statcon cases 12-20

8/6/2019 Statcon Cases 12-20

1/32

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

ManilaEN BANC

G.R. No. L-15045 January 20, 1961IN RE: PETITION FOR EXEMPTION FROM COVERAGE BY THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM.

ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, petitioner-appellant,vs.SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, respondent-appellee.Feria, Manglapus and Associates for petitioner-appellant.Legal Staff, Social Security System and Solicitor General for respondent-appellee.GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:On September 1, 1958, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, thru counsel, filed with theSocial Security Commission a request that "Catholic Charities, and all religious and charitableinstitutions and/or organizations, which are directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, operated by theRoman Catholic Archbishop of Manila," be exempted from compulsory coverage of Republic ActNo. 1161, as amended, otherwise known as the Social Security Law of 1954. The request wasbased on the claim that the said Act is a labor law and does not cover religious and charitableinstitutions but is limited to businesses and activities organized for profit. Acting upon therecommendation of its Legal Staff, the Social Security Commission in its Resolution No. 572,

series of 1958, denied the request. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, reiterating itsarguments and raising constitutional objections, requested for reconsideration of the resolution.The request, however, was denied by the Commission in its Resolution No. 767, series of 1958;hence, this appeal taken in pursuance of section 5(c) of Republic Act No. 1161, as amended.Section 9 of the Social Security Law, as amended, provides that coverage "in the System shall becompulsory upon all members between the age of sixteen and sixty rears inclusive, if they havebeen for at least six months a the service of an employer who is a member of the System,Provided, that the Commission may not compel any employer to become member of the Systemunless he shall have been in operation for at least two years and has at the time of admission, ifadmitted for membership during the first year of the System's operation at least fifty employees,and if admitted for membership the following year of operation and thereafter, at least sixemployees x x x." The term employer" as used in the law is defined as any person, natural orjuridical, domestic or foreign, who carries in the Philippines any trade, business, industry,undertaking, or activity of any kind and uses the services of another person who is under hisorders as regards the employment, except the Government and any of its political subdivisions,branches or instrumentalities, including corporations owned or controlled by the Government" (par.[c], see. 8), while an "employee" refers to "any person who performs services for an 'employer' inwhich either or both mental and physical efforts are used and who receives compensation for suchservices" (par. [d], see. 8). "Employment", according to paragraph [i] of said section 8, covers anyservice performed by an employer except those expressly enumerated thereunder, likeemployment under the Government, or any of its political subdivisions, branches orinstrumentalities including corporations owned and controlled by the Government, domesticservice in a private home, employment purely casual, etc.From the above legal provisions, it is apparent that the coverage of the Social Security Law ispredicated on the existence of an employer-employee relationship of more or less permanentnature and extends to employment of all kinds except those expressly excluded.Appellant contends that the term "employer" as defined in the law should following the principle

ofejusdem generis be limited to those who carry on "undertakings or activities which have theelement of profit or gain, or which are pursued for profit or gain," because the phrase ,activity ofany kind" in the definition is preceded by the words "any trade, business, industry, undertaking."The contention cannot be sustained. The rule ejusdem generis applies only where there isuncertainty. It is not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would therebybe hindered and defeated. (Grosjean vs. American Paints Works [La], 160 So. 449). In the case atbar, the definition of the term "employer" is, we think, sufficiently comprehensive as to includereligious and charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit, like herein appellant, withinits meaning. This is made more evident by the fact that it contains an exception in which saidinstitutions or entities are not included. And, certainly, had the Legislature really intended to limitthe operation of the law to entities organized for profit or gain, it would not have defined an"employer" in such a way as to include the Government and yet make an express exception of it.It is significant to note that when Republic Act No. 1161 was enacted, services performed in theemploy of institutions organized for religious or charitable purposes were by express provisions of

said Act excluded from coverage thereof (sec. 8, par. [j] subpars. 7 and 8). That portion of the law,however, has been deleted by express provision of Republic Act No. 1792, which took effect in


2/32

1957. This is clear indication that the Legislature intended to include charitable and religiousinstitutions within the scope of the law.In support of its contention that the Social Security Law was intended to cover only employment forprofit or gain, appellant also cites the discussions of the Senate, portions of which were quoted inits brief. There is, however, nothing whatsoever in those discussions touching upon the question ofwhether the law should be limited to organizations for profit or gain. Of course, the saiddiscussions dwelt at length upon the need of a law to meet the problems of industrializing societyand upon the plight of an employer who fails to make a profit. But this is readily explained by thefact that the majority of those to be affected by the operation of the law are corporations andindustries which are established primarily for profit or gain.Appellant further argues that the Social Security Law is a labor law and, consequently, followingthe rule laid down in the case ofBoy Scouts of the Philippines vs. Araos (G.R. No. L-10091,January 29, 1958) and other cases1, applies only to industry and occupation for purposes of profitand gain. The cases cited, however, are not in point, for the reason that the law therein involvedexpressly limits its application either to commercial, industrial, or agricultural establishments, orenterprises. .Upon the other hand, the Social Security Law was enacted pursuant to the "policy of the Republicof the Philippines to develop, establish gradually and perfect a social security system which shallbe suitable to the needs of the people throughout the Philippines and shall provide protection toemployees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death." (See. 2, Republic Act

No. 1161, as amended.) Such enactment is a legitimate exercise of the police power. It affordsprotection to labor, especially to working women and minors, and is in full accord with theconstitutional provisions on the "promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economicsecurity of all the people." Being in fact a social legislation, compatible with the policy of theChurch to ameliorate living conditions of the working class, appellant cannot arbitrarily delimit theextent of its provisions to relations between capital and labor in industry and agriculture.There is no merit in the claim that the inclusion of religious organizations under the coverage of theSocial Security Law violates the constitutional prohibition against the application of public funds forthe use, benefit or support of any priest who might be employed by appellant. The fundscontributed to the System created by the law are not public funds, but funds belonging to themembers which are merely held in trust by the Government. At any rate, assuming that said fundsare impressed with the character of public funds, their payment as retirement death or disabilitybenefits would not constitute a violation of the cited provisions of the Constitution, since suchpayment shall be made to the priest not because he is a priest but because he is an employee.

Neither may it be validly argued that the enforcement of the Social Security Law impairsappellant's right to disseminate religious information. All that is required of appellant is to makemonthly contributions to the System for covered employees in its employ. These contributions,contrary to appellant's contention, are not in the nature of taxes on employment." Together withthe contributions imposed upon the employees and the Government, they are intended for theprotection of said employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old age and death in linewith the constitutional mandate to promote social justice to insure the well-being and economicsecurity of all the people.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Resolutions Nos. 572 kind 767, series of 1958, of the SocialSecurity Commission are hereby affirmed. So ordered with costs against appellant.Paras, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Barrera, JJ., concur in the result.Bengzon, J., reserves his vote.


3/32


Baguio CityEN BANC

G.R. No. 127116 April 8, 1997

ALEX L. DAVID, in his own behalf as Barangay Chairman of Barangay 77, Zone 7, KalookanCity and as President of the LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY SA PILIPINAS, petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Department of Interior and Local Government, and THEHONORABLE SECRETARY, Department of Budget and Management, respondents.G.R. No. 128039 April 8, 1997LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY QUEZON CITY CHAPTER, Represented by BONIFACIO M.RILLON, petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET ANDMANAGEMENT, respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:The two petitions before us raise a common question: How long is the term of office of barangay

chairmen and other barangay officials who were elected to their respective offices on the secondMonday of May 1994? Is it three years, as provided by RA 7160 (the Local Government Code) orfive years, as contained in RA 6679? Contending that their term is five years, petitioners ask thisCourt to order the cancellation of the scheduled barangay election this coming May 12, 1997 andto reset it to the second Monday of May, 1999.

The AntecedentsG.R. No. 127116

In his capacity as barangay chairman of Barangay 77, Zone 7, Kalookan City and as president ofthe Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas, Petitioner Alex L. David filed on December 2, 1996 apetition for prohibition docketed in this Court as G.R. No. 127116, under Rule 65 of the Rules ofCourt, to prohibit the holding of the barangay election scheduled on the second Monday of May1997. On January 14, 1997, the Court resolved to require the respondents to comment on thepetition within a non-extendible period of fifteen days ending on January 29, 1997.On January 29, 1997, the Solicitor General filed his four-page Comment siding with petitioner andpraying that "the election scheduled on May 12, 1997 be held in abeyance." RespondentCommission on Elections filed a separate Comment, dated February 1, 1997 opposing thepetition. On February 11, 1997, the Court issued a Resolution giving due course to the petition andrequiring the parties to file simultaneous memoranda within a non-extendible period of twenty daysfrom notice. It also requested former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. 1 to act as amicuscuriae and to file a memorandum also within a non-extendible period of twenty days. It noted butdid not grant petitioner's Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ ofPreliminary Injunction dated January 31, 1997 (as well as his Urgent Ex-Parte Second Motion tothe same effect, dated March 6, 1997). Accordingly, the parties filed their respective memoranda.The Petition for Leave to Intervene filed on March 17, 1997 by Punong Barangay Rodson F. Mayorwas denied as it would just unduly delay the resolution of the case, his interest like those of allother barangay officials being already adequately represented by Petitioner David who filed thispetition as "president of the Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas."

G.R. No. 128039On February 20, 1997, Petitioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter represented by itspresident Bonifacio M. Rillon filed a petition, docketed as G.R. No. 128039, "to seek a judicialreview by certiorarito declare as unconstitutional:

1. Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160 which reads as follows:(c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniangkabataan shall be for three (3) years, which shall begin after the regular electionof barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994.2. COMELEC Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 fixing the date of the holding of thebarangay elections on May 12, 1997 and other activities related thereto;

3. The budgetary appropriation of P400 million contained in Republic Act No.8250 otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1997 intended todefray the costs and expenses in holding the 1997 barangay elections: 2

Comelec Resolution 2880, 3 promulgated on December 27, 1996 and referred to above, adopted a"Calendar of Activities and List and Periods of Certain Prohibited Acts for the May 12, 1997Barangay Elections." On the other hand, Comelec Resolution 2887 promulgated on February 5,


4/32

1997 moved certain dates fixed in Resolution 2880.4

Acting on the petition, the Court on February 25, 1997 required respondents to submit theircomment thereon within a non-extendible period of ten days ending on March 7, 1997. The Courtfurther resolved to consolidate the two cases inasmuch as they raised basically the same issue.Respondent Commission filed its Comment on March 6, 1997 5 and the Solicitor General, inrepresentation of the other respondent, filed his on March 6, 1997. Petitioner's Urgent OmnibusMotion for oral argument and temporary restraining order was noted but not granted. The petitionwas deemed submitted for resolution by the Court without need of memoranda.

The IssuesBoth petitions though worded differently raise the same ultimate issue: How long is the term ofoffice of barangay officials?Petitioners 6 contend that under Sec. 2 of Republic Act No. 6653, approved on May 6, 1988, "(t)heterm of office of barangay officials shall be for five (5) years . . ." This is reiterated in Republic ActNo. 6679, approved on November 4, 1988, which reset the barangay elections from "the secondMonday of November 1988" to March 28, 1989 and provided in Sec. 1 thereof that such five-yearterm shall begin on the "first day of May 1989 and ending on the thirty-first day of May 1994."Petitioners further aver7 that although Sec. 43 of RA 7160 reduced the term of office of all localelective officials to three years, such reduction does not apply to barangay officials because (1) RA6679 is a special law applicable only to barangays while RA 7160 is a general law which applies toall other local government units; (2) RA 7160 does not expressly or impliedly repeal RA 6679

insofar as the term of barangay officials is concerned; (3) while Sec. 8 of Article X of the 1987constitution fixes the term of elective local officials at three years, the same provision states thatthe term of barangay officials "shall be determined by law"; and (4) thus, it follows that theconstitutional intention is to grant barangay officials any term, except three years; otherwise, "therewould be no rhyme or reason for the framers of the Constitution to except barangay officials fromthe three year term found in Sec. 8 (of) Article X of the Constitution." Petitioners conclude (1) thatthe Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion when it promulgated ResolutionNos. 2880 and 2887 because it "substituted its own will for that of the legislative and usurped thejudicial function . . . by interpreting the conflicting provisions of Sec. 1 of RA 6679 and Sec. 43 (c)of RA 7160; and (2) that the appropriation of P400 million in the General Appropriation Act of 1997(RA 8250) to be used in the conduct of the barangay elections on May 12, 1997 is itselfunconstitutional and a waste of public funds.The Solicitor General agrees with petitioners, arguing that RA 6679 was not repealed by RA 7160and thus "he believes that the holding of the barangay elections (o)n the second Monday of May

1997 is without sufficient legal basis."Respondent Commission on Elections, through Chairman Bernardo P. Pardo, defends its assailedResolutions and maintains that the repealing clause of RA 7160 includes "all laws, whethergeneral or special, inconsistent, with the provisions of the Local Government Code," citing thisCourt's dictum in Parasvs. Comelec8 that "the next regular election involving the barangay officeis barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled in May 1997." Furthermore, RA8250 (the General Appropriations Act for 1997) and RA 8189 (providing for a general registrationof voters) both "indicate that Congress considered that the barangay elections shall take place inMay, 1997, as provided for in RA 7160, Sec. 43 (c)." 9 Besides, petitioners cannot claim a term ofmore than three years since they were elected under the aegis of the Local Government Code of1991 which prescribes a term of only three years. Finally, Respondent Comelec denies the chargeof grave abuse of discretion stating that the "question presented . . . is a purely legal one involvingno exercise of an act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion." 10

As amicus curiae, former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. urges the Court to deny the petitionsbecause (1) the Local Autonomy Code repealed both RA 6679 and 6653 "not only by implicationbut by design as well"; (2) the legislative intent is to shorten the term of barangay officials to threeyears; (3) the barangay officials should not have a term longer than that of their administrativesuperiors, the city and municipal mayors; and (4) barangay officials are estopped from contestingthe applicability of the three-year term provided by the Local Government Code as they wereelected under the provisions of said Code.From the foregoing discussions of the parties, the Court believes that the issues can becondensed into; three, as follows:

1. Which law governs the term of office of barangay official: RA 7160 or RA6679?2. Is RA 7160 insofar as it shortened such term to only three years constitutional?3. Are petitioners estopped from claiming a term other than that provided underRA 7160?.

The Court's RulingThe petitions are devoid of merit.


5/32

Brief Historical Backgroundof Barangay Elections

For a clear understanding of the issues, it is necessary to delve briefly into the history of barangayelections.An a unit of government, the barangay antedated the Spanish conquest of the Philippines Theword "barangay" is derived from the Malay "balangay," a boat which transported them (the Malays)to these shores. 11 Quoting from Juan de Plasencia, a Franciscan missionary in 1577, HistorianConrado Benitez 12 wrote that the barangay was ruled by a dato who exercised absolute powers ofgovernment. While the Spaniards kept the barangay as the basic structure of government, theystripped the dato orrajah, of his powers. 13 Instead, power was centralized nationally in thegovernor general and locally in the encomiendero and later, in the alcalde mayorandthegobernadorcillo. The dato orrajah was much later renamed cabeza de barangay, who waselected by the local citizens possessing property. The position degenerated from a title of honor tothat of a "mere government employee. Only the poor who needed a salary, no matter how low,accepted the post." 14

After the Americans colonized the Philippines, the barangays became known as "barrios." 15 Forsome time, the laws governing barrio governments were found in the Revised Administrative Codeof 1916 and later in the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. 16 Barrios were granted autonomy bythe original Barrio Charter, RA 2370, and formally recognized as quasi-municipal corporations 17 bythe Revised Barrio Charter, RA 3590. During the martial law regime, barrios were "declared" or

renamed "barangays" a reversion really to their pre-Spanish names by PD. No. 86 and PDNo. 557. Their basic organization and functions under RA 3590, which was expressly "adopted asthe Barangay Charter, were retained. However, the titles of the officials were changed to"barangay captain," "barangay councilman," "barangay secretary" and "barangay treasurer."Pursuant to Sec. 6 of Batas Pambansa Big. 222, 18 "a Punong Barangay (Barangay Captain) andsix Kagawads ng Sangguniang Barangay (Barangay Councilmen), who shall constitute thepresiding officer and members of the Sangguniang Barangay (Barangay Council) respectively"were first elected on May 17, 1982. They had a term of six years which began on June 7, 1982.The Local Government Code of 1983 19 also fixed the term of office of local elective officials at sixyears. 20Under this Code, the chief officials of the barangay were the punong barangay, six electivesangguniang barangay members, the kabataang barangay chairman, a barangay secretary and a

barangay treasurer. 21B.P. Blg. 881, the Omnibus Election Code, 22 reiterated that barangayofficials "shall hold office, for six years," and stated that their election was to be held "on thesecond Monday of May nineteen hundred and eighty eight and on the same day every six yearsthereafter." 23

This election scheduled by B.P. Blg. 881 on the second Monday of May 1988 was reset to "thesecond Monday of November 1988 and every five years thereafter24 by RA 6653. Under this law,the term of office of the barangay officials was cut to five years 25 and the punong barangay was tobe chosen from among themselves by seven kagawads, who in turn were to be elected at large bythe barangay electorate. 26

But the election date set by RA 6653 on the second Monday of November 1988 was again"postponed and reset to March 28, 1989" by RA 6679, 27 and the term of office of barangay officialswas to begin on May 1, 1989 and to end on May 31, 1994. RA 6679 further provided that "thereshall be held a regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May 1994 and onthe same day every five (5) years thereafter Their term shall be for five years . . . " 28 Significantly,the manner of election of the punong barangay was changed. Sec. 5 of said law ordained thatwhile the seven kagawads were to be elected by the registered voters of the barangay, "(t)he

candidate who obtains the highest number of votes shall be the punong barangay and in the eventof a tie, there shall be a drawing of lots under the supervision of the Commission on Elections."Under the Local Government Code of 1991, RA 7160, 29 several provisions concerning barangayofficial were introduced:

(1) The term of office was reduced to three years, as follows:Sec. 43. Term of Office.

xxx xxx xxx(c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniangkabataan shall be for three (3)years, which shall begin after the regular electionof barangay officials on the second Monday of May, 1994 (Emphasis supplied.)

(2) The composition of the Sangguniang Barangay and the manner of electing its officials werealtered, inter alia, the barangay chairman was to be elected directly by the electorate, as follows:

Sec. 387. Chief Officials and Offices. (a) There shall be in each barangay apunong barangay, seven (7) sanggunian barangay members, the sanggunian

kabataan chairman, a barangay secretary and a barangay treasurer.xxx xxx xxx


6/32

Sec. 390. Composition. The Sangguniang barangay, the legislative body of thebarangay, shall be composed of the punong barangay as presiding officer, andthe seven (7) regular sangguniang barangay members elected at large and thesangguniang kabataan chairman as members.Sec. 41. Manner of Election. (a) The . . . punong barangay shall be elected atlarge . . . by the qualified voters in the barangay. (Emphasis supplied.)

Pursuant to the foregoing mandates of the Local Autonomy Code, the qualified barangayvoters actually votedfor one punong barangay and seven (7) kagawads during the barangayelections held on May 9, 1994. In other words, the punong barangay was elected directly andseparately by the electorate, and not by the seven (7) kagawads from among themselves.

The First Issue: Clear Legislative Intentand Design to Limit Term to Three Years

In light of the foregoing brief historical background, the intent and design of the legislature to limitthe term of barangay officials to only three (3) years as provided under the Local GovernmentCode emerges as bright as the sunlight. The cardinal rule in the interpretation of all laws is toascertain and give effect to the intent of the law. 30And three years is the obvious intent.First. RA 7160, the Local Government Code, was enacted later than RA 6679. It is basic that incase of an irreconciliable conflict between two laws of different vintages, the later enactmentprevails. 31Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. The rationale is simple: a later lawrepeals an earlier one because it is the later legislative will. It is to be presumed that the

lawmakers knew the older law and intended to change it. In enacting the older law, the legislatorscould not have known the newer one and hence could not have intended to change what they didnot know. Under the Civil Code, laws are repealed only by subsequent ones 32 and not the otherway around.Under Sec. 43-c of RA 7160, the term of office of barangay officials was fixed at "three (3) yearswhich shall begin after the regular election of barangay officials on the second Monday of May1994." This provision is clearly inconsistent with and repugnant to Sec. 1 of RA 6679 which statesthat such "term shall be for five years." Note that both laws refer to the same officials who wereelected "on the second Monday of May 1994."Second. RA 6679 requires the barangay voters to elect seven kagawads and the candidateobtaining the highest number of votes shall automatically be the punong barangay. RA 6653empowers the seven elected barangay kagawads to select the punong barangay from amongthemselves. On the other hand, the Local Autonomy Code mandates a direct vote on the barangaychairman by the entire barangay electorate, separately from the seven kagawads. Hence, under

the Code, voters elect eight barangay officials, namely, the punong barangay plus the sevenkagawads. Under both RA 6679 and 6653, they vote for only seven kagawads, and not for thebarangay chairman.Third. During the barangay elections held on May 9, 1994 (second Monday), the voters actuallyand directly elected one punong barangay and seven kagawads. If we agree with the thesis ofpetitioners, it follows that all the punong barangays were elected illegally and thus, Petitioner AlexDavid cannot claim to be a validly elected barangay chairman, much less president of the nationalleague, of barangays which he purports to represent in this petition. It then necessarily follows alsothat he is not the real party-in-interest and on that ground, his petition should be summarilydismissed.Fourth. In enacting the general appropriations act of 1997, 33 Congress appropriated the amount ofP400 million to cover expenses for the holding of barangay elections this year. Likewise, underSec. 7 of RA 8189, Congress ordained that a general registration of voters shall be held

"immediately after the barangay elections in 1997." These are clear and expresscontemporaneous statements of Congress that barangay officials shall be elected this May, inaccordance with Sec. 43-c of RA 7160.Fifth. In Parasvs. Comelec, 34 this Court said that "the next regular election involving the barangayoffice concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled in May,1997." This judicial decision, per Article 8 of the Civil Code, is now a "part of the legal system ofthe Philippines."Sixth. Petitioners pompously claim that RA 6679, being a special law, should prevail over RA7160, all alleged general law pursuant to the doctrine ofgeneraila specialibus non derogant.Petitioners are wrong. RA. 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically applies to localgovernment units. It specifically and definitively provides in its Sec. 43-c that "the term of office ofbarangay officials . . . shall be for three years." It is a special provision that applies only to the termof barangay officials who were elected on the second Monday of May 1994. With suchparticularity, the provision cannot be deemed a general law. Petitioner may be correct in alleging

that RA 6679 is a special law, but they are incorrect in stating (without however giving the reasonstherefor) that RA 7160 is necessarily a general law. 35 It is a special law insofar as it governs the


7/32

term of office of barangay officials. In its repealing clause, 36 RA 7160 states that "all general andspecial laws . . . which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealedor modified accordingly." There being a clear repugnance and incompatibility between the twospecific provisions, they cannot stand together. The later law, RA 7160, should thus prevail inaccordance with its repealing clause. When a subsequent law encompasses entirely the subjectmatter of the former enactments, the latter is deemed repealed. 37

The Second Issue: Three-Year TermNot Repugnant, to Constitution

Sec. 8, Article X of the Constitution states:Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,which shall be determined by law, shall be three years, and no such official shallserve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the officefor any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuityof his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Petetioner Liga ng mga Barangay Quezon City Chapter posits that by excepting barangay officialswhose "term shall be determined by law" from the general provision fixing the term of "electivelocal officials" at three years, the Constitution thereby impliedlyprohibits Congress from legislatinga three year term for such officers. We find this theory rather novel but nonetheless logically andlegally flawed.Undoubtedly, the Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term of office for

barangay officials. It merely left the determination of such term to the lawmaking body, without anyspecific limitation or prohibition, thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term inaccordance with the exigencies of public service. It must be remembered that every law has in itsfavor the presumption of constitutionality. 38 For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there isa clear and unequivocal (not just implied) breach of the Constitution. 39 To strike down a law asunconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the fundamental lawprohibits, the statute permits. 40 The petitioners have miserably failed to discharge this burden andto show clearly the unconstitutionality they aver.There is absolutely no doubt in our mind that Sec. 43-c of RA 7160 is constitutional. Sec. 8, ArticleX of the Constitution limiting the term of all elective local officials to three years, except that ofbarangay officials which "shall be determined by law" was an amendment proposed byConstitutional Commissioner (now Supreme Court Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr. According to Fr.Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., the amendment was "readily accepted without much discussion andformally approved." Indeed, a search into the Record of the Constitutional Commission yielded

only a few pages 41 of actual deliberations, the portions pertinent to the ConstitutionalCommission's intent being the following:

MR. NOLLEDO. One clarificatory question, Madam President. What will be theterm of the office of barangay officials as provided for?MR. DAVIDE. As may be determined by law..MR. NOLLEDO. As provided for in the Local Government Code?MR. DAVIDE. Yes.

xxx xxx xxxTHE PRESIDENT. Is there any other comment? Is there any objection to thisproposed new section as submitted by Commissioner Davide and accepted bythe Committee?MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, does this prohibition to serve for more thanthree consecutive terms apply to barangay officials?

MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, the voting that we had on the terms of office didnot include the barangay officials because it was then the stand of the Chairmanof the Committee on Local Governments that the term of barangay officials mustbe determined by law. So it is now for the law to determine whether the restrictionon the number of reelections will be included in the Local Government Code.MR. RODRIGO. So that is up to Congress to decide.MR. DAVIDE. Yes.MR. RODRIGO. I just wanted that clear in the record.

Although the discussions in the Constitutional Commission were very brief, they nonethelessprovide the exact answer to the main issue. To the question at issue here on how long the term ofbarangay officials is, the answer of the Commission was simple, clear and quick: "As may bedetermined by law"; more precisely, "(a)s provided for in the Local Autonomy Code." And the LocalAutonomy Code, in its Sec. 43-c, limits their term to three years.

The Third Issue: Petitioners Estopped From

Challenging Their Three-Year TermsWe have already shown that constitutionally, statutorily, logically, historically and


8/32

commonsensically, the petitions are completely devoid of merit. And we could have ended ourDecision right here. But there is one last point why petitioners have no moral ascendancy for theirdubious claim to a longer term of office: the equities of their own petition militate against them. Aspointed out byAmicus Curiae Pimentel, 42 petitioners are barred by estoppel from pursuing theirpetitions.Respondent Commission on Elections submitted as Annex "A" of its memorandum, 43 a machinecopy of the certificate of candidacy of Petitioner Alex L. David in the May 9, 1994 barangayelections, the authenticity of which was not denied by said petitioner. In said certificate ofcandidacy, he expressly stated under oath that he was announcing his "candidacy for the office ofpunong barangay for Barangay 77, Zone 7" of Kalookan City and that he was "eligible for saidoffice." The Comelec also submitted as Annex "B" 44 to its said memorandum, a certified statementof the votes obtained by the candidates in said elections, thus:

BARANGAY 77CERTIFIED LIST OF CANDIDATES

VOTES OBTAINEDMay 9, 1994 BARANGAY ELECTIONS

PUNONG BARANGAY VOTES OBTAINED1. DAVID, ALEX L. 112

KAGAWAD1. Magalona, Ruben 150

2. Quinto, Nelson L. 1303. Ramon, Dolores Z. 1204. Dela Pena, Roberto T. 1155. Castillo, Luciana 1146. Lorico, Amy A. 1077. Valencia, Arnold 1028. Ang, Jose 979. Dequilla, Teresita D. 5810. Primavera, Marcelina 52

If, as claimed by petitioners, the applicable law is RA 6679, then (1) Petitioner David should nothave run and could not have been elected chairman of his barangay because under RA 6679,there was to be no direct election for the punong barangay; the kagawad candidate who obtainedthe highest number of votes was to be automatically elected barangay chairman; (2) thus, applyingsaid law, the punong barangay should have been Ruben Magalona, who obtained the highest

number of votes among the kagawads 150, which was much more than David's 112; (3) theelectorate should have elected only seven kagawads and not one punong barangay plus sevenkagawads.In other words, following petitioners' own theory, the election of Petitioner David as well as all thebarangay chairmen of the two Liga petitioners was illegal.The sum total of these absurdities in petitioners' theory is that barangay officials are estopped fromasking for any term other than that which they ran for and were elected to, under the law governingthie very claim to such offices: namely, RA 7160, the Local Government Code. Petitioners' belatedclaim of ignorance as to what law governed their election to office in 1994 is unacceptablebecause under Art. 3 of the Civil Code, "(i)gnorance of the law excuses no one from compliancetherewith."

EpilogueIt is obvious that these two petitions must fail. The Constitution and the laws do not support them.

Extant jurisprudence militates against them. Reason and common sense reject them. Equity andmorality abhor them. They are subtle but nonetheless self-serving propositions to lengthengovernance without a mandate from the governed. In a democracy, elected leaders can legallyand morally justify their reign only by obtaining the voluntary consent of the electorate. In this casehowever, petitioners propose to extend their terms not by seeking the people's vote but by faultylegal argumentation This Court cannot and will not grant its imprimatur to such untenableproposition. If they want to continue serving, they must get a new mandate in the electionsscheduled on May 12, 1997.WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED for being completely devoid of merit.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Mendoza,Francisco and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.Vitug, J., reserves his vote.Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines


9/32

SUPREME COURTManila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 107797 August 26, 1996PURITA SALVATIERRA, ELENITA SALVATIERRA NUNEZ, ANSELMO SALVATIERRA, JR.,

EMELITA SALVATIERRA, and ROMEL SALVATIERRA, petitioners,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. LINO LONGALONG and PACIENCIAMARIANO,respondents.

HERMOSISIMA, JR. J.:pThe intricate yet timeworn issue of prescription has come to the fore in this case. Whichprescriptive period for actions for annulment should prevail, Art. 1391 of the New CivilCode which limits the filing of actions to four (4) years or Art. 1144 of the same Codewhich limits the period of the filing of actions on certain grounds to ten years? Likewise, atissue is whether or not there was a double sale to a party or parties under the factsobtaining.The petitioners in this case filed the herein petition forcertiorari, assailing as they do thedecision of the Court of Appeals which held 1:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is herein REVERSED, defendants-appellees are ordered to reconvey to plaintiffs-appellants the 149-sq. m. portionof Lot. 26 registered in the name of Anselmo Salvatierra under OCT 0-4221 asdescribed in the deed of sale Exh. "A" or "1" of this case; and defendants-appellees are furthermore ordered to pay plaintiffs-appellants the amount ofP5,000.00 as attorney's fees.

The antecedent facts are not disputed:In 1930, Enrique Salvatierra died intestate and without any issue. He was survived by hislegitimate brothers: Tomas, Bartolome, Venancio and Macario, and sisterMarcela, allsurnamed Salvatierra. His estate consisted of three (3) parcels of land, more particularlydescribed in the following manner:

Cad. Lot No. 25 covered by Tax Declaration No. 11950A parcel of land Lot No. 25, situated at Poblacion, San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija.Bounded on the NE-Lots Nos. 26 & 27; on the SE-Rizal St., SW-Lot No. 24; andon the NW-Bonifacio Street. Containing an area of ONE THOUSAND ONEHUNDRED AND SIXTEEN (1,116) sq. m. more or less and assessed atP1,460.00.Cad. Lot No. 26 covered by Tax Decl. No. 11951A parcel of land situated at Poblacion, San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija, Lot No. 26,bounded on the NE-Lot No. 29 & 27; on the SE-Lot No. 25; and on the NW-Bonifacio St. Containing an area of SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY NINE (749) sq.m. more or less and assessed at P720.00.Cad. Lot No. 27 Covered by Tax Decl. No. 11949A parcel of land situated at Poblacion, San Leonardo, Nueva Ecija, Lot No. 27,bounded on the NE-Lot No. 28; SE-Rizal St.; SW-Lot No. 25 and on the NW-LotNo. 26. Containing an area of SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY (670) sq. m. more orless.

(Exh. :B: or "2")On May 4, 1966, Macario Salvatierra sold Lot No. 26 to his son, Anselmo Salvatierra bymeans of a deed of sale, and in consideration of the amount of P1,000.00. Meanwhile,Marcela, prior to her death sold her 1/5 undivided share in the Estate of EnriqueSalvatierra to her brother, Venancio. After the death of Bartolome, his heirs Catalina andIgnacia Marquez sold his 1/5 undivided share to Tomas and his wife, Catalina Azarcon.On September 24, 1968, an "Extrajudicial Partition with Confirmation of Sale" wasexecuted by and among the surviving legal heirs and descendants of Enrique Salvatierra,which consisted of the aforementioned Lot No. 25, 26 and 27. By virtue of the saleexecuted by Marcela in favor of Venancio, the latter now owns 2/5 shares of the estate.By virtue of the sale by Bartolome's heirs Catalina and Ignacia, of his undivided shares toTomas, now deceased, represented by his widow, Catalina Azarcon, the latter now owns2/5 shares in the said estate. Anselmo Salvatierra represented his father Macario, whohad already died. The extrajudicial partition with confirmation of sale summed up the

shares assigned to the heirs of Enrique Salvatierra:To: VENANCIO SALVATIERRA 1,041 sq. m. known as Lot


10/32

No. 27 covered by Tax Decl. N. 11949 and portion of LotNo. 26 covered by Tax Decl. No. 11951;

To: Macario Salvatierra now ANSELMO SALVATIERRA 405 sq. m. known asLot No. 26-part and covered by Tax. Decl. No. 11951;To: HEIRS OF TOMAS SALVATIERRA 1,116 sq. m. the whole of Lot No. 25and declared under Tax Decl. No. 11950.

Legal Heirs of Tomas Salvatierra are:Montano SalvatierraAnselmo SalvatierraDonata SalvatierraFrancisco SalvatierraCecilio SalvatierraLeonilla Salvatierra

(Exhs. "B-1", and 2-B", p. 8, id.). 2

(Emphasis supplied)Thereafter, on June 15, 1970, Venancio sold the whole of Lot No. 27 and a 149-sq. m.portion of Lot 26 for the consideration of P8,500.00 to herein respondent spouses LinoLongalong and Paciencia Mariano. The Longalongs took possession of the said lots. Itwas discovered in 1982 (through a relocation survey) that the 149 sq. m. portion of LotNo. 26 was outside their fence. It turned out that Anselmo Salvatierra was able to obtain a

title, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-4221 in his name, the title covering the whole of LotNo. 26 which has an area of 749 sq. m.Efforts to settle the matter at the barangay level proved futile because Purita Salvatierra(widow of Anselmo) refused to yield to the demand of Lino Longalong to return to thelatter the 149 sq. m. portion of Lot No. 26.Private respondents Longalong then filed a case with the RTC for the reconveyance of thesaid portion of Lot 26. The court a quo dismissed the case on the following grounds: 1)that Longalong, et al. failed to establish ownership of the portion of the land in question,and 2) that the prescriptive period of four (4) years from discovery of the alleged fraudcommitted by defendants' predecessor Anselmo Salvatierra within which plaintiffs shouldhave filed their action had already elapsed. 3

On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled:To start with, a vendor can sell only what he owns or what he is authorized to sell(Segura v. Segura, 165 SCRA 368). As to the co-owner of a piece of land, he canof course sell his pro indiviso share therein to anyone (Art. 493, New Civil Code;Pamplona v. Moreto, 96 SCRA 775), but he cannot sell more than his sharetherein.The deed of extrajudicial partition with confirmation of previous sale Exh. "B" or"2" executed by the heirs of Enrique Salvatierra was explicit that the share ofAnselmo Salvatierra which he got from his father Macario Salvatierra thru sale,was only Four Hundred Five (405) sq. mts. out of Lot No. 26 (Exhs. "B-1" and "B-2"), the whole lot of which has an area of 749 sq. mts., so that 344 sq. mts. ofsaid lot do not pertain to Anselmo Salvatierra and his heirs, herein defendants-appellees. This must be the reason why, in said deed of extrajudicial partition,Venancio Salvatierra was still given a "portion of Lot No. 26 covered by TaxDeclaration No. 11951" (Exh. "B-3", p. 7, Rec.), for logically, if the whole of LotNo. 26 measuring 749 sq. mts. had been given to Anselmo Salvatierra, Venancio

Salvatierra would no longer be entitled to a portion of said lot. And as both partiesto this case do not at all dispute the truth, correctness, and authenticity of thedeed of extrajudicial partition with confirmation of sale Exh. "B" or "2" datedSeptember 24, 1968, as in fact both parties even marked the same as their ownexhibit, we have no choice but simply to enforce the provisions of said deed.Now, as we have stated earlier, Macario Salvatierra, even before the extrajudicialpartition of the three lots left by the late Enrique Salvatierra among his heirs,could very well dispose only of his pro indiviso share in said lots, as he in fact didon May 4, 1966 in a deed of sale in favor of his son Anselmo Salvatierra; and twoyears later, on September 24, 1968, when the deed of extrajudicial partition Exh."B" or "2" was executed by the heirs of Enrique Salvatierra, it was stipulated thatMacario's share in Lot No. 26 was only 405 sq. mts. thereof, which share Macariohad already sold to his son Anselmo Salvatierra. As of September 24, 1968, thedate of said deed of partition, then, Anselmo Salvatierra already knew that he had

only acquired 405 sq. mts. of Lot No. 26 from his father Macario Salvatierra, andyet on May 20, 1980, or 12 years later, he proceeded with the registration of the


11/32

earlier deed of sale between him and his father and of the whole Lot No. 26 withan area of 749 sq. mts. although he already knew through the deed ofextrajudicial partition Exh. "A" or "1" that he was only entitled to 405 sq. mts. outof Lot No. 26, and which knowledge he could not deny as he was one of thesignatories to said deed of extrajudicial partition (Exh. "B-1" or "2-b").It is, therefore, obvious and clear, on the basis of the evidence on record, thatwhen Anselmo Salvatierra registered the deed of sale Exh. "7" dated May 4,1966 between him and his father Macario Salvatierra on May 20, 1980, and whenhe obtained a title in his name over the whole of Lot No. 26 with an area of 749sq. mts., he did so with intent to defraud the other heirs of the late EnriqueSalvatierra, particularly Venancio Salvatierra and the latter's heirs andsuccessors-in-interest, for he, Anselmo Salvatierra, knew that he was entitled toonly 405 sq. mts. out of the whole Lot No. 26 with an area of 749 sq. mts. In fact,a closer look at the deed of sale Exh. "7" dated May 4, 1966 between father andson, Macario and Anselmo, reveals that the word and figure "SEVEN HUNDREDFORTY NINE (749)" sq. mts. written therein appear to have been onlysuperimposed over another word and figure that had been erased, and even theword "FORTY NINE" was merely inserted and written above the regular line,thereby creating the strong conviction that said word and figure were altered tosuit Anselmo's fraudulent design (p. 12, Rec.).

Apparently, the lower court failed to examine carefully the deed of extrajudicialpartition Exh. "B" or "2" and the deed of sale Exh. "7" between MacarioSalvatierra and his son Anselmo Salvatierra, for had it done so, it could not havefailed to notice that Anselmo Salvatierra received only 405 sq. mts. out of Lot No.26 from his father Macario Salvatierra, not the whole Lot No. 26 measuring 749sq. mts. The lower court was also of the mistaken impression that this caseinvolves a double sale of Lot No. 26, when the truth is that Macario Salvatierracould only sell and, therefore, sold only 405 sq. mts. out of Lot No. 26 to his sonAnselmo by virtue of the deed of sale Exh. "7", not the whole 749 sq. mts. of saidlot, and plaintiffs in turn bought by virtue of the deed of sale Exh. "A" 149 sq. mts.out of the remaining area of 344 sq. mts. of Lot No. 26 from Venancio Salvatierra,to whom said 344-sq. mt. portion of Lot No. 26 was given under the deed ofpartition Exh. "B" or "2".Neither can we agree with the lower court that even if plaintiffs-appellants had

established their ownership over the 149-sq. mt. portion of Lot No. 26 in question,they are already barred by prescription to recover said portion from defendants.In this connection, the lower court ratiocinated that an action for reconveyanceshould be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud,citing Esconde v. Barlongay, 152 SCRA 603, which in turn cited Babin v. Medalla,108 SCRA 666, so that since plaintiffs-appellants filed their action forreconveyance only on November 22, 1985 or five years after the issuance ofAnselmo Salvatierra's title over Lot No. 26 on May 20, 1980, said court held thatappellant's action for reconveyance against defendants has already prescribed.At this juncture, we find the need to remind the court a quo as well as other trialcourts to keep abreast with the latest jurisprudence so as not to cause possiblemiscarriages of justice in the disposition of the cases before them. In therelatively recent case ofCaro v. CA, 180 SCRA 401, the Supreme Court clarified

the seemingly confusing precedents on the matter of prescription of actions forreconveyance of real property, as follows:We disagree. The case ofLiwalug Amerold, et al. v. MolokBagumbaran, G.R. L-33261, September 30, 1987, 154 SCRA396 illuminated what used to be a gray area on the prescriptiveperiod for an action to reconvey the title to real property andcorrollarily, its point of reference:. . . It must be remembered that before August 30, 1950, thedate of the effectivity of the new Civil Code, the Old Code ofCivil Procedure (Act No. 190) governed prescription. It provided:Sec. 43. Other civil actions; how limited. Civil actions otherthan for the recovery of real property can only be brought withinthe following periods after the right of action accrues:3. Within four years: . . . An action for relief on the ground of

fraud, but the right of action in such case shall not be deemed tohave accrued until the discovery of the fraud:


12/32

xxx xxx xxxIn contract under the present Civil Code, we find that just as animplied or constructive trust in an offspring of the law (Art. 1465,Civil Code), so is the corresponding obligation to reconvey theproperty and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. In thiscontext, and vis-a-vis prescription, Article 1144 of the Civil Codeis applicable.Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within tenyears from the time the right of action accrues:1) Upon a written contract;2) Upon an obligation created by law;3) Upon a judgment;

xxx xxx xxxAn action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust mustperforce prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of thisCourt, and of very recent vintage at that, illustrated this rule. Undoubtedly, it isnow well-settled that an action for reconveyance based on an implied orconstructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens titleover the property. The only discordant note, it seems, is Balbin v. Medalla, whichstates that the prescriptive period for a reconveyance action is four years.

However, this variance can be explained by the erroneous reliance on Geronav. de Guzman. But in Gerona, the fraud was discovered on June 25, 1948, henceSection 43(3) of Act No. 190 was applied, the New Civil Code not coming intoeffect until August 30, 1950 as mentioned earlier. It must be stressed, at thisjuncture, that Article 1144 and Article 1456, are new provisions. They have "nocounterparts in the old Civil Code or in the old Code of Civil Procedure, the latterbeing than resorted to as legal basis of the four-year prescriptive period for anaction for reconveyance of title of real property acquired under false pretenses.An Action for reconveyance has its basis in Section 53, paragraph 3 ofPresidential Decree No. 1529, which provides:

In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner maypursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties tosuch fraud without prejudice, however, to the rights of anyinnocent holder of the decree of registration on the originalpetition or application, . . .

This provision should be read in conjunction with Article 1456 of the Civil Code,which provides:

Art. 1456. If property is acquire through mistake or fraud, theperson obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of animplied trust for the benefit of the person from whom theproperty comes.The law thereby creates the obligation of the trustee toreconvey the property and the tile thereto in favor of the trueowner. Correlating Section 53, paragraph 3 of PresidentialDecree No. 1529 and Article 1456 of the Civil Code with Article1144 (2) of the Civil Code, supra, the prescriptive period for thereconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is ten (10)

years reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificateof title. In the present case, therefore, inasmuch as Civil CaseNo. 10235 was filed on June 4, 1975, it was well-within theprescriptive period of ten (10) years from the date of theissuance of "Original Certificate of Title No. 0-6836 onSeptember 17, 1970."(All Emphasis Supplied).

And the above ruling was re-affirmed in the very recent case ofTalevs. C.A. G.R. No. 101028, promulgated only last April 23, 1992.Guided by the above clarificatory doctrine on prescription of actions forreconveyance of real property, it is obvious that the lower court erred in relying onthe discredited ruling in Esconde v.Barlongay, supra, which case in turn relied onthe earlier discredited case ofBalbin v. Medalla, alsosupra, which mistakenlylimited the running of the prescriptive period in an action for reconveyance of real

property to only four (4) years form the issuance of the certificate of title.Since OCT No. 0-4221 over Lot No. 26 was issued to Anselmo Salvatierra


13/32

on May 20, 1980, appellants' filing of the instance action for reconveyanceon November 22, 1985was well within the ten (10) year prescriptive periodprovided by law for such action.

A motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners brought this petition to setaside the decision of the respondent appellate court and to affirm in toto the decision ofthe trial court.Petitioners assail the decision of the respondent appellate court for its failure to considerthe application and interpretation of certain provisions of the New Civil Code in the case atbar, namely Articles 1134, 493, 1088, 1544, 1431, 1396, and 1391. 4

Since petitioners invoke the abovementioned provisions of law, it is apparent that they relyon the theory that this is a case of double sale of Lot No. 26 to both petitioners andrespondents Longalong, et al. A perusal of the records and evidence (exhibits andannexes), however, reveals otherwise. Both parties did not dispute the existence andcontents of the Extrajudicial Partition with Confirmation of Sale, as both presented themas their respective exhibits (Exh. "B-1" and "2"). The parties may not have realized it, butthe deciding factor of this dispute is this very document itself. It is very clear therein thatMacario Salvatierra's share in the estate of the deceased Enrique Salvatierra is only 405sq. m. out of the 749 sq. m. comprising Lot No. 26. Since Venancio Salvatierra, under thisdocument, is to get a portion of Lot No. 26 in addition to Lot No. 27, then it follows thatVenancio is entitled to the remaining 344 sq. m. of Lot No. 26, after deducting the 405 sq.

m. share of Macario.We find no ambiguity in the terms and stipulations of the extrajudicial partition. The termsof the agreement are clear and unequivocal, hence the literal and plain meaning thereofshould be observed. 5 The applicable provision of law in the case at bar is Article 1370 ofthe New Civil Code which states:

Art. 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon theintention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulation shallcontrol.

Contracts which are the private laws of the contracting parties, should be fulfilledaccording to the literal sense of their stipulations, if their terms are clear and leave noroom for doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, for contracts are obligatory,no matter what their forms maybe, whenever the essential requisites for their validity arepresent. 6

As such, the confirmation of sale between Macario and his son Anselmo, mentioned in the

extrajudicial partition involves only the share of Macario in the estate. The law is clear onthe matter that where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent its,before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, 7 and hence, the effect of thealienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portionwhich may be alloted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. 8

It goes without saying, therefore, that what Anselmo bought from his father in 1966 wasonly his father's share in the estate which turned out to be 405 sq. m. of Lot No. 26, asagreed upon during their extrajudicial partition, in which Anselmo was a signatory. Theregistration of the whole Lot No. 26 in the name of Anselmo Salvatierra was therefore,done with evident bad faith. A careful examination of Deed of Sale (Exh. 7) dated May 4,1966 between Macario and Anselmo (father and son) shows that an alteration wasperpetrated by the superimposition of the words and figure SEVEN HUNDRED FORTYNINE (749) sq. m. over other words and figures therein. Besides, when Anselmo

Salvatierra obtained the Original Certificate of Title No. 0-4221 covering the whole of LotNo. 26 on May 20, 1980, he had already known that he was entitled to only 405 sq. m. ofthe said lot since the extrajudicial partition has already been executed earlier in 1968.Obviously, Anselmo's act of registering the whole Lot No. 26 in his name was intended todefraud Venancio who was then legally entitled to a certain portion of Lot No. 26 by theextrajudicial partition.With regard to the issue as to prescription of the action, we agree with the respondentsappellate court that this action has not yet prescribed. Indeed, the applicable provision inthe case at bar is Art. 1144 of the New Civil Code which provides that:

Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the timethe right of action accrues:(1) Upon written contract;(2) Upon an obligation created by law; and(3) Upon a judgment.

Art. 1391 9of the same code, referred to by petitioners is not in point. This article must beread in conjunction with Art. 1390 10which refers to voidable contracts. This case at hand


14/32

involves fraud committed by petitioner Anselmo Salvatierra in registering the whole of LotNo. 26 in his name, with evident bad faith. In effect, an implied trust was created by virtueof Art. 1456 of the New Civil Code which states:

Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining itis, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of theperson from whom the property comes.

Implied trust is defined as the right, enforceable solely in equity, to the beneficialenjoyment of property, the legal title to which is vested in another and is furthersubdivided into resulting and constructive trust. 11While resulting trust is one raised byimplication of law and presumed to have been contemplated by the parties; constructivetrust, on the other hand, is one raised by construction of law or arising by operation oflaw. 12

This case more specifically involves constructive trust. In a more restricted sense, it is atrust not created by any words, either expressly or impliedly, evincing a direct intention tocreate a trust, but by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the demands ofjustice. 13 It does not arise by agreement or intention but by operation of law. 14

In this connection, we hold that an action for reconveyance of registered land based on animplied trust may be barred by laches. The prescriptive period for such actions is ten (10)

years from the date the right of action accrued. 15We have held in the case ofArmamentov. Central Bank16 that an action for reconveyance of registered land based on implied

trust, prescribes in ten (10) years even if the decree of registration is no longer open toreview.

In Duque v. Domingo, 17 especially, we went further by stating:The registration of an instrument in the Office of the Register of Deedsconstitutes constructive notice to the whole world, and, therefore, discovery of thefraud is deemed to have taken place at the time of registration. Such registrationis deemed to be a constructive notice that the alleged fiduciary or trustrelationship has been repudiated. It is now settled that an action on an implied orconstructive trust prescribes in ten (10) years from the date the right of actionaccrued.

The complaint for reconveyance was filed by the Longalong spouses on November 22,1985, only five (5) years after the issuance of the O.C.T.No. 0-4221 over Lot No. 26 in the name of Anselmo Salvatierra. Hence prescription hasnot yet set in.We find no reason to disturb the findings of the respondent Court of Appeals as to facts itssaid factual findings having been supported by substantial evidence on record. They arefinal and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. The analysis by the Court ofAppeals of the evidence on record and the process by which it arrived at its findings onthe basis thereof, impel conferment of the Supreme Court's approval on said findings, onaccount of the intrinsic merit and cogency thereof no less than that Court's superior status

as a review tribunal. 18No reversible errors can be attributed to the findings of therespondent Court of Appeals because the decision herein assailed was properlysupported by substantial evidence on record, which were not in anyway impugned by thepetitioners.IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, we resolve to DENY the petition forwant of merit, with costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Vitug and Kapunan, JJ., concur.Bellosillo, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISION


15/32

G.R. No. L-27760 May 29, 1974CRISPIN ABELLANA and FRANCISCO ABELLANA, petitioners,vs.HONORABLE GERONIMO R. MARAVE, Judge, Court of First Instance of MisamisOccidental, Branch II; and GERONIMO CAMPANER, MARCELO LAMASON, MARIAGURREA, PACIENCIOSA FLORES and ESTELITA NEMEN0, respondents.Prud. V. Villafuerte for petitioners.Hon. Geronimo R. Marave in his own behalf.FERNANDO, J.:pThis petition forcertiorariis characterized by a rather vigorous insistence on the part of petitionersCrispin Abellana and Francisco Abellana that an order of respondent Judge was issued with graveabuse of discretion. It is their contention that he ought to have dismissed an independent civilaction filed in his court, considering that the plaintiffs, as offended parties, private respondentshere, 1 failed to reserve their right to institute it separately in the City Court of Ozamis City, whenthe criminal case for physical injuries through reckless imprudence was commenced. Such a standof petitioners was sought to be bolstered by a literal reading of Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 111. 2 Itdoes not take into account, however, the rule as to a trial de novo found in Section 7 of Rule123. 3What is worse, petitioners appear to be oblivious of the principle that if such an interpretation

were to be accorded the applicable Rules of Court provisions, it would give rise to a graveconstitutional question in view of the constitutional grant of power to this Court to promulgate rulesconcerning pleading, practice, and procedure being limited in the sense that they "shall notdiminish, increase, or modify substantive rights." 4 It thus appears clear that the petitionforcertiorariis without merit.The relevant facts were set forth in the petition and admitted in the answer. The dispute had itsorigins in a prosecution of petitioner Francisco Abellana of the crime of physical injuries throughreckless imprudence in driving his cargo truck, hitting a motorized pedicab resulting in injuries toits passengers, namely, private respondents Marcelo Lamason, Maria Gurrea, Pacienciosa Flores,and Estelita Nemeo. The criminal case was filed with the city court of Ozamis City, which foundthe accused Francisco Abellana guilty as charged, damages in favor of the offended partieslikewise being awarded. The accused, now petitioner, Francisco Abellana appealed such decision

to the Court of First Instance. 5At this stage, the private respondents as the offended parties filedwith another branch of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, presided by respondentJudge, a separate and independent civil action for damages allegedly suffered by them from thereckless driving of the aforesaid Francisco Abellana. 6 In such complaint, the other petitioner,Crispin Abellana, as the alleged employer, was included as defendant. Both of them then soughtthe dismissal of such action principally on the ground that there was no reservation for the filingthereof in the City Court of Ozamis. It was argued by them that it was not allowable at the stagewhere the criminal case was already on appeal. 7

Respondent Judge was not persuaded. On April 28, 1967, he issued the following order: "This is amotion to dismiss this case on the ground that in Criminal Case No. OZ-342 which was decided bythe City Court and appealed to this Court, the offended parties failed to expressly waive the civilaction or reserve their right to institute it separately in said City Court, as required in Section 1,Rule 111, Rules of Court. From the Records of Criminal Case No. OZ-342, it appears that the CityCourt convicted the accused. On appeal to this Court, the judgment of the City Court was vacatedand a trial de novowill have to be conducted. This Court has not as yet begun trying said criminal

case. In the meantime, the offended parties expressly waived in this Court the civil action impliedlyinstituted with the criminal action, and reserve their right to institute a separate action as in fact,they did file. The Court is of the opinion that at this stage, the offended parties may still waive thecivil action because the judgment of the City Court is vacated and a trial de novo will have to behad. In view of this waiver and reservation, this Court would be precluded from judging civildamages against the accused and in favor of the offended parties. [Wherefore], the motion to

dismiss is hereby denied. ..." 8There was a motion for reconsideration which was denied. Hencethis petition.The only basis of petitioners for the imputation that in the issuance of the challenged order therewas a grave abuse of discretion, is their reading of the cited Rules of Court provision to the effectthat upon the institution of a criminal action "the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising fromthe offense charge is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party...reserves his right to institute itseparately." 9 Such an interpretation, as noted, ignores the de novo aspect of appealed cases from

city courts. 10It does likewise, as mentioned, give rise to a constitutional question to the extent thatit could yield a meaning to a rule of court that may trench on a substantive right. Such an


16/32

interpretation is to be rejected. Certiorari, to repeat, clearly does not lie.1. In the language of the petition, this is the legal proposition submitted for the consideration of thisCourt : "That a separate civil action can be legally filed and allowed by the court only at theinstitution, or the right to file such separate civil action reserved or waived, at such institution of the

criminal action, and never on appeal to the next higher court." 11It admits of no doubt that anindependent civil action was filed by private respondents only at the stage of appeal. Nor was

there any reservation to that effect when the criminal case was instituted in the city court ofOzamis. Petitioners would then take comfort from the language of the aforesaid Section 1 of Rule111 for the unwarranted conclusion that absent such a reservation, an independent civil action isbarred. In the first place, such an inference does notper se arise from the wording of the citedrule. It could be looked upon plausibly as anon-sequitur. Moreover, it is vitiated by the grievousfault of ignoring what is so explicitly provided in Section 7 of Rule 123: "An appealed case shall betried in all respects anew in the Court of First Instance as if it had been originally instituted in that

court." 12Unlike petitioners, respondent Judge was duly mindful of such a norm. This Court hasmade clear that its observance in appealed criminal cases is mandatory. 13 In a 1962decision, People v. Carreon, 14 Justice Barrera, asponente, could trace such a rule to a 1905decision,Andres v. Wolfe. 15Another case cited by him is Crisostomo v. Director of Prisons, 16 whereJustice Malcolm emphasized how deeply rooted in Anglo-American legal history is such a rule. Inthe latest case in point, People v. Jamisola, 17 this Court, through Justice Dizon, reiterated such adoctrine in these words: "The rule in this jurisdiction is that upon appeal by the defendant from a

judgment of conviction by the municipal court, the appealed decision is vacated and the appealedcase 'shall be tried in all respects anew in the court of first instance as if it had been originallyinstituted in that court.'" 18 So it is in civil cases under Section 9 of Rule 40. 19 Again, there is a hostof decisions attesting to its observance. 20 It cannot be said then that there was an error committedby respondent Judge, much less a grave abuse of discretion, which is indispensable if this petitionwere to prosper.2. Nor is the above the only ground for rejecting the contention of petitioners. The restrictiveinterpretation they would place on the applicable rule does not only result in its emasculation butalso gives rise to a serious constitutional question. Article 33 of the Civil Code is quite clear: "Incases of ... physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from thecriminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independentlyof the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence." 21 That is asubstantive right, not to be frittered away by a construction that could render it nugatory, if throughoversight, the offended parties failed at the initial stage to seek recovery for damages in a civil suit.As referred to earlier, the grant of power to this Court, both in the present Constitution and underthe 1935 Charter, does not extend to any diminution, increase or modification of substantiveright. 22 It is a well-settled doctrine that a court is to avoid construing a statute or legal norm in sucha manner as would give rise to a constitutional doubt. Unfortunately, petitioners, unlike respondentJudge, appeared to lack awareness of the undesirable consequence of their submission. Thus isdiscernible another insuperable obstacle to the success of this suit.3. Nor is this all that needs to be said. It is understandable for any counsel to invoke legalpropositions impressed with a certain degree of plausibility if thereby the interest of his client wouldbe served. That is though, merely one aspect of the matter. There is this other consideration. He isnot to ignore the basic purpose of a litigation, which is to assure parties justice according to law.He is not to fall prey, as admonished by Justice Frankfurter, to the vice of literalness. The law asan instrument of social control will fail in its function if through an ingenious construction sought tobe fastened on a legal norm, particularly a procedural rule, there is placed an impediment to a

litigant being given an opportunity of vindicating an alleged right.23

The commitment of this Court tosuch a primordial objective has been manifested time and time again. 24

WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari is dismissed.Costs against petitioners.Zaldivar (Chairman), Barredo, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.Antonio, J., concurs on the bases of par. nos. 2 & 3 of opinion.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila


17/32

SECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. L-43760 August 21, 1976PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU), petitionervs.BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, HONORABLE CARMELO C. NORIEL, NATIONALFEDERATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (NAFLU), and PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO.,INC., respondents.Guevara, Pineda, Guevara & Castillon for petitioner.Olalia Dimapilis & Associates for respondent Union (NAFLU)Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno and Solicitor Jesus V. Diaz for respondent Bureau ofLabor Relations, etc., et al.FERNANDO,Acting C.J.:A certification by respondent Director of Labor Relations, Carmelo C. Noriel, that respondentNational Federation of Free Labor Unions (NAFLU) as the exclusive bargaining agent of all theemployees in the Philippine Blooming Mills, Company, Inc. disregarding the objection raised bypetitioner, the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU), is assailed in this certiorariproceeding. Admittedly, in the certification election held on February 27, 1976, respondent Unionobtained 429 votes as against 414 of petitioner Union. Again, admittedly, under the Rules andRegulations implementing the present Labor Code, a majority of the valid votes cast suffices for

certification of the victorious labor union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent. 1There werefour votes cast by employees who did not want any union. 2 On its face therefore, respondentUnion ought to have been certified in accordance with the above applicable rule. Petitioner,undeterred, would seize upon the doctrine announced in the case ofAllied Workers Association of

the Philippines v. Court of Industrial Relations 3that spoiled ballots should be counted indetermining the valid votes cast. Considering there were seventeen spoiled ballots, it is thesubmission that there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Director. Implicitin the comment of respondent Director of Labor Relations, 4 considered as an answer, is thecontrolling weight to be accorded the implementing rule above-cited, no inconsistency beingshown between such rule and the present Labor Code. Under such a view, the ruling in the AlliedWorkers Association case that arose during the period when it was the Industrial Peace Act 5, thatwas in effect and not the present law, no longer possesses relevance. It cannot and should not beapplied. It is not controlling. There was no abuse of discretion then, much less a grave one.This Court is in agreement. The law is on the side of respondent Director, not to mention thedecisive fact appearing in the Petition itself that at most, only ten of the spoiled ballots "were

intended for the petitioner Union,"6thus rendering clear that it would on its own showing obtainonly 424 votes as against 429 for respondent Union. certiorari does not lie.1. What is of the essence of the certification process, as noted in Lakas Ng Manggagawang

Pilipino v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc. 7"is that every labor organization be given the opportunity ina free and honest election to make good its claim that it should be the exclusive collective

bargaining representative." 8Petitioner cannot complain. It was given that opportunity. It lost in afair election. It came out second best. The implementing rule favors, as it should, respondentUnion, It obtained a majority of the valid votes cast. So our law Prescribes. It is equally the case inthe United States as this excerpt from the work of Cox and Bok makes clear: "It is a well-settledrule that a representative will he certified even though less than a majority of all the employees inthe unit cast ballots in favor of the union. It is enough that the union be designated by a majority ofthe valid ballots, and this is so even though only a small proportion of the eligible voters

participates. Following the analogy of political elections, the courts have approved this practice ofthe Board." 9

2. There is this policy consideration. The country is at present embarked on a wide-scaleindustrialization project. As a matter of fact, respondent firm is engaged in such activity.Industrialization, as noted by Professor Smith, Merrifield and Rothschild, "can thrive only as there

is developed a. stable structure of law and order in the productive sector." 10That objective is bestattained in a collective bargaining regime, which is a manifestation of industrial democracy at work,if there be no undue obstacles placed in the way of the choice of a bargaining representative. Toinsist on the absolute majority where there are various unions and where the possibility of invalidballots may not be ruled out, would be to frustrate that goal. For the probability of a long drawn-out, protracted process is not easy to dismiss. That is not unlikely given the intensity of rivalryamong unions capable of enlisting the allegiance of a group of workers. It is to avoid such acontingency that there is this explicit pronouncement in the implementing rule. It speakscategorically. It must be obeyed. That was what respondent Director did.3. Nor can fault of a grave and serious character be imputed to respondent Director presumablybecause of failure to abide by the doctrine or pronouncement of this Court in the aforesaid Allied


18/32

Workers Association case. The reliance is on this excerpt from the opinion: "However, spoiledballots, i.e., those which are defaced, torn or marked (Rules for Certification Elections, Rule II, sec.2[j]) should be counted in determining the majority since they are nevertheless votes cast by thosewho are qualified to do so." 11 Nothing can be clearer than that its basis is a paragraph in a

section of the then applicable rules for certification elections. 12They were promulgated under theauthority of the then prevailing Industrial Peace Act. 13That Legislation is no longer in force, having

been superseded by the present Labor Code which took effect on November 1, 1974. Thiscertification election is governed therefore, as was made clear, by the present Labor Code and theRules issued thereunder. Absent a showing that such rules and regulations -are violative of theCode, this Court cannot ignore their existence. When, as should be the case, a public official actsin accordance with a norm therein contained, no infraction of the law is committed. RespondentDirector did, as he ought to, comply with its terms. He took into consideration only the "valid votes"as was required by the Rules. He had no choice as long as they remain in force. In a proper

showing, the judiciary can nullify any rule it found in conflict with the governing statute. 14That wasnot even attempted here. All that petitioner did was to set forth in two separate paragraphs the

applicable rule followed by respondent Director15and the governing article. 16It did not even botherto discuss why such rule was in conflict with the present Labor Code. It failed to point out anyrepugnancy. Such being the case, respondent Director must be upheld.4. The conclusion reached by us derives further support from the deservedly high repute attachedto the construction placed by the executive officials entrusted with the responsibility of applying a

statute. The Rules and Regulations implementing the present Labor Code were issued bySecretary Blas Ople of the Department of Labor and took effect on February 3, 1975, the presentLabor Code having been made known to the public as far back as May 1, 1974, although its dateof effectivity was postponed to November 1, 1974, although its date of effectivity was postponed toNovember 1, 1974. It would appear then that there was more than enough time for a really seriousand careful study of such suppletory rules and regulations to avoid any inconsistency with theCode. This Court certainly cannot ignore the interpretation thereafter embodied in the Rules. As far

back as In re Allen,"17a 1903 decision, Justice McDonough, asponente, cited this excerpt from theleading American case ofPennoyer v. McConnaughy, decided in 1891: "The principle that thecontemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive officers of the government, whoseduty it is to execute it, is entitled to great respect, and should ordinarily control the construction ofthe statute by the courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisprudence that no authorities need be

cited to support it." 18There was a paraphrase by Justice Malcolm of such a pronouncement

in Molina v. Rafferty,"19

a 1918 decision: "Courts will and should respect the contemporaneousconstruction placed upon a statute by the executive officers whose duty it is to enforce it, andunless such interpretation is clearly erroneous will ordinarily be controlled thereby." 20Since then,such a doctrine has been reiterated in numerous decisions . 21As was emphasized by ChiefJustice Castro, "the construction placed by the office charged with implementing and enforcing theprovisions of a Code should he given controlling weight. " 22

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner PhilippineAssociation of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU).Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion Jr., JJ., concur.


ManilaSECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-50320 March 30, 1988


19/32

PHILIPPINE APPAREL, WORKERS UNION, petitioner,vs.THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION APPAREL PHILIPPINE APPAREL,INC., respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N

PARAS,J. :This is a classic case of dilatory tactics employed to obstruct justice.

On July 31, 1981, this Court rendered Judgment in this case, the dispositive portion of whichreads:

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is hereby granted, the decision of therespondent Commission is hereby set aside, and private respondent is herebydirected to pay, in addition to the increased allowance provided for in P.D. 1123,the negotiated wage increase of P0.80 daily effective April 1, 1977 as well as allother wage increases embodied in the collective bargaining agreement, to allcovered employees. Costs against private respondent.This decision, is immediately executory (p. 178, rec.).

A motion for reconsideration of the July 31, 1981 decision. this Court was filed by privaterespondent. Petitioner, through the Paterno D. Menzon Law Office, filed a comment thereon. ThisCourt, on October 21, 1981 denied the aforesaid motion for reconsideration and the denial was

declared final Entry of judgment was made on October 30, 1981 (Rollo, p. 244).On December 18, 1981 the respondent NLRC issued an order, through Labor Arbiter Antonio TriaTirona, directing the Chief of the Research and Information Division of the NLRC to designate aSocio-Economic Analyst to compute the awards due the members of the petitioner union inaccordance with the final disposition of this case.On January 10, 1983 petitioner flied an "Urgent Manifestation and Motion" claiming that despite itsfiling of a motion for execution dated November 12, 1981, a manifestation and motion datedFebruary 10, 1982, and another manifestation and motion dated February 26, 1982, the executionarm of public respondent NLRC continued to fail to implement the decision of this Court. Petitionerprayed that those obstructing the implementation of the decision be declared in contempt,especially the president of Bagong Pilipino Philippine Apparel Workers' Union (BPPAWU) andprivate respondent PAI for circumventing the final decision of this Court by offering members ofpetitioner the amount of P500 each as full payment of their claims in the instant case.The respondent NLRC, in its Comment on petitioner's "Urgent Manifestation and Motion"explained that it could not issue a writ of execution because the actual or exact amounts of thevarious awards due the members of the petitioner union could not be determined. For that matter,even with the submission of the "Report of Examiner" prepared by the Research and InformationDivision of the NLRC, it was not possible for the NLRC to issue a writ of execution in fullsatisfaction of the judgment of this Court because said "Report of Examiner" did not include thecomputation of the amounts due for the months of May, June, November and December 1978,and January and February 1980 as the pertinent records covering those periods were notavailable at the time of the preparation of the Report. Adding confusion was the fact that evenbefore the submission of the "Report of Examiner," private respondent PAI had already madepayments in satisfaction of this Court's decision to some of the members of the petitioner union.Moreover, after the submission of the Reports, and notwithstanding its exception to the findingstherein, private respondent PAI continued to make payments to the other members of the union.Respondent PAI offered the payment to petitioner's counsel but the latter refused to accept the

payment because the amount offered left some 88 members of the petitioner unpaid. Petitioner'scounsel was willing to accept the money only as partial payment, but not as full payment as PAIwanted it to be.On October 27, 1983, this Court issued an order requiring private respondent PAI to comply fullywith this Court's decision of July 31, 1981; to pay the members of the petitioner the amount ofP695,413.17, with 10% thereof to be deducted as attorney's fees payable to the Menzon LawOffice; to make available, within ten (10) days from notice thereof, to public respondent its payrollscorresponding to the unpaid periods, for the latter to prepare immediately a computation withinthirty (30.1 days from receipt of such payrolls; and, thereafter, to pay members of petitioner theremaining backwages within ten (1 0) days from receipt of such computation. In that same order ofOctober 27, 1983, the BPPAWU, Atty. Luis D. Flores and respondent Philippine Apparel, Inc. wereadjudged guilty of contempt and were ordered to pay one thousand pesos (Pl,000) each within ten(10) days from notice thereof.The Court justified its ruling as follows:

...The judgment in this case has already become final and executory and as suchthe prevailing party as a matter of right is entitled to a writ of execution. What


20/32

seems to be the problem in this case is that execution of the judgment cannot behad at the earliest possible time, since a computation of the amount due themembers of petitioner must first be undertaken. The Report of the Examinerindicating the amount due them was submitted only after one and a half years, sothat in the meantime, negotiations on how the judgment may be executed weremade. It is the posture of the Paterno D. Menzon Law Office that the judgmentcannot be negotiated, hence any act to subvert it is contemptuous.We agree, The attempts of the BPPAWU and its counsel and respondentcompany to render the decision of this Court meaningless by paying thebackwages of the affected employees in a lesser amount clearly manifest a willfuldisregard on their part, of the authority of this Court as the final arbiter of casesbrought to it. The series of acts by the BPPAWU from the outset, where theycaused the 'Kapahintulutan' to be circulated and signed by workers declaring asinvalid any acts of petitioner union and its counsel to the time they campaignedfor the workers to receive the amount of P300.00 or P500.00 but with theconcomitant obligation to release the company from any further liability showeddisrespect for the administration of justice.The BPPAWU and its counsel cannot pretend that they are just being moreprotective to the employees when they encouraged them to receive the amountof P300.00 o

statcon cases 12-20

Documents