rule 130 evidence - cases

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Tijing vs CA

GR. No. 125901, March 8, 2001 [Habeas Corpus]

FACTS:Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing filed a petition for habeas corpus in order to recover

their youngest child, Edgardo Jr., whom they did not see for 4 years. Trial court

granted the petition and ordered Angelita Diamante to immediately release the child,

now named John Thomas D. Lopez, and turn him over to his parents. CA reversed and

set aside the decision rendered by the lower court. It questioned the propriety of the

habeas corpus in this case.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy?

(2) Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the

same person and is the son of petitioners?

RULING:

Yes. SC upheld the decision of the trial court.

The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by

which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by the rightful custody of any person

withheld from the persons entitled thereto. The writ of habeas corpus is the proper

legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the

latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will. It must be stressed out

that in habeas corpus proceeding, the question of identity is relevant and material,

subject to the usual presumption, including those as identity of the person.

The trial court was correct in its judgment based on the evidence established by the

parents and by the witness who is the brother of the late common-law husband of

Angelita. Furthermore, there are no clinical records, log book or discharge from the

clinic where John Thomas was allegedly born were presented. Strong evidence

directly proves that Thomas Lopez, Angela's "husband", was not capable of siring achild. Moreover, his first marriage produced no offspring even after almost 15 years

of living together with his legal wife. His 14 year affair with Angelita also bore no

offspring.

The birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez were attended by irregularities. It was

filed by Thomas Lopez, the alleged father. Under Sec. 4, Act No. 3753 (Civil Register

Law), the attending physician or midwife in attendance of the birth should cause the



registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or midwife, can the parent

register the birth of his child. Certificate must be filed with the LCR within 30 days

after the birth. The status of Thomas and Angelita on the birth certificate were typed

in as legally married, which is false because Angelita herself had admitted that she

is a "common-law wife."

Trial court also observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were

both in court, the two had strong similarities in their faces. Resemblance between a

minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish

parentage. Lastly, the spouses presented clinical records and testimony of the

midwife who attended Bienvenida's childbirth.

A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we

adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the

facility and expertise in using DNA test19 for identification and parentage testing.

The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA

Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short

tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a

child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the

father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to

establish parentage.20 Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA

test as evidence is still open to challenge.21 Eventually, as the appropriate case

comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it

was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained

in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.22

Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would beuseful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.

________________________________

PEOPLE vs. ULZORON

SAMUEL ULZORON was charged with rape with the use of a deadly weapon. Complaining witness was

Emily Gabo. On 8 March 1995 the trial court adjudged him guilty as charged and sentenced him to

reclusion perpetua. 1 No indemnity was awarded to Emily for the sexual assault.

On the strength of the testimony of Emily Gabo, the trial court convicted the accused.

Appellant concedes, even as he assails his conviction, that his defense is inherently weak. Nevertheless,

he faults the trial court for convicting him on the basis of his defense. He argues that the undisputed



facts and circumstances made it more likely that Emily was involved in an adulterous relationship with

him. 10 He claims, for instance, that there was absolutely nothing to support the victim's claim of

struggle, and that while he allegedly dragged her forty (40) meters away before assaulting her sexually,

the examining physician could not conclude that physical force was actually inflicted since she did not

sustain any physical injuries. 11 Another point raised by the defense is her testimony that while he was

on top of her his bolo was beside him. The plain import of such testimony, according to the accused, is

that the bolo was not a necessary instrument in the commission of the crime. 12 He also invites

attention to the circumstance that the judge who wrote the decision did not personally try the case and

therefore lacked the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the parties and their witnesses. 13

The arguments of appellant are unpersuasive; they fail to convince us. Contrary to his claim that he was

convicted because of his weak defense, his conviction was actually founded on the overwhelming

evidence of the prosecution. With regard to his claim that he had an adulterous relationship with the

victim, the Office of the Solicitor General observed that such claim was a radical departure from the

defense of denial he raised at the trial. The OSG observed further that the "sweetheart defense" was

being raised for the first time in this appeal hence should be disallowed conformably with established jurisprudence. 14 Here, the Court does not necessarily agree. Appellant could only be emphasizing the

point that the facts and circumstances established could lead to a conclusion of the existence of

adulterous relationship between him and Emily and not of rape. In other words, appellant could be

utilizing the "sweetheart theory" not necessarily as a defense but as a focal point in disputing the

appreciation by the trial court of the evidence for the prosecution. Thus, this course taken by the

defense may not be totally disregarded.

The term "dragged" should not indeed be taken in the meaning understood by appellant as "dragged

along on the ground." When asked on cross-examination by the defense counsel to "describe how she

and appellant traveled at (sic) forty (40) meters distance," 15 she said, "He was holding my hands and atthe same time he is (sic) pushing me forward." 16 This testimony adequately explains the absence of

injuries in her body. At any rate, it is not necessary for the commission of rape that there be marks of

physical violence on the victim's body. 17 While Emily repeatedly mentioned her struggles to be

released from his grasp, such efforts need not always result in physical injuries. 18 Besides, they did not

refer to the circumstances when she was being dragged by the accused, but to the circumstances when

he initially grabbed her hands, 19 when he was on top of her, 20 when he was undressing her, 21 and

when she was exerting efforts to disengage herself from the sexual anchorage. 22

PEOPLE vs. NARVASA,

Appellants Felicisimo Narvasa and Jimmy Orania seek the reversal of the October 11, 1996 Decision 1 of

the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos, Pangasinan, in Criminal Case Nos. 2629-A, 2648-A and 2646-A,

finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of firearms in its aggravated form and

sentencing them to reclusion perpetua.



The trial court accorded credibility to the prosecution witnesses and held that mere denial could not

overcome the prosecution evidence showing that appellants used high-powered firearms to shoot at the

prosecution witnesses, thereby resulting in the death of SPO3 Primo Camba. Further supporting said

testimonies were the results of the paraffin test conducted on appellants and the recovery of various

cartridges and shells matching the firearms purportedly used in the crime. Though these unlicensed

firearms were not presented as evidence, the trial court, citing People v. Ferrera, 12 ruled that

appellants may still be convicted of illegal possession of firearms.

Finally, the trial court found that appellants acted in conspiracy in the killing of Primo Camba. However,

on the basis of People v. Barros, 13 it held that the homicide was merely an element of the illegal

possession of firearms in its aggravated form; thus, homicide in the present case was taken into account

not as a separate crime but as an aggravating circumstance which increased the penalty for the illegal

possession of firearms.

Hence, this appeal. 14

In the main, the resolution of this case revolves around the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, the

sufficiency of the prosecution evidence and the characterization of the crime committed.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Appellants cite People v. Lualhati, 19 wherein this Court ruled "that in crimes involving illegal possession

of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of proving the elements thereof, viz: the existence of the

subject firearm and the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the

corresponding license or permit to possess the same." Appellants contend that the existence of the

firearms was not sufficiently proven because the prosecution had not presented the firearms as

evidence. It is necessary, they argue, that said "firearms allegedly possessed by the accused-appellantsand allegedly used in the killing of Policeman Primo Camba be presented in evidence as those firearms

constitute the corpus delicti of the crime with which they are sentenced." 20

Appellants' argument is not persuasive. In People v. Lualhati, this Court merely stated that the existence

of the firearm must be established; it did not rule that the firearm itself had to be presented as

evidence. Thus, in People v. Orehuela, 21 the Court held that the existence of the firearm can be

established by testimony, even without the presentation of the said firearm. In the said case, Appellant

Orehuela was convicted of qualified illegal possession of a firearm despite the fact that the firearm used

was not presented as evidence. The existence of the weapon was deemed amply established by the

testimony of an eyewitness that Orehuela was in possession of it and had used it to kill the victim.

In the present case, the testimonies of several witnesses indubitably demonstrate the existence of the

firearms. Villamor Laderas stated that when he went to Barangay Quinaoayanan, Bani, Pangasinan to

investigate a report regarding missing carabaos, pigs and goats, he saw the appellants carrying long

firearms. We quote hereunder the relevant portion of his testimony:



In addition, Primo Camba was hit by a bullet, and empty shells of M-16, M-14 and .30 caliber carbine

bullets were later on recovered in the vicinity of the place where the shooting occurred.

The above facts, duly proven and taken together, sufficiently establish the existence of the subject

firearms and the fact that appellants possessed and used said firearms in firing at Villamor Laderas,

Ernesto Nagal, and Simeon Navora, as well as Primo Camba who succumbed to the gunshot wound hehad sustained.

The present case can be distinguished from People v. Navarro 25 wherein the Court held that illegal

possession of firearm could not be deemed an aggravating circumstance because the existence of the

said firearm was not proven. In said case, a witness testified that he saw appellant shoot the victim with

a "short" firearm. No firearm, however, was presented as evidence, although a gun was recovered from

the accused when he was arrested. Moreover, no proof was adduced to show that the firearm allegedly

seen by the witness was the same one recovered by the authorities from the accused. Thus, the Court

held:

In the case at bar, the Information alleged that on January 5, 1991, the appellant had in his possession

an unlicensed firearm which he used in killing Ferdinand Rabadon. This firearm was allegedly recovered

on January 5, 1994, when appellant was arrested. However, said firearm was not presented in court or

offered as evidence against the appellant. Although Rabago testified that he saw the appellant with a

"short" firearm when the latter shot Rabadon on January 5, 1991 no other proof was presented to show

that such gun, allegedly used on January 5, 1991, was the same one recovered on January 5, 1994. The

prosecution was not able to establish sufficiently the existence of the subject firearm . . . .

In other words, the evidence on the existence of the firearm was beset with doubt and conflict. Such

uncertainty is not found in the present case, for the testimonies of several witnesses indubitably

established that the subject firearms were in the possession of the appellants.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED. For the death of Primo Camba, Appellants

Felicisimo Narvasa and Jimmy Orania are found GUILTY of HOMICIDE with the special aggravating

circumstance of using unlicensed firearms.

__________________________

ABALOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Liberato Damias visited his girlfriend at her house in San Isidro, Rosales, Pangasinan, on the night of 27

January 1993. He did not realize that would be his last rendezvous with her. He was gunned down soon

after and died slowly in her arms. His assailant apparently driven by extreme jealousy hurriedly fled

leaving the lovers to the mercy of their fate.

But Delfin denied killing Liberato. He claimed that on the night of 27 January 1993 he worked with his

father in the tobacco fields from 3:00 p.m. until midnight, 13 and the only time he left was from 6:00 to



is not conclusive proof that he has not fired a gun. 34 In fact, the traces of nitrates can easily be

removed by the simple act of washing one's hand. 35

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding petitioner DELFIN ABALOS guilty of homicide

is MODIFIED. He is instead adjudged GUILTY of MURDER with recidivism as a generic aggravating

circumstance.

_______________________

ABELLA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

On May 26, 1987, petitioner Mercedes N. Abella, as lessor, and private respondent Conrado Colarina, as

lessee, signed a contract of lease 1 of a portion of Juanabel Building situated at Elias Angeles Street,

Naga City. The duration of the contract is from "July 1, 1987 until July 1, 1991" 2 or for a term of four (4)

years 3 with a stipulated monthly rental of Three Thousand Pesos (P3,000.00). 4 Upon the signing of the

contract, Colarina paid an amount of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) to Abella which the latter

acknowledged by issuing the corresponding receipt. 5 Intending to use the premises for his pawnshop

business, Colarina introduced thereon certain improvements 6 for which he spent Sixty Eight Thousand

Pesos (P68,000.00). Colarina paid the monthly rental on a regular basis but discontinued payment from

November 1987 to April 1988. 7 Thereafter, Abella then made repeated demands to pay with notice of

extrajudicial rescission pursuant to paragraph thirteen (13) 8 of the lease contract which were all

unheeded. Thus, Abella took possession of the premises on May 1, 1988, with the assistance of the Naga

City PNP and some Barangay officials 9 who made an inventory 10 of all the items found therein.

On May 5, 1988, Colarina filed an action for "enforcement of contract of lease with preliminary

mandatory injunction and damages" 11 against Abella before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga.

After trial, the lower court among others ordered: (1) Abella to return the amount of Forty Thousand

Pesos (P40,000.00) less Eighteen Thousand Pesos (P18,000.00) representing unpaid rental from

November-December, 1987, to April, 1988 or for a period of six (6) months, or the sum of TWENTY TWO

THOUSAND Pesos (P22,000.00) to Colarina together with the destroyed and removed materials and

improvements introduced by him in the premises leased; and (2) the dismissal of the case for lack of

merit. 12

On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered

petitioner Abella: (1) to restore to Colarina the possession of the leased premises under the same terms

and conditions stated in the contract of lease; (2) to restore in the premises the improvementsintroduced by Colarina which were demolished or removed by Abella or to pay the value thereof in the

sum of P68,000.00, with interest until fully paid; and (3) to pay the costs of the Suit. 13 Aggrieved, Abella

filed this petition for review on certiorari faulting the respondent Court of Appeals with five assigned

errors which basically dwell on the following issues, to wit: (1) whether or not respondent Colarina

violated the contract of lease warranting its extrajudicial rescission; and (2) whether or not possession of

the premises may properly be restored to Colarina.



Anent the first issue. It is not disputed that petitioner received the sum of forty thousand pesos

(P40,000.00) from Colarina. 14 Petitioner and Colarina, however, are at loggerheads with respect to the

purpose of such payment. The trial court agreed with the petitioner that the amount represents only a

"goodwill money" given to the latter by Colarina in payment for the privilege to occupy the vacant

portion of Juanabel Building. 15 On the other hand, the respondent Court of Appeals sided with Colarina

and held that the same is an "advance deposit to answer for any rental which Colarina may fail to pay."

16 We uphold the findings of the respondent Court of Appeals.

Our careful review of the record reveals that Colarina did not violate the subject contract of lease with

respect to his rental obligation in view of his payment of forty thousand pesos.

It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts that "if the terms of a contract are clear and leave

no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall

control". 18 The above-quoted receipt is clear and unequivocal that the disputed amount is an advance

deposit which will answer for any rental that Colarina may fail to pay. No amount of extrinsic aids are

required and no further extraneous sources are necessary in order to ascertain the parties' intent,

determinable as it is, from the receipt itself. 19

We are, thus, more convinced that the receipt expresses truly the parties' intent on the purpose of said

payment as against the oral testimony of the petitioner that said amount is but only a "goodwill money".

Without any doubt, oral testimony as to a certain fact, depending as it does exclusively on human

memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence. 20 "I would sooner trust the smallest slip

of paper for truth", said Judge Limpkin of Georgia, "than the strongest and most retentive memory ever

bestowed on mortal man." 21 This is especially true in this case where such oral testimony is given by

the petitioner himself, a party to the case who has an interest in its outcome, and by Jesus Hipolito, a

witness who claimed to have received a commission from the petitioner. 22 In addition, the trial court

itself has found that this receipt is genuine when it brushed aside the petitioner's claim that her

signature appearing thereon was a forgery. 23 The authenticity of the receipt further enhances its

probative value as against the oral testimony of the petitioner and of her witness.

We also find unmeritorious petitioner's contention that the receipt failed to reflect her true intention

warranting a reformation thereof. Petitioner, being of age and a businesswoman, is presumed to have

acted with due care and to have signed the receipt in question with full knowledge of its contents and

import. 24 Equally unmeritorious is petitioner's insistence that Colarina procured her signature "thru

fraud and any other deceitful means", 25 an issue which was never raised below. It is a settled rule that

an issue which was not threshed out below may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Moreover, no

iota of evidence was ever adduced at the trial to support her allegation of fraud. The reformation of said

receipt simply lacks basis.

Hence, we rule that respondent Colarina was not yet in arrears with his rental payment when petitioner

took possession of the leased premises on May 1, 1988. Accordingly, petitioner's rescission of the

subject contract of lease was improper.

________________________



SISON vs. PEOPLE

The case before us occurred at a time of great political polarization in the aftermath of the 1986 EDSA

Revolution. This was the time when the newly-installed government of President Corazon C. Aquino was

being openly challenged in rallies, demonstrations and other public fora by "Marcos loyalists,"

supporters of deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Tension and animosity between the two (2)groups sometimes broke into violence. On July 27, 1986, it resulted in the murder of Stephen Salcedo, a

known "Coryista."

Appellants mainly claim that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the testimonies of the two in

prosecution eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, because they are unreliable, doubtful

and do not deserve any credence.

We sustain the appellate and trial courts' findings that the witnesses' testimonies corroborate each

other on all important and relevant details of the principal occurrence. Their positive identification of all

petitioners jibe with each other and their narration of the events are supported by the medical and

documentary evidence on record.

Dr. Roberto Garcia, the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, testified that the

victim had various wounds on his body which could have been inflicted by pressure from more than one

hard object. 35 The contusions and abrasions found could have been caused by punches, kicks and

blows from rough stones. 36 The fatal injury of intracranial hemorrhage was a result of fractures in

Salcedo's skull which may have been caused by contact with a hard and blunt object such as fistblows,

kicks and a blunt wooden instrument. 37

Appellants do not deny that Salcedo was mauled, kicked and punched. Sumilang in fact testified that

Salcedo was pummeled by his assailants with stones in their hands. 38

Appellants also contend that although the appellate court correctly disregarded Exhibits "D," "G," and

"P," it erroneously gave evidentiary weight to Exhibits "O," "V," "V-1" to "V-48," "W," "W-1" to "W-13."

39 Exhibit "O" is the Joint Affidavit of Pat. Flores and Pat. Bautista, the police intelligence-operatives

who witnessed the rally and subsequent dispersal operation. Pat. Flores properly identified Exhibit "O"

as his sworn statement and in fact gave testimony corroborating the contents thereof. 40 Besides, the

Joint Affidavit merely reiterates what the other prosecution witnesses testified to. Identification by Pat.

Bautista is a surplusage. If appellants wanted to impeach the said affidavit, they should have placed Pat.

Flores on the witness stand.

Exhibits "V," "V-1" to "V-48" are photographs taken of the victim as he was being mauled at the Luneta— starting from a grassy portion to the pavement at the Rizal Monument and along Roxas Boulevard, 41

— as he was being chased by his assailants 42 and as he sat pleading with his assailants. 43 Exhibits "W",

"W-1" to "W-13" are photographs of Salcedo and the mauling published in local newspapers and

magazines such as the Philippine Star, 44 Mr. and Ms. Magazine, 45 Philippine Daily Inquirer, 46 and the

Malaya. 47 The admissibility of these photographs is being questioned by appellants for lack of proper

identification by the person or persons who took the same.



The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the

photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were

produced. 48 The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction

of the original, 49 and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time

of the crime. 50 The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he

has taken. 51 The correctness of the photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can

be proved prima facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent

witnesses, after which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. 52 Photographs,

therefore, can be identified by the photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify to

its exactness and accuracy. 53

__________________________

VIRGILIO CALLANTA vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner Virgilio Callanta seeks the annulment or setting aside of the

decision of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) dated September 10, 1991

which reversed the finding of illegal dismissal and order of reinstatement with backwages by the

Executive Labor Arbiter Zosimo T. Vassalo.

THE HONORABLE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND

WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT COMPLAINANT IS STILL

ENTITLED TO THE PAYMENT AND/OR REFUND OF P76,893.42 AS PER AUDIT FINDING OF RESPONDENT

COMPANY'S AUDITOR PLUS THE SUM OF P10,000.00 AS ALLOWANCE STILL DUE TO COMPLAINANT.

(Rollo, p. 6.)

Coming now to the main issue of the present petition, i.e., whether the resignation by petitioner was

valid and effective this Court believes and so holds that the resignation tendered by petitioner was

voluntary, and therefore valid, in the absence of any evidence of coercion and intimidation on the part

of private respondent company.

Anent the claims for refund, petitioner once against failed to convincingly prove the authenticity of his

claim against private respondent company. Petitioner claims that the amounts of P76,893.42 and

P10,000.00 allegedly owed to him by private respondent company were matter proved during the

hearings before the Labor Arbiter (Rollo, p.10). However, the records show that no hearing for the

reception of evidence was ever conducted by the Labor Arbiter. At most, what transpired werepreliminary hearings which had to be reset for five (5) times due to the absence of counsel for private

respondent (Rollo, p. 4). In fact, because of the absence of counsel for respondent company, the Labor

Arbiter just ordered the parties to submit their respective position papers in lieu of actual hearings. This

having been the case, the Court is not convinced that the money claims of petitioner have really been

proven during the alleged hearings before the Labor Arbiter, if any, especially in the present case where

the money claims are even refuted by private respondent.



In support of its claims for refund, petitioner presented a written summation of accounts reflecting the

amounts allegedly owed by private respondent company to him. However, the aforestated summation

is undated and unsigned, thus inadmissible and uncertain as to its origin and authenticity. Further

kindling the flame of suspicion as to the origin of the summation in question is the context of the

November 17, 1987 letter of petitioner to private respondent Limpe. Quite unusual is the fact that in

refuting the findings of the alleged "post audit" conducted by private respondent company, petitioner

did not even bother to mention the source of his conclusion that private respondent company still owes

him P76,893.42, while at the same time complaining that somehow he is being refused access to and

disclosure of some of the company records, particularly the records/audit of E.V. Rodriguez and J. Pong,

Jr. These facts are inconsistent with petitioner's contention that is was the auditor of private respondent

company itself who made the written summation.

________________________

PEOPLE vs. TANDOY

The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133 dated October 13, 1987, convicting Mario

Tandoy of the crime of violation of Art. II, Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425 known as the Dangerous Drugs Act

of 1972, is before us on appeal.

Upon arraignment, Tandoy entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, Judge Buenaventura J. Guerrero

rendered a decision finding Mario Tandoy y Lim guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Sec. 4,

Art. II, Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, and is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of

P20,000.00 and cost.

The accused-appellant raises the following assignment of errors in this appeal:

2. The Court a quo erred in admitting in evidence against the accused Exh. "E-2-A" which is merely a

xerox copy of the P10.00 bill allegedly used as buy-bust money.Tthe accused-appellant invokes the best

evidence rule and questions the admission by the trial court of the xerox copy only of the marked

P10.00 bill.

The Solicitor General, in his Comment, correctly refuted that contention thus:

This assigned error centers on the trial court's admission of the P10.00 bill marked money (Exh.

E-2-A) which, according to the appellant, is excluded under the best evidence rule for being a

mere xerox copy. Apparently, appellant erroneously thinks that said marked money is an

ordinary document falling under Sec. 2, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court which excludes

the introduction of secondary evidence except in the five (5) instances mentioned therein.

The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of inquiry.

Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the



circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and

testimonial evidence is admissible. (Cf. Moran, op. cit., pp. 76-77; 4 Martin, op. cit., p. 78.)

Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of

establishing its existence and not its contents, other substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy thereof,

is therefore admissible without the need of accounting for the original.

Moreover, the presentation at the trial of the "buy-bust money" was not indispensable to the conviction

of the accused-appellant because the sale of the marijuana had been adequately proved by the

testimony of the police officers. So long as the marijuana actually sold by the accused-appellant had

been submitted as an exhibit, the failure to produce the marked money itself would not constitute a

fatal omission.

_______________________

TRANS-PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL SUPPLIES, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioner Trans-Pacific Industrial Supplies, Inc. seeks the

reversal of the decision of respondent court, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision of June 11, 1991 is SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED; the complaint is dismissed, and

on the counterclaim, Transpacific is ordered to pay Associated attorney's fees of P15,000.00.

Sometime in 1979, petitioner applied for and was granted several financial accommodations amounting

to P1,300,000.00 by respondent Associated Bank. The loans were evidenced and secured by four (4)

promissory notes, a real estate mortgage covering three parcels of land and a chattel mortgage over

petitioner's stock and inventories.

Unable to settle its obligation in full, petitioner requested for, and was granted by respondent bank, a

restructuring of the remaining indebtedness which then amounted to P1,057,500.00, as all the previous

payments made were applied to penalties and interests.

To secure the re-structured loan of P1,213,400.00, three new promissory notes were executed by Trans-

Pacific as follows: (1) Promissory Note No. TL-9077-82 for the amount of P1,050,000.00 denominated as

working capital; (2) Promissory Note No. TL-9078-82 for the amount of P121,166.00 denominated as

restructured interest; (3) Promissory Note No. TL-9079-82 for the amount of P42,234.00 denominated

similarly as restructured interest (Rollo. pp. 113-115).

The mortgaged parcels of land were substituted by another mortgage covering two other parcels of land

and a chattel mortgage on petitioner's stock inventory. The released parcels of land were then sold and

the proceeds amounting to P1,386,614.20, according to petitioner, were turned over to the bank and

applied to Trans-Pacific's restructured loan. Subsequently, respondent bank returned the duplicate

original copies of the three promissory notes to Trans-Pacific with the word "PAID" stamped thereon.



Despite the return of the notes, or on December 12, 1985, Associated Bank demanded from Trans-

Pacific payment of the amount of P492,100.00 representing accrued interest on PN No. TL-9077-82.

According to the bank, the promissory notes were erroneously released.

Initially, Trans-Pacific expressed its willingness to pay the amount demanded by respondent bank. Later,

it had a change of heart and instead initiated an action before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Br.146, for specific performance and damages. There it prayed that the mortgage over the two parcels of

land be released and its stock inventory be lifted and that its obligation to the bank be declared as

having been fully paid.

After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment in favor of Trans-Pacific.

Respondent bank elevated the case to the appellate court which, as aforesaid, reversed the decision of

the trial court. In this appeal, petitioner raises one of the issues, i.e., whether or not petitioner has

indeed paid in full its obligation to respondent bank.

Applying the legal presumption provided by Art. 1271 of the Civil Code, the trial court ruled thatpetitioner has fully discharged its obligation by virtue of its possession of the documents (stamped

"PAID") evidencing its indebtedness.

Respondent court disagreed and held, among others, that the documents found in possession of Trans-

Pacific are mere duplicates and cannot be the basis of petitioner's claim that its obligation has been fully

paid. Accordingly, since the promissory notes submitted by petitioner were duplicates and not the

originals, the delivery thereof by respondent bank to the petitioner does not merit the application of

Article 1271 (1st par.) of the Civil Code. Respondent court is of the view that the above provision must

be construed to mean the original copy of the document evidencing the credit and not its duplicate,

thus:

. . . [W]hen the law speaks of the delivery of the private document evidencing a credit, it must

be construed as referring to the original. In this case, appellees (Trans-Pacific) presented, not

the originals but the duplicates of the three promissory notes." (Rollo, p. 42)

The above pronouncement of respondent court is manifestly groundless. It is undisputed that the

documents presented were duplicate originals and are therefore admissible as evidence. Further, it

must be noted that respondent bank itself did not bother to challenge the authenticity of the duplicate

copies submitted by petitioner. In People vs. Tan, (105 Phil. 1242 [1959]), we said:

When carbon sheets are inserted between two or more sheets of writing paper so that the writing of acontract upon the outside sheet, including the signature of the party to be charged thereby, produces a

facsimile upon the sheets beneath, such signature being thus reproduced by the same stroke of pen

which made the surface or exposed impression, all of the sheets so written on are regarded as duplicate

originals and either of them may be introduced in evidence as such without accounting for the

nonproduction of the others.



A duplicate copy of the original may be admitted in evidence when the original is in the possession of

the party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice

(Sec. 2[b], Rule 130), as in the case of respondent bank.

In fine, the Court is satisfied that plaintiffs must be found to have settled their obligations in full.

___________________

HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN vs. COMORPOSA

The admissibility of evidence should be distinguished from its probative value. Just because a piece of

evidence is admitted does not ipso facto mean that it conclusively proves the fact in dispute.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the August 7,2001 Decision and the February 27, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals3 (CA) in CA-GR SP No.

60645. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the Decision dated 22

June 2000 rendered by Branch 18 of the Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, REVERSING

and SETTING ASIDE the Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Su[r]."4

The CA summarized the factual antecedents of the case as follows:

"A [C]omplaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by [petitioners] against [respondents]

before the Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur Municipal Trial Court.

"The [C]omplaint alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful and actual possessor of Lot No. 845, Land 275

located at Darong, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur with an area of 1.2 hectares. In 1960, he died leaving all his

heirs, his children and grandchildren.

"Respondents, in their Answer, denied the material allegations of the [C]omplaint and alleged that they

entered and occupied the premises in their own right as true, valid and lawful claimants, possessors and

owners of the said lot way back in 1960 and up to the present time; that they have acquired just and

valid ownership and possession of the premises by ordinary or extraordinary prescription, and that the

Regional Director of the DENR, Region XI has already upheld their possession over the land in question

when it ruled that they [were] the rightful claimants and possessors and [were], therefore, entitled to

the issuance of a title.

"The Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur rendered judgment in favor of petitioners but the

Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, on appeal, reversed and set aside the said decision. x x x"6

Affirming the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the CA upheld the right of respondents as claimants and

possessors. The appellate court held that -- although not yet final -- the Order issued by the regional



Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best exact copies. As such, they

are not admissible in evidence, as there is no way of determining whether they are genuine or

authentic.19

The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a facsimile of the signature of CENR

Officer Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the same as that which is alluded to in Garvida.The one mentioned here refers to a facsimile signature, which is defined as a signature produced by

mechanical means but recognized as valid in banking, financial, and business transactions.20

Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification. In fact, the DENR regional director has

acknowledged and used it as reference in his Order dated April 2, 1998:

"x x x. CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda, in a 'CERTIFICATION' dated 22 July 1997, certified among

others, that: x x x per records available in his Office, x x x the controverted lot x x x was not

allocated to any person x x x."21

If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims, then the regional director would not have used it asreference in his Order. Instead, he would have either verified it or directed the CENR officer to take the

appropriate action, as the latter was under the former's direct control and supervision.

Petitioners' claim that the Certification was raised for the first time on appeal is incorrect. As early as the

pretrial conference at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), the CENR Certification had already been marked

as evidence for respondents as stated in the Pre-trial Order.22 The Certification was not formally

offered, however, because respondents had not been able to file their position paper.

Neither the rules of procedure23 nor jurisprudence24 would sanction the admission of evidence that

has not been formally offered during the trial. But this evidentiary rule is applicable only to ordinary

trials, not to cases covered by the rule on summary procedure -- cases in which no full-blown trial is

held.25

_____________________

NBORJE vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

That the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the accused has not been satisfactorily

overcome by the prosecution evidence in the case at bar where the conviction of petitioner for

falsification of public documents was based principally on the mere assumption that as possessor of thefalsified documents, he is presumed to be the author of the falsification, is stoutly raised in this appeal

by certiorari. Since there is no direct proof showing that accused-appellant, being then the Provincial

Plant Industry Officer with many subordinate employees and personnel under him engaged in

agricultural field work and assigned in the rural areas like the complainant Rodrigo Ducusin, had

personally and actually falsified the public documents in question (Timebook and Payroll, Exhibit "A";

Daily Time Record, Exhibit "B"; and Certification, Exhibit "C") which under normal office procedures pass



through numerous hands at several government offices for typing, attestations, funding, accounting,

and payment of the check for P225.00, the legal issue thus raised merits Our careful consideration and

resolution, in the face of accused-appellant's vigorous denial.

The information filed against the accused-appellant reads as follows:

The undersigned Special Prosecutor accuses NICASIO BORJE of the crime of FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC

DOCUMENT committed as follows:

That on or about the period from January, February and March, 1977, and sometime thereafter,

in the Municipality of San Fernando, Province of La Union, Philippines, and within the

jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the Provincial Plant

Industry Officer of Bureau of Plant Industry, Provincial Office at San Fernando, La Union and in

relation by his performance of the duties of his office, taking advantage of his position as such,

did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify the Timebook and Payroll of his

office for the periods January to March, 1977, Daily Time Record for the same period of Rodrigo

Ducusin and Certification for P225.00 by causing it to appear in the said documents that Rodrigo

Ducusin have participated in the same and affixed his signatures thereon when in truth and in

fact he did not so sign the said documents nor otherwise participated in their execution to the

damage and prejudice of the and Rodrigo Ducusin and the Republic.

The accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged and the trial commenced on August 7,

1980 after the case was reinvestigated by the Tanodbayan on petition of said accused-appellant, herein

petitioner.

On October 23, 1980, the respondent court rendered a decision promulgated on October 29, 1980,

finding the petitioner guilty as per the dispositive portion thereof, to wit:

WHEREFORE, accused is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal for the crane

of Falsification of Public Documents as defined and penalized under Article 171, paragraph 2, of

the Revised Penal Code, and there being no modifying circumstance to consider, the Court

hereby sentences him to an indeterminate imprisonment ranging from two (2) years, four (4)

months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of

prision mayor as maximum, to pay a fine of P2,500.00 and to pay the costs.

The decision appealed from recites the evidence for the government as follows:

The defense disclaims the authenticity of the prosecution's Exhibit H which is purportedly the originalBorje reply letter to BPI Regional Director Varquez' endorsement of Ducusin's resignation letter. Instead,

Exhibit 8 was presented in evidence as the genuine carbon copy of Borje's signed letter reply dated May

5,1978 in response to Varquez' memorandum of May 3, 1978 wherein petitioner recommended

disapproval of Ducusin's resignation in order that Ducusin could face the charges against him in

connection with his work with the Gulayan Program. (TSN, Aug. 27,1980, pp. 56- 58,90).



The Sandiganbayan in its decision formulated two issues determinative of the innocence or guilt of the

accused, to wit: (1) Whether or not the Time Book and Payroll (Exhibit A), the certification (Exhibit C)

and the Daily Time Records (Exhibit D) in support of said payroll were falsified, and (2) If they were, the

liability of the accused, if any. As indicated earlier, the accused- appellant was found guilty by

respondent court.

Hence, the instant appeal by way of certiorari.

Petitioner submits the following assignment of errors:

IThe respondent court erred in holding that the petitioner is guilty of the offense of falsification of public

documents, the same not having began established by proof beyond reasonable doubt, considering that:

A. the originals of the alleged falsified documents were not presented in court and, hence, the

corpus delicti has not been established as held in the case of U S. vs. Gregorio

B. There is no iota of evidence that the petitioner falsified the complainant's signature on the

alleged falsified documents;

Before resolving the above assigned errors, We find it imperative and compelling to describe and detail

the nature and contents of the vital documentary exhibits of the prosecution alleged to have been

falsified by the accused-appellant. These are official forms and they are (1) Exhibit A, Timebook and

Payroll of accused-appellant's office for the period January to March 1977; (2) Exhibit D, Daily Time

Record for the same period of Rodrigo Ducusin; and (3) Exhibit C, Certification that Ducusin was detailed

to the Program.

The defense contends that the prosecution, having presented xerox copies only of the falsified

documents, Exhs. "D" and "C", fatted to prove the corpus delicti of the crime charged, citing the case ofU.S. vs. Gregorio, 17 Phil. 522. In this case of Gregorio, the Supreme Court held:

In a criminal case for the falsification of a document, it is indispensable that the judges and the

courts have before them the document alleged to have been simulated, counterfeited or

falsified, in order that they may find, pursuant to the evidence produced at the trial, whether or

not the crime of falsification was actually committed; in the absence of the original document, it

is improper to conclude, with only a copy of the said original in view, that there has been a

falsification of a document which was neither found nor exhibited, because, in such a case, even

the existence of such original document may be doubted.

Reacting to the defense contention, the Sandiganbayan held that "(a)ccused's claim that in the

absence of the original documents it is improper to conclude that there is falsification of

document in accordance with the case of U.S. vs. Gregorio, 17 Phil. 522, is sleazy for the case

referred to is not in point," and then attempted to differentiate said case with the case at bar by

holding that "(h)ad the issue confronting the Court been one of alteration or superimposition of

signatures or word or figure, then the issue of bringing out the original may have relevance. "

The Sandiganbayan further added: "At any rate, it is worthwhile to note that with the



development of modem copying devices which virtually eliminate the possibility of error in

reproduction of the original, the relevancy of the doctrine in U.S. vs. Gregorio is now open to

question.

We do not agree with the respondent court. Firstly the Gregorio ruling makes no distinction for the

doctrine itself applies in criminal proceedings for the falsification of a document, whether simulated,counterfeited, or falsified. Secondly, the Gregorio doctrine is still tenable notwithstanding modern

copying devices for a falsified document, passed off as an original can also be duplicated by xeroxing and

thereafter, certified as true copy of the original as in Exh. "D". And thirdly, considering that in the case at

bar, the xeroxing was done or caused to be done by complainant Ducusin (TSN, pp. 189-191, Aug. 25,

1980) after taking out the original documents without the official authority and permission of the

Disbursing Officer and Cashier, Remedios Lorenzo, who was then out on rural service and thereafter the

originals were lost, misplaced and are now missing, the failure to present the originals is suspicious for

complainant had ulterior and ill motives in accusing the petitioner as will be shown hereunder.

__________________________

Tomasa Vda. de Jacob vs. CA

(Presumption of Marriage)

Nature of the Case:

This is a Petition for Review assailing the decision of the CA denying petitioner’s Motion for

Reconsideration

Facts:

Petitioner Tomasa Vda. de Jacob claimed to be the surviving spouse of deceased Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and

was appointed Special Administratix for the various estates of the deceased by virtue of a reconstructed

Marriage Contract between herself and the deceased. Respondent Pedro Pilapil on the other hand,

claimed to be the legally-adopted son of Alfredo, purportedly supported by an Order issued by then

Presiding Judge Jose L. Moya, CFI, Camarines Sur, granting the petition for adoption filed by deceased

Alfredo in favor of Pedro Pilapil. Pedro sought to intervene during the proceeding for the settlement of

the estate of Alfredo, claiming his share of the deceased’s estate as Alfredo's adopted son and sole

surviving heir. Pedro likewise questioned the validity of the marriage between Appellant Tomasa and his

adoptive father Alfredo. Appellant claims that the marriage between her and Alfredo was solemnized by

one Msgr. Florencio C. Yllana, CBCP, Intramuros, Manila sometime in 1975. She could not however

present the original copy of the Marriage Contract stating that the original document was lost when

Msgr. Yllana allegedly gave it to Mr. Jose Centenera for registration. In lieu of the original, Tomasa

presented as secondary evidence a reconstructed Marriage Contract issued in 1978. Several

irregularities on the reconstructed Marriage Contract were observed by the court such as: (1) no copy of

the Marriage Contract was sent to the local civil registrar by the solemnizing officer; (2) a mere



“thumbmark” was purportedly placed by the late Alfredo Jacob on said reconstructed marriage contract

on 16 September 1975 (date of the marriage), instead of his customary signature as affixed in their

Sworn Affidavit; (3) inconsistencies in the circumstances and personalities surrounding the lost Marriage

Contract mentioned in the affidavit executed by Msgr. Yllana and in the testimony admitted by the

appellant; and (4) appellant admitted that there was no record of the purported marriage entered in the

book of records in San Agustin Church where the marriage was allegedly solemnized. Based on the

evidence presented, the trial court ruled for defendant-appellee Pilapil, sustaining his claim as the

legally adopted child and sole heir of deceased Alfredo and declaring the reconstructed Marriage

Contract as spurious and non-existent. The Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the trial court.

Issues:

WON the marriage between the plaintiff, Tomasa Vda. De Jacob and deceased Alfredo E. Jacob was

indeed valid.

Held:

Yes. The marriage between appellant and the deceased was valid.

Ratio:

Pilapil’s claim that the marriage was void due to absence of a marriage license was misplaced. An

affidavit executed by the appellant and the late Dr. Jacob that they lived together as husband and wife

for at least five years exempted them from the marriage license requirement (Article 76 of the Civil

Code). Also misplaced was Pilapil’s argument that the marriage was void because of the absence of a

marriage contract and the absence of entry of such in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar

and in the National Census and Statistics Office. A marriage contract is the best evidence of a marriage

ceremony. However, “the contents of a document may be proven by competent evidence other than

the document itself, provided that the offeror establishes its due execution and its subsequent loss or

destruction. Accordingly, the fact of marriage may be shown by extrinsic evidence other than the

marriage contract.” In the instant case, appellant provided competent evidence to prove that a marriage

ceremony was solemnized between her and the late Dr.Jacob. Such evidence was supplied by appellant

Tomasa, witness Adela Pilapil and the solemnizing officer Msgr. Yllana through their sworn testimonies

both in open court and in writing, and through the photographs taken during the ceremony. The

absence of an entry pertaining to 1975 in the Books of Marriage of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila and

in the National Census and Statistics Office (NCSO) does not invalidate the marriage. It is primary duty of

the solemnizing officer, not the petitioner, to send a copy of the marriage certificate to these offices in

order to be duly recorded.

In the absence of any counter presumption or evidence special to the case, a man and a woman

deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed to have entered into a lawful contract of

marriage. As the fact that Dr. Jacob and appellant Tomasa lived together as husband and wife was not

disputed in this case, but was in fact even accepted, it would follow that the presumption of marriage

was not likewise rebutted.



CITIBANK, N.A. MASTERCARD, petitioner, vs. EFREN S. TEODORO, respondent .

D E C I S I O N

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Before secondary evidence may be admitted to prove the contents of original documents, the

offeror must prove the due execution and the subsequent loss or unavailability of the original.

The Case

The Petition for Review[1] before us assails the July 31, 2001 Decision[2] and the November 22, 2001

Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 62891. The dispositive portion of the

challenged Decision reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED; and

the Decisions of the trial courts are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No

costs.”[4]

The assailed Resolution denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

Petitioner operates a credit card system through which it extends credit accommodations to its

cardholders for the purchase of goods and services from its member establishments. The purchases are

later on paid for by cardholders upon receipt of the billings or statements of account from the

company. Respondent Efren S. Teodoro was one such cardholder. On December 14, 1990, he applied

for membership with petitioner. After his application was approved, he was issued Citibank, N.A.

Mastercard No. 5423-3920-4457-7009.

Under the terms and conditions governing the use of the Citibank credit card, the cardholder

undertakes to pay all the purchases made using the card within the period indicated on the statement of

account or within thirty (30) days from the date or dates of its use. Charges that remain unpaid within

the period fixed in the monthly statement of account shall earn interest at the rate of 3.5 percent per

month plus a penalty fee equivalent to 5 percent of the amount due for every month or even a fraction

of a month’s delay.

Respondent made various purchases through his credit card. Accordingly, he was billed by

petitioner for those purchases, for which he tendered various payments.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2003/sep2003/150905.htm#_ftn1















Petitioner claims that as of January 20, 1995, the obligations of respondent stood at P191,693.25,

inclusive of interest and service charges. Several times it demanded payment from him, but he refused

to pay, claiming that the amount demanded did not correspond to his actual obligations. His refusal

prompted petitioner to file a Complaint for collection on January 25, 1996 before the Regional Trial

Court (RTC) of Makati City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 96-092 and raffled to Branch 133.

The RTC, in an Order dated April 23, 1996, dismissed the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the

amount involved. The case was then transferred to the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Makati City,

where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 51586 and raffled to Branch 66.

During the trial, petitioner presented several sales invoices or charge slips, which added up to only

P24,388.36. Although mere photocopies of the originals, the invoices were marked in evidence as

Exhibits “F” to “F-4.” Because all these copies appeared to bear the signatures of respondent, the trial

court deemed them sufficient proof of his purchases with the use of the credit card. Accordingly, the

MTC in its July 25, 2000 Decision [5] ordered him to pay petitioner the amount of P24,388.36 plus interest

and penalty fee.

greed attorney’s fees plus cost of suit.”[6]

Thereafter, respondent appealed the MTC judgment to the RTC of Makati City, where the appeal

was docketed as Civil Case No. 00-1051 and raffled to Branch 146. In its October 30, 2000 Decision,[7] the

RTC affirmed the MTC Decision in toto.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The focal issue of the case according to the CA was whether the photocopies of the sales invoices

or charge slips, marked as Exhibits “F” to “F-4,” were competent proofs of the obligations of

respondent. These were the only evidence presented by petitioner that could prove the actual amount

of obligation he had incurred in favor of the former. In reversing the trial courts, the CA ruled that this

evidence was insufficient to prove any liability on respondent’s part.

According to Sections 3 and 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, whenever the subject of inquiry is

the content of a document, its original must be produced, as it is the best evidence to prove such

content. Secondary evidence, like the subject photocopies, is inadmissible. It will be admissible only if

the offeror proves (a) any of the exceptions enumerated in Section 3 and (b) the conditions for its

admissibility set forth in Section 5 of Rule 130. For secondary evidence to be admissible, there must be

satisfactory proof of (1) the due execution of the original; (2) the original’s loss, destruction or

unavailability that is not due to the offeror’s bad faith; and (3) reasonable diligence and good faith in the

search for or attempt to produce the original.

Although petitioner was able to prove the existence of the original sales invoices, it failed to prove

their due execution or to account for their loss or unavailability.













Hence, this Petition.[8]

Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:

“I. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in reversing and setting aside the decision of

the trial courts for insufficiency of evidence to support its findings.

“II. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner failed to prove the

due execution and the cause of the unavailability and non-production of the charge slips

marked in evidence as Exhibits ‘F’ to ‘F-4.’”[9]

In brief, the main issue boils down to whether the photocopies of the sales invoices or charge slips

marked during trial as Exhibits “F” to “F-4” are admissible in evidence.

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

Main Issue:

Admissibility of Photocopies

Petitioner contends that the testimony[10] of its principal witness –- Mark Hernando, assistant

manager of Citibank, N.A. Mastercard -- proves the following:

a) the existence or due execution of the original sales invoices which sufficiently proved

respondent’s liability of P24,388.36;

b) the loss or unavailability of the original sales invoices; and

c) petitioner’s reasonable diligence and good faith in the search f or or attempt to produce the

originals.

It further argues that Hernando competently identified the signatures of respondent on the sales

invoices, having recognized them as identical to the signature on the latter’s credit card application

form.

On the other hand, respondent maintains that petitioner failed to prove the due execution of the

sales invoices. According to him, Hernando was not privy to such execution and could not have properly

or competently declared that the signatures on the invoices and on the application form belonged to the















execution, loss, and contents. At the sound discretion of the court, this order may be changed if

necessary.[15]

In the present case, the existence of the original sales invoices was established by the photocopies

and the testimony of Hernandez. Petitioner, however, failed to prove that the originals had been lost or

could not be produced in court after reasonable diligence and good faith in searching for them.

Indeed, the loss of the originals and reasonable diligence in the search for them were conditions

that were not met, because the sales invoices might have been found by Equitable. Hernandez,

testifying that he had requested the originals from Equitable, failed to show that he had subsequently

followed up the request.[16]







