crimpro cases - rule 113

8/11/2019 CrimPro Cases - Rule 113

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Rule 113Criminal Procedure | Page 1of 43

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 87429 August 27, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.

REGALADO BATI accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Ildefonso B. Malveda for accused-appellant.

PARAS,J.:

Upon being informed by their civilian informer, at around 5:30 o'clock in the

afternoon of July 27, 1986, that there would be a transaction involving the buying

and selling of marijuana which would take place on that same day at the Doa

Crispina Park Subdivision in Barangay Bagong Bayan, San Pablo City, Patrolmen Jose

Luciano, Angelito Caraan, Nelson Dimatulac and Democrito Cuenca immediately

proceeded to the vicinity where the alleged transaction would take place. Cuenca

and Dimatulac were dispatched by Luciano to the Bolante Section of the public

market near the railroad tracks while Luciano himself together with Caraan riding in

a police jeepney proceeded to the Doa Crispina Park.1

When Luciano and Caraan reached the place where the alleged transaction would

take place and while positioned at a street corner, they saw appellant Regalado Bati

and Warner Marquez by the side of the street about forty to fifty meters away from

them (the police officers). They saw Marquez giving something to Bati, who,

thereafter, handed a wrapped object to Marquez who then inserted the object

inside the front of his pants infront of his abdomen while Bati, on his part, placed

the thing given to him inside his pocket. (pp. 5-7, tsn., Luciano, Aug. 25, 1987; p. 5,

tsn., Caraan, Nov. 3, 1987; pp. 1-2, Decision, January 31, 1988)

As soon as the above observed transaction was completed, Bati and Marquez

parted ways. Luciano and Caraan in their jeepney followed Marquez who was riding

a bicycle. The police officers were able to catch up with him (Marquez) along the

circular street going toward the general direction of the national highway. Marquez

was questioned by them and, at first, denied having received anything from Bati

However, upon being asked about what he had inside the front of his pants, he

brought out an object wrapped in newspaper. Stripped of the wrappings, the object

turned out to be a pink plastic bag containing marijuana. Marquez then told the

police officers that he had bought marijuana for P190.00 from Bati. WhereuponMarquez was arrested on the spot and was made to board the police jeep. (pp. 7-8,

tsn., Luciano, Aug. 25, 1987; p. 6, tsn., Caraan, Nov. 3, 1987; p. 2, Decision, January

31, 1988).

Luciano and Caraan on board the jeep, immediately gave chase and caught up with

Bati at the Bolante section. Luciano went down the vehicle and confronted Bati who

admitted to the police officers present that he sold the marijuana to Marquez for

P190,00. Bati then was likewise arrested and made to board the police jeep. The

money in the amount of P190.00 in Bati's possession was confiscated. Both Bati and

Marquez were brought to the Police station where, again, they admitted they were

in the buying and selling of the confiscated marijuana (pp. 8-10, tsn., Luciano, Aug.25, 1987, pp. 6-7, tsn., Caraan, Nov. 3, 1987, p. 2, Decision, January 31, 1988).

Before the confiscated money in the amount of P190.00 was turned over to Sgt.

Bayani Yte, Chief of the Intelligence and Investigation Section of the San Pablo City

Police Station, Luciano, one of the arresting officers, affixed his initials "JBL" on the

said confiscated peso bills. The marijuana confiscated was likewise turned over to

Sgt. Yte and was personally delivered by Patrolman Nelson Dimatulac to the PC

Came Laboratory in Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna. The examination

conducted by the Forensic Chemist, P/Lt. Rosalinda Royales, revealed that the

confiscated specimen was positive for marijuana. (p. 9, tsn., Royales, July 21, 1987;

pp. 10-11, tsn., Luciano, Aug. 25, 1987; pp. 3-9, tsn., Yte, Dec. 8, 1987; p. 2,Decision, Jan. 31, 1988).

In due course, an Information was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial

Region, Branch 30, San Pablo City and docketed as Criminal Case No. 4760-SP,

charging REGALADO BATI with violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No.

6425, as amended, committed as follows:

That on or about July 27, 1986, in the City of San Pablo, Republic

of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable

Court, the above-named, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully


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and feloniously distribute and sell dried marijuana leaves, a

dangerous drug, without being authorized by law.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (15, Rollo)

After trial, following a plea of not guilty upon arraignment, the trial court entered a

judgment of conviction, the pertinent portion reading

The accused took the witness stand denying every damaging

testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. He claimed he was then

on his way to buy vegetables for his mother at the time of his

arrest at 5:30 p.m. of July 27, 1986. The accused did not impress

the Court as a well behaved individual who does marketing for his

mother and wife. If he were really such a "good boy", why did

Marquez and the police officers fabricate the charge of drug

pushing against him? There was no ill-motive shown by the

defense on the part of Marquez and the police officers. As already

mentioned elsewhere, the accused admitted that he did not have

any quarrel with them. He likewise admitted that when he signed

the waiver before and in the presence of Atty. Vivencio H. Reyes,he knew him to be a lawyer and was acting as his lawyer when he

explained to him his constitutional rights. (Hearing of September

20, 1987) It is also a matter of record that since his arrest,

detention and up to the trial of the case, he never executed any

written statement denying the charge against him narrating

therein that he was about to do marketing when arrested by the

police officers. Clearly, his alleged marketing is a mere after

thought. The defense was not convincing when it was alleged that

he does the marketing every afternoon buying the same

vegetables and quantity since July 27, 1986 up to the present. His

mother's testimony failed to convince the Court of his innocence.

In sum the prosecution overwhelmingly adduced material

evidence beyond reasonable doubt to warrant the conviction of

the accused for unlawfully selling and distributing marijuana as

against the lame denials of the accused. His denials are only self

serving negative evidence which cannot outweigh the positive

evidence of the prosecution (People vs. Jara, G.R, Nos. 61356-57,

September 30, 1986).

As the records show that the accused had violated the terms of

his bail for which reason his arrest was effected when he failed to

honor his commitment, the Court believes that he should no

longer be granted bail for his provisional liberty as the chances for

his jumping bail are very strong.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders

judgment finding the accused Regalado Bati guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of Sec. 4, Art. II, RANo. 6425 as amended, without any modifying circumstance to

consider, hereby sentences him to suffer life imprisonment, to

pay the fine of P25,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case

of insolvency and to pay the costs.

The bail bond for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled and

the accused be immediately incarcerated. (pp. 18-19, Rollo)

From the foregoing judgment of conviction, appellant came to this

Court assigning the following errors allegedly committed by the court a quoto wit:

FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THAT THE HONORABLE COURTA QUOSERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT

HOLDING THAT THE ARREST OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND

THE SEIZURE/TAKING OF THE MONEY FROM HIM BY THE POLICE

OFFICERS WAS ILLEGAL AND UNLAWFUL BEING VIOLATIVE OF

ONE'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE SECURE IN HIS PERSON AND

PROPERTY AND THERETO WHATEVER EVIDENCE OBTAINED

THEREFROM WAS NOT ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.

SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THAT THE HONORABLE COURTA QUOSERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT

HOLDING THAT THE NON PRESENTATION OF THE ALLEGED BUYER

WARNER MARQUEZ AND THAT OF THE CIVILIAN INFORMER

AMOUNTED TO SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE WHOSE TESTIMONIES

IF PRESENTED WOULD PRODUCE ADVERSE EFFECTS TO THE

PROSECUTION'S CAUSE.


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THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THAT THE HONORABLE COURTA QUO ERRED IN NOT HOLDING

THAT THE TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES WERE

REPLETE WITH CONTRADICTION AND MATERIAL

INCONSISTENCIES WITH RESPECT TO THE MARIJUANA SPECIMEN

ADMITTEDLY TAKEN FROM THE ALLEGED BUYER WARNER

MARQUEZ AND NOT FROM THE HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANT

WHICH DEFINITELY WILL NOT WARRANT CONVICTION OF THEACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. (pp. 2-3, Brief for the

Plaintiff-Appellee; p. 50, Rollo)

Appellant first contends that the arrest was not valid as the requirements for a

warrantless arrest were not complied with.

This contention is without merit.

Section 5 Rule 113 of the Rules in Criminal Procedure clearly provides:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant, when lawful. A peace officer orprivate person may, without warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be

arrested has committed, is actually committing,

or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been

committed,and he haspersonal knowledgeof

facts indicating that the person to be arrested

has committed it; . . .

xxx xxx xxx

(emphasis supplied)

As the court a quocorrectly ruled

It is the considered view of the Court that there was no need for

Luciano and Caraan to be armed with a warrant of arrest when

they arrested Marquez and the accused since they had personal

knowledge of the actual commission of the crime viz: They were

eyewitnesses to the illegal exchange of marijuana and P190.00

between Marquez and accused who were caught inflagrante

delicto. The facts and circumstances attendant precisely fall under

Sec. 5, (a), Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. The

subsequent arrest of Marquez and accused were made under the

principle of "hot pursuit". The recovery of the marijuana from

Marquez and the P190.00 from accused by the said police officers

were not violative of their constitutional rights since Marquez andthe accused voluntarily surrendered them to the police officers.

But even for the sake of argument that the recovery of the

marijuana and peso bills were against the consent of Marquez and

accused, still, the search on their persons was incidental to their

valid warrantless arrest. For, the rule that searches and seizures

must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule.

There are at least three exceptions: (1) search incidental to an

arrest, (2) search of a moving vehicle and (3) seizure of evidence

in plain view (Manipon v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267). In the

case at bar, the searches made on Marquez and accused were

incidental to their valid arrest. (pp. 8-9, Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee; p. 50,Rollo)

Having caught the appellant inflagranteas a result of the buy-bust operation, the

policemen were not only authorized but were also under obligation to apprehend

the drug pusher even without a warrant of arrest (People vs. Paco, 170 SCRA 681,

686; People vs. Rodriguez, 172 SCRA 742). And since appellant's arrest was lawful, it

follows that the search made incidental to the arrest was also valid. (Rule 126, Sec.

12, Rules of Court; Alvero vs. Dizon, 76 Phil. 637; People vs. Claudio G.R. No. 72564,

April 15, 1988)

Appellant next contends that the non-presentation of the alleged buyer Warner

Marquez and that of the civilian informer, amounted to suppression of evidence.

This contention is, likewise, without merit. In the case of People vs. Andiza(164

SCRA 642, 647) this Court held

The appellant underscores the fact that Pat. Hernandez and the

civilian informer were not made to take the witness stand, and

maintains that their non-presentation rendered a fatal blow to

the prosecution's case. We do not agree. Admittedly, Pat.

Hernandez and the civilian informer would be highly competent


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witnesses, being, themselves, the poseurs-buyers: however, their

testimonies are not indispensable in view of the declarations of

not only one, but two other eyewitnesses. If presented, their

testimonies would merely constitute cumulative evidence, thus,

their non-presentation as witnesses does not mean suppression

of testimony that is adverse to the prosecution. (People vs. Extra,

No. L-29205, July 30, 1976, 72 SCRA 199, citing People v. Sigayan,

et al., Nos. L-18523-26, April 30, 1966,16 SCRA 844; People v.

Cristobal, No. L-13062, January 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 151; and Peoplev. Escalona No. L-13294, March 29, 1961, 1 SCRA 891). At any

rate, the matter of presenting witnesses for the People is a

prerogative of the prosecuting fiscal. In the instant case, there

was no need to present Pat. Hernandez because the testimonies

of Sgt. Raquidan and Pat. de la Cruz, together with those of Cpl.

Romeo Consengco and the forensic chemist, Daily Panganiban,

were already clear, sufficient, and convincing. Besides the defense

could have requested the court below to issue subpoenas

requiring the said eyewitnesses to testify, but as the defense

apparently failed to do that, they cannot now argue that said

eyewitnesses testimonies would have been adverse to theprosecution. (pp. 16-17, Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee; p.

50, Rollo)

In the case at bar, there were other prosecution witnesses who testified and

positively Identified appellant as the principal participant in the illegal transaction.

Both Patrolmen Luciano and Caraan actually witnessedthe same and their

testimonies were based on their actual and personal knowledge of the events that

took place leading to appellant's arrest. They may not have been within hearing

distance, specially since conversation would expectedly be carried on in hushed

tones, but they were certainly near enough to observe the movements of the

appellant and the buyer. Moreover, these prosecution witnesses are an law

enforcers and are, therefore, presumed to have regularly performed their duties in

the absence of proof to the contrary. (People vs. Agapito, G.R. No. 73786, Oct. 12,

1987)

Furthermore, We find the testimonies of the above eyewitnesses, given during the

direct as well as in the cross-examination, to be consistent and compatible on the

material points. Both Luciano and Caraan categorically stated that they saw

Marquez who then inserted the object inside the front of his pants infront of his

abdomen while Bati, on his part, placed the thing given to him inside his pocket.

Since the testimonies of Luciano and Caraan were not actuated by "improper

motives" they are entitled to "full faith and credit." (People vs. Patog, 144 SCRA

429; People vs. de Jesus, 145 SCRA 521).

Finally, anent the alleged inconsistencies like.

(a) in the information it is alleged on one hand that he was caught

distributing and selling marijuana leavesand likewise in the latter

request sent by Sgt. Bayani Yte to the Commanding Office of

Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna, it was therein mentioned

that the marijuana leavessubmitted for examination were

confiscated from Marquez, on the other hand, in the Chemistry

Report No. D-112-86, the Forensic Chemist Rosalinda Royales,

allegedly mentioned that the specimen submitted to her for

examination consisted ofmarijuana fruiting tops.(p. 9, Appellant's

Brief)

(b) The "conflicting versions" of Sgt. Yte and P/Lt. Rosalinda

Royales taken during cross-examination. Sgt. Yte testified that he

placed his initials both on the pink plastic bag and on the

newspaper used as wrapper. Royales, on the other hand, testifiedthat there were no markings whatever on the pink plastic bag.

Suffice it to state that these cannot serve to discredit the prosecution's case

considering that the trial court has decisively found that the specimen confiscated

from Marquez and submitted to the PC laboratory for examination consisted of

marijuana leaves with fruiting tops wrapped in newspaper and placed inside a pink

plastic bag. (p. 2, Decision) And the fact remains that the specimen indorsed by Sgt.

Yte to the PC laboratory was the very sameone taken from Warner Marquez and

that after examination conducted by P/Lt. Royales, was positive for marijuana.

Thus, as aptly pointed out by the trial court

The defense contended that the specimen tested by the forensic

chemist was not the same one taken in the possession of the

accused and that Marquez did not Identify it. This claim is not

worthy of belief since themarijuana leaves with fruiting topswere

inside a pink plastic bag (Exh. 5-B) when brought by Dimatulac to

the PC crime laboratory and it was the same pink plastic bag

containing 17.1 grams of marijuana that was the subject matter

of the examinationconducted by Sgt. Royales from which Exh. B

came into being. (p. 2, Decision; emphasis supplied)


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(pp. 26-27, Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee; p. 50, Rollo)

The Court, after a careful study of the case finds the evidence presented by the

prosecution, upon which the trial court based its judgment of conviction, to be

overwhelmingly against the pretended innocence of the appellant and has proved

to a moral certainty the latter's guilt of the crime of selling prohibited drugs.

The penalty for the sale of marijuana is life imprisonment to death and a fine

ranging from P20,000 to P30,000 (Sec. 4, R.A. 6425, as amended by P.D. 1675)

The law is severe because those who are caught in the strangle hold of prohibited

drugs not only slide into the ranks of the living dead, what is worse, they become a

grave menace to the safety of the law-abiding members of society. (People vs.

Lamog, 172 SCRA 342, 349). As this Court also declared in People vs. Policarpio, 158

SCRA 85, "(P)eddlers of drugs are actually agents of destruction. They deserve no

less than the maximum penalty."

In the instant case, however, the trial court erred in not applying the rule that when

the penalty imposed is higher thanprision correccional no subsidiary imprisonment

shall be imposed upon the culprit. (Art. 39 (3) Revised Penal Code; People vs.Andiza, 164 SCRA 642, 650).

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is AFFIRMED except that there shall be

no subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

With costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera (Chairman), Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Sarmiento, J., is on leave.


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SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 93239 March 18, 1991


vs.

EDISON SUCRO, accused-appellant.


Fidencio S. Raz for accused-appellant.

GUTIERREZ, JR.,J.:p

Edison Sucro was charged with and convicted of violation of Section 4, Article II of

the Dangerous Drugs Act, under an Information which reads:

That on or about the 21st day of March, 1989, in the evening, in

the Poblacion, Municipality of Kalibo, Province of Aklan, Republic

of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable

Court, the above-named accused, acting as a pusher or broker in

the business of selling, administering, delivery, giving away toanother and/or distributing prohibited drugs, did then and there

wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously and without authority of law

have in his possession and control nineteen (19) pieces of

marijuana cigarette sticks and four (4) tea bags of dried marijuana

leaves which were confiscated from him by the police authorities

of Kalibo, Aklan, shortly after having sold one tea bag of dried

marijuana leaves to a customer. (Rollo, p. 9)

Upon arraignment, the accused-appellant, assisted by counsel, entered a plea of

"not guilty" to the offense charged. Trial ensued and a judgment of conviction was

rendered, the pertinent portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered finding the accused Edison

Sucro guilty of the sale of prohibited drug under Section 4, Article

II of the Dangerous Drug Act, as amended, and sentencing him to

suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and pay a fine of P20,000,

and costs. He shall be entitled to full credit in the service of hissentence with the period for which he has undergone preventive

imprisonment to the date of promulgation of this judgment. All

the items of marijuana confiscated in this case are declared

forfeited in favor of the State. (Rollo, p. 41)

From the foregoing judgment of conviction, accused-appellant interposes this

appeal, assigning the following as errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, to

wit:

I

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE FOR THE

PROSECUTION EXHIBITS "E"-"E-4", TEA BAGS OF ALLEGED

MARIJUANA, TO BE THE CORPUS DELICTI;FURTHERMORE, THAT

THE SAME WERE TAKEN WITHOUT THE REQUIRED WARRANT OF

SEARCH AND ARREST SINCE THE ACCUSED WAS NOT IN THE ACT

OF COMMITTING ANY OFFENSE AT THE TIME OF HIS ARREST.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED EDISON

SUCRO GUILTY OF THE SALE OF PROHIBITED DRUGS UNDERSECTION 4, ARTICLE II, OF THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT AND

SENTENCING HIM TO SUFFER A PENALTY OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT

AND TO PAY A FINE OF P 20,000.00. (Appellant's Brief, p. 1)

The antecedent facts of the case as summarized by the Solicitor General are as

follows:

On March 21, 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP,

Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente Seraspi, Jr. (Station


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Commander of the INP Kalibo, Aklan) to monitor the activities of

appellant Edison Sucro, because of information gathered by

Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana. (p. 6, TSN, May 2,1989).

As planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on said date, Pat. Fulgencio

Positioned himself under the house of a certain Arlie Regalado at

C. Quimpo Street. Adjacent to the house of Regalado, about 2

meters away, was a chapel. Thereafter, Pat. Fulgencio saw

appellant enter the chapel, taking something which turned outlater to be marijuana from the compartment of a cart found

inside the chapel, and then return to the street where he handed

the same to a buyer, Aldie Borromeo. After a while appellant

went back to the chapel and again came out with marijuana which

he gave to a group of persons. (pp. 6-8, 15-18, Ibid). It was at this

instance that Pat. Fulgencio radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and reported

the activity going on. P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat. Fulgencio to

continue monitoring developments. At about 6:30 P.M., Pat.

Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later

Identified as Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with appellant.

(pp. 18-19, Ibid)

At that point, the team of P/Lt. Seraspi proceeded to the area and

while the police officers were at the Youth Hostel at Maagma St.,

Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and

appellant. P/Lt. Seraspi and his team caught up with Macabante at

the crossing of Mabini and Maagma Sts. in front of the Aklan

Medical Center. Upon seeing the police, Macabante threw

something to the ground which turned out to be a tea bag of

marijuana. (pp. 6-8, TSN, June 19, 1989) When confronted,

Macabante readily admitted that he bought the same from

appellant (Edison Sucro) in front of the chapel. (p. 6, TSN, May 24,

1989) The police team was able to overtake and arrest appellant

at the corner of C. Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The police recovered

19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside the

chapel and another teabag from Macabante, The teabags of

marijuana were sent to the PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service, at

Camp Delgado, Iloilo City for analysis. The specimens (Exhibits "G"

to "G-18", Exhibits "E" to "E-4") were all found positive of

marijuana. (pp. 47, TSN, Sept. 4, 1989)" (Appellee's Brief, pp. 3-6)

As can be seen from the facts, the issue hinges mainly on whether or not the arrest

without warrant of the accused is lawful and consequently, whether or not the

evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.

We rule in the affirmative.

The accused-appellant contends that his arrest was illegal, being a violation of his

rights granted under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. He stresses that

there was sufficient time for the police officers to apply for a search and arrest

warrants considering that Fulgencio informed his Station Commander of the

activities of the accused two days before March 21, 1989, the date of his arrest.

This contention is without merit.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances

where arrest without warrant is considered lawful. The rule states:

Arrest without warrant, when lawful. A peace officer or privateperson may, without warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has

committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an

offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has

personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be

arrested has committed it; (Emphasis supplied)

An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the

meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the officer sees

the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and

proceeds at once to the scene thereof. (U.S. v. Fortaleza, 12 Phil. 472 [1909]; and

U.S. v. Samonte, 16 Phil. 516 [1910])

The records show that Fulgencio went to Arlie Regalado's house at C. Quimpo

Street to monitor the activities of the accused who was earlier reported to be

selling marijuana at a chapel two (2) meters away from Regalado's house.

Fulgencio, within a distance of two meters saw Sucro conduct his nefarious activity.

He saw Sucro talk to some persons, go inside the chapel, and return to them and


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exchange some things. These, Sucro did three times during the time that he was

being monitored. Fulgencio would then relay the on-going transaction to P/Lt.

Seraspi.

Anent the second requirement, the fact that Macabante, when intercepted by the

police, was caught throwing the marijuana stick and when confronted, readily

admitted that he bought the same from accused-appellant clearly indicates that

Sucro had just sold the marijuana stick to Macabante, and therefore, had just

committed an illegal act of which the police officers had personal knowledge, beingmembers of the team which monitored Sucro's nefarious activity.

The court earlier indicated in the case of People v. Bati (G.R. No. 87429, August 27,

1990) that police officers have personal knowledge of the actual commission of the

crime when it had earlier conducted surveillance activities of the accused. Thus, it

stated:

When Luciano and Caraan reached the place where the alleged

transaction would take place and while positioned at a street

comer, they saw appellant Regalado Bati and Warner Marquez by

the side of the street about forty to fifty meters away from them(the public officers). They saw Marquez giving something to Bati,

who, thereafter handed a wrapped object to Marquez who then

inserted the object inside the front of his pants in front of his

abdomen while Bati, on his part, placed the thing given to him

inside his pocket. (p. 2)

xxx xxx xxx

. . . Both Patrolman Luciano and Caraan actually witnessed the

same and their testimonies were based on their actual and

personal knowledge of the events that took place leading toappellant's arrest. They may not have been within hearing

distance, specially since conversation would expectedly be carried

on in hushed tones, but they were certainly near enough to

observe the movements of the appellant and the buyer.

Moreover, these prosecution witnesses are all law enforcers and

are, therefore, presumed to have regularly performed their duties

in the absence of proof to the contrary (People v.

Bati, supraciting People v. Agapito, G.R. No. 73786, October 12,

1987)

The accused questions the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant

considering that Fulgencio himself knew of Sucro's activities even prior to the

former's joining the police force. Fulgencio reported Sucro's activities only three

days before the incident.

As the records reveal, Fulgencio and Sucro had known each other since their

childhood years and that after Fulgencio joined the police force, he told the

accused-appellant not to sell drugs in their locality. Hence, it is possible that

because of this friendship, Fulgencio hesitated to report his childhood friend andmerely advised him not to engage in such activity. However, because of reliable

information given by some informants that selling was going on everyday, he was

constrained to report the matter to the Station Commander.

On the other hand, the failure of the police officers to secure a warrant stems from

the fact that their knowledge acquired from the surveillance was insufficient to

fulfill the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. What is paramount is

that probable cause existed. Thus, it has been held in the case of People v. Lo Ho

Wing, et al. (G.R. No. 88017, January 21, 1991):

In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factualfindings of the trial court that the authorities had reasonable

ground to believe that appellant would attempt to bring in

contraband and transport it within the country. The belief was

based on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance activities

on the suspected syndicate, of which appellant was touted to be a

member. Aside from this, they were also certain as to the

expected date and time of arrival of the accused from China. But

such knowledge was clearly insufficient to enable them to fulfill

the requirements for the issuance of a search warrant. Still and

all, the important thing is that there was probable cause to

conduct the warrantless search, which must still be present insuch a case.

As the Solicitor General has pointed out:

There are several instances when a warrantless search and seizure

can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest

provided the same is effected on the basis of probable cause (e.g.

stop and search without warrant at checkpoints). Between

warrantless searches and seizures at checkpoints and in the case

at bar the latter is more reasonable considering that unlike in the


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former, it was effected on the basis of probable cause. Under the

circumstances (monitoring of transactions) there existed probable

cause for the arresting officers, to arrest appellant who was in fact

selling marijuana and to seize the contraband.

That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute

rule (Manipon, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267 [1986]). Among the exceptions

granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of

the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully arrestedmay be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof

of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. (People v. Castiller, G.R.

No. 87783, August 6, 1990)

The accused-appellant claims that the arrest having been done without warrant, it

follows that the evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible.

As earlier discussed, there is nothing unlawful about the arrest considering its

compliance with the requirements of a warrantless arrest. Ergo, the fruits obtained

from such lawful arrest are admissible in evidence.

Edison Sucro assails the trial court's reliance on the statement of Macabante whose

reason for testifying could be merely to escape prosecution.

We quote the trial court's finding as to the testimony of Macabante:

The non-filing of a complaint against him for possession of

marijuana may have been the reason of (sic) his willingness to

testify in court against the accused. But this does not necessarily

taint the evidence that proceeds from his lips. As explained by Lt.

Seraspi, the best sources of information against drug pushers are

usually their customers, especially if as in this case, there is noother direct evidence of the selling except the testimony of the

buyer. We accept this observation as a realistic appraisal of a

situation in which drug users are, and should be employed by law

enforcement authorities to bolster the drive against pushers who

are the real felons in our society. We have observed the

demeanor of the witness in court, and found him to be

straightforward, unhesitating, and spontaneous in his

declarations, so that we are satisfied as to his intention and

disposition to tell the truth (Rollo, p. 40)

Time and again it has been held that the findings of the trial court are entitled to

great weight and should not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the trial

court had overlooked certain facts of weight and importance, it being

acknowledged. that the court below, having seen and heard the witnesses during

the trial, is in a better position to evaluate their testimonies (People v. Umali, et al.,

G.R. No. 84450, February 4, 1991 citing People v. Alvarez, 163 SCRA 745 [1988];

People v. Dorado, 30 SCRA 53 [1969]; and People v. Espejo, 36 SCRA 400 [1970]).

Furthermore, the testimony of Macabante was corroborated on material points bypublic officers Fulgencio and Seraspi.

There is nothing in the record to suggest that the police officers were compelled by

any motive than to accomplish their mission to capture a drug pusher in the

execution of the crime, the presumption being that police officers perform their

duties regularly in the absence of any evidence to the contrary (Rule 131, Sec. 3(m),

Revised Rules on Evidence; People v. Castiller, supracitingPeople v. Natipravat, 145

SCRA 483 [1986]).

The prosecution evidence was further bolstered by the findings of the Forensic

Chemist that the items seized were all positive for marijuana.

In contrast to the evidence presented by the prosecution, accused-appellant's

defense is alibi which is unavailing considering that he was positively identified by

Macabante to be the person from whom he bought marijuana.

Sucro alleges that he could not have committed the crime since he was with his

uncle and cousin distributing handbills for his Auntie's candidacy. The fact,

however, remains that it does not preclude the possibility that he was present in

the vicinity as established by his admission that he moved a lot and even had the

occasion to meet Macabante on the street.

It is well-settled that mere denials cannot prevail against the positive identification

of the appellant as the seller of the prohibited substances. (People v. Khan, 161

SCRA 406 [1988]; and People v. Paco, 170 SCRA 681 [1989])

Premises considered, this Court is convinced that appellant Edison Sucro had indeed

committed the offense charged. The trial court's decision must be upheld.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.


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SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.


11/43



SUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R.No. 74869 July 6, 1988


vs.

IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.


Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.

CRUZ,J.:

The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was

nonetheless arrested, tried and found guilty of illegally transporting marijuana. The

trial court, disbelieving him, held it was high time to put him away and sentenced

him to life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00.1

Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the

M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were

in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what

looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The

two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the

NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an

information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him.2Later,

the information was amended to include Farida Ali y Hassen, who had also been

arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated.3Both were

arraigned and pleaded not guilty.4Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss

the charge against Ali on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers

absolving her after a 'thorough investigation."5The motion was granted, and trial

proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually convicted .6

According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of

their informers that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo

City and was carrying marijuana.7He was Identified by name.

8Acting on this tip,

they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he

descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him.9They

detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three

kilos of what were later analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic

examiner,10

who testified that she conducted microscopic, chemical and

chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the correspondingcharge was then filed against Aminnudin.

In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his

bag was his clothing consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants.11

He

alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was

confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he was manhandled

to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him

with a piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he

was still handcuffed.12

He insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like

and that his business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes.13

He also

argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have been carrying was not properlyIdentified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock room of the

PC headquarters.14

The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused

that he claimed to have come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two

watches at the time, traveling from Jolo for that purpose and spending P107.00 for

fare, not to mention his other expenses.15

Aminnudin testified that he kept the two

watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not discovered

when he was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a

result of his manhandling.16

He also said he sold one of the watches for P400.00

and gave away the other, although the watches belonged not to him but to his

cousin, 17to a friend whose full name he said did not even know. 18The trial court

also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not sufficiently

proved the injuries sustained by him.19

There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the

trial judge who had immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had

the opportunity to weigh their credibility on the stand. Nuances of tone or voice,

meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face and dart of eyes, which may reveal

the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal record. But the trial

judge sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.


12/43


The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the

accused-appellant was not really beaten up because he did not complain about it

later nor did he submit to a medical examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is

possible Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was at that time under

detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been set free since he was

arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been allowed for his release.

There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's

claim that he was arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuanaallegedly found in his possession inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill

of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this point. For his part, the Solicitor

General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest of Aminnudin

was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on

warrantless arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.

It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the

prosecution, that they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized

the bag he was carrying. Their only justification was the tip they had earlier

received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to them that

Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as tothe time they received the tip, one saying it was two days before the

arrest,20

another two weeks21

and a third "weeks before June 25."22

On this

matter, we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting team, Lt.

Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follows:

Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the

coming of Idel Aminnudin on June 25, 1984?

A Yes, sir.

Q When did you receive this intelligence report?

A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable sources.

Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible

trafficking of marijuana leaves on that date?

A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this

information from that particular informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we have

already reports of the particular operation which was being participated by

Idel Aminnudin.

Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June 25,

1984 with respect to the coming of Wilcon 9?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?

A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the coming

of Wilcon 9. For instance, report of illegal gambling operation.

COURT:

Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before

June 25, 1984, did you also receive daily report regarding the activities of

Idel Aminnudin

A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of Idel

Aminnudin.

Q What were those activities?

A Purely marijuana trafficking.

Q From whom did you get that information?

A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of information,

maybe for security reason and we cannot Identify the person.

Q But you received it from your regular informer?

A Yes, sir.

ATTY. LLARIZA:

Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel

Aminnudin is coming with drugs?


13/43


A Marijuana, sir.

Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with

marijuana was received by you many days before you received the

intelligence report in writing?

A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.

Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days before?

A Yes, sir.

Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that minnudin

was coming?

A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was coming

but on June 23, 1984 that was the time when I received the information

that he was coming. Regarding the reports on his activities, we have

reports that he was already consummated the act of selling and shipping

marijuana stuff.

COURT:

Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?

A Yes, sir.

Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was

mentioned?

A Yes, sir.

Q Are you sure of that?

A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.

Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23, 1984,

you had already gathered information to the effect that Idel Aminnudin

was coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?

A Only on the 23rd of June.

Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of

the subject mentioned in your intelligence report?

A No, more.

Q Why not?

A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive

result.

Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do

not need a search warrant anymore?

A Search warrant is not necessary.23

That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere

lieutenant of the PC. The Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement.

This is still a government of laws and not of men.

The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and

seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be

inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue

except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the

judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the

complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly

describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to

be seized.

In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a

judge after personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause.

Contrary to the averments of the government, the accused-appellant was not

caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just been

committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of

Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the

warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca,24

for example. Here it was held that


14/43


vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and seizures for violation of

the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality or

jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.

The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of

the PC witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could

have obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo

on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was Identified. The date of

its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could havepersuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of

a warrant. Yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill

of Rights was ignored altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of

the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a "search warrant

was not necessary."

In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators

of the Dangerous Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-

handed, as a result of what are popularly called "buy-bust" operations of the

narcotics agents.25

Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the precise time of

arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest,

committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just

done so. What he was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9

and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances,

he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It

was only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he

suddenly became suspect and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger

that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the informer was the probable cause

as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce

upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.

Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen

years of the despised dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will,

detained without charges and punished without trial, we will have only ourselves to

blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more flaunt its

disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights guarantees.

While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very

own words suggest that he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he

is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that he is innocent, and he will be so

declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough

to convict him.

Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case

of the prosecution must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never

have been considered by the trial court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was

seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous

phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no

warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptionsallowed by the Rules of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and

the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.

The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction

and commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who

would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But

as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions

of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm,

including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its

protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high-

handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions.

Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the

rights of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of

liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think it a less evil that some criminals

should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is simply

not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the

law violated is the Constitution itself.

We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against

the accused-appellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and

he must therefore be discharged on the presumption that he is innocent.

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-

appellant is ACQUITTED. It is so ordered.

Narvasa, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions


15/43


AQUINO,J., dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. I hold that the accused was caught in flagrante, for he was

carrying marijuana leaves in his bag at the moment of his arrest. He was not

"innocently disembarking from the vessel." The unauthorized transportation of

marijuana (Indian hemp), which is a prohibited drug, is a crime. (Sec. 4, Rep. Act No.

6425). Since he was committing a crime, his arrest could be lawfully effected

without a warrant (Sec. 6a, Rule 113, Rules of Court), and the search of his bag

(which yielded the marijuana leaves) without a search warrant was also lawful (Sec.12, Rule 126, Rules of Court). I vote to affirm the judgment of the trial court finding

him guilty of illegally transporting marijuana.


16/43



SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 200951 September 5, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.

JOSE ALMODIEL alias "DO DONG ASTROBAL," Appellant.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO,J.:

The Case

Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision1of the Court of Appeals,

Cagayan de Oro City, (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00632-MIN . The CA affirmed the

Decision2of the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Branch 4 (RTC), in Criminal Case

No. 9840 convicting appellant Jose Almodiel alias "Dodong Astrobal" (accused) of

violation of Section 5, Article II (Sale of Dangerous Drugs)3of Republic Act No. 9165

(RA 9165) or The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

The Facts

The Information dated 16 May 2003 filed against the accused states:

AMENDED INFORMATION

The undersigned accuses JOSE ALMODIEL alias "DODONG" ASTROBAL of the crime

of violation of Section 5, Article II of R. A. No. 9165, committed as follows:

That at or about 2:00 oclock in the afternoon of March 20, 2003 a t Purok 9, Brgy.15, Langihan Road, Butuan City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this

Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law, did then and

there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, trade, deliver two (2) sachets of

methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu weighing zero point

one two zero five (0.1205) grams, a dangerous drug.

That the accused has already been convicted in Criminal Case No. 7338 for Violation

of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659.

CONTRARY TO LAW. (Violation of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. 9165)4

Upon arraignment, the accused entered a plea of not guilty. During pre-trial, the

defense admitted all the allegations in the Information except the specific place of

the alleged incident and the allegation of the sale of dangerous drugs. Thus, trial

ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented three witnesses: (1) PO2 Saldino C. Virtudazo (PO2

Virtudazo), (2) PO3 Arnel P. Lumawag (PO3 Lumawag), and (3) PSInsp. Cramwell T.

Banogon (PSInsp. Banogon).

At 7:30 a.m. of 20 March 2003, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA)

Regional Office XIII in Libertad, Butuan City, received a report from a confidential

agent that a certain "Dodong" was dealing with shabu. Immediately after, Regional

Director PSupt. Glenn Dichosa Dela Torre (PSupt. Dela Torre) conducted a briefingfor a buy-bust operation and designated SPO4 Alberto Arnaldo (SPO4 Arnaldo) as

teamleader, PO2 Virtudazo as poseur-buyer, and PO3 Lumawag as back-up

operative.

At 1:30 p.m. of the same day, PO2 Virtudazo, PO3 Lumawag, and the confidential

agent proceeded to Purok 9, Brgy. 15, Langihan Road, Butuan City to conduct the

buy-bust operation. PO3 Lumawag hid and positioned himself eight meters away

from PO2 Virtudazo and the confidential agent. When the accused arrived, the

confidential agent introduced PO2 Virtudazo to the accused as customer of shabu.

PO2 Virtudazo told the accused that he wanted to buy two sachets of shabu

worth P 400.00. The accused agreed, and then left. After thirty minutes, theaccused returned bringing two sachets containing white crystalline substance,

which he handed to PO2 Virtudazo. PO2 Virtudazo testified that based on

experience, he knew that the substance in the two sachets was shabu. Thus, PO2

Virtudazo gave a pre-arranged signal to PO3 Lumawag to approach them.

PO2 Virtudazo and PO3 Lumawag introduced themselves as PDEA agents, and

arrested the accused after informing him of his constitutional rights. They took him

to the PDEA Regional Office, and seized from him other items two aluminum foilsand one lighter.

5PO2 Virtudazo marked the two sachets with "APL-1" and "APL-2,"

the initials of PO3 Lumawag. Together with SPO3 Dindo Alota (SPO3 Alota) and PO3
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_200951_2012.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_200951_2012.html#fnt1http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_200951_2012.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_200951_2012.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_200951_2012.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_200951_2012.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_200951_2012.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_200951_2012.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_200951_2012.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_200951_2012.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_200951_2012.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_200951_2012.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_200951_2012.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_200951_2012.html#fnt5http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_200951_2012.html#fnt4http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_200951_2012.html#fnt3http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_200951_2012.html#fnt2http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2012/sep2012/gr_200951_2012.html#fnt1


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Lumawag, PO2 Virtudazo brought the accused and the two sachets to the Regional

Crime Laboratory Office for drug testing. In PSInsp. Banogons Chemistry Report No.D-061-2003,

6the substance contained in the two sachets was found positive of

shabu.

The prosecution offered and submitted the following exhibits: (1) Exhibit "A" and

sub-markings Certificate of Inventory or Confiscation Receipt dated 20 March2003; (2) Exhibit "B" and sub-markingswritten request for laboratory examination

dated 20 March 2003; (3) Exhibit "C" and sub-markings self-sealing packcontaining the actual specimen of two sachets of shabu; and (4) Exhibit "D" and

sub-markingsChemistry Report No. D-061-2003 dated 21 March 2003.7

Version of the Defense

On the other hand, the defense also presented three witnesses: (1) the accused

himself, (2) Felix Branzuela (Felix), and (3) Max Malubay (Max), the alleged

confidential agent.

The accused denied the charges of the prosecution, and narrated that on the

morning of 20 March 2003, he and his girlfriend stayed in Cadez Lodging House,located at Purok 9, Brgy. 15, Butuan City. At about 10 a.m., the accuseds girlfriendleft but promised to return later. While waiting, the accused and Felix played with

the slot machine. Then, Max approached the accused and requested to buy shabu

from him. The accused told Max that he was not selling shabu. Thus, Max left.

However, Felix alleged that he saw Max talking to police officers. Felix informed the

accused that Max is a police asset, but the accused ignored his remark and stated

that he had nothing to fear.

Around 1:30 p.m. of the same day, the accused decided to go home aboard his

motorcycle. While on his way, the accused was stopped by PO3 Lumawag, who

pointed a gun at the accused and arrested him. The accused noticed PO3 Lumawagholding a sachet of shabu while searching the accuseds body. The accusedprotested but PO3 Lumawag directed him to go to the PDEA office with another

police officer. Upon arrival, the accused was instructed to remove his clothes. PO3

Lumawag took the accuseds wallet and claimed to retrieve another sachet of shabufrom it. PO3 Lumawag insisted that the accused owned the shabu, but the accused

vehemently denied the same. After about thirty minutes, a representative from the

media and City Prosecutor Felixberto Guiritan (Prosecutor Guiritan) arrived. They

took pictures of the two sachets of shabu and signed the Certificate of Inventory.

The Decision of the Regional Trial Court

In its Decision dated 17 June 2008, the RTC found the accused guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of violation of RA 9165. The dispositive portion of the RTC

Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused is hereby found guilty beyond

reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act 9165 (otherwise

known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) and is hereby accordingly sentenced to

suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos

(P 500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

Accused shall serve his sentence at the Davao Prison and Penal Farm at Braulio E.

Dujali, Davao del Norte and shall be credited in the service thereof with his

preventive imprisonment pursuant to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as

amended.

The sachets of shabu are ordered confiscated and forfeited in favor of the

government to be dealt with in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.8

The RTC found that the elements of the crime of illegal sale of shabu were proven

by the prosecution. On the other hand, the accused failed to present clear and

convincing evidence to prove his defense of frame-up and planting of evidence.

Hence, the RTC held that the categorical and convincing testimonies of the

prosecution witnesses, supported by physical evidence, overcome the

unsubstantiated claim of ill-motive by the accused. In addition, the RTC ruled that

the arrest was lawfully made.

On 4 July 2008, the accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied

by the RTC in its Resolution9dated 22 July 2008. The accused filed an appeal to the

CA. The accused imputed the following errors on the RTC:

I

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS

CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO SELLING THE SUBJECT DANGEROUS DRUGS.

II
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THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ARREST AND THE

SEARCH OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WITHOUT A WARRANT WOULD FALL UNDER

THE DOCTRINE OF WARRANTLESS SEARCH AS AN INCIDENT TO A LAWFUL ARREST.

III

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE SUBJECT SHABU IS

ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE.

IV

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHEN

THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE ALLEGED CONFISCATED DRUGS WAS NOT

ESTABLISHED IN CONFORMITY WITH THE ESTABLISHED RULES.

V

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT WHEN HIS GUILT IS

NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.10

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its Decision dated 14 November 2011, the CA affirmed the RTCs Decision againstthe accused. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated June 17, 2008 finding

Jose Almodiel alias Dodong Astrobal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of

Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.11

The CA ruled that since a buy-bust operation was conducted, there was no

necessity for a warrant of arrest pursuant to Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of

Court. The CA found that the defenses version of the events was not credibleconsidering that the accused did not object to his arrest or file any complaint

against the police officers. On the chain of custody rule, the CA held that non-

compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165 is not fatal as long as there is justifiable

ground, and the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs are preserved,

as in this case.

Hence, this appeal.12

The Ruling of the Court

The appeal lacks merit.

The elements necessary for a prosecution for violation of RA 9165 or sale of

dangerous drugs are: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the

consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment .13What is

material is the proof that the transaction actually took place, coupled with the

presentation before the court of the corpus delicti.14

In the present case, all the elements of the crime have been sufficiently established.

PO2 Virtudazo testified that a buy-bust operation took place, to wit:

PROSECUTOR GUIRITAN:

Q: On March 20, 2003 at about 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, where were you atthat time?

A: I was at Purok 9, Barangay 15, San Ignacio, Langihan Road, Butuan City.

Q: Why were you there in that place?

A: Because we were conducting an entrapment operation.

x x x x

Q: You already mentioned last time that you were already at the place at about

2:00 oclock of March 20, 2003, and you were with your back -up Lumawag and yourconfidential agent. When you arrived at that place what happened actually?

A: At 2:00 oclock the accused arrived in the place and he gave me the two (2)sachets of "shabu."

Q: How did the accused know that you will be the buyer?

A: I was introduced by our confidential agent to him.
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Q: Now you said the accused handed to you "shabu", how many sachets, if you

recall?

A: Two (2) sachets, Sir.

Q: When already in possession of those two (2) sachets of "shabu", what did you

do?

A: I examined it if it is indeed "shabu."

Q: What was your findi[n]gs?

A: That it was real "shabu."

Q: How did you know that it was a "shabu"?

A: Based on my experience.15

Upon clarificatory questioning by the court, PO2 Virtudazo testified that theaccused agreed to sell shabu to him, thus:

Q: So what did you do when the accused was already with the asset?

A: I was introduced by our asset to the accused and at that point in time I also told

the accused that I was interested to buy "shabu."

Q: And the accused what did he do to you?

A: He agreed and then left immediately.

Q: What did you agree with the accused?

A: That he will give me "shabu."

Q: Why will the accused give you "shabu"?

A: Because I was going to buy it from him.

Q: For how much?

A: Worth P 400.00.16

PO3 Lumawag materially corroborated the testimony of PO2 Virtudazo as to the

conduct of the buy-bust operation, to wit:

Q: What happened when the accused arrived?

A: When the accused arrived they talked with each other then after more or less

two (2) minutes, the suspect left the area.

x x x x

Q: Now what happened after that?

A: After the suspect left the area, after another twenty-five (25) minutes more or

less, he came back and met Virtudazo at that area.

x x x x

Q: Now, when the accused went back, what happened next?

A: I observed that the accused approached Virtudazo and he gave something to

Virtudazo. When Virtudazo tried to inspect the items given to him, thats the timethat Virtudazo gave the pre-arranged signal by turning his cap.

Q: And, what did you do?

A: So, when PO2 Virtudazo gave the pre-arranged signal thats thetime I rushed upand apprehended the suspect.

x x x x

Q: How many shabu was given by him to your poseur-buyer?

A: Two (2) sachets, sir.

Q: How did you come to know of that?
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A: Because when I approached him, Virtudazo also showed to me that that is the

shabu given to him by the suspect.17

Both testimonies of PO2 Virtudazo and PO3 Lumawag positively identified PO2

Virtudazo as the poseur-buyer and the accused as the seller of two sachets

containing white crystalline substance for P 400.00. The confiscated sachets were

brought to the crime laboratory for examination, where a chemical analysis on the

substance confirmed that the same was shabu. The sachets containing shabu were

positively identified by PSInsp. Banogon during the trial as the same sachets seizedfrom the accused.

The accused, however, contends that there was no sale since the marked money

was not delivered to the accused or presented in Court. Cruz v. Peopl e18

is

instructive in ruling that the failure to present the buy-bust money is not fatal to the

case.

x x x The marked money used in the buy-bust operation is not indispensable but

merely corroborative in nature. In the prosecution for the sale of dangerous drugs,

the absence of marked money does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the

prosecution as long as the sale of dangerous drugs is adequately proven and thedrug subject of the transaction is presented before the court. Neither law nor

jurisprudence requires the presentation of any money used in the buy-bust

operation.19

It has been settled that credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police

officers for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner,

unless there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill-motive on the part of the

police officers.20

In the present case, the claim of ill-motive was not substantiated

by the accused. The trial court found the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses

convincing, categorical and credible. Findings of the trial court, which are factual in

nature and which involve the credibility of witnesses, are accorded respect when noglaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts or speculative, arbitrary and

unsupported conclusions are made from such findings.21

This rule finds an even

more stringent application where the findings are sustained by the Court of

Appeals, as in the present case.22

The accused denied the charge against him, and alleged frame-up and planting of

evidence by the police officers. In Quinicot v. People,23

we held that allegations of

frame-up by police officers are common and standard defenses in most dangerous

drugs cases. For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and

convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that government officials have

performed their duties in a regular and proper manner.24

Here, the accused made a

bare allegation without presenting clear and convincing evidence to support his

claim. Felix and Max testified that they did not witness the incident between the

accused and the police officers before the arrest .25

Against the positive testimonies

of the prosecution witnesses, the accuseds plain denial of the offense charged,unsubstantiated by any credible and convincing evidence, must simply fail.

26

Thus, in the absence of proof of motive to falsely impute such a serious crime

against the accused, the presumption of regularity in the performance of officialduty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, shall

prevail over the accuseds self-serving and uncorroborated denial.27

Arrest During a Buy-bust Operation

The accused contends that the police officers arrested him without securing a

warrant of arrest. Consequently, his arrest was unlawful, making the sachets of

shabu allegedly seized from him inadmissible in evidence.

Under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, a person may be arrested

without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting tocommit an offense."

28The accused was caught in the act of committing an offense

during a buy-bust operation. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto

as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police officers are not only authorized but

duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant.29

An arrest made after an

entrapment operation does not require a warrant inasmuch as it is considered a

valid "warrantless arrest."30

The accused argues that force and intimidation attended his arrest when four police

officers arrested him and one of them pointed a gun at him. However, his

allegations were not supported by evidence. On the contrary, the CA found that the

defense neither objected to the accuseds arrest nor filed any complaint against thepolice officers.

Considering that an arrest was lawfully made, the search incidental to such arrest

was also valid. A person lawfully arrested may be searched, without a search

warrant, for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or

constitute proof in the commission of an offense.31

Accordingly, the two sachets of

shabu seized in the present case are admissible as evidence.

The Chain of Custody Requirement
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The accused contends that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the

shabu in accordance with the requirements under RA 9165 and its Implementing

Rules and Regulations.32

The defense particularly alleges that there was no

photograph of the seized items and there was no barangay official present during

the incident.

We find the claim unmeritorious. In the prosecution of drug cases, it is of

paramount importance that the existence of the drug, the corpus delicti of the

crime, be established beyond doubt.33

It is precisely in this regard that RA 9165,particularly its Section 21,

34prescribes the procedure to ensure the existence and

identity of the drug seized from the accused and submitted to the court.

The Implementing Rules of RA 9165 offer some flexibility when a proviso added that

"non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the

integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the

apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and

custody over said items."35

In People v. Rosialda,36

People v. Llamado,37

and People

v. Rivera,38

the Court had the occasion to apply such flexibility when it ruled that

the failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the

required physical inventory and photograph of the evidence confiscated is not fataland does not automatically render the arrest of the accused illegal or the items

seized from him inadmissible.

The Court consistently held that what is of utmost importance is the preservation of

the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be

utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.39

In other

words, it must be established with unwavering exactitude that the dangerous drug

presented in court as evidence against the accused is the same as that seized from

him in the first place.40

The chain of custody requirement performs this function in

that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are

removed.41

Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002 ,42

which

implements RA 9165, defines "chain of custody" as follows:

"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of

seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or

laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to

receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for

destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the

identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized

item, the date and time when such transfer of custody were made in the course of

safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final dispos

crimpro cases - rule 113

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