rule 73 cases

Case 1G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZONvs.MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON__________________________________________PEREZ, J.:

FACTS: Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the RTC of Las Piñas City. Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia Quizaon by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico. To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father. It was alleged that Eliseo left real properties worth P2,040,000 and personal properties worth P2,100,000. In order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate.

Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.

The RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay.

On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the CA and held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence in Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, CA upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City. The petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:I. Whether or not Eliseo Quiazon was a resident of Las PiÑas and therefore, the petition for Letter's of Administration was properly filed with the RTC of Las PiÑas. (YES) ; and

II. Whether or not Elise Quiazon has not shown any interest in the petition for Letters of Asministration. (NO)

RULING:We find the petition bereft of merit.

I.) Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:

Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis supplied).

The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical

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sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.

The CA cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.

II.) Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.

Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:

Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:(a) The jurisdictional facts;(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors, of the decedent;(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.

An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.

In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the CA. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied. Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.

Case 2

Ypon v Ricaforte (Succession)


Ypon v Ricaforte

GR No. 198680, July 8, 2013 HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEÑALOSA, PETITIONERS, vs. GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS: On July 29, 2010, the Ypons filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte. In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on June 28, 1968 Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his name In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport. Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: (1) RTC-Toledo: dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.The Court also denied their motion for reconsideration due to the counsel’s failure to state the date on which his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance was issued.Direct to the Supreme Court (pure questions of law)

ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper

RULING: Yes, it was proper.

General Rule The rule is that the determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special proceeding precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the determination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case. The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.

Exception By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon, or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened. In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist.

(Remedial law related): 1. Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another. It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. In this relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for. Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.

2. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.


Case 4

JAO v CA

GR 128314, May 29, 2002

FACTS: Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea V. Jao, who died intestate in 1988 and 1989, respectively. The decedents left real estate, cash, shares of stock and other personal properties.

On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 99, over the estate of his parents.

Rodolfo moved to dismiss the petition on the ground of improper venue. He argued that their parents did not reside in Quezon City either during their lifetime or at the time of their deaths. Their actual residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga, and moved to Rodolfo’s residence at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City, solely for medical treatment and hospitalization purposes.

Perico countered that their parents actually resided in Rodolfo’s house in Quezon City at the time of their deaths. As a matter of fact, it was conclusively declared in their death certificates that their last residence before they died was at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City. Rodolfo himself even supplied the entry appearing on the death certificate of their mother, Andrea, and affixed his own signature on the said document.

The RTC denied Rodolfo’s motion to dismiss. The CA affirmed the RTC’s order.

ISSUE: Where should the settlement proceedings be had --- in Pampanga, where the decedents had their permanent residence, or in Quezon City, where they actually stayed before their demise?

HELD: Quezon City.

In determining residence at the time of death, the following factors must be considered, namely, the decedent had:

(a) capacity to choose and freedom of choice;

(b) physical presence at the place chosen; and

(c) intention to stay therein permanently.

There is substantial proof that the decedents have transferred to petitioner’s Quezon City residence. Petitioner failed to sufficiently refute respondent’s assertion that their elderly parents stayed in his house for some three to four years before they died in the late 1980s.


The decedents’ respective death certificates state that they were both residents of Quezon City at the time of their demise. Significantly, it was petitioner himself who filled up his late mother’s death certificate. This unqualifiedly shows that at that time, at least, petitioner recognized his deceased mother’s residence to be Quezon City. Moreover, petitioner failed to contest the entry in Ignacio’s death certificate, accomplished a year earlier by respondent.

In Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals, the Court clarified that the term “resides” means “the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.”

In addition, there is no distinction between venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings. They have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, “residence”, in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.

Case 5G.R. No. 102126 March 12, 1993

ANGELICA LEDESMA, petitioner, vs.

INTESTATE ESTATE OF CIPRIANO PEDROSA represented by Nelson Jimena, Honorable Judge Bethel Katalbas-Moscardon in her capacity as Presiding Judge-Designate, Branch 51, RTC, Bacolod

City,respondents.

FACTS: Petitioner Angelica Ledesma's marriage to Cipriano Pedrosa was declared a nullity by the RTC of Negros

Occidental. The Court ordered that the properties acquired by the parties at the time they were living together as common-law husband and wife are owned by them as co-owners. With respect to the properties acquired by them during marriage which was subsequently annulled by the Court , they will form part of the conjugal partnership of the spouses, to be dissolved and liquidated in accordance with the provision of the Civil Code.

Pending the order of inventory of the properties, Pedrosa died leaving a last will and testament. A separate petition for probate of the said will was filed. Nelson Jimena was named executor in the said proceeding and substituted the deceased in the partition proceeding with regard to the annulled marriage of the latter.

Respondent Judge Katalbas-Moscardon considered the supplemental action for partition (after annulment of the marriage) TERMINATED due to the death of one of the spouses (Pedrosa) and the pendency of intestate proceedings over his estate.

Petitioner argues that respondent judge reneged in the performance of a lawful duty when she refrained from rendering a decision in the partition case (RE: dissolution and distribution of conjugal properties) and considered the same closed and terminated, due to the pendency of intestate proceedings over the deceased husband's estate.

ISSUE:1. Whether or not it is proper to terminate the partition proceeding on account of the death of one of the

spouses and the pendency of intestate proceeding of the deceased spouse’s estate. NO2. Where will the partition of the properties be made – in the civil case where the marriage was annulled? or in

the proceeding for the settlement of estate? Civil Case

RULING:1. The Court cited the case of Macadangdang vs. Court of Appeals, where a similar issue was involved — the

husband also died after the legal separation of the spouses had been finally decreed but before the actual liquidation of their community of properties.


In the said case, the Court ruled that upon the finality of the decree of legal separation, the absolute conjugal community property of the spouses shall be dissolved and liquidated. Upon the liquidation and distribution conformably with the law governing the effects of the final decree of legal separation, the law on intestate succession should take over in the disposition of whatever remaining properties have been allocated to petitioner. This procedure involves details which properly pertain to the lower court.

The Macadangdang decision involved legal separation but the doctrine enunciated therein should be applied to a marriage annulment which is the situation at bar. The respondent presiding judge is directed to decide the partition (liquidation) case and determine which of the properties of the conjugal partnership should be adjudicated to the husband and the wife. Any properties that may be adjudicated to the deceased husband Pedrosa can then be distributed in accordance with his last will and testament in the special proceedings involving his estate.

2. The partition shall be done in the civil case rather than in the settlement proceedings because the law mandates the dissolution and liquidation of the property regime of the spouses upon finality of the decree annulling the marriage.

Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree of nullity. The legal effect of the decree of annulment of marriage ipso facto or automatically follows as an inevitable incident of the judgment decreeing annulment of the marriage for the purpose of determining the share of each spouse in their assets. A division of the property in a supplemental decision is a mere incident to the decree of annulment.”

The court when acting as testate or intestate court is a court of limited jurisdiction. It is so limited in the sense that it is only confined in the issue of settlement or division of the properties of the deceased. It cannot extend to collateral matters which are not related.

Case 6 DE BORJA VS. DE BORJA GR No. L-6622

FACTS:

Qunitin, Francisco, Crisanta and Juliana, are legitimate children of Marcelo de Borja.

Marcelo died intestate and Quintin became the administrator of the Intestate Estate of Marcelo.

Quintin died testate and Crisanto, son of Francisco, was appointed as administrator of the Estate of Marcelo.

Francisco, on the other hand, became the executor of the will of Quintin.

Francisco was later required by the Court to resign as such executor and was succeeded by Rogelio, a son-in-law of Quintin; while the Intestate Estate remained under the administration of Crisanto until the the outbreak of the war.

After the war, the court ordered the reconstitution of the records of the case, requiring the administrator to submit his report and a copy of the project of partition.

The heirs of Quintin opposed the approval of the statements of accounts rendered by the administrator of the Intestate Estate of Marcelo

Subsequently, the administrator filed his amended statement of accounts.


The heirs of Quintin again opposed the approval of the statements of accounts on the ground that certain fruits which should have been accrued to the estate were unaccounted for.

The administrator filed a reply to said opposition containing a counterclaim for moral damages against all the heirs of Quintin which was admitted by the court.

I: W/N a claim for moral damages may be entertained in a proceeding for the sett lement of an estate.

H: A counterclaim for moral damages demanded by an administrator against the heirs for alleged utterances, pleadings and actuations made in the course of a proceeding, is an extraneous matter in a testate or intestate proceedings. The injection into the action of incidental questions entirely foreign in probate proceedings should not be encouraged for to do otherwise would run counter to the clear intention of the law.

Case 7 same with case 5Case 8Limjoco vs. Intestate

Facts:

The Public Service Commission rendered its decision in case No. 4572 of Pedro O. Fragante, as applicant for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain and operate an ice plant;

Pedro was a Filipino Citizen at the time of his death; and that his intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service.

The commission overruled the opposition filed in this case. The commission held that the evidence therein showed that the public interest and convenience will be

promoted in a proper and suitable manner "by authorizing the operation and maintenance of another ice plant;

Petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission to allow the substitution of the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case, which is said to be in contravention of law.

Issues:

Whether the application of Pedro Fragrante of a Certificate of Public Convenience is included in his estate. Whether the estate of Fragrante is a person. Whether the estate of Fragrante is a Filipino Citizen.

Held:

First Issue

Yes, It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of public convenience before the Public Service Commission is not an "action". But the foregoing provisions and citations go to prove that the decedent's rights which by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcel of the assets of his estate which, being placed under the control and management of the executor or administrator, can not be exercised but by him in representation of the estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the heirs of the decedent. And if the right involved happens to consist in the prosecution of an unfinished proceeding upon an application for a certificate of public convenience of the deceased before the Public Service Commission, it is but logical that the legal representative be empowered and entitled in behalf of the estate to make the right effective in that proceeding.

Second Issue

Yes, the estate of the decedent is a person in legal contemplation. The heirs were formerly considered as the continuation of the decedent's personality simply by legal fiction, for they might not have been flesh and blood — the reason was one in the nature of a legal exigency derived from the principle that the heirs succeeded to the rights and obligations of the decedent. Under the present legal system, such rights and obligations as survive after death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased. And if the same legal fiction were not indulged, there would be no juridical basis for the estate, represented by the executor or administrator, to exercise those rights and to fulfill those obligations of the deceased. The


reason and purpose for indulging the fiction is identical and the same in both cases. This is why according to the Supreme Court of Indiana in Billings vs. State, supra, citing 2 Rapalje & L. Dictionary, 954, among the artificial persons recognized by law figures "a collection of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties", as for instance, the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person.

Third Issue

Yes, we can perceive no valid reason for holding that within the intent of the constitution (Article IV), its provisions on Philippine citizenship exclude the legal principle of extension above adverted to. If for reasons already stated our law indulges the fiction of extension of personality, if for such reasons the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person herein, we can find no justification for refusing to declare a like fiction as to the extension of his citizenship for the purposes of this proceeding.

Conclusion:Pedro O. Fragrante was a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in view of the evidence of record, he would have obtained from the commission the certificate for which he was applying. The situation has suffered but one change, and that is, his death. His estate was that of a Filipino citizen. And its economic ability to appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant was the same that it received from the decedent himself. In the absence of a contrary showing, which does not exist here, his heirs may be assumed to be also Filipino citizens; and if they are not, there is the simple expedient of revoking the certificate or enjoining them from inheriting it.Upon the whole, we are of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.

Case 9

VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE vs.CA

G.R. No. L-40502 and G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976

The two interrelated cases bring to the Supreme Court the question of what the word "resides" in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate of deceased persons, means. Additionally, the rule in the appointment of a special administrator is sought to be reviewed.

Facts:

On April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia died intestate, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna.

On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule, a creditor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia as well as an illegitimate sister of the latter, filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Laguna, a petition for letters of administration. At the same time, she moved ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia, surviving spouse of the deceased, on May 8, 1973, contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was issued without jurisdiction. She prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing.

On July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar issued an order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix.

On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1) jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in interest as she is not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia. This was subsequently denied on December 19, 1973.


On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.

On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.

Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule forthwith elevated the matter to the Supreme Court on appeal by certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. L-40502.

However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed the office.

Issues:

1.) Whether or not the instant petition should be denied for lack of jurisdiction and improper laying of venue.2.) Whether or not Preciosa’s appointment as special administratrix is proper.

Held:

1. Section 1, Rule 73 specifically the clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue. It could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties.

What does the term "resides" mean? We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature — residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.

Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on the residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. On this issue, SC rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his death. As it is, the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna.

2. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special


administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed.”

The discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in the probate court. Exercise of that discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the same fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be taken into account in the appointment of a special administrator. Nothing is wrong for the judge to consider the order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator in appointing a special administrator. After all, the consideration that overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of the decedent.

Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. The good or bad administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of a property.

Supreme Court rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed, the appointing court does not determine who are entitled to share in the estate of the decedent but who is entitled to the administration.

Case 10

Angela Rodriguez vs Hon. Juan de Borja (June 21, 1966)

Facts: Petitioners Angela, Maria, Abelardo and Antonio, surnamed Rodriguez, petition this Court for a writ of certiorari and prohibition to the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, for its refusal to grant their motion to dismiss its Special Proceeding No. 1331, which said Court is alleged to have taken cognizance of without jurisdiction.

A motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners through counsel that the Court has no jurisdiction to try the above-entitled case in view of the pendency of another action for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, namely, Sp. Proceedings No. 3907 entitled 'In the matter of the Intestate Estate of the deceased Rev. Fr. Celestino Rodriguez which was filed ahead of the instant case.

The records show that Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died on February 12, 1963 in the City of Manila; that on March 4, 1963, Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez; that on March 8, 1963, Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez, through counsel filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will; that on March 11, 1963 before the Court could act on the petition, the same was withdrawn; that on March 12, 1963, aforementioned petitioners filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other things, that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Parañaque, Rizal, and died without leaving a will and praying that Maria Rodriguez be appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate; and that on March 12, 1963 Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan filed a petition in this Court for the probation of the will delivered by them on March 4, 1963. It was stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Parañaque, Rizal; that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan, from the year 1930 up to the time of his death in 1963; that he was buried in Parañaque, and that he left real properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan.

The movants contend that since the intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal was filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate was filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate, citing as authority in support thereof the case of Ongsingco Vda. de Borja vs. Tan and De Borja, G.R. No. 7792, July 27, 1955.

The petitioners Pangilinan and Jacalan, on the other hand, take the stand that the Court of First Instance of Bulacan acquired jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by them of the will to the Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963, and that the case in this Court therefore has precedence over the case filed in Rizal on March 12, 1963.


Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Bulacan has jurisdiction to try the case?

Ruling: YES.

The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance ahead of any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73 (old Rule 75) of the Rules of Court, since the same enjoins that:

The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. (Sec. 1)

This disposition presupposes that two or more courts have been asked to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate. Of them only one could be of proper venue, yet the rule grants precedence to that Court whose jurisdiction is first invoked, without taking venue into account.

As for the petitioners commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they learned of the delivery of the decedent's will to the Court of Bulacan, was in bad faith, patently done with a view to divesting the latter court of the precedence awarded it by the Rules. Certainly the order of priority established in Rule 73 (old Rule 75) was not designed to convert the settlement of decedent's estates into a race between applicants, with the administration of the properties as the price for the fleetest.

Therefore, as ruled in Castro, et al. vs. Martinez, 10 Phil. 307, "only after final decision as to the nullity of testate succession could an intestate succession be instituted in the form of pre-established action". The institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may not thus proceed while the probate of the purported will of Father Rodriguez is pending.

We rule that the Bulacan Court of First Instance was entitled to priority in the settlement of the estate in question, and that in refusing to dismiss the probate proceedings, said court did not commit any abuse of discretion. It is the proceedings in the Rizal Court that should be discontinued.

Wherefore, the writ of certiorari applied for is denied. Costs against petitioners Rodriguez.

Case 11

Deogracias Bernardo vs. CA

(GR.No:L-18148 February 28, 1963)

“A Court of First Instance (Now RTC) being a probate court in a Special Proceeding has jurisdiction to determine the Validity of the deed of donation in question and to pass upon the question of title of ownership of the properties mentioned therein.”

Facts:

Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes were husband and wife. The first died on July 27, 1958 and a testate proceeding for the settlement of his estate was instituted in the Court of the Fist Instance of Bulacan. His will was admitted to probate on October 9, 1958, disposing of his properties in favor of his widow; his cousins Armando, Ursula, and Buenaventura, all surnamed Capili; and Arturo, Deogracias and Eduardo, all surnamed Bernardo. Hermogena Reyes herself died on April 24, 1959. Upon petition of Deogracias Bernardo, executor of the estate of the deceased Eusebio Capili, she was substituted by her collateral relatives and intestate heirs, namely, Marcos, Vicente, Francisco and Dominga, all surnamed Reyes; and Jose, Constancia, Raymunda and Elena, all surnamed Isidoro.

On June 12, 1959, the executor filed a project of partition in the testate proceeding in accordance with the terms of the will, adjudicating the estate of Eusebio Capili among the testamentary heirs with the exception of Hermogena Reyes, whose share was alloted to her collateral relatives aforementioned. On June 16, 1959 these relatives filed an


opposition to the executor's project of partition and submitted a counter-project of partition of their own, claiming 1/2 of the properties mentioned in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili on the theory that they belonged not to the latter alone but to the conjugal partnership of the spouses.

The probate court, in two orders dated June 24, 1959 and February 10, 1960, respectively, set the two projects of partition for hearing, at which evidence was presented by the parties, followed by the submission of memoranda discussing certain legal issues. In the memorandum for the executor and the instituted heirs it was contended: (1) that the properties disposed of in the will of the deceased Eusebio Capili belonged to him exclusively and not to the conjugal partnership, because Hermogena Reyes had donated to him her half share of such partnership; (2) that the collateral heirs of Hermogena Reyes had no lawful standing or grounds to question the validity of the donation; and (3) that even assuming that they could question the validity of the donation, the same must be litigated not in the testate proceeding but in a separate civil action.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts.

The oppositors and heirs of Hermogena Reyes, on their part, argued that the deed of donation itself was determinative of the original conjugal character to the properties, aside from the legal presumption laid down in Article 160 of the Civil Code, and that since the donation was null and void the deceased Eusebio Capili did not become owner of the share of his wife and therefore could not validly dispose of it in his will.

On September 14, 1960, the probate court, the Honorable M. Mejia presiding, issued an order declaring the donation void without making any specific finding as to its juridical nature, that is, whether it was inter vivos or mortis causa, for the reason that, considered under the first category, it falls under Article 133 of the Civil Code, which prohibits donations between spouses during the marriage; and considered under the second category, it does not comply with the formalities of a will as required by Article 728 in relation to Article 805 of the same Code, there being no attestation clause. In the same order the court disapproved both projects of partition and directed the executor to file another," dividing the property mentioned in the last will and testament of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the properties mentioned in the deed of donation, Exhibit B, between the instituted heirs of the deceased Eusebio Capili and the legal heirs of the deceased Hermogena Reyes, upon the basis that the said properties were conjugal properties of the deceased spouses." On September 27, 1960, the executor filed a motion for new trial, reiterating and emphasizing the contention previously raised in their memorandum that the probate court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim of the legal heirs of Hermogena Reyes involving title to the properties mentioned in the will of Eusebio Capili and taking exception to the court's declaration of the nullity of the donation "without stating facts or provision of law on which it was based." The motion for new trial was denied in an order dated October 3, 1960.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals the order appealed from being affirmed, petitioners filed this present petition for review by certiorari.

The petitioners-appellants contend that the appellate court erred in not declaring that the probate court, having limited and special jurisdiction, had generally no power to adjudicate title and erred in applying the exception to the rule.

Issue:

Whether or not a probate court, having limited and special jurisdiction, had generally no power to adjudicate title.

Ruling:

In a line of decisions, this Court consistently held that as a general rule, question as to title to property cannot be passed upon on testate or intestate proceedings," except where one of the parties prays merely for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, in which case the probate court may pass provisionally upon the question without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action. However, we have also held that when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased, it is optional to them to submit to the probate court a question as to title to property, and when so submitted, said probate court may definitely pass judgment thereon (Pascual v. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561; Manalac v. Ocampo, et al., 73 Phil. 661); and that with the consent of the parties, matters


affecting property under judicial administration may be taken cognizance of by the court in the course of intestate proceeding, provided interests of third persons are not prejudiced (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil. 229, 232).

In the light of this doctrine, may it be said correctly that the trial court as well as the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the power of the probate court in this case to adjudicate in the testate proceedings, the question as to whether the properties herein involved belong to the conjugal partnership of Eusebio Capili and Hermogena Reyes, or to the deceased husband exclusively?

At the outset, let it be clarified that the matter at issue is not a question of jurisdiction, in the sense advanced by appellants that the trial court had completely no authority to pass upon the title to the lands in dispute, and that its decision on the subject is null and void and does not bind even those who had invoked its authority and submitted to its decision because, it is contended, jurisdiction is a creature of law and parties to an action can not vest, extend or broaden it. If appellants' contention is correct, then there can be no exception to the no-jurisdiction theory. But as has been stated in the case of Cunanan v. Amparo (supra) the Supreme Court speaking through Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason: "Determination of title to property is within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance. The responding Soriano's objection (that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to order the delivery of the possession of the lots to the estate) relates exclusively to the procedure, which is distinct from jurisdiction. It affects only personal rights to a mode of practice (the filing of an independent ordinary action) which may be waived". Strictly speaking, it is more a question of jurisdiction over the person, not over the subject matter, for the jurisdiction to try controversies between heirs of a deceased person regarding the ownership of properties alleged to belong to his estate, has been recognized to be vested in probate courts. This is so because the purpose of an administration proceeding is the liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. Liquidation means determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses. Thereafter, distribution is made of the decedent's liquidated estate among the persons entitled to succeed him. The proceeding is in the nature of an action of partition, in which each party is required to bring into the mass whatever community property he has in his possession. To this end, and as a necessary corollary, the interested parties may introduce proofs relative to the ownership of the properties in dispute. All the heirs who take part in the distribution of the decedent's estate are before the court, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, in all matters and incidents necessary to the complete settlement of such estate, so long as no interests of third parties are affected.

In the case now before us, the matter in controversy is the question of ownership of certain of the properties involved — whether they belong to the conjugal partnership or to the husband exclusively. This is a matter properly within the jurisdiction of the probate court which necessarily has to liquidate the conjugal partnership in order to determine the estate of the decedent which is to be distributed among his heirs who are all parties to the proceedings, including, of course, the widow, now represented because of her death, by her heirs who have been substituted upon petition of the executor himself and who have appeared voluntarily. There are no third parties whose rights may be affected. It is true that the heirs of the deceased widow are not heirs of the testator-husband, but the widow is, in addition to her own right to the conjugal property. And it is this right that is being sought to be enforced by her substitutes. Therefore, the claim that is being asserted is one belonging to an heir to the testator and, consequently, it complies with the requirement of the exception that the parties interested (the petitioners and the widow, represented by dents) are all heirs claiming title under the testator.

Petitioners contend additionally that they have never submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the probate court, for the purpose of the determination of the question of ownership of the disputed properties. This is not borne by the admitted facts. On the contrary, it is undisputed that they were the ones who presented the project of partition claiming the questioned properties as part of the testator's asset. The respondents, as representatives or substitutes of the deceased widow opposed the project of partition and submitted another. As the Court of Appeals said, "In doing so all of them must be deemed to have submitted the issue for resolution in the same proceeding. Certainly, the petitioners can not be heard to insist, as they do, on the approval of their project of partition and, thus, have the court take it for granted that their theory as to the character of the properties is correct, entirely without regard to the opposition of the respondents". In other words, by presenting their project of partition including therein the disputed lands (upon the claim that they were donated by the wife to her husband), petitioners themselves put in issue the question of ownership of the properties — which is well within the competence of the probate court — and just because of an opposition thereto, they can not thereafter withdraw either their appearance or the issue from the jurisdiction of the court. Certainly, there is here a waiver where the parties who raise the objection are the ones who


set the court in motion. They can not be permitted to complain if the court, after due hearing, adjudges question against them.

Finally, petitioners-appellants claim that appellees are estopped to raise the question of ownership of the properties involved because the widow herself, during her lifetime, not only did not object to the inclusion of these properties in the inventory of the assets of her deceased husband, but also signed an extra-judicial partition of those inventoried properties. But the very authorities cited by appellants require that to constitute estoppel, the actor must have knowledge of the facts and be appraised of his rights at the time he performs the act constituting estoppel, because silence without knowledge works no estoppel. In the present case, the deceased widow acted as she did because of the deed of donation she executed in favor of her husband not knowing that such deed was illegal, if inter-vivos, and ineffectual if mortis-causa, as it has not been executed with the required formalities similar to a will.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals being in accordance with law, the same is hereby affirmed with costs against appellants. So ordered.

Case 12

In the Matter of the Intestate of the deceased Andres Eusebio. EUGENIO EUSEBIO, petitioner-appellee, vs.AMANDA EUSEBIO, JUAN EUSEBIO, DELFIN EUSEBIO, VICENTE EUSEBIO, and CARLOS EUSEBIO,oppositors-appellants.

On November 16, 1953, when Eugenio Eusebio filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, a petition for his appointment as administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio, who died on 1952, residing, in the City of Quezon.

On December 4, 1953, Amanda, Virginia, Juan, Delfin, Vicente and Carlos, all surnamed Eusebio, objected to said petition, stating that they are illegitimate children of the deceased and that the latter was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, and praying that the case be dismissed upon the ground that venue had been improperly filed.

TC: court overruled this objection and granted said petition. Hence, this appeal. The appeal hinges on the situs of the residence of Andres Eusebio on

November 28, 1952, for Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules of Court, provides:

Where estate of deceased persons settled. — If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines in the CFI in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.XXX.

Andres Eusebio was, and had always been, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga, where he had his home. Inasmuch as his heart was in bad condition and his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P. Florentino St., Quezon City, on October 29, 1952, Andres Eusebio bought a house and lot at 889-A España Extention(EXHIBIT 2).

As proof of his residence the deed of conveyance and marriage contracts was presented where he it stated therein that he made Pampanga as his residence.The lower court, however, rejected said Exhibits 1 and 2, upon being offered in evidence, it believed that said documents should not be admitted in evidence before appellants had established their "personality" to intervene in the case, because of their alleged lack of "personality", but, when tried to establish such "personality", they were barred from doing so on account of the question of venue raised by him.

In this case the the trial Judge had taken inconsistent positions. While, on the one hand, he declared that appellants could not be permitted to introduce evidence on the residence of the decedent, for they contested the jurisdiction of court, on the other hand, he held, in the order appealed from, that, by cross-examining the appellee, said appellants had submitted themselves to the authority of the court.


ISSUE:SUPPOSE, Settlement of estate proceedings were situated in two courts, then the question of Improper venue was raised. Where shall the motion questioning the venue be filed?

It appears that on November 14, 1953, the Clerk of the CFI of Pampanga received a petition of appellants herein, dated November 4, 1953, for the settlement of the "Intestate Estate of the late Don Andres Eusebio". Attached to said petition was petition for the docketing thereof free charge, pursuant to Rule 3, section 22, of the Rules of Court. The latter petition was granted by an order dated November 16, 1953, which was received by the cashier of said court on November 17, 1953, on which date the case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 957.

On December 14, 1953, Jesus, Eugenio, Amando and Alfonso, all surnamed Eusebio (the children of the decedent by first marriage, including petitioner herein), moved for the dismissal of said proceedings, owing to the pendency of the present case, before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, since November 16, 1953 . This motion was granted in an order dated December 21, 1953, relying upon the above Rule 75, section 1, of the Rules of Court, pursuant to which "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."

Although said order is now final, it cannot affect the outcome of the case at bar. Said order did not pass upon the question of domicile or residence of the decedent. Moreover, in granting the court first taking cognizance of the case exclusive jurisdiction over the same, said provision of the Rules of Court evidently refers to cases triable before two or more courts with concurrent jurisdiction. It could not possibly have intended to deprive a competent court of the authority vested therein by law, merely because a similar case had been previously filed before a court to which jurisdiction is denied by law , for the same would then be defeated by the will of one of the parties. More specially, said provision refers mainly to non-resident decedents who have properties in several provinces in the Philippines, for the settlement of their respective estates may undertaken before the court of first instance of either one of said provinces, not only because said courts then have concurrent jurisdiction — and, hence, the one first taking cognizance of the case shall exclude the other courts — but, also, because the statement to this effect in said section 1 of Rule 75 of the Rules of the Court immediately follows the last part of the next preceding sentence, which deals with non-resident decedents, whose estate may settled the court of first instance of any province in which they have properties.lawphil.net

In view, however, of the last sentence of said section, providing that:. . . The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceedings, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

if proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased resident are instituted in two or more courts, and the question of venue is raised before the same, the court in which the first case was filed shall have exclusive jurisdiction to decide said issue. Should it be decided, in the proceedings before the said court, that venue had been improperly laid, the case pending therein should be dismissed and the corresponding proceedings may, thereafter, be initiated in the proper court.

In conclusion, the court find that the decedent was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga; that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly; and that it should, accordingly, have sustained appellants' opposition and dismissed appellee's petition.

Order appealed from is hereby reversed and appellee's petition is dismissed.

Case 16ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTSvs.JUDGE TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, Branch 38, Court of FirstInstance of Manila; MAXINE TATE-GRIMM, EDWARD MILLER GRIMM II and LINDAGRIMM, G.R. No. L-55509, April 27, 1984

Facts:


Edward M. Grimman American resident of Manila, died at 78 in the Makati Medical Centeron November 27, 1977. Survived by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and two children, Edward(Pete) and Linda, and by Juanita and Ethel (McFadden), his two children by a first marriage whichended in divorce.He executed on January 23, 1959,two willsi n San Francisco, California. One will disposed of hisPhilippine estate which he described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. Thesecond will disposed of his estate outside the Philippines.The two children of thefirst marriage were given their legitimes in the will disposing of the estatesituated in this country. In the will dealing with his property outside this country, the testator said:I purposely have made no provision in this will for my daughter, Juanita Grimm Morris, or mydaughter, Elsa Grimm McFadden (Ethel Grimm Roberts), because I have provided for eachof them in a separate will disposing of my Philippine property.The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine in Court of Tooele County, Utah.Two weeks later, Maxine, Linda and Pete, as the first parties, and Ethel, Juanita and their motherJuanita Kegley Grimm as the second parties, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila,entered into a compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate. It was signed the lawyers of theparties. It was stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated as personalrepresentatives (administrators) of Grimm's Philippine estate.On January 9, 1978, Ethel, filed with CFI Instance intestate proceeding for the settlement of hisestate. She was named special administratrix. On March 11, the second wife, Maxine, filedan opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the ground of the pendency of Utahof a proceeding for the probate of Grimm's will. She also moved that she be appointed specialadministratrix, She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm's will disposing of his Philippine estate.The intestate court in its orders of May 23 and June 2 noted that Maxine, withdrew that oppositionand motion to dismiss and, at the behest of Maxine, Ethel and Pete, appointed them jointadministrators. Apparently, this was done pursuant to the aforementioned Utah compromiseagreement. The court ignored the will already found in the record.The three administrators submitted an inventory. With the authority and approval of the court, theysoldsome of the testator’s properties. Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partitionsigned and filed by lawyers Limqueco and Macaraeg (not signed by Maxine and her two children),Judge Conrado M. Molina adjudicated to Maxine one-half (4/8) of the decedent's Philippine estateand one-eighth (1/8) each to his four children or 12.5%. Later, Maxine and her two children replacedLimqueco with Octavio del Callar as their lawyer.On April 18, 1980 Juanita Grimm Morris, through Ethel's lawyers, filed a motion for accounting "sothat the Estate properties can be partitioned among the heirs and the present intestate estate beclosed." Del Callar, Maxine's lawyer was notified of that motion

On September 8, 1980, Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the lower court a petitionpraying for the probate of Grimm's two wills (already probated in Utah), that the 1979 partitionapproved by the intestate court be set aside and the letters of administration revoked, that Maxinebe appointed executrix and that Ethel and Juanita Morris be ordered to account for the propertiesreceived by them and to return the same to Maxine. Grimm's second wife and two children allegedthat they were defraud due to the machinations of the Roberts spouses, that the 1978 Utahcompromise agreement was illegal, that the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm died testateand that the partition was contrary to the decedent's wills.Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack of merit in his order ofOctober 27, 1980. Ethel then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court, praying thatthe testate proceeding be dismissed, or alternatively that the two proceedings be consolidated andheard in Branch 20 and that the matter of the annulment of the Utah compromise agreement beheard prior to the petition for probate.

Issue:

Whether or not a petition for allowance of wills and to annul a partition, approved in anintestate proceeding byCourt of First Instance, can be entertained by its Branch 38 (after a probatein the Utah district court)

Ruling:

Respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss. A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is provedand allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person whodied testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should beconsolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding shouldcontinue hearing the two cases.Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an opposition and answerto the petition unless she considers her motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for thepurpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the intestate case, should be served with copies oforders, notices and other papers in the testate case.WHEREFORE the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order is dissolved.Case 17

URIARTE v. CFI NEGROS OCCIDENTAL (33 SCRA 252)

Facts:


Don Juan Uriarte y Goite died. Vicente Uriarte filed with the CFI of Negros Occidental a petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan (Special Proceeding No. 6344) alleging that, as a natural son of the latter, he was his sole heir, and that, during the lifetime of said decedent, Vicente had instituted a civil case in the same Court for his compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son. Higinio Uriarte, nephew of the deceased, filed an opposition to the petition alleging that Don Juan had executed a Will in Spain. He further questioned Vicente's capacity and interest to commence the intestate proceeding. Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent, commenced Special Proceeding No. 51396 in the CFI of Manila for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, and on the same date he filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the same on the following grounds: (1) that, as the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a last will, there was no legal basis to proceed with said intestate proceedings, and (2) that Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest to initiate said intestate proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son of the decedent. Vicente Uriarte opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending that, as the Negros Court was first to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over same pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. The Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's motion to dismiss and dismissed the Special Proceeding No. 6344 pending before it.

Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in Special Proceeding No. 51396 pending in the Manila Court, asking for leave to intervene therein; for the dismissal of the petition and the annulment of the proceedings had in said special proceeding. This motion was denied by said court.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the Negros Court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6344.2. Whether the Manila Court erred in not dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396 notwithstanding prior filing

of Special Proceeding No. 6344 in the Negros Court .

Held:

1. NO While the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance over "all matters of probate" is beyond question, the matter of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance where the special proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of first instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in which he had estate. Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is that of a nonresident alien (like the deceased) the Courts of First Instance in provinces where the deceased left any property have concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper special proceeding for the settlement of his estate. In the case before Us, these Courts of First Instance are the Negros and the Manila Courts - province and city where the deceased left considerable properties. In accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found it that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings.

2. NO Wrong venue is merely a waiveable procedural defect, and, in the light of the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, Vicente Uriarte has waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. Vicente Uriarte knew of the existence of a will executed by Don Juan since 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; Vicente Uriarte likewise was servedwith notice of


the existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its probate with the Manila Court since 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion for the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only in1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein up to that date. To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396 would put a premium on his negligence. This Court is not inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection against said proceedings is raise too late. Vicente Uriarte is entitled to prosecute Civil Case No. 6142 until it is finally determined, or intervene in Special Proceeding No. 51396 of the Manila Court, if it is still open, or to ask for its reopening if it has already been closed, so as to be able to submit for determination the question of his acknowledgment as natural child of the deceased testator, said court having, in its capacity as a probate court, jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the deceased testator and whether or not a particular party is or should be declared his acknowledged natural child.

Case 18Cuenco vs. CA

G.R. No. L-24742, October 26, 1973

The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of adecedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts

FACTS: Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by hiswidow and two minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon City. The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed a petition with CFI Rizal for the probate of the last will and testament, where she was named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted on the probate proceedings. Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.

ISSUEs: Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition.Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings

HELD:The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the last will and testament of the deceased and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's wish. On Venue and Jurisdiction Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. If this were otherwise, it would affect the prompt administration of justice. The court with whom the petition is first filed must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite adverse party. The definitions of a civil action and a special proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in which "a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong" necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or defendant. On the other hand, a special proceeding, "by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact," has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of action. As a special


proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate, pay its liabilities, and to distribute the residual to those entitled to the same.

Case 19

PURITA ALIPIO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO G. JARING, represented by his

Attorney-In-Fact RAMON G. JARING, respondents.

Mendoza, J

FACTS:Respondent Romeo Jaring subleased a fishpond, for the remaining period of his lease, to the spouses Placido and Purita Alipio and the spouses Bienvenido and Remedios Manuel. The stipulated amount of rent was P485,600.00, payable in two installments ofP300,000.00 and P185,600.00.

However, both the sub lessees failed to pay the second installment.

Hence, on October 13, 1989, private respondent sued the Alipio and Manuel spouses for the collection of the said amount.

Petitioner Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that her husband, Placido Alipio, had passed away on December 1, 1988.[2] She based her action on Rule 3, 21 of the 1964 Rules of Court which then provided that "when the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these rules." This provision has been amended so that now Rule 3, 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

When the action is for the recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment.

The trial court denied petitioner's motion.

The CA affirmed trial court’s ruling.

ISSUE:WON a creditor can sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in an ordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum of money chargeable against the conjugal partnership

RULING:

No.

When petitioner's husband died, their conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved [9] and debts chargeable against it are to be paid in the settlement of estate proceedings in accordance with Rule 73, 2 which states:


http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2000/sept2000/134100.htm#_edn9


Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either.

As held in Calma v. Taedo,[10] after the death of either of the spouses, no complaint for the collection of indebtedness chargeable against the conjugal partnership can be brought against the surviving spouse. Instead, the claim must be made in the proceedings for the liquidation and settlement of the conjugal property.

The reason for this is that upon the death of one spouse, the powers of administration of the surviving spouse ceases and is passed to the administrator appointed by the court having jurisdiction over the settlement of estate proceedings.[11] Indeed, the surviving spouse is not even a de facto administrator such that conveyances made by him of any property belonging to the partnership prior to the liquidation of the mass of conjugal partnership property is void.

Case 20VDA DE. RODRIGUEZ VS. CA 91 SCRA 540

Facts:

This is supposedly a case about collation.

Beatriz Bautista and Jose M. Valero, did not have any child during their marriage. However, Beatriz adopted Carmen (Carmencita) Bautista. Jose manifested in the adoption proceeding that he consented to the use by Carmen of his surname Valero.

On September 18, 1964, Jose M. Valero donated to Carmen B. Valero his one-half proindiviso share (apparently his inchoate share) in two conjugal lots, with the improvements thereon, located at San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Rizal, with an area of 1,500 square meters. Beatriz, consented to the donation. However, the deed of donation was not registered.On January 13, 1966, Jose M. Valero, executed his last will and testament. In that will, he did not mention the donation. He devised to his wife properties sufficient to constitute her legitime and bequeathed the remainder to his two children, Mrs. Flora Rodriguez and Mrs. Rosie Gutierrez.

On February 15, 1966, the Valero spouses, by means of a deed of absolute sale, conveyed the San Lorenzo Village lots and the improvements thereon to Carmen B. Valero-Rustia for the sum of one hundred twenty thousand pesos.

Beatriz B. Valero died intestate on September 12, 1972, survived by her husband and her adopted child. Her estate is pending settlement in Special Proceeding No. 88896 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Mrs. Carmen Valero-Rustia was named administratrix of her adopted mother's estate.

On October 18, 1972, Jose M. Valero died testate. The two San Lorenzo Village lots were included as part of the testate estate.

The executor opposed the motion on the ground that the two lots were donated to Mrs. Rustia and the donation would allegedly involve collation and the donee's title to the lots. The executor revealed that he was informed by Mrs. Gutierrez and Mrs. Rodriguez (supposed movants) that the two lots should be included in the inventory. Thus, the issue of collation was prematurely raised.

ISSUE:




WHETHER OR NOT the order of exclusion dated August 9, 1973 (subject to collation) was not interlocutory but was a final and appealable order valid that the order of December 14, 1973 (excluded from collation) modifying the order of August 3 is void.

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT:

We hold that the order of exclusion dated August 9, 1973 was not a final order. It was interlocutory in the sense that it did not settle once and for all the title to the San Lorenzo Village lots. The probate court in the exclusion incident could not determine the question of title.

The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties (3 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pages 448-9 and 473; Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257, June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266).

We hold further that the dictum of the Court of Appeals and the probate court that the two disputed lots are not subject to collation was a supererogation and was not necessary to the disposition of the case which merely involved the issue of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of the testator's estate. The issue of collation was not yet justifiable at that early stage of the testate proceeding. It is not necessary to mention in the order of exclusion the controversial matter of collation.

In this appeal, it is not proper to pass upon the question of collation and to decide whether Mrs. Rustia's titles to the disputed lots are questionable. The proceedings below have not reached the stage of partition and distribution when the legitimes of the compulsory heirs have to be determined.

WHEREFORE, we affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals and the orders of the, lower court dated August 9 and December 14, 1973, excluding from the inventory of Jose M. Valeros estate the two San Lorenzo Village lots now registered in the name of Carmen B. Valero-Rustia, but we delete from that decision and the two orders any ruling regarding collation which is a matter that may be passed upon by the probate court at the time when it is seasonably raised by the interested parties, if it is ever raised at all. No costs.

TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:

There can therefore be no collation here because from the documents of record, respondent Carmen B. Valero-Rustia is not a compulsory heir who received property by donation or gratuitous title from the deceased that would be subject to collation. The real question between petitioners (Children of the deceased vendor) and respondent-vendee (a stranger to the deceased's estate) is not collation, but a question of title and ownership of the properties.

Case 21G.R. No. L-56340 June 24, 1983SPOUSES ALVARO PASTOR, JR. and MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, petitioners, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN Y. REYES, JUDGE OF BRANCH I, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU and LEWELLYN BARLITO QUEMADA, respondents.PLANA, J.:

FACTS:

Spouses Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (PASTOR, SR.) and his wife Sofia Bossio were survived by their two legitimate children, Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (PASTOR, JR.) and Sofia Pastor de Midgely (SOFIA), as well as an illegitimate child Lewellyn Barlito Quemada (QUEMADA PASTOR, JR.).

QUEMADA filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of PASTOR, SR. with the CFI of Cebu, (PROBATE COURT). The will contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of QUEMADA consisting of 30% of PASTOR, SR.'s 42% share in the operation by Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation (ATLAS).

The PROBATE COURT appointed QUEMADA as a special administrator of the entire estate of PASTOR, SR.

QUEMADA instituted against PASTOR, JR. and his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate, which included the properties subject of the legacy which were in the names of PASTOR, JR. and his wife, Maria Elena Achaval de Pastor, who claimed to be the owners thereof in their own rights, and not by inheritance.


PASTOR, JR. and his sister SOFIA filed their opposition to the petition for probate and the order appointing QUEMADA as special administrator.

The PROBATE COURT issued an order allowing the will to probate. The CA affirmed the said decision. On petition for review, the SC dismissed the petition in a minute resolution and remanded the same to the PROBATE COURT after denying reconsideration.

QUEMADA asked for payment of his legacy and seizure of the properties subject of said legacy. PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA opposed these pleadings on the ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit. All pleadings remained unacted upon by the PROBATE COURT.

Later on, the PROBATE COURT required the parties to submit their respective position papers as to how much inheritance QUEMADA was entitled to receive. PASTOR. JR. and SOFIA manifested that determination of how much QUEMADA should receive was still premature. ATLAS, upon order of the Court, submitted a sworn statement of royalties paid to the Pastor Group. The statement revealed that of the mining claims being operated by ATLAS, 60% pertained to the Pastor Group distributed as follows:

1. A. Pastor, Jr. ...................................40.5% 2. E. Pelaez, Sr. ...................................15.0%

3. B. Quemada .......................................4.5%

On August 20, 1980, while the reconveyance suit was still being litigated, the PROBATE COURT issued the assailed Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that the legacy to QUEMADA was NOT INOFFICIOUS.

The PROBATE COURT directed ATLAS to remit directly to QUEMADA the 42% royalties due decedent's estate, of which QUEMADA was authorized to retain 75% for himself as legatee and to deposit 25% with a reputable banking institution for payment of the estate taxes and other obligations of the estate.

The 33% share of PASTOR, JR. and/or his assignees was ordered garnished to answer for the accumulated legacy of QUEMADA from the time of PASTOR, SR.'s death.

The order being "immediately executory", QUEMADA succeeded in obtaining a Writ of Execution and Garnishment, serving the same on ATLAS on the same day. The oppositors sought reconsideration thereof on the ground that the PROBATE COURT gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the question of ownership of the royalties and ordered the payment of QUEMADA's legacy after prematurely passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will.

In the meantime, the PROBATE COURT ordered suspension of payment of all royalties due PASTOR, JR. and/or his assignees until after resolution of oppositors' motion for reconsideration.

Before the Motion for Reconsideration could be resolved, PASTOR, JR. and his wife Ma. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer for writ of preliminary injunction, assailing the writ of execution and garnishment issued by the Probate Court. Said petition was denied as well as their motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this Petition for Review by certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not questions of ownership and the intrinsic validity of the holographic were resolved by the Probate Court with finality in the case at bar?

RULING:

No, it was not resolved by the Probate Court in the case at bar.

In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. (Rules of Court, Rule 75, Section 1; Rule 76, Section 9.)

As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.

Nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific properties. It confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the will, and the need for and propriety of appointing a special administrator. It allowed and approved the holographic will with respect to its


extrinsic validity and declared that the intestate estate administration aspect must proceed “subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and personal properties.”

The Probate Order did not resolve the question of ownership of the properties listed in the estate inventory, considering that the issue of ownership was the very subject of controversy in the reconveyance suit that was still pending.

It was, therefore, error for the assailed implementing Orders to conclude that the Probate Order adjudged with finality the question of ownership of the mining properties and royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion, the dispositive portion of the said Probate Order directed the special administrator to pay the legacy in dispute.

Case 22G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989

VICTORIA BRINGAS PEREIRA, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RITA PEREIRA NAGAC, respondents.

GANCAYCO, J.:

FACTS:

Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of Philippine Air Lines, passed away without a will. He was survived by his legitimate spouse of 10 months, herein petitioner Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira Nagac, herein private respondent.

On March 1, 1983, private respondent instituted before Branch 19 of the RTC of Bacoor, Cavite, a Special Proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira.

In her verified petition, private respondent alleged that:

she and Victoria Bringas Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the deceased; that the deceased left no will

there are no creditors of the deceased

the deceased left several properties, namely: death benefits from the Philippine Air Lines (PAL), the PAL Employees Association (PALEA), the PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA) and the Social Security System (SSS), as well as savings deposits with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), and a 300 square meter lot located at Barangay Pamplona, Las Pinas, Rizal

and finally, that the spouse of the deceased (herein petitioner) had been working in London as an auxiliary nurse and as such, one-half of her salary forms part of the estate of the deceased.

On March 23, 1983, petitioner filed an opposition and a motion to dismiss the petition of private respondent, alleging that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration and praying in the alternative, that if an estate does exist, the letters of administration relating to the said estate be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse.

The Regional Trial Court, appointed private respondent Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestate estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira upon a bond posted by her in the amount of P 1,000.00. The trial court ordered her to take custody of all the real and personal properties of the deceased and to file an inventory thereof within 3 months after receipt of the order.

Not satisfied with the resolution of the lower court, petitioner brought the case to the CA and the latter affirmed the appointment of private respondent as administratrix of the estate in question.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not a judicial administration proceeding is necessary when the decedent dies intestate without leaving any debts?

RULING:

The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the


deceased left no will, or in case he had left one, should he fail to name an executor therein.

An exception to this rule is established in Section 1 of Rule 74. Under this exception, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator.

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action.

It should be noted that recourse to an administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons.

In the case at bar, there are only two surviving heirs, a wife of 10 months and a sister, both of age. The parties admit that there are no debts of the deceased to be paid. What is at once apparent is that these two heirs are not in good terms. The only conceivable reason why private respondent seeks appointment as administratrix is for her to obtain possession of the alleged properties of the deceased for her own purposes, since these properties are presently in the hands of petitioner who supposedly disposed of them fraudulently.

We are of the opinion that this is not a compelling reason which will necessitate a judicial administration of the estate of the deceased. To subject the estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira, which does not appear to be substantial especially since the only real property left has been extrajudicially settled, to an administration proceeding for no useful purpose would only unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being wasted or squandered.

The court below before which the administration proceedings are pending was not justified in issuing letters of administration, there being no good reason for burdening the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding.

WHEREFORE, the letters of administration issued by the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor to Rita Pereira Nagac are hereby revoked and the administration proceeding dismissed without prejudice to the right of private respondent to commence a new action for partition of the property left by Andres de Guzman Pereira. No costs.

Case 23

G.R. No. L-27082 January 31, 1978

Intestate Estate of the Spouses Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba. FILOMENO COCA, Administrator, PRIMA PANGILINAN, and HEIRS OF CONCEPCION PANGILINAN-YAMUTA, namely, MARIA P. YAMUTA DE ATAY, EUSEBIO P. YAMUTA, and APOLINAR P. YAMUTA, petitioners-appellants, vs.GUADALUPE PIZARRAS VDA. DE PANGILINAN, HEIRS OF FRANCISCO PANGILINAN, namely, FRANCIS, ALGERIAN, BENJAMIN, PERLA and FRANCISCO, JR., all surnamed PANGILINAN, and CRISPIN BORROMEO, oppositors-appellees.

G.R. No. L-29545 January 31, 1978

FILOMENO COCA, administrator-appellant, vs.CRISPIN BORROMEO and GUADALUPE PIZARRAS VDA. DE PANGILINAN and her Children, claimants-appellees.

AQUINO, J.:

FACTS:

The spouses Juan Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba died intestate in 1943 and 1948, respectively. They possessed a homestead consisting of t2 parcels of land, located at Barrio Bunawan or Mauswagon, Calamba, Misamis Occidental.

One parcel is Identified as Lot No. 1927 with an area of 3.9791 hectares. It is now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 86 (T-10) of the registry of deeds of Misamis Occidental The other parcel is identified as Lot No. 1112 with an area of 18.0291 hectares and is covered by OCT No. P-8419 in the name of the Heirs of Juan Pangilinan,


represented by Concepcion Pangilinan de Yamuta.

According to Guadalupe Pizarras and her children, a third parcel, Lot No. 1920, with an area of 8 hectares and which was surveyed in the name of Concepcion Pangilinan adjoins Lots Nos. 1927 and 1112. She alleged that it forms part of the estate of the deceased Pangilinan spouses.

The Pangilinan spouses were survived by the following heirs:

(1) Prima Pangilinan

(2) Maria, Eusebio and Apolinar all surnamed Yamuta, the children of Concepcion Pangilinan Yamuta who died in 1961, and

(3) Francis, A Benjamin Perla and Francisco, Jr., all surnamed Pangilinan the children of Francisco Pangilinan who died in 1948 and who was also survived by his widow, Guadalupe Pizarras.

A Special Proceeding was instituted on September 5, 1963 for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses, Juan C. Pangilinan and Teresa Magtuba.

On September 25, 1965 the administrator presented a project of partition wherein the combined areas of Lots Nos. 1112 and 1927, or 22.0082 hectares, were partitioned as follows among Crispin Borromeo, the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan, Prima Pangilinan, and heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan.

It was also provided in the project of partition that the sum of P5,088.50, as the alleged debt of the estate to Concepcion Pangilinan, should be divided equally among the heirs.

The heirs of Francisco Pangilinan opposed that project of partition. They contended that the proposed partition Prima Pangilinan, who sold her share to Francisco Pangilinan should be excluded from the partition; that the total share of the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan in Lot No. 1112 is 12.6720 hectares, while that of the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan is 6.3360 hectares, and that the claim of the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan for 115,088.50 had not been properly allowed.

The lower court directed the administrator to pay the debt of the estate to the heirs of Concepcion Pangilinan. It deferred action on the project of partition until the ownership of the 12 hectares, which were claimed by the heirs of Francisco Pan and the 6 hectares, which were claimed by Crispin Borromeo is determined in an ordinary action.

On May 14,1966, the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan filed a supplemental opposition to include in the partition, Lot No. 1920, with an area of 8 hectares.

On August 31, 1966 the lower court, after noting that no separate action had been filed to determine the ownership of the 12 hectares, issued an order approving the project of partition but excluding the 12 hectares claimed by the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan.

The administrator, Filomeno Coca, Prima Pangilinan and the heirs of Concepcion Pan appealed from the lower court’s orders, contending that the latter, as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to decide the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion of Lot No. 1112. On the other hand, the appellees" or the heirs of Francisco Pangilinan counter that the lower court did not decide the ownership of the twelve hectares when it ordered their exclusion from the project of partition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the ownership of a parcel of land belonging to the deceased spouses or to their heirs, should be decided in the intestate proceeding or in a separate action?

RULING:

As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in the estate or intestate proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a separate action. That general rule, however, has qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and convenience.

The probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action.

Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of 'third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.


We hold that the instant case may be treated as an exception to the general rule that questions of title should be ventilated in a separate action.

Here, the probate court had already received evidence on the ownership of the twelve-hectare portion during the hearing of the motion for its exclusion from title inventory. The only interested parties are the heirs who have all appeared in the intestate proceeding.

After the issues have been joined and in case no amicable settlement has been reached, the probate court should receive evidence for a full-dress hearing to be held.

Crispin Borromeo may set forth also his claim for the three hectares but only for the purpose of deciding what portion of the estate should be given to him in satisfaction of his share.

After trial, the lower court's decision on the issues as to what constitutes the estate of the Pangilinan spouses should include the partition thereof and should indicate what portion of the estate should be allocated to Crispen Borromeo. If necessary, the validity of the donation or partition of Lot No. 1112, made by Juan C. Pangilinan during his lifetime, should be passed upon.

The case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings in accordance with the guidelines already set forth.

Case 24G.R. No. 75579 September 30, 1991

TOMAS TRINIDAD, petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.PARAS, J.

Atty. Tomas Trinidad was the administrator of the estate of the late NICOLAI DREPIN, President and General Manager of the Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation, owner-developer of the Munting Baguio Village Subdivision, located at Antipolo, Rizal.

He was charged with violation of P.D. 957 for non-delivery of title of Lot No. 19, Block No. 51 of Munting Baguio Village Subdivision to FRANCISCA T. DIMABUYO, after the sale of the same to the latter for the purchase price of P14,000,00.

Francisca T. Dimabuyu testified that she filed a case against the accused for Violation of P.D. No. 957 for non-delivery of title despite her full payment of the lot in the amount of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00).

Herein petitioner testified that he was the administrator of the Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation, and that said corporation had lots for sale. He continued to receive payments of lots for sale in installment. In 1978, however, the National Housing Authority stopped the sale of lots, and his corporation stopped operating the property, which is now under control of the Ministry of Human Settlements.

Petitioner claimed that he asked the Probate Court as administrator to allow him to execute a Deed of Sale to his lot buyers and he was allowed in November 1982. However, the private complainant did not file the proper petition or motion with the Probate Court for the delivery of the land. She likewise did not pay the taxes for the said land. As such, the contract has not been duly complied with.

On January 5, 1984, the RTC of Manila rendered judgment, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sec. 25 in relation to Section 39 of P.D. 957.

The petitioner elevated the case to the then IAC, which AFFIRMED in toto the findings of the RTC.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the petitioner may be held criminally responsible for the non-delivery of the land in question?

2. Whether or not execution of the deed of absolute sale without the Probate Court’s go-signal would be recreant to his sworn duty as administrator, as well as to render void his actuations done without the permission of the Probate Court?

RULING:

1. The Court ruled in the affirmative.


Sections 39 of Presidential Decree 957 provide, thus:

Sec. 25. Issuance of Title. — The owner or developer shall deliver the title of the lot or unit to the buyer upon full payment of the lot or unit. No fee, except those required for the registration of the deed of sale in the Registry of Deeds, shall be collected for the issuance of such title. In the event a mortgage over the lot or unit is outstanding at the time of the issuance of the title to the buyer, the owner or developer shall redeem the mortgage or the corresponding portion thereof within six months from such issuance in order that the title over fully paid lo or unit may be secured and delivered to the buyer in accordance herewith.

Sec. 39. Penalties. — Any person who shall violate any of the provision of this decree and/or any rule or regulation that may be issued pursuant to this Decree shall upon conviction, be punished by fine of not more than twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos and/or imprisonment of not more than ten years: Provided, that in the case of corporations, partnerships, cooperatives, or associations, the President, Manager or Administrator or the person who has charge with the administration of the business shall be criminally responsible for any violation of this Decree and/or the rules and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.

From the foregoing, it is clear that any person who violate Section 25 thereof by non-delivery of the title upon full payment of the lot or in case of a corporation, partnership, cooperative, or association, the president, manager or administrator or the person who has charge of the administration of the business shall be criminally responsible.

In the case at bar, Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation is the developer of the property in question which belongs to the deceased, Nicolai Drepin. As administrator of the estate of the said decedent, herein petitioner took over the administration of all the properties of said deceased including the property in question. Thus undeniably he is also the administrator of the Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation which is handling the development and disposition of said property.

2. The Court found the second issue to be meritorious, thus deserving its careful consideration.

Petitioner’s contention is correct and is impressed with merit. Inasmuch as the owner-seller of the property was already deceased and there were proceedings in the Probate Court, it was incumbent for the Probate Court to first give authorization to administrator of the estate to deliver titles of lots which had previously been sold.

The private complainant had been duly instructed by the accused herein to file the proper petition or motion with the Probate Court for delivery of said title but said complainant for one reason or another, disregarded said instructions. If at anybody should be blamed, it should be private complainant herself for her failure to obtain the needed authorization from the court.

Questions of title to any property apparent still belonging to estate of the deceased may be passed upon in the Probate Court, with consent of all the parties, without prejudice to third persons such as the herein private complainant. Just as ordinary claimant against the estate of the deceased are duty bound to present claim before the Probate Court so was private complainant herein required to file her claim for redress in said Probate Court.

We uphold petitioner's contention that if he had proceeded to immediately cause the delivery of the title of private complainant herein, he could have been held liable for a blatant disregard of the jurisdiction and function of the Probate Court. Truly, he was caught between the horns of a dilemma which was not of his own making.

If the probate proceedings referred to in this case are still going on, the proper remedy of the private complainant herein is to file before said Probate Court her claim for the delivery of the title of the lot she has purchased. If on the other hand, said probate proceedings are already closed and terminated, the Mother Earth Realty Development Corporation through its present President or General Manager is hereby ordered to cause the delivery of said title to Ms. Dimabuyu, within the shortest possible time, as soon as all the requ


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