendix to the law. It should also here be stated that "cattle", which is among those listedpreceding the term in question, includes not only those intended for slaughter but also those forbreeding purposes. Again, it is noteworthy that under, Republic Act No. 814 amending the above-quoted section of Republic Act No. 601, "industrial starch", which does not always refer to food forhuman consumption, was added among the items grouped with "stabilizer and flavors". Thus, on thebasis of the grouping of the articles alone, it cannot validly be maintained that the term "stabilizerand flavors" as used in the above-quoted provision of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to thoseused in the manufacture of food and food products. This view is supported by the principle "Ubi lexnon distinguish nec nos distinguire debemos", or "where the law does not distinguish, neither do we


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distinguish". (Ligget & Myers Tobacco Company vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 53 Off. Gaz. No.15, page 4831). Since the law does not distinguish between "stabilizer and flavors" used in thepreparation of food and those used in the manufacture of toothpaste or dental cream, we are notauthorized to make any distinction and must construe the words in their general sense. The rule ofconstruction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by particular recitals whenused in connection with them, does not require the rejection of general terms entirely. It is intended

merely as an aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is to be taken in connection withother rules of construction. (See Handbook of the Construction and Interpretation of Laws by Black,p. 215.216, 2nd ed.)

Having arrived at the above conclusion, we deem it now idle to pass upon the other questions raisedby the parties.

WHEREFORE, the decision under review is reversed and the respondents are hereby ordered toaudit petitioners applications for refund which were approved by the Officer-in-Charge of theExchange Tax Administration in the total amount of P23,958.13.

Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ.,concur.

Labrador, J.,reserves his vote.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 89483. August 30, 1990.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES THRU: THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOODGOVERNMENT (PCGG), AFP ANTI-GRAFT BOARD, COL. ERNESTO A. PUNSALANG and PETER T.TABANG, Petitioners, v. HON. EUTROPIO MIGRINO, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,

NCJR, Branch 151, Pasig, Metro Manila and TROADIO TECSON, Respondents.

The Solicitor General, for Petitioners.

Pacifico B. Advincula for Private Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CORTES,J.:

This case puts in issue the authority of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), throughthe New Armed Forces of the Philippines Anti-Graft Board (hereinafter referred to as the "Board"), toinvestigate and cause the prosecution of petitioner, a retired military officer, for violation of Republic ActsNos. 3019 and 1379.

Assailed by the Republic in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and/or mandamus with prayer for theissuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order are the orders of respondentjudge in Civil Case No. 57092 Branch 151 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Metro Manila: (1) dated June23, 1989, denying petitioners Motion to Dismiss and Opposition, and (2) dated June 26, 1989, grantingprivate respondents application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. Thus, the petition seeksthe annulment of the two orders, the issuance of an injunction to enjoin respondent judge from proceedingwith Civil Case No. 57092 and, finally, the dismissal of the case before the trial court.

The controversy traces its roots to the order of then PCGG Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, dated May 13, 1986,which created the New Armed Forces of the Philippines Anti-Graft Board. The Board was created to"investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both retired and in activeservice." The order further stated that" [t]he Board shall be primarily charged with the task of investigating


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cases of alleged violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019, as amended)and shall make the necessary recommendations to appropriate government agencies and instrumentalitieswith respect to the action to be taken thereon based on its findings." cralaw virtua1aw library

Acting on information received by the Board, which indicated the acquisition of wealth beyond his lawfulincome, private respondent Lt. Col. Troadio Tecson (ret.) was required by the Board to submit hisexplanation/comment together with his supporting evidence by October 31, 1987 [Annex "B", Petition].

Private respondent requested, and was granted, several postponements, but was unable to produce hissupporting evidence because they were allegedly in the custody of his bookkeeper who had gone abroad.

Just the same, the Board proceeded with its investigation and submitted its resolution, dated June 30, 1988,recommending that private respondent be prosecuted and tried for violation of Rep. Act No. 3019, asamended, and Rep. Act No. 1379, as amended.chanrobleslawlibrary : rednad

The case was set for preliminary investigation by the PCGG. Private respondent moved to dismiss the caseon the following grounds: (1) that the PCGG has no jurisdiction over his person; (2) that the action againsthim under Rep. Act No. 1379 has already prescribed; (3) that E.O. No. 14, insofar as it suspended theprovisions of Rep. Act No. 1379 on prescription of actions, was inapplicable to his case; and (4) that havingretired from the AFP on May 9, 1984, he was now beyond the reach of Rep. Act No. 3019. The Boardopposed the motion to dismiss.

In a resolution dated February 8, 1989, the PCGG denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Private

respondent moved for reconsideration but this was denied by the PCGG in a resolution dated March 8, 1989.Private respondent was directed to submit his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidence on March20, 1989 at 2:00 p.m.

On March 13, 1989, private respondent filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction with theRegional Trial Court in Pasig, Metro Manila. The case was docketed as Case No. 57092 and raffled to Branch151, respondent judges court. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and opposed the application for theissuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on the principal ground that the Regional Trial Court had nojurisdiction over the Board, citing the case of PCGG v. Pea, G.R. No. 77663, April 12, 1988, 159 SCRA 556.Private respondent opposed the motion to dismiss. Petitioner replied to the opposition.

On June 23, 1989, respondent judge denied petitioners motion to dismiss. On June 26, 1989, respondentjudge granted the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining petitioners frominvestigating or prosecuting private respondent under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 upon the filing of abond in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00).

Hence, the instant petition.

On August 29, 1989, the Court issued a restraining order enjoining respondent judge from enforcing hisorders dated June 23, 1989 and June 26, 1989 and from proceeding with Civil Case No. 57092.

Private respondent filed his comment, to which petitioners filed a reply. A rejoinder to the reply was filed byprivate Respondent. The Court gave due course to the petition and the parties filed their memoranda.Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted.

The issues raised in the petition are as follows:chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

I.

WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION OR ACTED WITHOUT OR INEXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER AND INTERFERING WITH THE ORDERS ANDFUNCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT.

II.

WHETHER, OR NOT RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION OR ACTED WITHOUT OR INEXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED ORDER DATED JUNE 26, 1989 ENJOININGPETITIONERS FROM INVESTIGATING AND PROSECUTING PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR VIOLATION OF


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REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ANDREPUBLIC ACT NO. 1379, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS AN ACT FOR THE FORFEITURE OF UNLAWFULLYACQUIRED PROPERTY [Rollo, p. 19].

As to the first issue, petitioner contends that following the ruling of the Court in PCGG v. Pea the Board,being a creation and/or extension of the PCGG, is beyond the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. On thesecond issue, petitioner strongly argues that the private respondents case falls within the jurisdiction of the

PCGG.

The pivotal issue is the second one. On this point, private respondents position is as follows:chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

1. . . . he is not one of the subordinates contemplated in Executive Orders 1 , 2 , 14 and 14-A as the allegedillegal acts being imputed to him, that of alleged amassing wealth beyond his legal means while FinanceOfficer of the Philippine Constabulary, are acts of his own alone, not connected with his being a crony,business associate, etc. or subordinate as the petition does not allege so. Hence the PCGG has nojurisdiction to investigate him.

If indeed private respondent amassed wealth beyond his legal means, the procedure laid down by Rep. Act1379 as already pointed out before be applied. And since, he has been separated from the government morethan four years ago, the action against him under Republic Act 1379 has already prescribed.

2. . . . no action can be filed anymore against him now under Republic Act 1379 for recovery of unexplained

wealth for the reason that he has retired more than four years ago.

3. . . . The order creating the AFP Anti-Graft Board (Annex "A", Petition) is null and void. Nowhere inExecutive Orders 1, 2, 14 and 14-A is there any authority given to the commission, its chairman andmembers, to create Boards or bodies to be invested with powers similar to the powers invested with thecommission .. [Comment, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 117-118].

1. The most important question to be resolved in this case is whether or not private respondent may beinvestigated and caused to be prosecuted by the Board, an agency of the PCGG, for violation of Rep. ActsNos. 3019 and 1379. According to petitioners, the PCGG has the power to investigate and cause theprosecution of private respondent because he is a "subordinate" of former President Marcos. They cite thePCGGs jurisdiction over

(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, hisimmediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad,

including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them,during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public officeand/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship. [E.O. No. 1, sec. 2.].

Undoubtedly, the alleged unlawful accumulation of wealth was done during the administration of Pres.Marcos. However, what has to be inquired into is whether or not private respondent acted as a "subordinate"of Pres. Marcos within the contemplation of E.O. No. 1, the law creating the PCGG, when he allegedlyunlawfully acquired the properties.

A close reading of E. O. No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is contemplated within theterm "subordinate."cralaw virtua1aw library

The Whereas Clauses of E. O. No. 1 express the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed byformer President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here andabroad.

E.O. No. 2 freezes "all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or hiswife, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies,agents, or nominees have any interest or participation." cralaw virtua1aw library

Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, that is

[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specificmeaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applyingonly to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co., Ltd. v.


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Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58 (1954), citing Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd Ed., 203].

the term "subordinate" as used in E.O. Nos. 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association orrelation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, andclose associate in E.O. No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in E.O.No. 2.

Thus, as stated by the Court in Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co., Inc. v. PCGG, G.R. No. 75885, May 27,1987, 150 SCRA 181, 205-206.

The situations envisaged and sought to be governed [by Proclamation No. 3 and E.O. Nos. 1, 2 and 14] areself-evident, these being:chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

1) that" (i)ll gotten properties (were) amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime" ;

a) more particularly, that" (i)ll-gotten wealth (was) accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,his immediate family, relatives, subordinates, and close associates, . . . located in the Philippines or abroad,xx (and) business enterprises and entities (came to be) owned or controlled by them, during . . . (theMarcos) administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public officeand/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship;"

b) otherwise stated, that "there are assets and properties pertaining to former President Ferdinand E.

Marcos, and/or his wife Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, businessassociates, dummies, agents or nominees which had been or were acquired by them directly or indirectly,through or as a result of the improper or illegal use of funds or properties owned by the Government of thePhilippines or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or financial institutions, or by takingundue advantage of their office, authority, influence, connections or relationship, resulting in their unjustenrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic of thePhilippines" ;

c) that "said assets and properties are in the form of bank accounts, deposits, trust accounts, shares ofstocks, buildings, shopping centers, condominiums, mansions, residences, estates, and other kinds of realand personal properties in the Philippines and in various countries of the world;" and.

2) that certain "business enterprises and properties (were) taken over by the government of the MarcosAdministration or by entities or persons close to former President Marcos." [Footnotes deleted].

It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or employee duringthe administration of former Pres. Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the respondentunlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/orhis wife. This is so because otherwise the respondents case will fall under existing general laws andprocedures on the matter. Rep. Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, penalizes the corruptpractices of any public officer. Under Rep. Act No. 1379 (An Act Declaring Forfeited in Favor of the State AnyProperty Found to Have Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee and Providing for theProcedure Therefor), whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency anamount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee andto his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall bepresumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired [Sec. 2]. The Solicitor General shall file the petitionand prosecute the case in behalf of the Republic, after preliminary investigation by the provincial or cityprosecutor [Ibid].

Moreover, the record shows that private respondent was being investigated for unlawfully acquired wealthunder Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, and not under E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

Since private respondent was being investigated by the PCGG through the AFP Anti-Graft Board it wouldhave been presumed that this was under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 in relation to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and14-A. But the record itself belies this presumption:chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

(a) The letter of the chairman of the AFP Anti-Graft Board to private respondent, dated October 16, 1987,states: "This letter is in connection with the alleged information received by the AFP Anti-Graft Boardindicating your acquisition of wealth beyond legal means of income in violation of Rep. Act No. 3019 knownas the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." [Rollo, p. 39].


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(b) The Resolution dated June 30, 1988 of the Board categorically states:chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT: chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

This refers to the case against Col Troadio B. Tecson PC (Ret) for alleged unexplained wealth pursuant toR.A. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and R.A. 1379, as

amended, otherwise known as the "Act for Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property." [Rollo, p. 43].

The resolution alleges that private respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by taking advantage of hisoffice as Finance Officer of the Philippine Constabulary. No attempt is made in the Boards resolution to linkhim or his accumulation of wealth to former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife.

(c) The letter of the Board chairman to the chairman of the PCGG, dated July 28, 1988, is clear: chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

Respectfully transmitted herewith for the prosecution before the Sandiganbayan is the case folder ofCOLONEL TROADIO TECSON (Ret) who after preliminary investigation of the case by the Board, found aprima facie evidence against subject officer for violating Section 8, R.A. 3019, as amended by BP 195,otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and R.A. 1379, otherwise known as an Act forthe Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property." [Rollo, p. 46].

Moreover, from the allegations of petitioner in its memorandum, it would appear that private respondent

accumulated his wealth for his own account. Petitioner quoted the letter of Ignacio Datahan, a retired PCsergeant, to General Fidel Ramos, the material portion of which reads:chanrob1esvirtual1aw library

. . . After an official in the military unit received an Allotment Advice the same signed a cash advancevoucher, let us say in the amount of P5,000.00. Without much ado, outright, Col. Tecson paid the amount.The official concerned was also made to sign the receipt portion on the voucher the amount of which wasleft blank. Before the voucher is passed for routine processing by Mrs. Leonor Cagas, clerk of Col. Tecsonand its facilitator, the maneuver began. The amount on the face of the cash advance voucher is altered orsuperimposed. The original amount of P5,000.00 was now made say, P95,000.00. So it was actually theamount of P95,000.00 that appeared on the records. The difference of P90,000.00 went to the syndicate.

. . . Boy Tanyag, bookkeeper in Col. Tecsons office took care of the work.

. . . In the liquidation of the altered cash advance amount, names of persons found in the MetropolitanManila Telephone Directory with fictitious addresses appeared as recipients or payees. Leonor and Boy got

their shares on commission basis of the looted amount while the greater part went to Col. Tecson. [Rollo,pp. 184-185.].

Clearly, this alleged unlawful accumulation of wealth is not that contemplated in E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

2. It will not do to cite the order of the PCGG Chairman, dated May 13, 1986, creating the Board andauthorizing it to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both retired andin active service, to support the contention that PCGG has jurisdiction over the case of private Respondent.The PCGG cannot do more than what it was empowered to do. Its powers are limited. Its task is limited tothe recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies. The PCGG cannot, throughan order of its chairman, grant itself additional powers powers not contemplated in its enabling law.

3. Petitioner assails the trial courts cognizance of the petition filed by privateRespondent. Particularly,petitioner argues that the trial court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the PCGG. This matter has already beensettled in Pea, supra, where the Court ruled that those who wish to question or challenge the PCGGs actsor orders must seek recourse in the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive and original jurisdiction.The Sandiganbayans decisions and final orders are in turn subject to review oncertiorariexclusively by thisCourt. [Ibid, at pp. 564-565].

The ruling in Pea was applied in PCGG v. Aquino, G.R. No. 77816, June 30, 1988, 163 SCRA 363, SorianoIII v. Yuson, G.R. No. 74910 (and five other cases), August 10, 1988, 164 SCRA 226 and Olaguer v. RTC,NCJR, Br. 48, G.R. No. 81385, February 21, 1989, 170 SCRA 478, among others, to enjoin the regional trialcourts from interfering with the actions of the PCGG.


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Respondent judge clearly acted without or in excess of his jurisdiction when he took cognizance of Civil CaseNo. 57092 and issued the writ of preliminary injunction against the PCGG.

4. Thus, we are confronted with a situation wherein the PCGG acted in excess of its jurisdiction and, hence,may be enjoined from doing so, but the court that issued the injunction against the PCGG has not beenvested by law with jurisdiction over it and, thus, the injunction issued was null and void.

The nullification of the assailed order of respondent judge issuing the writ of preliminary injunction istherefore in order. Likewise, respondent judge must be enjoined from proceeding with Civil Case No. 57092.

But in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause the prosecution of privaterespondent for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined from proceedingwith the case, without prejudice to any action that may be taken by the proper prosecutory agency. The ruleof law mandates that an agency of government be allowed to exercise only the powers granted it.

5. The pronouncements made above should not be taken to mean that the PCGGs creation of the AFP Anti-Graft Board is a nullity and that the PCGG has no authority to investigate and cause the prosecution ofmembers and former members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines for violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019and 1379. The PCGG may investigate and cause the prosecution of active and retired members of the AFPfor violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 only in relation to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, i.e., insofar asthey involve the recovery of the ill-gotten wealth of former Pres. Marcos and his family and "cronies." Butthe PCGG would not have jurisdiction over an ordinary case falling under Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, as

in the case at bar. E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A did not envision the PCGG as the investigator and prosecutorof all unlawful accumulations of wealth. The PCGG was created for a specific and limited purpose, as wehave explained earlier, and necessarily its powers must be construed with this in mind.

6. n his pleadings, private respondent contends that he may no longer be prosecuted because ofprescription. He relies on section 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379 which provides that" [t]he right to file such petition[for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired wealth] shall prescribe within four years from the date of resignation,dismissal or separation or expiration of the term of the officer or employee concerned." He retired on May 9,1984, or more than six (6) years ago. However, it must be pointed out that section 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379should be deemed amended or repealed by Article XI, section 15 of the 1987 Constitution which providesthat" [t]he right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, fromthem or from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel."Considering that sec. 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379 was deemed amended or repealed before the prescriptiveperiod provided therein had lapsed insofar as private respondent is concerned, we cannot say that he hadalready acquired a vested right that may not be prejudiced by a subsequent enactment.

Moreover, to bar the Government from recovering ill-gotten wealth would result in the validation orlegitimization of the unlawful acquisition, a consequence at variance with the clear intent of Rep. Act No.1379, which provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

SEC. 11. Laws on prescription. The laws concerning acquisitive prescription and limitation of actionscannot be invoked by, nor shall they benefit the respondent, in respect to any property unlawfully acquiredby him.

Thus, we hold that the appropriate prosecutory agencies, i.e., the city or provincial prosecutor and theSolicitor General under sec. 2 of Rep. Act No. 1379, may still investigate the case and file the petition for theforfeiture of unlawfully acquired wealth against private respondent, now a private citizen. (On the otherhand, as regards respondents for violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 who are still in the governmentservice, the agency granted the power to investigate and prosecute them is the Office of the Ombudsman[Rep. Act No. 6770]). Under Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, and Batas Pambansa Blg. 195violations of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 shall be tried by the Sandiganbayan.

7. The Court hastens to add that this decision is without prejudice to the prosecution of private respondentunder the pertinent provisions of the Revised Penal Code and other related penal laws.

WHEREFORE, the order of respondent judge dated June 26, 1989 in Civil Case No. 57092 is NULLIFIED andSET ASIDE. Respondent judge is ORDERED to dismiss Civil Case No. 57092. The temporary restraining orderissued by the Court on August 29, 1989 is MADE PERMANENT. The PCGG is ENJOINED from proceeding withthe investigation and prosecution of private respondent in I.S. No. 37, without prejudice to his investigationand prosecution by the appropriate prosecutory agency.


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SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-47757-61 January 28, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ABUNDIO R. ELLO, As 4th Assistant of Provincial BoholVICENTE DE LA SERNA. JR., as complainant all private prosecutor, petitioners,vs.HON. VICENTE B. ECHAVES, JR., as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bohol Branch II,ANO DACULLO, GERONIMO OROYAN, MARIO APARICI, RUPERTO CAJES and MODESTO SSUELLO,respondents.

AQUINO, J.:p

The legal issue in this case is whether Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalizes squatting and

similar acts, applies to agricultural lands. The decree (which took effect on August 20, 1975)provides:

SECTION 1. Any person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or takingadvantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying orpossessing the property of the latter against his will for residential, commercial or anyother purposes, shall be punished by an imprisonment ranging from six months toone year or a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than five thousand pesosat the discretion of the court, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.(2nd paragraph is omitted.)

The record shows that on October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower court separate

informations against sixteen persons charging them with squatting as penalized by PresidentialDecree No. 772. The information against Mario Aparici which is similar to the other fifteeninformations, reads:

That sometime in the year 1974 continuously up to the present at barangayMagsaysay, municipality of Talibon, province of Bohol, Philippines and within the

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with stealth andstrategy, enter into, occupy and cultivate a portion of a grazing land physicallyoccupied, possessed and claimed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. as successor tothe pasture applicant Celestino de la Serna of Pasture Lease Application No. 8919,accused's entrance into the area has been and is still against the win of the offendedparty; did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously squat and cultivate aportion of the said grazing land; said cultivating has rendered a nuisance to and has

deprived the pasture applicant from the full use thereof for which the land applied forhas been intended, that is preventing applicant's cattle from grazing the whole area,thereby causing damage and prejudice to the said applicant-possessor-occupant,

Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. (sic)

Five of the informations, wherein Ano Dacullo, Geronimo Oroyan, Mario Aparici, Ruperto Cajes andModesto Suello were the accused, were raffled to Judge Vicente B. Echaves, Jr. of Branch II(Criminal Cases Nos. 1824, 1828, 1832, 1833 and 1839, respectively).


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Before the accused could be arraigned, Judge Echaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order datedDecember 9, 1977 dismissing the five informations on the grounds (1) that it was alleged that theaccused entered the land through "stealth and strategy", whereas under the decree the entry shouldbe effected "with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence ortolerance of the landowner", and (2) that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does notapply to the cultivation of a grazing land.

Because of that order, the fiscal amended the informations by using in lieu of "stealth and strategy"the expression "with threat, and taking advantage of the absence of the ranchowner and/or toleranceof the said ranchowner". The fiscal asked that the dismissal order be reconsidered and that theamended informations be admitted.

The lower court denied the motion. It insisted that the phrase "and for other purposes" in the decreedoes not include agricultural purposes because its preamble does not mention the Secretary of

Agriculture and makes reference to the affluent class.

From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440. Theappeal is devoid of merit.

We hold that the lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands becauseits preamble shows that it was intended to apply to squatting in urban communitiesor moreparticularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-do individuals. The squatingcomplained of involves pasture lands in rural areas.

The preamble of the decree is quoted below:

WHEREAS, it came to my knowledge that despite the issuance of Letter ofInstruction No. 19 dated October 2, 1972, directing the Secretaries of NationalDefense, Public Work. 9 and communications, Social Welfare and the Director ofPublic Works, the PHHC General Manager, the Presidential Assistant on Housingand Rehabilitation Agency, Governors, City and Municipal Mayors, and City andDistrict Engineers, "to remove an illegal constructions including buildings on andalong esteros and river banks, those along railroad tracks and those built withoutpermits on public and private property." squatting is still a major problem in urbancommunities all over the country;

WHEREAS, many persons or entities found to have been unlawfully occupying publicand private lands belong to the affluent class;

WHEREAS, there is a need to further intensify the government's drive against thisillegal and nefarious practice.

It should be stressed that Letter of Instruction No. 19 refers to illegal constructions on public and

private property. It is complemente

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