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G.R. No. 133917 February 19, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.

NASARIO MOLINA y MANAMA @ !O!ONG a"# GREGORIO M$LA yMALAG$RA @ !O!O%, accused-appellants.

%NARES&SANTIAGO, J.'

To sanction disrespect and disregard for the Constitution in the name of protecting

the society from lawbreakers is to make the government itself lawless and to subvert

those values upon which our ultimate freedom and liberty depend.1

For automatic review is the Decisionof the !egional Trial Court of Davao City,

"ranch 1#, in Criminal Case $o. %#,&'-(&, finding accused-appellants $asario

)olina y )anamat alias *"obong* and +regorio )ula y )alaguraalias *"oboy,*

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of ection ,%of the Dangerous Drugs

ct of 1(# /!epublic ct $o. &'0, as amended by !epublic ct $o. #&0(, 'and

sentencing them to suffer the supreme penalty of death.

The information against accused-appellants reads2

That on or about ugust , 1((&, in the City of Davao, 3hilippines, and withinthe 4urisdiction of this 5onorable Court, the above-named accused, in

conspiracy with each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and

feloniously was found in their possession ('&.( grants of dried mari4uana which

are prohibited.

C6$T!!7 T6 89.0

:pon arraignment on eptember ', 1((&, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to

the accusation against them.&Trial ensued, wherein the prosecution presented 3olice

uperintendent ;riel )allorca, 361 8eonardo 7. 3amplona,

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3ursuant to rticle '# of the !evised penal Code and !ule 1, ection 1= of the

!ules of Court, the case was elevated to this Court on automatic review. ccused-

appellants contend2

A. T5T T5; )!Auittal of both accused-appellants.

The fundamental law of the land mandates that searches and sei@ures be carried outin a reasonable fashion, that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant

predicated upon the eEistence of a probable cause. The pertinent provision of the

Constitution provides2

;C. . The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,

and effects against unreasonable searches and sei@ures of whatever nature

and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of

arrest shall issue eEcept upon probable cause to be determined personally by

the 4udge after eEamination under oath or affirmation of the complainant

and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to

be searched and the persons or things to be sei@ed.1

Complementary to the foregoing provision is the eEclusionary rule enshrined underrticle AAA, ection %, paragraph , which bolsters and solidifies the protection

against unreasonable searches and sei@ures.Thus2

ny evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be

inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

9ithout this rule, the right to privacy would be a form of words, valueless and

undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties? so too,

without this rule, the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral

and so neatly severed from its conceptual neEus with the freedom from all brutish

means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Courts high regard as a freedom

implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.%

The foregoing constitutional proscription, however, is not without eEceptions. earch

and sei@ure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom

may be admissible in the following instances2 /1 search incident to a lawful arrest?

/ search of a moving motor vehicle? /% search in violation of customs laws? /'

sei@ure of evidence in plain view? /0 when the accused himself waives his right

against unreasonable searches and sei@ures?'and /& stop and frisk situations /Terry

search.0

The first eEception /search incidental to a lawful arrest includes a valid warrantlesssearch and sei@ure pursuant to an e>ually valid warrantless arrest which must

precede the search. An this instance, the law re>uires that there be first a lawful arrest

before a search can be made --- the process cannot be reversed. &s a rule, an arrest

is considered legitimate if effected with .a valid warrant of arrest. The !ules of

Court, however, recogni@es permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a

private person may, without warrant, arrest a person2 /a when, in his presence, the

person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to

commit an offense /arrest in flagrante delicto? /b when an offense has 4ust been

committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of

facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it /arrest effected

in hot pursuit? and /c when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped

from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final 4udgment or istemporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being

transferred from one confinement to another / arrest of escaped prisoners .#

An the case at bar, the court a quo anchored its 4udgment of conviction on a finding

that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellants, and the subse>uent search

conducted by the peace officers, are valid because accused-appellants were caught in

flagrante delicto in possession of prohibited drugs. This brings us to the issue of

whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and sei@ure in the present case fall

within the recogni@ed eEceptions to the warrant re>uirement.

AnPeople v. Chua Ho San,(the Court held that in cases of in flagrante

delicto arrests, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a

person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actuallycommitting, or is attempting to commit an offense. The arresting officer, therefore,

must have personal knowledge of such fact or, as recent case law adverts to, personal

knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of

probable cause. s discussed inPeople v. oria,%=probable cause means an actual

belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable

when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the

person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual

facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the

probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. reasonable suspicion therefore

must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace

officers making the arrest.

s applied to in flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that *reliable information*alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and

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within the view of the arresting officers, are not sufficient to constitute probable

cause that would 4ustify an in flagrante delicto arrest. Thus, inPeople v.

!innudin,%1it was held that *the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his

arrest, committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had

4ust done so. 9hat he was doing was descending the gangplank of the #$9ilcon (

and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he

was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. At was

only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the mari4uana that he

suddenly became suspect and so sub4ect to apprehension.*

8ikewise, inPeople v. #engote,%the Court did not consider *eyes... darting from

side to side 2.. whileG holding ... onesG abdomen*, in a crowded street at 112%= in

the morning, as overt acts and circumstances sufficient to arouse suspicion and

indicative of probable cause. ccording to the Court, *bGy no stretch of the

imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had 4ust been

committed, or was actually being committed or was at least being attempted in the

arresting officersG presence.* o also, inPeople v. %ncinada,%%the Court ruled that no

probable cause is gleanable from the act of riding a otorela while holding two

plastic baby chairs.&'wphi&.nt

Then, too, in#alacat v. Court of !ppeals,%'the trial court concluded that petitioner

was attempting to commit a crime as he was *Hstanding at the comer of 3la@a)iranda and Iue@on "oulevard with his eyes moving very fast and looking at

every person that come /sic nearer /sic to them.*%0An declaring the warrantless

arrest therein illegal, the Court said2

5ere, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto ... arrest preceding

the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of B u, the

arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner,

indicating that a crime had 4ust been committed, was being committed or

was going to be committed.%&

At went on to state that J

econd, there was nothing in petitioners behavior or conduct which couldhave reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were

*moving very fast* - an observation which leaves us incredulous since 7u

and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already &2%=

p.m., thus presumably dusk. 3etitioner and his companions were merely

standing at the comer and were not creating any commotion or trouble...

Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that

petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. $one was visible to 7u, for as

he admitted, the alleged grenade was *discovered* *inside the front

waistline* of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between

7u and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed

hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to 7u.%#

Clearly, to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto arrest, two re>uisites must concur2

/1 the person to be arrested must eEecute an overt act indicating that he has 4ust

committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime? and / such

overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.%

An the case at bar, accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would

4ustify their arrest. An holding a bag on board a trisiad, accused-appellants could not

be said to be committing, attempting to commit or have committed a crime. At

matters not that accused-appellant )olina responded *"oss, if possible we will settlethis* to the re>uest of 361 3amplona to open the bag. uch response which

allegedly reinforced the *suspicion* of the arresting officers that accused-appellants

were committing a crime, is an e>uivocal statement which standing alone will not

constitute probable cause to effect an inflagrante delicto arrest. $ote that were it not

for 361 )arino 3aguidopon /who did not participate in the arrest but merely

pointed accused-appellants to the arresting officers, accused-appellants could not be

the sub4ect of any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise.

9hile 361 3aguidopon claimed that he and his informer conducted a surveillance

of accused-appellant )ula, 361 3aguidopon, however, admitted that he only

learned )ulas name and address after the arrest. 9hat is more, it is doubtful if

361 3aguidopon indeed recogni@ed accused-appellant )ula. At is worthy to note

that, before the arrest, he was able to see )ula in person only once, pinpointed tohim by his informer while they were on the side of the road. These circumstances

could not have afforded 361 3aguidopon a closer look at accused-appellant )ula,

considering that the latter was then driving a motorcycle when, 361 3aguidopon

caught a glimpse of him. 9ith respect to accused-appellant )olina, 361

3aguidopon admitted that he had never seen him before the arrest.

This belies the claim of 361 3amplona that he knew the name of accused-

appellants even before the arrest, to wit J

*I- 9hen you said that certain )ula handed a black bag to another

person and how did you know that it was )ula who handed the black bag to

another personK

- "ecause A have already information from 3aguidopon, regarding

)ula and )olina, when they pass by through the street near the residence

of 3aguidopon. 5e told that the one who is big one that is +regorio )ula

and the thin one is $a@ario )olina*%(

The aforecited testimony of 361 3amplona, therefore, is entirely baseless 361

3amplona could not have learned the name of accused-appellants from 361

3aguipodon because 3aguipodon himself, who allegedly conducted the surveillance,

was not even aware of accused-appellants name and address prior to the arrest.

;vidently, 361 3aguidopon, who acted as informer of the arresting officers, more

so the arresting officers themselves, could not have been certain of accused-

appellants identity, and were, from all indications, merely fishing for evidence at thetime of the arrest.

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Compared toPeople v. %ncinada, the arresting officer in the said case knew

appellant ;ncinada even before the arrest because of the latters illegal gambling

activities, thus, lending at least a semblance of validity on the arrest effected by the

peace officers. $evertheless, the Court declared in said case that the warrantless

arrest and the conse>uent search were illegal, holding that *tGhe prosecutions

evidence did not show any suspicious behavior when the appellant disembarked from

the ship or while he rode the otorela.$o act or fact demonstrating a felonious

enterprise could be ascribed to appellant under such bare circumstances.* '=

)oreover, it could not be said that accused-appellants waived their right against

unreasonable searches and sei@ure. Amplied ac>uiescence to the search, if there was

any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under

intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all

within the purview of the constitutional guarantee.'1

9ithal, the Court holds that the arrest of accused-appellants does not fall under the

eEceptions allowed by the rules. 5ence, the search conducted on their person was

likewise illegal. Conse>uently, the mari4uana sei@ed by the peace officers could not

be admitted as evidence against accused-appellants, and the Court is thus, left with

no choice but to find in favor of accused-appellants.

9hile the Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drugaddiction and commends the efforts of our law-enforcement officers towards this

drive, all efforts for the achievement of a drug-free society must not encroach on the

fundamental rights and liberties of individuals as guaranteed in the "ill of !ights,

which protection eEtends even to the basest of criminals.

(HEREFORE,the Decision of the !egional Trial Court of Davao City, "ranch 1#,in Criminal Case $o. %#, &'-(&, is RE)ERSE* and SET ASI*E. For lack ofevidence to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellants $asario

)olina y )anamat alias *"obong* and +regorio )ula y )alagura alias *"oboy*,

areA+$ITTE* and ordered RELEASE* from confinement unless they arevalidly detained for other offenses. $o costs.

SO OR*ERE*.

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-G.R. No. 12299. /a"uary 22, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee, vs. FLOREN+IO *ORIAy !OLA*O, a"# )IOLETA GA**AO y +ATAMA @NENETH, accused-appellants.

* E + I S I O N

P$NO,J.'

6n December #, 1((0, accused-appellants Florencio Doria y "olado and

Bioleta +addao y Catama L *$eneth* were charged with violation of ection ', in

relation to ection 1 of the Dangerous Drugs ct of 1(#.1GThe information reads2

*That on or about the 0th day of December, 1((0 in the City of )andaluyong,

3hilippines, a place within the 4urisdiction of this 5onorable Court, the above-named

accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and aiding one another and

without having been authori@ed by law, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and

feloniously sell, administer, deliver and give away to another eleven /11 plastic bags

of suspected mari4uana fruiting tops weighing #,&'1.= grams in violation of the

above-cited law.

C6$T!!7 T6 89.*G

The prosecution contends the offense was committed as follows2 An $ovember

1((0, members of the $orth )etropolitan District, 3hilippine $ational 3olice /3$3

$arcotics Command /$arcom, received information from two / civilian

informants /CA that one *uestioning himwere strangers, accused-appellant denied knowing any *Totoy.* The men took

accused-appellant inside his house and accused him of being a pusher in their

community. 9hen accused-appellant denied the charge, the men led him to their car

outside and ordered him to point out the house of *Totoy.* For five /0 minutes,

accused-appellant stayed in the car. Thereafter, he gave in and took them to

*Totoys* house.

Doria knocked on the door of *Totoys* house but no one answered. 6ne of the

men, later identified as 36% )anlangit, pushed open the door and he and his

companions entered and looked around the house for about three minutes. ccused-

appellant Doria was left standing at the door. The policemen came out of the house

and they saw Bioleta +addao carrying water from the well. 5e asked Bioleta where

*Totoy* was but she replied he was not there. Curious onlookers and kibit@ers were,by that time, surrounding them. 9hen Bioleta entered her house, three men were

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jan99/125299.htm#_edn1http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jan99/125299.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jan99/125299.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jan99/125299.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jan99/125299.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jan99/125299.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jan99/125299.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jan99/125299.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jan99/125299.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jan99/125299.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jan99/125299.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jan99/125299.htm#_edn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jan99/125299.htm#_edn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jan99/125299.htm#_edn2http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jan99/125299.htm#_edn3http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jan99/125299.htm#_edn4http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jan99/125299.htm#_edn5http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jan99/125299.htm#_edn6http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jan99/125299.htm#_edn7http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jan99/125299.htm#_edn8http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jan99/125299.htm#_edn9http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jan99/125299.htm#_edn10http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/jan99/125299.htm#_edn1

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already inside. ccused-appellant Doria, then still at the door, overheard one of the

men say that they found a carton boE. Turning towards them, Doria saw a boE on

top of the table. The boE was open and had something inside. 36% )anlangit

ordered him and Bioleta to go outside the house and board the car. They were

brought to police head>uarters where they were investigated.

ccused-appellant Doria further declared that his co-accused, Bioleta +addao,

is the wife of his ac>uaintance, Totoy +addao. 5e said that he and Totoy +addao

sometimes drank together at the neighborhood store. This closeness, however, didnot eEtend to Bioleta, Totoys wife.11G

ccused-appellant Bioleta +addao, a %0-year old rice vendor, claimed that on

December 0, 1((0, she was at her house at Daang "akal, )andaluyong City where

she lived with her husband and five /0 children, namely, rvy, aged 1=, r4ay, aged

, the twins !aymond and !aynan, aged 0, and

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)!Auor and narcotics

offenses.1G;ntrapment sprouted from the doctrine of estoppel and the public interest

in the formulation and application of decent standards in the enforcement of criminal

law.1(GAt also took off from a spontaneous moral revulsion against using the powers

of government to beguile innocent but ductile persons into lapses that they mightotherwise resist.=G

An the merican 4urisdiction, the term *entrapment* has a generally negative

meaning because it is understood as the inducement of one to commit a crime not

contemplated by him, for the mere purpose of instituting a criminal prosecution

against him.1GThe classic definition of entrapment is that articulated by uently adopted the test by 4udicial pronouncement or

legislation. 5ere, the court considers the nature of the police activity involved and

the propriety of police conduct. %(GThe in>uiry is focused on the inducements used by

government agents, on police conduct, not on the accused and his predisposition to

commit the crime. For the goal of the defense is to deter unlawful police conduct.'=GThe test of entrapment is whether the conduct of the law enforcement agent was

likely to induce a normally law-abiding person, other than one who is ready and

willing, to commit the offense? '1Gfor purposes of this test, it is presumed that a law-abiding person would normally resist the temptation to commit a crime that is

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presented by the simple opportunity to act unlawfully.'G6fficial conduct that merely

offers such an opportunity is permissible, but overbearing conduct, such as

badgering, ca4oling or importuning,'%Gor appeals to sentiments such as pity,

sympathy, friendship or pleas of desperate illness, are not.''G3roponents of this test

believe that courts must refuse to convict an entrapped accused not because his

conduct falls outside the legal norm but rather because, even if his guilt has been

established, the methods employed on behalf of the government to bring about the

crime *cannot be countenanced.* To some eEtent, this reflects the notion that the

courts should not become tainted by condoning law enforcement improprieties.'0G5ence, the transactions leading up to the offense, the interaction between the

accused and law enforcement officer and the accuseds response to the officers

inducements, the gravity of the crime, and the difficulty of detecting instances of its

commission are considered in 4udging what the effect of the officers conduct would

be on a normal person.'&G

"oth the *sub4ective* and *ob4ective* approaches have been critici@ed and

ob4ected to. At is claimed that the *sub4ective* test creates an *anything goes* rule,

i.e., if the court determines that an accused was predisposed to commit the crime

charged, no level of police deceit, badgering or other unsavory practices will be

deemed impermissible.'#GDelving into the accuseds character and predisposition

obscures the more important task of 4udging police behavior and pre4udices theaccused more generally. At ignores the possibility that no matter what his past crimes

and general disposition were, the accused might not have committed the particular

crime unless confronted with inordinate inducements.'G6n the other eEtreme, the

purely *ob4ective* test eliminates entirely the need for considering a particular

accuseds predisposition. 5is predisposition, at least if known by the police, may

have an important bearing upon the >uestion of whether the conduct of the police

and their agents was proper.'(GThe undisputed fact that the accused was a dangerous

and chronic offender or that he was a shrewd and active member of a criminal

syndicate at the time of his arrest is relegated to irrelevancy.0=G

6b4ections to the two tests gave birth to hybrid approaches to

entrapment. ome states in the :nited tates now combine both the *sub4ective* and

*ob4ective* tests.01GAn Cru v. State,0Gthe Florida upreme Court declared that thepermissibility of police conduct must first be determined. Af this ob4ective test is

satisfied, then the analysis turns to whether the accused was predisposed to commit

the crime.0%GAnBaca v. State,0'Gthe $ew )eEico upreme Court modified the states

entrapment analysis by holding that *a criminal defendant may successfully assert a

defense of entrapment, either by showing lack of predisposition to commit the crime

for which he is charged, or, that the police eEceeded the standards of proper

investigation.00GThe hybrid approaches combine and apply the *ob4ective* and

*sub4ective* tests alternatively or concurrently.

s early as 1(1=, this Court has eEamined the conduct of law enforcers while

apprehending the accused caught inflagrante delicto. An *nited States v. Phelps,0&G

we ac>uitted the accused from the offense of smoking opium after finding that thegovernment employee, a "A! personnel, actually induced him to commit the crime in

order to prosecute him. mith, the "A! agent, testified that 3helps apprehension

came after he overheard 3helps in a saloon say that he liked smoking opium on some

occasions. miths testimony was disregarded. 9e accorded significance to the fact

that it was mith who went to the accused three times to convince him to look for an

opium den where both of them could smoke this drug. 0#GThe conduct of the "A!

agent was condemned as *most reprehensible.*0GAnPeople v. !bella,0(Gwe

ac>uitted the accused of the crime of selling eEplosives after eEamining the

testimony of the apprehending police officer who pretended to be a merchant. The

police officer offered *a tempting price, EEE a very high one* causing the accused tosell the eEplosives. 9e found that there was inducement, *direct, persistent and

effective* by the police officer and that outside of his testimony, there was no

evidence sufficient to convict the accused. &=GAnPeople v. -ua Chu and * Se /ieng,&1Gwe convicted the accused after finding that there was no inducement on the part

of the law enforcement officer. 9e stated that the Customs secret serviceman

smoothed the way for the introduction of opium from 5ongkong to Cebu after the

accused had already planned its importation and ordered said drug. 9e ruled that the

apprehending officer did not induce the accused to import opium but merely

entrapped him by pretending to have an understanding with the Collector of Customs

of Cebu to better assure the sei@ure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the

surreptitious importers.&G

At was also in the same case ofPeople v. -ua Chu and * Se /ieng&%Gwe first

laid down the distinction between entrapment vis-a-vis instigation or

inducement. Iuoting 1& Corpus

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The distinction above->uoted was reiterated in two / decisions of the Court of

ppeals. AnPeople v. +alicia,&&Gthe appellate court declared that *there is a wide

difference between entrapment and instigation.* The instigator practically induces

the would-be accused into the commission of the offense and himself becomes a co-

principal. An entrapment, ways and means are resorted to by the peace officer for the

purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreaker in the eEecution of his criminal

plan.GAnPeople v. /an /iong,&Gthe Court of ppeals further declared that

*entrapment is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the lawbreaker.* &(G

The pronouncement of the Court of ppeals in People v. +aliciawas affirmed

by this Court inPeople v. /iu *a.#=G;ntrapment, we further held, is not contrary to

public policy. At is instigation that is deemed contrary to public policy and illegal.#1G

At can thus be seen that the concept of entrapment in the merican 4urisdiction

is similar to instigation or inducement in 3hilippine 4urisprudence. ;ntrapment in the

3hilippines is not a defense available to the accused. At is instigation that is a defense

and is considered an absolutory cause.#GTo determine whether there is entrapment

or instigation, our courts have mainly eEamined the conduct of the apprehending

officers, not the predisposition of the accused to commit the crime. The *ob4ective*

test first applied in *nited States v. Phelpshas been followed in a series of similar

cases.#%G$evertheless, adopting the *ob4ective* approach has not precluded us from

likewise applying the *sub4ective* test. AnPeople v. Boholst,#'Gwe applied both testsby eEamining the conduct of the police officers in a buy-bust operation

and admitting evidence of the accuseds membership with the notorious and dreaded

igue-igue putnik +ang. 9e also considered accuseds previous convictions of

other crimes#0Gand held that his opprobrious past and membership with the dreaded

gang strengthened the states evidence against him. Conversely, the evidence that the

accused did not sell or smoke mari4uana and did not have any criminal record was

likewise admitted inPeople v. 0utuc#&Gthereby sustaining his defense that led to his

ac>uittal.

The distinction between entrapment and instigation has proven to be very

material in anti-narcotics operations. An recent years, it has become common

practice for law enforcement officers and agents to engage in buy-bust operationsand other entrapment procedures in apprehending drug offenders. nti-narcotics

laws, like anti-gambling laws are regulatory statutes.##GThey are rules of

convenience designed to secure a more orderly regulation of the affairs of society,

and their violation gives rise to crimes ala prohibita.#GThey are not the traditional

type of criminal law such as the law of murder, rape, theft, arson, etc. that deal with

crimes ala in seor those inherently wrongful and immoral.#(G8aws defining

crimes ala prohibitacondemn behavior directed, not against particular individuals,

but against public order. =GBiolation is deemed a wrong against society as a whole

and is generally unattended with any particular harm to a definite person. 1GThese

offenses are carried on in secret and the violators resort to many devices and

subterfuges to avoid detection. At is rare for any member of the public, no matter

how furiously he condemns acts ala prohibita,to be willing to assist in theenforcement of the law. At is necessary, therefore, that government in detecting and

punishing violations of these laws, rely, not upon the voluntary action of aggrieved

individuals, but upon the diligence of its own officials. This means that the police

must be present at the time the offenses are committed either in an undercover

capacity or through informants, spies or stool pigeons.G

Though considered essential by the police in enforcing vice legislation, the

confidential informant system breeds abominable abuse. Fre>uently, a person who

accepts payment from the police in the apprehension of drug peddlers and gamblers

also accept payment from these persons who deceive the police. The informanthimself may be a drug addict, pickpocket, pimp, or other petty criminal. For

whatever noble purpose it serves, the spectacle that government is secretly mated

with the underworld and uses underworld characters to help maintain law and order

is not an inspiring one.%G;>ually odious is the bitter reality of dealing with

unscrupulous, corrupt and eEploitative law enforcers. 8ike the informant,

unscrupulous law enforcers motivations are legion-- harassment, eEtortion,

vengeance, blackmail, or a desire to report an accomplishment to their

superiors. This Court has taken 4udicial notice of this ugly reality in a number of

cases'Gwhere we observed that it is a common odus operandiof corrupt law

enforcers to prey on weak and hapless persons, particularly unsuspecting provincial

hicks.0GThe use of shady underworld characters as informants, the relative ease with

which illegal drugs may be planted in the hands or property of trusting and ignorantpersons, and the imposed secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals have

compelled this Court to be eEtra-vigilant in deciding drug cases. &GCriminal activity

is such that stealth and strategy, although necessary weapons in the arsenal of the

police officer, become as ob4ectionable police methods as the coerced confession and

the unlawful search. s well put by the upreme Court of California inPeople v.

Barraa,#G

*;Gntrapment is a facet of a broader problem. long with illegal search and

sei@ures, wiretapping, false arrest, illegal detention and the third degree, it is a type

of lawless enforcement. They all spring from common motivations. ;ach is a

substitute for skillful and scientific investigation. ;ach is condoned by the sinister

sophism that the end, when dealing with known criminals of the criminal classes,

4ustifies the employment of illegal means.*G

At is thus imperative that the presumption,1uris tantu, of regularity in the

performance of official duty by law enforcement agents raised by the olicitor

+eneral be applied with studied restraint. This presumption should not by itself

prevail over the presumption of innocence and the constitutionally-protected rights

of the individual.(GAt is the duty of courts to preserve the purity of their own temple

from the prostitution of the criminal law through lawless enforcement.(=GCourts

should not allow themselves to be used as an instrument of abuse and in4ustice lest

an innocent person be made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug

offenses.(1G

9e therefore stress that the *ob4ective* test in buy-bust operations demands

that the details of the purported transaction must be clearly and ade>uately shown.This must start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the

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offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the

consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug sub4ect of the sale.(GThe manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an

informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the *buy-bust* money, and

the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer,

must be the sub4ect of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citi@ens are

not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be caught but not at all

cost. t the same time, however, eEamining the conduct of the police should not

disable courts into ignoring the accuseds predisposition to commit the crime. Af thereis overwhelming evidence of habitual delin>uency, recidivism or plain criminal

proclivity, then this must also be considered. Courts should look at all factors to

determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are

relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement.

An the case at bar, the evidence shows that it was the confidential informant

who initially contacted accused-appellant Doria. t the pre-arranged meeting, the

informant was accompanied by 36% )anlangit who posed as the buyer of mari4uana.

36% )anlangit handed the marked money to accused-appellant Doria as advance

payment for one /1 kilo of mari4uana. ccused-appellant Doria was apprehended

when he later returned and handed the brick of mari4uana to 36% )anlangit.

36% )anlangit testified in a frank, spontaneous, straighforward and categoricalmanner and his credibility was not crumpled on cross-eEamination by defense

counsel. )oreover, 36% )anlangits testimony was corroborated on its material

points by 361 "adua, his back-up security. The non-presentation of the

confidential informant is not fatal to the prosecution. Anformants are usually not

presented in court because of the need to hide their identity and preserve their

invaluable service to the police. (%GAt is well-settled that eEcept when the appellant

vehemently denies selling prohibited drugs and there are material inconsistencies in

the testimonies of the arresting officers,('Gor there are reasons to believe that the

arresting officers had motives to testify falsely against the appellant, (0Gor that only

the informant was the poseur-buyer who actually witnessed the entire transaction,(&G the testimony of the informant may be dispensed with as it will merely be

corroborative of the apprehending officers eyewitness testimonies. (#GThere is noneed to present the informant in court where the sale was actually witnessed and

ade>uately proved by prosecution witnesses.(G

The inconsistencies in 36% )anlangits and 361 "aduas testimonies and the

other police officers testimonies are minor and do not detract from the veracity and

weight of the prosecution evidence. The source of the money for the buy-bust

operation is not a critical fact in the case at bar. At is enough that the prosecution

proved that money was paid to accused-appellant Doria in consideration of which he

sold and delivered the mari4uana.

Contrary to accused-appellant Dorias claim, the one kilo of mari4uana *sold*

by him to 36% )anlangit was actually identified by 36% )anlangit himself before

the trial court. fter appellants apprehension, the $arcom agents placed this one /1brick of mari4uana recovered from appellant Doria inside the carton boE lumping it

together with the ten /1= bricks inside. This is why the carton boE contained eleven

/11 bricks of mari4uana when brought before the trial court. The one /1 brick

recovered from appellant Doria and each of the ten /1= bricks, however, were

identified and marked in court. Thus2

*TT7. !A, Counsel for Florencio Doria2

)r. 3olice 6fficer, when you identified that boE,. Tell the court, how were

you able to identify that boEK

A T 4e bo5 4a4 I brou64 4o 4e r8e abora4ory : o"4a"e#

4e ee;e" ua"a br? :e o"=a4e# =ro8 4e uuestioning considering the fact that

we are now dealing with eleven items when the >uestion posed to the

witness was what was handed to him by

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(a4 8a?e you o ureA !eaue I 8ar?e# 4 :4 8y o:" "4a be=ore 6;"6 4 4o 4e

";e46a4or a"# be=ore :e brou64 4 4o 4e P++L, your Ho"or. E E E.

PROSE+$TOR May :e reue4 4a4 a 4a6 be

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likewise made without a search warrant. At is claimed, however, that the warrants

were not necessary because the arrest was made in *hot pursuit* and the search was

an incident to her lawful arrest.

To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant +addao must fall under any of

the three /% instances enumerated in ection 0 of !ule 11% of the 1(0 !ules on

Criminal 3rocedure as afore>uoted. The direct testimony of 36% )anlangit, the

arresting officer, however shows otherwise2

*TT7 B8D;, Counsel for appellant +addao29e submit at this 4uncture, your 5onor, that there will be no basis for that

>uestion.

I This particular eEhibit that you identified, the wrapper and the contents was

given to you by whomK

At was given to me by suspect u4 a: er ou4#e, r.

A"# a4 4a4 uestion, your 5onor. )oney, theres no

testimony on that.TT7. B8D;2

A was asking him precisely.

3!6;C:T6!2

$o basis.

C6:!T2

ustained.

I lright. A will ask you a >uestion and A eEpect an honest answer. ccording

to the records, the amount of 31,&==.== was recovered from the person of

ling $eneth. Thats rightK

7es, sir, the buy-bust money.

I 9hat you are now saying for certain and for the record is the fact that you

were not the one who retrieved the money from ling $eneth, it was)anlangit maybeK

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A saw it, sir.

I At was )anlangit who got the money from ling $enethK

The buy-bust money was recovered from the house of ling $eneth, sir.

I At was taken from the house of ling $eneth, not from the person of ling

$eneth. As that what you are trying to tell the CourtK

$o, sir.

TT7. B8D;2 A am through with this witness, your 5onor.*11%G

ccused-appellant +addao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bustoperation to give ground for her arrest under ection 0 /a of !ule 11%. he was not

committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no

occasion at all for appellant +addao to flee from the policemen to 4ustify her arrest in

*hot pursuit.*11'GAn fact, she was going about her daily chores when the policemen

pounced on her.

$either could the arrest of appellant +addao be 4ustified under the second

instance of !ule 11%. *3ersonal knowledge* of facts in arrests without warrant under

ection 0 /b of !ule 11% must be based upon *probable cause* which means an

*actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.*110GThe grounds of suspicion are

reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the

suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense,

is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong inthemselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. 11&G

reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with

good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.11#G

ccused-appellant +addao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged

identification made by her co-accused. 36% )anlangit, however, declared in his

direct eEamination that appellant Doria named his co-accused in response to his

/36% )anlangits >uery as to where the marked 8o"eywas.11Gppellant Doria didnot point to appellant +addao as his associate in the drug business, but as the person

with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to

the conclusion that appellant +addao conspired with her co-accused in pushing

drugs. ppellant Doria may have left the money in her house,

11(G

with or without herknowledge, with or without any conspiracy. ave for accused-appellant Dorias

word, the $arcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged

in drug pushing. Af there is no showing that the person who effected the warrantless

arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of facts implicating the person arrested to the

perpetration of a criminal offense, the arrest is legally ob4ectionable.1=G

ince the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant +addao was illegal, it follows

that the search of her person and home and the subse>uent sei@ure of the marked bills

and mari4uana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest. This brings us to

the >uestion of whether the trial court correctly found that the boE of mari4uana was

in plain view, making its warrantless sei@ure valid.

6b4ects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the positionto have that view are sub4ect to sei@ure even without a search warrant and may be

introduced in evidence.11GThe *plain view* doctrine applies when the following

re>uisites concur2 /a the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a

prior 4ustification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a

particular area? /b the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent? /c it is

immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a

crime, contraband or otherwise sub4ect to sei@ure.1GThe law enforcement officer

must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he

can particularly view the area.1%GAn the course of such lawful intrusion, he came

inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. 1'GThe ob4ectmust be open to eye and hand 10Gand its discovery inadvertent.1&G

At is clear that an ob4ect is in plain view if the ob4ect itself is plainly eEposed to

sight. The difficulty arises when the ob4ect is inside a closed container. 9here the

ob4ect sei@ed was inside a closed package, the ob4ect itself is not in plain view and

therefore cannot be sei@ed without a warrant. 5owever, if the package proclaims its

contents, whether by its distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents

are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain view and may be sei@ed.1#GAn other words, if the package is such that an eEperienced observer could infer

from its appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the article is deemed

in plain view.1GAt must be immediately apparent to the police that the items that

they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise sub4ect to sei@ure.1(G

36% )anlangit, the $arcom agent who found the boE, testified on cross-

eEamination as follows2

*TT7. B8D;2

o here we are. 9hen you and "adua arrived, ling $eneth was inside the

houseK

7es, sir.

I "adua demanded from ling $eneth the buy-bust moneyK

7es, sir.

A4 4a4

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7es.

PROSE+$TORO"e =a< "#e a"# 4e o4er =a< 4a"#"6 a"# :4 4e o"4e"4;be.

+O$RTNo4e#.

A4 4 >u"4ure, you :e"4 "#e 4e oueA %e, r.

A"# 6o4 o# o= 4 ar4o"A %e, r. *# you 8e"4o" a"y4"6 4o A"6 Ne"e4A I a?e# er, :a4 4...I $o, no. no. did you mention anything to ling $eneth before getting the

cartonK

A think it was "adua who accosted ling $eneth regarding the buy-bust

money and he asked *a iyo galing ang mari4uanang ito, nasaan ang buy-

bust money naminK* sir.

I )aking reference to the mari4uana that was given by alias

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Continue. $eEt >uestion.

E E E.*1%=G

36% )anlangit and the police team were at appellant +addaos house because they

were led there by appellant Doria. The $arcom agents testified that they had no

information on appellant +addao until appellant Doria named her and led them to

her.1%1Gtanding by the door of appellant +addaos house, 36% )anlangit had a view

of the interior of said house. Two and a half meters away was the dining table and

underneath it was a carton boE. The boE was partially open and revealed somethingwrapped in plastic.

An his direct eEamination, 36% )anlangit said that he was sure that the contents

of the boE were mari4uana because he himself checked and marked the said contents.1%G6n cross-eEamination, however, he admitted that he merely uitted.

SO OR*ERE*.

Two civilian informants informed the PNP Narcom that one Jun was engaged inillegal drug activities and the Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrenst Jun in abuy-bust operation.

? n the day of entrapment! P" #anlangit handed Jun the mar$ed bills andJun instructed P" #anlangit to wait for him while he got the mari%uana from hisassociate.

? &hen they met up! Jun gave P" something wrapped in plastic upon whichP" arrested Jun. They fris$ed Jun but did not find the mar$ed bills on him. Junrevealed that he left the money at the house of his associate named neneth

? They wen to Neneth's house. P" #anlangit noticed a carton bo( under thedinin table and noticed something wrapped in plastic inside the bo(.

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? )uspicious! P" entered the house and too$ hold of the bo( and found that itha *+ bric$s of what appeared to be dried mari%uana leaves.

? )imultaneously! )P* ,adua recovered the mar$ed bills from Neneth. Thepolicemen arrested Neneth and too$ both her and Jun! together with the co! itscontents and the mar$ed bill and turned them over to the investigator atheaduarters!

? Jun was then learned to be /lorencio 0oria while Neneth is 1iolata 2addao.

? They were both convicted feloniously selling! administering and giving away toanother ** plastic bags of suspected mari%uana fruiting tops! in violation of 3.4 5678!as amended by 34 958:

;ssue< &N 1ioleta 2addao is liable

? =ntrapment is recognied as a valid defense that can be raised by an accused> parta$es the nature of a confession > avoidance.

? 4merican federal courts and state courts usually use the sub%ective or originof intent test laid down in )orrells v. .). to determine whether entrapment actuallyoccurred. The focus of the inuiry is on the accused's predisposition to commit theoffense is charged! his state of mind and inclination before his initial e(posure togovernment agents.

? 4nother test is the ob%ective test where the test of entrapment is whether theconduct of the law enforcement agenst was li$ely to induce a normally law-abidingperson! other than one who is ready and willing! to commit the offense.

? The ob%ective test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of thepurported transaction must be clearly > adeuately shown. @ourts should loo$ at allfactors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so faras they are relevant to determine the validty of the defense of inducement.

? ;n the case at bar! 2addao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bustoperation to give ground for her arrest uner )ec. 8a of 3ule **". )he was notcommitting any crime. @ontrary to the finding of the T@! there was no occasion at allfor 2addao to flee from the policement to %ustify her arrest in hot pursuit

? Neither could her arrest ne %ustified under second instance of personal

$nowledge in 3ule **" as this must be based upon probable cause which means anactual belief or reasonable grounds for suspicion. 2addao was arrested solely on thebasis of the alleged indentification made by her co-accused. P" #anlangt! however!declared in his direct e(amination that appellant 0oria named his co-accused inresponse to his uery as to where the mar$ed money was. 0oria did not point to2addao as his associate in the drug business! but as the person with whom he lfetthe mar$ed bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that2addao conspired with 0oria in pushing drugs! ;f there is no showing that the personwho effected the warrantless arrest had! in his own right! $nowledge of the actsimplicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a criminal offense! the arrest islegally ob%ectionable.

? /urthermore! the fact that the bo( containing about 5 $ilos of mari%uana wasfound in 2addao's house does not %ustify a finding that she herself is guilty of the

crime charged.

? The prosecution thus had failed to prove that 2addao conspired with 0oria inthe sale of the said drug. Thus! 2addao is acuitted

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-G.R. No. 13012. May 11, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee, vs. !ERNAR*INO*OMANTA%, @ /$NIOR OTOT,J accused-appellant.

S%NOPSIS

ppellant, ( years old, was charged with rape with homicide for the death of

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sadistically augmented the victims suffering thus . . . there must be proof that

the victim was made to agoni@e before the the accusedG rendered the blow

which snuffed out herG life. An this case, there is no such proof of cruelty. Dr.

"andonill testified that any of the ma4or wounds on the victims back could

have caused her death as they penetrated her heart, lungs and liver, kidney and

intestines.

. +RIMINAL LA( RAPE +ARNAL NO(LE*GE, NOTESTA!LISHE* IN +ASE AT !AR.-- s the victim here was siE years old,only carnal knowledge had to be proved to establish rape. Carnal knowledge is

defined as the act of a man having seEual intercourse or seEual bodily

connections with a woman. For this purpose, it is enough if there was even the

slightest contact of the male seE organ with the labia of the victims genitalia.

5owever, there must be proof, by direct or indirect evidence, of such contact.

EEE ;ven assuming that uently, standing

alone, a physicians finding that the hymen of the alleged victim was lacerated

does not prove rape. At is only when this is corroborated by other evidence

proving carnal knowledge that rape may be deemed to have been established.

. +I)IL LA( *AMAGES A+T$AL *AMAGES M$ST !E *$L%S$PPORTE* !% E)I*EN+E. -- The list of eEpenses produced by thevictims father, ui police pointed to accused-appellant

"ernardino Domantay, a cousin of the victimPs grandfather, as the lone suspect in the

gruesome crime. t around &2%= in the evening of that day, police officers

)ontemayor, de la Cru@, and de +u@man of the )alasi>ui 3hilippine $ational 3olice

/3$3 picked up accused-appellant at the )alasi>ui public market and took him to

the police station where accused-appellant, upon >uestioning by 361 ntonio

;spino@a, confessed to killing uently, the following information was filed2'G

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That on or about the 1#th day of 6ctober, 1((&, in the afternoon, in barangay +uilig,

)unicipality of )alasi>ui, province of 3angasinan, 3hilippines and within the

4urisdiction of this 5onorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design and

armed with a bayonnete, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously

have seEual intercourse with uestioning, he apprised accused-appellant of his

constitutional right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel,

in ;nglish, which was later translated into 3angasinense.1%Gccording to 361

;spino@a, accused-appellant agreed to answer the >uestions of the investigator even

in the absence of counsel and admitted killing the victim. ccused-appellant also

disclosed the location of the bayonet he used in killing the victim.1'G6n cross-

eEamination, ;spino@a admitted that at no time during the course of his >uestioningwas accused-appellant assisted by counsel. $either was accused-appellantPs

confession reduced in writing.10G;spino@aPs testimony was admitted by the trial

court over the ob4ection of the defense.

Celso )anuel, for his part, testified that he is a radio reporter of station D93!,

an ) station based in Dagupan City. 5e covers the third district of 3angasinan,

including )alasi>ui. ometime in 6ctober 1((&, an uncle of the victim came to

Dagupan City and informed the station about ui to interview accused-appellant who

was then detained in the municipal 4ail. 5e described what transpired during the

interview thus21#G

3!6. I:A$AT2

I Did you introduce yourself as a media practitionerK

7es, sir.

I 5ow did you introduce yourself to the accusedK

A showed to "ernardino Domantay alias Ruest for an interviewK

5e was willing to state what had happened, sir.

I 9hat are those matters which you brought out in that interview with the

accused "ernardino Domantay alias R

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. . . .

3!6. I:A$AT2

I 7ou mentioned about accused admitting to you on the commissionG of the

crime, how did you ask him thatK

A asked him very politely.

I )ore or less what have you asked him on that particular matterK

A asked Ruestioning by the court, )anuel said that it was the first time he had been called to

testify regarding an interview he had conducted.=Gs in the case of the testimony of

361 ;spino@a, the defense ob4ected to the admission of )anuelPs testimony, but

the lower court allowed it.

Dr. "andonill, the $"A medico-legal who conducted an autopsy of the victim

on 6ctober 0, 1((&, testified that ui, 3angasinan. 5e confirmed thatDaudencio was then having drinks in front of his /)acasaebPs house. ccused-

appellant claimed, however, that he did not 4oin in the drinking and that it was

;dward Domantay, whom the prosecution had presented as witness, and a certain

uested to buy some more li>uor, for which reason he gave money

to ;dward Domantay so that the latter could get two bottles of gin, a bottle of prite,

and a pack of cigarettes. &G5e denied ;dward DomantayPs claim that he /accused-

appellant had raised his shirt to show a bayonet tucked in his waistline and that he

had said he would massacre someone in +uilig.#G

ccused-appellant also confirmed that, at about oPclock in the afternoon, he

went to lacan passing on the trail beside the bamboo grove of mparo

Domantay. "ut he said he did not know that ui. The tricycle

was driven by ui to meet his brother. s his brother did not

come, accused-appellant proceeded to town and reported for work. That night, while

he was in the )alasi>ui public market, he was picked up by three policemen and

brought to the )alasi>ui police station where he was interrogated by 361 ;spino@a

regarding the killing of

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been obtained in violation of rt. AAA, Q1/1 of the Constitution and that, with these

vital pieces of evidence eEcluded, the remaining proof of his alleged guilt, consisting

of circumstantial evidence, is inade>uate to establish his guilt beyond reasonable

doubt.%%G

rt. AAA, Q1 of the Constitution in part provides2

/1 ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the

right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and

independent counsel preferably of his own choice. Af the person cannot afford theservices of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived

eEcept in writing and in the presence of counsel.

. . . .

/% ny confession or admission obtained in violation of this section or section 1#

hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence.

This provision applies to the stage of custodial investigation, that is, Rwhen the

investigation is no longer a general in>uiry into an unsolved crime but starts to focus

on a particular person as a suspect.S %'G!.. $o. #'% has eEtended the constitutional

guarantee to situations in which an individual has not been formally arrested but has

merely been RinvitedS for >uestioning.%0G

Decisions%&Gof this Court hold that for an eEtra4udicial confession to be

admissible, it must satisfy the following re>uirements2 /1 it must be voluntary? / it

must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel? /% it must

be eEpress? and /' it must be in writing.

An the case at bar, when accused-appellant was brought to the )alasi>ui police

station in the evening of 6ctober 1#, 1((&, %#Ghe was already a suspect, in fact the

only one, in the brutal slaying of ually inadmissible. The

rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the tate should not

be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegal obtained

evidencetaintsall evidence subse>uently obtained.

9e agree with the olicitor +eneral, however, that accused-appellantPs

confession to the radio reporter, Celso )anuel, is admissible. AnPeople v. !ndan,'=Gthe accused in a rape with homicide case confessed to the crime during interviews

with the media. An holding the confession admissible, despite the fact that the

accused gave his answers without the assistance of counsel, this Court said2'1G

GppellantPs oralG confessions to the newsmen are not covered by ection 1/1

and /% of rticle AAA of the Constitution. The "ill of !ights does not concern itself

with the relation between a private individual and another individual. At governs the

relationship between the individual and the tate. The prohibitions therein are

primarily addressed to the tate and its agents.

ccused-appellant claims, however, that the atmosphere in the 4ail when he was

interviewed was Rtense and intimidatingS and was similar to that which prevails in a

custodial investigation.'G9e are not persuaded. ccused-appellant was interviewed

while he was inside his cell. The interviewer stayed outside the cell and the only

person besides him was an uncle of the victim. ccused-appellant could have

refused to be interviewed, but instead, he agreed. 5e answered >uestions freely and

spontaneously. ccording to Celso )anuel, he said he was willing to accept the

conse>uences of his act.

Celso )anuel admitted that there were indeed some police officers around

because about two to three meters from the 4ail were the police station and the radio

room.'%G9e do not think the presence of the police officers eEerted any undue

pressure or influence on accused-appellant and coerced him into giving his

confession.

ccused-appellant contends that Rit is . . . not altogether improbable for the

police investigators to ask the police reporter /)anuel to try to elicit some

incriminating information from the accused.S''GThis is pure con4ecture. lthough he

testified that he had interviewed inmates before, there is no evidence to show that

Celso was a police beat reporter. ;ven assuming that he was, it has not been shown

that, in conducting the interview in >uestion, his purpose was to elicit incriminating

information from accused-appellant. To the contrary, the media are known to take

an opposite stance against the government by eEposing official wrongdoings.

http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130612.htm#_edn33http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130612.htm#_edn33http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130612.htm#_edn34http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130612.htm#_edn35http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130612.htm#_edn36http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130612.htm#_edn37http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130612.htm#_edn37http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130612.htm#_edn38http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130612.htm#_edn39http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130612.htm#_edn40http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130612.htm#_edn41http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130612.htm#_edn42http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130612.htm#_edn43http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130612.htm#_edn43http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130612.htm#_edn43http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130612.htm#_edn44http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130612.htm#_edn33http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130612.htm#_edn34http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130612.htm#_edn35http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130612.htm#_edn36http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130612.htm#_edn37http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130612.htm#_edn38http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130612.htm#_edn39http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130612.htm#_edn40http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130612.htm#_edn41http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130612.htm#_edn42http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130612.htm#_edn43http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/1999/may99/130612.htm#_edn44

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Andeed, there is no showing that the radio reporter was acting for the police or

that the interview was conducted under circumstances where it is apparent that

accused-appellant confessed to the killing out of fear. s already stated, the

interview was conducted on 6ctober %, 1((&, & days after accused-appellant had

already confessed to the killing to the police.

ccused-appellantPs eEtra4udicial confession is corroborated by evidence

of corpus delicti, namely, the fact of death of

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intercourse or seEual bodily connections with a woman. 0GFor this purpose, it is

enough if there was even the slightest contact of the male seE organ with the labia of

the victimPs genitalia.0%G5owever, there must be proof, by direct or indirect

evidence, of such contact.

Dr. !onald "andonillPs report on the genital eEamination he had performed on

the deceased reads20'G

+;$AT8 ;O)A$TA6$? showed a complete laceration of the right side of the

hymen. The surrounding genital area shows signs of inflamation.

. . . .

!;)!M2 1 Findings at the genital area indicate the probability of penetration of

that area by a hard, rigid instrument.

5ymenal laceration is not necessary to prove rape? 00Gneither does its presence

prove its commission. s held inPeople v. *lili,0&Ga medical certificate or the

testimony of the physician is presented not to prove that the victim was raped but to

show that the latter had lost her virginity. Conse>uently, standing alone, a

physicianPs finding that the hymen of the alleged victim was lacerated does not prove

rape. At is only when this is corroborated by other evidence proving carnal

knowledge that rape may be deemed to have been established.0#G

This conclusion is based on the medically accepted fact that a hymenal tear

may be caused by ob4ects other than the male seE organ 0Gor may arise from other

causes.0(GDr. "andonill himself admitted this. 5e testified that the right side of the

victimPs hymen had been completely lacerated while the surrounding genital area

showed signs of inflammation.&=G5e opined that the laceration had been inflicted

within ' hours of the victimPs death and that the inflammation was due to a trauma

in that area.&1G9hen asked by the private prosecutor whether the lacerations of the

hymen could have been caused by the insertion of a male organ he said this was

possible. "ut he also said when >uestioned by the defense that the lacerations could

have been caused by something blunt other than the male organ. Thus, he testified2&G

3!6. F. I:A$AT2I $ow, what might have caused the complete laceration of the right side of the

hymen, doctorK

9ell, sir, if you look at my report there is a remark and it says

there? findings at the genital area indicated the probability of penetration of

that area by a hard rigid instrument.

I Could it have been caused by a human organK

Af the human male organ is erect, fully erect and hard then it is possible, sir.

. . . .

TT7. B8D;2

I An your remarks? finding at the genital area indicates the probability of

penetration of that area by a hard rigid instrument, this may have also been

caused by a dagger used in the killing of

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the girl. )aybe he did not. )aybe he simply inserted a blunt ob4ect into her organ,

thus causing the lacerations in the hymen. 6therwise, there is no circumstance from

which it might reasonably be inferred that he abused her, e.g., that he was @ipping up

his pants, that there was spermato@oa in the girlPs vaginal canal.

Andeed, the very autopsy report of Dr. "andonill militates against the finding of

rape. An describing the stab wounds on the body of the victim, he tes tified2&&G

Gfter eEamining the body A took note that there were several stab wounds . . . these

were all found at the bac areasir . . . eEtending from the back shoulder down to thelower back area from the left to the right.

Considering the relative physical positions of the accused and the victim in crimes of

rape, the usual location of the eEternal bodily in4uries of the victim is on the face,Gneck,&Gand anterior portion&(Gof her body. lthough it is not unnatural to find

contusions on the posterior side, these are usually caused by the downward pressure

on the victimPs body during the seEual assault. #=GAt is un>uestionably different when,

as in this case, allthe stab wounds /eEcept for a minor cut in the lower left leg had

their entry points at the back running from the upper left shoulder to the lower right

buttocks.

At is noteworthy that the deceased was fully clothed in blue shorts and white

shirt when her body was brought to her parentPs house immediately after it wasfound.#1GFurthermore, there is a huge bloodstain in the back portion of her shorts.#G This must be because she was wearing this piece of clothing when the stab

wounds were inflicted or immediately thereafter, thus allowing the blood to seep into

her shorts to such an eEtent. s accused-appellant would naturally have to pull down

the girlPs lower garments in order to consummate the rape, then, he must have,

regardless of when the stab wounds were inflicted, pulled up the victimPs shorts and

undergarments after the alleged rape, otherwise, the victimPs shorts would not have

been stained so eEtensively. gain, this is contrary to ordinary human eEperience.

;ven assuming that

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Far ;ast "ank and Trust Company, "lumentritt "ranch, ta. Cru@, )anila. "oth

were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide for the killing of the bank

security guard, !amon )atias y Abay. The trial court found both guilty of

murder. "oth appealed. 5owever, !odrigue@ withdrew his appeal for financial

reasons. lthough only rtellero is the appellant now, in view of the circumstances

obtaining in this case, we are compelled to review !odrigue@Ps conviction as well.

The facts of the case are as follows2

6n 6ctober 11, 1((1, early in the morning, at the Far ;ast "ank and TrustCompany branch office in !i@al venue cor. "atangas t., ta. Cru@, )anila, a

messenger discovered the lifeless body of )atias, inside the bank premises. The

body was hogtied with a nylon cord, and bore % stab wounds. The chairs and tables

inside the bank were in disarray. The bankPs emergency eEit vault bore chisel

marks. t around &2== .)., 36% )endo@a and two other officers of the 9estern

3olice District arrived after receiving a report on the incident. They interviewed the

bank 4anitor, a )r. Cawagdan, and the other security guard, Dionisio Bargas. Then

they ordered the transfer of the body of )atias to the morgue. The police found a

bloodstained scissorPs mate inside a podium located near the main entrance of the

bank. The head guard of the bankPs security agency /8eopard also reported that

three .% cal. revolvers and five 1 gauge shotguns were missing from the guard

rostrum.%G

t around '2== 3.)., 36% uest of Chief

Anspector

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The evidence for the defense consists of the testimonies of the following

witnesses2 /1 ;vangelo :.

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An the case ofPeople v. Bolanos,%Gwe held that an accused who is on board

the police vehicle on the wa to the police stationis already under custodial

investigation, and should therefore be accorded his rights under the Constitution. An

this case, the teaching ofBolanos clearly went unheeded.

The rights of persons under custodial investigation is enshrined in rticle AAA,

ection 1 of the 1(# Constitution which provides2

ec. 1 /1 ny person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall

have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent andindependent counsel preferably of his own choice. Af the person cannot afford the

services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived

eEcept in writing and in the presence of counsel.

/ $o torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiates

the free will shall be used against him. ecret detention places,

solitary, incounicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

/% ny confession or admission obtained in violation of this or section 1# hereof

/right against self-incrimination shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.

/' The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violation of this section as

well as compensation for the rehabilitation of victims of tortures or similar practices,

and their families.

Custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the

investigation is no longer a general in>uiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to

focus on a particular person as a suspect. 'G9hen !odrigue@ and appellant were

arrested by the police in the afternoon of 6ctober 11, 1((1, they were already the

suspects in the slaying of the security guard, !amon )atias, and should have been

afforded the rights guaranteed by rticle AAA, ection 1 of the 1(# Constitution,

particularly the right to counsel. The records do not show that !odrigue@ and

appellant, at the time of their arrest in the afternoon of 6ctober 11, 1((1, were

informed of the well-known#irandarights. 9orse, they were not provided with

competent and independent counsel during the custodial investigation prior to the

eEecution of the eEtra4udicial confession.

AnPeople v. e la C