G.R. No. 90501ARIS (PHIL.) INC., petitioner, vs.NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER FELIPE GARDUQUE III, LEODEGARIO DE GUZMAN, LILIA PEREZ, ROBERTO BESTAMONTE, AIDA OPENA, REYNALDO TORIADO, APOLINARIO GAGAHINA, RUFINO DE CASTRO, FLORDELIZA RAYOS DEL SOL, STEVE SANCHO, ESTER CAIRO, MARIETA MAGALAD, and MARY B. NADALA, respondents.FACTS:- On 11 April 1988, private respondents, who were employees of petitioner lodged a protest action against the management concerning their working surroundings which had become detrimental and hazardous. For these actions, private respondents were dismissed for violation of company rules and regulations.- Private respondents then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner with the NLRC.- After due trial, Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the private respondents with order of reinstatement, etc. Pending appeal by petitioner, private respondents move for issuance of a writ of execution pursuant to Section 12 of RA 6715.- Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the amendment introduced by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715 to Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines (PD No. 442, as amended) allowing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of a labor arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee and of Section 2 of the NLRC Interim Rules on Appeals under R.A. No. 6715 implementing the same. It also questions the validity of the Transitory Provision (Section 17) of the said Interim Rules.The challenged portion of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715, which took effect on 21 March 1989, reads as follows:SEC 12. Article 223 of the same code is amended to read as follows:ART. 223. Appeal.xxx xxx xxxIn any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, in so far as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided therein.

ISSUE:- W/N Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715 is unconstitutional and it can be applied retrospectively.RULING:- Execution pending appeal is interlinked with the right to appeal. One cannot be divorced from the other. The latter may be availed of by the losing party or a party who is not satisfied with a judgment, while the former may be applied for by the prevailing party during the pendency of the appeal. The right to appeal, however, is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right. It is a statutory privilege of statutory origin 18 and, therefore, available only if granted or provided by statute. The law may then validly provide limitations or qualifications thereto or relief to the prevailing party in the event an appeal is interposed by the losing party. - The validity of the questioned law is not only supported and sustained by the foregoing considerations. As contended by the Solicitor General, it is a valid exercise of the police power of the State. Certainly, if the right of an employer to freely discharge his employees is subject to regulation by the State, basically in the exercise of its permanent police power on the theory that the preservation of the lives of the citizens is a basic duty of the State, that is more vital than the preservation of corporate profits.- The charge then that the challenged law as well as the implementing rule are unconstitutional is absolutely baseless. Laws are presumed constitutional. 24 To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication; a law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt. 25 In Parades, et al. vs. Executive Secretary 26 We stated:"For one thing, it is in accordance with the settled doctrine that between two possible constructions, one avoiding a finding of unconstitutionality and the other yielding such a result, the former is to be preferred. That which will save, not that which will destroy, commends itself for acceptance. After all, the basic presumption all these years is one of validity. The onerous task of proving otherwise is on the party seeking to nullify a statute. It must be proved by clear and convincing evidence that there is an infringement of a constitutional provision, save in those cases where the challenged act is void on its face. Absent such a showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice. Justice Malcolm's aphorism is apropos: To doubt is to sustain.The reason for this:... can be traced to the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins on each department a proper respect for the acts of the other departments. ... The theory is that, as the joint act of the legislative and executive authorities, a law is supposed to have been carefully studied and determined to be constitution before it was finally enacted. Hence, as long as there is some other basis that can be used by the courts for its decision, the constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched upon and the case will be decided on other available grounds.- Settled is the rule that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect. There are no vested rights in rules of procedure. A remedial statute may be made applicable to cases pending at the time of its enactment.- Petition is DISMISSED.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------G.R. No. 115044HON. ALFREDO S. LIM, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, and the City of Manila, petitioners,vs.HON. FELIPE G. PACQUING, as Judge, branch 40, Regional Trial Court of Manila and ASSOCIATED CORPORATION, respondents.G.R. No. 117263TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR. and DOMINADOR R. CEPEDA, petitioners,vs.HON. VETINO REYES and ASSOCIATED DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.FACTS:- The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949. Section 18 thereof provides:Sec. 18. Legislative Powers. The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:xxx xxx xxx(jj) To tax, license, permit and regulate wagers or betting by the public on boxing, sipa, bowling, billiards, pools, horse and dog races, cockpits, jai-alai, roller or ice-skating on any sporting or athletic contests, as well as grant exclusive rights to establishments for this purpose, notwithstanding any existing law to the contrary.- On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority to regulate jai-alais from local government to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB).- On 20 June 1953, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 954, entitled "An Act to Prohibit With Horse Races and Basque Pelota Games (Jai-Alai), And To Prescribe Penalties For Its Violation". The provisions of Republic Act No. 954 relating to jai-alai are as follows:Sec. 4. No person, or group of persons other than the operator or maintainer of a fronton with legislative franchise to conduct basque pelota games (Jai-alai), shall offer, to take or arrange bets on any basque pelota game or event, or maintain or use a totalizator or other device, method or system to bet or gamble on any basque pelota game or event.Sec. 5. No person, operator or maintainer of a fronton with legislative franchise to conduct basque pelota games shall offer, take, or arrange bets on any basque pelota game or event, or maintain or use a totalizator or other device, method or system to bet or gamble on any basque pelota game or event outside the place, enclosure, or fronton where the basque pelota game is held.- On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila nonetheless passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled "An Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The Associated Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain And Operate A Jai-Alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And Conditions And For Other Purposes."- On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then President Marcos. The decree, entitled "Revoking All Powers and Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public On Horse And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other Forms Of Gambling", in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits issued by local governments.- On 16 October 1975, Presidential Decree No. 810, entitled "An Act granting The Philippine Jai-Alai And Amusement Corporation A Franchise To Operate, Construct And Maintain A Fronton For Basque Pelota And Similar Games of Skill In THE Greater Manila Area," was promulgated.- On 08 May 1987, then President Aquino, by virtue of Article XVIII, Section 6, of the Constitution, which allowed the incumbent legislative powers until the first Congress was convened, issued Executive Order No. 169 expressly repealing PD 810 and revoking and cancelling the franchise granted to the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation.- In May 1998, Associated Development Corporation tried to operate jai.alai. The government through the Games and Amusement Board intervened and invoked PD 771, issued on August 20, 1975, Sec 3 pf which expressly revoked all existing franchises including (jai alai) issued by local governments. ADC assials the constitutionality of PD 771 as violative of equal protection and non.impairment clauses of the Constitution.HELD:- The time-honored doctrine is that all laws (PD No. 771 included) are presumed valid and constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled by this Court. Not only this; Article XVIII Section 3 of the Constitution states:Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.

- There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the executive still exercised legislative powers).- Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued existence of ADC's franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision of the Court's First Division in said case, aside from not being final, cannot have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since only the Court En Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution.- And on the question of whether or not the government is estopped from contesting ADC's possession of a valid franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents (Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90)- Consequently, in the light of the foregoing expostulation, we conclude that the republic (in contra distinction to the City of Manila) may be allowed to intervene in G.R. No. 115044. The Republic is intervening in G.R. No. 115044 in the exercise, not of its business or proprietary functions, but in the exercise of its governmental functions to protect public morals and promote the general welfare.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------G.R. No. 149276JOVENCIO LIM and TERESITA LIM, petitioners,vs.THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 217, THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY, AND WILSON CHAM, respondentsThe constitutionality of PD 818, a decree which amended Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalties for estafa committed by means of bouncing checks, is being challenged in this petition for certiorari, for being violative of the due process clause, the right to bail and the provision against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment enshrined under the Constitution.FACTS:- Petitioner spouses issued to private respondent two postdated checks. First check was dishonored upon presentment for having been drawn against insufficient funds while the other was not presented for payment upon request of petitioners who promised to replace the dishonored check.- When petitioners reneged on their promise to cover the amount of check, the private respondent filed a complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor charging petitioner spouses with the crime of estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by PD 818.

- The City Prosecutor issued a resolution finding probable cause against petitioners and recommending the filing of an information for estafa with no bail recommended. On the same day, an information for the crime of estafa was filed. Thereafter, the trial court issued a warrant for the arrest of herein petitioners.- It appearing on the face of the information and from supporting affidavit of the complaining witness and its annexes that probable cause exists, that the crime charged was committed and accused is probably guilty thereof, let a warrant for the arrest of the accused be issued. No Bail Recommended.- Petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court and the Office of the City Prosecutor, arguing that PD 818 violates the constitutional provisions on due process, bail and imposition of cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.ISSUE: W/N PD 818 is unconstitutional.HELD:- When a law is questioned before the Court, the presumption is in favor of its constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unmistakable breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. 4 The burden of proving the invalidity of a law rests on those who challenge it. In this case, petitioners failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality of PD 818.- The petition is DISMISSED.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------G.R. No. 94723KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and Natural Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA E. SALVACION,petitioners,vs.CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT,respondents.FACTS:- On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to rape the child once on February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account China Banking Corp., US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money (P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the complainant.- On February 16, 1989, Makati Investigating Fiscal Edwin G. Condaya filed against Greg Bartelli, Criminal Case No. 801 for Serious Illegal Detention and Criminal Cases Nos. 802, 803, 804, and 805 for four (4) counts of Rape. On the same day, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati Civil Case No. 89-3214 for damages with preliminary attachment against Greg Bartelli.- On February 24, 1989, escaped from jail. - Greg Bartelli failed to file his answer to the complaint and was declared in default on August 7, 1989. After hearing the case ex-parte, the court rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant, ordering the latter to pay plaintiff Karen E. Salvacion moral damages, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and litigation expenses.- The Deputy Sheriff served a Notice of Garnishment on China Banking Corporation.- The corresponding writ of execution was issued but respondents China Banking Corporation and Central Bank of the Philippines refused to honor the writ of execution on the strength of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 wherein dollar deposits of defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body, whatsoever.- Expanding, the Central Bank said; that one reason for exempting the foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment or any other order or process of any court, is to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit System and the Offshore Banking System in the Philippines; that another reason is to encourage the inflow of foreign currency deposits into the banking institutions thereby placing such institutions more in a position to properly channel the same to loans and investments in the Philippines, thus directly contributing to the economic development of the country; that the subject section is being enforced according to the regular methods of procedure; and that it applies to all foreign currency deposits made by any person and therefore does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.- Respondent Central Bank further avers that the questioned provision is needed to promote the public interest and the general welfare; that the State cannot just stand idly by while a considerable segment of the society suffers from economic distress; that the State had to take some measures to encourage economic development; and that in so doing persons and property may be subjected to some kinds of restraints or burdens to secure the general welfare or public interest. Respondent Central Bank also alleges that Rule 39 and Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court provide that some properties are exempted from execution/attachment especially provided by law and R.A. No. 6426 as amended is such a law, in that it specifically provides, among others, that foreign currency deposits shall be exempted from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.ISSUE:- W/N Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient.HELD:- This petition for declaratory relief can only be entertained and treated as a petition formandamusto require respondents to honor and comply with the writ of execution.- This questioned law, therefore makes futile the favorable judgment and award of damages that she and her parents fully deserve. The reason for imposing exemplary or corrective damages is due to the wanton and bestial manner defendant had committed the acts of rape during a period of serious illegal detention of his hapless victim. If Karen's sad fate had happened to anybody's own kin, it would be difficult for him to fathom how the incentive for foreign currency deposit could be more important than his child's rights to said award of damages; in this case, the victim's claim for damages from this alien who had the gall to wrong a child of tender years of a country where he is a mere visitor. This further illustrates the flaw in the questioned provisions.- It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at a time when the country's economy was in a shambles; when foreign investments were minimal and presumably, this was the reason why said statute was enacted. But the realities of the present times show that the country has recovered economically; and even if not, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the questioned law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us.- The petition raises the question whether the protection against attachment, garnishment or other court process accorded to foreign currency deposits by PD No. 1246 and CB Circular No. 960 applies when the deposit does not come from a lender or investor but from a mere transient or tourist who is not expected to maintain the deposit in the bank for long.- The resolution of this question is important for the protection of nationals who are victimized in the forum by foreigners who are merely passing through.- One of the principal purposes of the protection accorded to foreign currency deposits is "to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit system and the Offshore Banking in the Philippines".- Obviously, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time.- In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that "in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. "Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro." Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience. (Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377).- It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent.- IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby REQUIRED to COMPLY with the writ of execution issued.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------[G.R. No. 123169.November 4, 1996]DANILO E. PARAS,petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,respondent.FACTS:- Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay ofPula,CabanatuanCitywho won during the last regular barangay election in 1994.A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay.- The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioners opposition.- Petitioners argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election, petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. In support thereof, petitioner citesAssociated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court considered the SK election as a regular local election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a regular local election, hence no recall election can be had for barely four months separate the SK election from the recall election.ISSUE: won petitioners contention is correct.RULING:No. The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:SEC. 74.Limitations on Recall. (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.(b)No recall shall take place withinone (1) year from the date of the officials assumption to office orone (1) year immediately preceding aregular local election."It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.[4]The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office.Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his term of office.Thus, subscribing to petitioners interpretation of the phraseregular local electionto include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term.And if the SK election which is set by R.A. No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase regular local election, as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.- In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute.[5]An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.[6]- It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution.[7]Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization witheffective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum x x x.- Moreover, petitioners too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition:We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth x x x[8]- The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ACHILLES C. BERCES, SR.,petitioner,vs.HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., CHIEF PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL COUNSEL ANTONIO CARPIO and MAYOR NAOMI C. CORRAL OF TIWI, ALBAY,respondents.A CASE OF implied repeal is not favoredFACTS:- Petitioner filed two administrative cases against respondent Naomi C. Corral, the incumbent Mayor of Tiwi, Albay with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay-The Sangguniang Panlalawigan in their judgement, suspended the mayor.- Consequently, respondent Mayor appealed to the Office of the President questioning the decision and at the same time prayed for the stay of execution thereof in accordance with Section 67(b) of the Local Government Code, which provides:Administrative Appeals. Decision in administrative cases may, within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, be appealed to the following:xxx xxx xxx(b) The Office of the President, in the case of decisions of the sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang panglungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities.- Acting on the prayer to stay execution during the pendency of the appeal, the Office of the President issued an Order on July 28, 1993, the pertinent portions of which read as follows:xxx xxx xxxThe stay of the execution is governed by Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 dated 12 February 1987, quoted below:Sec. 68. Execution Pending Appeal. An appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory. The respondent shall be considered as having been placed under preventive suspension during the pendency of an appeal in the events he wins such appeal. In the event the appeal results in an exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and such other emoluments during the pendency of the appeal (R.A. No. 7160).Sec. 6 Except as otherwise provided by special laws, the execution of the decision/resolution/order appealed from is stayed upon filing of the appeal within the period prescribed herein. However, in all cases, at any time during the pendency of the appeal, the Office of the President may direct or stay the execution of the decision/resolution/order appealed from upon such terms and conditions as it may deem just and reasonable (Adm. Order No. 18).xxx xxx xxx- After due consideration, and in the light of the Petition for Review filed before this Office, we find that a stay of execution pending appeal would be just and reasonable to prevent undue prejudice to public interest.- WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office hereby orders the suspension/stay of execution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigans Decision of Suspension- Petitioner claims that the governing law in the instant case is R.A. No. 7160, which contains a mandatory provision that an appeal "shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and executory." He argues that administrative Order No. 18 dated February 12, 1987, (entitle "Prescribing the Rules and Regulations Governing Appeals to Office the President") authorizing the President to stay the execution of the appealed decision at any time during the pendency of the appeal, was repealed by R.A. No. 7160, which took effect on January 1, 1991.ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid repeal.RULING:There was none.Petitioner invokes the repealing clause of Section 530 (f), R.A. No. 7160, which provides:All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, administrative regulations, part or parts thereof, which are incosistent with any of the provisions of this Code, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.- The aforementioned clause is not an express repeal of Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 because it failed to identify or designate the laws or executive orders that are intended to be repealed (cf.I Sutherland, Statutory Construction 467 [1943]).- If there is any repeal of Administrative Order No. 18 by R.A. No. 7160, it is through implication though such kind of repeal is not favored. There is even a presumption against implied repeal.An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found between the new and prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcible inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible (maayo pa ang law, naay compatible ) There must be such a repugnancy between the laws that they cannot be made to stand together.- We find that the provisions of Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 are not irreconcillably inconsistent and repugnant and the two laws must in fact be read together.The term "shall" may be read either as mandatory or directory depending upon a consideration of the entire provisions in which it is found, its object and the consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the other. In the case at bench, there is no basis to justify the construction of the word as mandatory.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO,petitioners,vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA,respondentsA CASE OF DEFERRING NOT "the letter that killeth" BUT TO "the spirit that vivifieth," FACTS:- Five brothers and sisters inherited in equalpro indivisoshares a parcel of land. - One of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share of the herein petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by way of absolute sale.2One year later, on April 22, 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the same vendees- By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners ALONZO occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. - On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs, sought to redeem the area sold to the spouses Alonzo and followed by Marianos sister and co-heir Tecla Padua also filed her own complaint invoking the same right of redemption.- A written notice of the sale was not clearly established in the case. However, the court apparently agreed that there was a valid notice of the sale to the co-heirs as evidenced by the facts narrated, however it not made in writing. (this is where the issue lies because the law says the notice should be in writing and it will run 30 days from the receipt thereof. However, there was no evidence of such written notice but the court is convinced that the coheirs knew of the sales on 1964 and 1964)- Both parties invoked the statutes on redemption and its procedural aspects:Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor.- The Court emphasized that the written notice should be given by the vendor and not the vendees, conformably to a similar requirement under Article 1623, reading as follows:Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendors, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.- The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of the adjoining owners.- Strictly applied and interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to only one conclusion, to wit, that in view of such deficiency, the 30 day period for redemption had not begun to run, much less expired in 1977.ISSUE: Whether or not statutes should be applied strictly in this case.RULING: We test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is torender justice.Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence.While we admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless have the power to interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the will of the legislature. While we may not readintothe law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to readout of itthe reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the law maker's will.The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction, hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is within the letter but although it is not within the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated differently, a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers.14In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it is really necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to begin, to obviate any problem of alleged delays, sometimes consisting of only a day or two.In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents' pretense that they were unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof of such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the redemptioners are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters were actually informed, although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice was sufficient.We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the strict letter of the law, which the respondent court understandably applied pursuant to existing jurisprudence. The said court acted properly as it had no competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by this Court in the above-cited cases. In fact, and this should be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the De Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What we are doing simply is adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case.The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the justifications for this exception.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------G.R. No. 103982 December 11, 1992ANTONIO A. MECANO,petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON AUDIT,respondent.(this digest is an internet find but it sums up what I wanted to write)

FACTS:- Mecano is a Director II of the NBI. He was hospitalized and on account of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA.- In a memorandum to the NBI Director, Director Lim requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699of the RAC, the pertinent provisions of which read:Sec. 699.Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in performance of duty. When a person in the service of the national government of a province, city, municipality or municipal district is so injured in the performance of duty as thereby to receive some actual physical hurt or wound, the proper Head of Department may direct that absence during any period of disability thereby occasioned shall be on full pay, though not more than six months, and in such case he may in his discretion also authorize the payment of the medical attendance, necessary transportation, subsistence and hospital fees of the injured person. Absence in the case contemplated shall be charged first against vacation leave, if any there be.xxx xxx xxxIn case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of some act in the line of duty, the Department head may in his discretion authorize the payment of the necessary hospital fees.- Director Lim then forwarded petitioners claim, to the Secretary of Justice. Finding petitioners illness to be service-connected, the Committee on Physical Examination of the Department of Justice favorably recommended the payment of petitioners claim.- However, then Undersecretary of Justice Bello III returned petitioners claim to Director Lim, having considered thestatements of the Chairman of the COA to the effect that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.- Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion No. 73, S. 1991of then Secretary of Justice Drilon stating that the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abregate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code, including the particular Section 699 of the latter.- Director Lim transmitted anew Mecanos claim to then Undersecretary Bello for favorable consideration; Secretary Drilon forwarded petitioners claim to the COA Chairman, recommending payment of the same. COA Chairman however, denied petitioners claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987, solely for thereason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. He commented, however, that the claim may be filed with the Employees Compensation Commission, considering that the illness of Director Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987.- Eventually, petitioners claim was returned by Undersecretary of Justice Montenegro to Director Lim with the advice that petitioner elevate the matter to the Supreme Court if he so desires.Hence this petition forcertiorari.ISSUE: WON Administrative code of 1987 repealed or abrogated sec. 699 of Revised administrative code.RULING:No.The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent law is a matter of legislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein a repealing provision which expressly and specifically cites the particular law or laws, and portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed. A declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by its number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all others are implied repealsIn the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the ascertainment of whether or not it was the intent of the legislature to supplant the old Code with the new Code partly depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause of the new Code. This provision is found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987 which reads:Sec. 27.Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.The question that should be asked is:What is the nature of this repealing clause?It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed.Rather, it is an example of a general repealing provision. It is a clause which predicates the intended repeal under the condition that substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. This latter situation falls under the category of an implied repeal.There are two categories of repeal by implication.1. Where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one.2.If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law.Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old Code. There are several matters treated in the old Code which are not found in the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries public, the leave law, the public bonding law, military reservations,claims for sickness benefits underSection 699, and still others.According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears clear is the intent to cover only those aspects of government that pertain to administration, organization and procedure, understandably because of the many changes that transpired in the government structure since the enactment of the RAC decades of years ago.Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the two Codes on the matter of the subject claim are in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be no such conflict because the provision on sickness benefits of the nature being claimed by petitioner has not been restated in the Administrative Code of 1987.Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored.20The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.NOTES:1. the COA would have Us consider that the fact that Section 699 was not restated in the Administrative Code of 1987 meant that the same section had been repealed. The COA anchored this argument on the whereas clause of the 1987 Code, which states:WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be enhanced by a new Administrative Code which incorporate in aunified documentthe major structural, functional and procedural principles and rules of governance; andxxx xxx xxxIt argues, in effect, that what is contemplated is only one Code the Administrative Code of 1987. This contention is untenable.The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act, since the new statute may merely becumulative or a continuation of the old one.What is necessary is a manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal.2. Regarding COA contention that recovery under this subject section (699) shall bar the recovery of benefits under the Employees Compensation Program, the same cannot be upheld. The second sentence of Article 173, Chapter II, Title II (dealing on Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund), Book IV of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that the payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code . . . whose benefits are administered by the system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the government.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Ursua vs CAFACTS:Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato. On 9 May 1989 the Provincial Governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila to conduct an investigation on a complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted benefits by petitioner and other officials of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The complaint was initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato through a resolution advising the Governor to report the involvement of petitioner and others in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the area.2On 1 August 1989 Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City requesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint against petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked his client Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firm's messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal matters.When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City he was instructed by the security officer to register in the visitors' logbook. Instead of writing down his name petitioner wrote the name "Oscar Perez" after which he was told to proceed to the Administrative Division for the copy of the complaint he needed. He handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the Administrative Division, Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a copy of the complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged by writing the name "Oscar Perez."When Loida learned that the person who introduced himself as "Oscar Perez" was actually petitioner Cesario Ursua, a customer of Josefa Amparo in her gasoline station, Loida reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged.Petitioner now comes to us for review of his conviction as he reasserts his innocence. He contends that he has not violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 as he never used anyaliasname; neither is "Oscar Perez" hisalias. Analias, according to him, is a term which connotes the habitual use of another name by which a person is also known. He claims that he has never been known as "Oscar Perez" and that he only used such name on one occasion and it was with the express consent of Oscar Perez himself. It is his position that an essential requirement for a conviction under C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 has not been complied with when the prosecution failed to prove that his supposedaliaswas different from his registered name in the Registry of Births. He further argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not considering the defense theory that he was charged under the wrong law.5ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is guilty of RA No. 6085?RULING:While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which theanti-alias lawand its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences.12Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused.13The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited.14Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by him. Petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ESSO vs CIRFACTSIn CTA Case No. 1251, petitioner ESSO deducted from its gross income for 1959, as part of its ordinary and necessary business expenses, the amount it had spent for drilling and exploration of its petroleum concessions. This claim was disallowed by the respondent Commissioner of Internal Revenue on the ground that the expenses should be capitalized and might be written off as a loss only when a "dry hole" should result. ESSO then filed an amended return where it asked for the refund of P323,279.00 by reason of its abandonment as dry holes of several of its oil wells. Also claimed as ordinary and necessary expenses in the same return was the amount of P340,822.04, representing margin fees it had paid to the Central Bank on its profit remittances to its New York head office.On August 5, 1964, the CIR granted a tax credit of P221,033.00 only, disallowing the claimed deduction for the margin fees paid.ESSO settled this deficiency assessment on August 10, 1964, by applying the tax credit of P221,033.00 representing its overpayment on its income tax for 1959 and paying under protest the additional amount of P213,201.92. On August 13, 1964, it claimed the refund of P39,787.94 as overpayment on the interest on its deficiency income tax. It argued that the 18% interest should have been imposed not on the total deficiency of P367,944.00 but only on the amount of P146,961.00, the difference between the total deficiency and its tax credit of P221,033.00.This claim was denied by the CIR, who insisted on charging the 18% interest on the entire amount of the deficiency tax. On May 4,1965, the CIR also denied the claims of ESSO for refund of the overpayment of its 1959 and 1960 income taxes, holding that the margin fees paid to the Central Bank could not be considered taxes or allowed as deductible business expenses.ISSUE:Whether or not Petitioner is entitled for the tax deduction?RULING:NO, ESSO has not shown that the remittance to the head office of part of its profits was made in furtherance of its own trade or business. The petitioner merely presumed that all corporate expenses are necessary and appropriate in the absence of a showing that they are illegal orultra vires. This is error. The public respondent is correct when it asserts that "the paramount rule is that claims for deductions are a matter of legislative grace and do not turn on mere equitable considerations ... . The taxpayer in every instance has the burden of justifying the allowance of any deduction claimed."5It is clear that ESSO, having assumed an expense properly attributable to its head office, cannot now claim this as an ordinary and necessary expense paid or incurred in carrying on its own trade or business.WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals denying the petitioner's claims for refund of P102,246.00 for 1959 and P434,234.92 for 1960, is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.

Miriam Defensor Santiago V ComelecFacts:The controversy in this case is the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the system ofinitiativeunder Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986 Constitutional Commission itself, through the original proponent1and the main sponsor2of the proposed Article on Amendments or Revision of the Constitution, characterized this system as "innovative".3Indeed it is, for both under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods of proposing amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were recognized,viz., (1) by Congress upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members and (2) by a constitutional convention.4For this and the other reasons hereafter discussed, we resolved to give due course to this petition.Issue: Whether or not Republic Act 6375 incomplete, inadequate or enacting. Ruling:The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by "empowering" the COMELEC "to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of [the] Act. The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin maxim:potestas delegata non delegari potest.59The recognized exceptions to the rule are as follows:(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;(3) Delegation to the people at large;(4) Delegation to local governments; and(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.60Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5 above. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.61A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected.----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Florencio Eugenio V Executive Secretary and HLURBFacts:The heart of the controversy is the Presidential Decree 957 or The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers' Protective Decree". On May 10, 1972, private respondent purchased on installment basis from petitioner and his co-owner/developer Fermin Salazar, two lots in the E & S Delta Village in Quezon City. Acting on complaints for non-development docketed as NHA Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620 filed by the Delta Village Homeowners' Association, Inc., the National Housing Authority rendered a resolution on January 17, 1979inter aliaordering petitioner to cease and desist from making further sales of lots in said village or in any project owned by him.While NHA Cases Nos. 2619 and 2620 were still pending, private respondent filed with the Office of Appeals, Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) of the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC), a complaint (Case No. 80-589) against petitioner and spouses Rodolfo and Adelina Relevo alleging that, in view of the above NHA resolution, he suspended payment of his amortizations, but that petitioner resold one of the two lots to the said spouses Relevo, in whose favor title to the said property was registered. Private respondent further alleged that he suspended his payments because of petitioner's failure to develop the village.Issue: WON PD 957 is to be given retroactive effect.Ruling:We hold otherwise, and herewith rule that respondent Executive Secretary did not abuse his discretion, and that P.D. 957 is to be given retroactive effect so as to cover even those contracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976.P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law.The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the situation, circumstances and conditions it sought to remedy, must be enforced. On this point, a leading authority on statutory construction stressed:The intent of a statute is the law. . . . The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent.The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. . . . In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the trite intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature.1(emphasis supplied.)It goes without saying that, as an instrument of social justice, the law must favor the weak and the disadvantaged, including, in this instance, small lot buyers and aspiring homeowners. P.D. 957 was enacted with no other end in view than to provide a protective mantle over helpless citizens who may fall prey to the manipulations and machinations of "unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers", and such intent is nowhere expressed more clearly than in its preamble, pertinent portions of which read as follows:of Title No. 168119 of which the parcels of lands subject of this contract is a part in accordance with the provisions of Quezon City Ordinance No. 6561, S-66 and the Party of the First Part further binds himself to comply with and abide by all laws, rules and regulations respecting the subdivision and development of lots for residential purposesas may be presently in force or may hereafter be required by laws passed by the Congress of the Philippines or required by regulations of the Bureau of Lands, the General Registration Office and other government agencies.(emphasis supplied)

People of the Philippines V Hon. Vincente EchavesFacts:The record shows that on October 25, 1977 Fiscal Abundio R. Ello filed with the lower court separate informations against sixteen persons charging them with squatting as penalized by Presidential Decree No. 772. The information against Mario Aparici, which is similar to the other fifteen informations."That sometime in the year 1974 continuously up to the present at barangay Magsaysay, municipality of Talibon, province of Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with stealth and strategy, enter into, occupy and cultivate a portion of a grazing land physically occupied, possessed and claimed by Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr. as successor to the pasture applicant Celestina de la Serna of Pasture Lease Application No. 8919,Accuseds entrance into the area has been and is still against the will of the offended party; did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously squat and cultivate a portion of the said grazing land: said cultivating has rendered a nuisance to and has deprived the pasture applicant from the full use thereof for which the land applied for has been intended, that is preventing applicants cattle from grazing the whole area, thereby causing damage and prejudice to the said applicant-possessor-occupant, Atty. Vicente de la Serna, Jr." Issue: Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts, applies to agricultural lands. Ruling: On the other hand, it should be noted that squatting on public agricultural lands, like the grazing lands involved in this case, is punished by Republic Act No. 947 which makes it unlawful for any person, corporation or association to forcibly enter or occupy public agricultural lands"SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, corporation or association to enter or occupy, through force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, any public agricultural land including such public lands as are granted to private individuals under the provisions of the Public Land Act or any other laws providing for the disposal of public agricultural lands in the Philippines, and are duly covered by the corresponding applications required for the purpose notwithstanding the fact that title thereto still remains in the Government; or for any person, natural or judicial, to instigate, induce or force another to commit such acts."cralaw virtua1aw libraryThe rule of ejusdem generis (of the same kind or species) invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. It is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. The rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain (Genato Commercial Corp. v. Court of Tax Appeals, 104)----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Commisioner of Customs V EssoFacts:Respondent ESSO is the holder of Refining Concession No. 2, issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources on December 9, 1957, and operates a petroleum refining plant in Limay Bataan. Under Article 103 of Republic Act No. 387 which provides: "During the five years following the granting of any concession, the concessionaire may import free of customs duty, all equipment, machinery, material, instruments, supplies and accessories," respondent imported and was assessed the special import tax.

Issue: Whether or not the exemption enjoyed by herein private respondent ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc. from customs duties granted by Republic Act No. 387, or the Petroleum Act of 1949, should embrace or include the special import tax imposed by R.A. No. 1394, or the Special Import Tax Law.Ruling:We have examined the records of this case thoroughly and carefully considered the arguments presented by both parties and We are convinced that the only thing left to this Court to do is to determine the intention of the legislature through interpretation of the two statutes involved, i.e., Republic Act No. 1394 and Republic Act No. 387.It is a well accepted principle that where a statute is ambiguous, as Republic Act No. 1394 appears to be, courts may examine both the printed pages of the published Act as well as those extrinsic matters that may aid in construing the meaning of the statute, such as the history of its enactment, the reasons for the passage of the bill and purposes to be accomplished by the measure.On the contention of herein petitioner that the exemptions enjoyed by respondent ESSO under R.A. No. 387 have been abrogated by R.A. No. 1394, We hold that repeal by implication is not favored unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is logical to conclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to the same matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable but also clear and convincing as a result of the language used, or unless the latter act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier.

Vera V CuevasFacts: The controversy arose from the order of defendant, Commissioner of Internal Revenue now petitioner herein, requiring plaintiffs- private respondents to withdraw from the market all of their filled milk products which do not bear the inscription required by Section 169 of the Tax Code within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order with the explicit warning that failure of plaintiffs' private respondents to comply with said order will result in the institution of the necessary action against any violation of the aforesaid order.Application of Statcon:Moreover, it seems apparent that Section 169 of the Tax Code does not apply to filled milk. The use of the specific and qualifying terms "skimmed milk" in the headnote and "condensed skimmed milk" in the text of the cited section, would restrict the scope of the general clause "all milk, in whatever form, from which the fatty pat has been removed totally or in part." In other words, the general clause is restricted by the specific term "skimmed milk" under the familiar rule ofejusdem generisthat general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms they follow in the statute.Skimmed milk is different from filled milk. According to the "Definitions, Standards of Purity, Rules and Regulations of the Board of Food Inspection," skimmed milk is milk in whatever form from which the fatty part has been removed. Filled milk, on the other hand, is any milk, whether or not condensed, evaporated concentrated, powdered, dried, dessicated, to which has been added or which has been blended or compounded with any fat or oil other than milk fat so that the resulting product is an imitation or semblance of milk cream or skim milk." The difference, therefore, between skimmed milk and filled milk is that in the former, the fatty part has been removed while in the latter, the fatty part is likewise removed but is substituted with refined coconut oil or corn oil or both. It cannot then be readily or safely assumed that Section 169 applies both to skimmed milk and filled milk.----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------NAPOLCOM vs De GuzmanFACTS:RA 6975, otherwise known as "An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police under a Reorganized Department of the Interior and Local Government", took effect on January 2, 1991.RA 6975 provides for a uniform retirement system for PNP members. Section 39 reads: "SEC. 39.Compulsory Retirement. Compulsory retirement, for officer and non-officer, shall be upon the attainment of age fifty-six (56); Provided, That, in case of any officer with the rank of chief superintendent, director or deputy director general, the Commission may allow his retention in the service for an unextensible period of one (1) year.Based on the above provision, petitioners sent notices of retirement to private respondents who are all members of the defunct Philippine Constabulary and have reached the age of fifty-six.Private respondents filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for the issuance of an exparte restraining order and/or injunction before the RTC of Makati. They aver that the age of retirement set at fifty-six (56) by Section 39 of RA 6975 cannot be applied to them since they are also covered by Sec. 89 thereof which provides:"Any provision hereof to the contrary notwithstanding, and within the transition period of four (4) years following the effectively of this Act, the following members of the INP shall be considered compulsorily retired:"a) Those who shall attain the age of sixty (60) on the first year of the effectivity of this Act."b)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-nine (59) on the second year of the effectivity of this Act."c)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-eight (58) on the third year of the effectivity of this Act."d)Those who shall attain the age of fifty-seven (57) on the fourth year of the effectivity of this Act."Respondents added that the term "INP" includes both the former members of the PhilippineConstabulary and the local police force who were earlier constituted as the IntegratedNational Police (INP) by virtue of PD 765 in 1975.On the other hand, it is the belief of petitioners that the 4-year transition period provided inSection 89 applies only to the local police forces who previously retire, compulsorily, at age sixty (60) for those in the ranks of Police/Fire Lieutenant or higher, while the retirement age for the PC had already been set at fifty-six (56) under the AFP law.Respondent judge De Guzman issued a restraining order followed by a writ of injunction. He declared that the term "INP" in Section 89 of the PNP Law includes all members of the present Philippine National police, irrespective of the original status of the present members of the Philippine National police before its creation and establishment, and that Section 39 thereof shall become operative after the lapse of the four-year transition period. Thus, the preliminary injunction issued is made permanent. Moreover, he observed, among others, that it may have been the intention of Congress to refer to the local police forces as the "INP" but the PNP Law failed to define who or what constituted the INP. The natural recourse of the court is to trace the source of the "INP" as courts are permitted to look to prior laws on the same subject and to investigate the antecedents involved.ISSUE:Whether or not Section 89 of the PNP Law includes all members of the presentPhilippine National police, irrespective of the original status of its present members and thatSection 39 of RA 6975 shall become applicable to petitioners only after the lapse of the four-year transition period.RULING:From a careful review of Sections 23 and 85 of RA 6975, it appears that the use of the term INP is not synonymous with the PC. Had it been otherwise, the statute could have just made a uniform reference to the members of the whole Philippine National police (PNP) for retirement purposes and not just the INP. The law itself distinguishes INP from the PC and it cannot be construed that "INP" as used in Sec. 89 includes the members of the PC.Contrary to the pronouncement of respondent judge that the law failed to define who constitutes the INP, Sec. 90 of RA 6975 has in fact defined the same. Thus,"SEC. 90. Status of Present NAPOLCOM, PC-INP. Upon the effectivity of this Act, the present National police Commisdion and the Philippine Constabulary-IntegratedNational police shall cease to exist. The Philippine Constabulary, which is the nucleus of thePhilippine Constabulary-Integrated National police shall cease to be a major service of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Integrated National police, which is the civilian component of the Philippine Constabulary-Integrated National police, shall cease to be the national police force and lieu thereof, a new police force shall be establish and constituted pursuant to this Act."It is not altogether correct to state, therefore, that the legislature failed to define who the members of the INP are. In this regard, it is of no moment that the legislature failed to categorically restrict the application of the transition period in Sec. 89 specifically in favor of the local police forces for it would be a mere superfluity as the PC component of the INP was already retirable at age fifty-six (56).Having defined the meaning of INP, the trial court need not have belabored on the supposed dubious meaning of the term. Nonetheless, if confronted with such a situation, courts are not without recourse in determining the construction of the statute with doubtful meaning for they may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body. In case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberations may be adopted. Courts should not give a literal interpretation to the letter of the law if it runs counter to the legislative intent.The legislative intent to classify the INP in such manner that Section 89 of R.A. 6975 is applicable only to the local police force is clear. The question now is whether the classification is valid. The test for this is reasonableness such that it must conform to the following requirements:(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;(2) It must be germane to the purpose of the law;(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only;(4) It must apply equally to all members of the same class (People vs. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12[1939]).WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The writ of injunction issued on January 8, 1992 is hereby LIFTED and the assailed decision of respondent judge is REVERSED and SET ASIDE

Casco vs GimenezFACTSThis is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim for refund of petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July 1, 1959, its Circular No. 95. fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. The Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for applications for exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in said Republic Act No. 2609.The petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc. bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde which are the main raw materials in the production of synthetic resin glues. Petitioner sought refund relying upon Resolution No.1529 of the Monetary Board which declares that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Central Bank issued margin fee vouchers for the refund. However, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approve the said vouchers on the ground that the exemption of the separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of section 2, paragraph XVIII of R.A. No. 2609. The petitioner also contends that the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde", and that the members of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea" formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished product.ISSUE:Whether or not urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee. RULING:National Institute of Science and Technology has expressed, through its Commissioner, the view that: Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when applied in water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for use in the manufacture of plywood. Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from urea" and" formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known as "urea formaldehyde. It is well settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and formaldehyde is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by Congress and approved by the President. If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system, the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Municipality of Nueva Era vs Municipality of MarcosFACTSThe Municipality of Nueva Era was created from the settlements of Bugayong, Cabittaoran, Garnaden, Padpadon, Padsan, Paorpatoc, Tibangran, and Uguis whichwere previously organized as rancherias, each of which was under the independent control of a chief. Governor General Francis Burton Harrison, acting on a resolution passed by the provincial government of Ilocos Norte, united these rancherias and created the township of Nueva Era by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 66 dated September 30, 1916.The Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was created on June 22, 1963 pursuantto Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3753 entitled An Act Creating the Municipality of Marcos in the Province of Ilocos Norte. There is no issue insofar as the first paragraph is concerned which named only Dingras as the mother municipality of Marcos. The problem, however, lies in the description of Marcos boundaries as stated in the second paragraph, particularly in the phrase: on the East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary.ISSUES1. Whether or not the mode of appeal adopted by Marcos in bringing the case to the CA is proper; and 2. Whether or not the eastern boundary of Marcos extends over and covers a portion of Nueva Era.RULING:1. Marcos correctly appealed the RTC judgment via petition for review under Rule 42. Under Section 118(b) of the Local Government Code, "(b)oundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same province shall be referred for settlement to the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned." The dispute shall be formally tried by the said sanggunian in case the disputing municipalities fail to effect an amicable settlement. Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by R.A. No. 7902,38 vests in the CA the appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, among others.39 B.P. Blg. 129 has been further supplemented by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides for the remedy of appeal via petition for review under Rule 42 to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.Thus, the CA need not treat the appeal via petition for review filed by Marcos as a petition for certiorari to be able to pass upon the same. B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, which is supplemented by Rule 42 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, gives the CA the authority to entertain appeals of such judgments and final orders rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.2. No part of Nueva Eras territory was taken for the creation of Marcos under R.A.No. 3753. Only the barrios (now barangays) of Dingras from which Marcos obtained its territory are named in R.A. No. 3753. Since only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos source of territory, Nueva Eras territory is, therefore, excluded.Only Dingras is specifically named by law as source territory of Marcos. Hence, the said description of boundaries of Marcos is descriptive only of the listed barangays of Dingrasas a compact and contiguous territory. Considering that the description of the eastern boundary of Marcos under R.A. No. 3753 is ambiguous, the same must be interpreted in light of the legislative intent.

G.R. No. L-69344 April 26, 1991REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and SPOUSES ANTONIO and CLARA PASTOR,respondents.FACTS:On April 15, 1980, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Internal Revenue, commenced an action in the Court of First Instance to collect from the spouses Antonio Pastor and Clara Reyes-Pastor deficiency income taxes for the years 1955 to 1959 in the amount of P17,117.08.On August 2, 1975, they filed an answer admitting there was an assessment against them of P17,117.08 for income tax deficiency but denying liability therefor. They contended that they had availed of the tax amnesty among others under P.D. No. 213 and had paid the corresponding amnesty taxes provided by the State under the law. Consequently, the Government is in estoppel to demand and compel further payment of income taxes by them.Trial court:Repondent spouses had settled their income tax deficiency for the years 1955 to 1959, under P.D. 213, as shown in the Amnesty Income Tax Returns' Summary Statement and the tax Payment Acceptance Order for P2,951.20 with its corresponding official receipt, which returns also contain the very assessment for the questioned years. By accepting the payment of the amnesty income taxes, the Government, therefore, waived its right to further recover deficiency incomes taxes "from the defendants under the existing assessment against them.Petitioner RP's contention:1. Private respondents were not qualified to avail of the tax amnesty under P.D. 213 for the benefits of that decree are available only to persons who had no pending assessment for unpaid taxes, as provided in Revenue Regulations Nos. 8-72 and 7-73 issued by the BIR as part of the implementation of PD 213 among others. Since the Pastors did in fact have a pending assessment against them, they were precluded from availing of the amnesty among others under PD 213.2. Tax exemptions should be interpretedstrictissimi jurisagainst the taxpayer.Respondent spouses' contention: 1. P.D. 213 contains no exemptions from its coverage2. There is nothing which can be construed as authority for the Bureau of Internal Revenue to introduce exceptions and/or conditions to the coverage of the law.

Issue:Whether or not the payment of deficiency income tax under the tax amnesty, P.D. 213, and its acceptance by the Government operated to divest the Government of the right to further recover from the taxpayer, even if there was an existing assessment against the latter at the time he paid the amnesty tax.Ruling:The petition is devoid of merit.Even assuming that the deficiency tax assessment of P17,117.08 against the Pastor spouses were correct, since the latter have already paid almost the equivalent amount to the Government by way of amnesty taxes under P.D. No. 213, and were granted not merely an exemption, but an amnesty, for their past tax failings, the Government is estopped from collecting the difference between the deficiency tax assessment and the amount already paid by them as amnesty tax.A tax amnesty, being a general pardon or intentional overlooking by the State of its authority to impose penalties on persons otherwise guilty of evasion or violation of a revenue or tax law, partakes of an absolute forgiveness or waiver by the Government of its right to collect what otherwise would be due it, and in this sense, prejudicial thereto, particularly to give tax evaders, who wish to relent and are willing to reform a chance to do so and thereby become a part of the new society with a clean slate (Commission of Internal Revenue vs. Botelho Corp. and Shipping Co., Inc., 20 SCRA 487).The rule is thatin case of doubt,tax statutes are to be construed strictly against the Government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer, for taxes, being burdens, are not to be presumed beyond what the applicable statute expressly and clearly declares.

G.R. No. L-23623 June 30, 1977ACTING COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS,petitioner,vs.MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY and COURT OF TAX APPEALS,respondents.FACTS:Respondent Manila Electric Co. seek for an exemption from the special import tax of its importation of insulation oils. Respondent claims that it is exempt from the special import tax not only by virtue of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 1394, which exempts from said tax equipment and spare parts for use in industries, but also under Paragraph 9, Part Two, of its franchise, which expressly exempts insulators from all taxes of whatever kind and nature. Par. 9 of its franchise provides: The grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes upon its real estate, buildings, plant (not including poles, wires, transformers, and insulators), machinery and personal property as other persons are or may be hereafter required by law to pay. In consideration of Part Two of the franchise herein granted, to wit, the right to build and maintain in the City of Manila and its suburbs a plant for the conveying and furnishing of electric current for light, heat, and power, and to charge for the same, the grantee shall pay to the City of Manila two and one-half per centum of the gross earnings received from the business under this franchise in the city and its suburbs: ... and shall be in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatsoever nature, and by whatsoever authority upon the privileges, earnings, income, franchise, and poles, wires, transformers, and insulators of the grantee, from which taxes and assessments the grantee is hereby expressly exempted."It noted that the above "exempts it from all taxes of whatever nature, and by whatever authority, with respect to its insulators in consideration for the payment of the percentage tax on its gross earnings."Acting Commissioner of Customs's decision:Respondent is not exempt due to the following reasons:1. An exemption from taxation must be justified by words too clear to be misread.2. An exemption from taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. Affirmatively put, the law frowns on exemption from taxation, hence, an exempting provision should be construed strictissimi juris."3. 'Insulating oils' does not within the meaning of the term 'insulator'Court of Tax Appeals' decision:Repondent is exempt from the said taxISSUE:Whether or not the insulating oil come within the meaning of the term 'insulator.RULING:Yes. Hence, respondent is exempted from payment of the said special import tax.While it is true that in the construction of tax statutes tax exemptions (and deductions are of this nature) are not favored in the law, and are construed strictissimi juris against the ta