statcon cases 1 - jul 29 edited

7/27/2019 Statcon Cases 1 - Jul 29 Edited

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24396 July 29, 1968

SANTIAGO P. ALALAYAN, ET AL., u!"# !" $! %&$'l( '") (o* +$& %&"&+ o( 'll o+$&* &*o" $'!"#/o00o" o* #&"&*'l !"+&*&+ !+$ $!0 !" '//o*)'"/& !+$ S&/. 12, Rul& 3, Rul& o( Cou*+,petitioners-appellants,vs.NATIONAL POER CORPORATION '") AMINISTRATOR O ECONOMIC COORINATION, respondents-appellees.

Alafriz Law Oces for petitioners-appellants.The Government Corporate Counsel and Oce of the Solicitor General for respondents-appellees.

ERNANO,J.:

This declaratory relief proceedin !as started in the lo!er court by petitioners, Alalayan and Philippine Po!er and"evelop#ent Co#pany, both franchise holders of electric plants in $auna, to test the validity of a section of ana#endatory act,%e#po!erin respondent National Po!er Corporation &in any contract for the supply of electric po!er

to a franchise holder,& receivin at least '() of its electric po!er and enery fro# it to re*uire as a condition thatsuch franchise holder &shall not reali+e a net prot of #ore than t!elve percent annually of its invest#ents plus t!o-#onth operatin epenses.& Respondent, under such provision, could lie!ise &rene! all eistin contracts !ithfranchise holders for the supply of electric po!er and enery,& so that the provisions of the Act could be ivene/ect.0This statutory provision !as assailed on the round that, bein a rider, it is violative of the constitutionalprovision re*uirin that a bill, !hich #ay be enacted into la!, cannot e#brace #ore than one sub1ect, !hich shall beepressed in its title,2as !ell as the due process uarantee, the liberty to contract of petitioners bein infrined upon.The lo!er court sustained its validity. 3e sustain the lo!er court in this appeal.

4n the petition for declaratory relief, after the usual alleations as to parties, it !as stated that respondent NationalPo!er Corporation &has for so#e years no! been, and still is, by virtue of si#ilar, valid and eistin contracts enteredinto by it !ith one hundred and thirty seven 5%267 natural persons and corporations distributed all over the country,supplyin, distributin, servicin and sellin electric po!er and enery at ed rites schedules to the latter !ho havefor so#e years no! been and still are, leally enaed in resupplyin, redistributin, reservicin and resellin the said

electric po!er and enery to individual custo#ers !ithin the coverae of their respective franchises.&8

Petitioners areincluded a#on the said %96 natural persons and entities.'Then, reference !as #ade to the particular contractspetitioners entered into !ith respondent, the contracts to continue indenitely unless and until either party !ould iveto the other t!o years previous notice in !ritin of its intention to ter#inate the sa#e.:After !hich, it !as noted thaton ;une % 527 After due hearin, to declare therider or ?ection 2 of Republic Act No. 2(82 null and void for bein illeal and unconstitutional, and to issue aper#anent in1unction re*uirin respondent NPC to refrain fro# enforcin or i#ple#entin the provisions of the sa#ela!.&%%

?oon after, petitioner Philippine Po!er and "evelop#ent Co#pany #oved that insofar as it !as concerned, the casebe dis#issed, !hich #otion !as ranted by the lo!er court on ;anuary 0', %9:2. %0The sole petitioner is therefore?antiao P. Alalayan, suin in his behalf and for the benet of all other persons havin co##on or eneral interest!ith hi#. Respondent National Po!er Corporation led an opposition on ebruary %', %9:2, opposin the issuance of a


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!rit for preli#inary in1unction.%2n March 0%, %9:2, the lo!er court, considerin that there !as &no sucient roundfor the issuance of the !rit for preli#inary in1unction,& denied the sa#e.%8

There !as in the ans!er, dated March 09, %9:2, an ad#ission of the #ain facts alleed, !ith a denial of the lealconclusion !hich petitioner !ould deduce therefro#, respondent National Po!er Corporation upholdin the validity ofthe challened provision. Then, ca#e a partial stipulation of facts sub#itted on ctober %, %9:8, consistin of aresolution of the Philippine Electric Plant !ners Association to tae the necessary steps to stop respondent NationalPo!er Corporation fro# enforcin its announced increase, sa#ples of contracts bet!een electric plant operators onthe one hand and respondent National Po!er Corporation on the other, the contract !ith petitioner Alalayan, datedMay 0:, %9':, sho!in that he did purchase and tae po!er and enery as follo!s= &?ity 5:(7 ilo!atts and of not

less than %8(,((( ilo!att-hours in any contract year at the rate of P%0(.(( per ilo!att per year& payable in t!elvee*ual #onthly install#ents, &plus an enery chare of P(.(%2 per ilo!att hour, payable on the basis of #onthlydelivery&> a letter of ;une 00, %9:0 of respondent National Po!er Corporation to petitioner approvin his %6.') rateincrease of po!er so that beinnin ;uly %, %9:0, the de#and chare !ould be P%(.(( per ilo!att per #onth and theenery chare !ould be P(.(0 per ilo!att hour> a letter of Auust %', %9:0, !herein respondent National Po!erCorporation notied petitioner that it deferred the e/ectivity of the ne! rates, but it !ill be enforced on Nove#ber %,%9:0> a letter of ;une 0', %9:2 enforcin respondent National Po!er Corporation deferrin once aain the e/ectivity ofthe ne! rates until ;anuary %, %9:8> as !ell as the conressional transcripts on @ouse Bill No. '266 and ?enate Bill No.:%2, no! Republic Act No. 2(82.%'

4n an order of Nove#ber ', %9:8, the lo!er court ave the parties a period of t!enty days !ithin !hich to sub#itsi#ultaneously their respective #e#oranda. After the sub#ission thereof, the lo!er court, in a decision of ;anuary 2(,%9:', sustained the validity and constitutionality of the challened provision. @ence, this appeal.

As !as set forth earlier, this appeal cannot prosper. 3e share the vie! of the lo!er court that the provision in *uestioncannot be i#puned either on the round of its bein violative of the constitutional re*uire#ent that a bill cannote#brace #ore than one sub1ect to be epressed in its title or by virtue of its alleed failure to satisfy the due processcriterion.

%. 3e consider rst the ob1ection that the statute in *uestion is violative of the constitutional provision that no bill&!hich #ay be enacted into la! shall e#brace #ore than one sub1ect !hich shall be epressed in Dits title ... &%:Thisprovision is si#ilar to those found in #any A#erican ?tate Constitutions. 4t is ai#ed aainst the evils of the so-calledo#nibus bills and lo-rollin leislation as !ell as surreptitious or unconsidered enact#ents.%63here the sub1ect of abill is li#ited to a particular #atter, the la!#aers alon !ith the people should be infor#ed of the sub1ect ofproposed leislative #easures. This constitutional provision thus precludes the insertion of riders in leislation, a riderbein a provision not er#ane to the sub1ect #atter of the bill. Petitioner Alalayan asserts that the provision ob1ectedto is such a rider.

To lend approval to such a plea is to construe the above constitutional provision as to cripple or i#pede properleislation. To i#part to it a #eanin !hich is reasonable and not unduly technical, it #ust be dee#ed sucient thatthe title be co#prehensive enouh reasonably to include the eneral ob1ect !hich the statute sees to e/ect !ithoutepressin each and every end and #eans necessary for its acco#plish#ent. Thus, #ere details need not be set forth.The leislature is not re*uired to #ae the title of the act a co#plete inde of its contents. The provision #erely callsfor all parts of an act relatin to its sub1ect ndin epression in its title.%


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and its operation. And this, to lead the# to in*uire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the sa#e, taeappropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the leislators.&

3e thus hold that there is no violation of the constitutional provision !hich re*uires that any bill enacted into la! shalle#brace only one sub1ect to be epressed in the title thereof.

0. Nor is petitioner any#ore successful in his plea for the nullication of the challened provision on the round of hisbein deprived of the liberty to contract !ithout due process of la!.

4t is to be ad#itted of course that property rihts nd shelter in specic constitutional provisions, one of !hich is thedue process clause. 4t is e*ually certain that our funda#ental la! fra#ed at a ti#e of &surin unrest anddissatisfaction&,0:!hen there !as the fear epressed in #any *uarters that a constitutional de#ocracy, in vie! of itsco##it#ent to the clai#s of property, !ould not be able to cope e/ectively !ith the proble#s of poverty and #iserythat unfortunately aFict so #any of our people, is not susceptible to the indict#ent that the overn#ent thereinestablished is i#potent to tae the necessary re#edial #easures. The fra#ers sa! to that. The !elfare state conceptis not alien to the philosophy of our Constitution.064t is i#plicit in *uite a fe! of its provisions. 4t suces to #entiont!o.

There is the clause on the pro#otion of social 1ustice to ensure the !ell-bein and econo#ic security of all thepeople,0


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leislative act of this character can only be sho!n if in fact there is such a denial. The relevant *uestion then is, !hatdoes due process re*uireG

The holdin of this Court in &rmita-'alate Hotel and 'otel Operators Asso. v. Cit( 'a(or,8


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reater portion of the ilipino people. By %9'2 ho!ever, the Moratoriu# Act could be rihtfully considered as aninfrine#ent of the non-i#pair#ent clause, as the econo#y had in the #ean!hile considerably chaned for the better

There is no clearer instance then of the process of har#oni+ation and balancin !hich is incu#bent upon the 1udiciaryto undertae !henever a reulatory #easure under the police po!er is assailed as violative of constitucess or e*ualprotection, all of !hich are intended to safeuard property rihts. Three leadin decisions of the Knited ?tates?upre#e Court, @o#e Buildin L $oan Astional uarantees, !hether of non-i#pair#ent, dueprosociation v.#laisdell,:%3e**ia v. 3ew 4or!,:0and 3orman v. #altimore and Ohio 2ailroad Co.$:2spea si#ilarly.

Even if, therefore, reliance be had on the non-i#pair#ent clause by petitioner and the process of ad1ust#ent or

har#oni+ation be undertaen to ascertain !hether the applicability of the statutory provision assailed to eistincontracts !ould run counter to such a uarantee, still the sa#e conclusion e#eres. There is a failure to #ae out acase for its invalidity.

3@ERERE, there bein no sho!in that ?ection 2 of Republic Act No. 2(82 is unconstitutional, the decision of thelo!er court, dis#issin the petition, is ar#ed. 3ith costs aainst petitioner Alalayan.

Concepcion$ C.5.$ 2e(es$ 5.#.L.$ 6izon$ 'a!alintal$ 7aldivar$ Sanchez$ Castro and Aneles$ 55.$ concur.

oo+"o+&

%?ection 2, Republic Act No. 2(82, approved ;une %6, %9:%, entitled &An Act to urther A#end Co##on!ealthAct Nu#bered ne @undred T!enty, as A#ended by Republic Act Nu#bered T!enty ?i @undred and orty

ne.&

0?ection 2 of Republic Act No. 2(82 reads thus>

&?EC. 2. The National Po!er Corporation is hereby authori+ed to represent and transact for the benetand in behalf of the public consu#ers, and it shall in any contract for the supply of electric po!er to afranchise holder re*uire as a condition that the franchise holder, if it receives at least fty percent ofits electric po!er and enery fro# the National Po!er Corporation, shall not reali+e a net prot of #orethan t!elve percent annually of its invest#ents plus t!o-#onth operatin epenses. The NationalPo!er Corporation shall rene! all eistin contracts !ith franchise holder for the supply of electricpo!er and enery, in order to ive e/ect to the provisions hereof. 4n the event that the net prot asveried by the Public ?ervice Co##ission should eceed the said t!elve percent, the public ?erviceCo##ission shall order such ecess to be returnedpro rata to the custo#ers either in cash or as creditfor future electric bills.&

2Article 4, ?ection 0%, par. %, Constitution of the Philippines. The constitutional provision reads thus= &No bill!hich #ay be enacted into la! shall e#brace #ore than one sub1ect !hich shall be epressed in the title ofthe bill.&

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 15371 No&0%&* 11, 1993

TE PILIPPINE JUGES ASSOCIATION, )uly *&. %y !+ P*&!)&"+, ERNARO P. AESAMIS, :!/&-P*&!)&"+(o* L'l A;'!*, MARIANO M. UMALI, !*&/+o* (o* P'!#, M'o" C!+y '") *'"/$& 165, 167 '") 166, P'!#, M&+*o M'"!l',*&&/+!&ly? +$& NATIONAL CONEERATION O TE JUGES ASSOCIATION O TE PILIPPINES,/o0o&) o( +$& METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT JUGES ASSOCIATION *&. %y !+ P*&!)&"+. REINATO=UILALA o( +$& MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT COURT, M'"!l'@ TE MUNICIPAL JUGES LEAGUE O TEPILIPPINES *&. %y !+ P*&!)&"+, TOMAS G. TALA:ERA@ %y +$&0&l& '") !" %&$'l( o( 'll +$& Ju)#& o(+$& R!o"'l T*!'l '") S$'*!' Cou*+, M&+*ool!+'" T*!'l Cou*+ '") Mu"!/!'l Cou*+ +$*ou#$ou+ +$&Cou"+*y, petitioners,vs.


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ON. PETE PRAO, !" $! /''/!+y ' S&/*&+'*y o( +$& &'*+0&"+ o( T*'"o*+'+!o" '")Co00u"!/'+!o", JORGE :. SARMIENTO, !" $! /''/!+y ' Po+0'+&* G&"&*'l, '") +$& PILIPPINEPOSTAL CORP., respondents.

CRUB,J.:

The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the ;udiciary. 4t is asserted by the petitioners that thishall#ar of republicanis# is i#paired by the statute and circular they are here challenin. The ?upre#e Court is itselfa/ected by these #easures and is thus an interested party that should ordinarily not also be a 1ude at the sa#e ti#e.Knder our syste# of overn#ent, ho!ever, it cannot inhibit itself and #ust rule upon the challene, because no otheroce has the authority to do so. 3e shall therefore act upon this #atter not !ith ociousness but in the dischare ofan unavoidable duty and, as al!ays, !ith detach#ent and fairness.

The #ain taret of this petition is ?ection 2' of R.A. No. 62'8 as i#ple#ented by the Philippine Postal Corporationthrouh its Circular No.90-0

b7 to pro#ote international interchane, cooperation and understandin throuh the unha#pered Ho!or echane of postal #atters bet!een nations>


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c7 to cause or e/ect a !ide rane of postal services to cater to di/erent users and chanin needs,includin but not li#ited to, philately, transfer of #onies and valuables, and the lie>

d7 to ensure that sucient revenues are enerated by and !ithin the industry to nance the overallcost of providin the varied rane of postal delivery and #essenerial services as !ell as theepansion and continuous upradin of service standards by the sa#e.

?ec. 2' of R.A. No. 62'8, !hich is the principal taret of the petition, reads as follo!s=

?ec. 2'. 2epealin Clause. All acts, decrees, orders, eecutive orders, instructions, rules andreulations or parts thereof inconsistent !ith the provisions of this Act are repealed or #odiedaccordinly.

All franin privilees authori+ed by la! are hereby repealed, ecept those provided for underCo##on!ealth Act No. 0:', Republic Acts Nu#bered :9, % and therefore a repealin section inthe ne! statute is valid, not!ithstandin that the title is silent on the sub1ect. 4t !ould be dicult to conceive of a#atter #ore er#ane to an act and to the ob1ect to be acco#plished thereby than the repeal of previous leislationsconnected there!ith.&4

The reason is that !here a statute repeals a for#er la!, such repeal is the e/ect and not the sub1ect of the statute>and it is the sub1ect, not the e/ect of a la!, !hich is re*uired to be brieHy epressed in its title. As observed in onecase,6if the title of an act e#braces only one sub1ect, !e apprehend it !as never clai#ed that every other act !hichrepeals it or alters by i#plication #ust be #entioned in the title of the ne! act. Any such rule !ould be neither !ithinthe reason of the Constitution, nor practicable.

3e are convinced that the !ithdra!al of the franin privilee fro# so#e aencies is er#ane to the acco#plish#entof the principal ob1ective of R.A. No. 62'8, !hich is the creation of a #ore ecient and e/ective postal service syste#.ur rulin is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealin clause, ?ection 2' did not have to be epressly included in thetitle of the said la!.

44

The petitioners #aintain that the second pararaph of ?ec. 2' coverin the repeal of the franin privilee fro# thepetitioners and this Court under E.. 0(6, P" %


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before its passae, ecept !hen the President certies to the necessity of its i##ediate enact#ent to#eet a public cala#ity or e#erency. Kpon the last readin of a bill, no a#end#ent thereto shall beallo!ed, and the vote thereon shall be taen i##ediately thereafter, and the(easandna(sentered inthe ;ournal.

The petitioners also invoe ?ec. 68 of the Rules of the @ouse of Representatives, re*uirin that a#end#ent to any bill!hen the @ouse and the ?enate shall have di/erences thereon #ay be settled by a conference co##ittee of bothcha#bers. They stress that ?ec. 2' !as never a sub1ect of any disaree#ent bet!een both @ouses and so the secondpararaph could not have been validly added as an a#end#ent.

These aru#ent are unacceptable.

3hile it is true that a conference co##ittee is the #echanis# for co#pro#isin di/erences bet!een the ?enate andthe @ouse, it is not li#ited in its 1urisdiction to this *uestion. 4ts broader function is described thus=

A conference co##ittee #ay, deal enerally !ith the sub1ect #atter or it #ay be li#ited to resolvinthe precise di/erences bet!een the t!o houses. Even !here the conference co##ittee is not by ruleli#ited in its 1urisdiction, leislative custo# severely li#its the freedo# !ith !hich ne! sub1ect #attercan be inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a conference co##ittee producesunepected results, results beyond its #andate, These ecursions occur even !here the rules i#posestrict li#itations on conference co##ittee 1urisdiction. This is sy#pto#atic of the authoritarian po!erof conference co##ittee 5"avies, $eislative $a! and Process= 4n a Nutshell, %9 ?enators and Me#bers ofthe @ouse of Representatives, the Co##ission on Elections> for#er Presidents of the Philippines> the National Censusand ?tatistics ce> and the eneral public in the lin of co#plaints aainst public oces and ocers.15

The respondents counter that there is no discri#ination because the la! is based on a valid classication inaccordance !ith the e*ual protection clause. 4n fact, the franin privilee has been !ithdra!n not only fro# the;udiciary but also the ce of Adult Education, the 4nstitute of National $anuae> the Teleco##unications ce> thePhilippine "eposit 4nsurance Corporation> the National @istorical Co##ission> the Ar#ed orces of the Philippines> theAr#ed orces of the Philippines $adies ?teerin Co##ittee> the City and Provincial Prosecutors> the Tanodbayan


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5ce of ?pecial Prosecutor7> the abataan Baranay> the Co##ission on the ilipino $anuae> the Provincial andCity Assessors> and the National Council for the 3elfare of "isabled Persons.11

The e*ual protection of the la!s is e#braced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discri#ination o/ends there*uire#ents of 1ustice and fair play. 4t has nonetheless been e#bodied in a separate clause in Article 444 ?ec. %., of theConstitution to provide for a #ore, specic uaranty aainst any for# of undue favoritis# or hostility fro# theovern#ent. Arbitrariness in eneral #ay be challened on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particularact assailed partaes of an un!arranted partiality or pre1udice, the sharper !eapon to cut it do!n is the e*ualprotection clause.

Accordin to a lon line of decisions, e*ual protection si#ply re*uires that all persons or thins si#ilarly situatedshould be treated alie, both as to rihts conferred and responsibilities i#posed, 12?i#ilar sub1ects, in other !ords,should not be treated di/erently, so as to ive undue favor to so#e and un1ustly discri#inate aainst others.

The e*ual protection clause does not re*uire the universal application of the la!s on all persons or thins !ithoutdistinction. This #iht in fact so#eti#es result in une*ual protection, as !here, for ea#ple, a la! prohibitin #atureboos to all persons, reardless of ae, !ould benet the #orals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. 3hat theclause re*uires is e*uality a#on e*uals as deter#ined accordin to a valid classication. By classication is #eantthe roupin of persons or thins si#ilar to each other in certain particulars and di/erent fro# all others in these sa#eparticulars. 13

3hat is the reason for the rant of the franin privilee in the rst placeG 4s the franin privilee etended to thePresident of the Philippines or the Co##ission on Elections or to for#er Presidents of the Philippines purely asacourtes(fro# the la!#ain bodyG 4s it o/ered because of the importanceor statusof the rantee or because of

its need for the privileeG r have the rantees been chosen pell-#ell, as it !ere, !ithout any basis at all for theselectionG

3e re1ect outriht the last con1ecture as there is no doubt that the statute as a !hole !as carefully deliberated upon,by the political depart#ents before it !as nally enacted. There is reason to suspect, ho!ever, that not enouh care orattention !as iven to its repealin clause, resultin in the un!ittin !ithdra!al of the franin privilee fro# the;udiciary.

3e also do not believe that the basis of the classication !as #ere courtesy, for it is uni#ainable that the politicaldepart#ents !ould have intended this serious sliht to the ;udiciary as the third of the #a1or and e*ual depart#entsthe overn#ent. The sa#e observations are #ade if the i#portance or status of the rantee !as the criterion used forthe etension of the franin privilee, !hich is en1oyed by the National Census and ?tatistics ce and even so#eprivate individuals but not the courts of 1ustice.

4n our vie!, the only acceptable reason for the rant of the franin privilee !as the perceived needof the ranteefor the acco##odation, !hich !ould 1ustify a !aiver of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest ofprovidin for a s#oother Ho! of co##unication bet!een the overn#ent and the people.

Assu#in that basis, !e cannot understand !hy, of all the depart#ents of the overn#ent, it is the ;udiciary, that hasbeen denied the franin privilee. There is no *uestion that if there is any #a1or branch of the overn#ent that needsthe privilee, it is the ;udicial "epart#ent, as the respondents the#selves point out. Curiously, the respondents !ould1ustify the distinction on the basis precisely of this need and, on this basis, deny the ;udiciary the franin privilee!hile etendin it to others less deservin.

4n their Co##ent, the respondents point out that available data fro# the Postal ?ervice ce sho! that fro# ;anuary%9


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those favored, !hich #ay or #ay not need it at all, and the ;udiciary, !hich denitely needs it. The proble# is notsolved by violatin the Constitution.

4n lu#pin the ;udiciary !ith the other oces fro# !hich the franin privilee has been !ithdra!n, ?ection 2' hasplaced the courts of 1ustice in a cateory to !hich it does not belon. 4f it reconi+es the need of the President of thePhilippines and the #e#bers of Conress for the franin privilee, there is no reason !hy it should not reconi+e asi#ilar and in fact reater need on the part of the ;udiciary for such privilee. 3hile !e #ay appreciate the !ithdra!alof the franin privilee fro# the Ar#ed orces of the Philippines $adies ?teerin Co##ittee, !e fail to understand!hy the ?upre#e Court should be si#ilarly treated as that Co##ittee. And !hile !e #ay concede the need of theNational Census and ?tatistics ce for the franin privilee, !e are intriued that a si#ilar if not reater need is not

reconi+ed in the courts of 1ustice.

5n second thouht, there does not see# to be any 1ustiable need for !ithdra!in the privilee fro# the Ar#edorces of the Philippines $adies ?teerin Co##ittee, !hich, lie for#er Presidents of the Philippines or their !ido!s,does not send as #uch fran #ail as the ;udiciary.7

4t is !orth observin that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a overn#ent-controlled corporation, !as created and isepected to operate for the purpose of pro#otin the public service. 3hile it #ay have been established pri#arily forprivate ain, it cannot ecuse itself fro# perfor#in certain functions for the benet of the public in echane for thefranchise etended to it by the overn#ent and the #any advantaes it en1oys under its charter.14A#on the servicesit should be prepared to etend is free carriae of #ail for certain oces of the overn#ent that need the franinprivilee in the dischare of their o!n public functions.

3e also note that under ?ection 9 of the la!, the Corporation is capitali+ed at P%( billion pesos, '') of !hich is

supplied by the Oovern#ent, and that it derives substantial revenues fro# the sources enu#erated in ?ection %(, ontop of the ee#ptions it en1oys. 4t is not liely that the retention of the franin privilee of the ;udiciary !ill cripple theCorporation.

At this ti#e !hen the ;udiciary is bein faulted for the delay in the ad#inistration of 1ustice, the !ithdra!al fro# it ofthe franin privilee can only further deepen this serious proble#. The volu#e of 1udicial #ail, as e#phasi+ed by therespondents the#selves, should stress the dependence of the courts of 1ustice on the postal service forco##unicatin !ith la!yers and litiants as part of the 1udicial process. The ;udiciary has the lo!est appropriation inthe national budet co#pared to the $eislative and Eecutive "epart#ents> of the P2(9 billion budeted for %992,only .


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3arvasa$ C.5.$ %eliciano$ )adilla$ #idin$ 2ealado$ 6avide$ 5r.$ 2omero$ 3ocon$ 'elo$ 9uiason$ )uno and :itu$ 55.$ concur.

#ellosillo$ 5.$ is on leave.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-28589 O/+o%&* 2, 1967

ARA LIASAN,petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondent.

Sunta( for petitioner.#arrios and %ule for respondent.

SANCEB,J.:

The *uestion initially presented to the Co##ission on Elections,%is this= 4s Republic Act 869(, !hich is entitled &An ActCreatin the Municipality of "ianaton in the Province of $anao del ?ur&, but !hich includes barrios located in anotherprovince Cotabato to be spared fro# attac planted upon the constitutional #andate that &No bill !hich #ay beenacted into la! shall e#brace #ore than one sub1ect !hich shall be epressed in the title of the bill&G Co#elecJsans!er is in the ar#ative. /shoot is the present oriinal petition for certiorariand prohibition.

n ;une %


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Apprised of this develop#ent, on ?epte#ber 6, %9:6, the ce of the President, throuh the Assistant Eecutive?ecretary, reco##ended to Co#elec that the operation of the statute be suspended until &claried by correctinleislation.&

Co#elec, by resolution of ?epte#ber 0(, %9:6, stood by its o!n interpretation, declared that the statute &should bei#ple#ented unless declared unconstitutional by the ?upre#e Court.&

This triered the present oriinal action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara $idasan, a resident and tapayer of thedetached portion of Paran, Cotabato, and a *ualied voter for the %9:6 elections. @e prays that Republic Act 869( bedeclared unconstitutional> and that Co#elecJs resolutions of Auust %', %9:6 and ?epte#ber 0(, %9:6 i#ple#entin

the sa#e for electoral purposes, be nullied.

%. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional re*uire#ent aforestated, that &Dno bill !hich #ay be enacted into la! shalle#brace #ore than one sub1ect !hich shall be epressed in the title of the bill.&0

4t #ay be !ell to state, riht at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains dual li#itations upon leislativepo!er. %irst. Conress is to refrain fro# conlo#eration, under one statute, of heteroeneous sub1ects. Second. Thetitle of the bill is to be couched in a lanuae sucient to notify the leislators and the public and those concerned ofthe i#port of the sinle sub1ect thereof.

f relevance here is the second directive. The sub1ect of the statute #ust be &epressed in the title& of the bill. Thisconstitutional re*uire#ent &breathes the spirit of co##and.&2Co#pliance is i#perative, iven the fact that theConstitution does not eact of Conress the obliation to read durin its deliberations the entire tet of the bill. 4n fact,in the case of @ouse Bill %086, !hich beca#e Republic Act 869(, only its title !as read fro# its introduction to its nalapproval in the @ouse of Representatives8!here the bill, bein of local application, oriinated.'

f course, the Constitution does not re*uire Conress to e#ploy in the title of an enact#ent, lanuae of suchprecision as to #irror, fully inde or cataloue all the contents and the #inute details therein. 4t suces if the titleshould serve the purpose of the constitutional de#and that it infor# the leislators, the persons interested in thesub1ect of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and conse*uences of the proposed la! and its operation. Andthis, to lead the# to in*uire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the sa#e, tae appropriate action thereon, andthus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the leislators.:

4n our tas of ascertainin !hether or not the title of a statute confor#s !ith the constitutional re*uire#ent, thefollo!in, !e believe, #ay be taen as uidelines=

The test of the suciency of a title is !hether or not it is #isleadin> and, !hich technical accuracy is not

essential, and the sub1ect need not be stated in epress ter#s !here it is clearly inferable fro# the details setforth, a title which is so uncertain that the averae person readin it would not *e informed of the purpose ofthe enactment or put on in;uir( as to its contents$ or which is misleadin$ either in referrin to or indicatinone su*pression orindication of the real su*


13/68

RespondentJs stance is that the chane in boundaries of the t!o provinces resultin in &the substantial di#inution ofterritorial li#its& of Cotabato province is erely the incidental leal results of the denition of the boundary& of the#unicipality of "ianaton and that, therefore, reference to the fact that portions in Cotabato are taen a!ay &need notbe epressed in the title of the la!.& This posture !e #ust say but e#phasi+es the error of constitutionaldi#ensions in !ritin do!n the title of the bill. Transfer of a si+eable portion of territory fro# one province to anotherof necessity involves reduction of area, population and inco#e of the rst and the correspondin increase of those ofthe other. This is as i#portant as the creation of a #unicipality. And yet, the title did not reHect this fact.

Respondent ass us to read %elwa vs. Salas, $-%:'%%, ctober 09, %9::, as controllin here. The %elwacase is not infocus. or there, the title of the Act 5Republic Act 8:9'7 reads= &An Act Creatin the Provinces of Benuet, Mountain

Province, 4fuao, and alina-Apayao.& That title !as assailed as unconstitutional upon the aver#ent that theprovisions of the la! 5?ection, < thereof7 in reference to the elective ocials of the provinces thus created, !ere notset forth in the title of the bill. 3e there ruled that this pretense is devoid of #erit &for, surely, an Act creatin saidprovinces #ust be epected to provide for the ocers !ho shall run the a/airs thereof& !hich is anifestlyer#ane to the sub1ect& of the leislation, as set forth in its title. The statute no! before us stands altoether on adi/erent footin. The lu#pin toether of barrios in ad1acent but separate provinces under one statute is neither anatural nor loical conse*uence of the creation of the ne! #unicipality of "ianaton. A chane of boundaries of the t!oprovinces #ay be #ade !ithout necessarily creatin a ne! #unicipality and vice versa.

As !e canvass the authorities on this point, our attention is dra!n to Hume vs. :illae of %ruitport, 0%9 N3 :8 but !e do not aree !ith appellant that the!ords last *uoted #ay, for that reason, be disrearded as surplusae.

. . . Knder the uise of discardin surplusae, a court cannot re1ect a part of the title of an act for the purposeof savin the act. ?ch#al+ vs. 3oody, ': N.;. E*. :89, 29 A. '29.

A purpose of the provision of the Constitution is to ?challene the attention of those a=ected *( the act to its

provisions.??avins Ban vs. ?tate of Michian, 00< Mich. 2%:, 0(( N3 0:0.

The title here is restrictive. 1t restricts the operation of the act of 'us!eon count(. The act oes *e(ond therestriction. As was said in Schmalz vs. 0ool($ supra@ ?The title is erroneous in the worst deree$ for it ismisleadin.?9

?i#ilar statutes ai#ed at chanin boundaries of political subdivisions, !hich leislative purpose is not epressed inthe title, !ere lie!ise declared unconstitutional.&%(

3e rule that Republic Act 869( is null and void.

0. ?uestion !as #ade that Republic Act 869( #ay still be salvaed !ith reference to the nine barrios in the#unicipalities of Buti and Balabaan in $anao del ?ur, !ith the #ere nullication of the portion thereof !hich too

a!ay the t!elve barrios in the #unicipalities of Buldon and Paran in the other province of Cotabato. The reasoninadvocated is that the li#ited title of the Act still covers those barrios actually in the province of $anao del ?ur.

3e are not un#indful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of lon standin, that !here a portion of a statute isrendered unconstitutional and the re#ainder valid, the parts !ill be separated, and the constitutional portion upheld.Blac, ho!ever, ives the eception to this rule, thus=

. . . But !hen the parts of the statute are so #utually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations,induce#ents, or co#pensations for each other, as to !arrant a belief that the leislature intended the# as a!hole, and that if all could not be carried into e/ect, the leislature !ould not pass the residue independently,then, if so#e parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions !hich are thus dependent, conditional, orconnected, #ust fall !ith the#,%%


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4n substantially si#ilar lanuae, the sa#e eception is reconi+ed in the 1urisprudence of this Court, thus=

The eneral rule is that !here part of a statute is void, as repunant to the ranic $a!, !hile another part isvalid, the valid portion if separa*le fro# the invalid, #ay stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, thevalid portion #ust be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the Leislaturewould have enacted it *( itself if the( had supposed that the( could not constitutionall( enact the other. . .Enouh #ust re#ain to #ae a co#plete, intelliible, and valid statute, !hich carries out the leislative intent.. . . The lanuae used in the invalid part of the statute can have no leal force or ecacy for any purpose!hatever, and what remains must e>press the leislative will independentl( of the void part$ since the courthas no power to leislate, . . . .%0

Could !e indule in the assu#ption that Conress still intended, by the Act, to create the restricted area of nine*arrios in the to!ns of Buti and Balabaan in $anao del ?ur into the to!n of "ianaton, if the twelve *arrios in theto!ns of Buldon and Paran, Cotabato !ere to be ecluded therefro#G The ans!er #ust be in the neative.

Municipal corporations perfor# t!in functions. %irstl(. They serve as an instru#entality of the ?tate in carryin out thefunctions of overn#ent. Secondl(. They act as an aency of the co##unity in the ad#inistration of local a/airs. 4t isin the latter character that they are a separate entity actin for their o!n purposes and not a subdivision of the?tate.%2

Conse*uently, several factors co#e to the fore in the consideration of !hether a roup of barrios is capable of#aintainin itself as an independent #unicipality. A#onst these are population, territory, and inco#e. 4t !asapparently these sa#e factors !hich induced the !ritin out of @ouse Bill %086 creatin the to!n of "ianaton.?peain of the oriinal twent(-one *arrios !hich co#prise the ne! #unicipality, the eplanatory note to @ouse Bill

%086, no! Republic Act 869(, reads=

The territory is no! a proressive co##unity> the areate population is lare> and the collective inco#e issucient to #aintain an independent #unicipality.

This bill, if enacted into la!, !ill enable the inhabitants concerned to overn the#selves and en1oy theblessins of #unicipal autono#y.

3hen the foreoin bill !as presented in Conress, un*uestionably, the totality of the t!enty-one barrios not ninebarrios !as in the #ind of the proponent thereof. That this is so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself,thereafter enacted into la!, states that the seat of the overn#ent is in Toai, !hich is a barrio in the #unicipality ofBuldon in Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a nu#ber of *uestions, thus= Could the observations as toproressive co##unity, lare areate population, collective inco#e sucient to #aintain an independent

#unicipality, still apply to a #otley roup of only nine barrios out of the t!enty-oneG 4s it fair to assu#e that theinhabitants of the said re#ainin barrios !ould have areed that they be for#ed into a #unicipality, !hat !ith theconse*uent duties and liabilities of an independent #unicipal corporationG Could they stand on their o!n feet !ith theinco#e to be derived in their co##unityG @o! about the peace and order, sanitation, and other corporate obliationsGThis Court #ay not supply the ans!er to any of these disturbin *uestions. And yet, to re#ain deaf to these proble#s,or to ans!er the# in the neative and still clin to the rule on separability, !e are afraid, is to i#pute to Conress anundeclared !ill. 3ith the no!n pre#ise that "ianaton !as created upon the basic considerations of proressiveco##unity, lare areate population and sucient inco#e, !e #ay not no! say that Conress intended to create"ianaton !ith only nine of the oriinal t!enty-one barrios, !ith a seat of overn#ent still left to be con1ectured.or, this unduly stretches 1udicial interpretation of conressional intent beyond credibility point. To do so, indeed, is topass the line !hich circu#scribes the 1udiciary and tread on leislative pre#ises. Payin due respect to the traditionalseparation of po!ers, !e #ay not no! #elt and recast Republic Act 869( to read a "ianaton to!n of nine instead ofthe oriinally intended t!enty-one barrios. Really, if these nine barrios are to constitute a to!n at all, it is the functionof Conress, not of this Court, to spell out that conressional !ill.

Republic Act 869( is thus indivisible, and it is accordinly null and void in its totality.%8

2. There re#ains for consideration the issue raised by respondent, na#ely, that petitioner has no substantial lealinterest adversely a/ected by the i#ple#entation of Republic Act 869(. ?tated di/erently, respondentJs pose is thatpetitioner is not the real party in interest.

@ere the validity of a statute is challened on the round that it violates the constitutional re*uire#ent that thesub1ect of the bill be epressed in its title. Capacity to sue, therefore, hines on !hether petitionerJs substantial rihtsor interests are i#paired by lac of notication in the title that the barrio in Paran, Cotabato, !here he is residin hasbeen transferred to a di/erent provincial hee#ony.


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The riht of every citi+en, tapayer and voter of a co##unity a/ected by leislation creatin a to!n to ascertain thatthe la! so created is not dis#e#berin his place of residence &in accordance !ith the Constitution& is reconi+ed inthis 1urisdiction.%'

Petitioner is a *ualied voter. @e epects to vote in the %9:6 elections. @is riht to vote in his o!n barrio before it !asanneed to a ne! to!n is a/ected. @e #ay not !ant, as is the case here, to vote in a to!n di/erent fro# his actualresidence. @e #ay not desire to be considered a part of hitherto di/erent co##unities !hich are fanned into the ne!to!n> he #ay prefer to re#ain in the place !here he is and as it !as constituted, and continue to en1oy the rihts andbenets he ac*uired therein. @e #ay not even no! the candidates of the ne! to!n> he #ay epress a lac of desireto vote for anyone of the#> he #ay feel that his vote should be cast for the ocials in the to!n before

dis#e#ber#ent. ?ince by constitutional direction the purpose of a bill #ust be sho!n in its title for the benet,a#onst others, of the co##unity a/ected thereby,%:it stands to reason to say that !hen the constitutional riht tovote on the part of any citi+en of that co##unity is a/ected, he #ay beco#e a suitor to challene the constitutionalityof the Act as passed by Conress.

or the reasons iven, !e vote to declare Republic Act 869( null and void, and to prohibit respondent Co##ission fro#i#ple#entin the sa#e for electoral purposes.

No costs allo!ed. ?o ordered.

Concepcion$ C.5.$ 2e(es$ 5.#.L.$ 6izon$ 'a!alintal$ #enzon$ 5.).$ 7aldivar$ Castro and Aneles$ 55.$concur.?eparate pinions

ERNANO,J., dissentin=

3ith reret and !ith due reconition of the #erit of the opinion of the Court, 4 nd #yself unable to ive #y assent.@ence these fe! !ords to epress #y stand.

Republic Act No. 869( deals !ith one sub1ect #atter, the creation of the #unicipality of "ianaton in the province of$anao del ?ur. The title #aes evident !hat is the sub1ect #atter of such an enact#ent. The #ere fact that in the bodyof such statute barrios found in t!o other #unicipalities of another province !ere included does not of itself suce fora ndin of nullity by virtue of the constitutional provision invoed. At the #ost, the statute to be free fro# theinsubstantial doubts about its validity #ust be construed as not includin the barrios, located not in the #unicipalitiesof Buti and Balabaan, $anao del ?ur, but in Paran and Baldon, Cotabato.

The constitutional re*uire#ent is that no bill !hich #ay be enacted into la! shall e#brace #ore than one sub1ect!hich shall be epressed in the title of the bill.%This provision is si#ilar to those found in the Constitution of #any

A#erican ?tates. 4t is ai#ed aainst the evils, of the so-called o#nibus bills, and lo-rollin leislation, and aainstsurreptitious or unconsidered enact#ents.03here the sub1ect of a bill is li#ited to a particular #atter, the #e#bers ofthe leislature as !ell as the people should be infor#ed of the sub1ect of proposed leislative #easures. Thisconstitutional provision thus precludes the insertion of riders in leislation, a rider bein a provision not er#ane tothe sub1ect #atter of the bill.

4t is not to be narro!ly construed thouh as to cripple or i#pede proper leislation. The construction #ust bereasonable and not technical. 4t is sucient if the title be co#prehensive enouh reasonably to include the eneralob1ect !hich the statute sees to e/ect !ithout epressin each and every end and #eans necessary for theacco#plish#ent of that ob1ect. Mere details need not be set forth. The leislature is not re*uired to #ae the title ofthe act a co#plete inde of its contents. The constitutional provision is satised if all parts of an act !hich relates to itssub1ect nd epression in its title.2

The rst decision of this Court, after the establish#ent of the Co##on!ealth of the Philippines, in %92


16/68

4t is true of course that in )hilconsa v. Gimenez,6one of the rounds on !hich the invalidity of Republic Act No. 2


17/68

4t !ould follo! then that both Philippine and A#erican decisions unite in the vie! that a leislative #easure, in thelanuae of an "evanter &should not be iven a construction !hich !ill i#peril its validity !here it is reasonably opento construction free fro# such peril.&%'Republic Act No. 869( as above construed incurs no such ris and is free fro#the peril of nullity.

?o 4 !ould vie! the #atter, !ith all due acno!led#ent of the practical considerations clearly brouht to liht in theopinion of the Court.

oo+"o+&

%@ereinafter referred to as Co#elec.

0Article 4, ?ec. 0%5%7, Philippine Constitution.

2?tilit+ vs. ?chiardien, 8( ?3 0d 2%', 2%6, 20(.

8Conressional Record, ol. 4, No. 8(, p. ol. 4, No. '(, pp. 8(-8%.

'?ection % e#phasis supplied.


18/68

sith class to!ns. To re#ove only ?ection 8 !ould be lie tain the #otor of an auto#obile !hich leaves the #achine of no use. 3eare *uite sure that these provisions !ould not have been enacted !ithout ?ection 8> hence, they too #ust fall.&

%'Macias vs. The Co##ission on Elections, $-% parteEndo 5%9887, 202 K? 0


19/68

ELLOSILLO,J.:

;@N ?TKART M4$$, in his essay On Li*ert(, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the rihts of the individualfro# the vast po!ers of the ?tate and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he dra!s a sacrosanct linede#arcatin the li#its on individuality beyond !hich the ?tate cannot tread - assertin that &individual spontaneityust be allo!ed to Hourish !ith very little reard to social interference - he veritably acno!ledes that the eerciseof rihts and liberties is i#bued !ith a civic obliation, !hich society is 1ustied in enforcin at all cost, aainst those!ho !ould endeavor to !ithhold fulll#ent. Thus he says -

The sole end for which man!ind is warranted$ individuall( or collectivel($ in interferin with the li*ert( of action of an(

of their num*er$ is self-protection. The onl( purpose for which power can *e rihtfull( e>ercised over an( mem*er of acivilized communit($ aainst his will$ is to prevent harm to others.

Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illi#itable riht of the ?tate to self-preservation. 3ith the end of#aintainin the interity and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the ?tate to for#ulate a syste# of la!s that!ould co#pel obeisance to its collective !isdo# and inHict punish#ent for non-observance.

The #ove#ent fro# MillJs individual liberalis# to unsyste#atic collectivis# !rouht chanes in the social order,carryin !ith it a ne! for#ulation of funda#ental rihts and duties #ore attuned to the i#peratives of conte#porarysocio-political ideoloies. 4n the process, the !eb of rihts and ?tate i#positions beca#e tanled and obscured,en#eshed in threads of #ultiple shades and colors, the sein irreular and broen. Antaonis#, often outrihtcollision, bet!een the la! as the epression of the !ill of the ?tate, and the +ealous atte#pts by its #e#bers topreserve their individuality and dinity, inevitably follo!ed. 4t is !hen individual rihts are pitted aainst ?tateauthority that 1udicial conscience is put to its severest test.

Petitioner ;oseph E1ercito Estrada, the hihest-ranin ocial to be prosecuted under RA 6( or

5:7 By tain advantae of ocial position, authority, relationship, connection or inHuence to un1ustly enrichhi#self or the#selves at the epense and to the da#ae and pre1udice of the ilipino people and the Republicof the Philippines.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/nov2001/gr_148560_2001.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/nov2001/gr_148560_2001.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/nov2001/gr_148560_2001.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/nov2001/gr_148560_2001.html#fnt2


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?ection 0. "enition of the Cri#e of Plunder, Penalties. -An( pu*lic ocer who$ *( himself or in connivance withmem*ers of his famil($ relatives *( anit( or consanuinit($ *usiness associates$ su*ordinates or other persons$amasses$ accumulates or ac;uires ill-otten wealth throuh a combination or series of overt or criminal actsasdescri*ed in Section + Bd hereof$ in the areate amount or total value of at least ft( million pesosB)DE$EEE$EEE.EE shall *e uilt( of the crime of plunder and shall *e punished *( reclusion perpetua to death. An(person who participated with the said pu*lic ocer in the commission of an o=ense contri*utin to the crime ofplunder shall li!ewise *e punished for such o=ense. 1n the imposition of penalties$ the deree of participation and theattendance of mitiatin and e>tenuatin circumstances as provided *( the 2evised )enal Code shall *e considered*( the court. The court shall declare an( and all ill-otten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assetsincludin the properties and shares of stoc!s derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of theState Bunderscorin supplied.

Section F. 2ule of &vidence. - %or purposes of esta*lishin the crime of plunder$ it shall not *e necessar( to proveeachand every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass,accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sucient to establish beyond reasonable doubt apattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracyBunderscorinsupplied.

n 8 April 0((% the ce of the #buds#an led before the ?andianbayan eiht 5 5b7 The Plunder $a! re*uiresless evidence for provin the predicate cri#es of plunder and therefore violates the rihts of the accused to dueprocess> and, 5c7 3hether Plunder as dened in RA 6(


21/68

4n La 8nion Credit Cooperative$ 1nc. v. 4aranon8!e held that as lon as there is so#e basis for the decision of thecourt, the constitutionality of the challened la! !ill not be touched and the case !ill be decided on other availablerounds. Qet the force of the presu#ption is not sucient to catapult a funda#entally decient la! into the safeenvirons of constitutionality. f course, !here the la! clearly and palpably transresses the hallo!ed do#ain of theoranic la!, it #ust be struc do!n on siht lest the positive co##ands of the funda#ental la! be unduly eroded.

erily, the onerous tas of rebuttin the presu#ption !eihs heavily on the party challenin the validity of thestatute. @e #ust de#onstrate beyond any tine of doubt that there is indeed an infrine#ent of the constitution, forabsent such a sho!in, there can be no ndin of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if !ell-founded, !ill hardly suce.As tersely put by ;ustice Malcol#, &To )ou%+ ! +o u+'!".&'And petitioner has #iserably failed in the instant case to

dischare his burden and overco#e the presu#ption of constitutionality of the Plunder $a!.

As it is !ritten, the Plunder $a! contains ascertainable standards and !ell-dened para#eters !hich !ould enable theaccused to deter#ine the nature of his violation. ?ection 0 is suciently eplicit in its description of the acts, conductand conditions re*uired or forbidden, and prescribes the ele#ents of the cri#e !ith reasonable certainty andparticularity. Thus -

+. That the o=ender is a pu*lic ocer who acts *( himself or in connivance with mem*ers of his famil($relatives *( anit( or consanuinit($ *usiness associates$ su*ordinates or other persons

. That he amassed$ accumulated or ac;uired ill-otten wealth throuh a com*ination or series of thefollowin overt or criminal acts@ Ba throuh misappropriation$ conversion$ misuse$ or malversation of pu*licfunds or raids on the pu*lic treasur( B* *( receivin$ directl( or indirectl($ an( commission$ ift$ share$percentae$ !ic!*ac! or an( other form of pecuniar( *enets from an( person andIor entit( in connection with

an( overnment contract or pro and #ore i#portantly, the accused, in identifyinthe real# of the proscribed conduct. 4ndeed, it can be understood !ith little diculty that !hat the assailed statutepunishes is the act of a public ocer in a#assin or accu#ulatin ill-otten !ealth of at leastP'(,(((,(((.(( throuha series or co#bination of acts enu#erated in ?ec. %, par. 5d7, of the Plunder $a!.

4n fact, the a#ended 4nfor#ation itself closely tracs the lanuae of the la!, indicatin !ith reasonable certainty thevarious ele#ents of the o/ense !hich petitioner is alleed to have co##itted=

&The undersined #buds#an, Prosecutor and 4C-"irector, EP4B, ce of the #buds#an, hereby accusesfor#er PRESIENT O TE REPULIC O TE PILIPPINES, ;oseph E1ercito Estrada, a..a. JA?4NO ?A$NOAJ anda..a. J;?E E$AR"E,J toether !ith ;ose J;inoyJ Estrada, Charlie JAtonJ An, Ed!ard ?erapio, Qolanda T. Ricaforte,Al#a Alfaro, ;@N "E a..a. Eleuterio Tan OREleuterio Ra#os Tan or Mr. Ky, ;ane "oe a..a. "elia Ra1as, and;ohn OESL ;ane "oes, of the cri#e of Plunder, dened and penali+ed under R.A. No. 6(


22/68

REPULIC O TE PILIPPINES, throuh ANY OR Aco#bination OR A series of overt ORcri#inal acts, ORSIMILAR SCEMES OR MEANS, described as follo!s=

5a7 by receivin ORcollectin, directly or indirectly, on SE:ERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN TE AGGREGATEAMOUNT O I:E UNRE ORTY-I:E MILLION PESOS P 4,555,555.55D, MORE OR LESS, ROMILLEGAL GAMLING IN TE ORM O GIT, SARE, PERCENTAGE, FICFACF OR ANY ORM OPECUNIARY ENEIT, Y IMSEL ANORin connection !ith co-accused CARLIE ATONG ANG,5ose5ino( &strada, Qolanda T. Ricaforte, Ed!ard ?erapio, AN JON OES AN JANE OES, inconsideration O TOLERATION OR PROTECTION O ILLEGAL GAMLING>

5b7 by I:ERTING, RECEI:ING, #isappropriatin, convertin OR#isusin IRECTLY OR INIRECTLY,for IS OR TEIR PERSONALain and benet, public funds in the a#ount of NE @KN"RE" T@4RTQ M4$$4NPE?? 5P%2(,(((,(((.((7, #ore or less, representin a portion of the TO UNRE MILLION PESOS P 255,555,555.55Dtobacco ecise ta share allocated for the province of 4locos ?ur under R.A. No. 6%6%, %y$!0&l( '")o* in connivance !ith co-accused Charlie JAtonJ An, Al#a Alfaro,JON OE '.


23/68

Com*ination- the result or product of co#binin> the act or process of co#binin. To com*ine is to brin into suchclose relationship as to obscure individual characters.

Series- a nu#ber of thins or events of the sa#e class co#in one after another in spatial and te#poral succession.

That Conress intended the !ords &co#bination& and &series& to be understood in their popular #eanins is pristinelyevident fro# the leislative deliberations on the bill !hich eventually beca#e RA 6(ample$ throuh misappropriation$ conversion$ misuse$ willthese *e included alsoM

2&). GA2C1A@ 4eah$ *ecause we sa( a series.

2&). 1S162O@ Series.

2&). GA2C1A@ 4eah$ we include series.

2&). 1S162O@ #ut we sa( we *ein with a com*ination.

2&). GA2C1A@ 4es.

2&). 1S162O@ 0hen we sa( com*ination$ it seems that -

2&). GA2C1A@ Two.

2&). 1S162O@ 3ot onl( two *ut we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.

2&). GA2C1A@ 3o$ no$ not twice.

2&). 1S162O@ 3ot twiceM

2&). GA2C1A@ 4es. Com*ination is not twice - *ut com*ination$ two acts.

2&). 1S162O@ So in other words$ thatNs it. 0hen we sa( com*ination$ we mean$ two di=erent acts. 1t cannot *e arepetition of the same act.

2&). GA2C1A@ That *e referred to series$ (eah.

2&). 1S162O@ 3o$ no. Supposin one act is repeated$ so there are two.

2&). GA2C1A@ A series.

2&). 1S162O@ ThatNs not series. 1ts a com*ination. #ecause when we sa( com*ination or series$ we seem to sa( thattwo or more$ di *aM

2&). GA2C1A@ 4es$ this distinuishes it reall( from ordinar( crimes. That is wh($ 1 said$ that is a ver( ood suestion*ecause if it is onl( one act$ it ma( fall under ordinar( crime *ut we have here a com*ination or series of overt orcriminal acts. So > > > >

2&). GA2C1A@ Series. One after the other eh di....

S&3. TA3A6A@ So that would fall under the term ?seriesM?

2&). GA2C1A@ Series$ oo.


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2&). 1S162O@ 3ow$ if it is a com*ination$ ano$ two misappropriations....

2&). GA2C1A@ 1ts not... Two misappropriations will not *e com*ination. Series.

2&). 1S162O@ So$ it is not a com*inationM

2&). GA2C1A@ 4es.

2&). 1S162O@ 0hen (ou sa( com*ination$ two di=erentM

2&). GA2C1A@ 4es.

S&3. TA3A6A@ Two di=erent.

2&). 1S162O@ Two di=erent acts.

2&). GA2C1A@ %or e>ample$ ha...

2&). 1S162O@ 3ow a series$ meanin$ repetition...

6&L1#&2AT1O3S O3 S&3AT& #1LL 3O. KK$ P 5une +QRQ

S&3ATO2 'AC&6A@ 1n line with our interpellations that sometimes ?one? or ma(*e even ?two? acts ma( alread( resultin such a *i amount$ on line D$ would the Sponsor consider deletin the words ?a series of overt or$? to read$therefore@ ?or conspirac( CO''1TT&6 *( criminal acts such as.? 2emove the idea of necessitatin ?a series.? An(wa($the criminal acts are in the plural.

S&3ATO2 TA3A6A@ That would mean a com*ination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.

TH& )2&S16&3T@ )ro*a*l( two or more would *e....

S&3ATO2 'AC&6A@ 4es$ *ecause ?a series? implies several or man( two or more.

S&3ATO2 TA3A6A@ Accepted$ 'r. )resident > > > >

TH& )2&S16&3T@ 1f there is onl( one$ then he has to *e prosecuted under the particular crime. #ut when we sa( ?actsof plunder? there should *e$ at least$ two or more.

S&3ATO2 2O'8LO@ 1n other words$ that is alread( covered *( e>istin laws$ 'r. )resident.

Thus !hen the Plunder $a! speas of &co#bination,& it is referrin to at least t!o 507 acts fallin under di/erentcateories of enu#eration provided in ?ec. %, par. 5d7, e.., raids on the public treasury in ?ec. %, par. 5d7, subpar. 5%7,and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonin to the National Oovern#ent under ?ec. %, par. 5d7, subpar. 527.

n the other hand, to constitute a series& there #ust be t!o 507 or #ore overt or cri#inal acts fallin under the sa#ecateory of enu#eration found in ?ec. %, par. 5d7, say, #isappropriation, #alversation and raids on the public treasury,all of !hich fall under ?ec. %, par. 5d7, subpar. 5%7. erily, had the leislature intended a technical or distinctive #eaninfor &co#bination& and &series,& it !ould have taen reater pains in specically providin for it in the la!.

As for &pattern,& !e aree !ith the observations of the ?andianbayan9that this ter# is suciently dened in ?ec. 8,in relation to ?ec. %, par. 5d7, and ?ec. 0 -

> > > > under Sec. + Bd of the law$ a pattern consists of at least a com*ination or series of overt or criminal actsenumerated in su*sections B+ to BP of Sec. + Bd. Secondl($ pursuant to Sec. of the law$ the pattern of overt orcriminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or oal which is to ena*le the pu*lic ocer to amass$ accumulateor ac;uire ill-otten wealth. And thirdl($ there must either *e an overall unlawful scheme or conspirac( to achievesaid common oal. As commonl( understood$ the term overall unlawful scheme indicates a eneral plan of action ormethod which the principal accused and pu*lic ocer and others connivin with him follow to achieve the aforesaidcommon oal. 1n the alternative$ if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used *( multipleaccused var($ the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspirac( to attain a common oal.
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@ence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the la! does not ive a fair !arnin and sucient notice of !hat it seesto penali+e. Knder the circu#stances, petitionerJs reliance on the &void-for-vaueness& doctrine is #anifestly#isplaced. The doctrine has been for#ulated in various !ays, but is #ost co##only stated to the e/ect that a statuteestablishin a cri#inal o/ense #ust dene the o/ense !ith sucient deniteness that persons of ordinary intelliencecan understand !hat conduct is prohibited by the statute. 4t can only be invoed aainst that specie of leislation thatis utterly vaue on its face, i.e., that !hich cannot be claried either by a savin clause or by construction.

A statute or act #ay be said to be vaue !hen it lacs co#prehensible standards that #en of co##on intellience#ust necessarily uess at its #eanin and di/er in its application. 4n such instance, the statute is repunant to theConstitution in t!o 507 respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties tareted by

it, fair notice of !hat conduct to avoid> and, it leaves la! enforcers unbridled discretion in carryin out its provisionsand beco#es an arbitrary Hein of the Oovern#ent #uscle.%(But the doctrine does not apply as aainst leislationsthat are #erely couched in i#precise lanuae but !hich nonetheless specify a standard thouh defectively phrased>or to those that are apparently a#biuous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The rst #ay be &saved&by proper construction, !hile no challene #ay be #ounted as aainst the second !henever directed aainst suchactivities.%%3ith #ore reason, the doctrine cannot be invoed !here the assailed statute is clear and free fro#a#biuity, as in this case.

The test in deter#inin !hether a cri#inal statute is void for uncertainty is !hether the lanuae conveys asuciently denite !arnin as to the proscribed conduct !hen #easured by co##on understandin and practice. %04t#ust be stressed, ho!ever, that the &vaueness& doctrine #erely re*uires a reasonable deree of certainty for thestatute to be upheld - not absolute precision or #athe#atical eactitude, as petitioner see#s to suest. leibility,rather than #eticulous specicity, is per#issible as lon as the #etes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated.An act !ill not be held invalid #erely because it #iht have been #ore eplicit in its !ordins or detailed in itsprovisions, especially !here, because of the nature of the act, it !ould be i#possible to provide all the details inadvance as in all other statutes.

Moreover, !e aree !ith, hence !e adopt, the observations of Mr. ;ustice icente . Mendo+a durin the deliberationsof the Court that the alleations that the Plunder $a! is vaue and overbroad do not 1ustify a facial revie! of itsvalidity -

The void-for-vaueness doctrine states that &a statute !hich either forbids or re*uires the doin of an act in ter#s sovaue that #en of co##on intellience #ust necessarily uess at its #eanin and di/er as to its application, violatesthe rst essential of due process of la!.&%2The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that &a overn#entalpurpose #ay not be achieved by #eans !hich s!eep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protectedfreedo#s.&%8

A facial challene is allo!ed to be #ade to a vaue statute and to one !hich is overbroad because of possible &chillin

e/ect& upon protected speech. The theory is that &D!hen statutes reulate or proscribe speech and no readilyapparent construction suests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitatin the statutes in a sinle prosecution, thetranscendent value to all society of constitutionally protected epression is dee#ed to 1ustify allo!in attacs onoverly broad statutes !ith no re*uire#ent that the person #ain the attac de#onstrate that his o!n conduct couldnot be reulated by a statute dra!n !ith narro! specicity.&%'The possible har# to society in per#ittin so#eunprotected speech to o unpunished is out!eihed by the possibility that the protected speech of others #ay bedeterred and perceived rievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory e/ects of overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Cri#inal statutes have eneral in terroreme/ect resultin fro# theirvery eistence, and, if facial challene is allo!ed for this reason alone, the ?tate #ay !ell be prevented fro# enactinla!s aainst socially har#ful conduct. 4n the area of cri#inal la!, the la! cannot tae chances as in the area of freespeech.

The overbreadth and vaueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for

testin the validity of penal statutes. As the K.?. ?upre#e Court put it, in an opinion by Chief ;ustice Rehn*uist, &!ehave not reconi+ed an JoverbreadthJ doctrine outside the li#ited contet of the irst A#end#ent.&%:4n #roadric! v.O!lahoma,%6the Court ruled that &clai#s of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involvin statutes!hich, by their ter#s, see to reulate only spoen !ords& and, aain, that &overbreadth clai#s, if entertained at all,have been curtailed !hen invoed aainst ordinary cri#inal la!s that are souht to be applied to protected conduct.&or this reason, it has been held that &a facial challene to a leislative act is the #ost dicult challene to #ountsuccessfully, since the challener #ust establish that no set of circu#stances eists under !hich the Act !ould bevalid.&%


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#ade to do service !hen !hat is involved is a cri#inal statute. 3ith respect to such statute, the established rule isthat &one to !ho# application of a statute is constitutional !ill not be heard to attac the statute on the round thati#pliedly it #iht also be taen as applyin to other persons or other situations in !hich its application #iht beunconstitutional.&0(As has been pointed out, &vaueness challenes in the irst A#end#ent contet, lie overbreadthchallenes typically produce facial invalidation, !hile statutes found vaue as a #atter of due process typically areinvalidated Donly Jas appliedJ to a particular defendant.&0%Conse*uently, there is no basis for petitionerJs clai# thatthis Court revie! the Anti-Plunder $a! on its face and in its entirety.

4ndeed, &on its face& invalidation of statutes results in striin the# do!n entirely on the round that they #iht beapplied to parties not before the Court !hose activities are constitutionally protected.004t constitutes a departure fro#

the case and controversy re*uire#ent of the Constitution and per#its decisions to be #ade !ithout concrete factualsettins and in sterile abstract contets.02But, as the K.?. ?upre#e Court pointed out in 4ouner v. Harris08

DThe tas of analy+in a proposed statute, pinpointin its deciencies, and re*uirin correction of these decienciesbefore the statute is put into e/ect, is rarely if ever an appropriate tas for the 1udiciary. The co#bination of therelative re#oteness of the controversy, the i#pact on the leislative process of the relief souht, and above all thespeculative and a#orphous nature of the re*uired line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in aind of case that is !holly unsatisfactory for decidin constitutional *uestions, !hichever !ay they #iht be decided.

or these reasons, &on its face& invalidation of statutes has been described as anifestly stron #edicine,& to bee#ployed &sparinly and only as a last resort,&0'and is enerally disfavored.0:4n deter#inin the constitutionality of astatute, therefore, its provisions !hich are alleed to have been violated in a case #ust be ea#ined in the liht of theconduct !ith !hich the defendant is chared.06

4n liht of the foreoin dis*uisition, it is evident that the purported a#biuity of the Plunder $a!, so tenaciouslyclai#ed and arued at lenth by petitioner, is #ore i#ained than real. A#biuity, !here none eists, cannot becreated by dissectin parts and !ords in the statute to furnish support to critics !ho cavil at the !ant of scienticprecision in the la!. Every provision of the la! should be construed in relation and !ith reference to every other part.To be sure, it !ill tae #ore than nitpicin to overturn the !ell-entrenched presu#ption of constitutionality andvalidity of the Plunder $a!. A fortiori, petitioner cannot fein inorance of !hat the Plunder $a! is all about. Bein oneof the ?enators !ho voted for its passae, petitioner #ust be a!are that the la! !as etensively deliberated upon bythe ?enate and its appropriate co##ittees by reason of !hich he even reistered his ar#ative vote !ith fullno!lede of its leal i#plications and sound constitutional anchorae.

The parallel case of Galleo v. Sandian*a(an0 that, for itsvaueness, ?ec. 2, par. 5e7, violates due process in that it does not ive fair !arnin or sucient notice of !hat itsees to penali+e. Petitioners further arued that the 4nfor#ation chared the# !ith three 527 distinct o/enses, to !it=5a7 ivin of &un!arranted& benets throuh #anifest partiality> 5b7 ivin of &un!arranted& benets throuh evidentbad faith> and, 5c7 ivin of &un!arranted& benets throuh ross inecusable nelience !hile in the dischare oftheir ocial function and that their riht to be infor#ed of the nature and cause of the accusation aainst the# !asviolated because they !ere left to uess !hich of the three 527 o/enses, if not all, they !ere bein chared andprosecuted.

4n dis#issin the petition, this Court held that ?ec. 2, par. 5e7, of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt )ractices Actdoes notsu/er fro# the constitutional defect of vaueness. The phrases anifest partiality,& &evident bad faith,& and &rossand inecusable nelience& #erely describe the di/erent #odes by !hich the o/ense penali+ed in ?ec. 2, par. 5e7, ofthe statute #ay be co##itted, and the use of all these phrases in the sa#e 4nfor#ation does not #ean that the

indict#ent chares three 527 distinct o/enses.

The !ord Jun!arrantedJ is not uncertain. 4t see#s lacin ade*uate or ocial support> un1ustied> unauthori+ed53ebster, Third 4nternational "ictionary, p. 0'%87> or !ithout 1ustication or ade*uate reason 5PhiladelphiaNe!spapers, 4nc. v. K? "ept. of ;ustice, C.". Pa., 8(' . ?upp.


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4t is not at all dicult to co#prehend that !hat the afore*uoted penal provisions penali+e is the act of a public ocer,in the dischare of his ocial, ad#inistrative or 1udicial functions, in ivin any private party benets, advantae orpreference !hich is un1ustied, unauthori+ed or !ithout 1ustication or ade*uate reason, throuh #anifest partiality,evident bad faith or ross inecusable nelience.

4n other !ords, this Court found that there !as nothin vaue or a#biuous in the use of the ter# &un!arranted& in?ec. 2, par. 5e7, of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt )ractices Act, !hich !as understood in its pri#ary and eneralacceptation. Conse*uently, in that case, petitionersJ ob1ection thereto !as held inade*uate to declare the sectionunconstitutional.

n the second issue, petitioner advances the hihly stretched theory that ?ec. 8 of the Plunder $a! circu#vents thei##utable obliation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constitutin the cri#e ofplunder !hen it re*uires only proof of a pattern of overt or cri#inal acts sho!in unla!ful sche#e or conspiracy -

S&C. F. Rule of Evidence. - %or purposes of esta*lishin the crime of plunder$ it shall not *e necessar( to prove eachand ever( criminal act done *( the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspirac( to amass$ accumulate orac;uire ill-otten wealth$ it *ein sucient to esta*lish *e(ond reasona*le dou*t a pattern of overt or criminal actsindicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspirac(.

The runnin fault in this reasonin is obvious even to the si#plistic #ind. 4n a cri#inal prosecution for plunder, as in alother cri#es, the accused al!ays has in his favor the presu#ption of innocence !hich is uaranteed by the Bill ofRihts, and unless the ?tate succeeds in de#onstratin by proof beyond reasonable doubt that culpability lies, theaccused is entitled to an ac*uittal.09The use of the &reasonable doubt& standard is indispensable to co##and therespect and condence of the co##unity in the application of cri#inal la!. 4t is critical that the #oral force of cri#inal

la! be not diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt !hether innocent #en are bein conde#ned. 4t isalso i#portant in our free society that every individual oin about his ordinary a/airs has condence that hisovern#ent cannot ad1ude hi# uilty of a cri#inal o/ense !ithout convincin a proper factnder of his uilt !ithut#ost certainty. This &reasonable doubt& standard has ac*uired such ealted stature in the real# of constitutional la!as it ives life to the 6ue )rocess Clause!hich protects the accused aainst conviction ecept upon proof beyondreasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the cri#e !ith !hich he is chared.2(The follo!in echanesbet!een Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Oarcia on this score durin the deliberations in the Hoor of the @ouse ofRepresentatives are elucidatin -

"E$4BERAT4N? T@E @K?E REPRE?ENTAT4E? N RA 6(ample$ 'r.Spea!er$ there is an enumeration of the thins ta!en *( the ro**er in the information three pairs of pants$ pieces of


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The thesis that ?ec. 8 does a!ay !ith proof of each and every co#ponent of the cri#e su/ers fro# a dis#al#isconception of the i#port of that provision. 3hat the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only anu#ber of acts sucient to for# a co#bination or series !hich !ould constitute a pattern and involvin an a#ount ofat least P'(,(((,(((.((. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleed in the 4nfor#ation to have beenco##itted by the accused in furtherance of the overall unla!ful sche#e or conspiracy to a#ass, accu#ulate orac*uire ill-otten !ealth. To illustrate, supposin that the accused is chared in an 4nfor#ation for plunder !ith havinco##itted fty 5'(7 raids on the public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fty 5'(7 raids, it beinsucient to prove by pattern at least t!o 507 of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they a#ountedto at least P'(,(((,(((.((.2%

A readin of ?ec. 0 in con1unction !ith ?ec. 8, brins us to the loical conclusion that &pattern of overt or cri#inal actsindicative of the overall unla!ful sche#e or conspiracy& inheres in the very acts of accu#ulatin, ac*uirin ora#assin hidden !ealth. ?tated other!ise, such pattern arises !here the prosecution is able to prove beyondreasonable doubt the predicate acts as dened in ?ec. %, par. 5d7. Pattern is #erely a by-product of the proof of thepredicate acts. This conclusion is consistent !ith reason and co##on sense. There !ould be no other eplanation for aco#bination or series of

overt or cri#inal acts to stash P'(,(((,(((.(( or #ore, than &a sche#e or conspiracy to a#ass, accu#ulate or ac*uireill otten !ealth.& The prosecution is therefore not re*uired to #ae a deliberate and conscious e/ort to prove patternas it necessarily follo!s !ith the establish#ent of a series or co#bination of the predicate acts.

Relative to petitionerJs contentions on the purported defect of ?ec. 8 is his sub#ission that &pattern& is &a veryi#portant ele#ent of the cri#e of plunder>& and that ?ec. 8 is &t!o proned, 5as7 it contains a rule of evidence and asubstantive ele#ent of the cri#e,& such that !ithout it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder -

58ST1C& #&LLOS1LLO@ 1n other words$ cannot an accused *e convicted under the )lunder Law without appl(in SectionF on the 2ule of &vidence if there is proof *e(ond reasona*le dou*t of the commission of the acts complained ofM

ATT4. AGA#13@ 1n that case he can *e convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the 2evised )enal Code$ *ut notplunder.

58ST1C& #&LLOS1LLO@ 1n other words$ if all the elements of the crime are proved *e(ond reasona*le dou*t withoutappl(in Section F$ can (ou not have a conviction under the )lunder LawM

ATT4. AGA#13@ 3ot a conviction for plunder$ (our Honor.

58ST1C& #&LLOS1LLO@ Can (ou not disreard the application of Sec. F in convictin an accused chared for violation of

the )lunder LawM

ATT4. AGA#13@ 0ell$ (our Honor$ in the rst place Section F la(s down a su*stantive element of the law > > > >

58ST1C& #&LLOS1LLO@ 0hat 1 said is - do we have to avail of Section F when there is proof *e(ond reasona*le dou*t onthe acts chared constitutin plunderM

ATT4. AGA#13@ 4es$ (our Honor$ *ecause Section F is two proned$ it contains a rule of evidence and it contains asu*stantive element of the crime of plunder. So$ there is no wa( *( which we can avoid Section F.

58ST1C& #&LLOS1LLO@ #ut there is proof *e(ond reasona*le dou*t insofar as the predicate crimes chared areconcerned that (ou do not have to o that far *( appl(in Section FM

ATT4. AGA#13@ 4our Honor$ our thin!in is that Section F contains a ver( important element of the crime of plunder andthat cannot *e avoided *( the prosecution.20

3e do not subscribe to petitionerJs stand. Pri#arily, all the essential ele#ents of plunder can be culled and understoodfro# its denition in ?ec. 0, in relation to ?ec. %, par. 5d7, and &pattern& is not one of the#. Moreover, the epiraph andopenin clause of ?ec. 8 is clear and une*uivocal=

S&C. F. Rule of Evidence. - %or purposes of esta*lishin the crime of plunder > > > >

4t purports to do no #ore than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a cri#inal case for plunder. Bein apurely procedural #easure, ?ec. 8 does not dene or establish any substantive riht in favor of the accused but onlyoperates in furtherance of a re#edy. 4t is only a #eans to an end, an aid to substantive la!. 4ndubitably, even !ithoutinvoin ?ec. 8, a conviction for plunder #ay be had, for !hat is crucial for the prosecution is to present sucient
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evidence to enender that #oral certitude eacted by the funda#ental la! to prove the uilt of the accused beyondreasonable doubt. Thus, even rantin for the sae of aru#ent that ?ec. 8 is Ha!ed and vitiated for the reasonsadvanced by petitioner, it #ay si#ply be severed fro# the rest of the provisions !ithout necessarily resultin in thede#ise of the la!> after all, the eistin rules on evidence can supplant ?ec. 8 #ore than enouh. Besides, ?ec. 6 ofRA 6(


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The evil of a cri#e #ay tae various for#s. There are cri#es that are, by their very nature, despicable, either becauselife !as callously taen or the victi# is treated lie an ani#al and utterly dehu#ani+ed as to co#pletely disrupt thenor#al course of his or her ro!th as a hu#an bein . . . . ?een in this liht, the capital cri#es of idnappin andserious illeal detention for ranso# resultin in the death of the victi# or the victi# is raped, tortured, or sub1ected todehu#ani+in acts> destructive arson resultin in death> and dru o/enses involvin #inors or resultin in the deathof the victi# in the case of other cri#es> as !ell as #urder, rape, parricide, infanticide, idnappin and serious illealdetention, !here the victi# is detained for #ore than three days or serious physical in1uries !ere inHicted on thevicti# or threats to ill hi# !ere #ade or the victi# is a #inor, robbery !ith ho#icide, rape or intentional #utilation,destructive arson, and carnappin !here the o!ner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is illed or raped,!hich are penali+ed by reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.

There are cri#es, ho!ever, in !hich the abo#ination lies in the sinicance and i#plications of the sub1ect cri#inalacts in the sche#e of the larer socio-political and econo#ic contet in !hich the state nds itself to be strulin todevelop and provide for its poor and underprivileed #asses. Reelin fro# decades of corrupt tyrannical rule thatbanrupted the overn#ent and i#poverished the population, the Philippine Oovern#ent #ust #uster the political !illto dis#antle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, reed and syndicated cri#inality that so deeply entrenched itself inthe structures of society and the psyche of the populace. D3ith the overn#ent terribly lacin the #oney to provideeven the #ost basic services to its people, any for# of #isappropriation or #isapplication of overn#ent fundstranslates to an actual threat to the very eistence of overn#ent, and in turn, the very survival of the people itoverns over. ie!ed in this contet, no less heinous are the e/ects and repercussions of cri#es lie *ualied bribery,destructive arson resultin in death, and dru o/enses involvin overn#ent ocials, e#ployees or ocers, that theirperpetrators #ust not be allo!ed to cause further destruction and da#ae to society.

The leislative declaration in R.A. No. 6:'9 that plunder is a heinous o/ense i#plies that it is a malum in se. or !henthe acts punished are inherently i##oral or inherently !ron, they are mala in se26and it does not #atter that suchacts are punished in a special la!, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate cri#es are #ainly mala in se.4ndeed, it !ould be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as thouh they are #ere prosecutions for violations of theBouncin Chec $a! 5B.P. Bl. 007 or of an ordinance aainst 1ay!alin, !ithout reard to the inherent !ronness ofthe acts.

To clinch, petitioner lie!ise assails the validity of RA 6:'9, the a#endatory la! of RA 6(


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Pananiban;., please see separate concurrin opinion.Carpio, ;., no part. 3as one of the co#plainants before #buds#an.

5!ith dissentin opinion7

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

?ECN" "4?4N

G.R. No. L-261 &%*u'*y 27, 1976

TE PEOPLE O TE PILIPPINES, plainti/-appellant,vs.ENCESLAO ALMUETE ERNANO RONA, AUSTO URION '") CIPRIANO RONA, defendants-appellees.

Sol!/!+o* G&"&*'l A"+o"!o P. '**&)o, A!+'"+ Sol!/!+o* G&"&*'l A"+o"!o G. I%'**' '") Sol!/!+o* :!/&"+& A.To**& (o* appellant.

E0!l!'"o . C'+&ll'"& (o* appellees.

A=UINO,J.:

3enceslao Al#uete ernando ronda, Cipriano ronda and austo "urion !ere chared !ith a violation of section 29 ofthe Aricultural Tenancy $a!. 4t !as alleed in the infor#ation that in "ece#ber, %9:2, in MuSo+, Nueva Eci1a theaccused bein tenants of Mararita ernando in her riceland, !ithout notice to her or !ithout her consent, pre-threshed a portion of their respective harvests of ve 5'7 cavans of palay each to her da#ae in the a#ount ofP% 507 that there is no la! punishin it, and 527 that the court has, no 1urisdiction over thealleed ti#e The scal opposed the #otion.

The lo!er court ranted the #otion and dis#issed the infor#ation in its order of Auust %%, %9::. 4t held that theinfor#ation is basically decient because it does not describe t lie circu#stances under !hich the cavans of palay!ere found in the possession of the accused tenants> it does not specify the date areed upon for the threshin of theharvests, and it does not allee that the palay found in the tenantsJ possession eceeded ten percent of their net sharebased on the last nor#al harvest.

The prosecution appealed fro# the order of dis#issal. The ?olicitor Oeneral arues in his brief that the infor#ation inthis case allees all the ele#ents of the o/ense dened in section 29 of Republic Act No. %%99, as a#ended ofRepublic Act No. 00:2. ?ections 29 and '6 of the sa#e la! reads as follo!s=

?EC. 29. )rohi*ition on )re-threshin. 4t shall be unla!ful for either the tenant or landholder, !ithout #utualconsent, to reap or thresh a portion of the crop at any ti#e previous to the date set for its threshin- That if the tenantn food for his fa#ily and the landholder does not or cannot furnish such and refuses to allo! the tenant to reap orthresh a portion of the crop previous to the date set for its threshin, the tenant can reap or thresh not #ore than tenpercent of his net share in the last nor#al harvest after ivin notice thereof to the landholder or his representative.Any violation of this situation by either party shall be treated and penali+ed in accordance !ith this Act andor underthe eneral provisions of la! applicable to that act co##itted.

?EC. '6. )enal )rovision. iolation of the provisions of ... sections thirty-nine and forty-nine of this Act shall bepunished by a ne not eceedin t!o thousand pesos or i#prison#ent not eceedin one year, or both, in thediscretion of the Court. ...
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/nov2001/gr_148560_2001.html#Panganibanhttp://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2001/nov2001/gr_148560_2001.html#Panganiban


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3e hold that the order of dis#issal should be ar#ed because as held in )eople vs. Adillo, $-02M, Nove#ber 06,%96', a case si#ilar to the instant case, section 99 !as i#pliedly repealed by the Aricultural $and Refor# Code of%9:2, as a#ended by Republic Act No. :2


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'artin$ 5.$ was desinated to sit in the Second 6ivision.

oo+"o+&

W AppelleesJ contention that the Court of irst 4nstance had no 1urisdiction over the o/ense because inferior courts have1urisdiction over o/ense in !hich the penalty is i#prison#ent for not #ore than three years, or a ne of not #orethree thousand pesos, or both such ne and i#prison#ent and that it is the MuSo+ #unicipal court that has 1urisdictionis !ron. The Court of irst 4nstance has concurrent 1urisdiction !ith the inferior court in ## in !hich the penaltyprovided by la! is i#prison#ent for #ore than si #onths, or a ne of-#ore than t!o hundred pesos 5?ec. 88Df,;udiciary $a!7.

The $a!phil Pro1ect - Arellano $a! oundation

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 153982 &/&0%&* 11, 1992

ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON AUIT, respondent.

CAMPOS, JR.,J.:

Antonio A. Mecano, throuh a petition for certiorari$ sees to nullify the decision of the Co##ission on Audit 5CA, forbrevity7 e#bodied in its 6th 4ndorse#ent, dated ;anuary %:, %990, denyin his clai# for rei#burse#ent under ?ection:99 of the Revised Ad#inistrative Code 5RAC7, as a#ended, in the total a#ount of P8(,


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@o!ever, then Kndersecretary of ;ustice ?ilvestre @. Bello 444, in a 8th 4ndorse#ent dated Nove#ber 0%, %99(, returnedpetitionerJs clai# to "irector $i#, havin considered the state#ents of the Chair#an of the CA in its 'th 4ndors

statcon cases 1 - jul 29 edited

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