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SECONDDIVISION

PEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,G.R.Nos.154218&154372

Petitioner,

PUNO,J.,Chairperson,

- versus - SANDOVAL-

GUTIERREZ,*COR

ONA,

AZCUNA,and

GARCIA,

JJ.

HON.JUDGEJOSER.HERNANDEZ,

inhiscapacityasPresidingJudge, Promulgated:Br.158,RTC-PasigCity,ATTY.

LIGAYAP.SALAYONandATTY.

ANTONIOM.LLORENTE,

Respondents.August28,2006

x---------------------------------------------------

x

DECISION

PUNO,J.:

BeforeusisaPetitionforReviewonCertiorariunderRule45

oftheRulesofCourt,seekingthereversaloftheJointDecision [1]of

theCourtofAppeals(CA)inCA-G.R.SPNos.68922and69703which

affirmed the Order[2] issued by respondent Judge Jose R.

Hernandez, presiding judge of Branch 158 of the Regional Trial

Court(RTC)ofPasigCity,dismissingCriminalCaseNos.118823-31,

118848-91, 118902-9063 and 119099-204 for violation of private

respondentsLlorenteandSalayon'srighttospeedytrial.

First,thefacts.

TheinstantcasestemmedfromacomplaintfiledbyAquilino

Pimentel, Jr., a senatorial candidate in theMay 1995 elections,

against private respondents Salayon and Llorente, Chairman and

Vice-Chairman,respectively,oftheCityBoardofCanvassersofPasig

City, and a certain Reynaldo San Juan, Campaign Manager of

senatorial candidate Juan Ponce Enrile, for allegedly decreasing

Pimentel'svotesintheStatementofVotesperprecinctandinthe

CityCertificateof Canvass forPasig City.Pimentelfiled apetition

with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 133509, which sought the

reversaloftheresolutionsoftheCOMELECdismissinghiscomplaintforlackofprobablecause.OnFebruary9,2000,wepromulgated

ourDecisioninsaidcase,grantingPimentel'spetitionandordering

theCOMELEC"tofileforthwithwiththeproper[RTC]thenecessary

criminalinformationforviolationofSection27(b)of[RepublicAct]

No. 6646,[3] otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of

1987, against private respondents Ligaya Salayon and Antonio

Llorente."[4]

Pursuant thereto, the COMELEC filed a total of 321

informationsforviolationofSection27(b)ofR.A.No.6646againstprivaterespondentsLlorenteandSalayononthefollowingdates:a)

nine (9) informationswerefiled onAugust 28, 2000,docketedas

CriminalCaseNos.118823-118831;b)forty-four(44)informations

on August 29, 2000, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 118848-

118891;c)onehundredsixty-two(162)informationsonAugust31,

2000, docketed asCriminal CaseNos. 118902-119063;andd)106

informationsonSeptember7,2000,docketedasCriminalCaseNos.

119099-119204. The four sets of informations were raffled to

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Branches 164, 158, 153 and 69, respectively,of the RTCof Pasig

City.

Private respondentLlorentefiledanUrgent Ex-ParteMotion

forConsolidation[5]ofCriminalCaseNos.118823-118831(pending

before Branch 164) with Criminal Case Nos. 118848-118891

(pendingbeforeBranch 158).ThismotionwasgrantedbyBranch

164,[6] thereby consolidating the nine (9) informations pending

beforeitwiththe44otherinformationspendingwithBranch158.

Subsequently, private respondent Llorente filed three (3)

OmnibusMotionsbeforeBranches 158,153and69of theRTCof

PasigCity,askingthem:1)toconsolidateallthecasesfiledagainst

himforviolationofSection27(b)ofR.A.No.6646;2)todeclarethe

multiple informations filed against him as constituting only one

offense;3)to treatthe321informationsfiled against himas onlyoneinformationforviolationofSection27(b)ofR.A.No.6646;and

4)toallowhimtopostbailtoonlyoneinformation.

After finding private respondent Llorente's prayer to

consolidatetobe"meritoriousandtherebeingnoobjection"from

theprosecution,JudgeEriccioC.YgaaofBranch153grantedthe

same and remanded Criminal Case Nos. 118902-119063 to the

Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Pasig City for proper

disposition.[7]Similarly,JudgeLorifelLacapPahimnaofBranch69

granted private respondent Llorente's motion to consolidate,findingthat"itisfortheconvenienceofthepartiesthatthesecases

(Criminal Case Nos. 119099-119204) be consolidated with those

casespendingbeforeBranch158consideringthatallcasesinvolved

common questions of fact and law and the parties may have to

introducecommonevidenceinsupportoftheirrespectivepositions

inthesecases."JudgePahimnaforwardedthecasespendingbefore

Branch69toBranch158"unlessthepresidingjudgeofsaidbranch

interposesobjection to suchconsolidation."Moreover, theother

issues raised by private respondent Llorente were referred to

Branch158forappropriateaction.[8]

On September 27, 2000, Senior State Prosecutor Rogelio

BagabuyofiledhisNoticeofAppearancewithBranch158oftheRTC

ofPasigCity.[9]HelikewisefiledanUrgentOmnibusMotionTo:1)

hold in abeyance the implementation of the orders of the court

priortohisappearanceascounsel;2)remandallthecasespending

beforeittotheOfficeoftheClerkofCourtoftheRTCofPasigCity;

3)hold inabeyancethe resolution ofall motions filedby private

respondentLlorentewiththecourt;4)ordertheOfficeoftheClerk

ofCourtoftheRTCofPasigCitytoholdinabeyancethere-raffling

ofallthe"dagdag-bawas"casesagainstprivaterespondents;and5)

allowhimampletimetosecurefromtheSupremeCourtatransfer

ofvenueofthecasesfromPasigCitytoManilaorPasayCity. [10]

Private respondent Llorente filed an Opposition (to the

Prosecution's Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 25 September

2000)[11]withBranch158oftheRTCofPasigCity.OnDecember

13, 2000, petitioner, through Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo,

filed with Branch 158 of the RTC of Pasig City its

Comment/Oppositionto [the]OmnibusMotionsfiledbyAccused

Llorente,[12] reiterating its prayers in itsOmnibus Motiondated

September25,2000.

OnMarch 2, 2001, respondent Judge issued anOrder, thedispositiveportionwhichreads:

WHEREFORE, accused Llorente's

OmnibusMotion dated September 5,2000,

OmnibusMotion dated September 6, 2000

and Omnibus Motion dated September 8,

2000are granted allowing theconsolidation

of cases against accused Llorente pending

before Branches 69, 153 and 164 of this

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Court with those pending before this

branch.Themultipleactsallegedinthe321

Informationsfiledagainsthimaredeclaredto

constituteonlyoneviolationofSection27(b)

ofRepublicActNo.6646.Thereshouldthen

be only one information against accused

Llorente.Thisbenefitappliesalsotoaccused

Salayon.PublicProsecutor's(sic)Bagabuyo's

OmnibusMotiondatedSeptember25, 2000

isdenied.

Thearraignmentandpre-trialofboth

accusedis(sic)setonMarch20,2001at8:30

inthemorning.

SOORDERED.[13]

The trial court noted that during the hearing on private

respondent Llorente's motion on September 12, 2000, the

prosecution, then through Director Jose P. Balbuena of the

COMELEC,washeardonthe matter ofconsolidation ofthe cases

andinfactgaveitsconsentthereto.Eventherepresentativefrom

theofficeofSenatorAquilinoPimentel,Jr.,anAtty.LuisGana,did

not register any objection thereto. In ruling that only one

informationforviolationofSection27(b)ofR.A.No.6646should

havebeenfiled,thetrialcourtheld: [I]n this case[,] the unity of criminal

intent is manifested by the fact that the

several acts of tampering[,] while allegedly

done separately over a three-day period,

were perpetuated on one single occasion

whichis the canvassingof the votescast in

theMay8,1995electionsinPasigCity,and,

significantly,perpetuatedonly onone single

document,theSoV,adocumentoffifty-eight

(58) pages.Whiletheremaybe severalacts

oftampering,thisCourtcouldattributeonly

onecrimeagainst accusedLlorente. This is

what the Comelec did in People vs. Maria

Arsenia Garcia, et al. docketed as Criminal

Case No. 3485-A before the Regional Trial

CourtofAlaminos,Pangasinan.Themultiple

acts of tampering by the accused were

treatedbytheCOMELECasoneoffenseora

singlecountof (sic) the violationof Section

27(b)ofR.A.6646.Thereis noreasonthen

why accused Llorente should be treated

differently.[14]

OnMarch25,2001,petitionermovedforthereconsideration

of the March 2, 2001 Order of the trial court.[15] Private

respondent Llorente filed his Comment and Opposition,[16] to

whichpetitionerfileditsrejoinder.[17]

In his Order[18] dated May 11, 2001, respondent Judge

denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the March 2,

2001 Order and set the arraignment and pre-trial of private

respondents"onJune15,2001at8:30inthemorning."

OnJune15,2001,privaterespondentsLlorenteandSalayon

werearraignedand pleaded "notguilty." Senior StateProsecutor

Bagabuyo was absent during the arraignment but the same

neverthelessproceededinthepresenceofPublicProsecutorJose

DaniloC.Jabson, the assigned prosecutor in the trial court. The

trialcourtheld:

Both accused, assisted by their

respective counsels, after having been

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informed of the charge filed against them

and its attending consequences, entered a

pleaofNOTGUILTY.

Pursuant to the Order of March 2,

2001, thethree hundred [twenty-one](321)

informationsfiledagainstbothaccusedwere

treatedtobeonlyasingleoffenseforwhich

they should be made answerable. It is for

thisreasonthatbothaccusedwerearraigned

and entered their plea to a single or one

informationonly.

Havingenteredtheirplea,setthepre-

trialofthiscaseon June29,2001at8:30in

themorning.[19] On June 27, 2001, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to

PostponeandMotion forReconsideration[20]oftheOrderdated

June15,2001ofthetrialcourt,askingthetrialcourttonullifythe

arraignment of respondents for lack of notice to the

prosecution.TheJune29,2001hearingwasresettoJuly6,2001in

viewoftheprosecution'sfilingoftheOmnibusMotiontoPostpone

and Motion for Reconsideration. The July 6, 2001 hearing was

cancelledas SeniorState Prosecutor Bagabuyodid not appear, a

representative having telephoned the trial court that he was

indisposed.ThehearingwasresettoJuly26,2001.[21]However,the hearing on July 26, 2001 was again cancelled and reset to

August 2,2001for Senior StateProsecutor Bagabuyo's failure to

appear,thus:

Since Prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo is

again not available for today's hearing

because he is indisposed as relayed to this

Court by his representative, Atty. Jay I.

Dejaresco,andthroughatelephonecallfrom

hissecretaryOrlandoNicolas,asprayedfor,

andoverthevehementobjectionofcounsels

forbothaccused,thepre-trial/trialscheduled

today is cancelled and reset on August 2,

2001at8:30inthemorning.

xxx

Intheeventthattherewillagainbeno

appearancefromProsecutorBagabuyoatthe

next scheduled hearing, the Legal

DepartmentoftheCOMELECshallthenmake

itsappearanceandtakeovertheprosecution

ofthiscase.

SOORDERED.[22]

Afterconsideringtherespectivepositionsoftheprosecution

andtheprivaterespondents,thetrialcourtissueditsOrderdated

August2,2001[23]denyingtheprosecution'sOmnibusMotionto

PostponeandMotion forReconsideration.It foundthat contrary

to the prosecution's claim that it was not notified of the

arraignmentonJune15,2001,therecordsrevealedthattheOrder

of the trialcourtdatedMay 11, 2001whichset the date ofthe

arraignment and pre-trialon June 15, 2001was received by theDepartment of Justice onMay 17, 2001. As a consequence, the

arraignment of private respondents Llorente and Salayon

proceeded as scheduled. TheMotion for Reconsideration of the

trialcourt'sMarch2,2001Orderwaslikewisedeniedforbeingin

the nature of a second motion for reconsideration which is a

prohibitedpleadingundertheRulesofCourt.Despitethedenialof

the prosecution'smotions, the pre-trial and trial were cancelled

and reset to September 4, 2001 in view of the prosecution's

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manifestation that it was appealing the trial court's order to a

higher court. The court warned that "[i]n the event that the

prosecutionshall notbe ableto getany restrainingorderto stop

theproceedingsinthiscase,thehearingonsaiddateshallproceed

asscheduled."[24]

Accordingly,petitioner,throughSeniorStateProsecutor

Bagabuyo, filed a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition,Mandamus,

InjunctionwithPrayerforaTemporaryRestrainingOrderwiththe

CA, docketedas CA-G.R. No. SPNo.65966.On August16,2001,

saidpetitionwasdismissedoutrightforhavingbeenfiledwithout

the participationof the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in

violationofSection35(1),Chapter12,TitleIII,BookIVofthe1987

Administrative Code.[25] Petitioner filed a Motion for

Reconsideration, to no avail.[26] Unhindered, petitioner filed a

Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Review onCertiorari[27] with this Court on October 30, 2001, pursuant to

Section2,Rule 45of theRulesofCourt.We grantedpetitioner's

motioninourResolutiondatedDecember12,2001.Petitionerfiled

itsPetitionforReviewonJanuary10,2002,docketedasG.R.No.

150317.WeresolvedtodenythepetitiononJanuary30,2002for

having been filed out of time and for Senior State Prosecutor

Bagabuyo'sfailuretosignthepetition.[28]Petitioneragainfileda

MotionforReconsiderationwiththisCourt,tonoavail.[29]

Meantime, in the trial court, the hearing set onSeptember4,2001didnotproceedduetoSeniorStateProsecutor

Bagabuyo's absence. Another representative from the office of

Senator Pimentel, an Atty. Galimpin, appeared in court and

requested for a postponement. Again, the court received a call

from the secretaryof Senior StateProsecutorBagabuyothatthe

latter had his tooth extracted, hence, could not appear in

court. The trial court found this excuse quite odd since Atty.

Galimpin informed thecourt thathe sawSenior StateProsecutor

BagabuyoattheOfficeoftheClerkofCourtinthefirstfloorofthe

samebuildingwherethecourtsits.Privaterespondentsmovedfor

thedismissaloftheinstantcasesduetothedenialoftheirrightto

speedy trial. The trial court denied their motion and gave the

prosecution the last opportunity to prosecute the instant cases,

setting the next hearings on October 3 and 15, 2001, with the

admonition that failure to proceed will be dealt with

accordingly.[30]

OnOctober3,2001,theprosecutionrefusedtoproceed

withpre-trialandtrial,givingasreasonitspendingpetitionbefore

the CA. Private respondent Llorente reiterated his motion to

dismissthecaseonthegroundofviolationofhisrighttospeedy

trial.Thetrialcourtgrantedprivaterespondentsaperiodofthree

(3) days therefrom within which to formalize their motions to

dismiss and the prosecution was also given three (3) days fromreceipt of private respondents' motions within which to file its

commentorobjection.[31]

PrivaterespondentLlorentefiledhisMotiontoDismiss

dated October 4, 2001.[32] Before petitioner could file an

opposition,itfileditsMotiontoInhibit[33]datedOctober5,2001,

askingJudgeHernandeztovoluntarilyinhibithimselffromhearing

the instant cases and remand the same tothe ClerkofCourtof

Pasig City for re-raffling. Later, the prosecution likewise filed its

Opposition (to [Private Respondent's Motion to] Dismiss withPrayertoHoldinAbeyanceitsResolutionuntilafterResolutionof

ourMotiontoInhibit).PrivaterespondentLlorentefiledhisReply

(toProsecution'sOppositiondatedOctober7,2001)andComment-

Opposition(toProsecution'sPrayerforInhibition).Theprosecution

fileditsRejoinder(toReplytoOppositiontotheMotiontoDismiss

with Prayer to Hold in Abeyance its Resolution until after

ResolutionofourMotiontoInhibit)andCounter-Comment(tothe

OppositiontoMotiontoInhibit).PrivaterespondentSalayonfileda

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ManifestationdatedOctober 6,2001,adoptingall theallegations

mentioned in the Motion to Dismiss of his co-respondent

Llorente.On October 15, 2001,the parties optednot tohave a

hearing after having agreed to put all their arguments in their

respectivepleadings.[34]

On November 23, 2001, the trial court rendered its

assailedorder,thedispositiveportionofwhichstates:

WHEREFORE, the Motion to

Dismiss dated October 4, 2001 filed by

accusedAntonioM.Llorente,adoptedbyco-

accusedLigayaP.Salayon,isgrantedandthis

case is dismissed. The cash bail posted by

eachaccusedisorderedreleasedtothem.

SOORDERED.[35]

Petitioner, through Senior State Prosecutor

Bagabuyo,thenfiledwith

thisCourtaPetitionforCertiorari,ProhibitionandMandamus[36]

dated February 1, 2002 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,

docketedasG.R.Nos.151461-151781.Petitionerprayedthat:

1. Upon the fil ing hereof, this case be

consolidatedwith [the]Petition for Review,filedlastJanuary10,2002[withtheSupreme

Court],anddocketedasG.R.No.150317;

2.TheOrderdismissingtheinstantcasesbe

recalled,setasideandthe321criminalcases

filed against both accused Salayon and

Llorente be reinstated; afterwhich they be

arraignedforthe321countsfortheviolation

ofSection27(b)ofR.A.6646;

3. The Order, dated June 15, 2001, be

declaredasnullandvoidandsetaside;

4. All the cases that used to be pending

before the respondent, Honorable RTC-158

be ordered remanded to the Office of the

Clerk of Court for re-raffle to the other

branches, except those where these cases

were originally assigned to; or in the

alternative,

5. AnOrder beissuedchangingvenue from

the City of Pasig toeither Manila, Pasay or

Makati;and,

6. Plaintiff-petitioner prays for such other

reliefconsistentwithlawand equityon the

matter.[37]

PursuanttoSection6,Rule56oftheRulesofCourt,we

referredsaidpetitionto theCA forappropriateaction.[38]Inthe

CA,thecasewasdocketedasCA-G.R.SPNo.69703.

Meantime, on February 2, 2001, petitioner, this time

through the OSG, filed aMotion for Extensionof Time to File a

petitionforcertiorariunderRule65directlywiththeCA,docketed

as CA-G.R. SP No. 68922. The motion having been granted,[39]

petitioner,throughtheOSG,filed itspetition[40]contendingthat

respondent Judge "committed grave abuse of discretion and/or

actedwithout or in excessof jurisdiction in issuingthe orderof

dismissal dated November 23, 2001 allegedly on account of the

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speedytrialrule."[41]

Subsequently, CA-G.R. SP Nos. 69703 and 68922 were

consolidated.[42]

OnJuly4,2002,theCArendereditsassailedJointDecisionin

CA-G.R.SPNos.69703and68922,thedispositiveportionofwhich

states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered,

thepetitionsinCA-G.R.SPNo.68922andCA-

G.R. SP No. 69703 are hereby both DENIED

DUECOURSEand accordinglyDISMISSED, for

lack of merit. The assailed Order dated

November 23, 2001 issuedby Branch 158 of

the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City in

Criminal Case Nos. 118823-31; 118848-91;118902-9063; and 119099-204, all entitled

PeopleofthePhilippinesv.LigayaP.Salayon

andAntonioM.Llorente,isherebyAFFIRMED

andUPHELD.

Nopronouncementastocosts.

SOORDERED.[43]

TheCA notedthatasto CA-G.R. SPNo.69703,Senior State

ProsecutorBagabuyofiledanUrgentMotiontoWithdrawPetition

datedApril21,2002withtheSupremeCourtdespiteourreferralof

the case to the CA. The CA heldthat the petition instituted by

Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo should be "effectively

withdrawn"asthesamewasfiledwithouttheparticipationofthe

OSG,inviolationofSection35(1),Chapter12,TitleIII,BookIVofthe

1987Administrative Code. Atany rate,theCAlikewisefoundno

meritinthepetitioninstitutedbytheOSG.Itheldthatpetitioner

was essentially assailing an error of judgment and not of

jurisdiction, hence, its resort to a special civil action for certiorari

underRule65oftheRulesofCourtinsteadofanordinaryappeal

was erroneous. Even assuming that petitioner's recourse was

proper, theCA heldthat respondentJudgedidnot actwith grave

abuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictionwhen

he rendered his assailed Order dated November 23, 2001. The

rulingofthetrialcourtwasfoundtobesupportedbySections6and

9oftheRevisedRulesofCriminalProcedure,Sections9and13of

R.A. No. 8493 and Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III ofthe 1987

Constitution. Itrestated the principle that "[t]he right to speedy

trial means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive

delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent

person may be freed from the anxiety and expense of a court

litigationor,ifotherwise,ofhavinghisguiltdeterminedwithintheshortest possible time compatible with the presentation and

considerations of whatever legitimate defense he may

interpose."[44] TheCAfoundthatthecancellationofthehearings

inthetrialcourtbytheprosecutionwithoutanyvalidgroundswas

"certainly vexatious, capricious and oppressive." CitingPeople v.

Abao,[45] it held that "the dismissal of the cases following a

numberofpostponementsattheinstanceoftheprosecutionisnot

anabuseofdiscretion."TheCAlikewiseheldthat"delayresulting

from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders," as an

exclusiontothecomputationofthe80-dayperiodwithinwhichtocommencetrialunderSection3(3),Rule119oftheRulesofCourt,

shouldbereadinharmonywithSection7ofRule65oftheRulesof

Court.Hence,inthecaseatbar,themereexpedientofpetitioner's

filing before the CA of a petition for certiorari, prohibition and

mandamusunderRule65questioningthetrialcourt'sinterlocutory

orderdidnotinterrupttherunningofthe80-dayperiod.Moreover,

petitioner'srelianceonSection3(7)ofRule119isalsomisplacedas

thetrialcourtdidnotstateinitsordersgrantingcontinuancethat

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theends ofjustice ingranting thecontinuance outweigh thebest

interest of the public and the right of the accused to a speedy

trial. Finally, the CA pointed out that the prosecution failed to

commencewiththetrialevenafterthelapseof122daysfromthe

arraignmentofprivaterespondents.

Hence,theinstantpetitiononcertiorariunderRule45in

whichpetitionerraisesthefollowingissues:

I . [WHETHER] THE COURT OF APPEALS

ERREDONAQUESTIONOFLAWINHOLDING

THAT THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS NOT

WARRANTED INASMUCHASWHATIS BEING

IMPUGNEDIS"ANERROROFJUDGMENT."

I I. [WHETHER] THE COURT OF APPEALS

ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN

UPHOLDING THE DISMISSAL OF THE 321CRIMINAL CASES AGAINST PRIVATE

RESPONDENTS.[46]

The issues to be resolved are: a) whether a special civil

actionforcertiorariunderRule65istheproperremedyfromthe

dismissalof the casesbefore the trialcourt onthegroundof the

denialofprivaterespondents'righttospeedytrial;andb)whether

theCAerredinfindingthatrespondentJudgedidnotcommitgrave

abuseofdiscretionindismissingtheinstantcriminalcasesagainstprivate respondents upon a finding that the right of private

respondentstospeedytrialhasbeenviolated.

Weshallfirstresolvetheproceduralissue.

PetitionercontendsthatitspetitionforcertiorariunderRule

65 with the CA was the proper remedy since respondent Judge

committedgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingtolackorexcessof

jurisdiction when he consolidated the 321 criminal cases into one

informationanddismissedthe"criminalcase"onthegroundofthe

denialof private respondents'right to speedytrial,withoutgiving

theprosecutionthe chanceto present evidence.Citing Peoplev.

Velasco,[47]petitionercontendsthatthedismissalofthe"criminal

case"against private respondentsis tantamountto theiracquittal

which,asageneralrule,theprosecutioncannotappealfrominthe

absenceof a statute clearlyconferring thatright.In anycase, the

allegedexistenceoftheremedyofappealdoesnotalwaysforeclose

theremedyofapetitionforcertiorariunderRule65.

Petitioner'sremedywiththeCAwascorrect.

Section1,Rule122oftheRevisedRulesofCriminalProcedure

provides that [a]ny partymay appeal from a judgment or final

order,unlesstheaccusedwillbeplacedindoublejeopardy .

Asageneralrule,theprosecutioncannotappealorbringerror

proceedingsfromajudgmentinfavorofthedefendantinacriminal

case inthe absence ofa statute clearly conferring that right.[48]

Thus, errors of judgment are not appealable by the

prosecution.Appealbytheprosecutionfromtheorderofdismissal

ofthecriminalcasebythetrialcourtmaybeallowedonlyonerrors

ofjurisdictionwhentherewasdenialofdueprocessresultinginloss

orlackofjurisdiction.[49]Thisissoaswhileitistruethatdouble

jeopardy will attach in case the prosecution appeals a decisionacquitting the accused, an acquittal rendered in grave abuse of

discretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictiondoesnotreally

"acquit"andthereforedoesnotterminatethecaseastherecanbe

nodoublejeopardybasedonavoidindictment.[50]

Inthecaseatbar,thetrialcourtdismissedthecasesagainst

privaterespondentsforthedenialoftheirrighttospeedytrial.Ina

longlineofcases,wehaveheldthata dismissalonthegroundof

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the denial oftheaccused'sright to aspeedy trialwillhavethe

effectofacquittalthatwould

bar further prosecution of the accused for the same

offense.[51]Thus,wehaveheldthatwhereaftersuchdismissalthe

prosecutionmovedforthereconsiderationoftheorderofdismissal

andthecourtre-setthecasefortrial,theaccusedcansuccessfully

claimdoublejeopardyas thesaid orderwas actually anacquittal,

was final and cannotbe reconsidered.[52] Hence,petitionerwas

correctinfilingapetitionforcertiorariunderRule65,allegingthat

"respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion and/or

actedwithout or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order of

dismissal dated November 23, 2001 allegedly on account of the

speedytrialrule"asanappealwasnotavailabletoit.Wherethe

dismissal ofthe case was allegedlycapricious, certiorari lies from

suchorderofdismissalanddoesnotinvolvedoublejeopardy,asthepetitionchallengesnotthecorrectnessbutthevalidityoftheorder

ofdismissalandsuchgraveabuseofdiscretionamountstolackof

jurisdictionwhichpreventsdoublejeopardyfromattaching.[53]

HavingsettledthatapetitionforcertiorariunderRule65with

the CAwas the proper remedy from thedismissalof the instant

casesby the trialcourt,thecrucialissueis:wastheCA correctin

rulingthatawritofcertiorariwasnotwarrantedinasmuchasthe

respondent Judge did not act in grave abuse of discretion

amountingtolackorexcessofjurisdictionindismissingtheinstantcases against private respondents for the denialof their right to

speedytrial?

Awritofcertiorariiswarrantedwhen1)anytribunal,boardor

officer hasactedwithoutorin excessof itsor his jurisdiction,or

with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of

jurisdiction; and 2) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and

adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[54] An actof a

courtortribunalmaybeconsideredasingraveabuseofdiscretion

whenthesamewasperformedinacapriciousorwhimsicalexercise

of judgment amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of

discretionmustbesopatentandgrossastoamounttoanevasion

ofapositiveduty,ortoavirtualrefusaltoperformadutyenjoined

bylaw,aswherethepowerisexercisedinanarbitraryanddespotic

mannerbecauseofpassionorhostility.[55]

We affirm the CA's ruling that no such grave abuse of

discretionwasshowntoexistinrespondentJudge'sdismissalofthe

instantcases.

Therightoftheaccusedtoaspeedytrialisguaranteedunder

Sections 14(2) and 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.[56] In

1998, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8493, otherwise known as the

"SpeedyTrialActof1998."Thelawprovidedfortimelimitsinorder"to ensure a speedy trial of all criminal cases before the

Sandiganbayan, [RTC], Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial

Court,andMunicipalCircuitTrialCourt."OnAugust11,1998,the

Supreme CourtissuedCircularNo.38-98, theRules Implementing

R.A.No.8493.Theprovisionsofsaidcircularwereadoptedinthe

2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. As to the time limit

within which trial must commence after arraignment, the 2000

RevisedRulesofCriminalProcedurestates:

Sec. 6, Rule 119. Extended time limit.--

Notwithstanding the provisions of section1(g), Rule 116 and the preceding section 1,

for the first twelve-calendar-month period

following its effectivity on September 15,

1998, the time limit with respect to the

periodfromarraignmenttotrialimposedby

said provision shall be one hundred eighty

(180) days. For the second twelve-month

period, the time limit shall beone hundred

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twenty (120)days,and forthe thirdtwelve-

monthperiod,the timelimit shallbe eighty

(80)days.

R.A.No.8493anditsimplementingrulesandtheRevised

RulesofCriminalProcedureenumeratecertainreasonabledelaysas

exclusions in thecomputationof theprescribedtime limits. They

alsoprovide that"noprovisionoflawonspeedytrialandnorule

implementingthesameshallbeinterpretedasabartoanycharge

ofdenialofspeedytrialasprovidedbyArticleIII,Section14(2),of

the 1987Constitution."[57] Thus, in spite of the prescribed time

limits,jurisprudencecontinuestoadopttheviewthattheconcept

of"speedytrial"isarelativetermandmustnecessarilybeaflexible

concept.[58]InCorpuzv.Sandiganbayan,[59]weheld:

The right of the accused to aspeedy trial and to a speedy disposition of

thecaseagainsthimwasdesignedtoprevent

the oppression of the citizen by holding

criminalprosecutionsuspendedoverhimfor

anindefinite time,and topreventdelaysin

the administration of justice by mandating

the courts to proceed with reasonable

dispatch inthe trialof criminal cases. Such

right to a speedy trial and a speedy

dispositionof a case isviolated only when

the proceeding is attended by vexatious,

capriciousandoppressivedelays .xxx

Whilejustice isadministeredwith

dispatch, the essential ingredient is orderly,

expeditiousandnotmerespeed.Itcannot

bedefinitely said how long is too long ina

systemwherejusticeissupposedtobeswift,

but deliberate. It is consistent with delays

anddependsuponcircumstances.Itsecures

rights to the accused, but it does not

precludetherightsofpublicjustice.Also,it

must beborneinmindthattherightsgiven

to theaccused by theConstitution and the

Rules of Court are shields, not weapons;

hence, courts are to give meaning to that

intent.

A balancing test of applying

societal interests and the rights of the

accused necessarily compels the court to

approach speedy trial cases on an ad hoc

basis.

In determining whether the

accusedhasbeendeprivedofhisrighttoaspeedy disposition of the case and to a

speedy trial, four factors must be

considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the

reason for the delay; (c) the defendants

assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to

thedefendant.(citationsomitted)

Inthe cases atbar,in finding that private respondents

were denied of their right to speedy trial, respondent Judge

recountedthefollowingincidentsinthetrialcourt:

The Court considers the accused['s]

arraignmentof June15, 2001and notesthat

the pre-trial was initially set on June 29,

2001. This initial setting did not proceed, as

earlier, the Prosecution, through State

Prosecutor Bagabuyo, filed an Omnibus

Motion to Postpone and Motion for

Reconsideration.TheCourt,nevertheless, set

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the hearing to July 5,2001and gave proper

noticeto theProsecution. This July6 setting

also did not proceed asa staffof Prosecutor

Bagabuyo made a telephone call with this

Court seeking for a postponement as

Prosecutor Bagabuyo was not feeling

well.TheCourtissueditsOrderofJuly6,2001

settingthepre-trial againto July 26, 2001at

8:30a.m.TheJuly26pre-trialhearinglikewise

didnotproceed,asProsecutorBagabuyowas

indisposed. This matter was relayed to this

Court ina telephonecallof Orlando Nicolas,

secretaryofProsecutorBagabuyo.Duringthe

hearing,Atty.Jay I.Dejaresco,a lawyerfrom

the office of Senator Aquilino Pimentel,

appeared and confirmed the inability ofProsecutor Bagabuyo to appear during the

pre-trial hearing. The Court also requested

Atty.DejarescotoinformSenatorPimentelon

the delay caused by the non-appearance of

the Prosecutor. The hearing was reset to

August 2, 2001, the date suggestedby Atty.

Dejaresco.

TheAugust 2,2001hearingwas held,

but the Prosecution, through ProsecutorBagabuyo,manifested thatit wouldquestion

the Orderof this Court datedJune 15, 2001

andtheCourtsOrderonsaiddatedenyingthe

Prosecutions Motion for Reconsideration to

theOrderofJune15,2001.Asrequested,the

CourtgrantedtheProsecution30daystofile

the proper petition before the higher court,

and the pre-trialandtrialwasresetanew to

September 4, 2001. The Court [h]as

impressed with the commitment of the

Prosecution that in the event no restraining

orderwas issued to stop the proceedings in

thiscase, thepre-trialand trialshall proceed

on September 4, 2001. But the hearing of

September 4, 2001 did not proceed on

account of the absence of Prosecutor

Bagabuyo. Another representative from the

office of Senator Pimentel, a certain Atty.

Rolando Galimpin, appeared and requested

for another postponement. Like before, the

Court received a call from the secretary of

Prosecutor Bagabuyo that the latter had his

toothextractedandwouldnotbeinaposition

toappearatthehearing.ThisCourtfoundthemotion for postponement odd because Atty.

Galimpin informed the Court he saw

ProsecutorBagabuyoattheOfficeoftheClerk

ofCourt,whichis located atthefirstfloorof

thebuildingwherethisCourtsits.Eventhen,

theCourtdenied theaccused['s]oralmotion

todismiss and gave the Prosecution the last

opportunity to prosecute this case. The

Prosecution was given two dates,October 3

and15,2001,thedatesProsecutorBagabuyowould be available as represented by Atty.

Galimpin. Despite these dates of October 3

and 15, 2001, the Prosecution still failed to

proceedtopre-trialandtrial.Giventheperiod

of time to prosecute this case as above

narrated, the last opportunity on October 3

and15,2001,thisCourtresolvesthatthiscase

mustnowbedismissed.Theaccused[s]right

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tospeedytrialunderSection9,Rule116( sic)

oftheRevisedRulesofCriminalProcedurehas

beenviolated.[60]

Clearly, the one hundred eleven (111) days that have

elapsedfromthetimeprivaterespondentswerearraignedonJune

15, 2001 up to the filing of the Motion to Dismiss by private

respondentson the ground ofthedenial oftheir rightto speedy

trialonOctober4,2001isbeyondthe80-daylimitprovidedunder

thelawandtherules.Theincidentsthattranspiredbeforethetrial

courtlikewiseshowthatthepostponementsattheinstanceofthe

prosecutionwerenotjustified.AsfoundbytheCA:

The Court a quo has sufficiently

justified its order of dismissal for failure to

prosecute in violation of the constitutionalright of the accused to a speedy trial as

mandatedbySection14(2)andSection16of

ArticleIIIofthe1987Constitution.Theright

to speedy trial means one free from

vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays,

itssalutaryobjectivebeingtoassurethatan

innocent person may be freed from the

anxietyandexpenseofacourtlitigationor,if

otherwise, of having his guilt determined

withintheshortestpossibletimecompatiblewith the presentation and consideration of

whatever legitimate defense he may

interpose.[61]

xxx

Thecancellationofthehearingsbythe

prosecution without any valid ground is

certainlyvexatious,capriciousandoppressive

andithasbeenheldthatthedismissalofthe

case following a number of postponements

attheinstanceof the prosecution isnot an

abuseofdiscretion,[62]andespeciallytaking

into account the periods inRule 119 which

areexplicitlyprovided.[63]

Petitioner invokes the exclusions provided in Section

3(a)(3) and (f), Rule 119 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedurewhichstate:

Sec.3.Exclusions.-- The following

periods of delay shall be excluded in

computing the timewithinwhich trialmust

commence:

a) Any period of

delayresultingfromother

proceedings concerning

theaccused,includingbut

not limited to the

following:

xxx

3) Delay resulting

from extraordinaryremedies against

interlocutory

orders;

xxx

f)Anyperiodofdelayresulting

froma continuancegrantedby anycourt

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motuproprio,or onmotionof eitherthe

accusedorhiscounsel,ortheprosecution,

if thecourt granted the continuanceon

the basis of its findings set forthin the

order thatthe ends ofjustice servedby

taking such action outweigh the best

interestofthepublicandtheaccusedina

speedytrial.

Petitionercontends thattherewasno inordinatedelay

onthepart ofthe prosecution tojustify a dismissal ofthe cases

basedon a violationof the private respondents' right to speedy

trial. The date of arraignment was June 15, 2001. Senior State

Prosecutor Bagabuyo filed a certiorari petition questioning the

arraignmentbeforetheCAonAugust6,2001.Thus,atotalof51days elapsed before the filingof the CApetition. OnAugust 24,

2001,SeniorStateProsecutorBagabuyoreceivedacopyoftheCA

Resolutiondismissinghispetition.OnSeptember6,2001,hefileda

motionforreconsiderationoftheCAResolution.Atthispoint,only

64dayshavepassedsincethearraignment.OnOctober17,2001,

Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo received a copy of the CA

Resolutiondenyinghismotionforreconsideration.OnOctober30,

2001,hefiledamotionforextensionoftimetofileapetitionunder

Rule 45 with this Court. Prior to his filing of this motion for

extension,76dayshavelapsedfromthedateofarraignment.ThisCourtgrantedhim30dayswithinwhichtofilethepetitionoruntil

December1,2001.Hence,whenJudgeHernandezissuedanOrder

of dismissal dated November 23, 2001, the 80-day period

mandated under Section 6 of Rule 119 has not yet

lapsed. Deducting the time it took Judge Hernandez to resolve

petitioner's Omnibus Motion to Postpone and Motion for

ReconsiderationdatedJune27,2001,only41dayshadlapsedafter

private respondents'arraignment on June15, 2001. Section 3 of

Rule 119 provides that "delay resulting from extraordinary

remediesagainstinterlocutoryorders"isexcludedincomputingthe

time within which trialmust commence. This provisionis not in

conflictwithSection3(f)ofRule119astheyspeakoftwodifferent

kinds of delay. If Section 3(f) is not applicable, Section 3(a)

definitelyis.

We are not persuaded.As correctlyheldby the CA, "delay

resultingfromextraordinaryremediesagainstinterlocutoryorders"

mustbereadinharmonywithSection7,Rule65oftheRulesof

Courtwhichprovidesthatthe"[p]etition[underRule65]shallnot

interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary

restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been

issuedagainstthepublicrespondent from further proceedingin

thecase."ThiswasclearlyspelledoutbyrespondentJudgewhen,

in addition to granting a 30-day continuance in view of themanifestationoftheprosecutionthatitwouldfileanappealfrom

the interlocutory orderof the trialcourtwith ahigher court,the

trialcourt,initsAugust2,2001Order,gaveawarningthat"[i]nthe

eventthattheprosecutionshallnotbeabletogetanyrestraining

order to stop the proceedings in this case, the hearing on

[September 4, 2001] shall proceed as scheduled." Despite this

warning, however, Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo did not

appearfortheprosecutionontheSeptember4,2001hearingset

by the trial court and the court only received a call from the

secretary of said Senior State Prosecutor that the latter had histoothextracted and wouldnot bein a position toappear atthe

hearing.Whatmadethemannerofpostponementworsewasthat

Atty.Galimpin,theprivateprosecutor,informedthetrialcourtthat

hesawSeniorStateProsecutorBagabuyoattheOfficeoftheClerk

of Court, which is located at the first floorof the same building

wherethetrialcourtsits.

Petitioner's relianceon Section 3(f) ofRule119 isalso

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misplaced as nowhere in the Orders granting continuance did

respondent Judge setforth that his orderwas basedon findings

thattheendsofjusticeservedbytakingsuchactionoutweighthe

best interestof the publicand the accusedin a speedytrial,as

requiredunderthelawandtheRulesofCourt.Tothecontrary,the

successivecontinuancesgrantedbythetrialcourtwerecompelled

bytherepeatedabsenceofthepublicprosecutororhisrefusalto

proceed with the pre-trial and trial. The orders of the court

containedrepeatedwarnings that "[i]nthe event that therewill

again be no appearance from Prosecutor Bagabuyo at the next

scheduled hearing, the Legal Department of the COMELEC shall

thenmake itsappearance and take over the prosecution of this

case."InitsSeptember4,2001Orderdenyingprivaterespondents'

oralmotionstodismissandgivingtheprosecutionanotherchance

toprosecutethecasesbyresettingthehearingstoOctober3and

15,2001,thetrialcourtgaveanadmonitionthattheprosecution'sfailuretoappearwillbedealtwithaccordingly.EvenwhenSenior

State Prosecutor Bagabuyo appeared on October 3, 2001, the

prosecutionrefused toproceedwiththe pre-trialandtrial of the

cases on the ground of the pendency of its petition with the

CA.This,despitethefactthatasearlyasAugust16,2001,theCA

hasdismissedCA-G.R.No.SP.No.65966whichraisedtheissueof

thevalidity of theprivate respondents' arraignment. As the trial

courtheld:

The Court notes the petition for

certiorari that Prosecutor Bagabuyo filedbeforetheCourtofAppealsdocketedasCA-

GRSPNo.65966questioningtheproprietyof

[the]June15,2001Order ofthisCourt and

theHonorableCourtofAppealsdatedAugust

16, 2001 dismissed the petition outright. It

also notes the resolution of the said Court

dated October 9, 2001 denying the

Prosecutions Motion for

Reconsideration.Giventheseresolution,the

Prosecution had no option under the

circumstancesbuttoproceedtopre-trialand

trialduringtheOctober15,2001hearing.All

andstill,theProsecutionstoodonitsground

not to prosecute this case and would only

have itselftoblame for thedismissalofthis

case.[64]

Petitioner also contends in the instant petition that

respondentJudge'sdecisiondeclaringthe321Informationsagainst

privaterespondentsforviolationofSection27(b)ofR.A.No.6646

asonlyoneInformation,thearraignmentoftheaccusedtoonlyone

informationand hisDecisiondismissingthe "case"against private

respondentsgiverisetothefollowingquestions:1)Whichoneof

the321Informationsdidprivaterespondentsplead"notguilty"to?

and2)WhatcasedidJudgeHernandezdismisswhenhestatedthat

"thiscaseisdismissed"?

The contention is unavailing. Contrary to petitioner's

claim,areadingoftheJune15,2001Orderofthetrialcourtduring

arraignmentleavesnoroomforvagueness.Itstates:

PursuanttotheOrderofMarch2,

2001, the threehundred[twenty-one] (321)informationsfiledagainstbothaccusedwere

treatedtobeonlyasingleoffenseforwhich

they should be made answerable. It is for

thisreasonthatbothaccusedwerearraigned

and entered their plea to a single or one

informationonly.[65]

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What this argument reflects is petitioner's stubborn

insistence not to recognize the trial court's interlocutory Orders

dated March 2, 2001 and June 15, 2001, granting private

respondentLlorente'smotiontoconsiderallthe321informations

filed against each of them as constituting only one offense and

declaring the arraignment of private respondents to only one

information, respectively. Notably, petitioner's Motion for

ReconsiderationofthisOrderonMarch25,2001hasbeendenied

bythetrialcourtandwasdeniedagainwhenre-raisedbypetitioner

withthetrialcourtinitsOmnibusMotiontoPostponeandMotion

forReconsiderationonJune27,2001.OnappealtotheCAraising

saidissue,theCAdismissedtheappealforthenon-participationof

theOSGandtheCAlikewisedeniedthemotionforreconsideration

itfiled.PetitionerfiledapetitionwiththisCourtraisingthesame

issueandwaslikewisedeniedonJanuary30,2002forhavingbeen

filedoutoftime.WelikewisedenieditsMotionforReconsiderationonApril 24,2002.Hencepetitionercan no longer raisethe same

issuein thispetition.In Zarate v.Director ofLands,[66]weheld

that:

Awell-knownlegalprincipleisthat

when an appellate court has once declared

thelawinacase,suchdeclarationcontinues

to be the law of that case even on a

subsequent appeal. The rule made by an

appellatecourt,whileitmay bereversedin

other cases, cannot be departed from in

subsequent proceedings in the same

case.TheLawoftheCase,asappliedtoa

formerdecisionofanappellatecourt,merely

expresses the practice of the courts in

refusing to reopen what has been

decided.Sucharuleis"necessarytoenable

an appellate court to perform its duties

satisfactorilyandefficiently,whichwouldbe

impossibleifaquestion,onceconsideredand

decided by it, were to be litigated anew in

the same case upon any and every

subsequent appeal." Again, the rule is

necessary as a matter of policy in order to

end litigation. "Therewouldbeno end toa

suit if every obstinate litigant could, by

repeatedappeals,compelacourttolistento

criticisms on their opinions, or speculateof

chancesfromchangesinitsmembers."

Petitioner's contention that the prosecution was clearly

deprivedofitsdayincourtwhenitwasnotaffordedtherighttobe

present during the private respondents' arraignment and to

proceed to trial cannot stand scrutiny. Again, the issue of the

validityofthearraignmentoftheprivaterespondentswithoutthe

presence of Senior State Prosecutor Bagabuyo has already been

establishedwith finality in theprosecution'spreviousappealwith

the CA inCA-G.R. SP. No. 65966and with this Court inG.R. No.

150317 and, thus, constitutes the law of the case between the

parties. Petitioner cannot re-raise said issue in this

petition.Moreover,petitioner'sfailuretoproceedtotrial,asclearly

shownbytheeventsthattranspiredinthetrialcourt,wasduetoits

ownfault.

Inorderthat a judgmentororderof acquittal may be

successfullychallengedinapetitionforcertiorariunderRule65,the

petitionermustprovethatthetrialcourt,inacquittingtheaccused,

committed not merely errors of judgment, but grave abuse of

discretionamountingtolackorexcessofjurisdiction.[67] Nosuch

graveabuseofdiscretioncanbeattributedtorespondentJudgein

dismissing theinstantcasesfor thedenial ofprivate respondents'

righttospeedytrial.

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A last note. Thefirst and the foremost state principle

announced in our Constitution is that the Philippines is a

democraticandrepublicanState.Sovereigntyresidesinthepeople

and all government authority emanates from them.[68] Our

people express theirmightysovereignty mainly thru the election

ballotwheretheydecide,freefromanyfetter,whowillrepresent

themingovernment.Inarepresentativegovernment,thechoiceby

the people ofwhowillbe theirvoiceis nothing less than sacred,

hence,itsdesecrationisunpardonable.Regrettably,theprosecutor

failedinvindicatingthisconstitutionalprinciplewhosewisdomhas

not been diminished by the erosions of t ime. The lack of

zealousness on the part of the prosecution to prove that the

senatorial elections held in May 1995 was marred by the

condemnable practice of dagdag-bawas which led to the

dismissal of the criminal charges againstthe private respondentscannotbutbelamented.TheinexplicablefailurehasleftthisCourt

noalternativeexcepttoaffirmthedismissalofsaidchargesforthe

constitutional rightof the accusedto speedytrial cannot beheld

hostage by the disinterest and mistakes of the prosecution in

dischargingitsduty.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied. The Joint

Decision datedJuly4,2002oftheCourtofAppealsin CA-G.R. SP

Nos.68922and69703isaffirmed.

Nocost.

SOORDERED.

REYNATOS.PUNO

AssociateJustice

RepublicofthePhilippinesSUPREMECOURTManila

SECONDDIVISION

G.R.No.177960January29,2009

JEFFREYRESODAYAP,Petitioner,vs.PRETZY-LOUSENDIONG,

GENESASENDIONG,ELVIESYandDEXIEDURAN,Respondents.

DECISION

Tinga,J.:

Before us is a petition for review1 on certiorari of the Decision

2

dated17August2006andResolution3dated25April2007bythe

Court of Appeals inCA-G.R. SPNo. 01179entitled,Pretzy-Lou P.

Sendiong,GenesaR.Sendiong,ElvieH.SyandDexieDuranv.Hon.

JudgeCresencioTanandJeffreyResoDayap.

The case had its origins in the filing of an Information4 on 29

December 2004 by the Provincial Prosecutors Office, Sibulan,

NegrosOriental,charginghereinpetitionerJeffreyResoDayapwith

the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide, Less

Serious Physical Injuries, and Damage to Property. Thepertinent

portionoftheinformationreads:

Thatatabout11:55oclockintheeveningof28December2004at

Brgy.Maslog,Sibulan,NegrosOriental,Philippines,andwithinthe

jurisdictionofthis Honorable Court,the above-namedaccused,did

then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive in a

recklessandimprudentmannera10-wheelercargotruckwithplate

number ULP-955, color blue, fully loaded with sacks of coconut

shell, registered in the name of Ruben Villabeto of Sta. Agueda

Pamplona, NegrosOriental, thereby hitting an automobile,a Colt

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GalantwithplatenumberNLD-379drivenbyLouGeneR.Sendiong

who was with two femalepassengers, namely: Dexie Duran and

ElvieSy,thuscausingtheinstantaneousdeathofsaidLouGeneR.

Sendiong,lessseriousphysicalinjuriesonthebodiesofDexieDuran

and Elvie Sy and extensivedamageto the above-mentionedColt

GalantwhichisregisteredinthenameofCristinaP.Weyerof115

Dr.V.LocsinSt.,DumagueteCity,tothedamageoftheheirsofthe

same Lou Gene R. Sendiong and the other two offended parties

above-mentioned.

Anact defined and penalizedby Article 365 oftheRevised Penal

Code.

On 10 January 2005, before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of

Sibulan,NegrosOriental,petitionerwasarraignedandhepleaded

notguiltytothecharge.5

On17 January 2005, respondentsPretzy-LouP. Sendiong,Genesa

SendiongandDexieDuranfiledamotionforleaveofcourttofilean

amended information.6 They sought to add the allegation of

abandonmentofthevictimsbypetitioner,thus:"Thedriverofthe

10-wheelercargotruckabandonedthevictims,atatimewhensaid

[Lou-Gene] R.Sendiongwasstillaliveinside the car; hewas only

extractedfromthecarbytheby-standers."7

On 21 January 2005, however, the Provincial Prosecutor filed anOmnibusMotionprayingthatthemotiontoamendtheinformation

beconsideredwithdrawn.8 On21 January 2003,theMTCgranted

the withdrawal and the motion to amend was considered

withdrawn.9

Pre-trialandtrialofthecaseproceeded.Respondentstestifiedfor

the prosecution. After the prosecution had rested its case,

petitioner sought leave tofilea demurrerto evidencewhichwas

granted.PetitionerfiledhisDemurrertoEvidence10dated15April

2005 grounded on the prosecutions failure to prove beyond

reasonable doubt that he is criminally liable for reckless

imprudence,towhichrespondentsfiledaComment11dated25April

2005.

IntheOrder12dated16May2005,theMTCgrantedthedemurrer

andacquittedpetitionerofthecrimeofrecklessimprudence.The

MTCfound that the evidence presentedby respondentsfailed to

establish the allegations in the Information. Pertinent portions of

theorderstate:

Anexaminationoftheallegationsintheinformationandcomparing

the samewith the evidence presentedby the prosecutionwould

reveal that the evidence presented has not established said

allegations.Thefactsandcircumstancesconstitutingtheallegationscharged have not been proven. It is elementary in the rules of

evidencethatapartymustprovehisownaffirmativeallegations.

xxxx

NowhereintheevidenceoftheprosecutioncanthisCourtfindthat

it was the accused who committed the crime as charged. Its

witnesses have never identifiedthe accusedas the one who has

committedthecrime.Theprosecutionneverbotheredtoestablish

if indeed itwas the accused who committed thecrimeor askedquestionswhichwouldhaveprovedtheelementsofthecrime.The

prosecutiondidnotevenestablishifindeeditwastheaccusedwho

wasdrivingthetruckatthetimeoftheincident.TheCourtsimply

cannotfindanyevidencewhichwouldprovethatacrimehasbeen

committed and that the accusedis the person responsible for it.

TherewasnoevidenceontheallegationofthedeathofLouGeneR.

Sendiong as there was no death certificate that was offered in

evidence.Theallegedlessseriousphysicalinjuriesonthebodiesof

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Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy were not also proven as no medical

certificate was presented to state the same nor was a doctor

presented to establish such injuries. The alleged damage to the

[C]olt[G]alantwasalsonotestablishedinanymannerasnowitness

evertestifiedonthisaspectandnodocumentaryevidencewasalso

presentedtostatethedamage.Theprosecutionthereforefailedto

establishifindeeditwastheaccusedwhowasresponsibleforthe

deathofLouGeneR.SendiongandtheinjuriestoDexieDuranand

ElvieSy,includingthedamagetotheColtGalant.Themotherofthe

victimtestifiedonlyontheexpensessheincurredandtheshockshe

andherfamilyhavesufferedasaresultoftheincident.Butsadto

say, she could not also pinpoint if it was the accused who

committedthecrimeandbeheldresponsibleforit.ThisCourtcould

onlysaythattheprosecutionhaspracticallybungledthiscasefrom

itsinception.

xxxx

The defense furthermore argued that on the contrary, the

prosecutions [evidence] conclusively show that the swerving of

vehicle1[theColtGalant]tothelaneofvehicle2[thecargotruck]

istheproximatecauseoftheaccident.Thecourtagainisinclinedto

agreewiththisargumentofthedefense.Ithaslookedcarefullyinto

thesketchoftheaccidentasindicatedinthepoliceblotterandcan

only conclude that the logicalexplanation of the accident is that

vehicle1swervedintothelaneofvehicle2,thushittingthelattersinnerfender and tires.Exhibit"7" whichis a picture ofvehicle 2

showstheextentofitsdamagewhichwastheeffectofvehicle1s

ramming into the rear left portion of vehicle 2 causing the

differentialguideofvehicle2tobecut,itstiresbustedandpulled

out togetherwith theiraxle.The cutting ofthe differentialguide

cause[d]theentirehousingconnectingthetirestothetruckbodyto

collapse, thus causing vehicle 2 totilt toits left side and swerve

towardsthelaneofvehicle1.Itwasthisaccidentthatcausedthe

swerving,notof[sic]anynegligentactoftheaccused.

xxxx

Everycriminalconvictionrequiresoftheprosecutiontoprovetwo

thingsthefactofthecrime,i.e.,thepresenceofalltheelements

ofthecrimeforwhichtheaccusedstandscharged,andthefactthat

the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. Sad to say, the

prosecutionhasmiserablyfailedtoprovethesetwothings.When

theprosecutionfailstodischargeitsburdenofestablishingtheguilt

ofthe accused, an accused need not even offer evidence in his

behalf.

xxxx

WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,thedemurrerisgrantedandtheaccusedJEFFREYRESODAYAPisherebyacquittedforinsufficiency

ofevidence.Thebailbondpostedforhistemporarylibertyisalso

herebycancelledand ordered released to theaccusedorhisduly

authorizedrepresentative.

SOORDERED.13

Respondents thereafter filed a petition for certiorari under Rule

65,14allegingthattheMTCsdismissalofthecasewasdonewithout

consideringtheevidenceadducedbytheprosecution.Respondentsaddedthat theMTCfailedto observe themanner the trialof the

caseshouldproceedasprovidedinSec.11,Rule119oftheRulesof

Courtaswellasfailedtoruleonthecivilliabilityoftheaccusedin

spite of the evidence presented. The case was raffled to the

RegionalTrialCourt(RTC)ofNegrosOriental,Br.32.

Intheorder15dated23August2005,theRTCaffirmedtheacquittal

ofpetitionerbut ordered the remand ofthecaseto theMTCfor

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furtherproceedingson thecivil aspectof thecase. TheRTC ruled

that the MTCs recital of every fact in arriving at its conclusions

disproved the allegation that it failed to consider the evidence

presentedbytheprosecution.Therecordsalsodemonstratedthat

theMTCconductedthetrialofthecaseinthemannerdictatedby

Sec.11,Rule119oftheRulesofCourt,exceptthatthedefenseno

longerpresenteditsevidenceaftertheMTCgaveduecoursetothe

accusedsdemurrertoevidence,thefilingofwhichisallowedunder

Sec.23,Rule119.TheRTChoweveragreedthattheMTCfailedto

ruleontheaccusedscivilliability,especiallysincethejudgmentof

acquittaldidnotincludeadeclarationthatthefactsfromwhichthe

civilliabilitymight arisedid notexist.Thus,theRTCdeclaredthat

the aspect of civil liability was not passedupon and resolved to

remandtheissuetotheMTC.Thedispositiveportionofthedecision

states:

WHEREFORE,thequestionedorderoftheMunicipalTrialCourtof

SibulanonaccusedsacquittalisAFFIRMED.ThecaseisREMANDED

tothecourtoforiginoritssuccessorforfurtherproceedingsonthe

civilaspectofthecase.Nocosts.

SOORDERED.16

Both parties filed their motions for reconsideration of the RTC

order,buttheseweredeniedforlackofmeritintheorder17dated

12September2005.

Respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of

Appeals under Rule 42, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179. The

appellate court subsequently rendered the assailed decision and

resolution.TheCourtofAppealsruledthattherebeingnoproofof

the totalvalueof the properties damaged,the criminal case falls

underthe jurisdictionof the RTCandthe proceedings beforethe

MTCare

nullandvoid.Insoruling,theappellatecourtcitedTulorv.Garcia

(correct titleof the case isCuyos v.Garcia)18 whichruledthatin

complexcrimesinvolvingrecklessimprudenceresultinginhomicide

orphysicalinjuriesanddamagetoproperty,thejurisdictionofthe

court to take cognizance of the case is determined by the fine

imposable forthe damageto property resulting fromthe reckless

imprudence, not by the corresponding penalty for the physical

injuries charged. Italso foundsupport inSec. 36of the Judiciary

Reorganization Act of 1980 and the 1991 Rule 8 on Summary

Procedure, which govern the summary procedure in first-level

courtsin offenses involvingdamageto property through criminal

negligencewheretheimposablefinedoesnotexceedP10,000.00.

Astherewasnoproofofthetotalvalueofthepropertydamaged

andrespondentswereclaimingtheamountofP1,500,000.00ascivil

damages,thecasefallswithintheRTCsjurisdiction.Thedispositive

portionoftheDecisiondated17August2006reads:

WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,judgmentisherebyrenderedby

UsREMANDINGthecasetotheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC),Judicial

Region, Branch 32, NegrosOriental for proper disposition of the

meritsofthecase.

SOORDERED.19

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals

decision,

20

arguingthatjurisdictionoverthecaseisdeterminedbytheallegationsin theinformation,andthat neither the1991Rule

onSummaryProcedurenorSec.36oftheJudiciaryReorganization

Actof1980canbethebasisoftheRTCsjurisdictionoverthecase.

However, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for

reconsideration for lack ofmeritin the Resolution dated25 April

2007.21 Itreiteratedthatit istheRTC thathas proper jurisdiction

considering that the information alleged a willful, unlawful,

feloniouskillingaswellasabandonmentofthevictims.

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Inthepresentpetitionforreview,petitionerarguesthattheMTC

hadjurisdictiontohearthecriminalcaseforrecklessimprudence,

owing tothe enactment ofRepublic Act (R.A.) No. 7691,22 which

confers jurisdiction to first-level courts on offenses involving

damageto property through criminal negligence.He asserts that

theRTCcouldnothaveacquiredjurisdictiononthebasisofalegally

unfiled and officially withdrawn amended information alleging

abandonment. Respondents are also faulted for challenging the

MTCsorderacquittingpetitionerthroughaspecialcivilactionfor

certiorariunderRule65inlieuofanordinaryappealunderRule42.

Thepetitionhasmerit.Itshouldbegranted.

ThefirstissueiswhethertheCourtofAppealserredinrulingthat

jurisdictionovertheoffensechargedpertainedtotheRTC.

BoththeMTCandtheRTCproceededwiththecaseonthebasisof

theInformationdated29December2004chargingpetitioneronly

with the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting to

homicide,lessseriousphysicalinjuriesanddamagetoproperty.The

Courtof Appeals however declared in itsdecisionthat petitioner

shouldhavebeenchargedwiththesameoffensebutaggravatedby

thecircumstanceof abandonment of thevictims. It appears from

the records however that respondents attempt to amend the

informationbychargingtheaggravatedoffensewasunsuccessfulas

the MTC had approved the Provincial Prosecutors motion towithdrawtheirmotiontoamendtheinformation.Theinformation

filed before the trial court had remained unamended.23 Thus,

petitioner isdeemed tohavebeenchargedonlywiththeoffense

alleged in the original Information without any aggravating

circumstance.

Article365oftheRevisedPenalCodepunishesanypersonwho,by

reckless imprudence, commits any act which, had it been

intentional,would constitute a grave felony, with the penalty of

arrestomayor initsmaximumperiod toprision correccional inits

mediumperiod.Whensuchrecklessimprudencetheuseofamotor

vehicle,resultinginthedeathofapersonattendedthesamearticle

imposesuponthedefendantthepenaltyof prision correccional in

itsmediumandmaximumperiods.

The offense with which petitioner was charged is reckless

imprudenceresultinginhomicide,lessseriousphysicalinjuriesand

damagetoproperty,acomplexcrime.Whereareckless,imprudent,

ornegligentactresultsintwoormoregraveorlessgravefelonies,a

complexcrimeiscommitted.24Article48oftheRevisedPenalCode

providesthatwhenthesingleactconstitutestwoormoregraveor

less grave felonies, orwhenanoffense is a necessarymeansfor

committingtheother,thepenaltyforthemostseriouscrimeshall

beimposed,thesametobeappliedinitsmaximumperiod.SinceArticle 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes through

negligenceinviewofthedefinitionoffeloniesinArticle3as"actsor

omissionspunishablebylaw"committedeitherbymeansofdeceit

(dolo) or fault (culpa).25 Thus, the penalty imposable upon

petitioner,werehetobefoundguilty,is prision correccional inits

medium period (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years) and

maximumperiod(4years,2monthsand1dayto6years).

Applicable aswell is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the

courttohearanddecideacaseisconferredbythelawinforceatthe time of the institution of the action, unless such statute

providesforaretroactiveapplicationthereof.26Whenthiscasewas

filedon29December2004,Section32(2)ofBatasPambansaBilang

129 had already been amended byR.A. No. 7691.R.A.No.7691

extendedthejurisdictionofthefirst-levelcourtsovercriminalcases

toincludealloffensespunishablewithimprisonmentnotexceeding

six(6)yearsirrespectiveof the amount offine, and regardlessof

other imposable accessory or other penalties including those for

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civilliability.Itexplicitlystates"thatinoffensesinvolvingdamageto

property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive

original jurisdiction thereof." It follows that criminal cases for

reckless

imprudencepunishablewith prisioncorreccional initsmediumand

maximumperiodsshouldfallwithinthejurisdictionoftheMTCand

nottheRTC.Clearly,therefore,jurisdictiontohearandtrythesame

pertainedtotheMTCandtheRTCdidnothaveoriginaljurisdiction

overthecriminalcase.27Consequently,theMTCofSibulan,Negros

Oriental had properly taken cognizance of the case and the

proceedingsbeforeitwerevalidandlegal.

As the records show, the MTC granted petitioners demurrer to

evidence and acquitted him of the offense on the ground of

insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer to evidence in criminalcases,such as the one atbar, is "filedafter the prosecution had

rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an

appreciationof the evidence adduced bythe prosecution and its

sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt,

resultinginadismissalofthecaseonthemerits,tantamounttoan

acquittaloftheaccused."28Suchdismissalofacriminalcasebythe

grantofdemurrertoevidencemaynotbe appealed, for todoso

wouldbetoplacetheaccusedindoublejeopardy.29Butwhilethe

dismissalorderconsequenttoademurrertoevidenceisnotsubject

toappeal,thesameisstillreviewablebutonlybycertiorariunderRule65oftheRulesofCourt.Thus,insuchcase,thefactualfindings

ofthetrialcourtareconclusiveuponthereviewingcourt,andthe

onlylegalbasistoreverseandsetasidetheorderofdismissalupon

demurrertoevidenceisbyaclearshowingthatthetrialcourt,in

acquitting the accused, committed grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due

process,thusrenderingtheassailedjudgmentvoid.30

Accordingly, respondents filed before the RTC the petition for

certiorari alleging that the MTC gravely abused its discretion in

dismissing the case and failing to consider the evidence of the

prosecutioninresolvingthesame,andinallegedlyfailingtofollow

theproperprocedureasmandatedbytheRulesofCourt.TheRTC

correctly ruled that the MTC did not abuse its discretion in

dismissing the criminal complaint. The MTCs conclusions were

basedonfactsdiligentlyrecitedintheordertherebydisprovingthat

the MTC failed to consider the evidence presented by the

prosecution.TherecordsalsoshowthattheMTCcorrectlyfollowed

theproceduresetforthintheRulesofCourt.

ThesecondissueiswhethertheCourtofAppealserredinordering

the remand of the case of the matter of civil liability for the

receptionofevidence.

WedisagreewiththeCourtofAppealsondirectingtheremandof

thecasetotheRTCforfurtherproceedingsonthecivilaspect,as

wellaswiththeRTCindirectingasimilarremandtotheMTC.

The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a

judgmentagainst himon thecivil aspectof thecase. Theextinction

ofthepenalactiondoesnotcarrywithittheextinctionofthecivil

liability where: (a) the acquittal is basedon reasonable doubt as

onlypreponderanceofevidenceisrequired;(b)thecourtdeclares

thattheliabilityoftheaccusedisonlycivil;and(c)thecivilliabilityoftheaccuseddoesnotarisefromorisnotbaseduponthecrimeof

whichtheaccusedisacquitted.31However,thecivilactionbasedon

delictmaybedeemedextinguishedifthereisafindingonthefinal

judgmentinthe criminalactionthattheactoromissionfromwhich

thecivilliabilitymayarisedidnotexist32orwheretheaccuseddid

notcommittheactsoromissionimputedtohim.33

Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquittedby the

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court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil

aspectof the case unlessthe court also declares that the act or

omissionfromwhichthecivilliabilitymayarisedidnotexist.34This

isbecausewhentheaccusedfilesademurrertoevidence,hehas

notyetadducedevidencebothonthecriminalandcivilaspectsof

the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the

prosecution.What the trial court should do is issue an order or

partialjudgmentgrantingthedemurrertoevidenceandacquitting

the accused, and set the case for continuation of trial for the

accusedtoadduceevidenceonthecivilaspectofthecaseandfor

the private complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal.

Thereafter,the courtshallrenderjudgmenton the civil aspectof

thecase.35

A scrutinyof theMTCs decision supports theconclusionthat the

acquittalwasbasedonthe findings thatthe actor omission fromwhichthecivilliabilitymayarisedidnotexistandthatpetitionerdid

notcommittheactsoromissionimputedtohim;hence,petitioners

civil liability has been extinguished by his acquittal. It shouldbe

noted that the MTC categorically stated that it cannot find any

evidencewhichwouldprovethatacrimehadbeencommittedand

that accusedwas the person responsible for it. Itadded that the

prosecutionfailedtoestablishthatitwaspetitionerwhocommitted

thecrimeaschargedsinceitswitnessesneveridentifiedpetitioner

as the one who was driving the cargo truck at the time of the

incident.Furthermore,theMTCfoundthattheproximatecauseof

theaccidentisthedamagetotherearportionofthetruckcaused

bytheswervingoftheColtGalantintotherearleftportionofthe

cargotruckandnottherecklessdrivingofthetruckbypetitioner,

clearly establishing that petitioner is not guilty of reckless

imprudence.Consequently, thereis nomoreneed to remand the

casetothetrialcourtforproceedingsonthecivilaspectofthecase,

sincepetitionersacquittalhasextinguishedhiscivilliability.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals

Decisiondated17August2006andResolutiondated25April2007

inCA-G.R.SP.No.01179areREVERSEDandSETASIDE.TheOrder

dated16May2005oftheMunicipalTrialCourtofSibulan,Negros

Oriental in Criminal Case No. 3016-04 granting the Demurrer to

EvidenceandacquittingpetitionerJeffreyResoDayapoftheoffense

chargedthereinisREINSTATEDandAFFIRMED.

SOORDERED.

DANTEO.TINGA AssociateJustice

SECONDDIVISION

[G.R.No.151931.September23,2003]

ANAMERSALAZAR,petitioner,vs.THEPEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES

and J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION,

respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO,SR.,J.:

ThisisapetitionforreviewoncertiorariunderRule45ofthe

1997Rulesof Criminal Procedureof theOrder[1] oftheRegional

Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Legazpi City, Branch 5,[2] dated

November 19, 2001, and its Order[3] dated January 14, 2002

denyingthemotionforreconsiderationofthedecisionofthesaid

court on the civil aspect thereof and to allow her to present

evidencethereon.

OnJune11,1997,anInformationforestafawasfiledagainst

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herein petitionerAnamerD. Salazar andco-accusedNenaJaucian

Timariowiththe RegionalTrialCourt ofLegazpiCity, docketed as

CriminalCaseNo.7474whichreadsasfollows:

ThatsometimeinthemonthofOctober,1996,intheCityof

Legazpi,Philippines,andwithinthejurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,theabovenamed-accused,conspiringandconfederatingwith

eachother,withintenttodefraudbymeansoffalsepretensesor

fraudulentactsexecutedsimultaneouslywiththecommissionofthe

fraud,didthenandtherewilfully,unlawfullyandfeloniously,onthe

partofaccusedNENAJAUCIANTIMARIO,drewandissue[d]

PRUDENTIALBANK,LEGASPICITYBRANCHCHECKNO.067481,

datedOctober15,1996,intheamountofP214,000.00infavorof

J.Y.BROTHERSMARKETINGCORPORATION,representedbyits

BranchManager,JERSONO.YAO,andaccusedANAMERD.SALAZAR

endorsedandnegotiatedsaidcheckaspaymentof300cavansof

riceobtainedfromJ.Y.BROTHERSMARKETINGCORPORATION,

knowingfullywellthatatthattimesaidcheckwasissuedand

endorsed,NenaJaucianTimariodidnothavesufficientfundsinor

creditwiththedraweebanktocovertheamountcalledfortherein

andwithoutinformingthepayeeofsuchcircumstance;thatwhen

saidcheckwaspresentedtothedraweebankforpayment,the

samewasconsequentlydishonoredandrefusedpaymentforthe

reasonofACCOUNTCLOSED;thatdespitedemands,accused

failedandrefusedandstillfailandrefusetopayand/ormake

arrangementforthepaymentofthesaidcheck,tothedamageand

prejudiceofsaidJ.Y.BROTHERSMARKETINGCORPORATION.

CONTRARYTOLAW.[4]

Upon arraignment, the petitioner, assisted by counsel,

enteredapleaofnotguilty.Trialthereafterensued.

TheEvidenceoftheProsecution

OnOctober 15,1996, petitioner Anamer Salazar purchased

300 cavans of rice from J.Y. Brothers Marketing Corporation,

throughMr.JersonYao.Aspaymentforthese cavansofrice,the

petitionergave theprivate complainantCheck No.067481drawn

againstthePrudentialBank,LegazpiCityBranch,datedOctober15,

1996, by one Nena Jaucian Timario in the amount of

P214,000. Jerson Yao accepted the check upon the petitioners

assurancethatitwasagoodcheck.Thecavansofricewerepicked

upthe next day bythe petitioner. Upon presentment, the check

was dishonored because it was drawn under a closed account

(Account Closed). The petitioner was informed of such

dishonor.ShereplacedthePrudentialBankcheckwithCheckNo.

365704 drawn against the Solid Bank, Legazpi Branch, which,

however, was returned with the word DAUD (Drawn Against

UncollectedDeposit).

After the prosecution rested itscase,the petitioner filed a

DemurrertoEvidencewithLeaveofCourt[5]allegingthatshecould

notbeguiltyofthecrimeaschargedforthefollowingreasons:(a)

shewasmerelyan indorserof the check issuedbyNena Timario,

andArticle315,paragraph2(d)onestafapenalizesonlytheissuer

ofthecheckandnottheindorserthereof;(b)thereisnosufficient

evidencetoprovethatthepetitionerconspiredwiththeissuerof

the check,Nena Jaucian Timario, in orderto defraud the private

complainant;(c)afterthefirstcheckwasdishonored,thepetitioner

replaceditwithasecondone.Thefirsttransactionhadtherefore

been effectively novated by the issuance of the secondcheck.Unfortunately,her personal checkwasdishonorednot for

insufficiencyof funds, butfor DAUD, whichin banking parlance

means drawn against uncollected deposit. According to the

petitioner,thismeansthattheaccounthadsufficientfundsbutwas

still restricted because the deposit, usually a check, had not yet

beencleared.

The prosecution filed its comment/opposition to the

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petitionersdemurrertoevidence.

On November 19, 2001, the trial court rendered judgment

acquittingthepetitionerofthecrimechargedbutorderingherto

remit to the private complainant the amount of the check as

paymentforherpurchase.Thetrialcourtruledthattheevidencefor the prosecution didnot establish the existence of conspiracy

beyondreasonabledoubtbetweenthepetitionerandtheissuerof

thecheck,herco-accusedNenaJaucianTimario,forthepurposeof

defrauding the private complainant. In fact, the private

complainant, Jerson Yao, admitted that he had never met Nena

JaucianTimariowhoremainedatlarge.Asamereindorserofthe

check,thepetitionersbreachofthewarrantythatthecheckwasa

good one is not synonymous with the fraudulent act of falsely

pretendingto possesscreditunderArticle 315(2)(d). Thedecretal

portionofthetrialcourtsjudgmentreadsasfollows:

WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,theaccusedAnamerD.Salazar

isherebyACQUITTEDofthecrimechargedbutisherebyheldliable

forthevalueofthe300bagsofrice.AccusedAnamerD.Salazaris

thereforeorderedtopayJ.Y.BrothersMarketingCorporationthe

sumofP214,000.00.Costsagainsttheaccused.[6]

Withinthereglementaryperiodtherefor,thepetitionerfiled

amotionforreconsiderationonthecivilaspectofthedecisionwith

apleathathebeallowedtopresentevidencepursuanttoRule33

of the Rulesof Court. On January 14, 2002,the court issuedanorderdenyingthemotion.

Inherpetitionatbar,thepetitionerassailstheordersofthe

trialcourtclaimingthatafterherdemurrertoevidencewasgranted

bythetrialcourt,shewasdenieddueprocessasshewasnotgiven

theopportunitytoadduceevidencetoprovethatshewasnotcivilly

liable to the private respondent. The petitioner invokes the

applicabilityofRule33oftheRulesofCivilProcedureinthiscase,

contending that before being adjudged liable to the private

offendedparty,sheshouldhavebeenfirstaccordedtheprocedural

reliefgrantedinRule33.

ThePetitionIsMeritorious

According to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of

CriminalProcedure

SECTION1.Institutionofcriminalandcivilactions. (a)Whena

criminalactionisinstituted,thecivilactionfortherecoveryofcivil

liabilityarisingfromtheoffensechargedshallbedeemedinstituted

withthecriminalactionunlesstheoffendedpartywaivesthecivil

action,reservestherighttoinstituteitseparatelyorinstitutesthe

civilactionpriortothecriminalaction.

Thereservationoftherighttoinstituteseparatelythecivilaction

shallbemadebeforetheprosecutionstartspresentingitsevidence

andundercircumstancesaffordingtheoffendedpartyareasonable

opportunitytomakesuchreservation.

Whentheoffendedpartyseekstoenforcecivilliabilityagainstthe

accusedbywayofmoral,nominal,temperate,orexemplary

damageswithoutspecifyingtheamountthereofinthecomplaintor

information,thefilingfeesthereforshallconstituteafirstlienon

thejudgmentawardingsuchdamages.

Wheretheamountofdamages,otherthanactual,isspecifiedinthe

complaintorinformation,thecorrespondingfilingfeesshallbepaid

bytheoffendedpartyuponthefilingthereofincourt.

ExceptasotherwiseprovidedintheseRules,nofilingfeesshallbe

requiredforactualdamages.

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Nocounterclaim,cross-claimorthird-partycomplaintmaybefiled

bytheaccusedinthecriminalcase,butanycauseofactionwhich

couldhavebeenthesubjectthereofmaybelitigatedinaseparate

civilaction.

(b)ThecriminalactionforviolationofBatasPambansaBlg.22

shallbedeemedtoincludethecorrespondingcivilaction.No

reservationtofilesuchcivilactionseparatelyshallbeallowed.

Uponfilingoftheaforesaidjointcriminalandcivilactions,the

offendedpartyshallpayinfullthefilingfeesbasedontheamount

ofthecheckinvolved,whichshallbeconsideredastheactual

damagesclaimed.Wherethecomplaintorinformationalsoseeks

torecoverliquidated,moral,nominal,temperateorexemplary

damages,theoffendedpartyshallpayadditionalfilingfeesbased

ontheamountsallegedtherein.Iftheamountsarenotsoalleged

butanyofthesedamagesaresubsequentlyawardedbythecourt,

thefilingfeesbasedontheamountawardedshallconstituteafirst

lienonthejudgment.

Wherethecivilactionhasbeenfiledseparatelyandtrialthereofhas

notyetcommenced,itmaybeconsolidatedwiththecriminalaction

uponapplicationwiththecourttryingthelattercase.Ifthe

applicationisgranted,thetrialofbothactionsshallproceedin

accordancewithsection2ofthisRulegoverningconsolidationof

thecivilandcriminalactions.

The last paragraphof Section2 ofthesaidruleprovides thatthe

extinctionofthepenalactiondoesnotcarrywithittheextinctionof

thecivilaction.Moreover,thecivilactionbasedondelictshallbe

deemedextinguishedifthereisafindinginafinaljudgmentinthe

criminalactionthattheactoromissionfromwhichthecivilliability

mayarisedidnotexist.[7]

The criminal action has a dual purpose, namely, the

punishment of the offender and indemnity to the offended

party.Thedominantandprimordialobjectiveofthecriminalaction

is the punishment of the offender. The civil action is merely

incidentaltoandconsequenttotheconvictionoftheaccused.The

reason for this is that criminal actions are primarily intended tovindicate an outrage against the sovereignty of the state and to

impose the appropriate penalty for the vindication of the

disturbance to the social order caused by the offender. On the

otherhand,the actionbetween the private complainant and the

accusedisintendedsolelytoindemnifytheformer.[8]

Unlesstheoffendedpartywaivesthecivilactionorreserves

therighttoinstituteitseparatelyorinstitutesthecivilactionprior

tothecriminalaction,therearetwoactionsinvolvedinacriminal

case. The first is the criminal action for the punishment of the

offender. The parties are the People of the Philippines as the

plaintiff and the accused. In a criminal action, the private

complainantismerelyawitnessfortheStateonthecriminalaspect

of the action. The second is the civil action arising from the

delict. Theprivatecomplainant istheplaintiffandthe accusedis

the defendant.There isa merger ofthetrial ofthetwocasesto

avoidmultiplicityofsuits.

Thequantumofevidenceonthecriminalaspectofthecaseis

proof beyond reasonable doubt, while in the civil aspect of the

action,thequantumofevidenceispreponderanceofevidence.[9]UnderSection3,Rule1ofthe1997RulesofCriminalProcedure,the

saidrulesshallgoverntheproceduretobeobservedinaction,civil

orcriminal.

Theprosecutionpresentsitsevidencenotonlytoprovethe

guiltoftheaccusedbeyondreasonabledoubtbutalsotoprovethe

civil liability of the accused to the offended party. After the

prosecution has rested its case, the accused shall adduce its

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evidencenotonlyonthecriminalbutalsoonthecivilaspectofthe

case. At the conclusion of the trial, the court should render

judgmentnotonlyonthecriminalaspectofthecasebutalsoonthe

civilaspectthereof:

SEC.2.Contentsofthejudgment. Ifthejudgmentisofconviction,itshallstate(1)thelegalqualificationoftheoffenseconstitutedby

theactscommittedbytheaccusedandtheaggravatingor

mitigatingcircumstanceswhichattendeditscommission;(2)the

participationoftheaccusedintheoffense,whetherasprincipal,

accomplice,oraccessoryafterthefact;(3)thepenaltyimposed

upontheaccused;and(4)thecivilliabilityordamagescausedbyhis

wrongfulactoromissiontoberecoveredfromtheaccusedbythe

offendedparty,ifthereisany,unlesstheenforcementofthecivil

liabilitybyaseparatecivilactionhasbeenreservedorwaived.

Incasethejudgmentisofacquittal,itshallstatewhetherthe

evidenceoftheprosecutionabsolutelyfailedtoprovetheguiltof

theaccusedormerelyfailedtoprovehisguiltbeyondreasonable

doubt.Ineithercase,thejudgmentshalldetermineiftheactor

omissionfromwhichthecivilliabilitymightarisedidnotexist.[10]

The acquittalof the accused does not prevent a judgment

againsthimonthecivilaspectofthecasewhere(a)theacquittalis

basedon reasonable doubtas only preponderance ofevidenceis

required; (b) where the court declared that the liability of the

accusedisonlycivil;(c)wherethecivilliabilityoftheaccuseddoes

notarisefromorisnotbaseduponthecrimeofwhichtheaccused

was acquitted. Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is

extinguishedifthereisafindinginthefinaljudgmentinthecriminal

actionthat the actor omission fromwhich the civil liabilitymay

arisedidnotexistorwheretheaccuseddidnotcommittheactsor

omissionimputedtohim.

Iftheaccusedisacquittedonreasonabledoubtbutthecourt

renders judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case, the

prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of acquittal as it

would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the

aggrieved party, the offended party or the accusedor bothmay

appealfromthejudgmentonthecivilaspectofthecasewithinthe

periodtherefor.

Aftertheprosecutionhasresteditscase,theaccusedhasthe

optioneither to (a) file a demurrer to evidencewith orwithout

leaveof courtunderSection23,Rule119of theRevisedRulesof

CriminalProcedure,orto(b)adducehisevidenceunlesshewaives

thesame.Theaforecitedrulereads:

Sec.23.Demurrertoevidence.Aftertheprosecutionrestsits

case,thecourtmaydismisstheactiononthegroundof

insufficiencyofevidence(1)onitsowninitiativeaftergivingthe

prosecutiontheopportunitytobeheardor(2)upondemurrertoevidencefiledbytheaccusedwithorwithoutleaveofcourt.

Ifthecourtdeniesthedemurrertoevidencefiledwithleaveof

court,theaccusedmayadduceevidenceinhisdefense.Whenthe

demurrertoevidenceisfiledwithoutleaveofcourt,theaccused

waiveshisrighttopresentevidenceandsubmitsthecasefor

judgmentonthebasisoftheevidencefortheprosecution.

Themotionforleaveofcourttofiledemurrertoevidenceshall

specificallystateitsgroundsandshallbefiledwithinanon-extendibleperiodoffive(5)daysaftertheprosecutionrestsits

case.Theprosecutionmayopposethemotionwithinanon-

extendibleperiodoffive(5)daysfromitsreceipt.

Ifleaveofcourtisgranted,theaccusedshallfilethedemurrerto

evidencewithinanon-extendibleperiodoften(10)daysfrom

notice.Theprosecutionmayopposethedemurrertoevidence

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withinasimilarperiodfromitsreceipt.

Theorderdenyingthemotionforleaveofcourttofiledemurrerto

evidenceorthedemurreritselfshallnotbereviewablebyappealor

bycertioraribeforethejudgment.

Incriminalcases,thedemurrerto evidence partakesof the

natureofamotiontodismissthecaseforfailureoftheprosecution

toprove hisguilt beyond reasonable doubt. Ina case wherethe

accused files a demurrer to evidence without leave of court, he

therebywaiveshisrighttopresentevidenceandsubmitsthecase

fordecisiononthebasisoftheevidenceoftheprosecution.Onthe

otherhand, i