statcon cases 1 - jul 29

8/12/2019 Statcon Cases 1 - Jul 29

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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24396 July 29, 1968

SANTIAGO P. ALALAYAN, ET AL., u!"# !" $! %&$'l( '") (o* +$& %&"&(!+ o( 'll o+$&* &* o" $' !"# o//o" o*#&"&*'l !"+&*& + 0!+$ $!/ !" ' o*)'" & 0!+$ S& . 12, Rul& 3, Rul& o( Cou*+, petitioners-appellants,vs.NATIONAL PO ER CORPORATION '") A MINISTRATOR O ECONOMICCOOR INATION, respondents-appellees.

Alafriz Law Offices for petitioners-appellants.The Government Corporate Counsel and Office of the Solicitor General for respondents-appellees.

ERNAN O, J.:

This declaratory relief proceedin !as started in the lo!er court by petitioners, Alalayan and Philippine Po!er and

"evelop#ent Co#pany, both franchise holders of electric plants in $a una, to test the validity of a section of ana#endatory act,% e#po!erin respondent National Po!er Corporation &in any contract for the supply of electric po!er a franchise holder,& receivin at least '() of its electric po!er and ener y fro# it to re*uire as a condition that suchfranchise holder &shall not reali+e a net profit of #ore than t!elve percent annually of its invest#ents plus t!o-#onthoperatin e penses.& Respondent, under such provision, could li e!ise &rene! all e istin contracts !ith franchiseholders for the supply of electric po!er and ener y,& so that the provisions of the Act could be iven effect. This statutory provision !as assailed on the round that, bein a rider, it is violative of the constitutional provision re*uirin that a !hich #ay be enacted into la!, cannot e#brace #ore than one sub/ect, !hich shall be e pressed in its title,0 as !ell as thedue process uarantee, the liberty to contract of petitioners bein infrin ed upon. The lo!er court sustained its validi1e sustain the lo!er court in this appeal.

2n the petition for declaratory relief, after the usual alle ations as to parties, it !as stated that respondent National Po

Corporation &has for so#e years no! been, and still is, by virtue of si#ilar, valid and e istin contracts entered into b!ith one hundred and thirty seven 3%045 natural persons and corporations distributed all over the country, supplyindistributin , servicin and sellin electric po!er and ener y at fi ed rites schedules to the latter !ho have for so#e yeno! been and still are, le ally en a ed in resupplyin , redistributin , reservicin and resellin the said electric po!eener y to individual custo#ers !ithin the covera e of their respective franchises.&6 Petitioners are included a#on thesaid %74 natural persons and entities.' Then, reference !as #ade to the particular contracts petitioners entered into !ithrespondent, the contracts to continue indefinitely unless and until either party !ould ive to the other t!o years previonotice in !ritin of its intention to ter#inate the sa#e.8 After !hich, it !as noted that on 9une %:, %78(, an act authori+ithe increase of the capital stoc of the National Po!er Corporation to P%(( #illion too effect.4 A year later, on 9une %4%78%, it !as alle ed that the challen ed le islation beca#e a la!, purportedly to increase further the authori+ed capistoc , but includin the alle ed rider referred to above, !hich, in the opinion of petitioners, trans ressed the constitu provision on the sub/ect #atter and title of bills as !ell as the due process clause.: Mention !as then #ade of the National

Po!er Corporation approvin a rate increase of at least %4.'), the effectivity of !hich, !as at first deferred to Nove#be%, %78 , then subse*uently to 9anuary %', %780, !ith the threat that in case petitioners !ould fail to si n the revisedcontract providin for the increased rate, respondent National Po!er Corporation !ould then cease &to supply, distriband service electric po!er and ener y to the#.&7

That !ould be, in the opinion of petitioners, violative of their ri hts, proceedin fro# le islation sufferin fro#constitutional infir#ities.%( A declaration of unconstitutionality !as therefore sou ht by the#. 2t !as prayed; &3%5 To due course to this petition< 3 5 To issue a !rit of preli#inary in/unction, upon the postin of the re*uisite bond, en/orespondent NPC fro# carryin or prosecutin its threat to enforce the provisions of the rider or =ection 0 of Republi No. 0(60 ... in the #anner stated in para raph %: of this petition until this >onorable Court shall have finally decideddisposed, by final /ud #ent, of the issues raised in this petition< 305 After due hearin , to declare the rider or =ectio


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Republic Act No. 0(60 null and void for bein ille al and unconstitutional, and to issue a per#anent in/unction re*uirespondent NPC to refrain fro# enforcin or i#ple#entin the provisions of the sa#e la!.&%%

=oon after, petitioner Philippine Po!er and "evelop#ent Co#pany #oved that insofar as it !as concerned, the case bedis#issed, !hich #otion !as ranted by the lo!er court on 9anuary ', %780.% The sole petitioner is therefore =antia oAlalayan, suin in his behalf and for the benefit of all other persons havin co##on or eneral interest !ith hi#.Respondent National Po!er Corporation filed an opposition on ?ebruary %', %780, opposin the issuance of a !rit fo preli#inary in/unction.%0 @n March %, %780, the lo!er court, considerin that there !as &no sufficient round for tissuance of the !rit for preli#inary in/unction,& denied the sa#e.%6

There !as in the ans!er, dated March 7, %780, an ad#ission of the #ain facts alle ed, !ith a denial of the le alconclusion !hich petitioner !ould deduce therefro#, respondent National Po!er Corporation upholdin the validity ofthe challen ed provision. Then, ca#e a partial stipulation of facts sub#itted on @ctober %, %786, consistin of a resof the Philippine Electric Plant @!ners Association to ta e the necessary steps to stop respondent National Po!erCorporation fro# enforcin its announced increase, sa#ples of contracts bet!een electric plant operators on the one hand respondent National Po!er Corporation on the other, the contract !ith petitioner Alalayan, dated May 8, %7'8,sho!in that he did purchase and ta e po!er and ener y as follo!s; &=i ty 38(5 ilo!atts and of not less than %6(,(((

ilo!att-hours in any contract year at the rate of P% (.(( per ilo!att per year& payable in t!elve e*ual #onthlyinstall#ents, &plus an ener y char e of P(.(%0 per ilo!att hour, payable on the basis of #onthly delivery&< a letter9une , %78 of respondent National Po!er Corporation to petitioner approvin his %4.') rate increase of po!er so be innin 9uly %, %78 , the de#and char e !ould be P%(.(( per ilo!att per #onth and the ener y char e !ould beP(.( per ilo!att hour< a letter of Au ust %', %78 , !herein respondent National Po!er Corporation notified petitionthat it deferred the effectivity of the ne! rates, but it !ill be enforced on Nove#ber %, %78 < a letter of 9une ', %78enforcin respondent National Po!er Corporation deferrin once a ain the effectivity of the ne! rates until 9anuary %%786< as !ell as the con ressional transcripts on >ouse Bill No. '044 and =enate Bill No. 8%0, no! Republic Act No0(60.%'

2n an order of Nove#ber ', %786, the lo!er court ave the parties a period of t!enty days !ithin !hich to sub#itsi#ultaneously their respective #e#oranda. After the sub#ission thereof, the lo!er court, in a decision of 9anuary 0(,%78', sustained the validity and constitutionality of the challen ed provision. >ence, this appeal.

As !as set forth earlier, this appeal cannot prosper. 1e share the vie! of the lo!er court that the provision in *uestion

cannot be i#pu ned either on the round of its bein violative of the constitutional re*uire#ent that a bill cannot e#b#ore than one sub/ect to be e pressed in its title or by virtue of its alle ed failure to satisfy the due process criterion

%. 1e consider first the ob/ection that the statute in *uestion is violative of the constitutional provision that no bill ay be enacted into la! shall e#brace #ore than one sub/ect !hich shall be e pressed in its title ... &%8This provision issi#ilar to those found in #any A#erican =tate Constitutions. 2t is ai#ed a ainst the evils of the so-called o#nibus billsand lo -rollin le islation as !ell as surreptitious or unconsidered enact#ents.%4 1here the sub/ect of a bill is li#ited to a particular #atter, the la!#a ers alon !ith the people should be infor#ed of the sub/ect of proposed le islative #easurThis constitutional provision thus precludes the insertion of riders in le islation, a rider bein a provision not er#anthe sub/ect #atter of the bill. Petitioner Alalayan asserts that the provision ob/ected to is such a rider.

To lend approval to such a plea is to construe the above constitutional provision as to cripple or i#pede proper le isl

To i#part to it a #eanin !hich is reasonable and not unduly technical, it #ust be dee#ed sufficient that the title beco#prehensive enou h reasonably to include the eneral ob/ect !hich the statute see s to effect !ithout e pressin eand every end and #eans necessary for its acco#plish#ent. Thus, #ere details need not be set forth. The le islature is re*uired to #a e the title of the act a co#plete inde of its contents. The provision #erely calls for all parts of an actrelatin to its sub/ect findin e pression in its title.%: More specifically, if the la! a#ends a section or part of a statute, itsuffices if reference be #ade to the le islation to be a#ended, there bein no need to state the precise nature of thea#end#ent. %7

2t !as in %70:, inGovernment v. Hong ong ! Shanghai "an # ( !here, for the first ti#e after the inau uration of theCo##on!ealth, this Court passed upon a provision of that character. 1e held there that the Reor ani+ation$a!, % providin for the #ode in !hich the total annual e penses of the Bureau of Ban in could be rei#bursed throuassess#ent levied upon all ban in institutions sub/ect to inspection by the Ban Co##issioner !as not violative of su


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a re*uire#ent in the 9ones $a!, the previous or anic act. 9ustice $aurel, ho!ever, vi orously dissented, his vie! beinthat !hile the #ain sub/ect of the act !as reor ani+ation, the provision assailed did not deal !ith reor ani+ation but !itta ation. This case ofGovernment v. Hong ong ! Shanghai "an !as decided by a bare #a/ority of four /ustices a ainstthree. Thereafter, it !ould appear that the constitutional re*uire#ent is to be iven the liberal test as indicated in the#a/ority opinion penned by 9ustice Abad =antos, and not the strict test as desired by the #inority headed by 9ustice$aurel.

=uch a trend is #ade #anifest in the cases be innin !ith =u#ulon v. Co##ission on Elections, up to andincludin $elwa v. Salas , 0 a %788 decision, the opinion co#in fro# Chief 9ustice Concepcion. There is nothinin Lidasan v. Commission on %lections# 6 !here a statute ' !as annulled on this round, to indicate the contrary. As aptlye pressed by 9ustice =anche+; &@f course, the Constitution does not re*uire Con ress to e#ploy in the title of anenact#ent, lan ua e of such precision as to #irror, fully inde or catalo ue all the contents and the #inute details the2t suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional de#and that it infor# the le islators, the personsinterested in the sub/ect of the bill, and the public, of the nature, scope and conse*uences of the proposed la! and itsoperation. And this, to lead the# to in*uire into the body of the bill, study and discuss the sa#e, ta e appropriate actithereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud upon the le islators.&

1e thus hold that there is no violation of the constitutional provision !hich re*uires that any bill enacted into la! shalle#brace only one sub/ect to be e pressed in the title thereof.

. Nor is petitioner any#ore successful in his plea for the nullification of the challen ed provision on the round of bein deprived of the liberty to contract !ithout due process of la!.

2t is to be ad#itted of course that property ri hts find shelter in specific constitutional provisions, one of !hich is the process clause. 2t is e*ually certain that our funda#ental la! fra#ed at a ti#e of &sur in unrest anddissatisfaction&,8 !hen there !as the fear e pressed in #any *uarters that a constitutional de#ocracy, in vie! of itsco##it#ent to the clai#s of property, !ould not be able to cope effectively !ith the proble#s of poverty and #isery thatunfortunately afflict so #any of our people, is not susceptible to the indict#ent that the overn#ent therein establishei#potent to ta e the necessary re#edial #easures. The fra#ers sa! to that. The !elfare state concept is not alien to the philosophy of our Constitution.4 2t is i#plicit in *uite a fe! of its provisions. 2t suffices to #ention t!o.

There is the clause on the pro#otion of social /ustice to ensure the !ell-bein and econo#ic security of all the people,: as

!ell as the pled e of protection to labor !ith the specific authority to re ulate the relations bet!een lando!ners andtenants and bet!een labor and capital.7 This particulari+ed reference to the ri hts of !or in #en !hether in industry aa riculture certainly cannot preclude attention to and concern for the ri hts of consu#ers, !ho are the ob/ects of solicin the le islation no! co#plained of. The police po!er as an attribute to pro#ote the co##on !eal !ould be dilutedconsiderably of its reach and effectiveness if on the #ere plea that the liberty to contract !ould be restricted, the statuco#plained of #ay be characteri+ed as a denial of due process. The ri ht to property cannot be pressed to such anunreasonable e tre#e.

2t is understandable thou h !hy business enterprises, not unnaturally evincin lac of enthusias# for police po!erle islation that affect the# adversely and restrict their profits could predicate alle ed violation of their ri hts on the process clause, !hich as interpreted by the# is a bar to re ulatory #easures. 2nvariably, the response fro# this Court,fro# the ti#e the Constitution !as enacted, has been far fro# sy#pathetic. Thus, durin the Co##on!ealth, !e

sustained le islation providin for collective bar ainin ,0(

security of tenure,0%

#ini#u# !a es,0

co#pulsoryarbitration,00 and tenancy re ulation.06 Neither did the ob/ections as to the validity of #easures re ulatin the issuance securities0' and public services08 prevail.

?or it is to be re#e#bered that the liberty relied upon is not freedo# of the #ind, !hich occupies a preferred position, nfreedo# of the person, but the liberty to contract, associated !ith business activities, !hich, as has been so repeatedlyannounced, #ay be sub/ected, in the interest of the eneral !elfare under the police po!er, to restrictions varied incharacter and !ide ran in in scope as lon as due process is observed. 2n Calalan v. 1illia#s,04 this Court found noob/ection to an enact#ent li#itin the use of and traffic in the national roads and streets as a ainst the assertion that te ercise of such an authority a#ounted to an unla!ful interference !ith le iti#ate business and abrid #ent of personalliberty. The opinion by 9ustice $aurel e plains !hy such an ar u#ent !as far fro# persuasive. Thus; &2n enactin saila!, therefore, the National Asse#bly !as pro#pted by considerations of public convenience and !elfare. 2t !as inspired


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by a desire to relieve con estion of traffic, !hich is, to say the least, a #enace to public safety. Public !elfare, then, liethe botto# of the enact#ent of said la!, and the state in order to pro#ote the eneral !elfare #ay interfere !ith personalliberty, !ith property, and !ith business and occupations. Persons and property #ay be sub/ected to all inds of restraiand burdens, in order to secure the eneral co#fort, health, and prosperity of the state ... &0: The above doctrine, valid theand e*ually valid no!, constituted #ore than sufficient /ustification for statutes curtailin the liberty en/oyed by businenterprises, !hether conducted by natural or /uridical persons, to satisfy the needs of public !elfare.

=o it continues to be under the Republic. This Court has invariably iven the seal of approval to statutes intended toi#prove the lot of tenants,07 !ho thereafter !ere iven the option to transfor# their relationship !ith lando!ners to one olease, !hich rant of authority !as sustained in %786.6( Retail trade !as nationali+ed, the #easure receivin /udicialapproval as a ainst due process ob/ection,6% a decision foreshado!ed earlier !ith the favorable action ta en on le islatio

rantin preference to ?ilipino citi+ens in the lease of public #ar et stalls.6 2t is easily understandable !hy the re ulatioof practice of #edicine


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police po!er, are applicable not only to those public utilities co#in into e istence after its passa e, but li e!ise to thalready, e istence established and in operation.&'0 =uch a doctrine !as follo!ed in the case of a tenancy le islation, theCon ress undoubtedly havin in #ind and not havin failed to ta e notice &of the e istence of contracts& !hich stia division of the crops on a '(-'( basis and therefore #ust have intended to re ulate the sa#e. There !as thus noi#pair#ent of an obli ation of contract, such an enact#ent under the police po!er bein re#edial in nature, the non-applicability of !hich to e istin conditions !ould be self-defeatin in character.'6

2n A)e v. $oster /heeler Corp. ,'' 9ustice Barrera, spea in for the Court, too note of the contention &that as the coof e#ploy#ent !ere entered into at a ti#e !hen there !as no la! rantin the !or ers said ri ht, the application as tothe# of the subse*uent enact#ent restorin the sa#e ri ht constitutes an i#pair#ent of their contractual obli ations.&Then he, #ade clear !hy the Court !as of a contrary vie! as, &the constitutional uaranty of non-i#pair#ent ... is li#ite by the e ercise of the police po!er of the =tate, in the interest of public health, safe, #orals and eneral !elfare.& Th!as reaffir#ed !hat previously had been announced as the rule. =uch a doctrine !as reiterated early this yearin (hilippine American Life 0nsurance Co. v. Auditor General ,'8 !here this Court found no ob/ection to the applicabilityof the Mar in $a!,'4 even if it be assu#ed that a reinsurance treaty !as already in e istence and had i#posed thecorrespondin obli ation on the parties prior to its enact#ent.

This is not to say that in each and every case the invocation of the protection of the non-i#pair#ent clause !ould beunavailin once the le islation co#plained of is sho!n to be an e ercise of the police po!er. @ther!ise, that !ould rennu atory the constitutional uarantee of non-i#pair#ent, and for that #atter both the e*ual protection and due procesclauses !hich e*ually serve to protect property ri hts. >ere, as in other cases !here overn#ental authority #ay trenchupon property ri hts, the process of balancin , ad/ust#ent or har#oni+ation is called for.

1utter v. %ste)an ': lends support to such an approach. 2n that leadin case, the continued operation and enforce#ent oMoratoriu# Act'7 !hich allo!ed an ei ht-year period of race for the pay#ent of pre-!ar obli ations on the part ofdebtors !ho suffered as a conse*uence of 1orld 1ar 22 !as, in a %7'0 decision, held &unreasonable and oppressive, anshould not be prolon ed a #inute lon er& for bein violative of the constitutional provision prohibitin the i#pair#ethe obli ation of the contracts &and, therefore, ... should be declared null and void and !ithout effect.&8( As of the date ofits enact#ent in %76:, the police po!er could be relied upon to sustain its validity, in vie! of the serious econo#iccondition faced by the country upon liberation and the state of penury that then afflicted a reater portion of the ?ilip people. By %7'0 ho!ever, the Moratoriu# Act could be ri htfully considered as an infrin e#ent of the non-i#pair#enclause, as the econo#y had in the #ean!hile considerably chan ed for the better.

There is no clearer instance then of the process of har#oni+ation and balancin !hich is incu#bent upon the /udiciaryunderta e !henever a re ulatory #easure under the police po!er is assailed as violative of constitucess or e*ual protection, all of !hich are intended to safe uard property ri hts. Three leadin decisions of the Fnited =tates =upreCourt, >o#e Buildin G $oan Astional uarantees, !hether of non-i#pair#ent, due prosociation v. "laisdell ,8% 2e))ia v.

2ew 3or ,8 and 2orman v. "altimore and Ohio 1ailroad Co.# 80 spea si#ilarly.

Even if, therefore, reliance be had on the non-i#pair#ent clause by petitioner and the process of ad/ust#ent orhar#oni+ation be underta en to ascertain !hether the applicability of the statutory provision assailed to e istin cont!ould run counter to such a uarantee, still the sa#e conclusion e#er es. There is a failure to #a e out a case for itsinvalidity.

1>ERE?@RE, there bein no sho!in that =ection 0 of Republic Act No. 0(60 is unconstitutional, the decision of thlo!er court, dis#issin the petition, is affir#ed. 1ith costs a ainst petitioner Alalayan.

Concepcion# C.4.# 1e'es# 4.".L.# 5izon# &a alintal# 6aldivar# Sanchez# Castro and Angeles# 44.# concur.

oo+"o+&

% =ection 0, Republic Act No. 0(60, approved 9une %4, %78%, entitled &An Act to ?urther A#end Co##on!eAct Nu#bered @ne >undred T!enty, as A#ended by Republic Act Nu#bered T!enty =i >undred and ?orty@ne.&


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=ection 0 of Republic Act No. 0(60 reads thusouses of Con ress and printedof the bill in its final for# !ere not distributed a#on the #e#bers before its passa e< and 305 it is discri#inatory andencroaches on the independence of the 9udiciary.

1e approach these issues !ith one i#portant principle in #ind, to !it, the presu#ption of the constitutionality of statutesThe theory is that as the /oint act of the $e islature and the E ecutive, every statute is supposed to have first beencarefully studied and deter#ined to be constitutional before it !as finally enacted. >ence, unless it is clearly sho!n thais constitutionally fla!ed, the attac a ainst its validity #ust be re/ected and the la! itself upheld. To doubt is to sustai

2

1e consider first the ob/ection based on Article H2, =ec. 83l5, of the Constitution providin that &Every bill passedCon ress shall e#brace only one sub/ect !hich shall be e pressed in the title thereof.&

The purposes of this rule are; 3%5 to prevent hod e-pod e or &lo -rollin & le islation< 3 5 to prevent surprise othe le islature by #eans of provisions in bills of !hich the title ives no inti#ation, and !hich #i ht therefore beoverloo ed and carelessly and unintentionally adopted< and 305 to fairly apprise the people, throu h such publicatile islative proceedin s as is usually #ade, of the sub/ect of le islation that is bein considered, in order that they #ahave opportunity of bein heard thereon, by petition or other!ise, if they shall so desire. 1

2t is the sub#ission of the petitioners that =ection 0' of R.A. No. 40'6 !hich !ithdre! the fran in privile e fro# the9udiciary is not e pressed in the title of the la!, nor does it reflect its purposes.

R.A. No. 40'6 is entitled &An Act Creatin the Philippine Postal Corporation, "efinin its Po!ers, ?unctions andResponsibilities, Providin for Re ulation of the 2ndustry and for @ther Purposes Connected There!ith.&

The ob/ectives of the la! are enu#erated in =ection 0, !hich provides;

The =tate shall pursue the follo!in ob/ectives of a nation!ide postal syste#;

a5 to enable the econo#ical and speedy transfer of #ail and other postal #atters, fro# sender toaddressee, !ith full reco nition of their privacy or confidentialityouses and so the second para raph could not have been validly added as an a#end#ent.

These ar u#ent are unacceptable.

1hile it is true that a conference co##ittee is the #echanis# for co#pro#isin differences bet!een the =enate and the>ouse, it is not li#ited in its /urisdiction to this *uestion. 2ts broader function is described thus;

A conference co##ittee #ay, deal enerally !ith the sub/ect #atter or it #ay be li#ited to resolvin the precise differences bet!een the t!o houses. Even !here the conference co##ittee is not by rule li#itedin its /urisdiction, le islative custo# severely li#its the freedo# !ith !hich ne! sub/ect #atter can beinserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a conference co##ittee produces une pected resultresults beyond its #andate, These e cursions occur even !here the rules i#pose strict li#itations onconference co##ittee /urisdiction. This is sy#pto#atic of the authoritarian po!er of conference

co##ittee 3"avies, $e islative $a! and Process; 2n a Nutshell, %7:8 Ed., p.:%5.2t is a #atter of record that the conference Co##ittee Report on the bill in *uestion !as returned to and duly approved both the =enate and the >ouse of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill !as enrolled !ith its certification by =enatePresident Neptali A. Jon+ales and =pea er Ra#on H. Mitra of the >ouse of Representatives as havin been duly pas by both >ouses of Con ress. 2t !as then presented to and approved by President Cora+on C. A*uino on April 0, %77

Fnder the doctrine of separation po!ers, the Court #ay not in*uire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill frthe presidin officers of Con ress.Casco (hilippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez laid do!n the rule that the enrolled bill, iconclusive upon the 9udiciary 3e cept in #atters that have to be entered in the /ournals li e the 'eas and na's on the finalreadin of the bill5. 8 The /ournals are the#selves also bindin on the =upre#e Court, as !e held in the old 3but still valid5 case of7.S.

vs. (ons , 9

!here !e e plained the reason thus;To in*uire into the veracity of the /ournals of the Philippine le islature !hen they are, as !e have saidclear and e plicit, !ould be to violate both the, letter and spirit of the or anic la!s by !hich thePhilippine Jovern#ent !as brou ht into e istence, to invade a coordinate and independent depart#entthe Jovern#ent, and to interfere !ith the le iti#ate po!ers and functions, of the $e islature.

Applyin these principles, !e shall decline to loo into the petitioners char es that an a#end#ent !as #ade upon thereadin of the bill that eventually beca#e R.A. No. 40'6 and that copies thereof in its final for# !ere not distributeda#on the #e#bers of each >ouse. Both the enrolled bill and the le islative /ournals certify that the #easure !as dulyenactedi.e., in accordance !ith Article H2, =ec. 83 5 of the Constitution. 1e are bound by such official assurances fcoordinate depart#ent of the overn#ent, to !hich !e o!e, at the very least, a beco#in courtesy.

222

The third and #ost serious challen e of the petitioners is based on the e*ual protection clause.

2t is alle ed that R.A. No. 40'6 is discri#inatory because !hile !ithdra!in the fran in privile e fro# the 9udiciary, retains the sa#e for the President of the Philippines, the Hice President of the Philippines< =enators and Me#bers of >ouse of Representatives, the Co##ission on Elections< for#er Presidents of the Philippines< the National Census an=tatistics @ffice< and the eneral public in the filin of co#plaints a ainst public offices and officers. 1


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The respondents counter that there is no discri#ination because the la! is based on a valid classification in accordanc!ith the e*ual protection clause. 2n fact, the fran in privile e has been !ithdra!n not only fro# the 9udiciary but alsthe @ffice of Adult Education, the 2nstitute of National $an ua e< the Teleco##unications @ffice< the Philippine "2nsurance Corporation< the National >istorical Co##ission< the Ar#ed ?orces of the Philippines< the Ar#ed ?orces oPhilippines $adies =teerin Co##ittee< the City and Provincial Prosecutors< the Tanodbayan 3@ffice of =pecialProsecutor5< the Kabataan Baran ay< the Co##ission on the ?ilipino $an ua e< the Provincial and City Assessorthe National Council for the 1elfare of "isabled Persons. 11

The e*ual protection of the la!s is e#braced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discri#ination offends there*uire#ents of /ustice and fair play. 2t has nonetheless been e#bodied in a separate clause in Article 222 =ec. %., of Constitution to provide for a #ore, specific uaranty a ainst any for# of undue favoritis# or hostility fro# the

overn#ent. Arbitrariness in eneral #ay be challen ed on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular aassailed parta es of an un!arranted partiality or pre/udice, the sharper !eapon to cut it do!n is the e*ual protectionclause.

Accordin to a lon line of decisions, e*ual protection si#ply re*uires that all persons or thin s si#ilarly situated sho be treated ali e, both as to ri hts conferred and responsibilities i#posed,12 =i#ilar sub/ects, in other !ords, should not betreated differently, so as to ive undue favor to so#e and un/ustly discri#inate a ainst others.

The e*ual protection clause does not re*uire the universal application of the la!s on all persons or thin s !ithoutdistinction. This #i ht in fact so#eti#es result in une*ual protection, as !here, for e a#ple, a la! prohibitin #ature boo s to all persons, re ardless of a e, !ould benefit the #orals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. 1hat theclause re*uires is e*uality a#on e*uals as deter#ined accordin to a valid classification. By classification is #eant th

roupin of persons or thin s si#ilar to each other in certain particulars and different fro# all others in these sa#e particulars.13

1hat is the reason for the rant of the fran in privile e in the first place 2s the fran in privile e e tended to thePresident of the Philippines or the Co##ission on Elections or to for#er Presidents of the Philippines purely asacourtes' fro# the la!#a in body 2s it offered because of theimportance or status of the rantee or because ofits need for the privile e @r have the rantees been chosen pell-#ell, as it !ere, !ithout any basis at all for the select

1e re/ect outri ht the last con/ecture as there is no doubt that the statute as a !hole !as carefully deliberated upon, by

political depart#ents before it !as finally enacted. There is reason to suspect, ho!ever, that not enou h care or attentio!as iven to its repealin clause, resultin in the un!ittin !ithdra!al of the fran in privile e fro# the 9udiciary.

1e also do not believe that the basis of the classification !as #ere courtesy, for it is uni#a inable that the politicaldepart#ents !ould have intended this serious sli ht to the 9udiciary as the third of the #a/or and e*ual depart#ents the

overn#ent. The sa#e observations are #ade if the i#portance or status of the rantee !as the criterion used for thee tension of the fran in privile e, !hich is en/oyed by the National Census and =tatistics @ffice and even so#e priindividuals but not the courts of /ustice.

2n our vie!, the only acceptable reason for the rant of the fran in privile e !as the perceivedneed of the rantee for thacco##odation, !hich !ould /ustify a !aiver of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providin for as#oother flo! of co##unication bet!een the overn#ent and the people.

Assu#in that basis, !e cannot understand !hy, of all the depart#ents of the overn#ent, it is the 9udiciary, that has bdenied the fran in privile e. There is no *uestion that if there is any #a/or branch of the overn#ent that needs the privile e, it is the 9udicial "epart#ent, as the respondents the#selves point out. Curiously, the respondents !ould /ustithe distinction on the basis precisely of this need and, on this basis, deny the 9udiciary the fran in privile e !hilee tendin it to others less deservin .

2n their Co##ent, the respondents point out that available data fro# the Postal =ervice @ffice sho! that fro# 9anuary%7:: to 9une %77 , the total volu#e of fran #ails a#ounted to P7(,6 6,%4'.((. @f this a#ount, fran #ails fro# the9udiciary and other a encies !hose functions include the service of /udicial processes, such as the intervenor, the"epart#ent of 9ustice and the @ffice of the @#buds#an, a#ounted to P:8,6:%,4'7. ?ran #ails co#in fro#the


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9udiciary a#ounted to P40,'46,:86.((, and those co#in fro# the petitioners reached the total a#ount ofP8(,77%,60%.((. The respondents conclusion is that because of this considerable volu#e of #ail fro# the 9udiciary, fran in privile e #ust be !ithdra!n fro# it.

The ar u#ent is self-defeatin . The respondents are in effect sayin that the fran in privile e should be e tended those !ho do not need it very #uch, if at all, 3li e the !ido!s of for#er Presidents5 but not to those !ho need it badly3especially the courts of /ustice5. 2t is li e sayin that a person #ay be allo!ed cos#etic sur ery althou h it is not renecessary but not an operation that can save his life.

2f the proble# of the respondents is the loss of revenues fro# the fran in privile e, the re#edy, it see#s to us, is to!ithdra! it alto ether fro# all a encies of overn#ent, includin those !ho do not need it. The proble# is not solved retainin it for so#e and !ithdra!in it fro# others, especially !here there is no substantial distinction bet!een thosefavored, !hich #ay or #ay not need it at all, and the 9udiciary, !hich definitely needs it. The proble# is not solved byviolatin the Constitution.

2n lu#pin the 9udiciary !ith the other offices fro# !hich the fran in privile e has been !ithdra!n, =ection 0' has placed the courts of /ustice in a cate ory to !hich it does not belon . 2f it reco ni+es the need of the President of thePhilippines and the #e#bers of Con ress for the fran in privile e, there is no reason !hy it should not reco ni+e asi#ilar and in fact reater need on the part of the 9udiciary for such privile e. 1hile !e #ay appreciate the !ithdra!al othe fran in privile e fro# the Ar#ed ?orces of the Philippines $adies =teerin Co##ittee, !e fail to understand !hy t=upre#e Court should be si#ilarly treated as that Co##ittee. And !hile !e #ay concede the need of the National Censuand =tatistics @ffice for the fran in privile e, !e are intri ued that a si#ilar if not reater need is not reco ni+ed icourts of /ustice.

3@n second thou ht, there does not see# to be any /ustifiable need for !ithdra!in the privile e fro# the Ar#ed ?orcof the Philippines $adies =teerin Co##ittee, !hich, li e for#er Presidents of the Philippines or their !ido!s, does notsend as #uch fran #ail as the 9udiciary.5

2t is !orth observin that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a overn#ent-controlled corporation, !as created and e pected to operate for the purpose of pro#otin the public service. 1hile it #ay have been established pri#arily for private ain, it cannot e cuse itself fro# perfor#in certain functions for the benefit of the public in e chan e for thfranchise e tended to it by the overn#ent and the #any advanta es it en/oys under its charter.14 A#on the services it

should be prepared to e tend is free carria e of #ail for certain offices of the overn#ent that need the fran in privin the dischar e of their o!n public functions.

1e also note that under =ection 7 of the la!, the Corporation is capitali+ed at P%( billion pesos, '') of !hich is supplied by the Jovern#ent, and that it derives substantial revenues fro# the sources enu#erated in =ection %(, on top of thee e#ptions it en/oys. 2t is not li ely that the retention of the fran in privile e of the 9udiciary !ill cripple theCorporation.

At this ti#e !hen the 9udiciary is bein faulted for the delay in the ad#inistration of /ustice, the !ithdra!al fro# it of thfran in privile e can only further deepen this serious proble#. The volu#e of /udicial #ail, as e#phasi+ed by therespondents the#selves, should stress the dependence of the courts of /ustice on the postal service for co##unicatin!ith la!yers and liti ants as part of the /udicial process. The 9udiciary has the lo!est appropriation in the national bud

co#pared to the $e islative and E ecutive "epart#ents< of the P0(7 billion bud eted for %770, only .:6), or less than%), is alloted for the /udiciary. 2t should not be hard to i#a ine the increased difficulties of our courts if they have toa purchased sta#p to every process they send in the dischar e of their /udicial functions.

1e are unable to a ree !ith the respondents that =ection 0' of R.A. No. 40'6 represents a valid e ercise of discretion bthe $e islature under the police po!er. @n the contrary, !e find its repealin clause to be a discri#inatory provision thdenies the 9udiciary the e*ual protection of the la!s uaranteed for all persons or thin s si#ilarly situated. The distin#ade by the la! is superficial. 2t is not based on substantial distinctions that #a e real differences bet!een the 9udiciaand the rantees of the fran in privile e.


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This is not a *uestion of !isdo# or po!er into !hich the 9udiciary #ay not intrude. 2t is a #atter of arbitrariness that thiCourt has the duty and po!er to correct.

2H

2n su#, !e sustain R.A. No. 40'6 a ainst the attac that its sub/ect is not e pressed in its title and that it !as not passeaccordance !ith the prescribed procedure. >o!ever, !e annul =ection 0' of the la! as violative of Article 0, =ec. %, of tConstitution providin that no person shall &be deprived of the e*ual protection of la!s.&

1e arrive at these conclusions !ith a full a!areness of the criticis# it is certain to provo e. 1hile rulin a ainst thediscri#ination in this case, !e #ay ourselves be accused of si#ilar discri#ination throu h the e ercise of our ulti#ate po!er in our o!n favor. This is inevitable. Criticis# of /udicial conduct, ho!ever undeserved, is a fact of life in the political syste# that !e are prepared to accept.. As /ud es, !e cannot debate !ith our detractors. 1e can only decide thecases before us as la! i#poses on us the duty to be fair and our o!n conscience ives us the li ht to be ri ht.

ACC@R"2NJ$L, the petition is partially JRANTE" and =ection 0' of R.A. No. 40'6 is declaredFNC@N=T2TFT2@NA$. Circular No. 7 - : is =ET A=2"E insofar as it !ithdra!s the fran in privile e fro# the=upre#e Court, the Court of Appeals, the Re ional trail Courts, the Municipal trial Courts, and the National $andRe istration Authority and its Re ister of "eeds to all of !hich offices the said privile e shall be RE=T@RE". Thete#porary restrainin order dated 9une , %77 , is #ade per#anent.

=@ @R"ERE".

2arvasa# C.4.# $eliciano# (adilla# "idin# 1egalado# 5avide# 4r.# 1omero# 2ocon# &elo# 8uiason# (uno and 9itug# 44.#concur.

"ellosillo# 4.# is on leave.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-28 89 O +o%&* 25, 196

ARA LI ASAN, petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.

Sunta' for petitioner. "arrios and $ule for respondent.

SANC7E@, J.:

The *uestion initially presented to the Co##ission on Elections,% is this; 2s Republic Act 647(, !hich is entitled &An ACreatin the Municipality of "ianaton in the Province of $anao del =ur&, but !hich includes barrios located in anoth province I Cotabato I to be spared fro# attac planted upon the constitutional #andate that &No bill !hich #ay beenacted into la! shall e#brace #ore than one sub/ect !hich shall be e pressed in the title of the bill& Co#elec s ansis in the affir#ative. @ffshoot is the present ori inal petition forcertiorari and prohibition.

@n 9une %:, %788, the Chief E ecutive si ned into la! >ouse Bill % 64, no!n as Republic Act 647(, no! in dispuThe body of the statute, reproduced inhaec ver)a , reads;


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=ec. %. Barrios To ai , Madalu#, Bayan a, $an on , =ara an, Kat-bo, "i a apan, Ma abo, Taban ao, TColodan, Kaba#a a!an, Kapata an, Bon abon , Aipan , "a o!an, Ba i is, Bun abun , $osain, Mati#os aMa olatun , in the Municipalities of Buti and Balaba an, Province of $anao del =ur, are separated fro# sa#unicipalities and constituted into a distinct and independent #unicipality of the sa#e province to be no!n asthe Municipality of "ianaton, Province of $anao del =ur. The seat of overn#ent of the #unicipality shall be iTo ai .

=ec. . The first #ayor, vice-#ayor and councilors of the ne! #unicipality shall be elected in the nineteenhundred si ty-seven eneral elections for local officials.

=ec. 0. This Act shall ta e effect upon its approval.

2t ca#e to li ht later that barrios To ai and Madalu# /ust #entioned are !ithin the #unicipality of "uldon , (rovince ofCota)ato , and that Bayan a, $an on , =ara an, Kat-bo, "i a apan, Ma abo, Taban ao, Tion o, Colodan andKaba#a a!an are parts and parcel of another #unicipality, the #unicipality of (arang , also in the (rovince ofCota)ato and not of $anao del =ur.

Pro#pted by the co#in elections, Co#elec adopted its resolution of Au ust %', %784, the pertinent portions of !hich

?or purposes of establish#ent of precincts, re istration of voters and for other election purposes, the Co##iss

RE=@$HE" that pursuant to RA 647(, the ne! #unicipality of "ianaton, $anao del =ur shall co#prise the barrios of Kapata an, Bon abon , Aipan , "a o!an, Ba i is, Bun abun , $osain, Mati#os, and Ma olatusituated in the #unicipality of Balaba an, $anao del =ur, the barrios of To ai and Madalu# situated in the#unicipality of Buldon, Cotabato, the barrios of Bayan a, $an on , =ara an, Kat-bo, "i a apan, Ma aboTaban ao, Tion o, Colodan and Kaba#a a!an situated in the #unicipality of Paran , also of Cotabato.

"oubtless, as the statute stands, t!elve barrios I in t!o #unicipalities in the province of Cotabato I are transferred tothe province of $anao del =ur. This brou ht about a chan e in the boundaries of the t!o provinces.

Apprised of this develop#ent, on =epte#ber 4, %784, the @ffice of the President, throu h the Assistant E ecutive=ecretary, reco##ended to Co#elec that the operation of the statute be suspended until &clarified by correctinle islation.&

Co#elec, by resolution of =epte#ber (, %784, stood by its o!n interpretation, declared that the statute &should bei#ple#ented unless declared unconstitutional by the =upre#e Court.&

This tri ered the present ori inal action for certiorari and prohibition by Bara $idasan, a resident and ta payer of tdetached portion of Paran , Cotabato, and a *ualified voter for the %784 elections. >e prays that Republic Act 647(declared unconstitutional< and that Co#elec s resolutions of Au ust %', %784 and =epte#ber (, %784 i#ple#entinsa#e for electoral purposes, be nullified.

%. Petitioner relies upon the constitutional re*uire#ent aforestated, that & n o bill !hich #ay be enacted into la! shae#brace #ore than one sub/ect !hich shall be e pressed in the title of the bill.&

2t #ay be !ell to state, ri ht at the outset, that the constitutional provision contains dual li#itations upon le islative po!er. $irst . Con ress is to refrain fro# con lo#eration, under one statute, of hetero eneous sub/ects.Second . The titleof the bill is to be couched in a lan ua e sufficient to notify the le islators and the public and those concerned of thi#port of the sin le sub/ect thereof.

@f relevance here is the second directive. The sub/ect of the statute #ust be &e pressed in the title& of the bill. Thiconstitutional re*uire#ent &breathes the spirit of co##and.&0 Co#pliance is i#perative, iven the fact that theConstitution does not e act of Con ress the obli ation to read durin its deliberations the entire te t of the bill. 2n the case of >ouse Bill % 64, !hich beca#e Republic Act 647(, only its title !as read fro# its introduction to its finalapproval in the >ouse of Representatives6 !here the bill, bein of local application, ori inated.'


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@f course, the Constitution does not re*uire Con ress to e#ploy in the title of an enact#ent, lan ua e of such precisto #irror, fully inde or catalo ue all the contents and the #inute details therein. 2t suffices if the title should serve th purpose of the constitutional de#and that it infor# the le islators, the persons interested in the sub/ect of the bill, and public, of the nature, scope and conse*uences of the proposed la! and its operation. And this, to lead the# to in*uire the body of the bill, study and discuss the sa#e, ta e appropriate action thereon, and, thus, prevent surprise or fraud the le islators.8

2n our tas of ascertainin !hether or not the title of a statute confor#s !ith the constitutional re*uire#ent, the follo!in!e believe, #ay be ta en as uidelines;

The test of the sufficiency of a title is !hether or not it is #isleadin < and, !hich technical accuracy is notessential, and the sub/ect need not be stated in e press ter#s !here it is clearly inferable fro# the details setforth,a title which is so uncertain that the average person reading it would not )e informed of the purpose of theenactment or put on in:uir' as to its contents# or which is misleading# either in referring to or indicating one

su);ect where another or different one is reall' em)raced in the act# or in omitting an' e


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creation of the ne! #unicipality of "ianaton. A chan e of boundaries of the t!o provinces #ay be #ade !ithoutnecessarily creatin a ne! #unicipality and vice versa.

As !e canvass the authorities on this point, our attention is dra!n to Hume vs. 9illage of $ruitport , %7 N1 86:, 867.There, the statute in controversy bears the title &An Act to 2ncorporate the Hilla e of ?ruitport, in the County ofMus e on.& The statute, ho!ever, in its section % reads; &The people of the state of Michi an enact, that the follodescribed territory in the counties of Mus e on and @tta!a Michi an, to !it; . . . be, and the sa#e is hereby constitutvilla e corporate, by the na#e of the Hilla e of ?ruitport.& This statute !as challen ed as void by plaintiff, a residen@tta!a county, in an action to restraint the Hilla e fro# e ercisin /urisdiction and control, includin ta in his landPlaintiff based his clai# on =ection (, Article 2H of the Michi an =tate Constitution, !hich reads; &No la! shall e#b#ore than one ob/ect, !hich shall be e pressed in its title.& The Circuit Court decree voided the statute and defendanappealed. The =upre#e Court of Michi an voted to uphold the decree of nullity. The follo!in , said in Hume , #ay !ellapply to this case;

2t #ay be that !ords, &An act to incorporate the villa e of ?ruitport,& !ould have been a sufficient title, and tthe !ords, &in the county of Mus e on& !ere unnecessary< but !e do not a ree !ith appellant that the !ords *uoted #ay, for that reason, be disre arded as surplusa e.

. . . Fnder the uise of discardin surplusa e, a court cannot re/ect a part of the title of an act for the purposesavin the act. =ch#al+ vs. 1oody, '8 N.9. E*. 867, 07 A. '07.

A purpose of the provision of the Constitution is to =challenge the attention of those affected )' the act to its provisions.= =avin s Ban vs. =tate of Michi an, : Mich. 0%8, (( N1 8 .

The title here is restrictive. 0t restricts the operation of the act of &us egon count'. The act goes )e'ond therestriction. As was said in Schmalz vs. /ool'# supra> =The title is erroneous in the worst degree# for it ismisleading.= 7

=i#ilar statutes ai#ed at chan in boundaries of political subdivisions, !hich le islative purpose is not e pressed in ttitle, !ere li e!ise declared unconstitutional.&%(

1e rule that Republic Act 647( is null and void.

. =u estion !as #ade that Republic Act 647( #ay still be salva ed !ith reference to the nine barrios in the#unicipalities of Buti and Balaba an in $anao del =ur, !ith the #ere nullification of the portion thereof !hich tooa!ay the t!elve barrios in the #unicipalities of Buldon and Paran in the other province of Cotabato. The reasoninadvocated is that the li#ited title of the Act still covers those barrios actually in the province of $anao del =ur.

1e are not un#indful of the rule, buttressed on reason and of lon standin , that !here a portion of a statute is rendereunconstitutional and the re#ainder valid, the parts !ill be separated, and the constitutional portion upheld. Blac ,ho!ever, ives the e ception to this rule, thus;

. . . But !hen the parts of the statute are so #utually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations,induce#ents, or co#pensations for each other, as to !arrant a belief that the le islature intended the# as a !holand that if all could not be carried into effect, the le islature !ould not pass the residue independently, then, iso#e parts are unconstitutional, all the provisions !hich are thus dependent, conditional, or connected, #ust fa!ith the#, %%

2n substantially si#ilar lan ua e, the sa#e e ception is reco ni+ed in the /urisprudence of this Court, thus;

The eneral rule is that !here part of a statute is void, as repu nant to the @r anic $a!, !hile another part isvalid, the valid portionif separa)le fro# the invalid, #ay stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the val portion #ust be so far independent of the invalid portionthat it is fair to presume that the Legislature would haveenacted it )' itself if the' had supposed that the' could not constitutionall' enact the other . . . Enou h #ustre#ain to #a e a co#plete, intelli ible, and valid statute, !hich carries out the le islative intent. . . . The


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lan ua e used in the invalid part of the statute can have no le al force or efficacy for any purpose !hatever,and what remains must eouse Bill % 64, no! Republic Act 647(,reads;

The territory is no! a pro ressive co##unity< the a re ate population is lar e< and the collective inco#e issufficient to #aintain an independent #unicipality.

This bill, if enacted into la!, !ill enable the inhabitants concerned to overn the#selves and en/oy the blessinof #unicipal autono#y.

1hen the fore oin bill !as presented in Con ress, un*uestionably, the totality of the t!enty-one barrios I not nine barrios I !as in the #ind of the proponent thereof. That this is so, is plainly evident by the fact that the bill itself,thereafter enacted into la!, states that the seat of the overn#ent is in To ai , !hich is a barrio in the #unicipality ofBuldon in Cotabato. And then the reduced area poses a nu#ber of *uestions, thus; Could the observations as to pro ressive co##unity, lar e a re ate population, collective inco#e sufficient to #aintain an independent #unicipalstill apply to a #otley roup of only nine barrios out of the t!enty-one 2s it fair to assu#e that the inhabitants of the re#ainin barrios !ould have a reed that they be for#ed into a #unicipality, !hat !ith the conse*uent duties andliabilities of an independent #unicipal corporation Could they stand on their o!n feet !ith the inco#e to be derived in

their co##unity >o! about the peace and order, sanitation, and other corporate obli ations This Court #ay not suppthe ans!er to any of these disturbin *uestions. And yet, to re#ain deaf to these proble#s, or to ans!er the# in thene ative and still clin to the rule on separability, !e are afraid, is to i#pute to Con ress an undeclared !ill. 1ith the

no!n pre#ise that "ianaton !as created upon the basic considerations of pro ressive co##unity, lar e a re ate population and sufficient inco#e, !e #ay not no! say that Con ress intended to create "ianaton !ith only nine I of theori inal t!enty-one I barrios, !ith a seat of overn#ent still left to be con/ectured. ?or, this unduly stretches /udicialinterpretation of con ressional intent beyond credibility point. To do so, indeed, is to pass the line !hich circu#scribe /udiciary and tread on le islative pre#ises. Payin due respect to the traditional separation of po!ers, !e #ay not no!#elt and recast Republic Act 647( to read a "ianaton to!n of nine instead of the ori inally intended t!enty-one barriosReally, if these nine barrios are to constitute a to!n at all, it is the function of Con ress, not of this Court, to spell outcon ressional !ill.

Republic Act 647( is thus indivisible, and it is accordin ly null and void in its totality.%6

0. There re#ains for consideration the issue raised by respondent, na#ely, that petitioner has no substantial le al inteadversely affected by the i#ple#entation of Republic Act 647(. =tated differently, respondent s pose is that petitionenot the real party in interest.

>ere the validity of a statute is challen ed on the round that it violates the constitutional re*uire#ent that the sub/ecthe bill be e pressed in its title. Capacity to sue, therefore, hin es on !hether petitioner s substantial ri hts or interei#paired by lac of notification in the title that the barrio in Paran , Cotabato, !here he is residin has been transferra different provincial he e#ony.


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The ri ht of every citi+en, ta payer and voter of a co##unity affected by le islation creatin a to!n to ascertain thatla! so created is not dis#e#berin his place of residence &in accordance !ith the Constitution& is reco ni+ed in this /urisdiction.%'

Petitioner is a *ualified voter. >e e pects to vote in the %784 elections. >is ri ht to vote in his o!n barrio before it !aanne ed to a ne! to!n is affected. >e #ay not !ant, as is the case here, to vote in a to!n different fro# his actualresidence. >e #ay not desire to be considered a part of hitherto different co##unities !hich are fanned into the ne!to!n< he #ay prefer to re#ain in the place !here he is and as it !as constituted, and continue to en/oy the ri hts and benefits he ac*uired therein. >e #ay not even no! the candidates of the ne! to!n< he #ay e press a lac of desire tovote for anyone of the#< he #ay feel that his vote should be cast for the officials in the to!n before dis#e#ber#ent.=ince by constitutional direction the purpose of a bill #ust be sho!n in its title for the benefit, a#on st others, of theco##unity affected thereby,%8 it stands to reason to say that !hen the constitutional ri ht to vote on the part of any citiof that co##unity is affected, he #ay beco#e a suitor to challen e the constitutionality of the Act as passed by Con r

?or the reasons iven, !e vote to declare Republic Act 647( null and void, and to prohibit respondent Co##ission froi#ple#entin the sa#e for electoral purposes.

No costs allo!ed. =o ordered.

Concepcion# C.4.# 1e'es# 4.".L.# 5izon# &a alintal# "engzon# 4.(.# 6aldivar# Castro and Angeles# 44.# concur.

=eparate @pinions

ERNAN O, J., dissentin ;

1ith re ret and !ith due reco nition of the #erit of the opinion of the Court, 2 find #yself unable to ive #y assent.>ence these fe! !ords to e press #y stand.

Republic Act No. 647( deals !ith one sub/ect #atter, the creation of the #unicipality of "ianaton in the province of$anao del =ur. The title #a es evident !hat is the sub/ect #atter of such an enact#ent. The #ere fact that in the body osuch statute barrios found in t!o other #unicipalities of another province !ere included does not of itself suffice for afindin of nullity by virtue of the constitutional provision invo ed. At the #ost, the statute to be free fro# theinsubstantial doubts about its validity #ust be construed as not includin the barrios, located not in the #unicipalitiesButi and Balaba an, $anao del =ur, but in Paran and Baldon, Cotabato.

The constitutional re*uire#ent is that no bill !hich #ay be enacted into la! shall e#brace #ore than one sub/ect !hichshall be e pressed in the title of the bill.% This provision is si#ilar to those found in the Constitution of #any A#erican=tates. 2t is ai#ed a ainst the evils, of the so-called o#nibus bills, and lo -rollin le islation, and a ainst surreptitiounconsidered enact#ents. 1here the sub/ect of a bill is li#ited to a particular #atter, the #e#bers of the le islature as!ell as the people should be infor#ed of the sub/ect of proposed le islative #easures. This constitutional provision thu precludes the insertion of riders in le islation, a rider bein a provision not er#ane to the sub/ect #atter of the bill.

2t is not to be narro!ly construed thou h as to cripple or i#pede proper le islation. The construction #ust be reasonaand not technical. 2t is sufficient if the title be co#prehensive enou h reasonably to include the eneral ob/ect !hich statute see s to effect !ithout e pressin each and every end and #eans necessary for the acco#plish#ent of that ob/eMere details need not be set forth. The le islature is not re*uired to #a e the title of the act a co#plete inde of itscontents. The constitutional provision is satisfied if all parts of an act !hich relates to its sub/ect find e pression in itstitle.0

The first decision of this Court, after the establish#ent of the Co##on!ealth of the Philippines, in %70:, construin a provision of this nature,Government v. Hong ong ! Shanghai "an ,6 held that the inclusion of =ection %% of Act No.6((4, the Reor ani+ation $a!, providin for the #ode in !hich the total annual e penses of the Bureau of Ban in #a be rei#bursed throu h assess#ent levied upon all ban in institutions sub/ect to inspection by the Ban Co##issione!as not violative of such a re*uire#ent in the 9ones $a!, the previous or anic act. 9ustice $aurel, ho!ever, vi orously


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dissented, his vie! bein that !hile the #ain sub/ect of the act !as reor ani+ation, the provision assailed did not deal !reor ani+ation but !ith ta ation. 1hile the case of Government vs. Hong ong ! Shanghai "an !as decided by a bare#a/ority of four /ustices a ainst three, the present trend see#s to be that the constitutional re*uire#ent is to be iven tliberal test as indicated in the #a/ority opinion penned by 9ustice Abad =antos, and not the strict test as desired by th#a/ority headed by 9ustice $aurel.

=uch a trend has been reflected in subse*uent decisions be innin !ithSumulong v. Commission on %lections ,' up to andincludin $elwa vs. Salas , a %788 decision,8 the opinion co#in fro# 9ustice Concepcion.

2t is true of course that in (hilconsa v. Gimenez ,4 one of the rounds on !hich the invalidity of Republic Act No. 0:08 ! predicated !as the violation of the above constitutional provision. This Retire#ent Act for senators and representative!as entitled &AN ACT AMEN"2NJ =FB-=ECT2@N 3c5, =ECT2@N T1E$HE @? C@MM@N1EA$T> ACT NFMBERE" @NE >FN"RE" E2J>TL-=2 , A= AMEN"E" BL REPFB$2C ACT NFMBERE" T>2RTL>FN"RE" N2NETL-=2 .& As !e noted, the para raph in Republic Act No. 0:08 dee#ed ob/ectionable &refers to#e#bers of Con ress and to elective officers thereof !ho are not #e#bers of the Jovern#ent =ervice 2nsurance =yste#To provide retire#ent benefits, therefore, for these officials, !ould relate to a sub/ect #atter !hich is not er#ane toCo##on!ealth Act No. %:8. 2n other !ords, this portion of the a#end#ent 3 re retire#ent benefits for Me#bers ofCon ress and appointive officers, such as the =ecretary and =er eants-at-ar#s for each house5 is not related in any #to the sub/ect of Co##on!ealth Act No. %:8 establishin the Jovern#ent =ervice 2nsurance =yste# and !hich providefor both retire#ent and insurance benefits to its #e#bers.& Nonetheless our opinion !as careful to note that there !as nabandon#ent of the principle of liberality. Thus; &!e are not un#indful of the fact that there has been a eneraldisposition in all courts to construe the constitutional provision !ith reference to the sub/ect and title of the Act, liber

2t !ould follo! therefore that the challen ed le islation Republic Act No. 647( is not susceptible to the indict#ent thathe constitutional re*uire#ent as to le islation havin only one sub/ect !hich should be e pressed in his title !as not #The sub/ect !as the creation of the #unicipality of "ianaton. That !as e#bodied in the title.

2t is in the li ht of the afore#entioned /udicial decisions of this Court, so#e of the opinions co#in fro# /urists illustrfor their #astery of constitutional la! and their ac no!led ed erudition, that, !ith all due respect, 2 find the citationfro# Corpus 4uris Secundum , unnecessary and far fro# persuasive. The =tate decisions cited, 2 do not dee# controllinas the freedo# of this Court to accept or re/ect doctrines therein announced cannot be doubted.

1herein does the !ea ness of the statute lie then To repeat, several barrios of t!o #unicipalities outside $anao del =u!ere included in the #unicipality of "ianaton of that province. That itself !ould not have iven rise to a constitutional*uestion considerin the broad, !ell-hi h plenary po!ers possessed by Con ress to alter provincial and #unicipal boundaries. 1hat /ustified resort to this Court !as the con ressional failure to #a e e plicit that such barrios in t!o#unicipalities located in Cotabato !ould thereafter for# part of the ne!ly created #unicipality of "ianaton, $anao del=ur.

To avoid any doubt as to the validity of such statute, it #ust be construed as to e clude fro# "ianaton all of such barri#entioned in Republic Act No. 647( found in #unicipalities outside $anao del =ur. As thus interpreted, the statute can#eet the test of the #ost ri id scrutiny. Nor is this to do violence to the le islative intent. 1hat !as created !as a ne!#unicipality fro# barrios na#ed as found in $anao del =ur. This construction assures precisely that.

This #ode of interpretin Republic Act No. 647( finds support in basic principles underlyin precedents, !hich if not precisely controllin , have a persuasive rin . 2n 1adiowealth v. Agregado ,: certain provisions of the Ad#inistrative Code!ere interpreted and iven a &construction !hich !ould be #ore in har#ony !ith the tenets of the funda#ental la!.&2nSanchez v. L'on Construction ,7 this Court had a si#ilar rulin ; &Article 0( of the Code of Co##erce #ust be appliein consonance !ith the relevant provisions of our Constitution.& The above principle ained acceptance at a #uch period in our constitutional history. Thus in a %7%0 decision, 2n re Juari a;%(&2n construin a statute enacted by thePhilippine Co##ission !e dee# it our duty not to ive it a construction !hich !ould be repu nant to an Act of Con resif the lan ua e of the statute is fairly susceptible of another construction not in conflict !ith the hi her la!. 2n doin!e thin !e should not hesitate to disre ard contentions touchin the apparent intention of the le islator !hich !ouldlead to the conclusion that the Co##ission intended to enact a la! in violation of the Act of Con ress. >o!ever speciothe ar u#ent #ay be in favor of one of t!o possible constructions, it #ust be disre arded if on e a#ination it is found


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rest on the contention that the le islator desi ned an atte#pt to transcend the ri htful li#its of his authority, and that happarent intention !as to enact an invalid la!.&

A#erican =upre#e Court decisions are e*ually e plicit. The then 9ustice, later Chief 9ustice, =tone, construed statute&!ith an eye to possible constitutional li#itations so as to avoid doubts as to their validity.&%% ?ro# the pen of thearticulate /urist, ?ran furter;% &Accordin ly, the phrase &lobbyin activities& in the resolution #ust be iven the #ethat #ay fairly be attributed to it, havin special re ard for the principle of constitutional ad/udication !hich #a es itdecisive in the choice of fair alternatives that one construction #ay raise serious constitutional *uestions avoided byanother.& >is opinion in the Ru#ely case continues !ith the above pronounce#ent of =tone and t!o other for#er Chief9ustices; &2n the !ords of Mr. Chief 9ustice Taft, 3i5t is our duty in the interpretation of federal statutes to reach co!hich !ill avoid serious doubt of their constitutionality , Rich#ond =cre! Anchor Co. v. Fnited =tates, 4' F= 00%, 066: =. Ct. %76, %7:, 4 $. ed. 0(0. . . . As phrased by Mr. Chief 9ustice >u hes, &if a serious doubt of constitutionaliraised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court !ill first ascertain !hether a construction of the statute is fairly possible!hich the *uestion #ay be avoided. Cro!ell v. Benson, :', 78, 48 $. ed. '7:, and cases cited.& The prevailin doctrthen as set forth by 9ustice Clar in a %780 decision,%0 is that courts &have consistently sou ht an interpretation !hichsupports the constitutionality of le islation.& Phrased differently by 9ustice "ou las, the /udiciary favors &thatinterpretation of le islation !hich ives it the reater chan e of survivin the test of constitutionality.&%6

2t !ould follo! then that both Philippine and A#erican decisions unite in the vie! that a le islative #easure, in thelan ua e of Han "evanter &should not be iven a construction !hich !ill i#peril its validity !here it is reasonably opeto construction free fro# such peril.&%' Republic Act No. 647( as above construed incurs no such ris and is free fro# t peril of nullity.

=o 2 !ould vie! the #atter, !ith all due ac no!led #ent of the practical considerations clearly brou ht to li ht in theopinion of the Court.

oo+"o+&

% >ereinafter referred to as Co#elec.

Article H2, =ec. %3%5, Philippine Constitution.

0 =ti lit+ vs. =chiardien, 6( =1 d 0%', 0%4, 0 (.

6 Con ressional Record, Hol. 2, No. 6(, p. :< Hol. 2, No. '(, pp. 6(-6%.

' =ection %:, Article H2 of the Constitution, provides;

&=ec. %:. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authori+in increase of the public debt, billslocal application, and private bills, shall ori inate e clusively in the >ouse of Representatives, but th=enate #ay propose or concur !ith a#end#ents.&

8 Hidal de Roces vs. Posadas, ': Phil. %(:, %%%-%% < 2chon vs. >ernande+, %(% Phil. %%'', %%::-%%7

4 : C.9.=. pp. 08', 04(< e#phasis supplied.

: E#phasis ours.

7 E#phasis supplied.


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%( E a#ples; 1ilco vs. Paddoc , 0% N1 8(7, !here the statute entitled &An act #a in an appropriation of ss!a#p lands to aid the county of Jratiot in i#provin the channel of Maple river . . .& but the body of the actaffected another county other than Jratiot.

=tate vs. Burr, 0: P ':', the statute entitled &An act to a#end =ecs. 60%: and 60 4 of the Codes ofMontana relatin to chan in the boundaries of ?er us and 9udith Basin countries& !as rendered vo because the body of the act included the boundaries of Petroleu# county.

Atchison vs. Kearney County, 6: P ':0, !here the title of the act purported to attach Kearney county to?inney county the body of the act attached it to >a#ilton county.

=tate vs. Nelson, 7: =o. 4%', the title of the act purportin to alter or rearran e the boundaries of "eccity and the body of the act !hich actually di#inished the boundary lines of the city !ere considered bythe court as dealin !ith incon ruous #atters. The readin of the for#er !ould ive no clear su estiothat the latter !ould follo! and be #ade the sub/ect of the act. 9ac son, Cler vs. =herrod, 7 =o. 6:%City of Ensley vs. =i#pson, ' =o. 8%,cited .

?airvie! vs. City of "etroit, %%0 N1 08:, !here the title ave notice that the entire villa e of ?airvie! ianne ed to "etroit !hen the body affected only a portion.

%%

Blac , 2nterpretation of $a!s, d. ed., p. %%8.% Barra#eda vs. Moir, ' Phil. 66, 64-6:, :uoted in Jovern#ent vs. =prin er 3'( Phil. '7, 7 < e#phasissupplied5.

%0 McDuillin, Municipal Corporations, 0d ed., pp. 6'8-686.

%6 2n the case of ?u*ua vs. City of Mobile, % % =o. 878, it !as asserted that the portion of the statute e cludterritory fro# Mobile !hich !as not e press in the title &An act to alter and rearran e the boundary lines of thcity of Mobile in the state of Alaba#a& should be the only portion invalidated. The court, usin the test !hethnot after the ob/ectionable feature is stric en off there !ould still re#ain an act co#plete in itself, sensible,capable of bein e ecuted, ruled that there can be no se re ation of that portion dealin !ith the e cludedterritory fro# that dealin !ith additional territory because these t!o #atters are all e#braced and inter#in ledin one section dealin !ith the corporate li#its of the city.

2n the case of En le vs. Bonnie, (6 =1 d 780, the statute involved !as entitled &An Act relatin tocities&. =ection 6 thereof &re*uires the creation of a #unicipality on petition of a #a/ority of voters ovoters.& But so#e of the provisions !ere er#ane to the title of the la!. This statute !as declared voidintoto . The Court of Appeals of Kentuc y ruled as follo!s;

&The /ud #ent declared only =ection 6 relative to the creation of a #unicipality on petition of the vto be void and the re#ainder valid. 1hile so#e of the provisions of the act are er#ane to the title, sincthey deal !ith the classification of cities to be created, they see# #erely to har#oni+e other sections ofthe statute !hich they a#end !ith a ne! creation of cities other than si th class to!ns. To re#ove only=ection 6 !ould be li e ta in the #otor of an auto#obile !hich leaves the #achine of no use. 1e are*uite sure that these provisions !ould not have been enacted !ithout =ection 6< hence, they too #ustfall.&

%' Macias vs. The Co##ission on Elections, $-%:8:6, =epte#ber %6, %78%.

%8 Broo s vs. >ydorn, 6 N1 %% , %% 0-%% 6< ?airvie! vs. City of "etroit, %%0 N1 08:, 04(.


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% Art. H2, =ec. %, par. %, Constitution.

Jovern#ent v. >on on G =han hai Ban 3%70:5, 88 Phil. 6:0.

0 People vs. Carlos 3%7645, 4: Phil. '0'.

6 88 Phil. 6:0.

'

40 Phil. 3%76 5 :.8 $- 8'%%, @ctober 7, %78(. The other cases that #ay be cited follo!s People v. Carlos 3%7645, 4: Phil. '0 Nuval v. de la ?uente 3%7'05, 7 Phil. %(46< 2chon v. >ernande+ 3%7'%5, %(% Phil. %%''< Cordero v. C$-%6'6 , @ct. 0%, %78 < Municipality of 9ose Pan aniban v. =hell Co#pany, $-%:067, 9uly 0(, %788.

4 $- 00 8, "ece#ber %:, %78'.

: :8 Phil. 6 7 3%7'(5.

7 :4 Phil. 0(7 3%7'(5,Cf . City of Manila v. Arellano $a! Colle es, 2nc. 3%7'(5, :' Phil. 880.

%( 6 Phil. 04. 9ustice Carson !ho penned the opinion cited Blac on 2nterpretation of $a!s to this effect; &>it follo!s that the courts !ill not so construe the la! as to #a e it conflict !ith the constitution, but !ill rather pusuch an interpretation upon it as !ill avoid conflict !ith the constitution and ive it full force and effect, if thiscan be done !ithout e trava ance. 2f there is doubt, or uncertainty as to the #eanin of the le islature, if the!ords or provisions of the statute are obscure, or if the enact#ent is fairly susceptible of t!o or #oreconstructions, that interpretation !ill be adopted !hich !ill avoid the effect of unconstitutionality, even thou h#ay be necessary, for this purpose, to disre ard the #ore usual or apparent i#pact of the lan ua e e#ployed.&

%% $ucas v. Ale ander 3%7 :5. 47 F= '40, '44-'4:, citin Fnited =tates e rel. Atty. Jen. v. "ela!are G >. Co.%0 F= 088, 6(4, 6(:, '0 $. ed. :08, :6:, :67, 7 =up. Ct. Rep. ' 4; Fnited =tates v. =tandard Bre!ery, '% F=%(, (, 86 $. ed. 7, 0', 6( =up. Ct. Rep. %07< Te as v. Eastern Te as R. Co. ': F= (6, %4, 88 $. e

'4 , 6 =up. Ct. Rep. :%< Bratton v. Chandler, 8( F= %%(, %%6, 84 $. ed. %'4, %8%, 60 =up. Ct. Rep. 6R. Co. v. 9ohnson, 86 F= 04', 07(, 8: $. ed. 46:, 4'6, 66 =up. Ct. Rep. 07%.

% Fnited =tates v. Ru#ely 3%7'05, 06' F= 6%, 6'.

%0 Fnited =tates v. National "airy Product Corp. 040 F= 7, 0 .

%6 %< parte Endo 3%7665, 0 0 F= :0, 77-0((.

%' Chippe!a 2ndians v. Fnited =tates 3%7045, 0(% F= 0':, 048.


22/80


Manila

EN ANC

G.R. No. 14856 No &/%&* 19, 2 1

JOSEP7 EJERCITO ESTRA A, petitioner,vs.SAN IGAN AYAN T$!*) ! ! !o"B '") PEOPLE O T7E P7ILIPPINES, respondents.

" E C 2 = 2 @ N

ELLOSILLO, J.:

9@>N =TFART M2$$, in his essayOn Li)ert' , unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the ri hts of the indivifro# the vast po!ers of the =tate and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he dra!s a sacrosanct line de#arcatithe li#its on individuality beyond !hich the =tate cannot tread - assertin that &individual spontaneity& #ust be allo!to flourish !ith very little re ard to social interference - he veritably ac no!led es that the e ercise of ri hts and lib

is i#bued !ith a civic obli ation, !hich society is /ustified in enforcin at all cost, a ainst those !ho !ould endeavor to!ithhold fulfill#ent. Thus he says -

The sole end for which man ind is warranted# individuall' or collectivel'# in interfering with the li)ert' of action of an' of their num)er# is self-protection. The onl' purpose for which power can )e rightfull' e


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3%5 Throu h #isappropriation, conversion, #isuse, or #alversation of public funds or raids on the public trea

3 5 By receivin , directly or indirectly, any co##ission, ift, share, percenta e, ic bac s or any other for# pecuniary benefit fro# any person andOor entity in connection !ith any overn#ent contract or pro/ect or byreason of the office or position of the public office concernedFN"RE" =EHENTL T>REE PE=@= AN"=EHENTEEN CENTAH@= 3P0, 00,%(6,%40.%45AN EPOSITING T7E SAME UN ER 7IS ACCOUNTNAME ?JOSE ELAR E? AT T7E E;UITA LE-PCI AND .&

1e discern nothin in the fore oin that is va ue or a#bi uous - as there is obviously none - that !ill confuse petitioin his defense. Althou h sub/ect to proof, these factual assertions clearly sho! that the ele#ents of the cri#e are easilyunderstood and provide ade*uate contrast bet!een the innocent and the prohibited acts. Fpon such une*uivocalassertions, petitioner is co#pletely infor#ed of the accusations a ainst hi# as to enable hi# to prepare for an intelli edefense.

Petitioner, ho!ever, be!ails the failure of the la! to provide for the statutory definition of the ter#s &co#bination& and&series& in the ey phrase &a co#bination or series of overt or cri#inal acts& found in =ec. %, par. 3d5, and =ec. !ord &pattern& in =ec. 6. These o#issions, accordin to petitioner, render the Plunder $a! unconstitutional for beini#per#issibly va ue and overbroad and deny hi# the ri ht to be infor#ed of the nature and cause of the accusationa ainst hi#, hence, violative of his funda#ental ri ht to due process.

The rationali+ation see#s to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void #erely because eneter#s are used therein, or because of the e#ploy#ent of ter#s !ithout definin the#


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DEL !E"#$ %&' %( $)E ! *#+E"#L *%++ $$EE %& J '$ *E, +ay //

1%(. 0S051O> 0 am ;ust intrigued again )' our definition of plunder. /e sa' TH1O7GH A CO&"02AT0O2 O1 S%10%SO$ O9%1T O1 C10&02AL ACTS AS &%2T0O2%5 02 S%CT0O2 O2% H%1%O$. 2ow when we sa' com)ination# weactuall' mean to sa'# if there are two or more means# we mean to sa' that num)er one and two or num)er one and

something else are included# how a)out a series of the same actI $or e 3eah# )ecause we sa' a series.

1%(. 0S051O> Series.

1%(. GA1C0A> 3eah# we include series.

1%(. 0S051O> "ut we sa' we )egin with a com)ination.

1%(. GA1C0A> 3es.

1%(. 0S051O> /hen we sa' com)ination# it seems that -

1%(. GA1C0A> Two.

1%(. 0S051O> 2ot onl' two )ut we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.

1%(. GA1C0A> 2o# no# not twice.

1%(. 0S051O> 2ot twiceI

1%(. GA1C0A> 3es. Com)ination is not twice - )ut com)ination# two acts.

1%(. 0S051O> So in other words# thatJs it. /hen we sa' com)ination# we mean# two different acts. 0t cannot )e arepetition of the same act.

1%(. GA1C0A> That )e referred to series# 'eah.

1%(. 0S051O> 2o# no. Supposing one act is repeated# so there are two.

1%(. GA1C0A> A series.

1%(. 0S051O> ThatJs not series. 0ts a com)ination. "ecause when we sa' com)ination or series# we seem to sa' that twoor more# di )aI

1%(. GA1C0A> 3es# this distinguishes it reall' from ordinar' crimes. That is wh'# 0 said# that is a ver' good suggestion

)ecause if it is onl' one act# it ma' fall under ordinar' crime )ut we have here a com)ination or series of overt orcriminal acts. So < < < Series. One after the other eh di....

S%2. TA2A5A> So that would fall under the term =seriesI=

1%(. GA1C0A> Series# oo.

1%(. 0S051O> 2ow# if it is a com)ination# ano# two misappropriations....


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1%(. GA1C0A> 0ts not... Two misappropriations will not )e com)ination. Series.

1%(. 0S051O> So# it is not a com)inationI

1%(. GA1C0A> 3es.

1%(. 0S051O> /hen 'ou sa' com)ination# two differentI

1%(. GA1C0A> 3es.

S%2. TA2A5A> Two different.

1%(. 0S051O> Two different acts.

1%(. GA1C0A> $or e 2ow a series# meaning# repetition...

5%L0"%1AT0O2S O2 S%2AT% "0LL 2O. K # 4une *MNM

S%2ATO1 &AC%5A> 0n line with our interpellations that sometimes =one= or ma')e even =two= acts ma' alread' resultin such a )ig amount# on line E # would the Sponsor consider deleting the words =a series of overt or#= to read# therefore>=or conspirac' CO&&0TT%5 )' criminal acts such as.= 1emove the idea of necessitating =a series.= An'wa'# thecriminal acts are in the plural.

S%2ATO1 TA2A5A> That would mean a com)ination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.

TH% (1%S05%2T> (ro)a)l' two or more would )e....

S%2ATO1 &AC%5A> 3es# )ecause =a series= implies several or man'D two or more.

S%2ATO1 TA2A5A> Accepted# &r. (resident < < < 0f there is onl' one# then he has to )e prosecuted under the particular crime. "ut when we sa' =acts of plunder= there should )e# at least# two or more.

S%2ATO1 1O&7LO> 0n other words# that is alread' covered )' e


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goal. As commonl' understood# the term overall unlawful scheme indicates a general plan of action or method whichthe principal accused and pu)lic officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. 0nthe alternative# if there is no such overall scheme or where the schemes or methods used )' multiple accused var'# theovert or criminal acts must form part of a conspirac' to attain a common goal.

>ence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the la! does not ive a fair !arnin and sufficient notice of !hat it see s penali+e. Fnder the circu#stances, petitioner s reliance on the &void-for-va ueness& doctrine is #anifestly #isplacedoctrine has been for#ulated in various !ays, but is #ost co##only stated to the effect that a statute establishin acri#inal offense #ust define the offense !ith sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelli ence can understan!hat conduct is prohibited by the statute. 2t can only be invo ed a ainst that specie of le islation that is utterly va uits face, i.e., that !hich cannot be clarified either by a savin clause or by construction.

A statute or act #ay be said to be va ue !hen it lac s co#prehensible standards that #en of co##on intelli ence #ustnecessarily uess at its #eanin and differ in its application. 2n such instance, the statute is repu nant to the Constitin t!o 3 5 respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties tar eted by it, fair no!hat conduct to avoid< and, it leaves la! enforcers unbridled discretion in carryin out its provisions and beco#es anarbitrary fle in of the Jovern#ent #uscle.%( But the doctrine does not apply as a ainst le islations that are #erelycouched in i#precise lan ua e but !hich nonetheless specify a standard thou h defectively phrased< or to those thatapparently a#bi uous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first #ay be &saved& by proper constru!hile no challen e #ay be #ounted as a ainst the second !henever directed a ainst such activities.%% 1ith #ore reason,the doctrine cannot be invo ed !here the assailed statute is clear and free fro# a#bi uity, as in this case.

The test in deter#inin !hether a cri#inal statute is void for uncertainty is !hether the lan ua e conveys a sufficientlydefinite !arnin as to the proscribed conduct !hen #easured by co##on understandin and practice.% 2t #ust bestressed, ho!ever, that the &va ueness& doctrine #erely re*uires a reasonable de ree of certainty for the statute to bupheld - not absolute precision or #athe#atical e actitude, as petitioner see#s to su est. ?le ibility, rather than#eticulous specificity, is per#issible as lon as the #etes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act !ill n be held invalid #erely because it #i ht have been #ore e plicit in its !ordin s or detailed in its provisions, especially!here, because of the nature of the act, it !ould be i#possible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statut

Moreover, !e a ree !ith, hence !e adopt, the observations of Mr. 9ustice Hicente H. Mendo+a durin the deliberationsthe Court that the alle ations that the Plunder $a! is va ue and overbroad do not /ustify a facial revie! of its validity

The void-for-va ueness doctrine states that &a statute !hich either forbids or re*uires the doin of an act in ter#s so that #en of co##on intelli ence #ust necessarily uess at its #eanin and differ as to its application, violates the firstessential of due process of la!.&%0 The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that &a overn#ental purpose not be achieved by #eans !hich s!eep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedo#s.&%6

A facial challen e is allo!ed to be #ade to a va ue statute and to one !hich is overbroad because of possible &chillineffect& upon protected speech. The theory is that & ! hen statutes re ulate or proscribe speech and no readily appaconstruction su ests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitatin the statutes in a sin le prosecution, the transcendent valuesociety of constitutionally protected e pression is dee#ed to /ustify allo!in attac s on overly broad statutes !ith nore*uire#ent that the person #a in the attac de#onstrate that his o!n conduct could not be re ulated by a statute dra!ith narro! specificity.&%' The possible har# to society in per#ittin so#e unprotected speech to o unpunished is

out!ei hed by the possibility that the protected speech of others #ay be deterred and perceived rievances left to fes because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Cri#inal statutes have eneralin terrorem effect resultin fro# their verye istence, and, if facial challen e is allo!ed for this reason alone, the =tate #ay !ell be prevented fro# enactin la!sa ainst socially har#ful conduct. 2n the area of cri#inal la!, the la! cannot ta e chances as in the area of free speech.

The overbreadth and va ueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt fortestin the validity of penal statutes. As the F.=. =upre#e Court put it, in an opinion by Chief 9ustice Rehn*uist, &!enot reco ni+ed an overbreadth doctrine outside the li#ited conte t of the ?irst A#end#ent.&%8 2n "roadric v.O lahoma ,%4 the Court ruled that &clai#s of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involvin statutes !hictheir ter#s, see to re ulate only spo en !ords& and, a ain, that &overbreadth clai#s, if entertained at all, have been
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curtailed !hen invo ed a ainst ordinary cri#inal la!s that are sou ht to be applied to protected conduct.& ?or this reait has been held that &a facial challen e to a le islative act is the #ost difficult challen e to #ount successfully, sincchallen er #ust establish that no set of circu#stances e ists under !hich the Act !ould be valid.&%: As for the va uenessdoctrine, it is said that a liti ant #ay challen e a statute on its face only if it is va ue in all its possible applications. plaintiff !ho en a es in so#e conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot co#plain of the va ueness of the la! as appliethe conduct of others.&%7

2n su#, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and va ueness are analytical tools developed for testin &on thefaces& statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in A#erican la!, ?irst A#end#ent cases. They cannot be #addo service !hen !hat is involved is a cri#inal statute. 1ith respect to such statute, the established rule is that &one to!ho# application of a statute is constitutional !ill not be heard to attac the statute on the round that i#pliedly it #i halso be ta en as applyin to other persons or other situations in !hich its application #i ht be unconstitutional.&( As has been pointed out, &va ueness challen es in the ?irst A#end#ent conte t, li e overbreadth challen es typically prodfacial invalidation, !hile statutes found va ue as a #atter of due process typically are invalidated only as applied particular defendant.&% Conse*uently, there is no basis for petitioner s clai# that this Court revie! the Anti-Plunder $aon its face and in its entirety.

2ndeed, &on its face& invalidation of statutes results in stri in the# do!n entirely on the round that they #i ht beapplied to parties not before the Court !hose activities are constitutionally protected. 2t constitutes a de

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