Te vs Te

Article 36: Psychological Incapacity

Kenneth met Rowena in a Filipino-Chinese gathering on campus. They did not have interest with each other at first but they developed a certain degree of closeness due to the fact that they share the same angst with their families. In 1996, while still in college, Rowena proposed that they should elope. Kenneth initially refused on the ground that he is young and jobless but due to Rowena’s persistence Kenneth complied bringing with him P80K. The money soon after disappeared and they found themselves forced to return to their respective home. Subsequently, Rowena’s uncle brought the two before a court and had had them be married. After marriage, Kenneth and Rowena stayed with her uncle’s house where Kenneth was treated like a prisoner. Kenneth was advised by his dad to come home otherwise he will be disinherited. One month later, Kenneth was able to escape and he was hidden from Rowena’s family. Kenneth later contacted Rowena urging her to live with his parents instead. Rowena however suggested that he should get his inheritance so that they could live together separately or just stay with her uncle. Kenneth however was already disinherited. Upon knowing this, Rowena said that it is better if they live separate lives from then on. Four years later, Kenneth filed for an annulment of their marriage. Rowena did not file an answer. The City Prosecutor, after investigation, submitted that he cannot determine if there is collusion between the 2 parties hence the need to try the merits of the case. The opinion of an expert was sought wherein the psychologist subsequently ruled that both parties are psychologically incapacitated. The said relationship between Kenneth and Rowena is said to be undoubtedly in the wreck and weakly-founded.  The break-up was caused by both parties’ unreadiness to commitment and their young age.  He was still in the state of finding his fate and fighting boredom, while she was still egocentrically involved with herself. The trial court ruled that the marriage is void upon the ruling of the expert psychologist. The OSG appealed and the CA ruled in favor of the OSG. The OSG claimed that the psychological incapacity of both parties was not shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable (Molina case).  The clinical psychologist did not personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. Further, the psychological incapacity was not shown to be attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. All these were requirements set forth in the Molina case to be followed as guidelines.

ISSUE: Whether or not the expert opinion of the psychologist should be admitted in lieu of the guidelines established in the landmark case of Molina.

HELD: The SC ruled that admittedly, the SC may have inappropriately imposed a set of rigid rules in ascertaining PI. So much so that the subsequent cases after Molina were ruled accordingly to the doctrine set therein. And that there is not much regard for the law’s clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as “courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.” The SC however is not abandoning the Molina guidelines, the SC merely reemphasized that there is need to emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36 such as in the case at bar. The principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own

facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

The SC then ruled that the marriage of Kenneth and Rowena is null and void due to both parties’ psychological disorder as evidenced by the finding of the expert psychologist. Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity. Kenneth cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others. He is too dependent on others. Rowena cannot perform the essential marital obligations as well due to her intolerance and impulsiveness.

 

Set of [Strict] Standards in the Interpretation of Art 36 of the FC Established in the Molina Case (RP vs Molina)

(1)               The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it “as the foundation of the nation.” It decrees marriage as legally “inviolable,” thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be “protected” by the state.

The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.

(2)        The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified , (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological—not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.

(3)        The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their “I do’s.” The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.

(4)        Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential obligation of marriage.

(5)        Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, “mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts” cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

(6)        The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.

(7)        Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:

“The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature.”

Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally— subject to our law on evidence—what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the Church—while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other—shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.

(8)        The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating

therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.

GOITIA VS CAMPUS RUEDA

FACTS:

Luisa Goitia y de la Camara, petitioner, and Jose Campos y Rueda, respondent, were married on January 7, 1915 and had a residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino Manila.  They stayed together for a month before petitioner returned to her parent’s home.  Goitia filed a complaint against respondent for support outside the conjugal home.  It was alleged that respondent demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs.  Petitioner refused to perform such acts and demanded her husband other than the legal and valid cohabitation.  Since Goitia kept on refusing, respondent maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries upon her lops, face and different body parts.  The trial court ruled in favor of respondent and stated that Goitia could not compel her husband to support her except in the conjugal home unless it is by virtue of a judicial decree granting her separation or divorce from respondent.  Goitia filed motion for review.

ISSUE: Whether or not Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home.

HELD:

The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act of marriage.  The law provides that the husband, who is obliged to support the wife, may fulfill the obligation either by paying her a fixed pension or by maintaining her in his own home at his option.  However, this option given by law is not absolute.  The law will not permit the husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts.  In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal abode because of the lewd designs and physical assault of the husband, she can therefore claim support from the husband for separate maintenance even outside the conjugal home.  Posted by hyper_jetsetter at 5:47:00 PM

.R. No. L-17014             August 11, 1921

MARIANO B. ARROYO, plaintiff-appellant, vs.DOLORES C. VASQUEZ DE ARROYO, defendant-appellee.

Fisher & DeWitt for appellant.Powell & Hill for appellee.

STREET, J.:

Mariano B. Arroyo and Dolores C. Vasquez de Arroyo were united in the bonds of wedlock by marriage in the year 1910, and since that date, with a few short intervals of separation, they have lived together as man and wife in the city of Iloilo until July 4, 1920, when the wife went away from their common home with the intention of living thenceforth separate from her husband. After efforts had been made by the husband without avail to induce her to resume marital relations, this action was initiated by him to compel her to return to the matrimonial home and live with him as a dutiful wife. The defendant answered, admitting the fact of marriage, and that she had left her husband's home without his consent; but she averred by way of defense and cross-complaint that she had been compelled to leave by cruel treatment on the part of her husband. Accordingly she in turn prayed for affirmative relief, to consist of (1) a decree of separation; (2) a liquidation of the conjugal partnership; (3) and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. Upon hearing the cause the lower court gave judgment in favor of the defendant, authorizing her to live apart from her husband, granting her alimony at the rate of P400 per month, and directing that the plaintiff should pay to the defendant's attorney the sum of P1,000 for his services to defendant in the trial of the case. The plaintiff thereupon removed the case with the usual formalities by appeal to this court.

The trial judge, upon consideration of the evidence before him, reached the conclusion that the husband was more to blame than his wife and that his continued ill-treatment of her furnished sufficient justification for her abandonment of the conjugal home and the permanent breaking off of marital relations with him. We have carefully examined and weighed every line of the proof, and are of the opinion that the conclusion stated is wholly untenable. The evidence shows that the wife is afflicted with a disposition of jealousy towards her husband in an aggravated degree; and to his cause are chiefly traceable without a doubt the many miseries that have attended their married life. In view of the decision which we are to pronounce nothing will be said in this opinion which will make the resumption of married relations more difficult to them or serve as a reminder to either of the mistakes of the past; and we prefer to record the fact that so far as the proof in this record shows neither of the spouses has at any time been guilty of conjugal infidelity, or has given just cause to the other to suspect illicit relations with any person. The tales of cruelty on the part of the husband towards the wife, which are the basis of the cross-action, are in our opinion no more than highly colored versions of personal wrangles in which the spouses have allowed themselves from time to time to become involved and would have little significance apart from the morbid condition exhibited by the wife. The judgment must therefore be recorded that the abandonment by her of the marital home was without sufficient justification in fact.

In examining the legal questions involved, it will be found convenient to dispose first of the defendant's cross-complaint. To begin with, the obligation which the law imposes on the husband to maintain the wife is a duty universally recognized in civil society and is clearly expressed in articles 142 and 143 of the Civil code. The enforcement of this obligation by the wife against the husband is not conditioned upon the procurance of a divorce by her, nor even upon the existence of a cause for divorce. Accordingly it had been determined that where the wife is forced to leave the matrimonial abode and to live apart from her husband, she can, in this jurisdiction, compel him to make provision for her separate maintenance (Goitia vs. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil., 252);

and he may be required to pay the expenses, including attorney's fees, necessarily incurred in enforcing such obligation, (Mercado vs. Ostrand and Ruiz, 37 Phil., 179.) Nevertheless, the interests of both parties as well as of society at large require that the courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to provide for the separate maintenance of the wife, for this step involves a recognition of the de facto separation of the spouses — a state which is abnormal and fraught with grave danger to all concerned. From this consideration it follows that provision should not be made for separate maintenance in favor of the wife unless it appears that the continued cohabitation of the pair has become impossible and separation necessary from the fault of the husband.

In Davidson vs Davidson, the Supreme Court of Michigan, speaking through the eminent jurist, Judge Thomas M. Cooley, held that an action for the support of the wife separate from the husband will only be sustained when the reasons for it are imperative (47 Mich., 151). That imperative necessity is the only ground on which such a proceeding can be maintained also appears from the decision in Schindel vs. Schindel (12 Md., 294). In the State of South Carolina, where judicial divorces have never been procurable on any ground, the Supreme court fully recognizes the right of the wife to have provision for separate maintenance, where it is impossible for her to continue safely to cohabit with her husband; but the same court has more than once rejected the petition of the wife for separate maintenance where it appeared that the husband's alleged cruelty or ill-treatment was provoked by the wife's own improper conduct. (Rhame vs. Rhame, 1 McCord's Chan. [S. Car.], 197; 16 Am. Dec., 597; Boyd vs. Boyd, Har. Eq. [S. Car.], 144.)

Upon one occasion Sir William Scott, pronouncing the judgment of the English Ecclesiastical Court in a case where cruelty on the part of the husband was relied upon to secure a divorce for the wife, made use of the following eloquent words, — which are perhaps even more applicable in a proceeding for separate maintenance in a jurisdiction where, as here, a divorce cannot be obtained except on the single ground of adultery and this, too, after the conviction of the guilty spouse in a criminal prosecution for that crime. Said he:

That the duty of cohabitation is released by the cruelty of one of the parties is admitted, but the question occurs, What is cruelty? . . .

What merely wounds the mental feelings is in few cases to be admitted where they are not accompanied with bodily injury, either actual or menaced. Mere austerity of temper, petulance of manners, rudeness of language, a want of civil attention and accommodation, even occasional sallies of passion, if they do not threaten bodily harm, do not amount to legal cruelty: they are high moral offenses in the marriage-state undoubtedly, not innocent surely in any state of life, but still they are not that cruelty against which the law can relieve. Under such misconduct of either of the parties, for it may exist on the one side as well as on the other, the suffering party must bear in some degree the consequences of an injudicious connection; must subdue by decent resistance or by prudent conciliation; and if this cannot be done, both must suffer in silence. . . .

The humanity of the court has been loudly and repeatedly invoked. Humanity is the second virtue of courts, but undoubtedly the first is justice. If it were a question of

humanity simply, and of humanity which confined its views merely to the happiness of the present parties, it would be a question easily decided upon first impressions. Every body must feel a wish to sever those who wish to live separate from each other, who cannot live together with any degree of harmony, and consequently with any degree of happiness; but my situation does not allow me to indulge the feelings, much less the first feelings of an individual. The law has said that married persons shall not be legally separated upon the mere disinclination of one or both to cohabit together. . . .

To vindicate the policy of the law is no necessary part of the office of a judge; but if it were, it would not be difficult to show that the law in this respect has acted with its usual wisdom and humanity with that true wisdom, and that real humanity, that regards the general interests of mankind. For though in particular cases the repugnance of the law to dissolve the obligations of matrimonial cohabitation may operate with great severity upon individual, yet it must be carefully remembered that the general happiness of the married life is secured by its indissolubility. When people understand that they must live together, except for a very few reasons known to the law, they learn to soften by mutual accommodation that yoke which they know cannot shake off; they become good husbands and good wives form the necessity of remaining husbands and wives; for necessity is a powerful master in teaching the duties which it imposes. . . . In this case, as in many others, the happiness of some individuals must be sacrificed to the greater and more general good. (Evans vs. Evans, 1 Hag. Con., 35; 161 Eng. Reprint, 466, 467.)

In the light of the considerations stated, it is obvious that the cross-complaint is not well founded and none of the relief sought therein can be granted.

The same considerations that require the dismissal of the cross-complaint conclusively prove that the plaintiff, Mariano B. Arroyo, has done nothing to forfeit his right to the marital society of his wife and that she is under an obligation, both moral and legal, to return to the common home and cohabit with him. The only question which here arises is as to the character and extent of the relief which may be properly conceded to him by judicial decree.

The action is one by which the plaintiff seeks the restitution of conjugal rights; and it is supposed in the petitory part of the complaint that he is entitled to a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the defendant to return to the conjugal home and live with him as a wife according to the precepts of law and morality. Of course if such a decree were entered, in unqualified terms, the defendant would be liable to attachment for contempt, in case she should refuse to obey it; and, so far as the present writer is aware, the question is raised for the first time in this jurisdiction whether it is competent for the court to make such an order.

Upon examination of the authorities we are convinced that it is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are invaled, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal rights of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and the experience of

these countries where the court of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it that court would make a mandatory decree, enforcible by process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon vs. Weldon (9 P. D., 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.

In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can discover, has ever attempted to make a peremptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision referred to (Gahn vs. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148.)

In a decision of January 2, 1909, the supreme court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order of the Audencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from the property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11.) but it does not appear that this order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.

We are therefore unable to hold that Mariano B. Arroyo in this case is entitled to the unconditional and absolute order for the return of the wife to the marital domicile, which is sought in the petitory part of the complaint; though he is, without doubt, entitled to a judicial declaration that his wife has presented herself without sufficient cause and that it is her duty to return.

Therefore, reversing the judgment appealed from, in respect both to the original complaint and the cross-bill, it is declared that Dolores Vasquez de Arroyo has absented herself from the marital home without sufficient cause; and she is admonished that it is her duty to return. The

plaintiff is absolved from the cross-complaint, without special pronouncement as to costs of either instance. So ordered.

Mapa, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-48183            November 10, 1941

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Cardenas & Casal for appellants.Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Acting Solicitor Luciano for appellee.

MORAN, J.:

On March 16, 1926, the accused Rodolfo A. Schneckenburger married the compliant Elena Ramirez Cartagena and after seven years of martial life, they agreed, for reason of alleged incompatibility of character, to live separately each other and on May 25, 1935 they executed a document which in part recites as follows:

Que ambos comparecientes convienen en vivir separados el uno del otro por el resto de su vida y se comprometen, y obligan reciprocamente a no molastarse ni intervenir ni mezclarse bajo ningun concepto en la vida publica o privada de los mismos, entre si, quendado cada uno de los otorgantes en completa libertad de accion en calquier acto y todos concepto.

On June 15, 1935, the accused Schneckenburger, without leaving the Philippines, secured a decree of divorce from the civil court of Juarez, Bravos District, State of Chihuahua, Mexico. On May 11, 1936, he contracted another marriage with his co-accused, Julia Medel, in the justice of the peace court of Malabon, Rizal, and since then they lived together as husband and wife in the city of Manila. Because of the nullity of the divorce decreed by the Mexico Court, complaint herein instituted two actions against the accused, one for bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the other concubinage in the court of First Instance of Manila. The first culminated in the conviction of the accused for which he was sentenced to penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor. On the trial for the offense of concubinage accused interposed the plea of double jeopardy, and the case was dismissed; but, upon appeal by the fiscal, this Court held the dismissal before the trial to be premature this was under the former procedure and without deciding the question of double jeopardy, remanded the case to the trial court for trial on the merits. Accused was convicted of concubinage through reckless imprudence and sentenced to a penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor. Hence this appeal.

As to appellant's plea of double jeopardy, it need only be observed that the office of bigamy for which he was convicted and that of concubinage for which he stood trial in the court below are two distinct offenses in law and in fact as well as in the mode of their prosecution. The

celebration of the second marriage, with the first still existing, characterizes the crime of bigamy; on the other hand, in the present case, mere cohabitation by the husband with a woman who is not his wife characterizes the crime of concubinage. The first in an offense against civil status which may be prosecuted at the instance of the state; the second, an offense against chastity and may be prosecuted only at the instance of the offended party. And no rule is more settled in law than that, on the matter of double jeopardy, the test is not whether the defendant has already been tried for the same act, but whether he has been put in jeopardy for the same offense. (Diaz v. U. S., 223 U. S., 422; People v. Cabrera, 43 Phil., 82)

Upon the other hand, we believe and so hold that the accused should be acquitted of the crime of concubinage. The document executed by and between the accused and the complaint in which they agreed to be "en completa libertad de accion en cualquier acto y en todos conceptos," while illegal for the purpose for which it was executed, constitutes nevertheless a valid consent to the act of concubinage within the meaning of section 344 of the Revised Penal Code. There can be no doubt that by such agreement, each party clearly intended to forego to illicit acts of the other.

We said before (People vs. Guinucod, 58 Phil., 621) that the consent which bars the offended party from instituting a criminal prosecution in cases of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness is that which has been given expressly or impliedly after the crime has been committed. We are now convinced that this is a narrow view in way warranted by the language, as well as the manifest policy, of the law. The second paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

The offended party cannot institute criminal prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have consented or pardoned the offenders. (Emphasis ours.)

As the term "pardon" unquestionably refers to the offense after its commission, "consent" must have been intended agreeably with its ordinary usage, to refer to the offense prior to its commission. No logical difference can indeed be perceived between prior and subsequent consent, for in both instances as the offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy to come to court and invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong. For instance, a husband who believers his wife another man for adultery, is as unworthy, if not more, as where, upon acquiring knowledge of the adultery after its commission, he says or does nothing. We, therefore, hold that the prior consent is as effective as subsequent consent to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense.

In this arriving at this conclusion we do not with to be misconstrued as legalizing an agreement to do an illicit act, in violation of law. Our view must be taken only to mean that an agreement of the tenor entered into between the parties herein, operates, within the plain language and manifest policy of the law, to bar the offended party from prosecuting the offense. If there is anything morally condemnatory in a situation of his character, the remedy lies not with us but with the legislative department of the government. What the law is, not what it should be, defines the limits of our authority.

Judgment is reversed and the accused is hereby acquitted, without costs.

Laperal vs Republic

Laperal vs. RepublicGR No. 18008, October 30, 1962

FACTS:

The petitioner, a bona fide resident of Baguio City, was married with Mr. Enrique R. Santamaria on March 1939.  However, a decree of legal separation was later on issued to the spouses.  Aside from that, she ceased to live with Enrique.  During their marriage, she naturally uses Elisea L. Santamaria.  She filed this petition to be permitted to resume in using her maiden name Elisea Laperal.  This was opposed by the City Attorney of Baguio on the ground that it violates Art. 372 of the Civil Code.  She was claiming that continuing to use her married name would give rise to confusion in her finances and the eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

ISSUE: Whether Rule 103 which refers to change of name in general will prevail over the specific provision of Art. 372 of the Civil Code with regard to married woman legally separated from his husband.   

HELD:

In legal separation, the married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of the vinculum.  The finding that petitioner’s continued use of her husband surname may cause undue confusion in her finances was without basis.  It must be considered that the issuance of the decree of legal separation in 1958, necessitate that the conjugal partnership between her and Enrique had automatically been dissolved and liquidated.  Hence, there could be no more occasion for an eventual liquidation of the conjugal assets.

Furthermore, applying Rule 103 is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of the name of Elisea for to hold otherwise would be to provide for an easy circumvention of the mandatory provision of Art. 372.

TENCHAVEZ VS ESCANO

Torts and Damages – When Liability for Quasi Delict Arises – Unfounded Suit

In February 1948, Tenchavez and Escaño secretly married each other and of course without the knowledge of Escaño’s parents who were of prominent social status. The marriage was celebrated by a military chaplain. When Escaño’s parents learned of this, they insisted a church wedding to be held but Escaño withdrew from having a recelebration because she heard that Tenchavez was having an affair with another woman. Eventually, their relationship went sour; 2 years later, Escaño went to the US where she acquired a decree of absolute divorce and she subsequently became an American citizen and also married an American.

In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and further alleged that Escaño’s parents dissuaded their daughter to go abroad and causing her to be estranged from him hence he’s

asking for damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00. The lower court did not grant the legal separation being sought for and at the same time awarded a P45,000.00 worth of counter-claim by the Escaños.

ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case at bar

HELD: Yes.

On the part of Tenchavez:

His marriage with Escaño was a secret one and the failure of said marriage did not result to public humiliation; that they never lived together and he even consented to annulling the marriage earlier (because Escaño filed for annulment before she left for the US but the same was dismissed due to her non-appearance in court); that he failed to prove that Escaño’s parents dissuaded their daughter to leave Tenchavez and as such his P1,000,000.00 claim cannot be awarded. HOWEVER, by reason of the fact that Escaño left without the knowledge of Tenchavez and being able to acquire a divorce decree; and Tenchavez being unable to remarry, the SC awarded P25,000.00 only by way of moral damages and attorney’s fees to be paid by Escaño and not her parents.

On the part of Escaño’s parents:

It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the Escaños is unfounded and the same must have wounded their  feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the decision of the lower court, is that they were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. The SC reduced the damages awarded from P45,000.00 to P5,000.00 only.

 

Macadangdang vs CA

Macadangdang vs CAGR No. 38287, October 23, 1981

FACTS:

Respondent Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang and petitioner Antonio Macadangdang were married in 1946 after having lived together for two years and had 6 children.  They started a buy and sell business and sari-sari store in Davao City.  Through hard work and good fortune, their business grew and expanded into merchandising, trucking, transportation, rice and corn mill business, abaca stripping, real estate etc.  Their relationship became complicated and both indulged in extramarital relations.  Married life became intolerable so they separated in 1965 when private respondent left for Cebu for good.  When she returned in Davao in 1971, she

learned of the illicit affairs of her estranged husband.  She then decided to take the initial action.  In April 1971, she instituted a complaint for legal separation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has effect on the legal separation.

HELD:

The death of a spouse after a final decree of legal separation has no effect on the legal separation.  When the decree itself is issued, the finality of the separation is complete after the lapse of the period to appeal the decision to a higher court even if the effects, such as the liquidation of the property, have not yet been commenced nor terminated.   

The law clearly spells out the effect of a final decree of legal separation on the conjugal property. Therefore, upon the liquidation and distribution conformably with the effects of such final decree, the law on intestate succession should take over the disposition of whatever remaining properties have been allocated to the deceased spouse.

Such dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the final decree. Article 106 of the Civil Code, now Article 63 of the Family Code provides the effects of the decree of legal separation.  These legal effects ipso facto or automatically follows, as an inevitable incident of the judgment decreeing legal separation, for the purpose of determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal assets.

Lapuz-Sy vs Eufemio

Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio43 SCRA 177

FACTS:

Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August 1953.  They were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days.  They had lived together as husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her.  They acquired properties during their marriage.  Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949.  She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal separation, which among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits. 

Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok.  Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence.  However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969.  Her counsel duly notified the court of her death.  Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-

year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.  Petitioner’s counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz. 

ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate the action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.

HELD:

An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved. These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.

The petition of  Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union.  Any property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.

Pelayo Vs. Lauron 12 Phil 453

Facts:On November 23, 1906 the plaintiff, Mr. Arturo Pelayo, a physician, has filed a case against the defendants, Mr Marelo Lauron and Mrs. Juana Abella. The case that was filed, was about the services rendered of Mr. Arturo Pelayo for the night and the day after of October 13, 1906 where the plaintiff was summoned to the defendants home to aid their daughter-in-law's birth, where the attending physician, Dr. Escaño, has said that it would have been a difficult process. Regardless of this, Mr Pelayo has proceeded with the job that required him to remove the fetus with the forceps. The job occupied him all night until the day after for the removal of the afterbirth and the visitation of the patient. The plaintiff has charged the defendants with P500 for the services he had rendered for them but the defendants has refused to pay. The counsel for the defendants alleged, that the defendants daughter-in-law had died from child birth and that when she was still alive, she has lived independently and separately, from the defendants, with her husband. Her birth at the house of the defendants was just accidental and was at an avoidable time.

Issue:Are the defendants liable for the payment of the services rendered by the plaintiff?

Head:No. According to the article Arts. 1090 and 1091, The rendering of medical assistance in case of illness was comprised among the mutual obligations to which the spouses were bound by way of mutual support. Spouses are mutually bounded together to support each other. In the issue above, it is the husbands duty to pay for the services rendered to his wife not the father nor the mother-

in-law who are just strangers within the meaning of the law. So ruling of the court is; "Therefore, in view of the consideration hereinbefore set forth, it is our opinion that the judgment appealed from should be affirmed with the costs against the appellant. So ordered."

GO VS GO

In 1981, Hermogenes Ong and Jane Ong contracted with Nancy Go for the latter to film their wedding. After the wedding, the newlywed inquired about their wedding video but Nancy Go said it’s not yet ready. She advised them to return for the wedding video after their honeymoon. The newlywed did so but only to find out that Nancy Go can no longer produce the said wedding video because the copy has been erased.

The Ongs then sued Nancy Go for damages. Nancy’s husband, Alex Go, was impleaded. The trial court ruled in favor of the spouses Ong and awarded in their favor, among others, P75k in moral damages. In her defense on appeal, Nancy Go said: that they erased the video tape because as per the terms of their agreement, the spouses are supposed to claim their wedding tape within 30 days after the wedding, however, the spouses neglected to get said wedding tape because they only made their claim after two months; that her husband should not be impleaded in this suit.

ISSUE: Whether or not Nancy Go is liable for moral damages.

HELD: Yes. Her contention is bereft of merit. It is shown that the spouses Ong made their claim after the wedding but were advised to return after their honeymoon. The spouses advised Go that their honeymoon is to be done abroad and won’t be able to return for two months. It is contrary to human nature for any newlywed couple to neglect to claim the video coverage of their wedding; the fact that the Ongs filed a case against Nancy Go belies such assertion. Considering the sentimental value of the tapes and the fact that the event therein recorded — a wedding which in our culture is a significant milestone to be cherished and remembered — could no longer be reenacted and was lost forever, the trial court was correct in awarding the Ongs moral damages  in compensation for the mental anguish, tortured feelings, sleepless nights and humiliation that the Ongs suffered and which under the circumstances could be awarded as allowed under Articles 2217 and 2218 of the Civil Code.

Anent the issue that Nancy Go’s husband should not be included in the suit, this argument is valid. Under Article 73 of the Family Code, the wife may exercise any profession, occupation or engage in business without the consent of the husband. In this case, it was shown that  it was only Nancy Go who entered into a contract with the spouses Ong hence only she (Nancy) is liable to pay the damages awarded in favor of the Ongs.

Narag vs. Narag, 291 SCRA 451 25 Jul

FACTS:

Atty. Dominador Narag was alleged to have abandoned his family for his paramour who was once his student in tertiary level. The administrative complaint of disbarment was filed by her

wife, Mrs. Julieta Narag. Respondent filed motion to dismiss because allegedly the complainant fabricated the story as well as the love letters while under extreme emotional confusion arising from jealousy. The case took an unexpected turn when another complaint was filed, the wife as again the complainant but now together with their seven children as co-signatories. After several hearings, the facts became clear, that the respondent indeed abandoned his family as against morals, based on testimonial evidences. In addition, the assailed relationship bore two children.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross immorality and for having violated and the Code of Ethics for Lawyers culpable for disbarment.

HELD:

YES. Respondent disbarred.

RATIO:

The complainant was able to establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that the respondent breached the high and exacting moral standards set for the members of the law profession.

Good moral character is not only a condition precedent to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar.

CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 — A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

Undoubtedly, the canons of law practice were violated.