Federation of Free Farmers vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS:

There are 4 parties in this case: a. Federation of Free Farmers (union representing the farmers/laborers) b. Planters (the group which harvests the lands where the farmers work) c. Santos and Tikol (individual planters) d. Central or Victorias milling corp, Inc. (Planters bring their harvest here to be milled).Section 1 of RA 809 stipulates that in the absence of written milling agreements between the majority of planters and the millers of sugarcane in any milling district in the Philippines, the unrefined sugar produced in that district from the milling by the sugar central of the sugarcane of any sugarcane planter or plantation owner, as well as all by-products and derivatives thereof, shall be divided between them in the proportion therein satisfied.

Section 9 stipulates that any increase in the share of proceeds of milled sugarcane and derivatives obtained by planters from the Central, 60% of said increase should be paid by planters to their respective laborers

*The following are the opposing contentions of the petitioners:(1) FFF alleged that they have not been paid from 1952-53 despite the 10% increase and from 1953-1974 with the 4% increase. FFF claimed too that Planters and Victorias entered into an agreement when they have no legal right because the law has already provided the ratio of division. Also, FFF contended that even if planters and millers had legal right to enter into such agreement, still 60% of the produce of milled sugarcane as well as the derivatives obtained by the planters have not been paid to the laborers.CA ruled that the planters and Victorias be jointly and severally liable.FFF agreed with this decison.

(2) Victorias said that evidence incontrovertibly shows that it has already paid in full to the planters their respective shares in proceeds and derivatives from the moment it was legally decided and agreed that it should do so. Also, based from initial petition, petitioner said that the Federation admitted the laborers have been given what is due them as far as 1952-53 to 1954-55 crops are concerned. Victorias claimed that planters and Victorias should not be held jointly and severally liable. The action filed was not founded on torts but on either an obligation created by a contract or by law, and even if on torts, the action has prescribed. They have paid the Planters so the Planters should only be the one sued.

(3) Planters association claim they have freedom to stipulate ration as they might agree. And that they have paid the laborers.(4) Individual planters complain that the decision of the Court of Appeals ignored their plea of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over their persons in spite of their proven claim that they had not been properly served with summons, and that the portion of said decision holding them jointly and severally liable with VICTORIAS and the PLANTERS to the latter's laborers for the amounts here in question has no factual and legal basis, considering they were not parties to the pertinent questioned agreements.In this connection, the question raised is: Does Republic Act No. 809 apply even if the majority of the sugarcane planters have written milling agreement with the miller or central stipulating a sharing proportion different from that provided in Sec 1 of the Act, such that any increase of participation granted the planter under said milling agreement will be divided between the planter and his plantation laborer in the proportion of 60% for the latter and 40%% for the former? What is the legislative intent which should be given effect.

Issue:a. WON Planters and Victorias should be severally liableb. WON RA 809 is applicable regardless if there exists a milling contract between Central and Planters.Held:

a. NO. Legal basis is that arising from law which does not impose upon Centrals any liability, whether expressly or impliedly, any joint and several liability.The judgment of the Court of Appeals is hereby modified by eliminating the joint and several liability of VICTORIAS with the PLANTERS for the said unpaid amounts, the said liability being solely and exclusively of the PLANTERS No contract bet sugar mill and the laborers. Principal liability lies on Planters and secondarily on Dept or Labor.b. YES. The Act is thus operative irrespective of whether there exists a milling agreement between the central and the sugar planters. To give literal import in interpreting the two section will defeat the purpose of theAct. It is undeniable that Section 9 of Republic Act 809 uses the words "any increase in participation granted the plantersunder this Act". Read literally, there could be a little shade of plausibility in the posture of VICTORIAS and PLANTERS that only any increase as a result of the application of Section 1 of the Act is contemplated in its Section 9, and not an increase by virtue of a written milling contract executed after the effectivity of the Act. But if we look at the purpose why the Act was enacted: 1.) continuous production of sugar 2.) to grant the laborers a share in the increased participation of planters in the sugar produce. Therefore, any such increase should be deemed as an "increase under this Act", since it is a result of its operation. The legislative intent is, thus to make the act operative irrespective of whether there exists a milling agreement between central and sugar planters.

43 MANILA JOCKEY CLUB Inc. Vs GAMES AND AMUSEMENT

Facts: This is a petition for declaratory relief filed by petitioner Manila Jockey Club, Inc., in the Court of First Instance Manila praying that judgment be rendered against respondents Games and Amusements Board (GAB), Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), and Executive Secretary Fortunato de Leon.

Section 4 Republic Act No. 309, as amended by Republic Act No. 983, by express terms, specifically reserved 23 Sundays and 16 Saturdays for the Philippine Anti-Tuberculosis Society, the White Cross, Inc. and the PCSO, and 12 Saturdays to the President for other charitable, relief, or civic purposes. These days can not be disposed of by the GAB without authority of law.

Issue: W/N the placement of the six (6) additional racing days given to the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, in virtue of Republic Act No. 1502, is proper

Ratio: At the time of the enactment of Republic Act No. 1502 in June, 1956, the long, continuous, and uniform practice wasthat all sweepstakes draws and races were held on Sundays and during the whole day when Congress chose not to specify in express terms how the additional sweepstakes draws and races would beheld, it is safe to conclude that it did not intend to disturb the then prevailing situation and practice. Appellants have no vested right to the unreserved Sundays, or even to the 24 Saturdays (except, perhaps, on theholidays), because their holding of races on these days is merely permissive, subject to the licensing and determinationby the GAB. Republic Act No. 1502 was enacted increasing by six (6) the sweepstakes draw and races, but without specifying thedays for holding them GAB had no alternative except to make room for the additional races, from among the only available racing daysunreserved by any law the Sundays on which the private individuals and entities have been permitted to holdtheir races, subject to licensing and determination by the GAB. In the interpretation of a legal document, especially a statute (unlike in the interpretation of an ordinary writtendocument) It is not enough to obtain information to the intention or meaning of the author or authorsbut also to see whether the intention or meaning has been expressed in such a way as to give it legal effect andvalidity

The purpose of the inquiry, is not only to know what the author meant by the language he used, but also to see thatthe language used sufficiently expresses that meaning.

The legal act is made up of two elements an (1) internal and an (2) external one it originates in intention and is perfected by expression failure of the latter may defeat the former Legislative debates are expressive of the views and motives of individual members and are not safe guides It may not be resorted to in ascertaining the meaning and purpose of the lawmaking body It is impossible to determine with certainty what construction was put upon an act by the members of the legislative body that passed the bill, by resorting to the speeches of the members thereof Those who did not speak, may not have agreed with those who did; and those who spoke, might differ from eachother

Aisporna v. CAGR L-39419, 12 April 1982 (113 SCRA 459)First Division, de Castro (p): 5 concur, 1 took no partFacts: Since 7 March and on 21 June 1969, a Personal Accident Policy was issued by Perla Compania de Seguros, through its authorized agent Rodolfo Aisporna, for a period of 12 months with the beneficiary designated as Ana M. Isidro. The insured died by violence during lifetime of policy. Mapalad Aisporna participated actively with the aforementioned policy.For reason unexplained, an information was filed against Mapalad Aisporna, Rodolfos wife, with the City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act on 21 November 1970, or acting as an agent in the soliciting insurance without securing the certificate of authority from the office of the Insurance Commissioner. Mapalad contends that being the wife of true agent, Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that policy was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had called by telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note on top of her husbands desk to renew. On 2 August 1971, the trial court found Mapalad guilty and sentenced here to pay a fine of P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. On appeal and on 14 August 1974, the trial courts decision was affirmed by the appellate court (CA-GR 13243-CR). Hence, the present recourse was filed on 22 October 1974. On 20 December 1974, the Office of the Solicitor General, representing the Court of Appeals, submitted that Aisporna may not be considered as having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.Issue: Whether Mapalad Aisporna is an insurance agent within the scope or intent of the Insurance ActHeld: Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce harmonious whole. In the present case, the first paragraph of Section 189 prohibits a person from acting as agent, subagent or broker in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner; while the second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within the intent of the section; while the third paragraph prescribes the penalty to be imposed for its violation. The appellate courts ruling that the petitioner is prosecuted not under the second paragraph of Section 189 but under its first paragraph is a reversible error, as the definition of insurance agent in paragraph 2 applies to the paragraph 1 and 2 of Section 189, which is any person who for compensation shall be an insurance agent within the intent of this section. Without proof of compensation, directly or indirectly, received from the insurance policy or contract, Mapalad Aisporna may not be held to have violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.The Supreme Court reversed the appealed judgment and acquitted the accused of the crime charged, with costs de oficio.

Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation 136 SCRA 142

Facts:Several miners were killed in a cave-in at one of Philex Mining Corporations mine sites. The heirs of the miners were able to recover under the Workmans Compensation Act (WCA).

Thereafter, a special committee report indicated that the company failed to provide the miners with adequate safety protection.

The heirs decided to file a complaint for damages before the court of first instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Manila.

Philex filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the action was based on an industrial accident which is covered under the WCA, and therefore, the CFI has no jurisdiction over the case. Philex argues that work-connected injuries are compensable exclusively under Sections 5 and 46 of the WCA, which provides:

Section 5: Exclusive right to compensation. The rights and remedies granted by this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury x x x.

Section 46. Jurisdiction. The Workmens Compensation Commissioner shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide claims for compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act, subject to appeal to the Supreme Court, x x x.

Philex further contends that the WCA covers work-connected accidents even if the employer was negligent as the WCA under Section 4-A imposes a 50% additional compensation in the event that the employer was negligent.

The heirs, however, content that the CFI has jurisdiction as their complaint is not based on the WCA but on the Civil Code provisions on damages arising out of negligence.

The CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

The heirs questioned the dismissal before the Supreme Court.Issue: Does the CFI have jurisdiction over the complaint?

Held:

Majority Opinion; Makasiar, J.

Several opinions [amicus curiae] were advanced as to the nature of the remedies provided for under the WCA, namely:

CUMULATIVE Justice Lazaro is of the opinion that the heirs may file a complaint for damages (which is different from compensation under the WCA) with the regular courts on the basis of the negligence of an employer pursuant to the Civil code provisions.

EXCLUSIVE Atty. (now Senator) Angara believes that recovery under the WCA is exclusive and therefore precludes an action of damages under the Civil Code.

SELECTIVE Atty. Bacungan believes that the remedies are selective, i.e., the heirs had the option of choosing between availing of the compensation under the WCA or filing an action for damages arising out of negligence under the provisions of the Civil Code. If the heirs had chosen one remedy and have collected under that remedy, they can no longer avail of the other remedy.

The allegations of the complaint indicate that there was a breach of contract which may justify an award for damages under the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code. The question now is whether or not the action for damages will prosper, notwithstanding the fact that the heirs had already received compensation under the WCA.

The Court agreed with the position of Atty. Bacungan that the two remedies are selective. The WCA is based on a theory of compensation distinct from existing theories on damages. Recovery under the WCA is not based on any theory on the part of the employer.

Since the two remedies are distinct and the heirs have the option of selecting which remedy to avail of, are the heirs now precluded from selecting the remedy under the Civil Code, considering that they had already availed of (and received compensation) under the WCA?

The heirs have a choice but they cannot pursue both choices simultaneously.

The Court, however, noted that the heirs only learned of the negligence report after they had already availed and received compensation under the WCA; they thus could not make an intelligent and informed choice at the time they opted for the WCA remedy.

The heirs were thus allowed to pursue the Civil Code remedy but they are not entitled to recover under both remedies. Any payment they received under the WCA shall be deducted from the courts award of damages, if any.

Lidasan v ComelecG.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967 Sanchez, J.:

Facts:1. Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections assails the constitutionality of RA 4790 and petitioned that Comelec's resolutions implementing the same for electoral purposes be nullified.Under RA 4790, 12 barrios in two municipalities in the province of Cotabato are transferred to the province of Lanao del Sur. This brought about a change in the boundaries of the two provinces.

2. Barrios Togaig and Madalum are within the municipality ofBuldon intheProvince of Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality ofParang, also in theProvince of Cotabatoand not of Lanao del Sur.

3.Apprised of this development, the Office of the President, recommended to Comelec that the operation of the statute be suspended until "clarified by correcting legislation."

4. Comelec, by resolution declared that the statute should be implemented unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790, which is entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur", but which includes barrios located in another province Cotabatois unconstitutional for embracing more than one subject in the title

YES. RA 4790 is null and void

1.The constitutional provision contains dual limitations upon legislative power.First. Congress is to refrain from conglomeration, under one statute, of heterogeneous subjects.Second. The title of the bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof. Of relevance here is the second directive. The subject of the statute must be "expressed in the title" of the bill. This constitutional requirement "breathes the spirit of command."Compliance is imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not exact of Congress the obligation to read during its deliberations the entire text of the bill. In fact, in the case of House Bill 1247, which became RA 4790, only its title was read from its introduction to its final approval in the House where the bill, being of local application, originated.2.The Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. And this, to lead them to inquire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the same, take appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislators.3.The test of the sufficiency of a title is whether or not it is misleading; and, which technical accuracy is not essential, and the subject need not be stated in express terms where it is clearly inferable from the details set forth,a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act, is bad.4.The title "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton,in the Province of Lanao del Sur" projects the impression that only the province of Lanao del Sur is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Not the slightest intimation is there that communities in the adjacent province of Cotabato are incorporated in this new Lanao del Sur town. The phrase "in the Province of Lanao del Sur," read without subtlety or contortion, makes the title misleading, deceptive. For, the known fact is that the legislation has a two-pronged purpose combined in one statute: (1) it creates the municipality of Dianaton purportedly from twenty-one barrios in the towns of Butig and Balabagan, both in the province of Lanao del Sur; and (2) it also dismembers two municipalities in Cotabato, a province different from Lanao del Sur.5. Finally, the title did not inform the members of Congress the full impact of the law. One, it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur. Two, it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill.

CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC.,petitioner, vs.BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,respondents.

Stat-Con Principle: Relative Constitutionality PrincipleThe constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another.A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because ofaltered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light ofchanged conditions.Facts:On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central Bank of the Philippines, and created a new Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides that those with Salary Grades (SG) 20 and above are exempted from the Salary Standardization Law (SSL), meaning their Money Board can make its own compensation structure; while those with SG 19 and below are not exempted from SSL, such that their salary structure are bound to the provisions of SSL.Following the enactment of RA No. 7653, other Government Financial Institutions (GFIs) like the GSIS, SSS, DBP and others, followed suit and changed their respective charters. The controversial difference however is that all of its employees, regardless of SG, are exempted from SSL.This prompted the Central Bank Employees Association to petition, after 8 years since its enactment, R.A. No. 7653.The petitioners thrust for their challenge is that RA 7653 denies them the equal protection of the law as it makes an unconstitutional cut between two classes: 1) officers and executives (SG 20 and above), exempted from SSL; and 2) rank-in-file (SG 19 and below), not exempted from SSL. This thus is a class legislation. Further, one of their sub-sets of arguments is that GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from the coverage of the SSL; thus within the class of rank-and-file personnel of government financial institutions (GFIs), the BSP rank-and-file are also discriminated upon.Issue:Whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that "No person shall be. . . denied the equal protection of the laws.Ruling:A) UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION, SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID.It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not prevent the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate - so long as the classification is not unreasonable. That is, the standard for classification is satisfied if it is based on reasonable foundation and is not palpably arbitrary.In the case at bar, exemption of SG 20 and above from SSL was reasonable as it was intended to address the BSPs lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate the rank-in-file employees. If the discrimination of the rank-in-file employees was the end result, the discrimination has a rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.B) THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS - EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEESOF GFIs FROM THE SSL - RENDERS THE CONTINUED APPLICATION OF THE CHALLENGED PROVISION A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. (this is where concept of Relative Constitutionality comes in)A statute valid when enacted may become invalid by change in the conditions to which it is applied.Although R.A. No. 7653 was held valid under the present standards of equal protection, the subsequent enactments of the charters of the other GFIs which unanimously exempted all of their employees from the SSL, including those occupying rank-in-file positions, where now invidious to that of the rank-in-file employees of the BSP, who are not exempted from the SSL, considering that they all belong to the same class of GFIs.The rights for equal protection of laws of the rank-in-file employees of the BSP were now abridged.Held:The continued operation and implementation of the lastprovisoof Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional.

G.R. No. 178831-32 (Promulgated April 1, 2009)Jocelyn SyLimkaichong vs. COMELECLouis C. Biraogo vs. Hon. Prospero Nograles, Jocelyn SyLimkaichongOlivia P. Paras vs. House of Representatives, Jocelyn SyLimkaichongRenald F. Villando vs. COMELEC, Jocelyn SyLimkaichong

At the core of these contentious consolidated petitions are: (1) the Joint Resolutionof the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division dated May 17, 2007, disqualifying Jocelyn D. SyLimkaichong (Limkaichong) from running as a congressional candidate for the First District of Negros Oriental; (2) the COMELECEn BancResolutiondated June 29, 2007, affirming her disqualification; and (3) the COMELECEn BancResolution dated August 16, 2007, resolving that all pending incidents relating to her qualifications should now be determined by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).

Facts On March 26, 2007 LIMKAICHONG filed a COC for House Rep. Two petitions for her disqualification: April 4, 2007 and April 11, 2007 Napoleon Camero and Renald F. Villando, respectively, filed separate petitions on the grounds of her lacking of citizenship which would invalidate her candidacy. COMELEC consolidated such complaints, the cases remained pending on May 14, 2007 when the elections were conducted. LIMKAICHONG EMERGED AS THE VICTOR (65,708) on the margin of 7, 746 from opponent Olivia Paras (57,962) On May 15, 2007 Olivia Paras filed to COMELEC for the suspension of the Proclaimation of Limkaichong as winner In the COMELEC investigations, it was found that LIMKAICHONGs father did not fully acquire said naturalization where the resolution disqualifies LIMKAICHONG. On May 18, COMELEC En Banc issued resolution 8062 not suspending the proclamation of winning candidates with pending disqualification caseswhich shall be without prejudice to the continuation of the hearing and resolution of the involved cases. LIMKAICHONG filed a motion for reconsideration and to lift the suspension (May 20, 22 2007) where on May 25 the PBOC proclaimed her as First District Representative. Numerous cases followed suit reaching the Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari. The Court granted it and dismissed all petitions, including Biraogos petition, and reversed the ruling of the COMELEC. Petitioner also questioned on the 360-degree turn of the decision by the Court dated April 1, 2009 as embodied in the Decision written by Justice Ruben T. Reyes, which although unpromulgated, was nonetheless signed by 14 Associate Justices and approved en banc on july 15, 2008. Issue/s:1. Was the proclamation of LIMCKAICHONG valid?2. Upon proclamation, would it have been the HRET, and not COMELEC whom have had the jurisdiction over the Disqualification cases?3. Was COMELEC (Second Division and En Banc) correct in disqualifying LIMKAICHONG on the grounds of her being not a natural-born citizen?4. Can the HoR be compelled to prohibit LIMKAICHONG from assuming her duties as representative?5. WON the unpromulgated Decision of the Court is final and executoryHeld/Decisions

1. Yes it was valid. On the grounds that LIMKAICHONG timely filed with COMELEC En Banc her motion for reconsideration and the lifting of the incorporated directive suspending her proclamation. COMELEC resolution 8062 is valid exercise of COMELECs constitutional power to promulgate its own rules of conduct and procedure. Planas vs. COMELEC the proclamation of Defensor, the respondent therein who garnered the highest number of votes, the Division Resolution invalidating his certificate of candidacy was not yet final.As such, his proclamation was valid or legal, as he had at that point in time remained qualified.2. Yes it should be the HRETs jurisdictionThe Court has invariably held that once a winning candidatehas been proclaimed,taken his oath, andassumed officeas a Member of the House of Representatives,the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.3. Since there was a flaw in the naturalization process of LIMKAICHONGs father, Julio OngSy, which prevented him from gaining finalty, LIMKAICHONG remains a Chinese national and was supposed to be disqualified to run.However, Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 clearly states that the cancellation of the naturalization certificate can only be made "upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representatives, or by the proper provincial fiscal." In other words, the initiative must come from these officers, presumably after previous investigation in each particular case. Thus, the State, through its representatives, not private persons, are the only ones who may question the illegally or invalidly procures certificate of naturalization.4. No (presumption of regularity) [Norgales] went on to state that after assumption by the Member-elect, or having acquired a presumptively valid title to the office, the House of Representatives cannot, (motuproprio, cancel, revoke, withdraw any recognition given to a sitting Member or to remove his name from its roll, as such would amount to a removal of such Member from his office without due process of law. The unseating of a Member of theHouse of Representatives should be exercised with great caution and after the proper proceedings for the ouster has been validly completed.For to arbitrarily unseat someone, who obtained the highest number of votes in the elections, and during the pendency of the proceedings determining ones qualification or disqualification, would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom sovereignty resides.5. NO. in Belacvs COMELEC, held that a decision must not only be signed by the Justices who took part in the deliberation, but must also be promulgated to be considered a Decision, to wit:[A] true decision of the Court is the decisionsigned by the Justices and duly promulgated. Before that decision is so signed and promulgated, there is no decision of the Court to speak of.before a decision is signed and promulgated, all opinions and conclusions stated during and after the deliberation of the Court, remain in the breasts of the Justices, binding upon no one, not even upon the Justices themselves. Of course, they may serve for determining what the opinion of the majority provisionally is and for designating a member to prepare the decision of the Court, but inno way is that decision binding unless and until signed and promulgated.

Thus an unpromulgated decision is no decision at all.

Relation to said TOPIC (ANALYSIS)Promulgation: Operative Fact for the Effectivity of a DecisionIt can be seen that in the case of Limkaichong vs. COMELEC (wherein it involves numerous cases under one common theme) there is the idea of the usage of promulgation of resolutions as a means to effect decision to the parties. The importance of timing, as seen in the facts of the case (see full text) consummates the multiple angles affected by said cases. The Supreme Court taking cognizance of the matter looked into the details of TIME as basis for their decisions. Where on the multiple cases that followed suit, the idea of operative fact steps in on the grounds of when the decisions were made (on/against Limkaichong) and the effect to which it constituted (affecting the validity of Limkaichong as not only a citizen but as a proclaimed winner).

Reversal of Judicial ConstructionThe previous leaked unpromulgated decision of the court is not yet final and executory. Although it is already signed, as long as it is not still promulgated, it can still be change. An unpromulgated decision is not a decision since they are part of internal deliberations of the Court which must not be released to the public, since it is still subject to change. This goes to the reason of preserving ones freedom of action, thus a member of the court, although he already signed can withdraw his vote as long as the decision has not yet been promulgated.

Source:

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2009/jul2009/gr_178831_2009.html

Villanueva Y Paredes vs. Commission on Elections (municipal board of canvassers of dolores, quezon, vivencio g. lirio) ---------December , 1985Doctrines1. Laws and statute should be construed in accordance with the spirit of the law2. Election laws should be reasonably and liberally construed to achieve their purposeto effectuate and safeguard the will of the electorate in the choice of their representatives. The rules and regulation for the conduct of elections are mandatory before the elections, but when it is sought to enforce them after the elections, they are held to be directory only. Since if they are held mandatory, innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault on their part.Facts[Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision (a decision which dismissed his petition to set aside the COMELEC resolutions on Feb. 21 and July 31 1980-denying his petition for annulment of the proclamation of respondent Vivencio Lirio as the elected vice-mayor of Dolores, Quezon arguing that it should have been him considering the majority of the votes casts) on May 3, 1983.]Narciso Mendoza had filed on Jan. 4, 1980 (the last day of filing for candidacy) a sworn certificate of candidacy for the Office of Vice-mayor in Dolores,Quezon. However on that same day Mendoza filed an unsworn letter in his own handwriting withdrawing his said certificate of candidacy "for personal reasons." On the next day, January 25, 1980, petitioner Crisologo Villanueva, upon learning of his companion Mendoza's withdrawal,. filed his own sworn "Certificate of Candidacy in substitution" of Mendoza's for the said office of vice mayor as a one-man independent ticket. The results showed that Villanueva won (3,112 votes over 2,660 votes of Lirio, his opponent). But the Municipal board of Canvassers didnt acknowledge the victory because for them it was a stray vote because Villanueva didnt appear in the COMELECs certified list of candidates in that municipality, presuming that his candidacy was not approved by the COMELEC. The canvassers then proclaimed Vivencio G. Lirio as the unopposed winner of the elections.The Comelec argued: The 1978 Election Code provides:SEC. 27. ...Nocertificate of candidacy duly filed shall be considered withdraw ... unless the candidate files with the office which received the certificate ... or with the Commission a sworn statement of withdrawal ...SEC. 28. ... If,afterlast day for filing certificates of candidacy, a candidate with a certificate of candidacy duly filed should ... withdraw ... any voter qualified for the office may file his certificate of candidacy for the office for which ... the candidate who has withdrawn ... was a candidate on or before midday of election ...Clearly, Petitioner Villanueva could not have substituted for Candidate Mendoza on the strength of Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code which he invokes, For one thing, Mendoza's withdrawal of his certificate is not under oath, asrequiredunder Section 27 of the Code; hence it produces no legal effect. For another, said withdrawal was made not after the last day (January 4, 1980) for filing certificates of candidacy, ascontemplatedunder Sec. 28 of the Code, but onthat very same day.Issues:1. Is the literal interpretation of the Comelec on the Election code (denying the proclamation of Villanueva due to an unsworn withdrawal of certificate of candidacy of Mendoza (sec. 27) and because the withdrawal was not done after the last day of filing) in accordance with the spirit of the law?Held/Rationale1. The fact that Mendoza's withdrawal was not sworn is but a technicality which should not be used to frustrate the people's will in favor of petitioner as the substitute candidate. Moreover, Mendozas withdrawal was an actual fact, so much that no votes were cast for him at all. Although, his candidacy was filed on the last day, his name was not on the certified list of candidates. Thus, his unsworn withdrawal was accepted by the election registrar without protest or objection. Also, since there was no time to include the name of the petitioner in the candidates list, he circularized formal notices of his candidacy to all chairmen and members of the citizens election committees in compliance with the suggestion of the Comelec Law Manager, Atty. Zoilo Gomez.2. The legal requirement that a withdrawal be under oath will be held to be merelydirectoryand Mendoza's failure to observe the requirement should be "considered a harmless irregularity.3. The Comelec's post-election act of denying petitioner's substitute candidacy certainly does not seem to be in consonance with the substance and spirit of the law. Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code provides for such substitute candidates in case of death, withdrawal or disqualification up to mid-day of the very day of the elections. Mendoza's withdrawal was filed on the last hour of the last day for regular filing of candidacies on January 4, 1980, which he had filed earlier that same day. For all intents and purposes, such withdrawal should therefore be considered as having been made substantially and in truth after the last day, even going by the literal reading of the provision by the Comelec.4. It follows that the votes cast in his favor must be counted. Such being the case, there is more than sufficient justification for his proclamation as Vice Mayor

Manahan vs. ECC, 104 SCRA 198Facts: Claimant was the widow of Nazario Manahan, Jr., who died of Enteric Fever while employed as a classroom teacher in the Las Pias Municipal High School. Claimant filed her claim with the GSIS for death benefits under P.D. No. 626. GSIS denied the claim finding that the ailment of the deceased is not an occupational disease. Claimant filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the deceased was in perfect health when admitted to the service and that the ailment of the deceased was attributable to his employment, GSIS maintained its denial.Claimant appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission which affirmed the GSIS denial.Issue: WON claimant is entitled to the benefitsHeld:Majority Opinion. The medical records of the deceased showed that he had a history of ulcer-like symptoms several months before his death on May 2, 1975. He was even treated for epigastric pain due to hyperacidity on Dec. 10,1974. Epigastric pain is a symptom, and ulcer is a common complication of typhoid fever. Hence, it is clear that the illness which claimed his life could have had its onset months before Dec. 10,1974. Such being the case, his cause of action accrued before Dec. 10,1974.In any case, the Court has always maintained that in case of doubt, the same should be resolved in favor of the workers. The Workers Compensation Act and the Labor Code should be liberally construed to attain their laudable objective, that is, to give relief to the workman and/or his dependents in the event that the former should die or sustain an injury. The presumption of compensability subsists in favor of the claimant.Concurring Opinion, Justice Melencio-Herrera:Although enteric fever is not an occupational disease, considering the cause of such illness, the risk of contracting it could have been increased by the working conditions of the deceased as a teacher, who used to eat his meals at the school canteen and used the comfort room and other facilities of the school.VillavertvsECC,110SCRA 233G.R. No. L-48605, December 14, 1981

FACTS:

This is a petition to review decision of the Employees Compensation Commission affirming decision of the Government Service Insurance System denying the claim for death benefits on the ground that acute hemmorhagic pancreatitis is not an occupational disease, thus, petitioner failed to show the causal connection between the fatal ailment of Marcelino Villavert and the nature of his employment. He was employed at the Philippine Constabulary as code verifier. However, due to shortage of qualified civilian personnel to handle certain task, he was assigned various tasks that would require him to render overtime services especially in the preparation of the checks for the salary of the Philippine Constabulary and the National Integrated Police personnel throughout the country.

ISSUE:Whether or not Marcelino Villavert thru mother Domna Villavert is entitled to death benefits?

HELD:

Yes. As provided for in Article 4 of the Labor Code of the Philippines, All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the Code, including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of thelabor.Judgment rendered ordering theGovernment Service Insurance System to pay the petitioner death benefits in the amount of Six Thousand Pesos (Php6,000.00)

Del Rosario & Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc. (Petitioner) vs.NLRC, PaulinoMabuti, NapoleoBorata, SilvinoTudio and Calinar Security Agency (Respondents)

FACTS:

Del Rosario & Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc. (Petitioner) entered into a Contract of Services with Calinar Security Agency for the supply of security guards. PaulinoMabuti, NapoleoBorata and SilvinoTudio, three of the guards deployed by the Security Agency with the Petitioner, filed a Complaint against the Security Agency and the Petitioner for underpayment of salary and the non-payment of living allowance and 13th month pay. The Security Agency denied liability alleging that it cannot comply with the payments required by law to the Security Guards because of the inadequate contract price paid by the Petitioner. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the Complaint against the Petitioner because of the non-existence of an employer-employee relationship but ordered the Security Agency to pay the Security Guards the total amount that they sought which was P2,923.17. Upon appeal by the Security Agency, the NLRC decided to hold both the Security Agency and the Petitioner jointly and severally liable to pay the Security Guards because the Petitioner is considered an indirect employer of the Security Guards. The Security Agency, in its appeal to the NLRC above, failed to file it under oath and did not pay the required appeal fee on time.

ISSUE: WON the NLRC erred in deciding that the Petitioner and the Security Agency are jointly and severally liable to pay the Security Guards. WON the NLRC erred in giving the appeal due course despite the Security Agencys failure to file the appeal under oath and pay the appeal fee on time.

RULING:On Issue No. 1:The SC affirms the decision of the NLRC holding the Petitioner and the Security Agency jointly and severally liable for the underpayment of the salary and the non-payment of the living allowance and 13th month pay to the Security Guards. Under Article 106 of the Labor Code, the Principal (in this case, the Petitioner) should be held jointly and severally liable with the Contractor (in this case, the Security Agency), in case the latter fails to pay the wages of its employees. This is more so the case with Petitioner considered as an indirect employer under the definition stated in Article 107 of the same Labor Code.The joint and several liability imposed by the Court is however without prejudice to the Petitioners right to reimburse from the Security Agency the amount it paid the Security Guards.The SC further ruled that the inadequate contract price received by the Security Agency from the Petitioner is irrelevant because the Security Agency is expected to have known the labor laws and the correct compensation it should have demanded for its services.On Issue No. 2:The SC rules that the NLRC has the right to accept the appeal despite the lack of verification and the delay in the payment of the appeal fee. Article 221 of the Labor Code provides that, unlike in the Courts of law where the rules of evidence are controlling, the primordial interest of the Labor Code and the NLRC is to speedily and objectively ascertain the facts of the case without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of due process. Anyway, the deficiency in the verification in this case can be cured in the actual oath-taking.

People v. ManantanGR L-14129, 31 July 1962 (5 SCRA 684)En Banc, Regala (p): 7 concur, 1 took no part, 1 on leaveFacts: In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of that Province, Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said court resulted in the finding of a probable cause that the crime charged was committed by the defendant. Thereafter, the trial started upon defendants plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of the peace, the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that a justice of the peace is within the purview of Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in People vs. Macaraeg, where it was held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on various motions and pleadings, the lower court dismissed the information against the accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. Hence, the appeal by the Solicitor General.Issue: Whether the justice of the peace was excluded from the coverage of Section 54 of the Revised Election CodeHeld: Under the rule of Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. The maxim casus omisus can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. The application of the rule of casus omisus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. Substitution of terms is not omission. For in its most extensive sense the term judge includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justice of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts. The intention of the Legislature did not exclude the justice of the peace from its operation. In Section 54, there is no necessity to include the justice of peace in the enumeration, as previously made in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, as the legislature has availed itself of the more generic and broader term judge, including therein all kinds of judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace.The Supreme Court set aside the dismissal order entered by the trial court and remanded the case for trial on the merits.

G.R. No. 113092 September 1, 1994Mario Centeno vs. Hon Victoria Villalon-Pornillos236 SCRA 197

Topic: Penal Statutes: Strictly against the State; liberally in favor of the accusedFacts: Last quarter of 1985, the officers from a group of elderly people of a civic organization (Samahan ng Katandaan ng Tikay, MalolosBulacan)esblished a fund raising activity for the purpose of renovating the chapel of their barrio. Petitioner Martin Centeno, solicited fromJudge Adoracion G. Angeles a contribution of P1,500 Said solicitation was made without a permit from the DSWD As a consequence, an information was filed against Martin Centeno for violation of PD No. 1564 (Solicitation Permit Law) On December 29, 1992, the court rendered judgment, sentencing the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.And required to pay only P200.00 and recommended a pardoned the accused for it is acted in good faith. Petitioner Centeno filed a motion to nullify the information on the ground that PD 1564 only covers solicitations made for charitable or public welfare purposes, but not those made for religious purposes such as construction/renovation of a chapel On May 21, 1993, Judge Villalon-Pornillos affirmed the decision of the lower court but modified the penalty because of perversity of the act committed, increasing the penalty of imprisonment to 6 yrs and the fine to P1,000. Issue: Should the phrasecharitable purposes be construed in its broadest sense so as to include religious purposes? NO.Ruling: PD 1564 merely stated charitable or public welfare purposes, only goes to show that the framers of the law never intended solicitation for religious purposes within its coverage. It will be observed in Article VI Section 28 of 1987 Constitution, treat the words charitable and religious separately and independently to each other. These two terms are likewise dissociated and individually mention in some statutes. Accordingly, the term charitable should be strictly construed so as to exclude solicitations for religious purposes. Thereby, we adhere to the fundamental doctrine underlying virtually all Penal Legislation that such interpretation should be adopted as would favor the accused. Petitioner next avers that solicitations for religious purposes cannot be penalized under the law for, otherwise, it will constitute an abridgment or restriction on the free exercise clause guaranteed under constitution. It may be conceded that the construction of church is social concern of the people involve public welfare and that such activity is within the cloak of free exercise clause under the right to freedom of religion guaranteed by the Constitution. To conclude, solicitations for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the state in the exercise of police power. However, the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564.. WHEREFORE, decision appealed is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and petitioner Martin Centeno is ACQUITTED of the offense charged, with costs de oficio.-

In the interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to subject it to careful scrutiny and to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the rights of the accused. Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statue had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms. If the statute is ambiguous and admits two reasonable but contradictory constructions, that which operates in favor of a party accused under its provisions be preferred. The purpose of strict construction is not to enable a guilty person to escape from punishment through a technicality but to provide a definition of forbidden acts.