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GR No. 162155. August 28,2007CIR V Primetown Property Group Inc.

A Petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolutionof the Court of Appeals

Facts:

August 1, 2003 decision of Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64782 and its February resolution denyingreconsideration.

On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, VP of PrimetownProperty Group, Inc., applied for refund or credit of IncomeTax and paid.

In Yap s letter to CIR District Director Arturo V. Parceroof Revenue District No. 049 (Makati) of the BIR, he explainedthat the cost of labor and materials increases and theirdifficulty in obtaining financing for projects and collectingreceivables caused the real estate industry to slowdown.Though business was good on the first quarter of 1997 theysuffered loss amounting to P71,879,228 that year. Because ofthis losses, Yap or the respondents were not liable for incometaxes. Nevertheless, Respondents paid its quarterly corporateincome tax and remitted creditable withholding tax from realestate sales to the BIR in the total amount of P26,318,398.32.Entitling them to tax refund/credit.

On May 13, 1999, BIR Officer Elizabeth Santosrequired respondent to submit additional documents to supportits claim. Respondent complied but its claim was not actedupon.

April 14, 2000, if filed a petition for review in the Courtof Tax Appeals.

December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition asit was filed beyond the two-year prescriptive period for filing a

judicial claim for tax refund/credit.

Issue:Whether or not Primetown Property Group, Inc . filed

beyond a prescriptive period for filing Judicial Claim.

HELD:Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Sec. 31, Chapter

VIII, Book of the Administrative Code of 1987 deal with thesame subject matter- the Computation of legal periods. Underthe Civil Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be aregular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months.Needless to state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, thenumber of days is irrelevant.

There obviously exist a manifest incompatibility in themanner of computing legal periods under the Civil Code andAdministrative Code of 1987. For this reason, Sec. 31,Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, beingmore recent law, governs the computation of legal periods.Lex Postoriori derogat priori (more recent law prevails)

Accordingly, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The caseis REMANDED to the Court of Tax Appeals which is orderedto expeditiously proceed to hear C.T.A. Case No. 6113 entitledPrimetown Property Group, Inc. V. Commissioner of InternalRevenue and Arturo V. Parcero.

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degree circumspection is required of the lower courts incomputing periods, bearing in mind not only to conduct aperfunctory or mechanical counting of days, but moreimportantly a mindful determination as to what specific daysthe ends of these periods fall on.

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EN BANCG.R. No. L-19671 November 29, 1965PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant ,vs.

VICENTA F. ESCAO, ET AL., defendants-appellees .I. V. Binamira & F. B. Barria for plaintiff-appellant.Jalandoni & Jarnir for defendants-appellees.

D E C I S I O N REYES, J.B.L., J.: Direct appeal, on factual and legal questions, from the

judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, in its CivilCase No. R-4177, denying the claim of the plaintiff-appellant,Pastor B. Tenchavez, for legal separation and one million

pesos in damages against his wife and parents-in-law, thedefendants-appellees, Vicente, Mamerto and Mena, 1 allsurnamed Escao, respectively. 2 The facts, supported by the evidence of record, are thefollowing:Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February 1948 in theUniversity of San Carlos, Cebu City, where she was thenenrolled as a second year student of commerce, VicentaEscao, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and sociallyprominent Filipino family of Spanish ancestry and a shelteredcolegiala), exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez,32 years of age, an engineer, ex-army officer and ofundistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents,before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house ofone Juan Alburo in the said city. The marriage was theculmination of a previous love affair and was duly registeredwith the local civil register.

Vicentas letters to Pastor, and his to her, before the marriage ,indicate that the couple were deeply in love. Together with afriend, Pacita Noel, their matchmaker and go-between, theyhad planned out their marital future whereby Pacita would be

the governess of their first-born; they started saving money ina piggy bank. A few weeks before their secret marriage, theirengagement was broken; Vicenta returned the engagementring and accepted another suitor, Joseling Lao. Her love forPastor beckoned; she pleaded for his return, and theyreconciled. This time they planned to get married and thenelope. To facilitate the elopement, Vicenta had brought someof her clothes to the room of Pacita Noel in St. Marys Hall,which was their usual trysting place.

Although planned for the midnight following their marriage, the

elopement did not, however, materialize because whenVicente went back to her classes after the marriage, hermother, who got wind of the intended nuptials, was alreadywaiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home whereshe admitted that she had already married Pastor. Mamertoand Mena Escao were surprised, because Pastor neverasked for the hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because ofthe great scandal that the clandestine marriage would provoke(t.s.n., vol. III, pp. 1105-06). The following morning, theEscao spouses sought priestly advice. Father Reynessuggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to bean invalid marriage, from the standpoint of the Church, due tothe lack of authority from the Archbishop or the parish priestfor the officiating chaplain to celebrate the marriage. Therecelebration did not take place, because on 26 February 1948Mamerto Escao was handed by a maid, whose name heclaims he does not remember, a letter purportedly comingfrom San Carlos college students and disclosing an amorous

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relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel;Vicenta translated the letter to her father, and thereafter wouldnot agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that dayin the house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta

continued living with her parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948 (Exh. M), while stillsolicitous of her husbands welfare, was not as endearing asher previous letters when their love was aflame.Vicenta was bred in Catholic ways but is of a changeabledisposition, and Pastor knew it. She fondly accepted her beingcalled a jellyfish. She was not prevented by her parents fromcommunicating with Pastor (Exh. 1 -Escao), but her lettersbecame less frequent as the days passed. As of June, 1948the newlyweds were already estranged (Exh. 2 -Escao).

Vicenta had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental, to escapefrom the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society.There, a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by then SenatorEmmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. She did not sign thepetition (Exh. B -5). The case was dismissed withoutprejudice because of her non-appearance at the hearing (Exh.B-4). On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she appliedfor a passport, indicating in her application that she was single,that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in CebuCity, and that she intended to return after two years. Theapplication was approved, and she left for the United States.On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorceagainst the herein plaintiff in the Second Judicial District Courtof the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, onthe ground of extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character. On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, final and absolute,was issued in open court by the said tribunal.

In 1951 Mamerto and Mena Escao filed a petition with the Archbishop of Cebu to annul their daughters marriage toPastor (Exh. D). On 10 Septe mber 1954, Vicenta soughtpapal dispensation of her marriage (Exh. D -2).

On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, RussellLeo Moran, in Nevada. She now lives with him in California,and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired Americancitizenship on 8 August 1958.But on 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedingsat bar by a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu,and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escao, herparents, Mamerto and Mena Escao, whom he charged withhaving dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining herhusband, and alienating her affections, and against the Roman

Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal,decreed the annulment of the marriage, and asked for legalseparation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimeda valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage toher present husband, Russell Leo Moran; while her parentsdenied that they had in any way influenced their daughtersacts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, butfreed the plaintiff from supporting his wife and to acquireproperty to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed thecounterclaim of Mamerto Escao and Mena Escao for moraland exemplary damages and attorneys fees against theplaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiffresorted directly to this Court.The appellant ascribes, as errors of the trial court, thefollowing:

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1. In not declaring legal separation; in not holding defendantVicenta F. Escao liable for damages and in dismissing thecomplaint;.2. In not holding the defendant parents Mamerto Escano and

the heirs of Doa Mena Escao liable for damages;.3 In holding the plaintiff liable for and requiring him to pay thedamages to the defendant parents on their counterclaims; and.4. In dismissing the complaint and in denying the relief soughtby the plaintiff.That on 24 February 1948 the plaintiff-appellant, PastorTenchavez, and the defendant-appellee, Vicenta Escao,were validly married to each other, from the standpoint of ourcivil law, is clearly established by the record before us. Bothparties were then above the age of majority, and otherwise

qualified; and both consented to the marriage, which wasperformed by a Catholic priest (army chaplain Lavares) in thepresence of competent witnesses. It is nowhere shown thatsaid priest was not duly authorized under civil law to solemnizemarriages.The chaplains alleged lack of ecclesiastical authorizati on fromthe parish priest and the Ordinary, as required by Canon law,is irrelevant in our civil law, not only because of the separationof Church and State but also because Act 3613 of thePhilippine Legislature (which was the marriage law in force atthe time) expressly provided that SEC. 1. Essential requisites . Essential requisites for marriageare the legal capacity of the contracting parties and consent.(Emphasis supplied)The actual authority of the solemnizing officer was thus only aformal requirement, and, therefore, not essential to give themarriage civil effects, 3 and this is emphasized by section 27 ofsaid marriage act, which provided the following:

SEC. 27. Failure to comply with formal requirements . Nomarriage shall be declared invalid because of the absence ofone or several of the formal requirements of this Act if, when itwas performed, the spouses or one of them believed in good

faith that the person who solemnized the marriage wasactually empowered to do so, and that the marriage wasperfectly legal.The good faith of all the parties to the marriage (and hence thevalidity of their marriage) will be presumed until the contrary ispositively proved (Lao vs. Dee Tim, 45 Phil. 739, 745;Francisco vs. Jason, 60 Phil. 442, 448). It is well to note herethat in the case at bar, doubts as to the authority of thesolemnizing priest arose only after the marriage, whenVicentas parents consulted Father Reynes and the

archbishop of Cebu. Moreover, the very act of Vicenta inabandoning her original action for annulment andsubsequently suing for divorce implies an admission that hermarriage to plaintiff was valid and binding.Defendant Vicenta Escao argues that when she contractedthe marriage she was under the undue influence of PacitaNoel, whom she charges to have been in conspiracy withappellant Tenchavez. Even granting, for arguments sake, thetruth of that contention, and assuming that Vicentas consentwas vitiated by fraud and undue influence, such vices did notrender her marriage ab initio void, but merely voidable, and themarriage remained valid until annulled by a competent civilcourt. This was never done, and admittedly, Vicentas suit forannulment in the Court of First Instance of Misamis wasdismissed for non-prosecution.It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriagebetween Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escao remainedsubsisting and undissolved under Philippine law,

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notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wifesought and obtained on 21 October 1950 from the SecondJudicial District Court of Washoe County, State of Nevada, ongrounds of extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character. At

the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escao, likeher husband, was still a Filipino citizen. 4 She was then subjectto Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of thePhilippines (Rep. Act No. 386), already in force at the time,expressly provided:Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status,condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon thecitizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admitabsolute divorce, quo ad vinculo matrimonii ; and in fact does

not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictivepolicy on the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislationthat admitted absolute divorce on grounds of adultery of thewife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead ofdivorce, the present Civil Code only provides for legalseparation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in thatcase, it expressly prescribes that the marriage bonds shall notbe severed (Art. 106, subpar. 1). For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition oreffect to a foreign decree of absolute divorce between Filipinocitizens could be a patent violation of the declared publicpolicy of the state, especially in view of the third paragraph of

Article 17 of the Civil Code that prescribes the following:Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property,and those which have for their object public order, policy andgood customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or

judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventionsagreed upon in a foreign country.

Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to suchforeign divorce decrees would, in effect, give rise to anirritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthycitizens, to the detriment of those members of our polity whose

means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and obtainabsolute divorces outside the Philippines.From this point of view, it is irrelevant that appellant PastorTenchavez should have appeared in the Nevada divorce court.Primarily because the policy of our law cannot be nullified byacts of private parties (Civil Code, Art. 17, jam quot.); andadditionally, because the mere appearance of a non-residentconsort cannot confer jurisdiction where the court originallyhad none (Area vs. Javier, 95 Phil. 579).From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a

necessary consequence that in this jurisdiction VicentaEscaos divorce and second marriage are not entitled torecognition as valid; for her previous union to plaintiffTenchavez must be declared to be existent and undissolved. Itfollows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties,and her denial of consortium and her desertion of her husbandconstitute in law a wrong caused through her fault, for whichthe husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (CivilCode, Art. 2176). Neither an unsubstantiated charge of deceitnor an anonymous letter charging immorality against thehusband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse.Wherefore, her marriage and cohabitation with Russell LeoMoran is techn ically intercourse with a person not herhusband from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitlesplaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of legal separationunder our law, on the basis of adultery (Revised Penal Code,

Art. 333).

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The foregoing conclusions as to the untoward effect of amarriage after an invalid divorce are in accord with theprevious doctrines and rulings of this court on the subject,particularly those that were rendered under our laws prior to

the approval of the absolute divorce act (Act 2710 of thePhilippine Legislature). As a matter of legal history, ourstatutes did not recognize divorces a vinculo before 1917,when Act 2710 became effective; and the present Civil Codeof the Philippines, in disregarding absolute divorces, in effectmerely reverted to the policies on the subject prevailing before

Act 2710. The rulings, therefore, under the Civil Code of 1889,prior to the Act above-mentioned, are now, fully applicable. Ofthese, the decision in Ramirez vs. Gmur , 42 Phil. 855, is ofparticular interest. Said this Court in that case:

As the divorce granted by the French Court must be ignored, itresults that the marriage of Dr. Mory and Leona Castro,celebrated in London in 1905, could not legalize their relations;and the circumstance that they afterwards passed for husbandand wife in Switzerland until her death is wholly without legalsignificance. The claims of the very children to participate inthe estate of Samuel Bishop must therefore be rejected. Theright to inherit is limited to legitimate, legitimated andacknowledged natural children. The children of adulterousrelations are wholly excluded. The word descendants asused in Article 941 of the Civil Code cannot be interpreted toinclude illegitimates born of adulterous relations. (Emphasissupplied)Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children,begotten from Vicentas marriage to Leo Moran after theinvalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar,the Gmur case is authority for the proposition that such unionis adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an

action for legal separation on the part of the innocent consortof the first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine law.In not so declaring, the trial court committed error.True it is that our ruling gives rise to anomalous situations

where the status of a person (whether divorced or not) woulddepend on the territory where the question arises. Anomaliesof this kind are not new in the Philippines, and the answer tothem was given in Barretto vs. Gonzales , 58 Phil. 667:The hardship of the existing divorce laws in the PhilippineIslands are well known to the members of the Legislature. It isthe duty of the Courts to enforce the laws of divorce as writtenby Legislature if they are constitutional. Courts have no right tosay that such laws are too strict or too liberal. (p. 72)The appellants first assignment of error is, therefore,

sustained.However, the plaintiff- appellants charge that his wifesparents, Dr. Mamerto Escao and his wife, the late DoaMena Escao, alienated the affections of their daughter andinfluenced her conduct toward her husband are not supportedby credible evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavezabout the Escaos animosity toward him st rikes us to bemerely conjecture and exaggeration, and are belied byPastors own letters written before this suit was begun (Exh.2-Escao and Vicenta, Rec. on App., pp. 270 -274). In theseletters he expressly apologized to the defendants formisjudging them and for the great unhappiness caused byhis impulsive blunders and sinful pride, effrontery andaudacity [sic]. Plaintiff was admitted to the Escao house tovisit and court Vicenta, and the record shows nothing to provethat he would not have been accepted to marry Vicente had heopenly asked for her hand, as good manners and breedingdemanded. Even after learning of the clandestine marriage,

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and despite their shock at such unexpected event, the parentsof Vicenta proposed and arranged that the marriage berecelebrated in strict conformity with the canons of theirreligion upon advice that the previous one was canonically

defective. If no recelebration of the marriage ceremony washad it was not due to defendants Mamerto Escao and hiswife, but to the refusal of Vicenta to proceed with it. That thespouses Escao did not seek to compel or induce theirdaughter to assent to the recelebration but respected herdecision, or that they abided by her resolve, does notconstitute in law an alienation of affections. Neither does thefact that Vicentas parents sent her money while she was inthe United States; for it was natural that they should not wishtheir daughter to live in penury even if they did not concur in

her decision to divorce Tenchavez (27 Am. Jur. 130-132).There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out ofimproper motives, aided and abetted her original suit forannulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to haveacted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to

judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions berespected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot becharged with alienation of affections in the absence of maliceor unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faithbeing always presumed until the contrary is proved.SEC. 529. Liability of Parents, Guardians or Kin . The lawdistinguishes between the right of a parent to interest himselfin the marital affairs of his child and the absence of rights in astranger to intermeddle in such affairs. However, suchdistinction between the liability of parents and that of strangersis only in regard to what will justify interference. A parent isliable for alienation of affections resulting from his ownmalicious conduct, as where he wrongfully entices his son or

daughter to leave his or her spouse, but he is not liable unlesshe acts maliciously, without justification and from unworthymotives. He is not liable where he acts and advises his child ingood faith with respect to his childs marit al relations in the

interest of his child as he sees it, the marriage of his child notterminating his right and liberty to interest himself in, and beextremely solicitous for, his childs welfare and happiness,even where his conduct and advice suggest or result in theseparation of the spouses or the obtaining of a divorce orannulment, or where he acts under mistake or misinformation,or where his advice or interference are indiscreet orunfortunate, although it has been held that the parent is liablefor consequences resulting from recklessness. He may ingood faith take his child into his home and afford him or her

protection and support, so long as he has not maliciouslyenticed his child away, or does not maliciously entice or causehim or her to stay away, from his or her spouse. This rule hasmore frequently been applied in the case of advice given to amarried daughter, but it is equally applicable in the case ofadvice given to a son.Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicentas aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with having exertedefforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce,unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling themto recover damages. While this suit may not have beenimpelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly recklessin the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Courtactions are not established for parties to give vent to theirprejudices or spleen.In the assessment of the moral damages recoverable byappellant Pastor Tenchavez from defendant Vicente Escao, itis proper to take into account, against his patently

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G.R. No. 178551 October 11, 2010

ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDALand MINISTRY OF PUBLIC HEALTH-KUWAIT Petitioners,vs.MA. JOSEFA ECHIN, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES,J . :

Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCIOverseas Corporation in behalf of its principal-co-petitioner, the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait (theMinistry), for the position of medical technologist under atwo-year contract, denominated as a Memorandum of

Agreement (MOA), with a monthly salary ofUS$1,200.00.

Under the MOA ,1 all newly-hired employees undergo a

probationary period of one (1) year and are covered byKuwaits Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. 2.

Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but wasterminated from employment on February 11, 2001, shenot having allegedly passed the probationary period.

As the Ministry denied r espondents request forreconsideration, she returned to the Philippines on March17, 2001, shouldering her own air fare.

On July 27, 2001, respondent filed with the NationalLabor Relations Commission (NLRC) a complain t2 forillegal dismissal against petitioner ATCI as the localrecruitment agency, represented by petitioner, AmaliaIkdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the foreign principal.

By Decision 3 of November 29, 2002, the Labor Arbiter,finding that petitioners neither showed that there was just

cause to warrant respondents dismissal nor that shefailed to qualify as a regular employee, held thatrespondent was illegally dismissed and accordinglyordered petitioners to pay her US$3,600.00, representingher salary for the three months unexpired portion of hercontract.

On appeal of petitioners ATCI and Ikdal, the NLRCaffirmed the Labor Arbiters decision by

Resolution 4 of January 26, 2004. Petitioners motion forreconsideration having been denied by Resolution 5 of

April 22, 2004, they appealed to the Court of Appeals,contending that their principal, the Ministry, being aforeign government agency, is immune from suit and, assuch, the immunity extended to them; and thatrespondent was validly dismissed for her failure to meet

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Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannotevade responsibility for the money claims of OverseasFilipino workers (OFWs) which it deploys abroad by themere expediency of claiming that its foreign principal is agovernment agency clothed with immunity from suit, orthat suc h foreign principals liability must first beestablished before it, as agent, can be held jointly andsolidarily liable.

In providing for the joint and solidary liability of privaterecruitment agencies with their foreign principals,Republic Act No. 8042 precisely affords the OFWs with a

recourse and assures them of immediate and sufficientpayment of what is due them. Skippers United Pacific v.Maguad 8 explains:

. . . [T]he obligations covenanted in the recruitmentagreement entered into by and between the localagent and its foreign principal are not coterminouswith the term of such agreement so that if either orboth of the parties decide to end the agreement, theresponsibilities of such parties towards the contractedemployees under the agreement do not at all end, but thesame extends up to and until the expiration of theemployment contracts of the employees recruited andemployed pursuant to the said recruitmentagreement. Otherwise, this will render nugatory thevery purpose for which the law governing the

employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad wasenacted . (emphasis supplied)

The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line withthe policy of the state to protect and alleviate the plight ofthe working class .9 Verily, to allow petitioners to simplyinvoke the immunity from suit of its foreign principal or towait for the judicial determination of the foreign principalsliability before petitioner can be held liable renders thelaw on joint and solidary liability inutile.

As to petitioners contentions that Philippine labor l aws

on probationary employment are not applicable since itwas expressly provided in respondents employmentcontract, which she voluntarily entered into, that theterms of her engagement shall be governed by prevailingKuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in factPOEA Rules accord respect to such rules, customs andpractices of the host country, the same was notsubstantiated.

Indeed, a contract freely entered into is considered thelaw between the parties who can establish stipulations,clauses, terms and conditions as they may deemconvenient, including the laws which they wish to governtheir respective obligations, as long as they are notcontrary to law, morals, good customs, public order orpublic policy.

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It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invokingthe application of a foreign law has the burden of provingthe law, under the doctrine of processual presumptionwhich, in this case, petitioners failed to discharge. TheCourts ruling in EDI -Staffbuilders Intl., v.NLRC10 illuminates:

In the present case, the employment contract signed byGran specifically states that Saudi Labor Laws willgovern matters not provided for in the contract (e.g.specific causes for termination, termination procedures,etc.). Being the law intended by the parties ( lex loci

intentiones ) to apply to the contract, Saudi Labor Lawsshould govern all matters relating to the termination ofthe employment of Gran.

In international law, the party who wants to have aforeign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden ofproving the foreign law. The foreign law is treated as aquestion of fact to be properly pleaded and proved as the

judge or labor arbiter cannot take judicial notice of aforeign law. He is presumed to know only domestic orforum law.

Unfortunately for petitioner, it did not prove the pertinentSaudi laws on the matter; thus, the International Lawdoctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual

presumption comes into play. Where a foreign law is not

pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, thepresumption is that foreign law is the same as ours.Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining theissues presented before us. (emphasis and underscoringsupplied)

The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreignlaws, hence, they must not only be alleged; they must beproven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it mustpresent a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court whichreads:

SEC. 24. Proof of official record. The record of publicdocuments referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19,when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced byan official publication thereof or by a copy attested by theofficer having the legal custody of the record, or by hisdeputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in thePhilippines, with a certificate that such officer has thecustody. If the office in which the record is kept is in aforeign country, the certificate may be made by asecretary of the embassy or legation, consul general,consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer inthe foreign service of the Philippines stationed in theforeign country in which the record is kept, andauthenticated by the seal of his office. (emphasissupplied)

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SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a document or record is attested forthe purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, insubstance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original,or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. Theattestation must be under the official seal of the attestingofficer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a courthaving a seal, under the seal of such court.

To prove the Kuwaiti law, petitioners submitted thefollowing: MOA between respondent and the Ministry, asrepresented by ATCI, which provides that the employee

is subject to a probationary period of one (1) year andthat the host countrys Civ il Service Laws andRegulations apply; a translated copy 11 (Arabic to English)of the termination letter to respondent stating that she didnot pass the probation terms, without specifying thegrounds therefor, and a translated copy of the certificateof termination ,12 both of which documents were certifiedby Mr. Mustapha Alawi, Head of the Department ofForeign Affairs-Office of Consular Affairs InslamicCertification and Translation Unit; and respondentslette r 13 of reconsideration to the Ministry, wherein shenoted that in her first eight (8) months of employment,she was given a rating of "Excellent" albeit it changeddue to changes in her shift of work schedule.

These documents, whether taken singly or as a whole,do not sufficiently prove that respondent was validlyterminated as a probationary employee under Kuwaiticivil service laws. Instead of submitting a copy of thepertinent Kuwaiti labor laws duly authenticated andtranslated by Embassy officials thereat, as requiredunder the Rules, what petitioners submitted weremere certifications attesting only to the correctnessof the translations of the MOA and the terminationletter which does not prove at all that Kuwaiti civilservice laws differ from Philippine laws and thatunder such Kuwaiti laws, respondent was validly

terminated. Thus the subject certifications read:

x x x x

This is to certify that the herein attached translation/sfrom Arabic to English/Tagalog and or vice versawas/were presented to this Office for review andcertification and the same was/were found to be inorder. This Office, however, assumes noresponsibility as to the contents of the document/s.

This certification is being issued upon request of theinterested party for whatever legal purpose it may serve.(emphasis supplied) 1avvphi1

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Respecting Ikdals joint and solidary liability as acorporate officer, the same is in order too following theexpress provision of R.A. 8042 on money claims, viz:

SEC. 10. Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provisionof law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the NationalLabor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have theoriginal and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide,within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of thecomplaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contractinvolving Filipino workers for overseas deployment

including claims for actual moral, exemplary and otherforms of damages.

The liability of the principal/employer and therecruitment/placement agency for any and all claimsunder this section shall be joint and several. Thisprovision shall be incorporated in the contract foroverseas employment and shall be a condition precedentfor its approval. The performance bond to be filed by therecruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shallbe answerable for all money claims or damages that maybe awarded to the workers. If the recruitment/placementagency is a juridical being, the corporate officers anddirectors and partners as the case may be, shallthemselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the

corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims anddamages. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

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TUNA PROCESSING INC V PHIL. KINGFORDG.R. No. 185582 (February 29, 2012)

PEREZ, J.:

FACTS:

Kanemitsu Yamaoka, co-patentee of a USPatent, Philippine Letters Patent, and anIndonesian Patent, entered into a M emorandum ofAgreement (MOA ) with five Philippine tunaprocessors including Respondent PhilippineKingford, Inc. (KINGFORD). The MOAprovides for the enforcing of the

abovementioned patents, granting licensesunder the same, and collecting royalties, andfor the establishment of herein Petitioner TunaProcessors, Inc. (TPI).

Due to a series of events not mentioned in thePetition, the tuna processors, includingRespondent KINGFORD, withdrew fromPetitioner TPI and correspondingly reneged ontheir obligations. Petitioner TPI submitted thedispute for arbitration before the InternationalCentre for Dispute Resolution in the State ofCalifornia, United States and won the caseagainst Respondent KINGFORD.

To enforce the award, Petitioner TPI fileda Petition for Confirmation, Recognition, and

Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Award before

the RTC of Makati City. RespondentKINGFORD filed a M otion to Di smiss , which theRTC denied for lack of merit. RespondentKINGFORD then sought for the inhibition of

the RTC judge, Judge Alameda, and moved forthe reconsideration of the order denying theMotion. Judge Alameda inhibited himselfnotwithstanding [t]he unfounded allegationsand unsubstantiated assertions in the motion. Judge Ruiz, to which the case was re-raffled, inturn, granted Respondent KINGFORDSs Motionfor Reconsiderati on and dismissed the Petition onthe ground that Petitioner TPI lacked legalcapacity to sue in the Philippines. Petitioner

TPI is a corporation established in the State ofCalifornia and not licensed to do business inthe Philippines.Hence, the present Petition for Review onCertiorari under Rule 45.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a foreign corporation notlicensed to do business in the Philippines, but

which collects royalties from entities in thePhilippines, sue here to enforce a foreignarbitral award?

ARGUMENT:

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Petitioner TPI contends that it is entitled toseek for the recognition and enforcement of thesubject foreign arbitral award in accordance

with RA No. 9285 ( Al tern ative Di spute Resolu tion A ct of

2004 ), the Convention on the Recognition andEnforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards draftedduring the United Nations Conference onInternational Commercial Arbitration in1958 (New York Convention ), and the UNCITRALModel Law on International Commercial Arbitration(Model Law ), as none of these specificallyrequires that the party seeking for theenforcement should have legal capacity to sue.

RULING:

YES. Petitioner TPI, although not licensed to do business in the Philippines, may seekrecognition and enforcement of the foreignarbitral award in accordance with theprovisions of the Al tern ative Dispute Resoluti on Act of2004 . A foreign corporations capacity to sue inthe Philippines is not material insofar as the

recognition and enforcement of a foreignarbitral award is concerned.

The Resolution of the RTC is REVERSED andSET ASIDE.

RATIO DECIDENDI:

Sec. 45 of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act of2004 provides that the opposing party in anapplication for recognition and enforcement ofthe arbitral award may raise only thosegrounds that were enumerated under Article Vof the New York Convention , to wit:

Article V

1. Recognition and enforcement of the award

may be refused, at the request of the partyagainst whom it is invoked, only if that partyfurnishes to the competent authority where therecognition and enforcement is sought, proofthat:

a. The parties to the agreement referred to in Article II were, under the law applicable tothem, under some incapacity, or the saidagreement is not valid under the law to whichthe parties have subjected it or, failing anyindication thereon, under the law of thecountry where the award was made;

b. The party against whom the award is invoked was not given proper notice of the appointment

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of the arbitrator or of the arbitrationproceedings or was otherwise unable topresent his case;

c. The award deals with a difference notcontemplated by or not falling within the termsof the submission to arbitration, or it containsdecisions on matters beyond the scope of thesubmission to arbitration, provided that, if thedecisions on matters submitted to arbitrationcan be separated from those not so submitted,that part of the award which contains decisionson matters submitted to arbitration may berecognized and enforced;

d. The composition of the arbitral authority orthe arbitral procedure was not in accordance

with the agreement of the parties, or, failingsuch agreement, was not in accordance withthe law of the country where the arbitrationtook place; or

e. The award has not yet become binding on theparties, or has been set aside or suspended by acompetent authority of the country in which, orunder the law of which, that award was made.

2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitralaward may also be refused if the competentauthority in the country where recognition andenforcement is sought finds that:

a. The subject matter of the difference is notcapable of settlement by arbitration under thelaw of that country; or

b. The recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of thatcountry.

Not one of the abovementioned exclusivegrounds touched on the capacity to sue of theparty seeking the recognition and enforcementof the award.

Pertinent provisions of the Special Rul es of Cou rton Alternative Dispute Resolution , which waspromulgated by the Supreme Court, likewisesupport this position.Rule 13.1 of the Special Rules provides that [a]nyparty to a foreign arbitration may petition thecourt to recognize and enforce a foreignarbitral award. The contents of such petitionare enumerated in Rule 13.5. Capacity to sue isnot included. Oppositely, in the rule on localarbitral awards or arbitrations in instances

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where the place of arbitration is in thePhilippines, it is specifically required that apetition to determine any ques tion concerningthe existence, validity and enforceability of

such arbitration agreement available to theparties before the commencement ofarbitration and/or a petition for judicial relieffrom the ruling of the arbitral tribunal on apreliminary question upholding or declining its

jurisdiction after arbitration has alreadycommenced should state [t]he facts showingthat the persons named as petitioner orrespondent have legal capacity to sue or besued.

Indeed, it is in the best interest of justice thatin the enforcement of a foreign arbitralaward, the Court deny availment by thelosing party of the rule that bars foreigncorporations not licensed to do business in thePhilippines from maintaining a suit inPhilippine courts. When a party enters into acontract containing a foreign arbitrationclause and, as in this case, in fact submitsitself to arbitration, it becomes bound by thecontract, by the arbitration and by the result ofarbitration, conceding thereby the capacity ofthe other party to enter into the contract,participate in the arbitration and cause theimplementation of the result. Although not onall fours with the instant case, also worthy toconsider is the wisdom of then AssociateJustice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her

Dissenting Opinion in Asset Privatization Trust v.Court of A ppeals [1998] , to wit:

xxx Arbitration, as an alternative mode ofsettlement, is gaining adherents in legal and judicial circles here and abroad. If its testedmechanism can simply be ignored by anaggrieved party, one who, it must be stressed,

voluntarily and actively participated in thearbitration proceedings from the very

beginning, it will destroy the very essence ofmutuality inherent in consensual contracts.

Clearly, on the matter of capacity to sue, aforeign arbitral award should be respected not because it is favored over domestic laws andprocedures, but because Republic Act No. 9285 hascertainly erased any conflict of law question.Finally, even assuming, only for the sake ofargument, that the RTC correctly observed thatthe Model Law , not the New York Convention , governs the subject arbitral award, PetitionerTPI may still seek recognition and enforcement

of the award in Philippine court, since the ModelL aw prescribes substantially identical exclusivegrounds for refusing recognition orenforcement.

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AMOS V BELLIS

Bellis vs Bellis G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

Lessons Applicable: Divorce , Doctrine of ProcessualPresumption

Laws Applicable: Art. 16, 17 1039 NCC

Violet Kennedy (2 nd wife) Amos G. Bellis --- Mary E. Mallen

(1st wife)Legitimate Children: LegitimateChildren:Edward A. Bellis Amos Bellis,Jr.George Bellis (pre-deceased) MariaCristina BellisHenry A. Bellis Miriam Palma

Bellis Alexander Bellis Anna Bellis Allsman

FACTS: Amos G. Bellis, a citizen of the State of Texas and of

the United States .

By his first wife , Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, hehad 5 legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, GeorgeBellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A.Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman

By his second wife, Violet Kennedy, who survived him,he had 3 legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S.Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had threeillegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria CristinaBellis and Miriam Palma Bellis

August 5, 1952: Amos G. Bellis executed a will in thePhilippines dividing his estate as follows:

1. $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen2. P40,000.00 each to his 3 illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr.,

Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis3. remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first

and second wives July 8, 1958: Amos G. Bellis died a resident of Texas,

U.S.A September 15, 1958: his will was admitted to probate in

the CFI of Manila on People's Bank and Trust Company as executor of the

will did as the will directed Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their

respective oppositions on the ground that they weredeprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children

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Probate Court : Relying upon Art . 16 of the Civil Code, itapplied the national law of the decedent, which inthis case is Texas law, which did not provide forlegitimes.

ISSUE: W/N Texas laws or national law of Amos should governthe intrinsic validity of the will

HELD: YES. Order of the probate court is hereby affirmed Doctrine of Processual Presumption: The foreign law , whenever applicable, should be proved

by the proponent thereof, otherwise, such law shall bepresumed to be exactly the same as the law of theforum.

In the absence of proof as to the conflict of law rule ofTexas, it should not be presumed different from ours.

Apply Philippine laws. Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code,

render applicable the national law of the decedent, inintestate or testamentary successions, with regard tofour items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amountof successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of theprovisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.They provide that

ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property issubject to the law of the country where it is situated.

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both withrespect to the order of succession and to the amount ofsuccessional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentaryprovisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the personwhose succession is under consideration, whatever may hethe nature of the property and regardless of the countrywherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by thelaw of the nation of the decedent.

The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis,was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and thatunder the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs orlegitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of theprovision of the will and the amount of successionalrights are to be determined under Texas law,the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to thetestacy of Amos G. Bellis.

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RAYTHEON V. ROUZIE(2008)[ G.R. No. 162894, February 26, 2008 ] FACTS:

Sometime in 1990, Brand Marine Services, Inc., a corporationduly organized and existing under the laws of the State ofConnecticut, United States of America, and respondent Stockton W.Rouzie, Jr., an American citizen, entered into a contract wherebyBMSI hired respondent as its representative to negotiate the sale ofservices in several government projects in the Philippines for anagreed remuneration of 10% of the gross receipts. On 11 March1992, respondent secured a service contract with the Republic ofthe Philippines on behalf of BMSI for the dredging of rivers affectedby the Mt. Pinatubo eruption and mudflows.

On 16 July 1994, respondent filed before the ArbitrationBranch of the National Labor Relations Commission, a suit againstBMSI and Rust International, Inc., Rodney C. Gilbert and Walter G.Browning for alleged nonpayment of commissions, illegaltermination and breach of employment contract.

On 8 January 1999, respondent, then a resident of La Union,instituted an action for damages before the Regional Trial Court ofBauang, La Union. The Complaint named as defendants hereinpetitioner Raytheon International, Inc. as well as BMSI and RUST,the two corporations impleaded in the earlier labor case.

Petitioner also referred to the NLRC decision which disclosedthat per the written agreement between respondent and BMSI andRUST, denominated as Special Sales Representative Agreement,the rights and obligations of the parties shall be governed by the

laws of the State of Connecticut. Petitioner sought the dismissal ofthe complaint on grounds of failure to state a cause of action and

forum non conveniens and prayed for damages by way ofcompulsory counterclaim.

Petitioner asserts that the written contract betweenrespondent and BMSI included a valid choice of law clause, that is,that the contract shall be governed by the laws of the State ofConnecticut. It also mentions the presence of foreign elements inthe dispute namely, the parties and witnesses involved areAmerican corporations and citizens and the evidence to bepresented is located outside the Philippines that renders our localcourts inconvenient forums.

ISSUE:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COMPLAINT BE DISMISSED ON THEGROUND OFFORUM NON CONVENIENS?

RULING:On the matter of jurisdiction over a conflicts-of-laws problem

where the case is filed in a Philippine court and where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties and the res , it mayor can proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws orthe convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum. This is anexercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is

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filed.

As regards jurisdiction over the parties, the trial court acquired jurisdiction over herein respondent (as party plaintiff) upon the

filing of the complaint. On the other hand, jurisdiction over theperson of petitioner (as party defendant) was acquired by itsvoluntary appearance in court.

That the subject contract included a stipulation that the sameshall be governed by the laws of the State of Connecticut does notsuggest that the Philippine courts, or any other foreign tribunal forthat matter, are precluded from hearing the civil action. Jurisdictionand choice of law are two distinct concepts. Jurisdiction considerswhether it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choiceof law asks the further question whether the application of asubstantive law which will determine the merits of the case is fair toboth parties.The choice of law stipulation will become relevant onlywhen the substantive issues of the instant case develop, that is,after hearing on the merits proceeds before the trial court.

Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens , a court, inconflicts-of-laws cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdictionwhere it is not the most convenient or available forum and theparties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.Petitioners averments of th e foreign elements in the instant caseare not sufficient to oust the trial court of its jurisdiction over CivilCase No. No. 1192-BG and the parties involved.

Moreover, the propriety of dismissing a case based on theprinciple of forum non conveniens requires a factual determination;

hence, it is more properly considered as a matter of defense. Whileit is within the discretion of the trial court to abstain from assuming jurisdiction on this ground, it should do so only after vital facts areestablished, to determine whether special circumstances require

the courts desistance.

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LLAVE v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINESG.R. No. 169766

Facts:

Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamano married Estrellita

twice initially under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27,1993 in Cotabato City and, subsequently, under a civil ceremonyofficiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao del Sur on June 2,1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen.Tamanos civil status wasindicated as divorced. Since then, Estrellita has been representingherself to the whole world as Sen. Tamanos wife, and upon hisdeath, his widow.On November 23, 1994, private respondents HajaPutri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda) and her son Adib Ahmad A.Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest of Sen.

Tamanos legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint withthe RTC of Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriagebetween Estrellita andSen. Tamano for being bigamous. Thecomplaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda on May31,1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsistingwhen he married Estrellita in 1993.

Issue:

Whether or not the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen.

Tamano was bigamous.

Held:

Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zorayda and late Sen.Tamano; their marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen.Tamano s subsequent marriage to Estrellita is void ab initio.

Ratio:

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda wascelebrated in 1958, solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. Theonly law in force governing marriage relationships between Muslimsand non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950, under the

provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time.Under the marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is notrecognized except during the effectivity of Republic Act No. 394which was not availed of during its effectivity. As far as Estrellita isconcerned, Sen. Tamanos prior marriage to Zor ayda has beensevered by way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codifiedMuslim personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita.Firstly, Article 13(1) thereof provides that the law applies tomarriage and divorce wherein both parties are Mu slims, or

wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage issolemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any partof the Philippines.But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a

situation where the parties were married both in civil and Muslimrites.

Ruling:

The petition is DENIED

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ATTY. MARIETTA D. ZAMORANOS v . PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINESG.R. No. 193902. June 1, 2011

Facts:

This is a case for divorce filed by the herein complainant Marietta D. Zamoranos deGuzman against her husband, the herein respondent, on the ground that the wife,herein complainant, was previously given by her husband the authority to exerciseTalaq, as provided for and, in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 1083,otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines. Whenthis case was called for hearing both parties appeared and herein respondent,Jesus de Guzman interposes no objection to confirm their divorce, which theyhave freely entered into on December 18, 1983. This Court, after evaluating thetestimonies of the herein parties is fully convinced that both the complainant and

the respondent have been duly converted to the faith of Islam prior to theirMuslim wedding and finding that there is no more possibility of reconciliation byand between them, hereby issues this decree of divorce. The allegation to theeffect that his marriage with Zamoranos on December 28, 1992 is a bigamousmarriage due to the alleged subsisting previous marriage between Zamoranos andJesus deGuzman is misplaced. The previous marriage between Jesus de Guzmanand Zamoranos has long been terminated [and] has gone with the wind. The factthat divorce by Talaq was enteredinto by Zamoranos and her first husband inaccordance with PD 1083, their marriage is dissolved and consequently thereof,

Zamoranos and Jesus de Guzman can re-marry. Moreover,the second marriageentered into by Zamoranos and her first husband Jesus de Guzman under theFamily Code on July 30, 1982 is merely ceremonial, being unnecessary, it does notmodify/alter or change the validity of the first marriage entered into by themunder PD 1083.

Issues:

Whether or not a divorce decree under Muslim law gives the spouses the right toremarry.

Held:

Yes. Since the parties are both converted to the faith of Islam prior to their Muslimwedding, then they are covered by the Muslim code or Muslim law. The spouseswho had divorce under such law is entitled to remarry other person.Ratio: If both parties are Muslims, there is a presumption that the Muslim Code orMuslim lawis complied with. If together with it or in addition to it, the marriage islikewise solemnized in accordance with the Civil Code of the Philippines, in a so-called combined Muslim-Civil marriage rites whichever comes first is the validatingrite and the second rite is merelyceremonial one. But, in this case, as long as both

parties are Muslims, this Muslim Code will apply. In effect, two situations will arise,in the application of this Muslim Code or Muslim law, that is, when both parties areMuslims and when the male party is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized inaccordance with Muslim Code or Muslim law. A third situation occurs whentheCivil Code of the Philippines will govern the marriage and divorce of the parties,if the maleparty is a Muslim and the marriage is solemnized in accordance with theCivil Code.Moreover, the two experts, in the same book, unequivocally state thatone of the effectsof irrevocable talaq, as well as other kinds of divorce, refers toseverance of matrimonial bond,entitling one to remarry.It stands to reason

therefore that Z amoranos divorce from De Guzman, as confirmed byan Ustadz and Judge Jainul of the Sharia Circuit Court, and attestedto by Judge Usman, was valid, and, thus, entitled her to remarry Pacasum in1989. Consequently, the RTC, Branch 6,Iligan City, is without jurisdiction to tryZamoranos for the crime of Bigamy.

Ruling:

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The petition is GRANTED

G.R. No. L 16439 July 20, 1961

ANTONIO GELUZ, PetitionerVs.The Honorable Court of Appeals and Oscar Lazo, Respondents

FACTS:

Petition for certiorari brings up for review whether the husbandwhose wife voluntarily aborted their child without his consent couldrecover damages from the physician who performed the abortion.The Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the lower court infavour of the plaintiff, ordering the defendant to pay damages andattorneys fees.

The husband, Oscar Lazo, impregnated his wife, Nita Villanuevabefore they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancyfrom her parent, she aborted the fetus performed by the physician,Antonio Geluz. After her marriage, she again became pregnant andhad herself aborted by Geluz as she was at that time employed inComelec and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient. Less than 2years later, she again became pregnant and was again aborted of atwo-month old fetus by Geluz. The husband did not know of or gaveconsent to the abortion.

Issues

Is an unborn child covered with personality so that if the unbornchild incurs injury, his parents may recover damages from the oneswho caused the damage to the unborn child?

Decision

The decision of the lower court as sustained by the Court of Appealsis reversed and the complaint was ordered dismissed without legalcosts. Furthermore, the Court ordered that the Department ofJustice and Board of Examiners be furnished of the Decision fortheir information and investigation and action as the facts maywarrant.

Reasons

Although personality begins at conception, called provisionalpersonality, it is essential that the child should be subsequentlyborn alive. In this case, the fetus was preterminated and isconsidered as never having possessed legal personality underArticle 40 of the Civil Code.

Since action for pecuniary damages on account of injury or deathpertains to the one injured, which is the unborn child, which has nolegal personality, it is easy to see that no action for damages couldbe instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of injuries itreceived.

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Quimiguing vs IcaoTI TLE : Quimiguing vs I cao CITA TI ON: 34 SCRA 132

FACTS:

Carmen Quimiguing, the petitioner, and Felix Icao, thedefendant, were neighbors in Dapitan City and had close andconfidential relations. Despite the fact that Icao was married,he succeeded to have carnal intercourse with plaintiff severaltimes under force and intimidation and without her consent.As a result, Carmen became pregnantdespite drugs supplied bydefendant and as a consequence, Carmen stopped studying.Plaintiff claimed for support at P120 per month, damages andattorneys fees. The complaint was dismissed by the lowercourt in Zamboanga del Norte on the ground lack of cause ofaction. Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint that as a resultof the intercourse, she gave birth to a baby girl but the courtruled that no amendment was allowable since the originalcomplaint averred no cause of action.

ISSUE: Whether plaintiff has a right to claim damages.

HELD:

Supreme Court held that a conceive chi ld, although as yetunborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own forall purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The conceive child mayalso receive donations and be accepted by those persons whowill legally represent them if they were already born as

prescribed in Article 742.

Lower court s theory on article 291 of the civilcode declaring that support is an obligation of parents andillegitimate children does not contemplate support to childrenas yet unborn violates article 40 aforementioned.

Another reason for reversal of the order is that Icao beinga married man forced a woman not his wife to yield to his lustand this constitutes a clear violation of Carmens rights. Thus,she is entitled to claim compensation for the damage caused.

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversedand set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of originfor further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costsagainst appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.

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De Jesus v. Syquia, 58

Phil. 866DE JESUS v. SYQUIA, 58 Phil 866 (1933)FACTS: Cesar Syquia courted Antonia de Jesuswho was 20 years old. Amorous relations resulted inde Jesus giving birth to a baby boy on June 17,1931. They lived together for one year until Antonio

got pregnant again after which Cesar left to marryanother woman. Cesar recognized his paternity offirst child in writing with a letter to the priest anduninterrupted possession of natural child status forone year Woman files for action for damages for

breach of promise and recognition of the child.

ISSUE: WON Antonia is entitled to damages for breach of promise to marry and kids to paternalsupport

HELD: Promise to marry not satisfactorily provedso the trial court was right in refusing to grant De

Jesus' prayer. Also, action for breach of promise tomarry has no standing for civil law, apart from theright to recover money or property advanced by the

plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. This caseexhibits none of the features necessary to maintainsuch action. Antonia de Jesus only entitled to thesupport of the first child because of Cesar's priorrecognition. No support for the second child

because no proof of paternity or recognition presented.

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Continental Steel v. Montano, G.R. No.182836, October 13, 2009FACTS: Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel, fileda claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death

and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the CBA. Theclaim was for Hortillanos unborn child who died. Hortillanos wife hada premature delivery while she was on her 38 th week of pregnancy.The female fetus died during the labor. The company grantedHortillanos claim for paternity leave but denied his claims forbereavement leave and death benefits. Hortillano claimed that theprovision in CBS did not specifically state that the dependent shouldhave first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality.Petitioner argued that the said provision of CBA did not contemplatedeath of an unborn child or a fetus without legal personality. Theyalso claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement of thebenefit: 1) death; and 2) status of legitimate dependent. None whichexisted in Hortillanos case. They further contend that the only onewith civil personality could die, based on Art 40-42 of Civil Code.Hence, according to petitioner, the unborn child never died. Labor

Arbiter Montana argued that the fetus had the right to be supportedby the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived.Petitioner appealed to CA but CA affirmed Labor Arbiters decision.Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N only one with juridical personality can die. HELD: No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and42 of the Civil Code for the legaldefinition of death is misplaced.

Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality onlywhen it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is consideredborn. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished bydeath. The issue of civil personality is irrelevant in this case. Arts 40-42 do not provide at all definition of death. Life is not synonymous tocivil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first befores/he could die. The Constitution in fact recognizes the life of theunborn from conception.

ISSUE: W/N a fetus can be considered as a dependent. HELD: Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. The fetuswould have not reached 38-39 weeks without depending upon its mother.

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