RULE 74Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 45904 September 30, 1938Intestate estate of the deceased Luz Garcia. PABLO G. UTULO,applicant-appellee,vs.LEONA PASION VIUDA DE GARCIA,oppositor-appellant.Feliciano B. Gardiner for appellant.Gerardo S. Limlingan for appellee.IMPERIAL,J.:This is an appeal taken by the oppositor from the order of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac appointing the applicant as judicial administrator of the property left by the deceased Luz Garcia.Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate, and in the proceedings instituted in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac for the administration of his property (special proceedings No. 3475), Leona Pasion Vda. de Garcia, the surviving spouse and the herein oppositor, was appointed judicial administratrix. The said deceased left legitimate children, named Juan Garcia, jr., Patrocinio Garcia and Luz Garcia who, with the widow, are the presumptive forced heirs. Luz Garcia married the applicant Pablo G. Utulo and during the pendency of the administration proceedings of the said deceased, she died in the province without any legitimate descendants, her only forced heirs being her mother and her husband. The latter commenced in the same court the judicial administration of the property of his deceased wife (special proceedings No. 4188), stating in his petition that her only heirs were he himself and his mother-in-law, the oppositor, and that the only property left by the deceased consisted in the share due her from the intestate of her father, Juan Garcia Sanchez, and asking that he be named administrator of the property of said deceased. The oppositor objected to the petition, opposing the judicial administration of the property of her daughter and the appointment of the applicant as administrator. She alleged that inasmuch as the said deceased left no indebtedness, there was no occasion for the said judicial administration; but she stated that should the court grant the administration of the property, she should be appointed the administratrix thereof inasmuch as she had a better right than the applicant. After the required publications, trial was had and the court, on August 28, 1936, finally issued the appealed order to which the oppositor excepted and thereafter filed the record on appeal which was certified and approved.The oppositor-appellant assigns five errors allegedly committed by the trial court, but these assigned errors raise only two questions for resolution, namely: whether upon the admitted facts the judicial administration of the property left by the deceased Luz Garcia lies, with the consequent appointment of an administrator, and whether the appellant has a better right to the said office than the appellee.1. As to the first question, we have section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure providing in part that "if no executor is named in the will, or if a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted" etc. This provision enunciates the general rule that when a person dies living property in the Philippine Islands, his property should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in the section, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one should he fail to name an executor therein. This rule, however, is subject to the exceptions established by sections 596 and 597 of the same Code, as finally amended. According to the first, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator. According to the second, if the property left does not exceed six thousand pesos, the heirs may apply to the competent court, after the required publications, to proceed with the summary partition and, after paying all the known obligations, to partition all the property constituting the inheritance among themselves pursuant to law, without instituting the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator.Construing the scope of section 596, this court repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings (Ilustrevs.Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Malahacanvs.Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434; Bondadvs.Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Baldemorvs.Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367; Fulevs.Fule, 46 Phil., 317).In enunciating the aforesaid doctrine, this court relied on the provisions of articles 657, 659 and 661 of the Civil Code under which the heirs succeed to all the property left by the deceased from the time of his death. In the case ofIlustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, supra, it was said:Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts. 657 to 661), the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs succeeded immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said property immediately. If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have that privilege. The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for partition in case they can not mutually agree in the division. When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is certainly no occasion for the intervention of an administrator in the settlement and partition of the estate among the heirs. When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts, there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with the costs and expenses of an administrator. The property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts against the estate, the administrator has no right to intervene in any way whatever in the division of the estate among the heirs. They are co-owners of an undivided estate and the law offers them a remedy for the division of the same among themselves. There is nothing in the present case to show that the heirs requested the appointment of the administrator, or that they intervened in any way whatever in the present actions. If there are any heirs of the estate who have not received their participation, they have their remedy by petition for partition of the said estate.In the cases ofMalahacan vs. Ignacio, supra,Bondad vs. Bondad, supra, andBaldemor vs. Malangyaon, supra, the same doctrine was reiterated. And in the case ofFule vs. Fule, supra, this court amplified and ratified the same doctrine in the following language:Upon the second question Did the courta quocommit an error in refusing to appoint an administrator for the estate of Saturnino Fule? it may be said (a) that it is admitted by all of the parties to the present action, that at the time of his death no debts existed against his estate and (b) that all of the heirs of Saturnino Fule were of age.In this jurisdiction and by virtue of the provisions of articles 657, 659 and 661 of the Civil Code, all of the property, real and personal, of a deceased person who dies intestate, is transmitted immediately to his heirs. (To Guioc-Covs. Del Rosario, 8 Phil., 546; Ilustrevs.Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Marinvs.Nacianceno, 19 Phil., 238; Malahacanvs.Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434; Nable Josevs.Uson, 27 Phil., 73; Bondadvs.Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Baldemorvs. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367.)If then the property of the deceased, who dies intestate, passes immediately to his heirs, as owners, and there are no debts, what reason can there be for the appointment of a judicial administrator to administer the estate for them and to deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are immediately entitled? In the case ofBondad vs. Bondad(34 Phil., 232), Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano, discussing this question, said: Under the provisions of the Civil Code (articles 657 to 661), the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said property immediately. If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have that privilege. The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for partition in case they cannot mutually agree in the division. (Sections 182-184, 196, and 596 of Act No. 190.)When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with the cost and expenses of an administrator. The administrator has no right to intervene in any way whatsoever in the division of the estate among the heirs when they are adults and when there are no debts against the estate. (Ilustrevs.Alaras Frondosa,supra; Bondadvs.Bondad,supra; Baldemorvs.Malangyaon,supra.)When there are no debts and the heirs are all adults, their relation to the property left by their ancestor is the same as that of any other coowners or owners in common, and they may recover their individual rights, the same as any other coowners of undivided property. (Succession of Story, 3 La. Ann., 502; Mcintyrevs.Chappell, 4 Tex., 187; Wood et ux.vs.Ford, 29 Miss., 57.) xxx xxx xxxThe right of the heirs in cases like the one we are discussing, also exist in the divisions of personal as well as the real property. If they cannot agree as to the division, then a suit for partition of such personal property among the heirs of the deceased owner is maintenable where the estate is not in debts, the heirs are all of age, and there is no administration upon the estate and no necessity thereof. (Jordanvs.Jordan, 4 Tex. Civ. App. Rep., 559.)It is difficult to conceive of any class or item of property susceptible of being held in common which may not be divided by the coowners. It may be of personal property as well as of real estate; of several parcels as well as of a single parcel, and of non-contiguous as well as of adjacent tracts; or of part only of the lands of the coowners as well as of the whole. (Pickeringvs.Moore, 67 N. H., 533; 31 L. R. A., 698; Pipesvs.Buckner, 51 Miss., 848; Tewksburyvs.Provizzo, 12 Cal., 20.)We conceive of no powerful reason which counsels the abandonment of a doctrine so uniformly applied. We are convinced that if the courts had followed it in all cases to which it has application, their files would not have been replete with unnecessary administration proceedings as they are now. There is no weight in the argument adduced by the appellee to the effect that his appointment as judicial administrator is necessary so that he may have legal capacity to appear in the intestate of the deceased Juan Garcia Sanchez. As he would appear in the said intestate by the right of the representation, it would suffice for him to allege in proof of his interest that he is a usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife who, in turn, would be a forced heir and an interested and necessary party if she were living . In order to intervene in said intestate and to take part in the distribution of the property it is not necessary that the administration of the property of his deceased wife be instituted an administration which will take up time and occasion inconvenience and unnecessary expenses. 2. In view of the foregoing, there is no need to determine which of the parties has preferential right to the office of administrator. The appealed order should be reversed, with the costs of this instance to the applicant-appellee. So ordered.SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-21859. September 30, 1924. ]

INTESTATE OF SATURNINO FULE, deceased. CIRIACO FULE,Petitioner-Appellant, v. ANASTASIO FULE ET AL., opponents-appellees.

Palma, Leuterio & Yamzon forAppellant.

Ramon Diokno forAppellees.

D E C I S I O N

JOHNSON,J.:

The record in this case presents two questions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

First. Was the appeal from the decision of the lower court perfected within the time required by law? And,

Second. Did the court a quo commit an error in refusing to appoint an administrator for the estate of Saturnino Fule, deceased?

FACTS

Saturnino Fule died on the 4th day of April, 1923, intestate. On the 2d day of July, 1923, Ciriaco Fule, one of the heirs, presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Laguna for the appointment of an administrator of the estate of Saturnino Fule, deceased, and prayed specially for the appointment of Cornelio Alcantara as such administrator. The petitioner further prayed that during the pendency of the petition for the appointment of an administrator, the said Cornelio Alcantara be then and there appointed as special administrator for said estate. The petitioner alleged that at the time of the death of Saturnino Fule, he was the owner of real and personal property located in the municipality of San Pablo, Province of Laguna, of the value of P50,000 with a rental value of about P8,000 and that, in addition to said real and personal property, he also left about P30,000 in cash. The lower court on the day of the presentation of the petition appointed Cornelio Alcantara as special administrator and required him to give a bond of P8,000. On the 26th day of July, 1923, the special administrator presented in court an inventory of the alleged property of the deceased.

On the 31st day of July, 1923, the oppositors, through their attorney Mr. Ramon Diokno, appeared and presented a motion alleging that they were children of Saturnino Fule and that they were all of age; that they opposed the appointment of an administrator upon the ground that the deceased had left no debts and that his property had already been partitioned among his children during his lifetime in conformity with article 1056 of the Civil Code; that the special administrator had taken possession of property of large value belonging to them, and had thereby deprived them of their means of livelihood, and prayed that the order appointing a special administrator be denied. To said motion there was annexed Exhibit A, containing a list of property, personal and real, which the special administrator had taken possession of, belonging to the oppositors.

On the 4th day of August, 1923, the oppositors, through their attorney, presented a further opposition to the appointment of an administrator for said estate, alleging again that the heirs of Saturnino Fule were all of age; that the deceased had left no debts; that the property had been divided among his heirs during his lifetime; that the special administrator had been appointed without any notification whatever, neither personal nor by publication, to the heirs of the deceased, and that there was no necessity for the appointment of a special administrator during the pendency of the question, nor for the appointment of an administrator.

On the 14th day of August, 1923, the petitioner answered the motion of the oppositors and opposed their petition for the revocation of the appointment of a special administrator. He alleged that the oppositors had been requested to make a partition of the property of the deceased; that no partition of the property of the deceased had been made during the lifetime of the deceased; that the property described in Exhibit A attached to the motion of the oppositors was the exclusive and absolute property of the petitioner, who had for more than forty years been in the quiet, public, and exclusive possession of the same, as owner; and prayed that the motion of the oppositors be denied.

Upon the issue thus presented, the Honorable Isidro Paredes, judge, on the 15th day of August, 1923, revoked the appointment of the special administrator and ordered him to render an account. On the same day (August 15, 1923) Judge Paredes denied the appointment of an administrator, and suggested to the petitioner that within thirty days from that date he should amend his petition and present an ordinary action for the partition of the property of the state of the deceased, and in case he should fail to do so it would be understood that the petition for the appointment of an administrator is denied.

On the 5th day of September, 1923, the petitioner excepted to the orders of the court of the 15th day of August, 1923, and on the same day presented a motion for reconsideration, or new trial, and prayed that the court declare without effect the orders of the 15th day of August and proceed to the appointment of an ordinary administrator who should present to the court a project of partition of the property involved, for approval. On the 11th day of September, 1923, the oppositors, through their attorney, opposed the motion for reconsideration or new trial upon the ground that the judgment of the court of the 15th day of August had become final and non-appealable.

On the 17th day of September, 1923, the court a quo, considering said motion for reconsideration or new trial and opposition thereto, annulled and set aside that part of the order of the court of the 15th day of August, which granted to the petitioner the right to amend his petition, and fixed the 4th day of October, 1923, for a continuation of the proof upon the question of the appointment of an administrator. On the 26th day of October, 1923, and after hearing the respective parties, the Honorable Isidro Paredes, denied the petition for the appointment of an administrator upon the principal ground that all of the property of Saturnino Fule had been in the possession of his heirs for many years before his death; and that at the time of his death there were no debts and no property to be administered. From that judgment the petitioner appealed.

In this court the oppositors renewed their motion to dismiss the appeal for the reason that it had not been presented within the period of twenty days as provided in section 783 of Act No. 190. Said section provides that: "Any person legally interested in any other order, decree, or judgment (other than those mentioned in sections 781 and 782) of a court of first instance in the exercise of its jurisdiction in special proceedings in the settlement of the states of deceased persons or the administration of guardian and trustees, may appeal to the Supreme Court from such order, decree, or judgment, when such order, decree, or judgment constitutes a final determination of the rights of the parties so appealing, and the appeal shall be effected in the manner provided in the two preceding sections: . . ." (within twenty days).

The appellees argue that the appeal was not perfected within twenty days from the 15th day of August, 1923. They evidently overlooked the fact that the decree was not a final decree for the reason that it gave the petitioner thirty days within to decide whether he would amend his petition or present an ordinary action. Inasmuch, therefore, as the petitioner had thirty days within which to decide just what course he pursue, said decision could not become final until after the expiration of thirty days or until the petitioner had decided just what course he decide to take. That order of the court conceding him thirty days to decide the option therein given, continued in force until the 17th day of September, when the court decided the motion for reconsideration and granted to the petitioner to a final hearing and judgment on the 26th day of October, 1923, and the appeal from the final judgment of that date was perfected within the time provided for in the above-quoted provision of Act No. 190.

Our conclusion, therefore, is that the judgment of the 15th day of August, 1923, was not final; that the final judgment rendered in the cause was on the 26th day of October, 1923; that the appeal from the final judgment was perfected within time, and therefore, the motion to dismiss the appeal for failure to perfect the same within the statutory period is hereby denied.

Upon the second question Did the court a quo commit an error in refusing to appoint an administrator for the estate of Saturnino Fule? it may be said (a) that it is admitted by all of the parties to the present action, that at the time of his death no debts existed against his estate and (b) that all of the heirs of Saturnino Fule were of age.

In this jurisdiction and by virtue of the provisions of articles 657, 659 and 661 of the Civil Code, all of the property, real and personal, of a deceased person who dies intestate, is transmitted immediately to his heirs. (To Guioc-Co v. Del Rosario, 8 Phil., 546; Ilustre v. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321; Marin v. Nacianceno, 19 Phil., 238; Malahacan v. Ignacio, 19 Phil., 434; Nable Jose v. Uson, 27 Phil., 73; Bondad v. Bondad, 34 Phil., 232; Baldemor v. Malangyaon, 34 Phil., 367.)

If then the property of the deceased, who dies intestate, passes immediately to his heirs, as owners, and there are no debts, what reason can there be for the appointment of a judicial administrator to administer the estate for them and deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are immediately entitled? In the case of Bondad v. Bondad (34 Phil., 232), Chief Justice Cayetano Arellano, discussing this question, said:" Under the provisions of the Civil code (articles 657 to 661), the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said property immediately. If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If they desire to partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they have also the privilege. The Code of Procedure in civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for partition in case they cannot mutually agree in the division." (Sections 182-184, 196, and 596 of Act No. 190.)

When the heirs are all of lawfully age and there are no debts there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with the cost and expenses of an administrator. The administrator has no right to intervene in any way whatsoever in the division of the state among the heirs when they are adults and when there are no debts against the estate, (Ilustre v. Alaras Frondosa, supra; Bondad v. Bondad, supra; Baldemor v. Malangyaon, supra.)

When there are no debts and the heirs are all adults, their relation to the property left by their ancestor is the same as that of any other coowners or owners in common, and they may recover their individual rights, the same as any other coowners of undivided property. (Succession of Story, 3 La. Ann., 502; McIntyre v. Chappell, 4 Tex., 187; Wood et ux. v. Ford, 29 Miss., 57.)

And even when there are debts against the estate, the heirs, all being of age, may pay the debts and divide the property among themselves according to their respective rights, as heirs or as legatees in case of will, without probating the same, and the effect of such division is to invest each party with a complete equitable title to their particular share of state. (Carter v. Owens, 41 Ala., 217.)

The right of the heirs in cases like the one we are discussing, also exists in the division of personal as well as the real property. If they cannot agree as to the division, then a suit for partition of such personal property among the heirs of the deceased owner is maintainable where the estate is not in debt, the heirs are all of age, and there is no administration upon the estate and no necessity thereof. (Jordan v. Jordan, 4 Tex. Civ. App. Rep., 559.)

It is difficult to conceive of any one class or item of property susceptible of being held in common which may not be divided by the coowners. It may be of personal property as well as of real estate; of several parcels as well as of a single parcel, and of non-contiguous as well as of adjacent tracts; or of part only of the lands of the coowners as well as of the whole. (Pickering v. Moore, 67 N. H., 533; 31 L. R. A., 699; Pipes v. Buckner, 51 Miss., 848; Tewksbury v. Provizzo, 12 Cal., 20.)

Therefore, and for all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, without any finding as to costs, and without prejudice to the right of the petitioner to commence a new action for a partition of any property left by Saturnino Fule which had not already been partition among his heirs. So ordered.

Avancea, Villamor, and Romualdez,JJ., concur.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989VICTORIA BRINGAS PEREIRA,petitioner,vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RITA PEREIRA NAGAC,respondents.Benjamin J. Quitoriano for petitioner.Linzag-Arcilla & Associates Law Offices for private respondent.GANCAYCO, J.:Is a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent dies intestate without leaving any debts? May the probate court appoint the surviving sister of the deceased as the administratrix of the estate of the deceased instead of the surviving spouse? These are the main questions which need to be resolved in this case.Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of the Philippine Air Lines, passed away on January 3, 1983 at Bacoor, Cavite without a will. He was survived by his legitimate spouse of ten months, the herein petitioner Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira Nagac, the herein private respondent.On March 1, 1983, private respondent instituted before Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite, Special Proceeding No. RTC-BSP-83-4 for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira.1In her verified petition, private respondent alleged the following: that she and Victoria Bringas Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the deceased; that the deceased left no will; that there are no creditors of the deceased; that the deceased left several properties, namely: death benefits from the Philippine Air Lines (PAL), the PAL Employees Association (PALEA), the PAL Employees Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (PESALA) and the Social Security System (SSS), as well as savings deposits with the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), and a 300 square meter lot located at Barangay Pamplona, Las Pinas, Rizal and finally, that the spouse of the deceased (herein petitioner) had been working in London as an auxiliary nurse and as such one-half of her salary forms part of the estate of the deceased.On March 23,1983, petitioner filed her opposition and motion to dismiss the petition of private respondent2alleging that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration and praying in the alternative, that if an estate does exist, the letters of administration relating to the said estate be issued in her favor as the surviving spouse.In its resolution dated March 28, 1985, the Regional Trial Court, appointed private respondent Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix of the intestate estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira upon a bond posted by her in the amount of Pl,000.00. The trial court ordered her to take custody of all the real and personal properties of the deceased and to file an inventory thereof within three months after receipt of the order.3Not satisfied with the resolution of the lower court, petitioner brought the case to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the appointment of private respondent as administratrix in its decision dated December 15, 1987.4Hence, this petition for review on certiorari where petitioner raises the following issues: (1) Whether or not there exists an estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for purposes of administration; (2) Whether or not a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where there are no debts left by the decedent; and, (3) Who has the better right to be appointed as administratrix of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira or the surviving sister Rita Pereira Nagac?Anent the first issue, petitioner contends that there exists no estate of the deceased for purposes of administration for the following reasons: firstly, the death benefits from PAL, PALEA, PESALA and the SSS belong exclusively to her, being the sole beneficiary and in support of this claim she submitted letter-replies from these institutions showing that she is the exclusive beneficiary of said death benefits; secondly, the savings deposits in the name of her deceased husband with the PNB and the PCIB had been used to defray the funeral expenses as supported by several receipts; and, finally, the only real property of the deceased has been extrajudicially settled between the petitioner and the private respondent as the only surviving heirs of the deceased.Private respondent, on the other hand, argues that it is not for petitioner to decide what properties form part of the estate of the deceased and to appropriate them for herself. She points out that this function is vested in the court in charge of the intestate proceedings.Petitioner asks this Court to declare that the properties specified do not belong to the estate of the deceased on the basis of her bare allegations as aforestated and a handful of documents. Inasmuch as this Court is not a trier of facts, We cannot order an unqualified and final exclusion or non-exclusion of the property involved from the estate of the deceased.5The resolution of this issue is better left to the probate court before which the administration proceedings are pending. The trial court is in the best position to receive evidence on the discordant contentions of the parties as to the assets of the decedent's estate, the valuations thereof and the rights of the transferees of some of the assets, if any.6The function of resolving whether or not a certain property should be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator is one clearly within the competence of the probate court. However, the court's determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action which may be instituted by the parties.7Assuming, however, that there exist assets of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira for purposes of administration, We nonetheless find the administration proceedings instituted by private respondent to be unnecessary as contended by petitioner for the reasons herein below discussed.The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one, should he fail to name an executor therein.8An exception to this rule is established in Section 1 of Rule 74.9Under this exception, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator.Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action.10It should be noted that recourse to an administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons.11Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings .12Now, what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of the estate of a deceased when the heirs are all of legal age and there are no creditors will depend on the circumstances of each case.In one case,13We said:Again the petitioner argues that only when the heirs do not have any dispute as to the bulk of the hereditary estate but only in the manner of partition does section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court apply and that in this case the parties are at loggerheads as to the corpus of the hereditary estate because respondents succeeded in sequestering some assets of the intestate. The argument is unconvincing, because, as the respondent judge has indicated, questions as to what property belonged to the deceased (and therefore to the heirs) may properly be ventilated in the partition proceedings, especially where such property is in the hands of one heir.In another case, We held that if the reason for seeking an appointment as administrator is merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the heir seeking such appointment wants to ask for the annulment of certain transfers of property, that same objective could be achieved in an action for partition and the trial court is not justified in issuing letters of administration.14In still another case, We did not find so powerful a reason the argument that the appointment of the husband, a usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife, as judicial administrator is necessary in order for him to have legal capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings of his wife's deceased mother, since he may just adduce proof of his being a forced heir in the intestate proceedings of the latter.15We see no reason not to apply this doctrine to the case at bar. There are only two surviving heirs, a wife of ten months and a sister, both of age. The parties admit that there are no debts of the deceased to be paid. What is at once apparent is that these two heirs are not in good terms. The only conceivable reason why private respondent seeks appointment as administratrix is for her to obtain possession of the alleged properties of the deceased for her own purposes, since these properties are presently in the hands of petitioner who supposedly disposed of them fraudulently. We are of the opinion that this is not a compelling reason which will necessitate a judicial administration of the estate of the deceased. To subject the estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira, which does not appear to be substantial especially since the only real property left has been extrajudicially settled, to an administration proceeding for no useful purpose would only unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being wasted or squandered. In most instances of a similar nature,16the claims of both parties as to the properties left by the deceased may be properly ventilated in simple partition proceedings where the creditors, should there be any, are protected in any event.We, therefore, hold that the court below before which the administration proceedings are pending was not justified in issuing letters of administration, there being no good reason for burdening the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding.With the foregoing ruling, it is unnecessary for us to delve into the issue of who, as between the surviving spouse Victoria Bringas Pereira and the sister Rita Pereira Nagac, should be preferred to be appointed as administratrix.WHEREFORE, the letters of administration issued by the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor to Rita Pereira Nagac are hereby revoked and the administration proceeding dismissed without prejudice to the right of private respondent to commence a new action for partition of the property left by Andres de Guzman Pereira. No costs.SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-31979. August 6, 1980.]

FILOMENA G. PIZARRO, MISAEL G. PIZARRO, AURELIO PIZARRO, JR., LUZMINDA G. PIZARRO, DELIA-THELMA G. PIZARRO, ROGELIO G. PIZARRO, VIRGILIO G. PIZARRO, ROSALINDA G. PIZARRO, JOSE ELVIN G. PIZARRO and MARIA EVELYN G. PIZARRO,Petitioners, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HONORABLE MANASES G. REYES, JUDGE OF BRANCH III OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF DAVAO, HONORABLE VICENTE P. BULLECER, JUDGE OF BRANCH IV OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF DAVAO, ALFONSO L. ANGLIONGTO JR., FELICITAS YAP ANGLIONGTO, GAUDENCIO A. CORIAS, REGALADO C. SALAVADOR, ALICIA P. LADISLA and LYDIA P. GUDANI,Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

MELENCIO-HERRERA,J.:

A review of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 42507-R, entitled Filomena Pizarro, Et. Al. v. Hon. Manases G. Reyes, Et Al., dismissing the petition forCertiorariand Mandamus with Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction which sought to nullify the Order of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch III, dated April 10, 1968, dismissing Civil Case No. 5762.

The controversy stemmed from the following facts:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Petitioner Filomena G. Pizarro, is the surviving spouse of the late Aurelio Pizarro, Sr., while the other petitioners, Misael, Aurelio, Jr., Luzminda, Delia-Thelma, Rogelio, Virgilio, Rosalinda, Jose Elvin and Maria Evelyn, all surnamed Pizarro, as well as respondents Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P. Gudani, are their children. Upon the death of Aurelio Pizarro, Sr., Special Proceedings No. 1421 entitled "In the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Aurelio Pizarro, Sr.," was instituted by petitioners through Atty. Regalado C. Salvador on September 21, 1965 in the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch I, presided by Judge Vicente P. Bullecer. Listed among the properties of the estate were parcels of land situated in Agdao, J. Palma Gil, and Claro M. Recto Streets, Davao City. On December 23, 1965, the Court, upon agreement of the parties, appointed Gaudencio A. Corias, Clerk of Court of said Court, as Administrator of the estate.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library

On January 11, 1967, the Administrator, through Atty. Regalado C. Salvador, filed a Motion for Authority to Sell the properties located at Agdao and Jose Palma Gil Streets, Davao City, to settle the debts of the estate initially estimated at P257,361.23, including inheritance and estate taxes. The heirs, Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P. Gudani, opposed the Motion stating that the claims against the estate had not yet been properly determined and that the sale of the Agdao lot with an area of 13,014 sq. ms. would be more than sufficient to cover the supposed obligations of the estate, which they claimed were exaggerated.

The Court, in its Order dated February 7, 1967, authorized the sale "in the interest of the parties" and since majority of the heirs were in favor of the sale "to avoid unnecessary additional burden of about P2,000.00 every month." 1 On February 8, 1867, the Administrator moved for the approval of the conditional sale of the Agdao property to Alfonso L. Angliongto for a total consideration of P146,820.00 payable in six installments including the down payment. 2 The document of sale stipulated that the vendor was to cause the ejectment of all occupants in the property on or before July 31, 1967, otherwise, the vendee was to have the right to rescind the sale and demand reimbursement of the price already paid. The heirs filed a Motion, also dated February 8, 1967, to set aside or hold in abeyance the Order authorizing the sale on the ground that they were negotiating for the sale of said lot to Mr. Benjamin Gonzales, whose theatre was being constructed on a 1,187 square meter portion thereof. 3

The Court, in its Order dated February 9, 1967, denied the "Motion to Set Aside" stating that the grounds relied upon by the heirs were "nothing but speculations and had no legal basis." 4 The heirs moved for reconsideration alleging that they were being deprived of the right to a more beneficial sale. 5 On February 11, 1967, a hearing was held on the Motion for approval of the sale of the Agdao lot to Alfonso Angliongto. 6 The heirs maintained their objection on the grounds that 1) the sale would be improvident and greatly prejudicial; 2) there has been no determination of the debts or obligations of the estate as yet; and 3) the terms of the sale were very prejudicial to them. The Court denied reconsideration on February 20, 1967, 7 and approved the sale on the same date stating that "the sale sought to be approved was more beneficial."cralaw virtua1aw library

On February 22, 1967, the Administrator presented another Motion for Authority to Sell the Claro M. Recto lot stating that the proceeds from the sale of the Agdao lot were not sufficient to settle the obligations of the estate and that the sale of the property on J. Palma Gil Street was unanimously opposed by the heirs. Authority was granted by the Court on March 6, 1967. 8

Prior to this, the heirs, in a Motion dated February 27, 1967 prayed that Administrator Gaudencio A. Corias be asked to resign or be removed for having abused his powers and duties as such and that Letters of Administration be granted instead to Filomena Pizarro. 9 They also terminated the services of Atty. Regalado C. Salvador, who had acted likewise as counsel for the Administrator.

On March 11, 1967, the Administrator moved that he be allowed to resign.

On June 22, 1967, the heirs, except Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P. Gudani, filed a "Motion for Cancellation or Rescission of Conditional Contract of Sale" of the Agdao lot in favor of Alfonso L. Angliongto reiterating that it was unnecessary and prejudicial to their interests, that the sale of the lot in Claro M. Recto Street for P370,000.00 was more than sufficient to settle the obligations of the estate, that it was impossible to eject all nineteen tenants, not later than July 31, 1967, and that the vendee had failed to pay the last four installments due despite repeated demands. 10 Angliongtos counsel countered that the condition of the sale requiring the prior ejectment of squatters had not been complied with so that the vendee would hold in abeyance payment of the balance of the purchase price until all the squatters were ejected. 11 The Court denied rescission of the sale in its Order, dated July 3, 1967, stating that the relief prayed for is not within its power to grant, and that the heirs "should file the necessary action before a competent Court not before this Court, and much less by mere motion." 12 The heirs moved to reconsider the said Order. In the meantime, Judge Bullecer was transferred to the Court of First Instance at Mati, Davao Oriental.chanrobles law library

On July 6, 1967, the Administrator presented a "Motion to Approve Final Sale" of the Agdao lot to spouses Angliongtos stating that the latter had paid the full balance of P58,728.00. On the same date, the Court approved the same. 13 It appears that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-19342 was issued in favor of Alfonso Angliongto on July 10, 1967. 14

On July 13, 1967, Gaudencio Corias ceased to be Administrator. 15

Without waiting for the resolution of their Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying rescission of the sale, the heirs, except Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P. Gudani, filed on October 5, 1967, a verified Complaint for "Cancellation of Authority to Sell and Rescission and Annulment of Deed of Sale and Damages with Preliminary Injunction" (Civil Case No. 5762, hereinafter called the Rescission Case) in the Court of First Instance of Davao (raffled to Branch III), against the Angliongto spouses, Administrator Gaudencio A. Corias, Judge Vicente P. Bullecer, Atty. Regalado C. Salvador, Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P. Gudani, 16 the latter two having refused to join as plaintiffs. Petitioners contended inter alia that despite all their efforts to block the sale "the Administrator taking advantage of the name and influence of the presiding Judge" succeeded in inducing Angliongto to purchase the lot at a price allegedly much higher than the reported P12.00 per square meter; that the sale contained an impossible condition which was the ejectment of the tenants before a certain date; that there was connivance between the Administrator and the vendee with the knowledge of the Judge and Atty. Regalado Salvador; and that they had suffered actual and moral damages by reason of the sale. They also prayed that since the vendees had entered the lot and destroyed improvements thereon, that they be enjoined from doing so. Attached to the Complaint was a letter 17 addressed to the surviving spouse, Filomena G. Pizarro, from Atty. Raul Tolentino to the effect that the sum of P58,728.00 issued by Alfonso Angliongto in favor of the estate and which was deposited by virtue of a Court Order had been dishonored by the Bank because of a stop-payment order of Angliongto.

All the defendants except Judge Bullecer and Atty. Corias who filed a Motion to Dismiss, presented their respective Answers. Eventually, however, they all adopted the same Motion predicated mainly on plaintiffs lack of legal capacity to sue and lack of cause of action. 18 In addition, the Angliongtos pleaded res judicata, the sale having been approved by the Court as far back as February 20, 1967 and the final deed on July 6, 1967, and the corresponding title issued in the name of Alfonso Angliongto on July 10, 1967. Plaintiffs filed an Opposition 19 as well as a supplemental Opposition. 20

On October 17, 1967, Judge Alfredo I. Gonzales, as Executive Judge, issued an Order enjoining the Angliongtos, their agents, laborers, representatives, from further cutting and destroying coconuts, other fruits and improvements on the property pending the final termination of the action or until a contrary order is issued by the Court, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P25,000.00. 21

On April 10, 1968, the trial Court (respondent Judge Manases G. Reyes presiding) dismissed the Rescission Case (Civil Case No. 5762) on the ground that it could not review the actuations of a coordinate Branch of the Court besides the fact that a Motion for Reconsideration was still pending resolution before the Probate Court. 22 Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal Order was denied on October 10, 1968.

While the Rescission Case was pending, the Angliongtos filed Civil Case No. 5849 for Damages (the Angliongtos Case) against the heirs.

On November 25, 1968, petitioners elevated their cause to the Court of Appeals on"Certiorariand Mandamus with Prohibition and Injunction," charging that respondent Judge Manases G. Reyes gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the Rescission Case and prayed that he be required to take cognizance thereof and that the Angliongtos be enjoined from exercising rights of ownership over the property.

On February 11, 1970, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition opining that the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV, did not abuse its discretion in approving the sale in the Intestate Case (Sp. Proc. No. 1421), and even granting that it did, the proper remedy was appeal notCertiorari; that the Court of First Instance, Branch III, neither abused its discretion in dismissing the Rescission Case (Civil Case No. 5762) as that case sought to review the actuations of a coordinate Branch which is beyond its judicial competence; and that since said dismissal was final, the proper remedy was appeal. It also observed that copies of the Orders sought to be reviewed were not certified true copies and, therefore, violative of Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

The present Petition before us seeks a reversal of the aforestated findings of the Appellate Court anchored on the principal contentions that the sale of the Agdao property should be rescinded for failure of the vendees to pay the purchase price, and that actually no review of the actuations of a co-equal Branch of the Court is being sought. We gave due course to the Petition on June 8, 1970.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In a Manifestation filed by petitioners on March 29, 1976, 23 they disclosed that the Angliongtos had mortgaged the Agdao property to the Development Bank of the Philippines in Davao City, in violation of the injunctive Order of the lower Court, and after redeeming the same, caused the property to be subdivided into three lots and titled in their names. Subsequently, they allegedly sold the biggest portion containing 11,500 sq. ms. to Yu Cho Khai and Cristina Sy Yu for P250,000.00 on October 25, 1975. Title to said portion has been allegedly transferred in favor of said vendees.

The primary point tendered for resolution is the correctness of the ruling of the Court of Appeals upholding the opinion of the trial Court that the latter was devoid of authority to review the actuations of a coordinate Branch of the Court. Secondarily, the propriety of the extra-ordinary remedy ofCertioraridespite the existence of the remedy of appeal is also in issue.

Certiorarishould lie.

While an Order of dismissal is, indeed, final and appealable as it puts an end to litigation and leaves nothing more to be done on the merits in the lower Court, 24 so thatCertiorariis ordinarily unavailable, that general rule allows of exceptions, namely, when appeal is inadequate and ineffectual or when the broader interest of justice so requires. 25 In this case, appeal would not have afforded the heirs an effective and speedy recourse. It would have entailed a protracted litigation and in the interim, the heirs stood to suffer as a consequence of the approval of the sale. The prompt stoppage of that sale was vital to them. Thusly, appeal not being speedy enough to bring about the desired objective and to be of any utility to the heirs, their availment ofCertiorarimust be held to have been proper.

We come now to the question of correctness of the Order of dismissal of the trial Court which the Appellate Tribunal had upheld. As a strict legal proposition, no actuation of the Probate Court had to be Reviewed. There is no judicial interference to speak of by one Court in the actuations of another co-equal Court. The Order authorizing the sale was issued on February 20, 1967, and on July 6, 1967, the Court gave its stamp of approval to the final sale. Title was issued in favor of the vendees on July 10, 1967. To all intents and purposes, therefore, that sale had been consummated; the Order approving the sale, final.

But, what petitioners sought to achieve in filing the Rescission Case was to rescind the sale mainly for failure of the vendees to pay the full consideration thereof, 26 which is a valid ground for rescission. That cause of action was within the judicial competence and authority of the trial Court (Branch III) as a Court of First Instance with exclusive original jurisdiction over civil cases the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation. It was beyond the jurisdictional bounds of the Probate Court (Branch IV) whose main province was the settlement of the estate. As a matter of fact, the Rescission Case was instituted after the Probate Court itself had stated that petitioners cause of action was not within its authority to resolve but should be filed with the competent Court. The cause of action in one is different from that obtaining in the other. It behooved the trial Court, therefore, to have taken cognizance of and to have heard the Rescission Case on the merits and it was reversible error for the Court of Appeals to have upheld its dismissal.

In so far as the non-presentation of a certified true copy of the Order of April 10, 1968, sought to be reviewed, its concerned, there seems to have been substantial compliance with section 1, Rule 65, of the Rules of Court since the copy of the Order submitted is a duplicate copy of the original and bears the seal of the Trial Court. Lawyers should bear in mind, however, that a faithful compliance with the Rules is still the better practice.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the incumbent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch III, is hereby ordered to take cognizance of and hear and decide Civil Case No. 5762 as expeditiously as possible.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 92436 July 26, 1991MARIA VDA. DE REYES, EFREN REYES, ELVIRA REYES-TIMBOL, ERLINDA REYES-VALERIO, ERNESTO REYES, ELIZABETH REYES, ALEX, RAFAEL II, EMELINA and EVELYN, all surnamed REYES, represented by their mother, MARIA VDA. DE REYES,petitioners,vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES DALMACIO GARDIOLA and ROSARIO MARTILLANOrespondents.De Lara, De Lunas & Rosales for petitioners.Santos, Pilapil & Associates for private respondents.DAVIDE, JR.,J.:pAssailed before Us in this appeal bycertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 11934, promulgated on 20 October 1989,1reversing the decision of 1 October 1986 of Branch 21 (Imus, Cavite) of the Regional Trial Court of the Fourth Judicial Region in Civil Case No. RTC-BCV-83-17 entitledMaria vda.de Reyes, et al.vs.Spouses Dalmacio Gardiola and Rosario Martillano, and Spouses Ricardo M.Gardiola and Emelita Gardiola,2and the resolution of 1 March 1990 denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.As culled from both decisions and the pleadings of the parties, the following facts have been preponderantly established:During his lifetime, one Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land of approximately 70 hectares, more or less, located at Sangayad, Ulong-Tubig, Carmona, Cavite. He sought to bring said land under the operation of the Torrens System of registration of property. Unfortunately, he died in 1921 without the title having been issued to him. The application was prosecuted by his son, Marcelo Reyes, who was the administrator of his property.In 1936 the above property was surveyed and subdivided by Gavino's heirs (Exh. "6"). In the subdivision plan, each resultant lot was earmarked, indicated for and assigned to a specific heir. It appears therein that two lots, one of which is Lot No. I A-14 (Exh. "6-A"), were allotted to Rafael Reyes, Sr., one of Gavino's children. Per testimony of Juan Poblete, the children thereafter secured tax declarations for their respective shares.In 1941, or about twenty (20) years after the death of Gavino, the original certificate of title for the whole property OCT No. 255 was issued. It was, however, kept by Juan Poblete, son-in-law of Marcelo Reyes, who was by then already deceased. The heirs of Gavino were not aware of this fact.On 3 December 1943, Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold a parcel of land with an area of 23,431 square meters, more or less, to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola (Exh. "5"). According to the vendee, this parcel corresponds to Lot No. 1-A-14 of the subdivision plan aforestated. The deed of sale, however, did not specifically mention Lot No. 1-A-14. The vendee immediately took possession of the property and started paying the land taxes therein.In 1945 or thereabouts, Juan Poblete "revalidated" the original Certificate of Title. As reconstituted, the new title isOCT (0-4358) RO-255(Exhs. "4" to "4-A").On 21 October 1967, when the heirs of Gavino Reyes executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Exh. "D") based on the aforestated subdivision plan (Exh. "6"), the lot that was intended for Rafael Reyes, Sr., who was already deceased, was instead adjudicated to his only son and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr. (the predecessor-in-interest of the petitioners herein). Private respondent Rosario Martillano signed the deed in representation of her mother, Marta Reyes, one of the children of Gavino Reyes.As a result of the Extrajudicial Settlement, OCT RO-255 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, several transfer certificates of title covering the subdivided lots were issued in the names of the respective adjudicatees. One of them is TCT No. 27257 in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr. covering Lot No. 1-A-14. The Transfer Certificates of Title were, however, kept by one Candido Hebron. On 10 January 1969, some of the heirs of Gavino Reyes filed a case of Annulment of Partition and Recovery of Possession before the Court of First Instance of Cavite City, which was docketed therein as Civil Case No. 1267. One of the defendants in said case is herein private respondent Rosario Martillano. The case was dismissed on 18 September 1969, but Candido Hebron was ordered by the trial court to deliver to the heirs concerned all the transfer certificates of title in his possession.3After obtaining the Transfer Certificate of Title for Lot No. 1-A-14 from Hebron, pursuant to the aforesaid order in Civil Case No. 1267, petitioners herein, as successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., filed on 14 March 1983 with the Regional Trial Court the above-mentioned Civil Case No. RTC-BCV-83-17 against private respondents (defendants therein) for recovery of possession or, in the alternative, for indemnification, accounting and damages. They allege therein that after "having definitely discovered that they are the lawful owners of the property," (Lot No. 1-A-14), they, "including Rafael Reyes, Jr., during his lifetime, made repeated demands to (sic) defendants to surrender the possession of and vacate the parcel of land belonging to the former, but defendants refused to vacate and surrender the possession of the said land to herein plaintiffs;" the last of the demands was allegedly made on 8 October 1982. They further allege that they have been deprived by said defendants of the rightful possession and enjoyment of the property since September 1969 which coincides with the date of the order in Civil Case No. 1267.4In their answer, private respondents deny the material averments in the complaint and assert that they are the owners of the lot in question, having bought the same from Rafael Reyes, Sr., that the issuance of TCT No. 27257 is null and void, for such sale was known to Rafael Reyes, Jr.; that they have been in possession of the property and have been paying the land taxes thereon; and that petitioners are barred by prescription and/or laches.5Petitioners amended their complaint on 21 March 1985 to implead as additional defendants the spouses Ricardo M. Gardiola and Emerita Gardiola, on the basis of the following claims:xxx xxx xxx9. Meanwhile, during the presentation of the defendants spouses Dalmacio Gardiola and Rosario Martillano's evidence the former testified that they mortgaged the subject land to the Rural Bank of Carmona Inc. For their failure to redeem the mortgage the same was foreclosed by the bank.10. However, within the period of one(1) year from such foreclosure the questioned land was redeemed by the original defendants' son in the person of Ricardo M. Gardiola, who was knowledgeable/aware of the pendency of the above captioned case. The corresponding redemption was effected through a deed of conveyance, . . . .6The prayer of the amended complaint now contains the alternative relief for indemnification for the reasonable value of the property "in the event restitution of the property is no longer possible."7In its decision of 1 October 1986,8the trial court concluded that petitioners' "title over the subject property is valid and regular and thus they are entitled to its possession and enjoyment," and accordingly decided thus:WHEREFORE, the defendants or anyone acting for and in their behalf are hereby ordered to relinguish possession or vacate the property in question which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257 in favor of the plaintiffs.All other claims and/or counterclaims of the parties relative to this case are dismissed for lack of proper substantiation.The conclusion of the trial court is based on its finding that (a) there is no evidence that the heirs of Gavino Reyes entered into any written agreement of partition in 1936 based on the subdivision plan; (b) there is no identity between Lot No. 1-14-A and the land sold to private respondents by Rafael Reyes, Sr., or otherwise stated, the description of the latter as indicated in the deed of sale (Exh. "5") does not tally with the description of the former; and (c) moreover:Granting,arguendo, that the sale made by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to the defendants covered the land in question Lot No. 1-A-14 and that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257 was obtained by means of fraud, the claim of the defendants over the said property is already barred. Action for reconveyance prescribes in four (4) years from the discovery thereof. If there was fraud, the defendant could have discovered the same in1967when the partition was made in as much as defendant Rosario Martillano was a party to that partition. Let us grant further that the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-27257 to Rafael Reyes, Jr. created a constructive or implied trust in favor of the defendants, again, the claim of the defendants is also barred. From 1967 to the filing of their answer (let us consider this as an action for reconveyance) to this case sometime in July, 1983, a period of about sixteen (16) years had already elapsed. Prescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust is ten (10) years.The trial court further held that the continued possession by private respondents, which it found to have started in 1943, did not ripen into ownership because at that time, the property was already registered, hence it cannot be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.9Private respondents appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals which docketed the appeal as C.A.-G.R. CV No. 11934. In its decision of 20 October 1989, the respondent Court of Appeals formulated the issues before it as follows:IWhether or not the lower court erred in declaring that the property of the late Gavino Reyes consisting of 70 hectares was partitioned only in 1967 by his grandchildren after discovery of the existence of OCT No. 255 and that no actual partition was made in 1936 by the decedent's children.IIWhether or not the lower court erred in concluding that the parcel of land sold by the appellees' predecessor-in-interest, the late Rafael Reyes, Sr. to appellant Dalmacio Gardiola was not the same parcel of land under litigation.10and resolved such issues, thus:On the first issue, We believe that the lower court committed a reversible error when it declared that the landed estate of the late Gavino Reyes was partitioned only in 1967 by the latter's grandchildren; and that no actual partition was made in 1936 by the decedents' (sic) children. The evidence on record bears out the existence of a subdivision plan (Exh. 6) which was not controverted nor denied by the appellees. In like manner, the lower court itself recognized the fact that the property of the late Gavino Reyes consisting of 70 hectares was surveyed and subdivided in 1936 as evidenced by the said subdivision plan (Exh. 6). With the existence of a subdivision plan, and from the uncontroverted testimony of appellants' witness, We can only infer that at least an oral partition, which under the law is valid and binding, was entered into by the heirs of Gavino Reyes regarding his properties in 1936. As held in a long line of decisions, extrajudicial partition can be done orally, and the same would be valid if freely entered into (Belen v. Belen, 49 O.G. 997, March 1953). The reason for this is because a partition is not exactly a conveyance for the reason that it does not involve transfer of property from one to the other but rather a confirmation by them of their ownership of the property. It must also be remembered that when Gavino Reyes died on March 7, 1921, his property was admittedly not yet covered by a torrens title, as it was only in 1941 when said properties were brought into the application of the torrens system. With this factual milieu, it can also be concluded that his heirs have indeed settled, subdivided and partitioned Gavino Reyes' landed estate without formal requirements of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court when a parcel of land is covered by a torrens title. As told earlier, the Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6) undisputedly showed on its face that the 70 hectares of land belonging to the late Gavino Reyes was subdivided and partitioned by his children in 1936. On this score, the partition of the said property even without the formal requirements under the rule is valid as held in the case ofHernandez vs.Andal,78 Phil. 176, which states:xxx xxx xxxMoreover, in the Deed of Sale dated December 3, 1943 (Exh. 5) executed by Rafael Reyes, Sr. in favor of appellant Dalmacio Gardiola, the land sold therein was described as "na aking minana sa aking ama." This alone would confirm the contention of the appellants that there was already an actual partition (at least an oral partition) of the property of Gavino Reyes in 1936. As aforestated, the presence of the Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6) is an (sic) evidence of such partition which appellees failed to controvert not to mention the fact that the lower court itself recognized the existence of said plan, in the same manner that it concluded that the property was already surveyed and actually subdivided in 1936 (page 3, pars. 3 and 4, Decision).From the foregoing considerations it is evident that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate (Exh. D) executed by the grandchildren of the late Gavino Reyes in 1967 is of no moment considering that the property subject of the partition in the deed was already partitioned in 1936 by the children of Gavino Reyes. It is for this reason that the lots supposedly inherited by the grandchildren named in the deed of 1967 were the same lots inherited and given to their respective fathers or mothers in 1936 while the land was not yet covered by the torrens system. Hence, in the case of Rafael Reyes, Sr., the land inherited by him was two (2) parcels of land known as Lots Nos. 1-A-3 and 1-A-14 described in the Subdivision plan of 1936 (Exh. 6), which were the same parcels of land allegedly inherited by Rafael Reyes, Jr. from Gavino Reyes in representation of his father, pursuant to the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate for which TCT No. 27257 was issued.Coming to the second issue, the lower court likewise erred when it concluded that the parcel of land sold by appellee's predecessor-in-interest to appellant Dalmacio Gardiola was not the same parcel of land under litigation. It must be pointed out that the identity of the parcel of land which the appellees sought to recover from the appellants was never an issue in the lower court, because the litigants had already conceded that the parcel identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257 was the same parcel of land identified as Cadastral Lot No. 1228 and 1235 described in Tax Declaration No. 4766. Despite this admission, however, the lower court declared that "as described in the deed of sale (Exh. 5), the land's description does not tally with the description of Lot No. 1-A-14, the land in litigation." As correctly pointed out by the appellants however, the discrepancy in the description was due to the fact that the description of the land sold in the Deed of Sale was expressed in layman's language whereas the description of Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257 was done in technical terms. This was so because, when Rafael Reyes, Sr. sold the property in dispute to appellant Dalmacio Gardiola on December 3, 1943, the only evidence of title to the land then available in so far as Rafael Reyes, Sr. was concerned was Tax Declaration No. 4766, because at that time, neither he nor appellant Dalmacio Gardiola was aware of the existence of OCT No. 255 as in fact TCT No. 27257 was issued only in 1967. Consequently, the land subject of the Deed of Sale was described by the vendor in the manner as described in Tax Declaration No. 4766. However, the description of the land appearing in the Deed of Sale (Exh. 5) was exactly the same land identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in the Subdivision Plan (Exh. 6) of 1936. Accordingly, the assumption of the lower court that "if the land sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. was the one now in litigation, he could have easily indicated Lot No. 1-A-14" is bereft of merit under the foregoing circumstances. Interestingly enough, the appellees never denied the identity of the subject lot during the hearing at the lower court. What they were denying only was the sale made by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to appellant Dalmacio Gardiola which does not hold true because of the document denominated as Deed of Sale (Exh. 5).11It concluded that the trial court erred when it ordered the private respondents or anyone acting in their behalf to relinquish the possession or vacate the property in question. It thus decreed:WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment is ordered REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered declaring appellants to be the lawful owners of the lot identified as Lot No. 1-A-14 in TCT No. 27257. Nocosts.12Their motion to reconsider the above decision having been denied by the Court of Appeals in its resolution of 1 March 1990,13petitioners filed the instant petition on 6 April 1990 after having obtained an extension of time within which to file it.The petition does not implead original new defendants Ricardo Gardiola and Emelita Gardiola.As ground for their plea for the review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioners allege that said court has decided questions of substance in a way not in accord with law or applicable jurisprudence when it held that "the deed of extrajudicial settlement of estate (Exh. "D") executed by the grandchildren of the late Gavino Reyes in 1967 is of no moment considering that the property subject of the partition was already partitioned in 1936 by the children of Gavino Reyes." In support thereof, they claim that (a) TCT No. 27257 covers two parcels of land; the lot described in paragraph 1 thereof is owned by petitioners and that ownership was confirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 79882, hence, the Court of Appeals should have affirmed the decision of the trial court; (b) private respondent Rosario Martillano was a party to the extrajudicial settlement of estate which was duly registered in the Registry of Deeds in 1967; said registration is the operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land and also constituted constructive notice to the whole world. The court cannot disregard the binding effect thereof Finally, the pronouncement of the Court of Appeals that private respondents are the lawful owners of the lot in question "militates against the indefeasible and incontrovertible character of the torrens title,"14and allows reconveyance which is not tenable since the action therefor had already prescribed, as stated in the decision of the trial court.In the resolution of 7 May 1990, We required respondents to comment on the petition. But even before it could do so, petitioner, without obtaining prior leave of the Court, filed on 29 May 1990 a so-called Supplemental Arguments in Support of The Petition For Review Oncertiorari15wherein they assert, among others, that: (a) the findings of facts of respondent Court are contrary to those of the trial court and appear to be contradicted by the evidence on record thus calling for the review by this Court;16(b) it also committed misapprehension of the facts in this case and its findings are based on speculation, conjecture and surmises; (c) private respondents' attack on petitioners' title is a collateral attack which is not allowed; even if it is allowed, the same had already prescribed and is now barred.It was only on 15 June 1990 that private respondents filed their Comment.17We required petitioners to reply thereto, which they complied with on 8 August 1990.18A rejoinder was filed by private respondents on 29 August 1990.We gave due course to the petition on 19 September 1990 and required the parties to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda which they complied with.Attached as Annex "A" to private respondent's Memorandum, which was filed on 10 December 1990, is the Resolution of this Court (Third Division) of 20 August 1990 in G.R. No. 92811 entitledSpouses Artemio Durumpili and Angustia Reyes vs.The Court of Appeals and Spouses Dalmacio Gardiola and Rosario Martillano,which also involves the property of Gavino Reyes, the partition thereof among his children in 1936, and the extrajudicial settlement in 1967.In said resolution, this Court held:. . . The partition made in 1936, although oral, was valid. The requirement in Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable property must appear in a public instrument is only for convenience and not for validity or enforceability as between the parties themselves. [Thunga Hui vs.Que Bentec, 2 Phil. 561 (1903)] The subsequent execution by the heirs of the Extrajudicial Partition in 1967 did not alter the oral partition as in fact the share pertaining to Angustia Reyes corresponded to that previously assigned to her father. Considering that Angel Reyes sold this property to Basilio de Ocampo who, in turn, sold the same to respondents, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the latter lawfully acquired the property and are entitled to ownership and possession thereof.In answer to the charge of private respondents that petitioners deliberately failed to cite this resolution, the latter, in their reply-memorandum dated 15 March 1991 and filed three days thereafter, allege:Our failure to mention the aforementioned resolution before this Honorable Court is not deliberate nor with malice aforethought. The reason is that to date, we have not yet received any resolution to our Motion For Leave of Court To Refer Case To The Honorable Supreme CourtEn Banc. Moreover, we honestly feel that the resolution that will be issued therein will not be applicable to the case before this Honorable Court's Second Division. It should be mentioned that in the Durumpili case before the Third Division, the Court of Appeals relied on the alleged confirmation of the sale executed by Angustia Reyes, while in the Reyes case before this Second Division, there was no sale that was executed by the petitioners Reyes' predecessor-in-interest, Rafael Reyes, Jr.The foregoing claim is not supported by therolloof G.R. No. 92811, which reveals the following: (a) On 18 September 1990, petitioners therein, represented byDe Lara, De Lunas and Rosales, who are the lawyers of petitioners in the instant case, filed a motion for the reconsideration of the resolution of 20 August 1990.19b) This motion was denied in the resolution of 1 October 1990.20c) On 17 November 1990, petitioners therein, through the same lawyers, filed a Motion For Leave Of Court To Refer Case To The Honorable Supreme CourtEnBancAnd/Or Motion For Reconsideration21wherein they specifically admit that said case and the instant petition have "identity and/or similarity of the parties, the facts, the issues raised," even going to the extent of "graphically" illustrating where such similarities lie.22d) This motion was denied in the resolution of 28 November 1990. Copy thereof was furnished the attorneys for petitioners.23e) Entry of judgment had already been made therein and a copy thereof was sent to petitioner's counsel per Letter of Transmittal of the Deputy Court and Chief of the Judicial Records Office dated 20 December 1990.What comes out prominently from the disquisitions of the parties is this simple issue: whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in setting aside the decision of the trial court.We find none. The reversal of the trial court's decision is inevitable and unavoidable because the legal and factual conclusions made by the trial court are unfounded and clearly erroneous. The Court of Appeals was not bound to agree to such conclusions. The trial court erred in holding that: (a) there was no partition among the children of Gavino Reyes in 1936 since there is no written evidence in support thereof; yet, it admits that there was a survey and subdivision of the property and the adjudication of specific subdivision lots to each of the children of Gavino; (b) the land sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondents is not identical to Lot No. 1-A-14, the lot specified for and adjudicated to Rafael Reyes, Jr. in the partition agreement; and (c) if the land sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola is indeed Lot No. 1-A-14 and that TCT No. T-27257 was obtained through fraud, the remedy open to the vendee was an action for reconveyance, which should have been brought within four (4) years from the discovery thereof in 1967 when the Extrajudicial Settlement was executed since private respondent Rosario Martillano, wife of Dalmacio, was a party thereto.The Court of Appeals correctly held that the partition made by the children of Gavino Reyes in 1936, although oral, was valid and binding. There is no law that requires partition among heirs to be in writing to be valid.24InHernandez vs.Andal, supra, this Court, interpreting Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, held that the requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. Where no such rights are involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by law. There is nothing in said section from which it can be inferred that a writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral partition is valid.Barcelona, et al.vs.Barcelona, et al.,supra, provides the reason why oral partition is valid and why it is not covered by the Statute of Frauds: partition among heirs or renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not exactly a conveyance of real property for the reason that it does not involve transfer of property from one to the other, but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property by the heir renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and receiving the inheritance.Additionally, the validity of such oral partition in 1936 has been expressly sustained by this Court in the Resolution of 20 August 1990 in G.R. No. 92811.25But even if We are to assumearguendothat the oral partition executed in 1936 was not valid for some reason or another, We would still arrive at the same conclusion for upon the death of Gavino Reyes in 1921, his heirs automatically became co-owners of his 70-hectare parcel of land. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.26The estate of the decedent would then be held in co-ownership by the heirs. The co-heir or co-owner may validly dispose of his share or interest in the property subject to the condition that the portion disposed of is eventually allotted to him in the division upon termination of the co-ownership. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership.InRamirez vs.Bautista,27this Court held that every co-heir has the absolute ownership of his share in the community property and may alienate, assign, or mortgage the same, except as to purely personal rights, but the effect of any such transfer is limited to the portion which may be awarded to him upon the partition of the property.In the case at bar, the lot sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. to private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola is his share in the estate of his deceased father, Gavino Reyes. It is the same property which was eventually adjudicated to his son and heir, Rafael Reyes, Jr., represented in turn by his heirs-petitioners herein-in the extrajudicial settlement of 1967.In respect to the issue as to whether the property sold by Rafael Reyes, Sr. is identical to Lot No. 1-14-A, the trial court based its conclusion that it is not, on his observation that the description of the former does not tally with that of the latter, moreover, if Rafael did intend to sell Lot No. 1-14-A, he should have specifically stated it in the deed since at that time, the property had already been partitioned and said lot was adjudicated to him. In addition to the contrary findings and conclusion of the respondent Court on this issue to which We fully agree, it is to be stressed that Rafael had this property declared for taxation purposes and the tax declaration issued was made the basis for the description of the property in the deed of sale. Upon the execution of the deed of sale, vendee herein private respondent Dalmacio Gardiola immediately took possession of the property. This is the very same property which is the subject matter of this case and which petitioners seek to recover from the private respondents. The main evidence adduced for their claim of ownership and possession over it is TCT No. T-27257, the certificate of title covering Lot No. 1-14-A. They therefore admit and concede that the property claimed by private respondent, which was acquired by sale from Rafael Reyes, Sr., is none other than Lot No. 1-14-A.The participation of private respondent Rosario Gardiola in the Extrajudicial Settlement did not place private respondents in estoppel to question the issuance of TCT No. T-27257. As correctly maintained by private respondents, she signed it in representation of her deceased mother, Marta Reyes, a daughter and an heir of Gavino Reyes. She did not sign for and in behalf of her husband, Dalmacio Gardiola, vendee of the share of Rafael Reyes, Sr.The same did not operate to divest the vendee of the share of Rafael Reyes, Sr. in the estate of Gavino. Petitioners, as mere successors-in-interest of Rafael Reyes, Jr., son of Rafael Reyes, Sr., can only acquire that whichRafael, Jr. could transmit to them upon his death. The latter never became the owner of Lot No. 1-A-14 because it was sold by his father in 1943. The issuance of TCT No. T-27257 in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr., in so far as Lot No. 1-14-A is concerned, was clearly erroneous because he never became its owner. An extrajudicial settlement does not create a light in favor of an heir. As this Court stated in theBarcelonacase,28it is but a confirmation or ratification of title or right to property. Thus, since he never had any title or right to Lot No. 1-14-A, the mere execution of the settlement did not improve his condition, and the subsequent registration of the deed did not create any right or vest any title over the property in favor of the petitioners as heirs of Rafael Reyes, Jr. The latter cannot give them what he never had before.Nemo dare potest quod non habet.There is one more point that should be stressed here. Petitioners' immediate predecessor-in-interest, Rafael Reyes, Jr., never took any action against private respondents from the time his father sold the lot to the latter. Neither did petitioners bring any action to recover from private respondents the ownership and possession of the lot from the time Rafael Reyes, Jr. died. As categorically admitted by petitioners in their complaint and amended complaint, it was only in or about September 1969 when, after the delivery of TCT No. 27257 by Candido Hebron to them, that they definitely discovered that they were the owners of the property in question. And yet, despite full knowledge that private respondents were in actual physical possession of the property, it was only about thirteen and one-half (13 1/2) years later that they decided to file an action for recovery of possession. As stated earlier, the original complaint was filed in the trial court on 14 March 1983. There was then absolutely no basis for the trial court to place the burden on private respondents to bring an action for reconveyance within four (4) years from their discovery of the issuance of the transfer certificate of title in the name of Rafael Reyes, Jr.The instant petition then is without merit.WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the petition with costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.

Republic of thePhilippinesSupreme CourtManilaTHIRD DIVISIONSPOUSES GORGONIO BENATIROG.R. No. 161220

and COLUMBA CUYOS-BENATIRO

substituted by their heirs, namely:

Isabelita,Renato,Rosadeliaand

Gorgonio, Jr., surnamedBenatiro, and

SPOUSES RENATO C. BENATIRO andPresent:

ROSIE M. BENATIRO,

Respondents,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,

- versus -Chairperson,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

HEIRS OF EVARISTO CUYOS,namely: GloriaCuyos-Talian,PatroceniaCuyos-Mijares,NumerianoCuyos, and EnriqueCuyos,represented by their attorney-in-fact,SaludCuyos,CHICO-NAZARIONACHURA,andREYES,JJ.Promulgated:

Respondents.July 30, 2008

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xD E C I S I O NAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,J.:Before us is a Petition for Review onCertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners seeking to annul the Decision[1]datedJuly 18, 2003of the Court of Appeals (CA) and its Resolution[2]datedNovember 13, 2003denying petitioners motion for reconsideration issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 65630.[3]SpousesEvaristoCuyosandAgatonaArroganteCuyoswere blessed with nine children, namely:Francisco,Victoria,Columba, Lope,Salud, Gloria,Patrocenia,Numeriano, and Enrique.OnAugust 28, 1966,Evaristodied leaving six parcels of land located inTapilon,Daanbantayan,Cebucovered by Tax Declaration (TD) Nos. 000725, 000728, 000729, 000730, 000731, 000732, all under the name ofAgatonaArrogante.On July 13, 1971, one of the heirs, GloriaCuyos-Talian(respondent Gloria) represented by Atty. Victor ElliotLepiten(Atty.Lepiten), filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) now Regional Trial Court (RTC),Cebu, Branch XI, a petition[4]for Letters of Administration, docketed as Special Proceeding (SP) No. 24-BN entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate ofEvaristoCuyos, GloriaCuyos-Talian, petitioner.The petition was opposed by Glorias brother, Francisco, who was represented by Atty. JesusYray(Atty.Yray).In the hearing held onJanuary 30, 1973, both parties together with their respective counsels appeared.Both counsels manifested that the parties had come to an agreement to settle their case.The trial court on even date issued an Order[5]appointing Gloria asadministratrixof the estate.Thedispositiveportion reads:WHEREFORE, letters of administration of the estate of the lateEvaristoCuyosand including the undivided half accruing to his spouseAgatonaArrogantewho recently died is hereby issued in favor of Mrs. GloriaCuyosTalianwho may qualify as suchadministratrixafter posting a nominal bond ofP1,000.00.[6]Subsequently, in the Order[7]dated December 12, 1975,the CFIstated that when the Intestate Estate hearing was called on that date, respondent Gloria and her brother,oppositorFrancisco,together with their respective counsels,appeared; thatAtty.Yray, Franciscos counsel, manifested that the parties had come to an agreement to settle the case amicably; that both counsels suggested that the Clerk of Court, Atty.Andres C.Taneo(Atty.Taneo), be appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement of the parties and to prepare the project of partition for