The Decline of the OttomanEmpire, C.I 798-1913

T h e U n p r e d i c t a b l e P a s t

Robert Johnson puts the decline of a once-great_

Empire into an international context.

For decades, the decay of the powerof the Ottoman Turks in the easternMediterranean was known to theBritish as The Eastern Question'. LordMorley, a Liberal politician of the latenineteenth century, described it as'that intractable and interwoventangle of conflicting interests, rivalpeoples and antagonistic faiths'. Itwa5 typical of the Europeans todismiss the Turks as incapable ofrunning an empire, for they regardedthem as 'Oriental' and thereforeinherently unabie to modernise. Inshort, they were seen as raciallyinferior.

The old regime's gradualdisintegration seemed to reinforcethese views. It is not surpnsing thatthe Ottoman Empire, racked byrebellions, corruption in theadministration, financial weaknessesand military defeats, was labelled the'Sick Man of Europe', The decline ofthe Ottoman system, as with thedemise of all empires, createddangerous instabilities and fosterednew ambitions amongst the region'spowers. However, what Morley andhis type did not acknowledge was thatthe interference of the Great Powersmade the situation far worse.

In a short article, one cannot dojustice to the complex narrative of theperiod, but a broad overview offers achance to assess the patterns andcontours of change and continuity. Itseems important today, in light ofrecent conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo,to reappraise the history of southeastern Europe, and therefore of theOttoman Empire that governed it forso long, Misha Glenny, in his excellentstudy The Balkans, criticises theparadigmatic way in which histonans

A European depiction, dating from 1904, of the 'Old Turk' massacringunbelievers in the name of Allah, who will reward him with assortedsexual delights after his death.

have traditionally approached thissubject. He argues convincingly that'Balkanisation', for example, is hardlya precise tool for analysis and misleadsscholars into thinking that extremenationalism, territorial fragmentation

and 'ancient hatreds' (which togetherdefine that term) are the only validexplanations for events there over thelast 100 years. In fact, what is strikingis how far Great Power rivalries fuelledand distorted the conflicts in the

HistoiyRevifw Seplettiber2O05 3

It was typical of the Europeans to dismiss the Turks as incapable ofrunning an empire, for they regarded them as 'Oriental' and

therefore inherently unable to modernise. In short, they were seen asracially inferior.

Abd-ulHamid II ('the old spider'). Sultan from 1876 to 1909. His long andtyrannical rule came to an end when he was deposed in favour of amilitary junta under Enver, Talaat and Jemal.

region. It was the European powersthat accelerated the process offragmentation, and, finally, after theFirst World War, presided over thedismemberment of the OttomanEmpire.

There are five key areas whichstand out as explanations for thedecline and fall of the Turkish empire,besides European intervention: (1)themoribund nature of the Ottomangovernment and the empire's relativedecline economically; (2) the spread ofnationalism in the Balkans; (3) theattempts to revive Turkey by the 'New

Ottomans' and 'Young Turks'; (4) theGerman attempts to generate asphere of influence in the Middle East,and (5) the impact of the Balkan Wars.

The Waning of the OttomanEmpireIn contrast to the early modernexpansionist period of the OttomanEmpire, backed by its efficientmilitary-bureaucratic structure, it wasthe inherent conservatism of thenineteenth-century regime whichallowed the whole system tostagnate. The emphasis on tradition

stifled the intellectual vibrancy thathad characterised Islamic culturebefore the 1500s, and compromisedits former military supremacy. All thiswas happening at a time whenwestern Europe was developingrapidly New advances in agriculture,in technology, in transport and incommunications gave the West theability to project its power beyondEurope. The Ottoman Empire did notdevelop a strong bourgeois class,beyond the old merchant elites, andthere was therefore economic as wellas intellectual stagnation.

The conservatism of the privilegedruling elite in Constantinople, corruptmilitary leaders and the relativedecline of the Ottoman economycompared with the industrial,commercial and financial 'take-off' ofthe West left the empire in adilapidated state. Rising inflation,worsened by financial

mismanagement, embezzlement ofstate revenue and fierce competitionfrom the West, reduced the empire'svitality still further. Yet any physicalprotest by the empire's impoverishedsubjects was met with severerepression since the army was the lastinstitution, and a remarkably resilientone, to be able to uphold Turkish rule.But, given its weaknesses, it was notsurprising that there were still calls forthe internal reform of the OttomanEmpire.

In the absence of any responsibleassembly, reform had to be initiated bythe Sultan. Yet the empire wasburdened with a succession of weakrulers with few skills and no training: asituation that simply encouragedconservatism. The provinces of theempire enjoyed a wide measure ofautonomy but this made anycentralised direction of reform evenmore difficult; and, since officialsoften purchased their positions, therewas a tendency to increase regionaltaxation to get their costs reimbursed.Nepotism and bribery also flourished.However, this was a period in whichthe costs of the state were increasing.The provincial cavalry armies which

4 Histoiy Review September 2005

It was the European powers that accelerated the process of fragmentation, and, finally,

after the First World War, presided over the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire.

had protected the frontiers of theempire were rendered obsolete by theEuropeans' advances in muskettechnology. When NapoleonBonaparte landed an invasion force inEgypt in 1798, he defeated theMameluke horsemen decisively.

To modernise, the Ottomans hadto pay for the new technology. Yettheir traditional exports in silks, textilesand spices were being rapidlyundercut by robust Europeancurrencies, faster ships that couldcarry greater volumes of cheap goods,and mass produced textiles that weremore cost-effective than hand-madefabrics. However, in the face of thisnew competition, the conservativeleaders feil back on their faith in the'inherent superiority' of Islam. In doingso they lost any effective power overthe penphery of their empire, and, bythe twentieth century, over Turkeyitself.

Nationalism and RebellionThe Ottoman Empire was already inretreat in the late eighteenth century,and the Sultan Selim III came to powerdetermined to reverse thetechnological and organisationalinferiority of his army. However, hisreforms failed to prevent the invasionof Egypt by Napoleon in 1798 and itwas dear that his changes had notgone far enough. As a result, new eliteinfantry regiments, clothed andequipped in the western style, wereestablished. However, the creation ofthe nizam-i-jedid infantry threatenedthe position of the traditional military-political caste of the Janissaries (anancient military force that hadconsiderable political influence), and,with the backing of the Ulema {Islamicclergy), they deposed Seiim in favourof the more conservative Mustapha IV.It was this conservativism, rather thannationalism, that provoked uprisingsin the Balkans.

Although the earliest 'nationalist'revolts against the Ottoman Empirecan be traced to the beginning of thenineteenth century, when the idea ofthe nation-state had entered the

consciousness of the people inwestern Europe, the majority of theBalkan peoples were as yet unfamiliarwith such concepts. In 1804, Serbsrebelled against the cruelties of theJanissaries rather than against theSultan, but the rebels came todemand regional autonomy as therevolt developed. By 1807, Serbs hadbeen so radicalised that theyembarked on a massacre of Turks inBelgrade. The Sultan responded with aprogramme of repression whichseemed to have restored order by1812, although a second revolt in

1815 ended with substantialconcessions to the Serbians.

The better known revolt in Greecein 1821 was also initiated byexasperation with conservative andauthoritarian rulers, but it was helpedin the early stages by divisionsamongst the Turks. Ali Pasha, theTurkish governor of Albania, centraiGreece and Macedonia, launched anattack on the Sultan's forces in 1817which tied down large numbers oftroops. Despite this inadvertentassistance, the declaration ofindependence at Epidauros went

The Boiling Kettle', a cartoon from Punch in 1908. Here the EuropeanPowers are trying to keep the lid on the 'Balkan Troubles'. But were they,in reality, fanning the flames and making Balkan problems worse?

History Review Seplembef 2005 5

Ironically, the modernisation of the financial systemmade the Ottomans more and more dependent onthe support of the European powers.

unheeded as the Greek rebels weredivided into a number of rival factions.Indeed, the situation was complex.Local conflicts in the Balkans hadsometimes cut across ethnic andreligious lines, and temporary alliancesbetween otherwise rival groups werefrequent. Nationalism was an Ideaconfined to an educated dass,especially those engaged in commerceand consequently in contact with theWest.

The revolt was intensified by thearrival of Egyptian troops underMehemet Ali {and the massacre ofChristians) which galvanised theEuropean powers into action. Threatsof European intervention, and thethreat of further military reform,spurred the Janissanes into rebellion atthis critical moment, but the Sultan,Mahmud II, crushed and thendisbanded them. The following year,his fleet was utterly destroyed atNavarino Bay and his Egyptian allieswere forced out of Greece, butMahmud declared a Jehad on allChristian states in the hope of winningover the conservative Ulema androusing the empire to greaterresistance. It was a disaster: Russianforces defeated the Turkish army andthe map of the Balkans was redrawn.It was, perhaps, the first great rent inthe rotting fabric of the OttomanEmpire.

Beyond the Balkans, nationalism inthe empire was also negligible. InNorth Africa, local Muslim elites hadreplaced or interbred with the originalArab conquerors and a specifically'Turkish' rule had never beenachieved. It was little surprisetherefore that first Egyptian and thenEuropean influence began to increase

Ottoman rule in the Balkans is tornapart. In this French cartoon of1908, the Austrian Emperor tearsBosnia-Herzegovina from theempire and Prince Ferdinanddeclares Bulgaria independent,while Abd-ul Hamid looks on,discontented but helpless.

6 History Rfview September 200S

in Ottoman North Africa. TheEgyptians effectively threw off Turkishsuzerainty (in all but religious affairs) in1831 and the Ottoman Empire wasonly preserved by the interventions offirst Russia (1833), and then Britain(1841 -56). Nevertheless, Russianannexations north of the Black Seaeventuatly extended as far as theCaucasus mountains, replacingTurkish rule there. In these peripheralparts of the empire, resistance to'foreign' rule was tribal, centred oncharismatic local chiefs like ImamShamyl, or based on regional identity.As the nineteenth century wore on,the Tsars were concerned about theinstability the retreat of the OttomanEmpire would produce at the fringesof their own empire, and they soughtto take advantage whenever theOttomans seemed about to collapse.But it was not until the end of thecentury that nationalist aspirationsfeatured in their calculations.

The 'New Ottomans' and the'Young Turks'Following the death of Mahmud in1839, a new attempt to reform theempire commenced under the title ofTanzimat. Although difficult to define,the reforms involved greaterwesternisation, from the adoption ofEuropean clothing to newspapers,schooling, and, above all, militarychange. Some of these had alreadybegun before the 1840s, and it isunclear how many of these changeswere internally generated or simplyimported from outside by default.Nevertheless, a group inspired bychanges in the justice system, oradalet, called themselves 'NewOttomans' and they promoted theidea of fatherland (vatan), andconstitutional freedom (hurriget).Whilst not yet 'nationalist', they feltthat loyalty to the empire wasparamount.

Ironically, the modernisation of the

T..

German officials circulated stories of setbacks to the British Empireand the fantastic idea that the Kaiser had secretly converted to Islam.

financial system made the Ottomansmore and more dependent on thesupport of the European powers, andthe Austrian stock market crash of1873, which coincided with the GreatDepression in the West, led toemergency measures throughout theempire. It was these measures thatprovoked unrest in Herzogovina, andthis inspired similar noting in Bosniaand Bulgaria, By 1875, the Balkanswere aflame and the new Turkisharmies were engaged in a bittercounter-insurgency conflict. Onceagain, European intervention tippedthe balance. The Russians drove theTurks out of the Balkans in 1877-8 andthe Great Powers demarcated the newfrontiers of the region. Abd-ul Hamid IIwas exasperated, but warmed to theGermans for their support which didnot entail any territorial concessions.It was to be a fateful liaison.

Incensed by the interventions ofthe European powers, Abd-ul Hamid IIreversed the policy of Tanzimat andfelt back on a traditional conservativestrategy. By the late 1880s, as therelative weakness of the empirebecame ever more apparent, theSultan embraced an atavistic pan-Islamic ideology. The ugliness of thispolicy was evident in 1894-5 whenChristian Armenians, who hadrevolted against the Turks, weresubjected to a genocidal policy ofmass murder. Yet, hopes of a moreliberalised regime had not beenabandoned.

The 'Young Turks' (or, moreaccurately, the Committee of Unionand Progress) were originally a band ofTurkish exiles influenced by the Westwho aimed to create a constitutionalmonarchy. They were soon unitedwith nationalist army officers, and, inprotest against conciliatory policies inMacedonia, sparked a revolt in July1908, Initially successful, they wereable to call the first Turkish Parliamentin November that year, but thesemodernisers were clearly split and itwas not long before the militaristfaction gained the upper hand. Abd-ulHamid's bnef counter-revolution in

1909 ended in failure and he wasdeposed in favour of a military junta-triumvirate under Enver, Talaat andJemat. From then on, the ethos of theold Ottoman Empire, which hadtended to devolve actual power(whilst retaining a centralisedauthority), was eroded in favour ofTurkish nationalist interests. Suchpolicies were bound to antagonise theother races of the empire, especiallythe Arabs. Therefore, we might saythe empire was doomed even beforethe First World War had broken out-

The decline of

the Ottoman

Empire seemed

to put Europe on

the trajectory to

war in 1914

German InterventionFrom the late 1890s, the Kaiser'smilitarist elite had cultivated analliance with Abd-ul Hamid in thehope of rendering Turkey a clientstate. The Kaiser's protestations offriendship, which he broadcastostentatiously in 1898, were hollow,in reality he harboured a desire forOstpolitik. This entailed the creation ofa German Empire, or at least a sphereof economic and political influence,over the entire Middle East. TheGermans despatched a militarymission, offered to support theconstruction of the Berlin-Baghdadrailway, and established consularofficials to inculcate the populationwith pro-German sympathies.German commerce certainly increasedmarkedly in this period, and Germanbankers and financiers grew innumber. Germany also obtainedmining rights. In an effort to neutralise

rivals, German officials circulatedstories of setbacks to the BritishEmpire and the fantastic idea that theKaiser had secretly converted to Islamin order to lead a pan-Islamic Jehadagainst all unbelievers.

Nevertheless, Turkey's nationalistand military leaders had their ownobjectives, to regenerate the OttomanEmpire and extend it eastwards intoPersia, the Caucasus and even intoRussian Turkestan, Enver Pasha, theleading member of the triumvirate,seemed to embody this new ambitionand his grandiose schemes eventuallyled to a military disaster in 1915 in theErzerum campaign against Russia,Turkish-German co-operation wastherefore strained and Germanofficials, like Ambassador BaronKonrad von Wangenheim, had towork hard to preserve a friendshipwith the 'Young Turks', having backedthe old Sultan, Despite Turkey'sparticipation in the First World War onthe side of the Central Powers, therelationship between Germany andTurkey was not close. It would be farmore accurate to say that Turkeyfought the war for its own interests,particularly the acquisition of modernmilitary and naval expertise.

The Impact of the Balkan WarsThe Balkan Wars (1912-13) seemed toconfirm that Turkey - ousted fromLibya in 1911 by Italy and with noremaining military or naval presence inthe Persian Gulf - was a spent force.There can be little doubt the warswere significant in the fortunes of theOttoman Empire, The formation of theBalkan League, made up of Greece,Montenegro, Serbia and Bulgaria,proved that 'ancient hatreds' could becurbed in the face of a commonTurkish threat. Conscious of theweakened state of the Ottomans, theLeague demanded concessions fromTurkey in Macedonia (a province it hadattacked and seized in 1896).Montenegro did not wait for Turkey'sresponse and launched its attack inOctober 1912, and the other statesjoined in. Again, the European powers

History Review Sepiember 200.S 7

intervened, and there wasconsiderable debate between themabout Serbia's access to the Adriatic. Itwas the ambiguity about the territorialsettlement of 1912 which provoked asecond Balkan War in 1913. Althoughthe Turks recovered a little of theirterritory in that second conflict againstBulgaria, the wars confirmed thatTurkey could no longer wield power insouth east Europe: it was nowconfined to a toehold nearConstantinople.

The implications of this were far-reaching. For the Balkan statesthemselves, the wars radicalisedpolitics and dedsion-making, testedtheir armed forces and fostered a spiritof national sacrifice. For the Serbs, theAlbanians, the Bulgarians and theGreeks, the consequences of theBalkan Wars could only be eithersurvival or foreign occupation - andthe latter meant a return to repression.But with victory, Serbia believed that,having defeated one empire, it couldchallenge the next, namely Austria.

Others drew their lessons from theBalkan wars too. The Arabs believedthat a revival of their fortunes wasimminent. The British and French wereencouraged to believe that a thrustagainst Turkey in the Dardenelles in1915 would bring the whole Ottomanedifice down. Hence the decline of theOttoman Empire seemed to putEurope on the trajectory to war in1914.

Yet the notion that south-eastEurope had become 'Balkanised', orterritorially fragmented and driven byirreconcilable and extremist politicsbased on ethnic divisions, and wasdriving the Great Powers into war, isperhaps misleading. As Glennyargues, it was also, to a large extentthe vortices of a decaying empire, andthe interventionism of the GreatPowers, that made conflicts there farworse. This pattern was to berepeated elsewhere in the OttomanEmpire in its last years. In the end, theTurkish army of 1914-18, besieged onall sides, bolstered a moulderingedifice longer than it deserved, until a

8 Hisloiy Review September 200S

combination of internal revolts andforeign intervention finallyoverwhelmed it.

Further ReadingMisha Glenny, The Balkans, 1804-1999: Nationalism, War and the GreatPoivers (London, 1999)Justin McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks(London, 1997)Sevket Pamuk, The Ottoman Empireand European Capitalism, 1820-1913(Cambridge, 1987)M.E. Yapp, The Making ofthe ModernNearEast, 1792-1923 {London. 1977)Erik J. Zuercher, Turkey: A ModernH/sto/y (London, 1998).

Issues to Debateo Why was the Ottoman Empireconsidered the 'Sick Man of Europe'by the end of the nineteenth century?o Why did attempts to reform theEmpire prior to 1914fail?o What combination of factorsfinally ended the Ottoman Empire?

About the AuthorDr Rob Johnson is the CourseManager of History at Richard HuishCollege and the author of severalbooks, including British imperialism:Histories and Controversies (Palgrave,2002), Hitler and Nazi Germany(Studymates, 3"^ edn,, 2004) andEuropean History 1870-1918 (2004),

Timeline1798 French invasion of Egypt1804 Serbian Revolt1806 Russo-Turkish War over Moldavia and Waliachia (ends with Treaty

of Bucharest, 1812)1815 Second Serbian revolt1817 Ali Pasha Revolt in Albania1821 Revolt by Ypsilanti in Romania and Greeks in Morea1824 Egyptian intervention in Greece1828 Russo-Turkish War ends with Treaty of Adrianople1830 Declaration of Independence for Greece, French conquest of

Algeria1831 Egyptians defeat Turks, prompting Russian assistance1839 Renewal of war between Egypt and Turkey, British intervention1853 Dispute over Holy Places escalated into war between Turkey and

Russia1854-6 Crimean War1875 Revolts in Bosnia and Herzogovina, spreading across the Balkans1877 Russo-Turkish War, ends with Treaty of San Stefano1878 Congress of Berlin revised terms of San Stefano, loss of Cyprus to

Britain1882 Invasion of Egypt by Britain1885 Revolt of Eastern Rumelia leads to the Bulgarian Crisis (1886-7)1895 Repression of the Armenian Christians1896-7 Crete Crisis, Turkey loses control of the island1898 Kaiser Wilhelm II tours the Ottoman Empire1908 Young Turk Revolt1909 Failure of the conservative counter-revolution1908-9 Bosnian Crisis, Austria annexes the province1911 Italy invades Libya1912 Balkan League created, First Balkan War1913 Second Balkan War1914 Turkey joins the Central Powers in the First World War, Turkish

offensive on the Suez Canal failed, British land at Basra1915 Failure of the Ezerum Offensive, Massacre of the Armenians,

Turks check British at Kut el Amara and the Allies at Gallipoli1917 British offensive in Palestine and Mesopotamia, Arab Revolt1918 Collapse of the Turkish army and the Ottoman Empire