ii & iii of statcon cases

8/12/2019 II & III of Statcon Cases

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ,petitioner,

vs.

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S.

GARCIA, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the

Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent,

Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed,

insulted and humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner

offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals, good

customs and public policy."

1

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event

and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in

the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs

awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case

was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by

petitioner.2The transcript reads as follows:

Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) Good Afternoon M'am.

Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot

ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka

kung ano ang gagawin ko sa 'yo.

CHUCHIKasi, naka duty ako noon.

ESGTapos iniwan no. (Sic)

CHUCHIHindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing

ganoon

ESGIto and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka,

kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako

ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung

kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin

makakahingi.

CHUCHIHindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to

10:00 p.m.

ESGBastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel.

Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano

ka nakapasok dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka kung

hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).

CHUCHIItutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.

ESG

Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.ESGNakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on

your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang

nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHIKumuha kami ng exam noon.

ESGOo, pero hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHIEh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo

ESGKukunin ka kasi ako.

CHUCHIEh, di sana

ESGHuwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala

mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.

CHUCHIMag-eexplain ako.

ESG

Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kungpaano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at

tatay mo ang mga magulang ko.

ESGWala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka

puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.

CHUCHIKasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.

ESGNandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka

makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa

akin, dahil tapos ka na.

CHUCHIIna-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.

ESGHuwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no,

nilapastangan mo ako.

CHUCHIPaano kita nilapastanganan?

ESGMabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo.

Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka.3

As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act

of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a

criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of

Republic Act 4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping

and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes."

An information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated

October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:

INFORMATION


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The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of

Violation of Republic Act No. 4200, committed as follows:

That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro

Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the

above-named accused, Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by Ester S.

Garcia to record the latter's conversation with said accused, did then andthere willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of a tape recorder

secretly record the said conversation and thereafter communicate in writing

the contents of the said recording to other person.

Contrary to law.

Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.

MARIANO M. CUNETA

Asst. City Fiscal

Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the

Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,

particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court

granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts

charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) theviolation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by

a personotherthan a participant to the communication.4

From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for

Review on Certiorariwith this Court, which forthwith referred the case to

the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.

On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed

Decision declaring the trial court's order of May 3, 1989 null and void, and

holding that:

[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section

1 of R.A. 4200. In thus quashing the information based on the ground that

the facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the respondent judge acted in

grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.5

Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for

Reconsideration which respondent Court of Appeals denied in its

Resolution6dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue"7that the

applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a

private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends

that the provision merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private

conversation by a party other than those involved in the communication.8In

relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the

conversation must be alleged in the Information, otherwise the facts charged

would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200.9Finally, petitioner agues that

R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private

conversation" and that consequently, her act of secretly taping her

conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10

We disagree.

First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of astatute. Where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is

applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted

to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible 11or absurb

or would lead to an injustice. 12

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire

Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication and Other

Purposes," provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the

parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or

cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,

intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device

commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any

person, not authorized by all the parties to any private communication to

secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law

makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the

statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the

private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons

unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of the

qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly

concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his

private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)

qualify as a violator" 13under this provision of R.A. 4200.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the

respondent court's conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers

indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private

conversations or communications taken either by the parties themselves or by

third persons. Thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Taada: That qualified only "overhear".

Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of

secrecy would not appear to be material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the

recording is not made by all the parties but by some parties and involved not


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criminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for

example civil cases or special proceedings whereby a reco rding is made not

necessarily by all the parties but perhaps by some in an effort to show the

intent of the parties because the actuation of the parties prior, simultaneous

even subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative of their

intention. Suppose there is such a recording, would you say, Your Honor,that the intention is to cover it within the purview of this bill or outside?

Senator Taada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.

Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of

offense but as evidence to be used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?

Senator Taada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded

conversations taken without the authorization of all the parties.

Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?

Senator Taada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record

the observation of one without his knowing it and then using it against him .It

is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose; Your honor, is to record the

intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the

observations are being recorded.Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.

Senator Taada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the

board of directors where a tape recording is taken, there is no objection to

this if all the parties know. It is but fair that the people whose remarks and

observations are being made should know that the observations are being

recorded.

Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.

Senator Taada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say:

"Please be informed that whatever you say here may be used against you."

That is fairness and that is what we demand. Now, in spite of that warning,

he makes damaging statements against his own interest, well, he cannot

complain any more.But if you are going to take a recording of the

observations and remarks of a person without him knowing that it is being

taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is being recorded may be

used against him, I think it is unfair.

xxx xxx xxx

(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)

Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the

bill as now worded, if a party secretly records a public speech, he would be

penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is public, but the recording is

done secretly.

Senator Taada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It

is the communication between one person and another person not between

a speaker and a public.

xxx xxx xxx

(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)

xxx xxx xxxThe unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with

the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional Record, therefore

plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision

seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the

law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the

statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the

information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing,

intercepting or recordingprivate communications by means of the devices

enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual made a secret

recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would

suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the SolicitorGeneral pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:

"Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a

violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a

third person should be professed."14

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the

ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The

word communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to

share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the

act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of

sharing or imparting, as in a conversation, 15or signifies the "process by

which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a

common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16These

definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or

expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to

include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between

petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office. Any

doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private

communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms

"conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator

Taada in his Explanatory Note to the bill quoted below:


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It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from

their conversationsbeing overheard. But this statement ignores the usual

nature of conversationsas well the undeniable fact that most, if not all,

civilized people have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose.

Freeconversationsare often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity,

agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social desires of views notintended to be taken seriously. The right to theprivacy of communication,

among others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless to

state here, the framers of our Constitution must have recognized the nature

of conversationsbetween individuals and the significance of man's spiritual

nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of

the pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and

free exchange of communicationbetween individuals free from every

unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means.17

In Gaanan vs.Intermediate Appellate Court, 18a case which dealt with the

issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that the use of a telephone extension

for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization

did not violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neitheramong those "device(s) or arrangement(s)" enumerated therein, 19following

the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the

accused."20The instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable

facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200 suffer from no

ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized

"recording" of private communications with the use of tape-recorders as

among the acts punishable.

WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and

unambiguous and leaves us with no discretion, the instant petition is hereby

DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against

petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Davide, Jr. and Bellosillo JJ., concur.

Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 Docketed as Civil Case No. 88-403, Regional Trial Court, Makati, Branch 64.2Rollo, p. 48.3Rollo, pp. 47-48.

4Rollo, p. 9.5Rollo, p. 37.6Rollo, p. 99, Annex "H".

7Rollo, p. 13.

8Id.

9Rollo, p. 14.10Rollo, p. 14-15.11 Pacific Oxygen and Acytelene Co. vs. Central Bank 37 SCRA 685 (1971).

12 Casela v. Court of Appeals, 35 SCRA 279 (1970).

13Rollo, p. 33.14Rollo, p. 67.15 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 460 (1976).

16Id.17 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. III, No. 31, at 573 (March 10, 1964).18 145 SCRA 112 (1986). See also, Salcedo-Ortanez v. CA 235 SCRA 111 (1994).

19Id., at 120.20Id., at 121.


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SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ,Petitioner,vs.

DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR

GENERAL,Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BRION, J.:Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1of the Regional Trial

Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on

certiorari2under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present petition).

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired

Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000.3On

January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a

Filipina, in Pasig City.

4

Due to work and other professional commitments,Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines

sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that

his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert

returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of

Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce on

December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8,

2006.5

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another

Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the

Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered

the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate. Despite

the registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics

Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn

still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree

must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to

NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce

and/or declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although

summoned, Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead

a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to

Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself

but was prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus,

requested that she be considered as a party-in-interest with a similar prayer to

Gerberts.

In its October 30, 2008 decision,7the RTC denied Gerberts petition. The RTC

concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for

judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized

Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy,under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8in order for him

or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.9Article 26 of the Family

Code reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with

the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as

such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles

35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien

spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise

have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behindthe enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as

determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;10the provision was

enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains

married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married

to the Filipino spouse."11

THE PETITION

From the RTCs ruling,12Gerbert filed the present petition.13

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory

relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a

determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the

Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of

Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to

the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched

the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to the

Filipino spousean interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the

second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a

proper party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there

is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marr ies his Filipina

fiance in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him, would

be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General

and Daisylyn, in their respective Comments,14both support Gerberts position.
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Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of

Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of

this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree.

THE COURTS RULING

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of

the Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipinospouse

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent

behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages

void15and voidable16marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial

declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage exists before or at

the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the

dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.17Our

family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a

Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her

legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution,19enacted Executive Order

No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording,

as follows:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with

the laws in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as

such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles

35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly

celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien

spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the F ilipino spouse shall likewise

have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227

effectively incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v.

Romillo, Jr.20and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21In both cases, the Court refused to

acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights after a foreign

courts divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus,

recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the marital bond

between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be

considered still married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's

obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to

live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien

spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible

rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own

country if the ends of justice are to be served.22

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid

the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien

spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino

spouse."

23

The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, byclarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce

decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code

provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to

the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to

remarry.24Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the

judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding

instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding,

would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not

recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;25Article 17 of the

Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be

subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the

second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct

exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the

marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the

Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If

the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the

courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract

another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a s imilar

declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already established by the

decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his national

law.26

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the

second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in

limiting the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse.

In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of

Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this

provision.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the

party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusioni.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26

of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the

complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss

Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the
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second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not

necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition

of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its

authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly

proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of

right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Courtwhich provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The effect of a

judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to

render the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or

final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final

order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their

successors in interest by a subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a

want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear

mistake of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is

sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action

before our courts for the recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce

situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien

abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid

according to his or her national law.27

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the

acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign

judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is

bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal

of another country."28This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity

must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens

applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself

or herself.29The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically

for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as

an integral aspect of his claim or defense.

In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of

the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be

official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of

Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official

publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the

documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the Philippines,

these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic

or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign

country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his

office.

The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce

decree, as well as the required certificates proving its authenticity,

30

but failedto include a copy of the Canadian law on divorce.31Under this situation, we

can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting

evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to

determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce

law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the

Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina wifes (Daisylyns)

obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the same time, will al low

other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a

petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction,

want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our

laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized,

shall have the effect of res judicata32between the parties, as provided in

Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.33

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of

reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata

effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for

extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its

terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino

spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article

26 of the Family Code provides.

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree

As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil

Registry Office has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and

Daisylyns marriage certificate based on the mere presentation of the

decree.34We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to

draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees

concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register."

The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce

legal consequences touching upon a persons legal capacity and status, i.e.,

those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent
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in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate

or illegitimate, or his being married or not."35

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, a lthough a foreign one, affecting a

persons legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753

or the Law on Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of

divorce decrees in the civil registry:Sec. 1. Civil Register.A civil register is established for recording the civil

status of persons, in which shall be entered:

(a) births;

(b) deaths;

(c) marriages;

(d) annulments of marriages;

(e) divorces;

(f) legitimations;

(g) adoptions;

(h) acknowledgment of natural children;

(i) naturalization; and

(j) changes of name.

x x x x

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books.The local registrars shall keep and preserve in

their offices the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the

proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:

(1) Birth and death register;

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages

solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages.

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and

naturalization register.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry,

the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto

authorize the decrees registration. The law should be read in relation with the

requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be

given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as

yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil

Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it

annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage

certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of

a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36and

Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of 198237both of which

required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign

judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it,

nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary to law,

the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial

recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC

may extend to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize thecancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a

foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of

Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be

changed or corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements

Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically providing for a special remedial

proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially cancelled or

corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and

procedural requirements that must be complied with before a judgment,

authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil

registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed

with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is

located;38that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest

must be made parties to the proceedings;39and that the time and place for

hearing must be published in a newspaper of general circulation.40As these

basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we

cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule

108 of the Rules of Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as

requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce

decree in the civil registryone for recognition of the foreign decree and

another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of

Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule

108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule

108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party

or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the

appropriate adversarial proceeding41by which the applicability of the foreign

judgment can be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want

of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and

REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag

City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order. We order the

REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance
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with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil

Registrar General. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRIONAssociate Justice

WE CONCUR: CONCHITA CARPIO MORALESAssociate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.Associate Justice

A T T E S T A T I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the

Courts Division.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate JusticeChairperson

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division

Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the

above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned

to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONAChief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated additional Member of the Third Division, in view of the retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, per Special Order No. 843 dated May 17,

2010.

1 Dated October 30, 2008, penned by Judge Perla B. Querubin; rollo, pp. 24-31.

2 Id. at 3-20.

3 Id. at 27.

4 Marriage Certificate, id. at 37.

5 Certificate of Divorce, id. at 38.

6 Id. at 47-50; the pertinent portion of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982, states:

It would therefore be premature to register the decree of annulment in the Register of Annulment of Marriages in Manila, unless and until final order of

execution of such foreign judgment is issued by competent Philippine court.

7 Supra note 1.

8 Executive Order No. 209, enacted on July 6, 1987.

9 Rollo, p. 31.

10 G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472 SCRA 114.

11 Id. at 121.

12 Gerberts motion for reconsideration of the RTCs October 30, 2008 decision was denied in an order dated February 17, 2009; rollo,p. 32.

13 Supra note 2.

14 Rollo, pp. 79-87 and 125-142, respectively.

15 The void marriages are those enumerated under Articles 35, 36, 37, 38, 40, 41, 44, and 53 in relation to Article 52 of the Family Code.

16 The voidable marriages are those enumerated under Article 45 of the Family Code.

17 Garcia v. Recio, G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001, 366 SCRA 437, 452.

18 Ibid. See A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume One, with the Family Code of the Philippines (2004

ed.), p. 262.

19 Proclamation No. 3, issued on March 25, 1996.

20 G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139.

21 G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.

22 Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20 at 144.

23 Republic v. Orbecido, supra note 10 at 121.

24 The capacity of the Filipino spouse to remarry, however, depends on whether the foreign divorce decree capacitated the alien spouse to do so.

25 See Article 17 in relation to Article 15 of the Civil Code:

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even

though living abroad.

x x x x

Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs

shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

26 Parenthetically, we add that an aliens legal capacity to contract is evidenced by a certificate issued by his or her respect ive diplomatic and consular

officials, which he or she must present to secure a marriage license (Article 21, Family Code). The Filipino spouse who seeks to remarry, however, must still

resort to a judicial action for a declaration of authority to remarry.

27 Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at 447; citing Van Dorn v. Romillo, supra note 20.

28 Remedial Law, Volume II, Rules 23-56 (2007 ed.), p. 529.

29 Republic v. Orbecido III, supra note 10 at 123 and Garcia v. Recio, supra note 17 at 448; see also Bayot v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 155635, November

7, 2008, 570 SCRA 472.

30 Rollo, pp. 38-41.

31 The foreign divorce decree only stated that the marriage between Gerbert and Daisylyn was dissolved by the Canadian court. Th e full text of the courts

judgment was not included.

32 Literally means "a thing adjudged," Blacks Law Dictionary (5th ed.), p. 1178; it establishes a rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court

of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits, on points and matters determined in the former.Supra note 28

at 462.

33 See Philsec Investment Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 103493, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 102, 110, where the Court said:

While this Court has given the effect of res judicata to foreign judgments in several cases, it was after the parties opposed to the judgment had been given

ample opportunity to repel them on grounds allowed under the law. It is not necessary for this purpose to initiate a separate action or proceeding for

enforcement of the foreign judgment. What is essential is that there is opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the court to properly

determine its efficacy. This is because in this jurisdiction, with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely

constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.

34 On the face of the marriage certificate, the word "DIVORCED" was written in big, bold letters; rollo, p. 37.

35 Silverio v. Republic, G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007, 537 SCRA 373, 390, citing Beduya v. Republic, 120 Phil. 114 (1964).

36 Rollo, pp. 47-50.

37 Id. at 51.

38 Section 1, Rule 108, Rules of Court.



41 When the entry sought to be corrected is substantial (i.e., the civil status of a person), a Rule 108 proceeding is deemed adversarial in nature. See Co v. Civil

Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, February 23, 2004, 423 SCRA 420, 430.
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt6http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt7http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt8http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt9http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt10http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt11http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt12http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt13http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt14http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt16http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt29http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt30http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt32http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt40http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt41http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt41http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt40http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt39http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt38http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt37http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt36http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt35http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt34http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt33http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt32http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt31http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt30http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt29http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt28http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt27http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt26http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt25http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt24http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt23http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt22http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt21http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt20http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt19http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt18http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr_186571_2010.html#rnt17http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2010/aug2010/gr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10/26


SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 102858 July 28, 1997THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS,petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORO ABISTADO, substituted by

MARGARITA, MARISSA, MARIBEL, ARNOLD and MARY ANN, all

surnamed ABISTO, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:Is newspaper publication of the notice of initial hearing in an original land

registration case mandatory or directory?

Statement of the Case

The Court of Appeals ruled that it was merely procedural and that the failure to

cause such publication did not deprive the trial court of its authority to grant the

application. But the Solicitor General disagreed and thus filed this petition to set

aside the Decision1promulgated on July 3, 1991 and the subsequent

Resolution2promulgated on November 19, 1991 by Respondent Court of

Appeals3in CA-G.R. CV No. 23719. The dispositive portion of the challenged

Decision reads:4

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of dismissal

appealed from is hereby set aside, and a new one entered confirming the

registration and title of applicant, Teodoro Abistado, Filipino, a resident

of Barangay 7, Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, now

deceased and substituted by Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and

Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, represented by their aunt, Miss Josefa

Abistado, Filipinos, residents of Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental

Mindoro, to the parcel of land covered under MSI (IV-A-8) 315-D

located in Poblacion Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.

The oppositions filed by the Republic of the Philippines and private

oppositor are hereby dismissed for want of evidence.

Upon the finality of this decision and payment of the corresponding

taxes due on this land, let an order for the issuance of a decree be issued.

The Facts

On December 8, 1986, Private Respondent Teodoro Abistado filed a petition for

original registration of his title over 648 square meters of land under Presidential

Decree (PD) No. 1529.5The application was docketed as Land Registration Case

(LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of

Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro.6However, during the pendency of his petition,

applicant died. Hence, his heirs Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold and Mary

Ann, all surnamed Abistado represented by their aunt Josefa Abistado, who

was appointed their guardian ad litem, were substituted as applicants.

The land registration court in its decision dated June 13, 1989 dismissed thepetition "for want of jurisdiction." However, it found that the applicants through

their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and

peaceful possession of the subject land since 1938.

In dismissing the petition, the trial court reasoned:7

. . . However, the Court noted that applicants failed to comply with the

provisions of Section 23 (1) of PD 1529, requiring the Applicants to

publish the notice of Initial Hearing (Exh. "E") in a newspaper of

general circulation in the Philippines. Exhibit "E" was only published in

the Official Gazette (Exhibits "F" and "G"). Consequently, the Court is

of the well considered view that it has not legally acquired jurisdiction

over the instant application for want of compliance with the mandatory

provision requiring publication of the notice of initial hearing in a

newspaper of general circulation.

The trial court also cited Ministry of Justice Opinion No. 48, Series of 1982,

which in its pertinent portion provides:8

It bears emphasis that the publication requirement under Section 23 [of

PD 1529] has a two-fold purpose; the first, which is mentioned in the

provision of the aforequoted provision refers to publication in the

Official Gazette, and is jurisdictional; while the second, which is

mentioned in the opening clause of the same paragraph, refers to

publication not only in the Official Gazette but also in a newspaper of

general circulation, and is procedural. Neither one nor the other is

dispensable. As to the first, publication in the Official Gazette is

indispensably necessary because without it, the court would be

powerless to assume jurisdiction over a particular land registration case.

As to the second, publication of the notice of initial hearing also in a

newspaper of general circulation is indispensably necessary as a

requirement of procedural due process; otherwise, any decision that the

court may promulgate in the case would be legally infirm.

Unsatisfied, private respondents appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals which,

as earlier explained, set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the

registration of the title in the name of Teodoro Abistado.

The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied in the challenged CA

Resolution dared November 19, 1991.


11/26

The Director of Lands represented by the Solicitor General thus elevated this

recourse to us. This Court notes that the petitioner's counsel anchored his petition

on Rule 65. This is an error. His remedy should be based on Rule 45 because he

is appealing a final disposition of the Court of Appeals. Hence, we shall treat his

petition as one for review under Rule 45, and not for certiorariunder Rule 65.9

The IssuePetitioner alleges that Respondent Court of Appeals committed "grave abuse of

discretion"10in holding

. . . that publication of the petition for registration of title in LRC Case

No. 86 need not be published in a newspaper of general circulation, and

in not dismissing LRC Case No. 86 for want of such publication.

Petitioner points out that under Section 23 of PD 1529, the notice of initial

hearing shall be "published bothin the Official Gazette andin a newspaper of

general circulation." According to petitioner, publication in the Official Gazette is

"necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the trial court, and . . . in . . . a newspaper

of general circulation to comply with the notice requirement of due process." 11

Private respondents, on the other hand, contend that failure to comply with the

requirement of publication in a newspaper of general circulation is a mere

"procedural defect." They add that publication in the Official Gazette is sufficient

to confer jurisdiction.12

In reversing the decision of the trial court, Respondent Court of Appeals ruled: 13

. . . although the requirement of publication in the Official

Gazette andin a newspaper of general circulation is couched in

mandatory terms, it cannot be gainsaid that the law also mandates with

equal force that publication in the Official Gazetteshallbe sufficient to

confer jurisdiction upon the court.

Further, Respondent Court found that the oppositors were afforded the

opportunity "to explain matters fully and present their side." Thus, it justified its

disposition in this wise:14

. . . We do not see how the lack of compliance with the required

procedure prejudiced them in any way. Moreover, the other

requirements of: publication in the Official Gazette, personal notice by

mailing, and posting at the site and other conspicuous places, were

complied with and these are sufficient to notify any party who is minded

to make any objection of the application for registration.

The Court's Ruling

We find for petitioner.

Newspaper Publication Mandatory

The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring

publication of the notice of initial hearing reads as follows:

Sec. 23.Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. The court shall,

within five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the

date and hour of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-

five days nor later than ninety days from the date of the order.

The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for

land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3)posting.

1.By publication.

Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing,

the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial

hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in a

newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines:Provided, however,

that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer

jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons

appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining

owners so far as known, and "to all whom it may concern." Said notice

shall also require all persons concerned to appear in court at a certain

date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not

be granted.

xxx xxx xxx

Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that

publication in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land

registration court. However, the question boils down to whether, absent any

publication in a newspaper of general circulation, the land registration court can

validly confirm and register the title of private respondents.

We answer this query in the negative. This answer is impelled by the demands of

statutory construction and the due process rationale behind the publication

requirement.

The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the

Commissioner of Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court order

setting the time for initial hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus

indicates the mandatory character of a statute. 15While concededly such literal

mandate is not an absolute rule in statutory construction, as its import ultimately

depends upon its context in the entire provision, we hold that in the present case

the term must be understood in its normal mandatory meaning. In Republic

vs.Marasigan,16the Court through Mr. Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. held that

Section 23 of PD 1529 requires notice of the initial hearing by means of (1)

publication, (2) mailing and (3) posting, all of which must be complied with. "If

the intention of the law were otherwise, said section would not have stressed in

detail the requirements of mailing of notices to all persons named in the petition


12/26

who, per Section 15 of the Decree, include owners of adjoining properties, and

occupants of the land." Indeed, if mailing of notices is essential, then by parity of

reasoning, publication in a newspaper of general circulation is likewise

imperative since the law included such requirement in its detailed provision.

It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem.17Being in

rem, such proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as

against allpersons, including the state, who have rights to or interests in the

property. Anin remproceeding is validated essentially through publication. This

being so, the process must strictly be complied with. Otherwise, persons who

may be interested or whose rights may be adversely affected would be barred

from contesting an application which they had no knowledge of. As has been

ruled, a party as an owner seeking the inscription of realty in the land registration

court must prove by satisfactory and conclusive evidence not only his ownership

thereof but the identity of the same, for he is in the same situation as one who

institutes an action for recovery of realty.18He must prove his title against the

whole world. This task, which rests upon the applicant, can best be achieved

when all persons concerned nay, "the whole world" who have rights to or

interests in the subject property are notified and effectively invited to come to

court and show cause why the application should not be granted. The elementary

norms of due process require that before the claimed property is taken from

concerned parties and registered in the name of the applicant, said parties must be

given notice and opportunity to oppose.

It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be

deemed mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the

Official Gazette as well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been

complied with in the case at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that

the Official Gazette is not as widely read and circulated as newspapers and is

oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices published therein may

not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such parties may

not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real

estate. In sum, the all-encompassingin remnature of land registration cases, the

consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective

of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory

construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.

Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement

of the law. Private respondents did not proffer any excuse; even if they had, it

would not have mattered because the statute itself allows no excuses. Ineludibly,

this Court has no authority to dispense with such mandatory requirement. The

law is unambiguous and its rationale clear. Time and again, this Court has

declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no

room for interpretation, vacillation or equivocation; there is room only for

application.19There is no alternative. Thus, the application for land registration

filed by private respondents must be dismissed without prejudice to reapplication

in the future, after all the legal requisites shall have been duly complied with.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision and

Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The application of private

respondent for land registration is DISMISSED without prejudice. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., is on leave.Footnotes

1Rollo, pp. 29-36.

2Ibid., p. 37.3 Seventh Division composed of Justice Celso L. Magsino,ponente; andJustices Serafin E. Camilon, Chairman; and Artemon D. Luna, concurring.

4Ibid., p. 35.5 Known as the Property Registration Decree.

6 Presided by Judge Niovady M. Martin.7Rollo, p. 41.8Ibid., pp. 41-42.

9 The Solicitor General asked for and was granted an extension of 30 dayswithin which to file a "petition for review on certiorari." It is thus strange whythe OSG described its petition as one "forcertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules

of Court." In any event, the Court, in its Resolution dated M arch 9, 1992admitted the OSG's "petition for review on certiorari," clearly ruling that the

petition was one for review, and not one for certiorari.10Ibid., p. 21. This should really read "reversible error" since as alreadyexplained, the petition should be treated as one for review under Rule 45.

11Ibid., pp. 22-23.12Ibid., pp. 56-57.13Ibid., p. 34; Decision, p. 6.

14Ibid.

15 Bersabal vs. Salvador, 84 SCRA 176, 179-180, July 21, 1978, citingDizonvs. Encarnacion, 9 SCRA 714, 716-717, December 24, 1963.16 198 SCRA 219, 227-228, June 6, 1991.

17 Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49, September 16, 1910.18 Archbishop of Manila vs. Arnedo, 30 Phil. 593, March 31, 1915.19 Cebu Portland Cement Company vs. Municipality of Naga, Cebu, 24 SCRA

708, 712, August 22, 1968 citingLizarraga Hermanos vs. Yap Tico, 24 Phil.504, 1913; People vs. Mapa, L-22301, August 30, 1967; Pacific Oxygen and

Acetylene Co. vs. Central Bank, L-21881, March 1, 1968; Dequito vs. Lopez,L-27757, March 28, 1968.


13/26


SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992

OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL,petitioners,

vs.

ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL C. PASCUAL, JOSE

C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C.

PASCUAL, WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE

OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO PASCUAL, ISOCELES

PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-

NER, NONA PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL,

GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE HONORABLE PRESIDING

JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro

Manila, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorariwhich seeks to reverse and set aside:

(a) the decision of the Court of Appeals 1dated April 29, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP.

No. 14010 entitled "Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual v. Esperanza C.Pascual-Bautista, Manuel C. Pascual, Jose Pascual, Susana C. Pascual-Bautista,

Erlinda C. Pascual, Wenceslao C. Pascual, Jr., et al." which dismissed the

petition and in effect affirmed the decision of the trial court and (b) the

resolution dated July 14, 1988 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

The undisputed facts of the case are as follows:

Petitioners Olivia and Hermes both surnamed Pascual are the acknowledged

natural children of the late Eligio Pascual, the latter being the full blood brother

of the decedent Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, petition, p. 17).

Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973 without any issue,

legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious children and wassurvived by the following:

(a) Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, surviving spouses;

(b) Children of Wenceslao Pascual, Sr., a brother of the full blood of the

deceased, to wit:

Esperanza C. Pascual-Bautista

Manuel C. Pascual

Jose C. Pascual

Susana C. Pascual-Bautista

Erlinda C. PascualWenceslao C. Pascual, Jr.

(c) Children of Pedro-Bautista, brother of the half blood of the deceased, to wit:

Avelino Pascual

Isoceles Pascual

Loida Pascual-Martinez

Virginia Pascual-Ner

Nona Pascual-Fernando

Octavio Pascual

Geranaia Pascual-Dubert;

(d) Acknowledged natural children of Eligio Pascual, brother of the full blood

of the deceased, to wit:

Olivia S. Pascual

Hermes S. Pascual

(e) Intestate of Eleuterio T. Pascual, a brother of the half blood of the deceased

and represented by the following:


14/26

Dominga M. Pascual

Mamerta P. Fugoso

Abraham S. Sarmiento, III

Regina Sarmiento-Macaibay

Eleuterio P. Sarmiento

Domiga P. San Diego

Nelia P. Marquez

Silvestre M. Pascual

Eleuterio M. Pascual

(Rollo, pp. 46-47)

Adela Soldevilla de Pascual, the surviving spouse of the late Don Andres

Pascual, filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 162 (CFI of Rizal,

Br. XXIII), a Special Proceeding, Case No. 7554, for administration of the

intestate estate of her late husband (Rollo, p. 47).

On December 18, 1973, Adela soldevilla de Pascual filed a Supplemental

Petition to the Petition for letters of Administration, where she expressly statedthat Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual, are among the heirs of Don Andres

Pascual (Rollo, pp. 99-101).

On February 27, 1974, again Adela Soldevilla de Pascual executed an affidavit,

to the effect that of her own knowledge, Eligio Pascual is the younger full

blood brother of her late husband Don Andres Pascual, to belie the statement

made by the oppositors, that they were are not among the known heirs of the

deceased Don Andres Pascual (Rollo, p. 102).

On October 16, 1985, all the above-mentioned heirs entered into a

COMPROMISE AGREEMENT, over the vehement objections of the herein

petitioners Olivia S. Pascual and Hermes S. Pascual, although paragraph V ofsuch compromise agreement provides, to wit:

This Compromise Agreement shall be without prejudice to the continuation of

the above-entitled proceedings until the final determination thereof by the

court, or by another compromise agreement, as regards the claims of Olivia

Pascual and Hermes Pascual as legal heirs of the deceased, Don Andres

Pascual. (Rollo, p. 108)

The said Compromise Agreement had been entered into despite the

Manifestation/Motion of the petitioners Olivia Pascual and Hermes Pascual,

manifesting their hereditary rights in the intestate estate of Don Andres

Pascual, their uncle (Rollo, pp. 111-112).

On September 30, 1987, petitioners filed their Motion to Reiterate HereditaryRights (Rollo, pp. 113-114) and the Memorandum in Support of Motion to

reiterate Hereditary Rights (Rollo, pp. 116-130).

On December 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court, presided over by Judge

Manuel S. Padolina issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves as it is hereby

resolved to Deny this motion reiterating the hereditary rights of Olivia and

Hermes Pascual (Rollo, p. 136).

On January 13, 1988, petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration (Rollo,

pp. 515-526). and such motion was denied.

Petitioner appealed their case to the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. No.

14010 (Rollo, p. 15.).

On Aril 29, 1988, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered its decision the

decision the dispositive part of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo,

ii & iii of statcon cases

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