rule 39 execution cases

8/11/2019 Rule 39 Execution Cases

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G.R. No. 148090 November 28, 2006

STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., Petitioner,vs.

HONORABLE NEMESIO S. FELIX, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 56, Regional Trial Court, Makati City,RICHARD C. JAMORA, Branch Clerk of Court, and EMERITA GARON, Respondents.

FACTS:

("Garon") filed an action for sum of money against Project Movers Realty and Development Corporation ("Project Movers") andStronghold Insurance Company, Inc. ("Stronghold Insurance). Regional Trial granted Garon’s motion for summary judgment. The triacourt rendered judgment in favor of Garon ordering Defendant Project Movers Realty and Development Corporation is hereby directedto pay plaintiff as follows:

On 6 October 2000, Garon filed a motion for execution pending appeal. On 10 October 2000, Stronghold Insurance moved for thereconsideration of the 19 September 2000 Order of the trial court.

In an Order dated 23 January 2001, the trial court denied Stronghold Insurance’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

The trial court granted Garon’s motion for execution pending appeal. The trial court ordered Garon to post a bond of P20 million toanswer for any damage that Project Movers and Stronghold Insurance may sustain by reason of the execution pending appeal. BranchClerk of Court ("Jamora") issued a writ of execution pending appeal.

Stronghold Insurance filed a notice of appeal.

Stronghold Insurance also filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals to assail the trial court’s Order and the writ oexecution pending appeal. The Court of Appeals enjoined the trial court, Jamora and Garon from Order..

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

It dismissed the petition of Stronghold Insurance and lifted the TRO it issued. The Court of Appeals sustained the trial court in issuingthe writ of execution pending appeal on the ground of illness of Garon’s husband. Citing Articles 6810 and 19511 of the Family Code, theCourt of Appeals held that while it was not Garon who was ill, Garon needed the money to support her husband’s medical expensesand to support her family.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

SC Court issued a TRO to restrain and enjoin the enforcement of the Order and the writ of execution pending appeal until furtherorders from this Court.

The Issue

WON there are good reasons to justify execution pending appeal. NO!

Sec . 2. Discretionary execution. -

(a) Execution of a judgment or final order pending appeal. - On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in thetrial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either the original record or the record on appeal, as the casemay be, at the time of the filing of such motion, said court may, in its discretion, order execution of a judgment or final order evenbefore the expiration of the period to appeal.

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After the trial court has lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending appeal may be filed in the appellate court.

Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a special order after due hearing.

Execution pending appeal is an extraordinary remedy, being more of the exception rather than the rule . This rule is strictlyconstrued against the movant because courts look with disfavor upon any attempt to execute a judgment which has not acquiredfinality. Such execution affects the rights of the parties which are yet to be ascertained on appeal.13

The requisites for the grant of an execution of a judgment pending appeal are the following:

(a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party;

(b) there must be good reasons for execution pending appeal;

(c) the good reasons must be stated in the special order .14

As a discretionary execution, execution pending appeal is permissible only when good reasons exist for immediately executing the judgment before finality or pending appeal or even before the expiration of the period to appeal. Good reasons, special, importantpressing reasons must exist to justify execution pending appeal; otherwise, instead of an instrument of solicitude and justice, it maywell become a tool of oppression and inequality. Good reasons consist of exceptional circumstances of such urgency as to outweigh

the injury or damage that the losing party may suffer should the appealed judgment be reversed later.

In this case, Garon anchors the motion for execution pending appeal on the following grounds:

(a) any appeal which Project Movers and Stronghold Insurance may take from the summary judgment would be patently dilatory;

(b) the ill health of Garon’s spouse and the spouses’ urgent need for the funds owed to them by Project Movers and StrongholdInsurance constitute good reasons for execution pending appeal; and

(c) Garon is ready and willing to post a bond to answer for any damage Project Movers and Stronghold Insurance may suffer shouldthe trial court’s decision be reversed on appeal.18

The trial court ruled that an appeal from its 19 September 2000 Order is only a ploy to delay the proceedings of the case. However, theauthority to determine whether an appeal is dilatory lies with the appellate court. The trial court’s assumption that the appeal is dilatoryprematurely judges the merits of the main case on appeal. Thus:

Well-settled is the rule that it is not for the trial court to determine the merit of a decision it rendered as this is the role of the appellateCourt. Hence, it is not within the competence of the trial court, in resolving the motion for execution pending appeal, to rule that theappeal is patently dilatory and to rely on the same as the basis for finding good reason to grant the motion.22

We agree with Stronghold Insurance that Garon failed to present good reasons to justify execution pending appeal. The situations inthe cases cited by the trial court are not similar to this case. In this case, it was not Garon, but her husband, who was ill.

The posting of a bond, standing alone and absent the good reasons required under Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules, is not

enough to allow execution pending appeal. The mere filing of a bond by a successful party is not a good reason to justify executionpending appeal as a combination of circumstances is the dominant consideration which impels the grant of immediate execution.26 Thebond is only an additional f actor for the protection of the defendant’s creditor .27

The exercise of the power to grant or deny a motion for execution pending appeal is addressed to the sound discretion of the trialcourt.28 However, the existence of good reasons is indispensable to the grant of execution pending appeal. Here, Garon failed toadvance good reasons that would justify the execution pending appeal.































RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner , vs. MAGWIN MARKETING CORPORATION, NELSON TIU, BENITOSY and ANDERSON UY, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BELLOSILLO, J .:

WE ARE PERTURBED that this case should drag this Court in the banal attempts to decipher the hazy and confused intent of the triacourt in proceeding with what would have been a simple, straightforward and hardly arguable collection case. Whether the dismissawithout prejudice for failure to prosecute was unconditionally reconsidered, reversed and set aside to reinstate the civil case and have iready for pre-trial are matters which should have been clarified and resolved in the first instance by the court a quo. Unfortunately, thisfeckless imprecision of the trial court became the soup stock of the parties and their lawyers to further delay the case below when theycould have otherwise put things in proper order efficiently and effectively.

On 4 March 1999 petitioner Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) filed a complaint for recovery of a sum of money withprayer for a writ of preliminary attachment against respondents Magwin Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu, Benito Sy and AndersonUy.[1] On 26 April 1999, the trial court issued a writ of attachment. [2] On 4 June 1999 the writ was returned partially satisfied since only aparcel of land purportedly owned by defendant Benito Sy was attached.[3] In the meantime, summons was served on each of thedefendants, respondents herein, who filed their respective answers, except for defendant Gabriel Cheng who was dropped withouprejudice as party-defendant as his whereabouts could not be located.[4] On 21 September 1999 petitioner moved for an alias writ o

attachment which on 18 January 2000 the court a quo denied.[5]

Petitioner did not cause the case to be set for pre-trial.[6] For about six (6) months thereafter, discussions between petitioner andrespondents Magwin Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu, Benito Sy and Anderson Uy, as parties in Civil Case No. 99-518, wereundertaken to restructure the indebtedness of respondent Magwin Marketing Corporation.[7] On 9 May 2000 petitioner approved a debpayment scheme for the corporation which on 15 May 2000 was communicated to the latter by means of a letter dated 10 May 2000 fothe conformity of its officers, i.e., respondent Nelson Tiu as President/General Manager of Magwin Marketing Corporation andrespondent Benito Sy as Director thereof .[8] Only respondent Nelson Tiu affixed his signature on the letter to signify his agreement tothe terms and conditions of the restructuring.[9]

On 20 July 2000 the RTC of Makati City, on its own initiative, issued an Order dismissing without prejudice Civil Case No. 99-518 forfailure of petitioner as plaintiff therein to ―prosecute its action for an unreasonable length of time x x x. ‖[10] On 31 July 2000 petitionemoved for reconsideration of the Order by informing the trial court of respondents’unremitting desire to settle the case amicably through

a loan restructuring program.[11] On 22 August 2000 petitioner notified the trial court of the acquiescence thereto of respondent NelsonTiu as an officer of Magwin Marketing Corporation and defendant in the civil case.[12]

On 8 September 2000 the court a quo issued an Order reconsidering the dismissal without prejudice of Civil Case No. 99-518 –

Acting on plaintiff’s ―Motion for Reconsideration‖ of the Order dated 20 July 2000 dismissing this case for failure to prosecute, itappearing that there was already conformity to the restructuring of defendants’ indebtedness with plaintiff by defendant Nelson Tiu,President of defendant corporation per ―Manifestation and Motion‖ filed by plaintiff on 22 August 2000, there being probability ofsettlement among the parties, as prayed for, the Order dated 20 July 2000 is hereby set aside.

Plaintiff is directed to submit the compromise agreement within 15 days from receipt hereof. Failure on the part of plaintiff to submit thesaid agreement shall cause the imposition of payment of the required docket fees for re-filing of this case.[13]

On 27 July 2000 petitioner filed in Civil Case No. 99-518 a Manifestation and Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial Conference alleging tha―[t]o date, only defendant Nelson Tiu had affixed his signature on the May 10, 2000 letter which informed the defendants that plaintif[herein petitioner] already approved defendant Magwin Marketing Corporation’s reques t for restructuring of its loan obligations toplaintiff but subject to the terms and conditions specified in said letter.‖[14] This motion was followed on 5 October 2000 bypetitioner’s Supplemental Motion to Plaintiff’s Manifestation and Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial Conference affirming that petitione―could not submit a compromise agreement because only defendant Nelson Tiu had affixed his signature on the May 10, 2000 letter x xx.‖[15] Respondent Anderson Uy opposed the foregoing submissions of petitioner while respondents Magwin Marketing CorporationNelson Tiu and Benito Sy neither contested nor supported them.[16]

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The trial court, in an undated Order (although a date was later inserted in the Order ), denied petitioner’s motion to calendar Civil CaseNo. 99-518 for pre-trial stating that -

Acting on plaintiff’s [herein petitioner] ―Manifestation and Motion to Set Case for Pre-Trial Conference,‖ the ―Opposition‖ filed bydefendant Uy and the subsequent ―Supplemental Motion‖ filed by plaintiff; defendant Uy’s ―Opposition,‖ and plaintiff’s ―Reply;‖ for failureof the plaintiff to submit a compromise agreement pursuant to the Order dated 8 September 2000 plaintiff’s motion to set case for pre-trial conference is hereby denied.[17]

On 15 November 2000 petitioner filed its Notice of Appeal from the 8 September 2000 Order of the trial court as well as its

undated Order in Civil Case No. 99-518. On 16 November 2000 the trial court issued two (2) Orders, one of which inserted the date ―6November 2000‖ in the undated Order rejecting petitioner’s motion for pre-trial in the civil case, and the other denying due course tothe Notice of Appeal on the ground that the ―Orders dated 8 September 2000 and 6 November 2000 are interlocutory orders andtherefore, no appeal may be taken x x x.‖[18]

On 7 December 2000 petitioner elevated the Orders dated 8 September 2000, 6 November 2000 and 16 November 2000 of the triacourt to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.[19] In the main, petitioner arguedthat the court a quo had no authority to compel the parties in Civil Case No. 99-518 to enter into an amicable settlement nor to deny theholding of a pre-trial conference on the ground that no compromise agreement was turned over to the court a quo.[20]

On 28 September 2001 the appellate court promulgated its Decision dismissing the petition for lack of merit and affirming theassailed Orders of the trial cour t[21] holding that -

x x x although the language of the September 8, 2000 Order may not be clear, yet, a careful reading of the same would clearly showthat the setting aside of the Order dated July 20, 2000 which dismissed petitioner’s complaint x x x for failure to prosecute its action foran unreasonable length of time is dependent on the following conditions, to wit: a) The submission of the compromise agreement bypetitioner within fifteen (15) days from notice; and b) Failure of petitioner to submit the said compromise agreement shall cause theimposition of the payment of the required docket fees for the re-filing of the case; so much so that the non-compliance by petitioner ofcondition no. 1 would make condition no. 2 effective, especially that petitioner’s manifestation and motion to set case for pre-trialconference and supplemental motion x x x [were] denied by the respondent judge in his Order dated November 6, 2000, which in effectmeans that the Order dated July 20, 2000 was ultimately not set aside considering that a party need not pay docket fees for the re-filingof a case if the original case has been revived and reinstated.[22]

On 2 April 2002 reconsideration of the Decision was denied; hence, this petition.

In the instant case, petitioner maintains that the trial court cannot coerce the parties in Civil Case No. 99-518 to execute a compromiseagreement and penalize their failure to do so by refusing to go forward with the pre-trial conference. To hold otherwise, so petitioneavers, would violate Art. 2029 of the Civil Code which provides that ―[t]he court shall endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil case toagree upon some fair compromise,‖ and this Court’s ruling in Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. Court of Appeal s[23] where it was held that thetrial court cannot dismiss a complaint for failure of the parties to submit a compromise agreement.

On the other hand, respondent Anderson Uy filed his comment after several extensions asserting that there are no special andimportant reasons for undertaking this review. He also alleges that petitioner’s attack is limited to the Order dated 8 September 2000as to whether it is conditional as the Court of Appeals so found and the applicability to this case of the ruling in Goldloop PropertiesInc. v. Court of Appeals. Respondent Uy claims that the Order reconsidering the dismissal of Civil Case No. 99-518 without prejudiceis on its face contingent upon the submission of the compromise agreement which in the first place was the principal reason opetitioner to justify the withdrawal of the Order declaring his failure to prosecute the civil case. He further contends that the trial courdid not force the parties in the civil case to execute a compromise agreement, the truth being that it dismissed the complaint therein fopetitioner’s dereliction.

Finally, respondent Uy contests the relevance of Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, and refers to its incongruence with theinstant case, i.e., that the complaint of petitioner was dismissed for failure to prosecute and not for its reckless disregard to present anamicable settlement as was the situation in Goldloop Properties, Inc., and that the dismissal was without prejudice, in contrast with thedismissal with prejudice ordered in the cited case. For their part, respondents Magwin Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu and BenitoSy waived their right to file a comment on the instant petition and submitted the same for resolution of this Court.[24]



































The petition of Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation is meritorious. It directs our attention to questions of substance decided by thecourts a quo plainly in a way not in accord with applicable precedents as well as the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedingsit offers special and important reasons that demand the exercise of our power of supervision and review. Furthermore, petitioner’sobjections to the proceedings below encompass not only the Order of 8 September 2000 but include the cognateOrders of the triacourt of 6 and 16 November 2000. This is evident from the prayer of the instant petition which seeks to reverse and set asidethe Decision of the appellate court and to direct the trial court to proceed with the pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. 99518. Evidently, the substantive issue involved herein is whether the proceedings in the civil case should progress, a question which abottom embroils all the Orders affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

On the task at hand, we see no reason why RTC-Br. 135 of Makati City should stop short of hearing the civil case on the merits. Thereis no substantial policy worth pursuing by requiring petitioner to pay again the docket fees when it has already discharged thisobligation simultaneously with the filing of the complaint for collection of a sum of money. The procedure for dismissed cases when refiled is the same as though it was initially lodged, i.e., the filing of answer, reply, answer to counter-claim, including other foot-draggingmaneuvers, except for the rigmarole of raffling cases which is dispensed with since the re-filed complaint is automatically assigned tothe branch to which the original case pertained.[25] A complaint that is re-filed leads to the re-enactment of past proceedings with theconcomitant full attention of the same trial court exercising an immaculate slew of jurisdiction and control over the case that waspreviously dismissed,[26] which in the context of the instant case is a waste of judicial time, capital and energy.

What judicial benefit do we derive from starting the civil case all over again, especially where three (3) of the four (4) defendants, i.e.,Magwin Marketing Corporation, Nelson Tiu and Benito Sy, have not contested petitioner’s plea before this Court and the courts aquo to advance to pre-trial conference? Indeed, to continue hereafter with the resolution of petitioner’s complaint without the usuaprocedure for the re-filing thereof, we will save the court a quo invaluable time and other resources far outweighing the docket fees tha

petitioner would be forfeiting should we rule otherwise.

Going over the specifics of this petition and the arguments of respondent Anderson Uy, we rule that the Order of 8 September 2000 didnot reserve conditions on the reconsideration and reversal of the Order dismissing without prejudice Civil Case No. 99-518. This isquite evident from its text which does not use words to signal an intent to impose riders on the dispositive portion -

Acting on plaintiff’s ―Motion for Reconsideration‖ of the Order dated 20 July 2000 dismissing this case for failure to prosecute, itappearing that there was already conformity to the restructuring of defendants’ indebtedness with plaintiff by defendant Nelson Tiu,President of defendant corporation per ―Manifestation and Motion‖ filed by plaintiff on 22 August 2000, there being probability ofsettlement among the parties, as prayed for, the Order dated 20 July 2000 is hereby set aside.

Plaintiff is directed to submit the compromise agreement within 15 days from receipt hereof. Failure on the part of plaintiff to submit the

said agreement shall cause the imposition of payment of the required docket fees for re-filing of this case.[27]

Contrary to respondent Uy’s asseverations, the impact of the second paragraph upon the first is simply to illustrate what the trial courtwould do after setting aside the dismissal without prejudice: submission of the compromise agreement for the consideration of the triacourt. Nothing in the second paragraph do we read that the reconsideration is subject to two (2) qualifications. Certainly far from it, foin Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. Court of Appeal s[28] a similar directive, i.e., ―[t]he parties are given a period of fifteen (15) days from todaywithin which to submit a Compromise Agreement,‖ was held to mean that ―should the parties fail in their negotiations the proc eedingswould continue from where they left off.‖ Goldloop Properties, Inc. further said that its order, or a specie of it, did not constitute anagreement or even an expectation of the parties that should they fail to settle their differences within the stipulated number of days theicase would be dismissed.

The addition of the second sentence in the second paragraph does not change the absolute nullification of the dismissal withouprejudice decreed in the first paragraph. The sentence ―[f]ailure on the part of plaintiff to submit the said agreement shall cause the

imposition of payment of the required docket fees for re-filing of this case‖ is not a directive to pay docket fees but only a statement ofthe event that may result in its imposition. The reason for this is that the trial court could not have possibly made such paymentobligatory in the same civil case, i.e., Civil Case No. 99-518, since docket fees are defrayed only after the dismissal becomes final andexecutory and when the civil case is re-filed.

It must be emphasized however that once the dismissal attains the attribute of finality, the trial court cannot impose legal fees anewbecause a final and executory dismissal although without prejudice divests the trial court of jurisdiction over the civil case as well asany residual power to order anything relative to the dismissed case; it would have to wait until the complaint is docketed onceagain.[29] On the other hand, if we are to concede that the trial court retains jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 99-518 for it to issue the























assailed Orders, a continuation of the hearing thereon would not trigger a disbursement for docket fees on the part of petitioner as thiswould obviously imply the setting aside of the order of dismissal and the reinstatement of the complaint.

Indubitably, it is speculative to reckon the effectivity of the Order of dismissal without prejudice to the presentation of the compromiseagreement. If we are to admit that the efficacy of the invalidation of the Order of dismissal is dependent upon this condition, then wemust inquire: from what date do we count the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period within which the alleged revival of the order ofdismissal began to run? Did it commence from the lapse of the fifteen (15) days provided for in the Order of 8 September 2000? Or dowe count it from the 6 November 2000 Order when the trial court denied the holding of a pre-trial conference? Or must it be uponpetitioner’s receipt of the 16 November 2000 Order denying due course to its Notice of Appeal ? The court a quo could not haveinstituted an Order that marked the proceedings before it with a shadow of instability and chaos rather than a semblance of constancyand firmness.

The subsequent actions of the trial court also belie an intention to revive the Order of dismissal without prejudice in the event thapetitioner fails to submit a compromise agreement. The Orders of 6 and 16 November 2000 plainly manifest that it was retaining

jurisdiction over the civil case, a fact which would not have been possible had the dismissal without prejudice beenresuscitated. Surely, the court a quo could not have denied on 6 November 2000 petitioner’s motion to calendar Civil Case No. 99-518for pre-trial if the dismissal had been restored to life in the meantime. By then the dismissal without prejudice would have alreadybecome final and executory so as to effectively remove the civil case from the docket of the trial court.

The same is true with the Order of 16 November 2000 denying due course to petitioner’s Notice of Appeal . There would have been nobasis for such exercise of discretion because the jurisdiction of the court a quo over the civil case would have been discharged andterminated by the presumed dismissal thereof. Moreover, we note the ground for denying due course to the appeal: the ―Ordersdated 8 September 2000 and 6 November 2000 are interlocutory orders and therefore, no appeal may be taken from x x x. ‖ [30]Thisdeclaration strongly suggests that something more was to be accomplished in the civil case, thus negating the claim that the Order odismissal without prejudice was resurrected upon the parties’ failure to yield a compromise agreement. A ―final order‖ issued by acourt has been defined as one which disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or actionleaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the court, while an ―interlocutory order‖ isone which does not dispose of a case completely but leaves something more to be decided upon.[31]

Besides the semantic and consequential improbabilities of respondent Uy’s argument, our ruling in Goldloop Properties, Inc., isdecisive of the instant case. In Goldloop Properties, Inc., we reversed the action of the trial court in dismissing the complaint for failureof the plaintiff to prosecute its case, which was in turn based on its inability to forge a compromise with the other parties within fifteen(15) days from notice of the order to do so and held -

Since there is nothing in the Rules that imposes the sanction of dismissal for failing to submit a compromise agreement, then it is

obvious that the dismissal of the complaint on the basis thereof amounts no less to a gross procedural infirmity assailable bycertiorari. For such submission could at most be directory and could not result in throwing out the case for failure to effect acompromise. While a compromise is encouraged, very strongly in fact, failure to consummate one does not warrant any proceduralsanction, much less an authority to jettison a civil complaint worth P4,000,000.00 x x x Plainly, submission of a compromise agreementis never mandatory, nor is it required by any rule.[32]

As also explained therein, the proper course of action that should have been taken by the court a quo, upon manifestation of the partiesof their willingness to discuss a settlement, was to suspend the proceedings and allow them reasonable time to come to terms (a) Ifwillingness to discuss a possible compromise is expressed by one or both parties; or (b) If it appears that one of the parties, before thecommencement of the action or proceeding, offered to discuss a possible compromise but the other party refused the offer, pursuant to

Art. 2030 of the Civil Code. If despite efforts exerted by the trial court and the parties the negotiations still fail, only then should theaction continue as if no suspension had taken place.[33]

Ostensibly, while the rules allow the trial court to suspend its proceedings consistent with the policy to encourage the use of alternativemechanisms of dispute resolution, in the instant case, the trial court only gave the parties fifteen (15) days to conclude a deal. Thiswas, to say the least, a passive and paltry attempt of the court a quo in its task of persuading litigants to agree upon a reasonableconcession.[34] Hence, if only to inspire confidence in the pursuit of a middle ground between petitioner and respondents, we must notinterpret the trial court’s Orders as dismissing the action on its own motion because the parties, specifically petitioner, were anxious tolitigate their case as exhibited in their several manifestations and motions.























We reject respondent Uy’s contention that Goldloop Properties, Inc. v. Court of Appeals is irrelevant to the case at bar on the dubiousreasoning that the complaint of petitioner was dismissed for failure to prosecute and not for the non-submission of a compromiseagreement which was the bone of contention in that case, and that the dismissal imposed in the instant case was without prejudice, incontrast to the dismissal with prejudice decreed in the cited case. To begin with, whether the dismissal is with or without prejudice igrievously erroneous is detrimental to the cause of the affected party; Goldloop Properties, Inc. does not tolerate a wrongful dismissa

just because it was without prejudice. More importantly, the facts in Goldloop Properties, Inc. involve, as in the instant case, adismissal for failure to prosecute on the ground of the parties’ in ability to come up with a compromise agreement within fifteen (15)days from notice of the court’s order therein. All told, the parallelism between them is unmistakable.

Even if we are to accept on face value respondent’s understanding of Goldloop Properties, Inc. as solely about the failure to submit acompromise agreement, it is apparent that the present case confronts a similar problem. Perhaps initially the issue was one of failureto prosecute, as can be observed from the Order dated 20 July 2000, although later reversed and set aside. But thereafter, inthe Order of 6 November 2000, the trial court refused to proceed to pre-trial owing to the ―failure of the plaintiff to submit a compromiseagreement pursuant to the Order dated 8 September 2000.‖ When the civil case was stalled on account of the trial court’s refusal to calthe parties to a pre-trial conference, the reason or basis therefor was the absence of a negotiated settlement - a circumstance thatakes the case at bar within the plain ambit of Goldloop Properties, Inc . In any event, given that the instant case merely revolvesaround the search for a reasonable interpretation of the several Orders of the trial court, i.e., as to whether the dismissal withoutprejudice was revived upon petitioner’s helplessness to perfect an out-of-court arrangement, with more reason must we employ theruling in Goldloop Properties, Inc . to resolve the parties’ differences of opinion.

We also find nothing in the record to support respondent Uy’s conclusion tha t petitioner has been mercilessly delaying the prosecutionof Civil Case No. 99-518 to warrant its dismissal. A complaint may be dismissed due to plaintiff’s fault: (a) if he fails to appear during a

scheduled trial, especially on the date for the presentation of his evidence in chief, or when so required at the pre-trial; (b) if he neglectsto prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time; or (c) if he does not comply with the rules or any order of the court. None othese was obtaining in the civil case.

While there was a lull of about six (6) months in the prosecution of Civil Case No. 99-518, it must be remembered that respondentsthemselves contributed largely to this delay. They repeatedly asked petitioner to consider re-structuring the debt of respondent MagwinMarketing Corporation to which petitioner graciously acceded. Petitioner approved a new debt payment scheme that was sought byrespondents, which it then communicated to respondent Corporation through a letter for the conformity of the latter’s officers, i.e.respondent Nelson Tiu as President/General Manager and respondent Benito Sy as Director thereof. Regrettably, only respondentNelson Tiu affixed his signature on the letter to signify his concurrence with the terms and conditions of the arrangement. Themomentary lag in the civil case was aggravated when respondent Benito Sy for unknown and unexplained reasons paid no heed to theadjustments in the indebtedness although curiously he has not opposed before this Court or the courts a quo petitioner’s desire to goahead with the pre-trial conference.

Admittedly, delay took place in this case but it was not an interruption that should have entailed the dismissal of the complaint even isuch was designated as without prejudice. To constitute a sufficient ground for dismissal, the inattention of plaintiff to pursue his causemust not only be prolonged but also be unnecessary and dilatory resulting in the trifling of judicial processes. In the instant case, theadjournment was not only fleeting as it lasted less than six (6) months but was also done in good faith to accommodate respondentsincessant pleas to negotiate. Although the dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute is a matter addressed to the sound discretion othe court, that judgment however must not be abused. The availability of this recourse must be determined according to the procedurahistory of each case, the situation at the time of the dismissal, and the diligence of plaintiff to proceed therein . [35] Stress must also belaid upon the official directive that courts must endeavor to convince parties in a civil case to consummate a fair settlement ,[36] and tomitigate damages to be paid by the losing party who has shown a sincere desire for such give-and-take .[37] All things considered, wesee no compelling circumstances to uphold the dismissal of petitioner’s complaint regardless of its characterization as being withouprejudice.

In fine, petitioner cannot be said to have lost interest in fighting the civil case to the end. A court may dismiss a case on the groundof non prosequitur but the real test of the judicious exercise of such power is whether under the circumstances plaintiff is chargeablewith want of fitting assiduousness in not acting on his complaint with reasonable promptitude. Unless a party’s conduct is soindifferent, irresponsible, contumacious or slothful as to provide substantial grounds for dismissal, i.e., equivalent to default or non-appearance in the case, the courts should consider lesser sanctions which would still amount to achieving the desired end.[38] In theabsence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or of a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of therules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense rather than wield their authority to dismiss.[39]























Clearly, another creative remedy was available to the court a quo to attain a speedy disposition of Civil Case No. 99-518 withousacrificing the course of justice. Since the failure of petitioner to submit a compromise agreement was the refusal of just one of hereinrespondents, i.e., Benito Sy, to sign his name on the conforme of the loan restructure documents, and the common concern of thecourts a quo was dispatch in the proceedings, the holding of a pre-trial conference was the best-suited solution to the problem as thisstage in a civil action is where issues are simplified and the dispute quickly and genuinely reconciled. By means of pre-trial, the triacourt is fully empowered to sway the litigants to agree upon some fair compromise.

Dismissing the civil case and compelling petitioner to re-file its complaint is a dangerous, costly and circuitous route that may end upaggravating, not resolving, the disagreement. This case management strategy is frighteningly deceptive because it does so at theexpense of petitioner whose cause of action, perhaps, may have already been admitted by its adverse parties as shown by three (3) ofour (4) defendants not willing to contest petitioner’s allegations, and more critically, since this approach promotes the useless andthankless duplication of hard work already undertaken by the trial court. As we have aptly observed, ―[i]nconsiderate dismissals, evenif without prejudice, do not constitute a panacea nor a solution to the congestion of court dockets. While they lend a deceptive aura oefficiency to records of individual judges, they merely postpone the ultimate reckoning between the parties. In the absence of clealack of merit or intention to delay, justice is better served by a brief continuance, trial on the merits, and final disposition of the casesbefore the court.‖[40]

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. The Decision dated 28 September 2001 and Resolution dated 2 April 2002 othe Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62102 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The Orders dated 8 September 2000, 6 November 2000 and 16 November 2000 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 135, of MakatCity, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-518, are also REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as these Orders are interpreted to impose uponand collect anew from petitioner RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION docket or legal fees for its complaint, or to dismisswithout prejudice Civil Case No. 99-518, or to preclude the trial court from calling the parties therein to pre-trial conference, or fromproceeding thereafter with dispatch to resolve the civil case.

Civil Case No. 99-518 is deemed REINSTATED in, as it was never taken out from, the dockets of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 135of Makati City. The trial court is ORDERED to exercise its jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 99-518, to CONDUCT the pre-triaconference therein with dispatch, and to UNDERTAKE thereafter such other proceedings as may be relevant, without petitioner beingcharged anew docket or other legal fees in connection with its reinstatement. Costs against respondents.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,vs.MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, AND THEADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City, through a petition for reviewon certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order 1 dated 31 January 2011 ofthe RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. TheRTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based onimproper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.




http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2013/jun2013/gr_196049_2013.html#fnt1







The Facts

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay (Marinay) in thePhilippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japanwhere he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being dissolved, Marinay andMaekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedlysuffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgmentfrom a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)."Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay andMaekara be declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct theLocal Civil Registrar of Quezon City to annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinayand Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National StatisticsOffice (NSO).6

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition and withdrawing the case fromits active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and

Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –

(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife.

x x x x

Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has been

residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in thePhilippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above provisions. The trial court based itsdismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements maybe a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this caseeither Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.

Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated ordinary civil actions for declarationof nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is aspecial proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcementor protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to establish (1) the

status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that theJapanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled torecognition by Philippine courts.12

In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code onthe ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration ofabsolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurdbecause only the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize that the party



















































interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki hadmaterial interest and therefore the personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.

Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 isthe "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The CivilRegister Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of thecourt to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaringmarriages void from the beginning" are subject to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to

annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.

Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petitionbased on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because itis lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Cour t 19 whichheld that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu propriodismissing the case."20Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not have "immediately dismissed" the petition underSection 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he substantially complied with the provision.

On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its twogrounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC

considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by theJapanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its groundof impropriety of venue. It only said that "[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] itshould be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24

The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,Negros Occidental .25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation orCorrection of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the"validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party,and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27

The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held

that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of thepetition was not authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediatedismissal" of the petition under the same provision.

The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay and Maekara

On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for review.30 The public respondents, the LocalCivil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of theSolicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.32 The SolicitorGeneral argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriagebetween Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republi c 33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No.02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:

[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during the connubial period that themarriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefitfrom the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in suchcircumstance, the "injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is


















































































clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the priormarriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of theinfidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34

The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may be made in a Rule 108proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish thestatus or right of a party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the JapaneseFamily Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.

The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts, events and judicial decreesconcerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requiresthe entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x x."38 TheJapanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule108 proceeding.

Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void marriage under Rule 108, citing DeCastro v. De Castr o39 and Niñal v. Bayadog 40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked."41

Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to comment on the petition.42 Maekarawrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was previously married to Fujiki.43Maekara also denied that he inflicted any

form of violence on Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition.45 She would like tomaintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following legal issues:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage

between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in theCivil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does notapply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreigncountry. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic ,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife

can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."48

I.

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of aforeign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copyof the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39,Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office which has custody is in a foreign country

































































such as Japan, the certification may be made by the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan andauthenticated by the seal of office.50

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that the trial court and theparties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of thepublic prosecutor ,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate thecase anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."57 Theinterpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every

judgment of a foreign court were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action,

rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal capacity of its parties. However, theeffect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts mustdetermine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Codeprovides that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding uponcitizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in private international law. Thus, the PhilippineState may require, for effectivity in the Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, overwhom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under a Philippine court of the case asif it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the

foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizenwho is under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according tothe rules of evidence.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a person creates a "presumptiveevidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules ofCourt states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusionfraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not allowed todelve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelledon grounds external to its merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact."The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the

jurisdiction of other states.62

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees between a Filipino and aforeign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but therecognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinarytrial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under thesecond paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained adivorce decree abroad.65

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriagebetween Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court

judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the

Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules ofCourt.

II.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made in a special proceeding forcancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Courtprovides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108



































































creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753.These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage,66 which the State has an interest in recording. As noted by theSolicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in aRule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establishthe status or right of a party or a particular fact."67

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons

which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relatingthereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinayand Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason hehas the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registryon the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage he contractedand the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamousmarriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of thespouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property

interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to besupported "in keeping with the financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property regime of the marriage.71

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right in a marriage extends further torelational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In any case,Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the wife of theunion recognized by law.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question the validity of a subsequentmarriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of voidmarriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage areneither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior subsisting marriage is the one who has thepersonality to file a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of theRevised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy becauseany citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to thedeclaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of asubsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is alsopersonally interested in the purely civil aspect of protecting his marriage.

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not onlythreatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to theprior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For thispurpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact thatsuch judgment is effective in the Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of thebigamous marriage in the civil registry.

III.






























































In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental , this Court held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullifymarriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity ofmarriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petitionfor recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.

Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where oneof the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a

marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under theFamily Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limitedgrounds for the dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition and distributionof the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declarationof nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the FamilyCourts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in theRegional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriageby the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.

However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of thesubstantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A

recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the effectivity ofa foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M.No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the partiesis a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipinospouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of theFamily Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce isthereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity toremarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce,is no longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family

Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allowdivorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.

The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results from a marriage between aFilipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spousebeing tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made byextending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was rendered.The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Court’s decision in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared thatthe Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served."91

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void

on the ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse,after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgmentis not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spousecannot remarry.

Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to correct a situation where the Filipinospouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code,Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign














































judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine publicpolicy as expressed in Article 35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the optionto undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedyavailable to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, withoutprejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment on how a case was decidedunder foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign

citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of aforeign judgment in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign country,Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 ofthe Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent with an overriding public policy inthe Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of

jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policynor adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity ofnations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a rightbetween the parties." Upon recognition of the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis forthe correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a

subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will bean inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.1âwphi1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground forextinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised PenalCode, "[t]he term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine archipelago."

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the questions on venue and the contentsand form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional

Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Courtis ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 198680 July 8, 2013

HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTORYPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEÑALOSA, PETITIONERS,vs.GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TOLEDOCITY, RESPONDENTS.

R E S O L U T I O N

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Branch 59 (RTC), through a petition for review oncertiorar i1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising a pure question of law. In particular, petitioners assail the July 27, 20112 and

August 31, 20113 Orders of the RTC, dismissing Civil Case No. T-2246 for lack of cause of action.







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The Facts

On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins,4 filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance withDamages (subject complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso E. Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed asCivil Case No. T-2246.5 In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on June 28,1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which were then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T77-A.6 Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation ofthe aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638,7 to theprejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.8

In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2)letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport.9 Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that:(a) petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not prosecutedby the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.10

The RTC Ruling

On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order ,11 finding that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of actionagainst Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with Magdaleno in a previous specialproceeding for the issuance of letters of administration,12 this did not mean that they could already be considered as the decedent’scompulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily established the fact that he is Magdaleno’s son – and hence, his

compulsory heir – through the documentary evidence he submitted which consisted of: (a) a marriage contract between Magdalenoand Epegenia Evangelista; (b) a Certificate of Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport.13

The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied on August 31, 2011 due to the counsel’s failure tostate the date on which his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance was issued.14

Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-2246,15 sought direct recourse to the Court through the instanpetition.

The Issue Before the Court

The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that thesubject complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another .16 It is well-settled that the existence of acause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint.17 In this relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause ofaction if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for .18 Accordingly, ifthe allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed, regardless of thedefenses that may be averred by the defendants.19

As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the lawful heirs ofMagdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be declared null and void andthat the transfer certificates of title issued in the latter’s favor be cancelled. While the foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, wouldconsequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint, the rule that the determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should bemade in the corresponding special proceeding20 precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance,from granting the same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA,21 the Court, citing several other precedents, held that thedetermination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such purpose, and not in anordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case:










































































Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper specialproceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of property.1âwphi1 This must takeprecedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot makea declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. UnderSection 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcemenor protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks toestablish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a specialproceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, andnot in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x:

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating to the rights offiliation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted precisely for the purpose ofdetermining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the status of an illegitimate child who claimed to bean heir to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery ofproperty.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be dispensed with for thesake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented theievidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon,23 or when a special proceeding

had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.24

In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need to institute theproper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil CaseNo. T-2246.

Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same fails to state a cause of action, a court cannotdisregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it.25 Thus, concordant with applicable jurisprudence,since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the dismissal ofCivil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s heirshipwhich should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and determined in the proper special proceeding. As such, the foregoingpronouncement should therefore be devoid of any legal effect.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 is hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to anysubsequent proceeding to determine the lawful heirs of the late Magdaleno Ypon and the rights concomitant therewith.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 173559 January 7, 2013

LETICIA DIONA, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, MARCELINA DIONA, Petitioner,vs.ROMEO A. BALANGUE, SONNY A. BALANGUE, REYNALDO A. BALANGUE, and ESTEBAN A. BALANGUE, JR., Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The great of a relief neither sought by the party in whose favor it was given not supported by the evidence presented violates theopposing party’s right to due process and may be declared void ab initio in a proper proceeding.



















This Petition for Review on Certiorar i1 assails the November 24, 2005 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) issued in G.R. SP No.85541 which granted the Petition for Annulment of Judgment3 filed by the respondents seeking to nullify that portion of the October 17,2000 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 75, Valenzuela City awarding petitioner 5% monthly interest rate for theprincipal amount of the loan respondent obtained from her.

This Petition likewise assails the CA’s June 26, 2006 Resolution5 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Factual Antecedents

The facts of this case are simple and undisputed.

On March 2, 1991, respondents obtained a loan of P45,000.00 from petitioner payable in six months and secured by a Real EstateMortgage6 over their 202-square meter property located in Marulas, Valenzuela and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.V-12296.7 When the debt became due, respondents failed to pay notwithstanding demand. Thus, on September 17, 1999, petitionerfiled with the RTC a Complaint8 praying that respondents be ordered:

(a) To pay petitioner the principal obligation of P45,000.00, with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum, from 02 March 1991until the full obligation is paid.

(b) To pay petitioner actual damages as may be proven during the trial but shall in no case be less thanP10,000.00; P25,000.00 by wayof attorney’s fee, plus P2,000.00 per hearing as appearance fee.

(c) To issue a decree of foreclosure for the sale at public auction of the aforementioned parcel of land, and for the disposition of theproceeds thereof in accordance with law, upon failure of the respondents to fully pay petitioner within the period set by law the sumsset forth in this complaint.

(d) Costs of this suit.

Other reliefs and remedies just and equitable under the premises are likewise prayed for .9 (Emphasis supplied)

Respondents were served with summons thru respondent Sonny A. Balangue (Sonny). On October 15, 1999, with the assistance of Atty. Arthur C. Coroza (Atty. Coroza) of the Public Attorney’s Office, they filed a Motion to Extend Period to Answer. Despite the

requested extension, however, respondents failed to file any responsive pleadings. Thus, upon motion of the petitioner, the RTCdeclared them in default and allowed petitioner to present her evidence ex parte.10

Ruling of the RTC sought to be annulled.

In a Decision11 dated October 17, 2000, the RTC granted petitioner’s Complaint. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner, ordering the respondents to pay the petitioner as follows:

a) the sum of FORTY FIVE THOUSAND (P45,000.00) PESOS, representing the unpaid principal loan obligation plus interest at 5% permonth [sic] reckoned from March 2, 1991, until the same is fully paid;

b) P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus cost of suit;

c) in the event the [respondents] fail to satisfy the aforesaid obligation, an order of foreclosure shall be issued accordingly for the saleat public auction of the subject property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. V-12296 and the improvements thereon for thesatisfaction of the petitioner’s claim.

SO ORDERED.12 (Emphasis supplied)

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Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Execution,13 alleging that respondents did not interpose a timely appeal despite receipt bytheir former counsel of the RTC’s Decision on November 13, 2000. Before it could be resolved, however, respondents filed a Motion toSet Aside Judgment14 dated January 26, 2001, claiming that not all of them were duly served with summons. According to the otherrespondents, they had no knowledge of the case because their co-respondent Sonny did not inform them about it. They prayed that theRTC’s October 17, 2000 Decision be set aside and a new trial be conducted.

But on March 16, 2001, the RTC ordered15 the issuance of a Writ of Execution to implement its October 17, 2000 Decision. However,since the writ could not be satisfied, petitioner moved for the public auction of the mortgaged property,16 which the RTC granted.17 In anauction sale conducted on November 7, 2001, petitioner was the only bidder in the amount of P420,000.00. Thus, a Certificate of

Sale18 was issued in her favor and accordingly annotated at the back of TCT No. V-12296.

Respondents then filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution Sale19 dated December 17, 2001, claimingthat the parties did not agree in writing on any rate of interest and that petitioner merely sought for a 12% per annum interest in herComplaint. Surprisingly, the RTC awarded 5% monthly interest (or 60% per annum) from March 2, 1991 until full payment. Resultantly,their indebtedness inclusive of the exorbitant interest from March 2, 1991 to May 22, 2001 ballooned from P124,400.00to P652,000.00.

In an Order 20 dated May 7, 2002, the RTC granted respondents’ motion and accordingly modified the interest rate awarded from 5%monthly to 12% per annum. Then on August 2, 2002, respondents filed a Motion for Leave To Deposit/Consign JudgmentObligation21 in the total amount of P126,650.00.22

Displeased with the RTC’s May 7, 2002 Order, petitioner elevated the matter to the CA via a Petition for Certiorar i23under Rule 65 ofthe Rules of Court. On August 5, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision24 declaring that the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction in awarding the5% monthly interest but at the same time pronouncing that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in subsequently reducing the rate ofinterest to 12% per annum. In so ruling, the CA ratiocinated:

Indeed, We are convinced that the Trial Court exceeded its jurisdiction when it granted 5% monthly interest instead of the 12% perannum prayed for in the complaint. However, the proper remedy is not to amend the judgment but to declare that portion as a nullity.Void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation (Leonorvs. CA, 256 SCRA 69). No legal rights can emanate from a resolution that is null and void (Fortich vs. Corona, 312 SCRA 751).

From the foregoing, the remedy of the respondents is to have the Court declare the portion of the judgment providing for a higherinterest than that prayed for as null and void for want of or in excess of jurisdiction. A void judgment never acquire[s] finality and anyaction to declare its nullity does not prescribe (Heirs of Mayor Nemencio Galvez vs. CA, 255 SCRA 672).

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Petition having merit, is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE. Resultantly, the challengedMay 7, 2002 and September 5, 2000 orders of Public Respondent Court are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE for having beenissued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction. No costs.

SO ORDERED.25 (Emphases in the original; italics supplied.)

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

Taking their cue from the Decision of the CA in the special civil action for certiorari, respondents filed with the same court a Petition for

Annulment of Judgment and Execution Sale with Damages.26

They contended that the portion of the RTC Decision granting petitioner5% monthly interest rate is in gross violation of Section 3(d) of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and of their right to due process. Accordingto respondents, the loan did not carry any interest as it was the verbal agreement of the parties that in lieu thereof petitioner’s familycan continue occupying respondents’ residential building located in Marulas, Valenzuela for free until said loan is fully paid.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Initially, the CA denied due course to the Petition.27 Upon respondents’ motion, however, it reinstated and granted the Petition. Insetting aside portions of the RTC’s October 17, 2000 Decision, the CA ruled that aside from being unconscionably excessive, the






























































monthly interest rate of 5% was not agreed upon by the parties and that petitioner’s Complaint clearly sought only the legal rate of 12%per annum. Following the mandate of Section 3(d) of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, the CA concluded that the awarded rate of interest isvoid for being in excess of the relief sought in the Complaint. It ruled thus:

WHEREFORE, respondents’ motion for reconsideration is GRANTED and our resolution dated October 13, 2004 is, accordingly,REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, another is entered ordering the ANNULMENT OF:

(a) public respondent’s impugned October 17, 2000 judgment, insofar as it awarded 5% monthly interest in favor of petitioner; and

(b) all proceedings relative to the sale at public auction of the property titled in respondents’ names under Transfer Certificate of TitleNo. V-12296 of the Valenzuela registry.

The judgment debt adjudicated in public respondent’s impugned October 17, 2000 judgment is, likewise, ordered RECOMPUTED atthe rate of 12% per annum from March 2, 1991. No costs.

SO ORDERED.28 (Emphases in the original.)

Petitioner sought reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in its June 26, 2006 Resolution.29

Issues

Hence, this Petition anchored on the following grounds:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT GRANTEDRESPONDENTS’ PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A SUBSTITUTE OR ALTERNATIVE REMEDY OF A LOST

APPEAL.

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE AND SERIOUS ERROR AND MISAPPREHENSION OF LAW AND THE FACTS WHEN IT GRANTED RESPONDENTS’ PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT OF THE DECISION OFTHE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF VALENZUELA, BRANCH 75 DATED OCTOBER 17, 2000 IN CIVIL CASE NO. 241-V-99,DESPITE THE FACT THAT SAID DECISION HAS BECOME FINAL AND ALREADY EXECUTED CONTRARY TO THE DOCTRINEOF IMMUTABILITY OF JUDGMENT.30

Petitioner’s Arguments

Petitioner claims that the CA erred in partially annulling the RTC’s October 17, 2000 Decision. She contends that a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be availed of only when the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriateremedies are no longer available through no fault of the claimant. In the present case, however, respondents had all the opportunity toquestion the October 17, 2000 Decision of the RTC, but because of their own inaction or negligence they failed to avail of the remediessanctioned by the rules. Instead, they contented themselves with the filing of a Motion to Set Aside Judgment and then a Motion toCorrect/Amend Judgment and to Set Aside Execution Sale.

Petitioner likewise argues that for a Rule 47 petition to prosper, the same must either be based on extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction.However, the allegations in respondents’ Rule 47 petition do not constitute extrinsic fraud because they simply pass the blame to the

negligence of their former counsel. In addition, it is too late for respondents to pass the buck to their erstwhile counsel considering thatwhen they filed their Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution Sale they were already assisted by their newlawyer, Atty. Reynaldo A. Ruiz, who did not also avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal, etc. As to the ground of lack of jurisdiction,petitioner posits that there is no reason to doubt that the RTC had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case and over the personsof the respondents.

While conceding that the RTC patently made a mistake in awarding 5% monthly interest, petitioner nonetheless invokes the doctrine ofimmutability of final judgment and contends that the RTC Decision can no longer be corrected or modified since it had long becomefinal and executory. She likewise points out that respondents received a copy of said Decision on November 13, 2000 but did nothing















to correct the same. They did not even question the award of 5% monthly interest when they filed their Motion to Set Aside Judgmentwhich they anchored on the sole ground of the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction over the persons of some of the respondents.

Respondents’ Arguments

Respondents do not contest the existence of their obligation and the principal amount thereof. They only seek quittance from the 5%monthly interest or 60% per annum imposed by the RTC. Respondents contend that Section (3)d of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court isclear that when the defendant is declared in default, the court cannot grant a relief more than what is being prayed for in the Complaint.

A judgment which transgresses said rule, according to the respondents, is void for having been issued without jurisdiction and for being

violative of due process of law.

Respondents maintain that it was through no fault of their own, but through the gross negligence of their former counsel, Atty. Coroza,that the remedies of new trial, appeal or petition for relief from judgment were lost. They allege that after filing a Motion to ExtendPeriod to Answer, Atty. Coroza did not file any pleading resulting to their being declared in default. While the said lawyer filed on theirbehalf a Motion to Set Aside Judgment dated January 26, 2001, he however took no steps to appeal from the Decision of the RTC,thereby allowing said judgment to lapse into finality. Citing Legarda v. Court of Appeals,31 respondents aver that clients are not alwaysbound by the actions of their counsel, as in the present case where the clients are to lose their property due to the gross negligence oftheir counsel.

With regard to petitioner’s invocation of immutability of judgment, respondents argue that said doctrine applies only to valid and not tovoid judgments.

Our Ruling

The petition must fail.

We agree with respondents that the award of 5% monthly interest violated their right to due process and, hence, the same may be setaside in a Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.

Annulment of judgment under Rule 47; an exception to the final judgment rule; grounds therefor.

A Petition for Annulment of Judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is a remedy granted only under exceptional circumstances

where a party, without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or otherappropriate remedies. Said rule explicitly provides that it is not available as a substitute for a remedy which was lost due to the party’sown neglect in promptly availing of the same. "The underlying reason is traceable to the notion that annulling final judgments goesagainst the grain of finality of judgment. Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effectiveadministration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause involved therein should be laid to rest."32

While under Section 2, Rule 4733 of the Rules of Court a Petition for Annulment of Judgment may be based only on the grounds ofextrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, jurisprudence recognizes lack of due process as additional ground to annul a judgment.34 In

Arcelona v. Court of Appeals,35 this Court declared that a final and executory judgment may still be set aside if, upon mere inspectionthereof, its patent nullity can be shown for having been issued without jurisdiction or for lack of due process of law.

Grant of 5% monthly interest is way beyond the 12% per annum interest sought in the Complaint and smacks of violation of due

process.

It is settled that courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being sought by the party. Theycannot also grant a relief without first ascertaining the evidence presented in support thereof. Due process considerations require that

judgments must conform to and be supported by the pleadings and evidence presented in court. In Development Bank of thePhilippines v. Teston,36 this Court expounded that:

Due process considerations justify this requirement. It is improper to enter an order which exceeds the scope of relief sought by thepleadings, absent notice which affords the opposing party an opportunity to be heard with respect to the proposed relief. The


























fundamental purpose of the requirement that allegations of a complaint must provide the measure of recovery is to prevent surprise tothe defendant.

Notably, the Rules is even more strict in safeguarding the right to due process of a defendant who was declared in default than of adefendant who participated in trial. For instance, amendment to conform to the evidence presented during trial is allowed the partiesunder the Rules.37 But the same is not feasible when the defendant is declared in default because Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules ofCourt comes into play and limits the relief that may be granted by the courts to what has been prayed for in the Complaint. It provides:

(d) Extent of relief to be awarded. – A judgment rendered against a party in default shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind

from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages.

The raison d’être in limiting the extent of relief that may be granted is that it cannot be presumed that the defendant would not file an Answer and allow himself to be declared in default had he known that the plaintiff will be accorded a relief greater than or different inkind from that sought in the Complaint.38 No doubt, the reason behind Section 3(d), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court is to safeguarddefendant’s right to due process against unforeseen and arbitrarily issued judgment. This, to the mind of this Court, is akin to the veryessence of due process. It embodies "the sporting idea of fair play"39 and forbids the grant of relief on matters where the defendant wasnot given the opportunity to be heard thereon.

In the case at bench, the award of 5% monthly interest rate is not supported both by the allegations in the pleadings and the evidenceon record. The Real Estate Mortgage40 executed by the parties does not include any provision on interest. When petitioner filed herComplaint before the RTC, she alleged that respondents borrowed from her "the sum of FORTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS

(P45,000.00), with interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum"41 and sought payment thereof. She did not allege or pray for thedisputed 5% monthly interest. Neither did she present evidence nor testified thereon. Clearly, the RTC’s award of 5% monthly interestor 60% per annum lacks basis and disregards due process. It violated the due process requirement because respondents were notinformed of the possibility that the RTC may award 5% monthly interest. They were deprived of reasonable opportunity to refute andpresent controverting evidence as they were made to believe that the complainant petitioner was seeking for what she merely stated inher Complaint.

Neither can the grant of the 5% monthly interest be considered subsumed by petitioner’s general prayer for "other reliefs and remedies just and equitable under the premises x x x."42 To repeat, the court’s grant of relief is limited only to what has been prayed for in theComplaint or related thereto, supported by evidence, and covered by the party’s cause of action.43 Besides, even assuming that theawarded 5% monthly or 60% per annum interest was properly alleged and proven during trial, the same remains unconscionablyexcessive and ought to be equitably reduced in accordance with applicable jurisprudence. In Bulos, Jr. v. Yasuma,44 this Court held:

In the case of Ruiz v. Court of Appeals, citing the cases of Medel v. Court of Appeals, Garcia v. Court of Appeals, Spouses Bautista v.Pilar Development Corporation and the recent case of Spouses Solangon v. Salazar, this Court considered the 3% interest per monthor 36% interest per annum as excessive and unconscionable. Thereby, the Court, in the said case, equitably reduced the rate ofinterest to 1% interest per month or 12% interest per annum. (Citations omitted)

It is understandable for the respondents not to contest the default order for, as alleged in their Comment, "it is not their intention toimpugn or run away from their just and valid obligation."45 Nonetheless, their waiver to present evidence should never be construed aswaiver to contest patently erroneous award which already transgresses their right to due process, as well as applicable jurisprudence.

Respondents’ former counsel was grossly negligent in handling the case of his clients; respondents did not lose ordinary remedies ofnew trial, petition for relief, etc. through their own fault.

Ordinarily, the mistake, negligence or lack of competence of counsel binds the client.1âwphi1 This is based on the rule that any actperformed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is regarded as an act of his client. A recognized exceptionto the rule is when the lawyers were grossly negligent in their duty to maintain their client’s cause and such amounted to a deprivationof their client’s property without due process of law.46 In which case, the courts must step in and accord relief to a client who sufferedthereby.47














































The manifest indifference of respondents’ former counsel in handling the cause of his client was already present even from thebeginning. It should be recalled that after filing in behalf of his clients a Motion to Extend Period to Answer, said counsel allowed therequested extension to pass without filing an Answer, which resulted to respondents being declared in default. His negligence wasaggravated by the fact that he did not question the awarded 5% monthly interest despite receipt of the RTC Decision on November 13,2000.48 A simple reading of the dispositive portion of the RTC Decision readily reveals that it awarded exorbitant and unconscionablerate of interest. Its difference from what is being prayed for by the petitioner in her Complaint is so blatant and very patent. It also defieselementary jurisprudence on legal rate of interests. Had the counsel carefully read the judgment it would have caught his attention andcompelled him to take the necessary steps to protect the interest of his client. But he did not. Instead, he filed in behalf of his clients aMotion to Set Aside Judgment49 dated January 26, 2001 based on the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction, oblivious to the fact that the

erroneous award of 5% monthly interest would result to his clients’ deprivation of property without due process of law. Worse, he evenallowed the RTC Decision to become final by not perfecting an appeal. Neither did he file a petition for relief therefrom. It was only ayear later that the patently erroneous award of 5% monthly interest was brought to the attention of the RTC when respondents, thrutheir new counsel, filed a Motion to Correct/Amend Judgment and To Set Aside Execution Sale. Even the RTC candidly admitted that it"made a glaring mistake in directing the defendants to pay interest on the principal loan at 5% per month which is very different fromwhat was prayed for by the plaintiff."50

"A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and theexertion of his utmost learning and ability, to the end that nothing can be taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with thelaw."51 Judging from how respondents’ former counsel handled the cause of his clients, there is no doubt that he was grossly negligentin protecting their rights, to the extent that they were deprived of their property without due process of law.

In fine, respondents did not lose the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief and other remedies through their own fault. It canonly be attributed to the gross negligence of their erstwhile counsel which prevented them from pursuing such remedies. We cannotalso blame respondents for relying too much on their former counsel. Clients have reasonable expectations that their lawyer wouldamply protect their interest during the trial of the case.52 Here,

"respondents are plain and ordinary people x x x who are totally ignorant of the intricacies and technicalities of law and legalprocedures. Being so, they completely relied upon and trusted their former counsel to appropriately act as their interest may lawfullywarrant and require."53

As a final word, it is worth noting that respondents’ principal obligation was only P45,000.00. Due to their former counsel’s grossnegligence in handling their cause, coupled with the RTC’s erroneous, baseless, and illegal award of 5% monthly interest, they nowstand to lose their property and still owe petitioner a large amount of money. As aptly observed by the CA:

x x x If the impugned judgment is not, therefore, rightfully nullified, petitioners will not only end up losing their property but willadditionally owe private respondent the sum of P232,000.00 plus the legal interest said balance had, in the meantime, earned. As acourt of justice and equity, we cannot, in good conscience, allow this unconscionable situation to prevail.54

Indeed, this Court is appalled by petitioner’s invocation of the doctrine of immutability of judgment. Petitioner does not contest as sheeven admits that the RTC made a glaring mistake in awarding 5% monthly interest.55 Amazingly, she wants to benefit from sucherroneous award. This Court cannot allow this injustice to happen.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed November 24, 2005 and June 26, 2006 Resolution of the Courtof Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 85541 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 145370 March 4, 2004

MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner,vs.RODOLFO S. ANCHETA, respondent.



































D E C I S I O N

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 which dismissed thepetitioner’s petition under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to annul the Order 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite,Branch 15 in Special Proceedings No. NC-662 nullifying the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent Rodolfo S. Ancheta, and ofthe resolution of the appellate court denying the motion for reconsideration of the said resolution.

This case arose from the following facts:

After their marriage on March 5, 1959, the petitioner and the respondent resided in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. They had eight childrenduring their coverture, whose names and dates of births are as follows:

a. ANA MARIE B . ANCHETA – born October 6, 1959

b. RODOLFO B. ANCHETA, JR. – born March 7, 1961

c. VENANCIO MARIANO B. ANCHETA – born May 18, 1962

d. GERARDO B. ANCHETA – born April 8, 1963

e. KATHRINA B. ANCHETA – born October 29, 1965

f. ANTONIO B. ANCHETA – born March 6, 1967

g. NATASHA MARTINA B. ANCHETA - born August 2, 1968

h. FRITZIE YOLANDA B. ANCHETA – born November 19, 19703

On December 6, 1992, the respondent left the conjugal home and abandoned the petitioner and their children. On January 25, 1994,petitioner Marietta Ancheta filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 40, against the respondent for the dissolution

of their conjugal partnership and judicial separation of property with a plea for support and support pendente lite. The case wasdocketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-3735. At that time, the petitioner was renting a house at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BFHomes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila.4

On April 20, 1994, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement5 where some of the conjugal properties were adjudicated to thepetitioner and her eight children, including the following:

b. A parcel of land (adjoining the two lots covered by TCT Nos. 120082 and TCT No. 120083-Cavite) located at Bancal, Carmona,Cavite, registered in the name of the family Ancheta. Biofood Corporation under TCT No. 310882, together with the resort MuntingParaiso, Training Center, four-storey building, pavilion, swimming pool and all improvements. All of the shares of stocks of AnchetaBiofoods Corporation were distributed one-third (1/3) to the petitioner and the eight children one-twelfth (1/12) each.6

The court rendered judgment based on the said compromise agreement. Conformably thereto, the respondent vacated, on June 1,1994, the resort Munting Paraiso and all the buildings and improvements thereon. The petitioner, with the knowledge of therespondent, thenceforth resided in the said property.

In the meantime, the respondent intended to marry again. On June 5, 1995, he filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Naic,Cavite, Branch 15, for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity. The casewas docketed as Sp. Proc. No. NC-662. Although the respondent knew that the petitioner was already residing at the resort MuntingParaiso in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, he, nevertheless, alleged in his petition that the petitioner was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue



corner CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, "where she may be served with summons."7 The clerk of courtissued summons to the petitioner at the address stated in the petition.8 The sheriff served the summons and a copy of the petition bysubstituted service on June 6, 1995 on the petitioner’s son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, at his residence in Bancal, Car mona,Cavite.9

On June 21, 1995, Sheriff Jose R. Salvadora, Jr. submitted a Return of Service to the court stating that the summons and a copy of thepetition were served on the petitioner through her son Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III on June 6, 1995:

RETURN OF SERVICE

This is to certify that the summons together with the copy of the complaint and its annexes was received by the herein defendant thruhis son Venancio M.B. Ancheta [III] as evidenced by the signature appearing on the summons. Service was made on June 6, 1995.

June 21, 1995, Naic, Cavite.

(Sgd.) JOSE R. SALVADORA, JR.Sheriff 10

The petitioner failed to file an answer to the petition. On June 22, 1995, the respondent filed an "Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendantas in Default" setting it for hearing on June 27, 1995 at 8:30 a.m. During the hearing on the said date, there was no appearance for thepetitioner. The public prosecutor appeared for the State and offered no objection to the motion of the respondent who appeared withcounsel. The trial court granted the motion and declared the petitioner in default, and allowed the respondent to adduce evidence ex-parte. The respondent testified in his behalf and adduced documentary evidence. On July 7, 1995, the trial court issued an Ordergranting the petition and declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio.11 The clerk of court issued a Certificate of Finality of theOrder of the court on July 16, 1996.12

On February 14, 1998, Valentine’s Day, the respondent and Teresita H. Rodil were married in civil rights before the municipal mayor ofIndang, Cavite.13

On July 7, 2000, the petitioner filed a verified petition against the respondent with the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules ofCourt, as amended, for the annulment of the order of the RTC of Cavite in Special Proceedings No. NC-662. The case was docketedas CA-G.R. SP No. 59550. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the respondent committed gross misrepresentations by making it

appear in his petition in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 that she was a resident of No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, when in truth and in fact, the respondent knew very well that she was residing at Munting Paraiso,Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. According to the petitioner, the respondent did so to deprive her of her right to be heard in the said case, andultimately secure a favorable judgment without any opposition thereto. The petitioner also alleged that the respondent caused theservice of the petition and summons on her by substituted service through her married son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, a residenof Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, where the respondent was a resident. Furthermore, Venancio M.B. Ancheta III failed to deliver to her thecopy of the petition and summons. Thus, according to the petitioner, the order of the trial court in favor of the respondent was null andvoid (1) for lack of jurisdiction over her person; and (2) due to the extrinsic fraud perpetrated by the respondent. She further contendedthat there was no factual basis for the trial court’s finding that she was suffering from psychological incapacity. Finally, the petitioneraverred that she learned of the Order of the RTC only on January 11, 2000. Appended to the petition, inter alia, were the affidavits ofthe petitioner and of Venancio M.B. Ancheta III.

The petitioner prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor, thus:

WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays this Honorable Court to render Judgment granting the Petition.

1. Declaring null and void the Order dated June 7, 1995 (of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Naic, Cavite).

2. Ordering respondent to pay petitioner

a. P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;



b. P500,000.00 as exemplary damages;

c. P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus P7,500.00 per diem for every hearing;

d. P100,000.00 as litigation expenses;

e. Costs of suit.14

On July 13, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the petition on the following ground:

We cannot give due course to the present petition in default or in the absence of any clear and specific averment by petitioner that theordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault ofpetitioner. Neither is there any averment or allegation that the present petition is based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lackof jurisdiction. Nor yet that, on the assumption that extrinsic fraud can be a valid ground therefor, that it was not availed of, or could nothave been availed of, in a motion for new trial, or petition for relief.15

The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said resolution, appending thereto an amended petition in which she alleged,inter alia, that:

4. This petition is based purely on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

5. This petition has not prescribed; it was filed within the four-year period after discovery of the extrinsic fraud.

6. The ground of extrinsic fraud has not been availed of, or could not have been availed of in a motion for new trial or petition for relief.

7. The ground of lack of jurisdiction is not barred by laches and/or estoppel.

8. The ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies were no longer available through no faultof petitioner; neither has she ever availed of the said remedies. This petition is the only available remedy to her.16

The petitioner also alleged therein that the order of the trial court nullifying her and the respondent’s marriage was null and void for thecourt a quo’s failure to order the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation on whether there was collusion between the parties, and

to order the Solicitor General to appear for the State.

On September 27, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution denying the said motion.

The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court alleging that the CA erred as follows:

1. In failing to take into consideration the kind of Order which was sought to be annulled.

2. In finding that the Petition was procedurally flawed.

3. In not finding that the Petition substantially complied with the requirements of the Rules of Court.

4. In failing to comply with Section 5, Rule 47, Rules of Court.

5. In not even considering/resolving Petitioner’s Motion to Admit the Amended Petition; and in not admitting the Amended Petition.

6. In failing to apply the Rules of Procedure with liberality.17

The petition is meritorious.



An original action in the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended, to annul a judgment or final order orresolution in civil actions of the RTC may be based on two grounds: (a) extrinsic fraud; or (b) lack of jurisdiction. If based on extrinsicfraud, the remedy is subject to a condition precedent, namely, the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or otherappropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.18 The petitioner must allege in the petition that theordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court are no longer availablethrough no fault of hers; otherwise, the petition will be dismissed. If the petitioner fails to avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal orrelief from judgment through her own fault or negligence before filing her petition with the Court of Appeals, she cannot resort to theremedy under Rule 47 of the Rules; otherwise, she would benefit from her inaction or negligence.19

It is not enough to allege in the petition that the said remedies were no longer available through no fault of her own. The petitioner mustalso explain and justify her failure to avail of such remedies. The safeguard was incorporated in the rule precisely to avoid abuse of theremedy.20 Access to the courts is guaranteed. But there must be limits thereto. Once a litigant’s rights have been adjudicated in a validfinal judgment of a competent court, he should not be granted an unbridled license to sue anew. The prevailing party should not bevexed by subsequent suits.21

In this case, the petitioner failed to allege in her petition in the CA that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, and petition for relief,were no longer available through no fault of her own. She merely alleged therein that she received the assailed order of the trial courton January 11, 2000. The petitioner’s amended petition did not cure the fatal defect in her original petition, because although sheadmitted therein that she did not avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal or petition for relief from judgment, she did not explain whyshe failed to do so.

We, however, rule that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the original petition and denying admission of the amended petition.This is so because apparently, the Court of Appeals failed to take note from the material allegations of the petition, that the petition wasbased not only on extrinsic fraud but also on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, on her claim that the summons andthe copy of the complaint in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 were not served on her. While the original petition and amended petition did notstate a cause of action for the nullification of the assailed order on the ground of extrinsic fraud, we rule, however, that it states asufficient cause of action for the nullification of the assailed order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the person of thepetitioner, notwithstanding the absence of any allegation therein that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration, or appeal areno longer available through no fault of the petitioner.

In a case where a petition for the annulment of a judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court isgrounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action, the petitionerneed not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom

are no longer available through no fault of her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or finalorder in any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked,22 unless barred by laches.23

In this case, the original petition and the amended petition in the Court of Appeals, in light of the material averments therein, werebased not only on extrinsic fraud, but also on lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the person of the petitioner because of the failureof the sheriff to serve on her the summons and a copy of the complaint. She claimed that the summons and complaint were served onher son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, who, however, failed to give her the said summons and complaint.

Even a cursory reading of the material averments of the original petition and its annexes will show that it is, prima facie meritorious;hence, it should have been given due course by the Court of Appeals.

In Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Japzon,24 we held that jurisdiction is acquired by a trial court over the person of the defendanteither by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of summons. The service of summons andthe complaint on the defendant is to inform him that a case has been filed against him and, thus, enable him to defend himself. He is,thus, put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff or the petitioner. Without such service in the absence of a valid waiver renders the

judgment of the court null and void.25 Jurisdiction cannot be acquired by the court on the person of the defendant even if he knows ofthe case against him unless he is validly served with summons.26



Summons and complaint may be served on the defendant either by handing a copy thereof to him in person, or, if he refuses to receiveand sign for it, by tendering it to her.27 However, if there is impossibility of prompt service of the summons personally on the defendantdespite diligent efforts to find him, service of the summons may be effected by substituted service as provided in Section 7, Rule 14 ofthe said Rules:

SEC. 7. Substituted service.— If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as provided in thepreceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant’s residence with some person ofsuitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies of defendant’s office or regular place of bus iness withsome competent person in charge thereof.28

In Miranda v. Court of Appeals,29 we held that the modes of service should be strictly followed in order that the court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Thus, it is only when a defendant cannot be served personally within a reasonable timethat substituted service may be made by stating the efforts made to find him and personally serve on him the summons and complaintand the fact that such effort failed.30 This statement should be made in the proof of service to be accomplished and filed in court by thesheriff. This is necessary because substituted service is a derogation of the usual method of service. It has been held that substitutedservice of summons is a method extraordinary in character; hence, may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstancescategorized by statutes.31

As gleaned from the petition and the amended petition in the CA and the annexes thereof, the summons in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 wasissued on June 6, 1995.32 On the same day, the summons was served on and received by Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III,33 thepetitioner’s son. When the return of summons was submitted to the court by the sheriff on June 21, 1995, no statement was made on

the impossibility of locating the defendant therein within a reasonable time, or that any effort was made by the sheriff to locate thedefendant. There was no mention therein that Venancio Mariano Ancheta III was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon,BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, where the petitioner (defendant therein) was allegedly residing. It turned out that Venancio Mariano B.

Ancheta III had been residing at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, and that his father merely showed him the summons and the complaint andwas made to affix his signature on the face of the summons; he was not furnished with a copy of the said summons and complaint.

4. From the time my father started staying at Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, I have been residing on the adjoining landconsisting of two (2) lots later apportioned to my father as his share of the conjugal partnership. Since then, I have been residingtherein up to the present.

5. On June 6, 1995, at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite (at my residence situated on my father’s lot), my father came to see me and thenasked me to sign and I did sign papers which he (my father) and the Sheriff did not allow me to read. Apparently, these papers are for

the Summons to my mother in the case for annulment of marriage filed by my father against her. I was not given any copy of theSummons and/or copy of the complaint/petition.34

We, thus, rule that the Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily in dismissing the original petition of the petitioner and the amended petition forannulment of the assailed order grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.

The action in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court does not involve the merits of the final order of the trial court. However, we cannot butexpress alarm at what transpired in the court a quo as shown by the records. The records show that for the petitioner’s failure to file ananswer to the complaint, the trial court granted the motion of the respondent herein to declare her in default. The public prosecutorcondoned the acts of the trial court when he interposed no objection to the motion of the respondent. The trial court forthwith receivedthe evidence of the respondent ex-parte and rendered judgment against the petitioner without a whimper of protest from the publicprosecutor. The actuations of the trial court and the public prosecutor are in defiance of Article 48 of the Family Code, which reads:

Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscaassigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence isnot fabricated or suppressed.

In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.35

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The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which provides:

Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation.— If the defendant in an action for annulment ofmarriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusionbetween the parties exits, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is notfabricated.36

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,37 this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the

Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for theState:

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decisionshall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein hisreasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorneyshall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of thecourt. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.38

This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin39 reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals,40regarding the role of theprosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State.41 The trial court, abetted by the ineptitude, ifnot sheer negligence of the public prosecutor, waylaid the Rules of Court and the Family Code, as well as the rulings of this Court.

The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-formacompliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but theexposure of an invalid one as well.42

A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all cases forannulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf ofthe State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated orsuppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, shouldorder the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose theapplication for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced isdubious and fabricated.

Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law is based on the policythat marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no strongeranchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservationis not the concern of the family members alone.43Whether or not a marriage should continue to exist or a family should stay togethermust not depend on the whims and caprices of only one party, who claims that the other suffers psychological imbalance,incapacitating such party to fulfill his or her marital duties and obligations.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated July 13, 2000 andSeptember 27, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 are hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED. Let the records of CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 beremanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings conformably with the Decision of this Court and Rule 47 of the Rules ofCourt, as amended.

SO ORDERED.

FAR EAST BANK AND TRUST CO. (now BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS), petitioner , vs. TOMAS TOH, SR., ANDREGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MANDALUYONG CITY, BRANCH 214, respondents.

R E S O L U T I O N


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QUISUMBING, J .:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the Resolution[1] dated June 26, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No59234, which dismissed petitioner’s petition and affirmed the Order [2] dated May 26, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofMandaluyong City, Branch 214 in Civil Case No. MC-99-643 granting private respondent’s motion for discretionary execution becauseof private respondent’s advanced age. Likewise challenged is the appellate court’s Resolution[3] dated July 10, 2000, denyingpetitioner’s motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 59234.

The factual antecedents of this case, as culled from the records, are as follows:

On March 17, 1999, Tomas Toh, Sr., private respondent herein, filed Civil Case No. MC-99-643 against petitioner Far East Bank &Trust Co. (FEBTCO now merged in Bank of the Philippine Islands), seeking recovery of his bank deposits with petitioner in the amounof P2,560,644.68 plus damages. In his complaint, Toh claimed that petitioner had debited, without Toh’s knowledge and consent, saidamount from his savings and current accounts with petitioner bank and then applied the money as payment for the Letters of Creditavailed of by Catmon Sales International Corporation (CASICO) from petitioner. Thus, when Toh issued two checks to AntonConstruction Supply, Inc., they were dishonored by FEBTCO allegedly for having been drawn against insufficient funds, although Tohalleged as of February 4, 1999, he had an outstanding withdrawable balance of P2,560,644.68.

It appears that earlier on August 29, 1997, private respondent Tomas Toh, Sr., together with his sons, Tomas Tan Toh, Jr., and AntonioTan Toh, had executed a Comprehensive Security Agreement in favor of petitioner, wherein the Tohs jointly and severally boundthemselves as sureties for the P22 million credit facilities, denominated as Omnibus Line and Bills Purchased Line, earlier granted bypetitioner to CASICO. Said credit line expired on June 30, 1998, but the parties renewed the same for another year, subject to the

following amendments: (1) a reduction in the credit line from P22 million to P7.5 million; and (2) the relief of Toh, Sr., as one of thesureties of CASICO.

In its answer to private respondent’s complaint, petitioner bank averred that the debiting of Toh’s bank accounts was justified due to hissurety undertaking in the event of the default of CASICO in its payments. Petitioner further claimed that the reduction of credit line doesnot relieve Toh, Sr. from his continuing surety obligation, citing the absence of a new surety undertaking or any provisions in therenewal agreement releasing Toh, Sr., from his personal obligation. It pointed out that CASICO’s default in its obligations becameinevitable after CASICO filed a Petition for Declaration in a State of Suspension of Payments before the Securities and ExchangeCommission (SEC).

On July 30, 1999, private respondent filed a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, which petitioner opposed. On October 15, 1999the lower court granted the aforesaid motion. In its Order dated March 10, 2000, the lower court rendered a decision in favor of TohSr., the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to restore immediately to plaintiff’s savings/current accounts theamount of P2,560,644.68 plus the stipulated interest thereon from February 17, 1999, until fully restored; and to pay to the plaintiff theamount of P100,000.00, as moral damages; and the amount of P50,000.00, as and by way of attorney’s fees. With costs against thedefendant.[4]

On March 29, 2000, Toh Sr., filed a Motion for Discretionary Execution by invoking Section 2,[5] Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of CourtHe prayed that execution pending appeal be granted on the ground of old age and the probability that he may not be able to enjoy hismoney deposited in petitioner’s bank. Petitioner duly opposed said motion.

On March 31, 2000, while private respondent’s motion was pending before the RTC, petitioner filed a notice of appeal of the t rial court’sorder of March 10, 2000.

On May 26, 2000, the RTC issued its order granting private respondent’s Motion for Discretionary Execution, thus:

WHEREFORE, the motion for discretionary execution is GRANTED. The issuance of the corresponding writ of execution for theenforcement and satisfaction of the aforesaid decision against the defendant is hereby ordered.[6]

On May 30, 2000, petitioner’s appeal was given due course.

In granting Toh’s motion, the trial court held that discretionary execution may be issued upon good reasons by virtue of Section2(a),[7] Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. Citing De Leon v. Soriano,[8] where we held that the approach of the end of one’s life

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span is a compelling cause for discretionary execution pending appeal ,[9] the trial court used the circumstance of Toh’s advanced ageas a ―good reason‖ to allow execution pending appeal.

On June 16, 2000, petitioner decided to forego filing a motion for reco nsideration of the trial court’s order of May 26, 2000. Instead, ibrought the matter to the Court of Appeals in a special civil action for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59234.

On June 26, 2000, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. SP No. 59234 as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. [10]

The Court of Appeals pointed out that petitioner filed its petition for certiorari without filing a motion for reconsideration. It held that thefact that the lower court already ordered the execution of its judgment did not constitute a situation of extreme urgency as to justifypetitioner’s by-passing the remedy of reconsideration. The appellate court declared it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part ofthe trial court in granting discretionary execution. For the trial court had determined that Toh Sr. was already 79 years old and given hisadvanced age, might not be able to enjoy the fruits of a judgment favorable to him if he were to wait for the eventual resolution of theappeal filed by petitioner.

Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied it on July 10, 2000.

Hence, this petition where petitioner submits the following issues for our resolution:

1) WHETHER OR NOT THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS NECESSARY BEFORE PETITIONER BANK CAN ASSAIL THE LOWER COURT’S ORDER DATED MAY 26, 2000 IN A SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION FOR CERTIORARI BEFORE THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS.

2) WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE LOWER COURTCOMMITTED NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE ORDER OF MAY 26, 2000.[11]

At the outset, it bears stressing that the first issue is now moot. We find that the appellate court did note petitioner’s procedural bypass or oversight. Nonetheless it proceeded to rule on the petition on its merits. The appellate court’s action is not wanting inprecedents as a special civil action for certiorari may be given due course, notwithstanding that no motion for reconsideration has beenfiled before the lower court under certain exceptional circumstances.[12] These exceptions include instances where: (1) the issue raisedis purely one of law; (2) public interest is involved; (3) the matter is one of urgency; (4) the question of jurisdiction was squarely raisedsubmitted to, met and decided by the lower court; and (5) where the order is a patent nullity.[13]

Hence, the only relevant issue for our resolution now is whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the lower court’s Or der grantingexecution pending appeal on the ground of advanced age of private respondent Tomas Toh, Sr.

Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court when it grantedthe motion for discretionary execution based on private respondent’s bare allegation that he was already 79 year s old.

Private respondent avers that Section 2, Rule 49 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states the requisites for a grant of a motionpending appeal. All these requirements and conditions were complied with as evidenced by respondent’s motion for disc retionaryexecution, petitioner’s opposition to the motion and the special order issued by the Regional Trial Court stating the good reason for thegrant of the motion. Hence, the Regional Trial Court could not have committed any grave abuse of discretion.[14]

In our view, the Court of Appeals committed no reversible error in sustaining the lower court. Discretionary execution is permissibleonly when ―good reasons‖ exist for immediately executing the judgment before finality or pending appeal or even before the expirationof the time to appeal. ―Good reasons‖ are compelling circumstances justifying the immediate execution lest judgment becomes illusoryor the prevailing party may, after the lapse of time, become unable to enjoy it, considering the tactics of the adverse party who may

apparently have no case except to delay.[15]

The Rules of Court does not state, enumerate, or give examples of ―good reasons‖ to justify execution. The determination of what is agood reason must, necessarily, be addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. In other words, the issuance of the writ ofexecution must necessarily be controlled by the judgment of the judge in accordance with his own conscience and by a sense of justiceand equity, free from the control of another’s judgment or conscience. It must be so for discretion implies the absence of a hard andfast rule.[16]



































In this case, the trial court granted private respondent’s motion for discretionary execution due to his advanced age , citing our rulingin De Leon v. Soriano.[17] It concluded that old age is a ―good reason‖ to allow execution pending appeal as any delay in the finaldisposition of the present case may deny private respondent of his right to enjoy fully the money he has with defendant bank .[18] TheCourt of Appeals found said ruling in conformity with sound logical precepts, inspired as it is by the probability that the lapse of timewould render the ultimate judgment ineffective. It further stressed that the trial court was in the vantage position to determine whetheprivate respondent’s advanced age and state of health would merit the execution private respondent prayed for.

In De Leon, we upheld immediate execution of judgment in favor of a 75-year-old woman. We ruled that her need of and right toimmediate execution of the decision in her favor amply satisfied the requirement of a paramount and compelling reason of urgency and

justice, outweighing the security offered by the supersedeas bond.[19] In the subsequent case of Borja v. Court of Appeals,[20] welikewise allowed execution pending appeal in favor of a 76 year-old man on the ground that the appeal will take years to decide withfinality, and he might very well be facing a different judgment from a Court higher than any earthly tribunal and the decision on hiscomplaint, even if it be in his favor, would have become meaningless as far as he himself was concerned.[21]

In the present case, private respondent Toh is already 79 years old. It cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be denied that he isalready of advanced age. Not a few might be fortunate to live beyond 79 years. But no one could claim with certainty that his tribewould be always blessed with long life.

Private respondent obtained a favorable judgment in the trial court. But that judgment in Civil Case No. MC-99-643 is still on appeabefore the Court of Appeals. It might even reach this Court before the controversy is finally resolved with finality. As well said in Borja―while we may not agree that a man of his years is practically moribund, the Court can appreciate his apprehension that he will not belong for this world and may not enjoy the fruit of the judgment before he finally passes away.‖[22]

Petitioner avers that private respondent’s claim of old age was unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence. In essencepetitioner wants us to re-evaluate this factual issue. Needless to stress, such re-examination is improper in a petition for review oncertiorari. Here, only questions of law should be raised.[23] Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, bindthis Court and are entitled to utmost respect.[24] No cogent reason having been given for us to depart therefrom we shall stand by thissalutary rule.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59234 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

































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