SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 160384. April 29, 2005.] CESAR T. HILARIO, for himself and as Attorney-in-Fact of IBARRA, NESTOR, LINA and PRESCILLA, all surnamed HILARIO, petitioners, vs. ALLAN T. SALVADOR, respondent. HEIRS OF SALUSTIANO SALVADOR, namely, REGIDOR M. SALVADOR and VIRGINIA SALVADOR-LIM, respondents-intervenors. D E C I S I O N CALLEJO, SR., J p: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Decision 1oftheCourtofAppeals(CA)inCA-G.R.CVNo.63737aswellasitsResolution2denyingthe motion for the reconsideration of the said decision. The Antecedents OnSeptember3,1996,petitionersCesar,Ibarra,Nestor,LinaandPrescilla,allsurnamedHilario, filedacomplaintwiththeRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)ofRomblon,Romblon,Branch71,against private respondent Allan T. Salvador. They alleged therein, inter alia, as follows: 2. That,theplaintiffsareco-ownersbyinheritancefromConcepcionMazoSalvadorofa parceloflanddesignatedasCad.LotNo.3113-part,locatedat Sawang,Romblon,Romblon,whichpropertywas[adjudged]asthe hereditaryshareoftheirfather,BrigidoM.Hilario,Jr.whentheirfather wasstillsingle,andwhichadjudicationwasknownbytheplaintiffs['] father's co-heirs; 3. That, sometime in 1989, defendant constructed his dwelling unit of mixed materials on the propertyoftheplaintiffs'fatherwithouttheknowledgeoftheherein plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-interest; 4. That,demandshavebeenmadeofthedefendanttovacatethepremisesbutthelatter manifestedthathehave(sic)askedthepriorconsentoftheir grandmother, Concepcion Mazo Salvador; 5. That,toreachapossibleamicablesettlement,theplaintiffsbroughtthemattertothe LuponofBarangaySawang,tonoavail,evidencedbythe CERTIFICATE TO FILE ACTION hereto attached as ANNEX B; 6. That,theunjustifiedrefusalofthedefendanttovacatethepropertyhascausedthe plaintiffstosuffershame,humiliation,woundedfeelings,anxietyand sleepless nights; CSDTac 7. That, to protect their rights and interest, plaintiffs were constrained to engage the services of a lawyer. 3 The petitioners prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor, thus: WHEREFORE, it is prayed of this Honorable Court that after due process (sic), an order be issuedforthedefendanttovacateandpeacefullyturnovertotheplaintiffsthe occupied property and that defendant be made to pay plaintiffs: a. actual damages, as follows: a.1. transportationexpensesinconnectionwiththeprojectedsettlementofthecase amountingtoP1,500.00andforthesubsequent attendancetothehearingofthiscaseatP1,500.00 each schedule; a.2. attorney's fees in the amount of P20,000.00 and P500.00 for every court appearance; b. moralandexemplarydamagesinsuchamountincumbentupontheHonorableCourtto determine; and c. such other relief and remedies just and equitable under the premises. 4 Theprivaterespondentfiledamotiontodismissthecomplaintonthegroundoflackofjurisdiction overthenatureoftheaction,citingSection33ofBatasPambansa(B.P.)Blg.129,asamendedby Section 3(3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691. 5 He averred that (1) the complaint failed to state the assessed value of the land in dispute; (2) the complaint does not sufficiently identify and/or describe the parcel of land referred to as the subject-matter of this action; both of which are essential requisites for determining the jurisdiction of the Court where the case is filed. In this case, however, the assessed value of the land in question is totally absent in the allegations of the complaint and there is nothing in the relief prayedforwhichcanbepicked-upfordeterminingtheCourt'sjurisdictionas provided by law. Inthefaceofthispredicament,itcanneverthelessbesurmisedbyreadingbetweenthe lines, that the assessed value of the land in question cannot exceed P20,000.00 and, as such, it falls within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Romblon and should have been filed before said Court rather than before the RTC. . . . 6 The petitioners opposed the motion. 7 They contended that the RTC had jurisdiction over the action sincethecourtcantakejudicialnoticeofthemarketvalueofthepropertyinquestion,whichwas P200.00 per square meter and considering that the property was 14,797 square meters, more or less, the total value thereof is P3,500,000.00. Besides, according to the petitioners, the motion to dismiss was premature and "the proper time to interpose it is when the [petitioners] introduced evidence that the land is of such value." OnNovember7,1996,theRTCissuedanOrder8denyingthemotiontodismiss,holdingthatthe actionwasincapableofpecuniaryestimation,andtherefore,cognizablebytheRTCasprovidedin Section 19(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended. After the denial of the motion to dismiss, the private respondent filed his answer with counterclaim. 9 Traversing the material allegations of the complaint, he contended that the petitioners had no cause of action against him since the property in dispute was the conjugal property of his grandparents, the spouses Salustiano Salvador and Concepcion Mazo-Salvador. caIEAD On April 8, 1997, Regidor and Virginia Salvador filed their Answer-in-Intervention 10 making common causewiththeprivaterespondent.Onherownmotion,however,VirginiaSalvadorwasdroppedas intervenor. 11 During trial, the petitioners adduced in evidence Tax Declaration No. 8590-A showing that in 1991 the property had an assessed value of P5,950.00. 12 On June 3, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment finding in favor of the petitioners. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, as prayed for, judgment is rendered: Orderingthedefendanttovacateandpeacefullyturnovertotheplaintiffstheoccupied property; and Dismissing defendant's counterclaim. SO ORDERED. 13 Aggrieved,theprivaterespondentandrespondent-intervenorRegidorSalvadorappealedthe decisiontotheCA,whichrenderedjudgmentonMay23,2003reversingtherulingoftheRTCand dismissing the complaint for want of jurisdiction. The fallo of the decision is as follows: INVIEWOFTHEFOREGOING,theappealeddecisionisREVERSED,andthecase DISMISSED, without prejudice to its refilling in the proper court. SO ORDERED. 14 TheCAdeclaredthattheactionofthepetitionerswasonefortherecoveryofownershipand possessionofrealproperty.Absentanyallegationinthecomplaintoftheassessedvalueofthe property,theMunicipalTrialCourt(MTC)hadexclusivejurisdictionovertheaction,conformablyto Section 33 15 of R.A. No. 7691. Thepetitionersfiledamotionforreconsiderationofthesaiddecision,whichtheappellatecourt denied. 16 Hence, they filed the instant petition, with the following assignment of errors: I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN HOLDINGTHATTHEINSTANTCASE,ACCIONREIVINDICATORIA,FALLS WITHINTHEEXCLUSIVEORIGINALJURISDICTIONOFTHEMUNICIPAL TRIALCOURTOFROMBLON,ANDNOTWITHTHEREGIONALTRIAL COURT OF ROMBLON. II THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR INORDERINGTHEREFILINGOFTHECASEINTHE[PROPER]COURT, INSTEADOFDECIDINGTHECASEONTHEMERITSBASEDONTHE COMPLETE RECORDS ELEVATED BEFORE SAID APPELLATE COURT AND IN NOT AFFIRMING IN TOTO THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT. 17 The Ruling of the Court The lone issue for our resolution is whether the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitioners, the plaintiffs in the RTC, against the private respondent, who was the defendant therein. SCaIcA The petitioners maintain that the RTC has jurisdiction since their action is an accion reivindicatoria, an actionincapableofpecuniaryestimation;thus,regardlessoftheassessedvalueofthesubject property, exclusive jurisdiction falls within the said court. Besides, according to the petitioners, in their oppositiontorespondent'smotiontodismiss,theymadementionoftheincreaseintheassessed valueofthelandinquestionintheamountofP3.5million.Moreover,thepetitionersmaintainthat theiractionisalsoonefordamagesexceedingP20,000.00,overwhichtheRTChasexclusive jurisdiction under R.A. No. 7691. The petition has no merit. It bears stressing that the nature of the action and which court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitledtosomeoralloftheclaimsassertedtherein.18Thecaptionofthecomplaintisnot determinativeofthenatureoftheaction.Nordoesthejurisdictionofthecourtdependuponthe answer of the defendant or agreement of the parties or to the waiver or acquiescence of the parties. We do not agree with the contention of the petitioners and the ruling of the CA that the action of the petitionersintheRTCwasanaccionreivindicatoria.Wefindandsorulethattheactionofthe petitionerswasanaccionpubliciana,oronefortherecoveryofpossessionoftherealproperty subjectmatterthereof.Anaccionreivindicatoriaisasuitwhichhasforitsobjecttherecoveryof possession over the real property as owner. It involves recovery of ownership and possession based on the said ownership. On the other hand, an accion publiciana is one for the recovery of possession of the right to possess. It is also referred to as an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year aftertheoccurrenceofthecauseofactionorfromtheunlawfulwithholdingofpossessionofthe realty. 19

The action of the petitioners filed on September 3, 1996 does not involve a claim of ownership over the property. They allege that they are co-owners thereof, and as such, entitled to its possession, and thattheprivaterespondent,whowasthedefendant,constructedhishousethereonin1989without their knowledge and refused to vacate the property despite demands for him to do so. They prayed that the private respondent vacate the property and restore possession thereof to them. When the petitioners filed their complaint on September 3, 1996, R.A. No. 7691 was already in effect. Section 33(3) of the law provides: Sec.33. JurisdictionofMetropolitanTrialCourts,MunicipalTrialCourtsandMunicipal CircuitTrialCourtsinCivilCases.MetropolitanTrialCourts,MunicipalTrial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise: xxx xxx xxx (3) Exclusiveoriginaljurisdictioninallcivilactionswhichinvolvetitleto,orpossessionof, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interestthereindoesnotexceedTwentyThousandPesos(P20,000.00)or,in civilactionsinMetroManila,wheresuchassessedvaluedoesnotexceedFifty ThousandPesos(P50,000.00)exclusiveofinterest,damagesofwhateverkind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That in cases of land not declared for taxation purposes, the value of such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. Section 19(2) of the law, likewise, provides that: Sec.19. Jurisdictionincivilcases.TheRegionalTrialCourtshallexerciseexclusive original jurisdiction: cCAIES xxx xxx xxx (2) Inallcivilactions,whichinvolvethetitleto,orpossessionof,realproperty,orany interesttherein,wheretheassessedvalueofthepropertyinvolvedexceeds Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) or, for civil actions in Metro Manila, where suchvalueexceedsFiftyThousandPesos(P50,000.00)exceptactionsfor forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction overwhichisconferredupontheMetropolitanTrialCourts,MunicipalTrial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. The jurisdiction of the court over an action involving title to or possession of land is now determined by the assessed value of the said property and not the market value thereof. The assessed value of realpropertyisthefairmarketvalueoftherealpropertymultipliedbytheassessmentlevel.Itis synonymous to taxable value. 20 The fair market value is the price at which a property may be sold by a seller, who is not compelled to sell, and bought by a buyer, who is not compelled to buy. Evenacursoryreadingofthecomplaintwillshowthatitdoesnotcontainanallegationstatingthe assessedvalueofthepropertysubjectofthecomplaint.21Thecourtcannottakejudicialnoticeof theassessedormarketvalueoflands.22Absentanyallegationinthecomplaintoftheassessed valueoftheproperty,itcannotthusbedeterminedwhethertheRTCortheMTChadoriginaland exclusive jurisdiction over the petitioners' action. Wenotethatduringthetrial,thepetitionersadducedinevidenceTaxDeclarationNo.8590-A, showingthattheassessedvalueofthepropertyin1991wasP5,950.00.Thepetitioners,however, did not bother to adduce in evidence the tax declaration containing the assessed value of the property whentheyfiledtheircomplaintin1996.Evenassumingthattheassessedvalueofthepropertyin 1991 was the same in 1995 or 1996, the MTC, and not the RTC had jurisdiction over the action of the petitionerssincethecaseinvolvedtitletoorpossessionofrealpropertywithanassessedvalueof less than P20,000.00. 23 We quote with approval, in this connection, the CA's disquisition: Thedeterminingjurisdictionalelementfortheaccionreivindicatoriais,asRA7691 discloses,theassessedvalueofthepropertyinquestion.Forpropertiesinthe provinces, the RTC has jurisdiction if the assessed value exceeds P20,000, and theMTC,ifthevalueisP20,000orbelow.Anassessedvaluecanhave referenceonlytothetaxrollsinthemunicipalitywherethepropertyislocated, and is contained in the tax declaration. In the case at bench, the most recent tax declarationsecuredandpresentedbytheplaintiffs-appelleesisExhibitB.The loose remark made by them that the property was worth 3.5 million pesos, not to mentionthatthereisabsolutelynoevidenceforthis,isirrelevantinthelightof thefactthatthereisanassessedvalue.Itistheamountinthetaxdeclaration that should be consulted and no other kind of value, and as appearing in Exhibit B,thisisP5,950.Thecase,therefore,fallswithintheexclusiveoriginal jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Romblon which has jurisdiction over the territory where the property is located, and not the court a quo. 24 Itiselementarythatthetaxdeclarationindicatingtheassessedvalueofthepropertyenjoysthe presumption of regularity as it has been issued by the proper government agency. 25 Unavailing also is the petitioners' argumentation that since the complaint, likewise, seeks the recovery of damages exceeding P20,000.00, then the RTC had original jurisdiction over their actions. Section 33(3) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, quoted earlier, explicitly excludes from the determination of the jurisdictionalamountthedemandfor"interest,damagesofwhateverkind,attorney'sfees,litigation expenses,andcosts."ThisCourtissuedAdministrativeCircularNo.09-94settingtheguidelinesin the implementation of R.A. No. 7691, and paragraph 2 thereof states that 2. Theexclusionoftheterm"damagesofwhateverkind"indeterminingthejurisdictional amount under Section 19(8) and Section 33(1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A.7691,appliestocaseswherethedamagesaremerelyincidentaltoora consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount ofsuchclaimshallbeconsideredindeterminingthejurisdictionofthecourt. acADIT NeithermaythepetitionersfindcomfortandsolaceinSection19(8)ofB.P.Blg.129,asamended, which states: SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: xxx xxx xxx (8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney'sfees,litigationexpenses,andcostsorthevalueofthepropertyin controversyexceedsOneHundredThousandPesos(P100,000.00)or,insuch othercasesinMetroManila,wherethedemand,exclusiveoftheabove-mentioned items exceeds Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00). Thesaidprovisionisapplicableonlyto"allothercases"otherthananactioninvolvingtitleto,or possessionofrealpropertyinwhichtheassessedvalueisthecontrollingfactorindeterminingthe court's jurisdiction. The said damages are merely incidental to, or a consequence of, the main cause of action for recovery of possession of real property. 26 SincetheRTChadnojurisdictionovertheactionofthepetitioners,alltheproceedingstherein, including the decision of the RTC, are null and void. The complaint should perforce be dismissed. 27 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 63737 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners. SO ORDERED. Puno, Austria-Martinez, Tinga and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur. ||| (Hilario v. Salvador, G.R. No. 160384, [April 29, 2005], 497 PHIL 327-339) THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 156360. January 14, 2005.] CESAR SAMPAYAN, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CRISPULO VASQUEZ and FLORENCIA VASQUEZ GILSANO, respondents. D E C I S I O N GARCIA, J p: InthisverifiedpetitionforreviewoncertiorariunderRule45oftheRulesofCourt,petitionerCesar Sampayan seeks the annulment and setting aside of the following issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43557, to wit: 1. DecisiondatedMay16,2002,denyinghispetitionforreviewandaffirminganearlierdecisionof the Regional Trial Court at Agusan del Sur, Branch VII, which in turn reversed on appeal a favorable judgmentoftheMunicipalCircuitTrialCourt(MCTC)ofBayuganandSibagat,AgusandelSurina forcibleentrycasethereatcommencedagainsthimbyhereinprivaterespondents,thebrother-and-sister Crispulo Vasquez and Florencia Vasquez-Gilsano; and 2. Resolution dated November 7, 2002, which denied his motion for reconsideration. ScCDET From the pleadings and memoranda respectively filed by the parties, the Court gathers the following factual antecedents: OnJuly8,1992,intheMCTCofBayuganandSibagat,AgusandelSur,thesiblingsCrispulo VasquezandFlorenciaVasquez-GilsanofiledcomplaintforforcibleentryagainstCesarSampayan for allegedly having entered and occupied a parcel of land, identified as Lot No. 1959, PLS-225, and built a house thereon without their knowledge, consent or authority, the entry having been supposedly effected through strategy and stealth. Intheircomplaint,theplaintiffs(nowprivaterespondents),substantiallyallegedthattheirmother Cristita Quita was the owner and actual possessor of Lot No. 1959; that after their mother's death on January 11, 1984, they became co-owners pro-indiviso and lawful possessors of the same lot; that on June1,1992,whiletheyweretemporarilyabsentfromthelotinquestion,defendantCesar Sampayan, through strategy and stealth, entered the lot and built a house thereon, to their exclusion; andthat,despitetheirrepeateddemandsforSampayantovacatethelotandsurrenderthe possession thereof to them, the latter failed and refused to do so. In his answer, defendant Sampayan denied the material allegations of the complaint and averred that neither the plaintiffs nor their mother have ever been in possession of Lot No. 1959 and that he does notevenknowplaintiffs'identitiesortheirplacesofresidence.Heclaimedthathedidnotenterthe subjectlotbystealthorstrategybecauseheaskedandwasgivenpermissionthereforbyMaria Ybaez,theoverseerofthelot'strueowners,Mr.andMrs.AnastacioTerradowhowerethen temporarily residing in Cebu City for business purposes. In the same answer, Sampayan alleged that the plaintiffs' claim has long prescribed for the reason that the lot in dispute had been possessed and declaredfortaxationpurposesbythespousesFelicisimoOriolandConcordiaBalida-Oriolin1960, andthatin1978,theOriolspousessoldone-half(1/2)ofthelottothespousesMr.andMrs. Anastacio Terrado, while the other half, to the couple Manolito Occida and Juliana Sambale-Occida in 1979.Bothvendees,soSampayanaverred,haveactuallypossessedtherespectiveportions purchased by them up to the present. He thus prayed for the dismissal of the complaint. In the ensuing proceedings following the joinder of issues, the plaintiffs, to prove that they have been in actual possession of Lot No. 1959 when defendant Sampayan effected his entry thereto, submitted in evidence the following documents: HTCIcE 1. Tax Declaration No. 3180 in the name of Cristita Quita; 2. Certificate of Death showing the date of death of Cristita Quita on January 11, 1984; 3. Certificate issued by Fermina R. Labonete, Land Management Officer-III of CENRO X-3-E, DENR-X-3-9,Bayugan,AgusandelSurshowingthatLot1959,PLS-225iscoveredbyaMiscellaneous Sales Application of Cristita Quita; jurcda2005 4. Affidavit of one Emiliano G. Gatillo to the effect that he was the one who gave the lot in question to Cristita Quita sometime in 1957 and that since then the latter had been occupying the lot; PlaintiffsalsofiledaSupplementalPositionPaperdatedJuly13,1994forthepurposeofshowing thatCristitaQuitaisoneoftheoppositorsinCadastralCaseNo.149.Togetherwithsaidposition paper, they submitted a copy of the Answer/Opposition earlier filed in Cadastral Case No. 149. In said cadastral case, Cristita Quita was claiming Lot 1959, thus her name appeared in the list of oppositors therein. 5. ThedecisioninthesaidCadastralCaseNo.149showingthatthethenCourtofFirstInstanceof Agusan del Sur declared Lot No. 1959 as one of the lots subject of the same cadastral case. Forhispart,defendantSampayan,toprovetheallegationsinhisanswer,offeredinevidencethe following: 1. Tax Declaration No. A-11698 in the name of Felicisimo Oriol, which cancels Tax Declaration 8103; DIEACH 2. TaxDeclarationNo.GRB-01-930inthenameofFelicisimoOriolwhichcancelsTaxDeclaration No. A-11698; 3. Deed of Absolute Sale of Portion of Land, dated April 30, 1979, executed by Jesus Oriol for and in behalfofthespousesFelicisimoOriolandConcordiaBalida-Oriol,conveyingtheone-half(1/2) portion of Lot No. 1959 to the couple Manolito Occida and Juliana Sambale-Occida who possessed the one-half (1/2) portion and introduced improvements thereon, such as coconut and caimito trees; 4. Deed of Relinquishment of Rights of Portion of Land, executed by the spouses Oriol in favor of the samecoupleManolitoOccidaandJulianaSambale-Occida,tofurtherstrengthenthetransferof possession and whatever possessory rights the Oriols had in the lot in question; 5. Deed of Absolute Sale of Land executed by Concordia Balida-Oriol with the conformity of Teodosio Mosquito (another claimant), to prove that the other half of Lot No. 1959 was sold in 1978 to Mr. and Mrs. Anastacio Terrado whose overseer allowed Sampayan to enter and occupy the premises; 6. Protest filed with the CENRO, Agusan del Sur by the vendee Juliana Sambale-Occida against the Miscellaneous Sales Application of Cristita Quita; 7. Affidavit of Dionesia Noynay attesting to the fact that she is residing in Lot No. 1957, a lot adjacent to the lot in question, since 1960 up to the present. In the same affidavit, Dionisia claimed that neither Cristita Quita, much less the plaintiffs, had ever possessed Lot No. 1959. She claimed that it was the Occida couple who possessed said lot and introduced improvements thereon; and 8. AffidavitofJulianaOccidaandMariaYbaeztoshowtheimpossibilityofplaintiffs'possessionof the same lot. aCTADI Meanwhile,onMarch21,1996,whilethecasewaspendingwiththeMCTC,thepresidingjudge thereof personally conducted an ocular inspection of the contested lot in the presence of the parties and/ortheircounsels.Amongthosefoundintheareaduringtheinspectionare:thehouseof defendant Sampayan; the dilapidated house of a certain Peter Siscon; and a portion of the house of Macario Noynay, husband of Dionisia Noynay, one of Sampayan's witnesses. Basedonhisocularfindings,thejudgeconcludedthattheimprovementshesawinthepremises couldneverhavebeenintroducedbytheplaintiffsnorbytheirmotherCristitaQuitabutbythe vendees of the same lot. Reproduced by petitioner Jose Sampayan in the instant petition as well as in the Memorandum he subsequently filed with this Court, the MCTC judge's findings and observations duringtheocularinspection,aboutwhichthehereinprivaterespondentstooknoexception whatsoever, are hereunder quoted, as follows: "Notedinsidethelandarethehouseofthedefendant,CesarSampayan,ofPeterSiscon,which appears to be dilapidated, and part of the house of Macario Noynay which encroached to the land in question.Plantedonthelandarefive(5)coconuttrees,fruitbearing,three(3)notfruitbearing coconuttrees,andthree(3)starappleorcaimitotrees.DefendantSampayanadmittedthathe started occupying the land since 1992. It is admitted by the parties during the ocular inspection that one-half (1/2) portion of the land was bought by a certain Occida from certain Mr. and Mrs. Felicisimo Oriol. Thefindingsintheocularinspectionhaveconfirmedtheallegationofthedefendantthathis predecessors-in-interest have introduced improvements by planting caimito trees, coconut trees, and others on the land in question. Nothing can be seen on the land that plaintiffs had once upon a time been in possession of the land. The allegation that Cristita Quita, the predecessor-in-interest of the plaintiffs had been in possession of the said property since 1957, openly, exclusively, continuously, adversely and in the concept of an owner is a naked claim, unsupported by any evidence. ADHaTC Clearly,fromtheappearanceoftheimprovementsintroducedbythepredecessors-in-interestofthe defendant,itisshowedthattheyhavebeeninpossessionofthelandformorethanone(1)year. Hence, the action of the plaintiffs, if any, is accion publiciana or plenaria de possession" 1 (Emphasis supplied). In time, the MCTC rendered judgment dismissing the complaint "for lack of merit". Therefrom, the plaintiffs appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Agusan del Sur, which appeal was raffled to Branch VII thereof. In a decision dated December 5, 1996, said court reversed that of the MCTC, taking note of the fact that Cristita Quita was among the oppositors in Cadastral Case No. 149andthatshefiledaMiscellaneousSalesApplicationoverthelot.Onthebasisofsuchfinding, theRTCconcludedthatitwasCristitaQuita,predecessor-in-interestofthehereinprivate respondents, who was in actual prior physical possession of Lot No. 1959. Unable to accept the RTC judgment, Sampayan went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for review, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 43557.

As stated at the threshold hereof, the Court of Appeals, in the herein assailed Decision dated May 16, 2002, 2 denied Sampayan's petition. His motion for reconsideration having been similarly denied by thatcourtinitsResolutionofNovember7,2002,3Sampayanisnowwithusviathepresent recourse, it being his submissions "I. THATTHECOURTOFAPPEALSERREDINRULINGTHATTHEMUNICIPALCIRCUITTRIAL COURTOFBAYUGAN,AGUSANDELSUR,HASJURISDICTIONOVERTHECASE, CONSIDERINGTHATDURINGTHEHEARINGTHEREOFITWASFOUNDOUTBYTHESAID MUNICIPALCOURTTHATACCIONPUBLICIANAORPLENARIADEPOSESION,ANDNOT FORCIBLE ENTRY, IS THE PROPER ACTION; EDcIAC II. THATTHECONCLUSIONOFTHEHONORABLECOURTOFAPPEALSTHATPRIVATE RESPONDENTSHAVEBEENINPRIORACTUALPOSSESSIONISCONTRADICTEDBY EVIDENCEONRECORD,ANDCONSIDERINGTHATTHEPOSSESSIONTOBELEGALLY SUFFICIENT,CONSIST(SIC)INTHEEXERCISEOFDOMINIUMOVERIT,SUCHASFENCING, CULTIVATING OR OTHER UNMISTAKABLE ACTS OF EXCLUSIVE CUSTODY AND CONTROL FACTS WHICH THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE NEVER DONE IS CONTRARY TO LAW". 4 In the main, petitioner maintains that based on the pieces of evidence on record, he had sufficiently provenhispriorphysicalpossessionofthesubjectlot.Uponthispremise,hearguesthatprivate respondents'complaintforforcibleentryhasnolegtostandon,addingthattheproperremedy availabletothelatterisaccionpublicianaorplenariadeposesionwhichfallsundertheoriginal jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and not of Municipal Circuit Trial Courts. Asweseeit,theargumentsputforwardbythepetitionercrystallizetoonepivotalquestion:willthe complaint for forcible entry in this case prosper? To resolve this, however, we must first determine as towhobetweenthehereinpartieswasinprioractualphysicalpossessionofthesubjectlotatthe time the complaint was filed in the MCTC. For, as we have said in Gaza vs. Lim 5 , ". . . In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior possession of the land orbuildingandthathewasdeprivedthereofbymeansofforce,intimidation,threat,strategyor stealth. . . ." We emphasize, absence of prior physical possession by the plaintiff in a forcible entry case warrants the dismissal of his complaint. ISaCTE Undoubtedly,theissueofpriorphysicalpossessionisoneoffact,andsettledistherulethatthis Courtisnotatrieroffactsanddoesnotnormallyembarkonare-examinationoftheevidence adduced by the parties during trial. Of course, the rule admits of exceptions. So it is that in Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd. vs. CA, 6 we wrote: "[i]tisasettledrulethatintheexerciseoftheSupremeCourt'spowerofreview,theCourtisnota trieroffactsanddoesnotnormallyundertakethere-examinationoftheevidencepresentedbythe contendingparties'duringthetrialofthecaseconsideringthatthefindingsoffactsoftheCAare conclusiveandbindingontheCourt.However,theCourthadrecognizedseveralexceptionstothis rule,towit:(1)whenthefindingsaregroundedentirelyonspeculation,surmisesorconjectures;(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of thecase,oritsfindingsarecontrarytotheadmissionsofboththeappellantandtheappellee;(7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in thepetitioner'smainandreplybriefsarenotdisputedbytherespondent;(10)whenthefindingsof fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion." To our mind, exceptions (5) and (11) are present in this case. However, before delving into the question of who as between the petitioner and private respondents had prior physical possession of the subject lot, we deem it best to first resolve the issue of whether ornottheMCTChadjurisdictionoverthecomplaintfiledinthiscase,anissuealsoraisedbythe petitioner. Relying on the conclusion of the MCTC that private respondents' proper remedy is accion publiciana or plenaria de posesion, and not forcible entry, petitioner would deny the MCTC's jurisdiction over the case. Petitioner is in error. aEcHCD In Sarmiento vs. CA 7 , we held: "[t]ogivethecourtjurisdictiontoeffecttheejectmentofanoccupantordeforciantontheland,itis necessarythatthecomplaintshouldembodysuchastatementoffactsasbringsthepartyclearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face to give the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony. The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. . . ." ClearitisfromtheabovethatfortheMCTCtoacquirejurisdictionoveraforcibleentrycase,itis enoughthatthecomplaintaversthejurisdictionalfacts,i.e.thattheplaintiffhadpriorphysical possessionandthathewasdeprivedthereofbythedefendantthroughforce,intimidation,threats, strategyandstealth.8Thecomplaintinthiscasemakessuchanaverment.Hence,theirrelevant circumstance that the evidence adduced during the hearing rendered improper an action for forcible entryisofnomomentandcannotdeprivetheMCTCofitsjurisdictionoverthecase.TheMCTC continues to have that jurisdiction. We shall now address the more decisive question of prior physical possession. After a careful evaluation of the evidence at hand, we find for the petitioner. Tobeginwith,weareatonceconfrontedbytheuncontestedfindingsoftheMCTCjudgehimself duringhisocularinspectionofthepremisesindisputethatwhathesawthereat"confirmedthe allegationsofthedefendant[nowpetitionerSampayan]thathispredecessors-in-interesthave introducedimprovementsbyplantingcaimitotrees,coconuttrees,andothersonthelandin question", adding that "[N]othing can be seen on the land that plaintiff had once upon a time been in possessionoftheland",andcategoricallystatingthat"[T]heallegationthatCristitaQuita,the predecessor-in-interestoftheplaintiffshadbeeninpossessionofthesaidpropertysince1957, openly,exclusively,continuously,adverselyandintheconceptofanownerisanakedclaim, unsupported by any evidence". aETAHD Then,too,thereistheswornaffidavitofDionesiaNoynaytotheeffectthatshehadbeenresiding since1960onwardonLotNo.1957,thelotadjacenttoLotNo.1959,andthatneithertheprivate respondentsnortheirmotherhadeverpossessedLotNo.1959.Comingasitdoesfroman immediateneighbor,Dionesia'sstatementcommandsgreatweightandrespect.Incidentally,the MCTCjudgehimselffoundduringtheocularinspectionthataportionofthehouseofMacario Noynay, husband of Dionesia, protruded on Lot No. 1959. We note that in the herein assailed decision, the Court of Appeals attached much significance to the fact that private respondents' mother Cristita Quita was an oppositor in Cadastral Case No. 149. We ruleandsoholdthatthemother'sbeinganoppositorinsaidcadastralcasedoesnot,byitself, establishpriorphysicalpossessionbecausenotalloppositorsincadastralcasesareactual possessors of the lots or lands subject thereof. WHEREFORE,theinstantpetitionisherebyGRANTEDandtheDecisionandResolution, respectivelydatedMay16,2002andNovember7,2002,oftheCourtofAppealsREVERSEDand SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED. Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona and Carpio Morales, JJ., concur. ||| (Sampayan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156360, [January 14, 2005], 489 PHIL 200-211) THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 137013. May 6, 2005.] RUBEN SANTOS, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES TONY AYON and MERCY AYON, respondents. D E C I S I O N SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J p: ForourresolutionisthepetitionforreviewoncertiorariassailingtheDecision1oftheCourtof AppealsdatedOctober5,1998inCA-G.R.SPNo.4735anditsResolution2datedDecember11, 1998 denying the motion for reconsideration. The petition alleges that on November 6, 1996, Ruben Santos, petitioner, filed with the Municipal Trial CourtinCities(MTCC),Branch2,DavaoCityacomplaintforillegaldetaineragainstspousesTony and Mercy Ayon, respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. 3506-B-96. Inhiscomplaint,petitioneraverredthatheistheregisteredownerofthreelotssituatedatLanzona Subdivision,Matina,DavaoCity,coveredbyTransferCertificatesofTitle(TCT)Nos.108174, 108175,and108176.Respondentspousesaretheregisteredownersofanadjacentparcelofland covered by TCT No. T-247792. The previous occupant of this property built a building which straddled both the lots of the herein parties. Respondents have been using the building as a warehouse. Petitionerfurtherallegedinhiscomplaintthatin1985,whenheboughtthethreelots,heinformed respondentsthatthebuildingoccupiesaportionofhisland.However,heallowedthemtocontinue usingthebuilding.Butin1996,heneededtheentireportionofhislot,hence,hedemandedthat respondents demolish and remove the part of the building encroaching his property and turn over to him their possession. But they refused. Instead, they continued occupying the contested portion and even made improvements on the building. The dispute was then referred to the barangay lupon, but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. Accordingly, on March 27, 1996, a certification to file action was issued. Intheiranswer,respondentssoughtadismissalofthiscaseonthegroundthatthecourthasno jurisdictionoveritsincethereisnolessor-lesseerelationshipbetweentheparties.Respondents denied they were occupying petitioner's property by mere tolerance, claiming they own the contested portion and have been occupying the same long before petitioner acquired his lots in 1985. On July 31, 1997, the MTCC rendered its Decision in favor of petitioner, thus: "WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants ordering the latter, their successors-in-interest and other persons acting in their behalf to vacate the portion of the subjectpropertiesandpeacefullysurrenderpossessionthereoftoplaintiffaswellas dismantle/remove the structures found thereon. IDAESH Defendants are further ordered to pay reasonable value for the use and occupation of the encroached area in the amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) a month beginning September 1996 and the subsequentmonthsthereafteruntilpremisesarevacated;topayattorney'sfeesofTenThousand Pesos (P10,000.00); and to pay the costs of suit. SO ORDERED." 3 On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 11, Davao City, in its Decision dated February 12, 1998 in Civil Case No. 25, 654-97, affirmed in toto the MTCC judgment. 4 The RTC upheld the finding oftheMTCCthatrespondents'occupationofthecontestedportionwasbymeretolerance.Hence, when petitioner needed the same, he has the right to eject them through court action. RespondentsthenelevatedthecasetotheCourtofAppealsthroughapetitionforreview.Inits DecisiondatedOctober5,1988nowbeingchallengedbypetitioner,theCourtofAppealsheldthat petitioner's proper remedy should have been an accion publiciana before the RTC, not an action for unlawful detainer, thus: "Inthiscase,petitionerswerealreadyinpossessionofthepremisesinquestionatthetimeprivate respondent bought three (3) lots at the Lanzona Subdivision in 1985, a portion of which is occupied by a building being used by the former as a bodega. Apart from private respondent's bare claim, no evidencewasalludedtoshowthatpetitioners'possessionwastoleratedby(his)predecessor-in-interest.Thefactthatrespondentmighthavetoleratedpetitioners'possessionisnotdecisive.What matters for purposes of determining the proper cause of action is the nature of petitioners' possession fromitsinception.Andinthisregard,theCourtnotesthatthecomplaintitselfmerelyallegesthat defendants-petitionershavebeen'occupyingaportionoftheabovepropertiesoftheplaintiffforthe past several years by virtue of the tolerance of the plaintiff.' Nowhere is it alleged that his predecessor likewise tolerated petitioners' possession of the premises. . . . Consequently, . . ., respondent should present his claim before the Regional Trial Court in an accion publiciana and not before the Municipal Trial Court in a summary proceeding of unlawful detainer. WHEREFORE,thedecisionunderreviewisherebyREVERSEDandSETASIDE.Accordingly,the complaint for unlawful detainer is ordered DISMISSED." 5 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was denied by the Appellate Court in its Resolution dated December 11, 1998. Hence,theinstantpetitionforreviewoncertiorariascribingtotheCourtofAppealsthefollowing errors: "I THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED THE LAW IN DISMISSING THE INSTANT CASEONTHEGROUNDTHATPETITIONERSHOULDPRESENTHISCLAIMBEFORETHE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN AN ACCION PUBLICIANA. II THEFINDINGSOFTHEHONORABLECOURTOFAPPEALSISNOTINCONSONANCEWITH EXISTING LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE." ThesoleissuehereiswhethertheCourtofAppealscommittedareversibleerroroflawinholding that petitioner's complaint is within the competence of the RTC, not the MTCC. Petitionercontendsthatitisnotnecessarythathehaspriorphysicalpossessionofthequestioned propertybeforehecouldfileanactionforunlawfuldetainer.Hestressesthathetolerated respondents'occupancyoftheportionincontroversyuntilheneededit.Afterhisdemandthatthey vacate, their continued possession became illegal. Hence, his action for unlawful detainer before the MTCC is proper. Respondents, in their comment, insisted that they have been in possession of the disputed property even before petitioner purchased the same on April 10, 1985. Hence, he cannot claim that they were occupying the property by mere tolerance because they were ahead in time in physical possession. We sustain the petition. Itisanelementaryrulethatthejurisdictionofacourtoverthesubjectmatterisdeterminedbythe allegations of the complaint and cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the answer or pleadings filed by the defendant. 6 This rule is no different in an action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer. 7 All actions for forcible entry or unlawful detainer shall be filed with the proper Metropolitan TrialCourts,theMunicipalTrialCourtsandtheMunicipalCircuitTrialCourts,whichactionsshall includenotonlythepleaforrestorationofpossessionbutalsoallclaimsfordamagesandcosts arisingtherefrom.8Thesaidcourtsarenotdivestedofjurisdictionoversuchcasesevenifthe defendantsthereinraisesthequestionofownershipoverthelitigatedpropertyinhispleadingsand the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership. 9 Section1,Rule70onforcibleentryandunlawfuldetainerofthe1997RulesofCivilProcedure,as amended, reads: "Section1. Whomayinstituteproceedings,andwhen.Subjecttotheprovisionsofthenext succeeding section, a person deprived of the possession of any land or building by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession ofanylandorbuildingisunlawfullywithheldaftertheexpirationorterminationoftherighttohold possession,byvirtueofanycontract,expressorimplied,orthelegalrepresentativesorassignsof anysuchlessor,vendor,vendeeorotherpersonmay,atanytimewithinone(1)yearaftersuch unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court againstthepersonorpersonsunlawfullywithholdingordeprivingofpossession,oranypersonor personsclaimingunderthem,fortherestitutionofsuchpossession,togetherwithdamagesand costs." Under the above provision, there are two entirely distinct and different causes of action, to wit: (1) a caseforforcibleentry,whichisanactiontorecoverpossessionofapropertyfromthedefendant whoseoccupationthereofisillegalfromthebeginningasheacquiredpossessionbyforce, intimidation,threat,strategyorstealth;and(2)acaseforunlawfuldetainer,whichisanactionfor recoveryofpossessionfromdefendantwhosepossessionofthepropertywasinceptivelylawfulby virtueofacontract(expressorimplied)withtheplaintiff,butbecameillegalwhenhecontinuedhis possession despite the termination of his right thereunder. 10 Petitioner'scomplaintforunlawfuldetainerinCivilCaseNo.3506-B-96isproperlywithinthe competence of the MTCC. His pertinent allegations in the complaint read: "4. Thatdefendants(spouses)haveconstructedanextensionoftheirresidentialhouseaswellas other structures and have been occupying a portion of the above PROPERTIES of the plaintiff for the pastseveralyearsbyvirtueofthetoleranceoftheplaintiffsinceatthetimehehasnoneedofthe property; 5. That plaintiff needed the property in the early part of 1996 and made demands to the defendants to vacateandturnoverthepremisesaswellastheremoval(of)theirstructuresfoundinsidethe PROPERTIESofplaintiff;thatwithoutanyjustifiablereasons,defendantsrefusedtovacatethe portion of the PROPERTIES occupied by them to the damage and prejudice of the plaintiff.

6. Hence, plaintiff referred the matter to the Office of the Barangay Captain of Matina Crossing 74-A, Davao City for a possible settlement sometime in the latter part of February 1996. The barangay case reachedthePangkatbutnosettlementwashad.Thereafter,a'CertificationToFileAction'dated March 27, 1996 was issued . . .; xxx xxx xxx." 11 (emphasis ours) Verily, petitioner's allegations in his complaint clearly make a case for an unlawful detainer. We find noerrorintheMTCCassumingjurisdictionoverpetitioner'scomplaint.Acomplaintforunlawful detainerissufficientifitallegesthatthewithholdingofthepossessionortherefusaltovacateis unlawful without necessarily employing the terminology of the law. 12 Here, there is an allegation in petitioner'scomplaintthatrespondentsoccupancyontheportionofhispropertyisbyvirtueofhis tolerance. Petitioner's cause of action for unlawful detainer springs from respondents' failure to vacate thequestionedpremisesuponhisdemandsometimein1996.Withinone(1)yeartherefrom,oron November 6, 1996, petitioner filed the instant complaint. It bears stressing that possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful when the possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by the owner. Our ruling in Roxas vs. Court of Appeals 13 is applicable in this case: "A person who occupies the land of another at the latter'stoleranceorpermission,withoutanycontractbetweenthem,isnecessarilyboundbyan implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against him." WHEREFORE,thepetitionisGRANTED.TheassailedDecisionandResolutionoftheCourtof AppealsinCA-G.R.SPNo.47435areherebyREVERSEDandSETASIDE.TheDecisiondated February 12, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City in Civil Case No. 25, 654-97, affirming the Decision dated July 31, 1997 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2, Davao City in Civil Case No. 3506-B-96, is hereby REINSTATED. CHcETA SO ORDERED. Panganiban, Corona, Carpio Morales and Garcia, JJ., concur. ||| (Santos v. Spouses Ayon, G.R. No. 137013, [May 6, 2005], 497 PHIL 415-423) FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 150755. June 28, 2005.] RENE GANILA, * EDUARDO DUMADA-OG, SR., RAFAEL GANILA, JOSE PASTRANA, LOURDES GANILA, FLORENTINO GANILA, SERAFIN GANILA, LORETO ARELLANO, CONRADO GANILA, VIVENCIO ALVIOR, EDUARDO GANTALA, AMPARO VILLANUEVA, ELEUTERIO SILVA, ADELINA GANILA, FELIZARDO GANILA, SR., ENRIQUE GANILA, ABRAHAM TANONG, EMILIO ALFARAS, JR., BAPTIST CHRISTIAN LEARNING CENTER, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND VIOLETA C. HERRERA, respondents. D E C I S I O N QUISUMBING, J p: For review on certiorari are the Decision 1 dated March 30, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58191, and its Resolution 2 dated October 18, 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration. TheassaileddecisiondeniedthepetitiontosetasidetheResolution3oftheRegionalTrialCourt (RTC) of San Miguel, Jordan, Guimaras, Branch 65, affirming the Order of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) for the 19 petitioners to vacate the contested parcel of land. The facts are as follows: OnMarch19,1997,privaterespondentVioletaHerrerafiled21ejectmentComplaints4beforethe 16thMCTC,Jordan-Buenavista-NuevaValencia,Jordan,Guimaras.Privaterespondentallegedthat sheownsLot1227oftheCadastralSurveyofJordan,Guimaras,withanareaof43,210square meters; that she inherited the lot from her parents; and that she only tolerated petitioners to construct residentialhousesorotherimprovementsoncertainportionsofthelotwithoutrental.Sometimein SeptemberorOctober1996,privaterespondentdemandedthatthepetitionersvacatethelotand remove their houses and other improvements thereon. Petitioners refused, despite offer of money by wayofassistancetothem.Afterthebarangayconciliationfailed,privaterespondentfiledthe complaints. IntheirAnswers,5eight6ofthepetitionersclaimedthatLot1227wasformerlyashorelinewhich they developed when they constructed their respective houses. Another eight 7 maintained that their houses stood on Lot 1229 of the Cadastral Survey of Jordan, Guimaras. The other three 8 asserted that Lot 1227 is a social forest area. Atthepreliminaryconference,thepartiesagreedtodesignatetwogeodeticengineersas commissionersoftheMCTCtoconductarelocationsurveyofLot1227andtoidentifywhoamong the petitioners have houses within the lot. 9 The commissioners reported that: (1) the house of Henry Gabasa, defendant in Civil Case No. 288-J, isalmostoutsideLot1227;(2)thehouseofLudovicoAmatorio,defendantinCivilCaseNo.289-J, diagonally traversed the boundary; and (3) the houses of the 19 petitioners are inside Lot 1227. 10 Eight months after herein petitioners' failure to comment on the manifestation of private respondent to terminatethepreliminaryconference,theMCTCterminatedthepreliminaryconference.11 Thereafter,petitioners'counselAtty.NeliaJesusaL.Gonzalesfailedtofileherclients'position papers and affidavits, even after they sought a 30-day extension to file the same. 12 Consequently, the MCTC decided the cases as follows: WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,judgmentisherebyrenderedinfavoroftheplaintiffwhereby each of the twenty-one (21) defendants are hereby ordered: 1. To vacate Lot 1227 of the Cadastral Survey of Jordan, Guimaras; THaDEA 2. To pay Two Hundred Pesos (P200.00) per month from October, 1996 as compensation for the use of the property until the same is vacated; and 3. To pay Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) as attorney's fees and litigation expenses. SO ORDERED. 13 Petitioners appealed to the RTC, Branch 65, at Jordan, Guimaras, which decided as follows: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision in Civil Cases Nos. 0270-J, 0272-J, 0273-J, 0274-J, 0275-J, 0276-J, 0277-J, 0278-J, 0279-J, 0280-J, 0281-J, 0282-J, 0283-J, 0284-J, 0285-J, 0286-J, 0287-J, 0291-J and 0292-J are hereby affirmed. ThedecisionofthecourtbelowinCivilCasesNos.0288-Jand0289-Jaresetaside.CivilCases Nos. 0288-J and 0289-J are hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. 14 The RTC ruled that the evidence showed the better right of private respondent to possess Lot 1227. Privaterespondent'spositionpaper,affidavitandtaxdeclarationsupportedherallegations.In addition, the commissioners' report and sketch plan showed that indeed petitioners occupy Lot 1227. On the other hand, according to the RTC, the petitioners failed to present evidence which would show that they are entitled to possess the lot. Basedonthesketchplan,theRTCdismissedthecasesagainstGabasaandAmatoriosincetheir houses occupy only a small area of Lot 1227. It declared that Gabasa and Amatorio believed in good faith that the whole area they occupied was part of the seashore. The 19 petitioners, who were ordered to vacate the lot, filed a joint petition for review with the Court of Appeals.Theappellatecourtdeniedthepetition.Petitionersmovedforreconsiderationandfiledan amendedpetition.TheCourtofAppeals,however,affirmedthefactualfindingsandconclusions arrived at by the trial courts and denied the amended petition for lack of merit. 15 It also denied the motion for reconsideration. Petitioners are now before us, on a petition for review, alleging that: The Honorable Court of Appeals, with due respect and deference, committed a reversible error in the interpretation/applicationofthelawintheinstantcaseandintheappreciationofthefactsand evidencepresented.TheCourtofAppealsgravelyabuseditsdiscretionwhenitdeniedand dismissed the petition filed by the petitioners. 16 After considering the parties' submissions, we find three basic issues: (1) Did the MCTC err in taking jurisdiction over and deciding the cases? (2) Did the RTC err in sustaining the MCTC's judgment? (3) Did the CA err in denying the petition for review filed by the 19 petitioners ordered to be ejected? Petitionersinsistthatprivaterespondentshouldhavefiledanactiontorecoverpossessiondejure, not a mere complaint for ejectment, for two reasons. One, they possessed Lot 1227 in good faith for more than 30 years in the concept of owners. And two, there was no withholding of possession since private respondent was not in prior possession of the lot. Private respondent states in her Comment before us that the allegations in her Complaints make out aclearcaseofunlawfuldetainerwhichiscognizablebytheMCTC.Weareinagreementwithher stance.Therewasnoerrorinthechoiceofthecomplainant'sremedy,amatterlefttoher determinationasthesuitor.Andthecomplaintitselfisdefinedbytheallegationstherein,notthe allegations of the defendants. HIAESC Attheoutset,wenotethatpetitionersquestiontheMCTC'sjurisdictionyettheyadmitintheir preliminarystatementthattheComplaintsfiledareindeedforunlawfuldetainer,andthattheonly issuetobedeterminedismerephysicalpossession(possessiondefacto)andnotjuridical possession (possession de jure), much less ownership. 17 Whilepetitionersassertthatthiscaseinvolvesonlydeprivationofpossession,theyconfusethe remedy of an action for forcible entry with that of unlawful detainer. In unlawful detainer, prior physical possession by the plaintiff is not necessary. It is enough that plaintiff has a better right of possession. Actual, prior physical possession of a property by a party is indispensable only in forcible entry cases. In unlawful detainer cases, the defendant is necessarily in prior lawful possession of the property but his possession eventually becomes unlawful upon termination or expiration of his right to possess. 18 Thus,thefactthatpetitionersareinpossessionofthelotdoesnotautomaticallyentitlethemto remain in possession. And the issue of prior lawful possession by the defendants does not arise at all inasuitforunlawfuldetainer,simplybecausepriorlawfulpossessionbyvirtueofcontractorother reasons is given or admitted. Unlike in forcible entry where defendants, by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, deprive the plaintiff or the prior physical possessor of possession. Here there is no evidence to show that petitioners entered the lot by any of these acts. Ifonlytostressthefundamentalprinciplesrelatedtopresentcontroversy,jurisdictionoverunlawful detainersuitsisvestedinmunicipaltrialcourts.19Andinejectmentcases,thejurisdictionofthe court is determined by the allegations of the complaint. 20 Inthiscaseforejectment,privaterespondent'sallegationssufficientlypresentacaseofunlawful detainer.Sheallegedthat(1)sheownsLot1227;(2)shetoleratedpetitionerstoconstructtheir housesthereon;(3)shewithdrewhertolerance;and(4)petitionersrefusedtoheedherdemandto vacatethelot.TheComplaintswerealsofiledwithinoneyearfromthedateofherdemand.The causeofactionforunlawfuldetainerbetweenthepartiesspringsfromthefailureofpetitionersto vacatethelotuponlawfuldemandoftheprivaterespondent.Whentheyrefusedtovacatethelot afterherdemand,petitioners'continuedpossessionbecameunlawful.Hercomplaintforejectment against respondent, to put it simply, is not without sufficient basis. Petitioners'contentionthatprivaterespondentshouldhavefiledanactiontorecoverpossessionde jure with the RTC is not supported by law or jurisprudence. The distinction between a summary action of ejectment and a plenary action for recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land is settled in our jurisprudence. What really distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action (accion publiciana) andfromareivindicatoryaction(accionreivindicatoria)isthatthefirstislimitedtothequestionof possession de facto. An unlawful detainer suit (accion interdictal) together with forcible entry are the two forms of an ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession of real property. Aside from the summaryactionofejectment,accionpublicianaortheplenaryactiontorecovertherightof possessionand accionreivindicatoriaortheactiontorecoverownershipwhichincludesrecoveryof possession, make up the three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession. 21

It is not up to defendants, now petitioners herein, to dictate upon plaintiff, now the private respondent, what her initial recourse should be. Her choice of an action for ejectment against so-called squatters is well within her rights. Petitioners cite the case of Bayubay v. Court of Appeals, 22 and argue that the MCTC's decision was without jurisdictional or legal basis because the MCTC did not issue a preliminary conference order. Theyassertthatthe10-dayperiodtofilepositionpapersandaffidavitsonlystartsaftertheparties hadreceivedapreliminaryconferenceorder.Theyinsisttheyweredenieddueprocesswhenthe MCTCdecidedthecasesbasedmerelyonprivaterespondent'sComplaintsandaffidavit,without considering their Answers. For her part, private respondent maintains that there was substantial compliance with the rules in the MCTC'sconductofthepreliminaryconference,hencetherewasnoviolationofdueprocessnor disregard of its proper jurisdiction. Petitioners'presentcontentionwasfirstraisedonlyintheirappealtotheRTC.Raisingitbeforethe appellate tribunal is barred by estoppel. 23 They should have raised it in the proceedings before the MCTC.Inourview,thisissueisamereafterthought,whentheMCTCdecidedagainstthem.Basic rulesoffairplay,justiceanddueprocessrequirethatasaruleanissuecannotberaisedbythe petitioners for the first time on appeal. 24 Besides, petitioners did not question initially the MCTC's Order dated February 19, 1999, when they movedforanextensionoftimetofiletheirpositionpapersandaffidavits.Theywantedanother30 daysontopofthe30dayssetbytheMCTC,whichstrictlyshouldhavebeen10daysonly.Inthis regard,petitionerscouldnotclaimthattheyweredeniedsufficienttimetofiletheirpositionpapers and affidavits before the trial court. Further, they cannot validly invoke our ruling 25 in Bayubay, for in that case there was no order at all terminating the preliminary conference and requiring the parties to submit position papers and affidavits. HDATCc Wenotewithdismaypetitioners'insistencethatweordertheMCTC"toconducttherequisite preliminaryconference."Thesummarycharacterofejectmentsuitswillbedisregardedifweallow petitioners to further delay this case by allowing a second preliminary conference. Ejectment by way offorcibleentryandunlawfuldetainercasesaresummaryproceedings,designedtoprovidean expeditiousmeansofprotectingactualpossessionortherighttopossessionovertheproperty involved. It is a timely procedure designed to remedy the delay in the resolution of such cases. 26 Lastly, petitioners aver that private respondent failed to prove her allegation of ownership of Lot 1227 as it is only based on a tax declaration which is not an evidence of ownership. They also claim that theirpossessionofthelotwasnotandcouldnotbebymeretolerance.However,thisisafactual matter best left to the trial courts. Whatwehavenowissufficientevidenceshowingthatprivaterespondenthasabetterrightto possessLot1227.Thecommissioners'reportandsketchplanshowthatthe19petitionersoccupy thelot,whichcorroborateprivaterespondent'sallegationanddisprovepetitioners'defensethatLot 1227isashoreline;orthatLot1227isasocialforestarea.Whilenotaconclusiveevidenceof ownership, private respondent's tax declaration constitutes proof that she has a claim of title over the lot. It has been held that: Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration ofapieceofpropertyfortaxationpurposesmanifestsnotonlyone'ssincereandhonestdesireto obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties,butalsotheintentiontocontributeneededrevenuestotheGovernment.Suchanact strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. 27 The lower courts did not err in adjudicating the issue of possession. Mere absence of title over the lot is not a ground for the courts to withhold relief from the parties in an ejectment case. Plainly stated, the trial court has validly exercised its jurisdiction over the ejectment cases below. The policy behind ejectment suits is to prevent breaches of the peace and criminal disorder, and to compel the party out ofpossessiontorespectandresorttothelawalonetoobtainwhatsheclaimsishers.Theparty deprivedofpossessionmustnottakethelawintohisorherownhands.28Fortheirpart,herein petitioners could not be barred from defending themselves before the court adequately, as a matter of law and right. However, petitioners in their defense should show that they are entitled to possess Lot 1227. If they hadanyevidencetoprovetheirdefenses,theyshouldhavepresentedittotheMCTCwiththeir position papers and affidavits. But they ignored the court's order and missed the given opportunity to havetheirdefensesheard,theveryessenceofdueprocess.29Theirallegationswerenotonly unsubstantiated but were also disproved by the plaintiff's evidence. DSHcTC In sum, we find no reversible error much less any grave abuse of discretion committed by the Court of Appeals.Apersonwhooccupiesthelandofanotheratthelatter'stoleranceorpermission,without anycontractbetweenthem,isnecessarilyboundbyanimpliedpromisethathewillvacateupon demand,failingwhichasummaryactionforejectmentistheproperremedyagainsthim.30His statusisanalogoustothatofalesseeortenantwhosetermofleasehasexpiredbutwhose occupancycontinuedbytoleranceoftheowner.Insuchacase,thedateofunlawfuldeprivationor withholding of possession is to be counted from the date of the demand to vacate. 31 WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 30, 2001 and its Resolution dated October 18, 2001 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr., C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ., concur. ||| (Ganila v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 150755, [June 28, 2005], 500 PHIL 212-225) SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 132197. August 16, 2005.] ROSS RICA SALES CENTER, INC. and JUANITO KING & SONS, INC., petitioners, vs. SPOUSES GERRY ONG and ELIZABETH ONG, respondents. Ernesto L. Abijay and Zosa & Quijano Law Offices for petitioners. Edgar F. Gica for respondents. SYLLABUS 1.REMEDIALLAW;APPEALS;DISMISSALOFAPPEAL;FILINGOFMOTIONFOR RECONSIDERATION DEEMED AN EFFECTIVE WITHDRAWAL OF THE DEFECTIVE NOTICE OF APPEAL.SincetheunlawfuldetainercasewasfiledwiththeMTCandaffirmedbytheRTC, petitionersshouldhavefiledaPetitionforReviewwiththeCourtofAppealsandnotaNoticeof AppealwiththeRTC.However,weconsiderthistohavebeenremediedbythetimelyfilingofthe Motion for Reconsideration on the following day. Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court allows the withdrawal of appeal at any time, as a matter of right, before the filing of the appellee's brief. Applying thisrulecontextually,thefilingoftheMotionforReconsiderationmaybedeemedasaneffective withdrawal of the defective Notice of Appeal. Perforce, the period of appeal was tolled by the Motion forReconsiderationandstartedtorunagainfromthereceiptoftheorderdenyingtheMotionfor Reconsideration. A Motion for Additional Time to File the Petition was likewise filed with the Court of Appeals. Counting fifteen (15) days from receipt of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration and the ten (10)-day request for additional period, it is clear that respondents filed their Petition for Review on time. 2.ID.; ID.; ID.; PETITION FOR REVIEW BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS; PROPER MODE OF APPEAL FROM A DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT. Petitioners invoke to the ruling in People v. De la Cruz that once a notice of appeal is filed, it cannot be validly withdrawn to give way to a motion for reconsideration. The factual circumstances in the two cases are different. De la Cruz isacriminalcase,governedbycriminalprocedure.Section3,Rule122oftheRulesofCourt providesthatthepropermodeofappealfromadecisionoftheRTCisanoticeofappealandan appeal is deemed perfected upon filing of the notice of appeal. In the case at bar, a petition for review before the Court of Appeals is the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC. Since the filing of the notice of appeal is erroneous, it is considered as if no appeal was interposed. 3.ID.;SPECIALCIVILACTIONS;UNLAWFULDETAINER;ANALLEGATIONTHATTHE DEFENDANTISUNLAWFULLYWITHHOLDINGPOSSESSIONFROMTHEPLAINTIFFIS DEEMEDSUFFICIENTWITHOUTNECESSARILYEMPLOYINGTHETERMINOLOGYOFTHE LAW. Well-settled is the rule that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court hasjurisdictionoveritaretheallegationsofthecomplaintandthecharacterofthereliefsought. Respondentscontendthatthecomplaintdidnotallegethatpetitioners'possessionwasoriginally lawful but had ceased to be so due to the expiration of the right to possess by virtue of any express or impliedcontract.TheemphasisplacedbytheCourtofAppealsonthepresenceofacontractasa requisite to qualify the case as one of unlawful detainer contradicts the various jurisprudence dealing on the matter. In Javelosa v. Court of the Appeals, it was held that the allegation in the complaint that there was unlawful withholding of possession is sufficient to make out a case for unlawful detainer. It is equally settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, an allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholdingpossessionfromtheplaintiffisdeemedsufficient,withoutnecessarilyemployingthe terminology of the law. Hence, the phrase "unlawful withholding" has been held to imply possession onthepartofdefendant,whichwaslegalinthebeginning,havingnoothersourcethanacontract, express or implied, and which later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant. In Rosanna B.Barbav.CourtofAppeals,weheldthatasimpleallegationthatthedefendantisunlawfully withholdingpossessionfromplaintiffissufficient.Basedonthispremise,theallegationinthe Complaint that: . . . . despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still refuse to vacate said lots, thus, unlawfully withholding possession of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use of their lots; is already sufficient to constitute an unlawful detainer case. 4.ID.; ID.; ID.; SUMMARY IN NATURE; TECHNICALITIES OR DETAILS OF PROCEDURE SHOULD BECAREFULLYAVOIDED.Inthesubjectcomplaint,petitionersallegedthattheyarethe registeredownersofthelotscoveredbyTCTNos.36466,36467and36468.Bytheirimplied tolerance,theyhaveallowedrespondents,theformerownersoftheproperties,toremaintherein. Nonetheless,theyeventuallysentalettertorespondentsaskingthatthelattervacatethesaidlots. Respondentsrefused,therebydeprivingpetitionersofpossessionofthelots.Clearly,thecomplaint establishesthebasicelementsofanunlawfuldetainercase,certainlysufficientforthepurposeof vesting jurisdiction over it in the MTC. Respondents would like to capitalize on the requisites as cited in the case of Raymundo dela Paz v. Panis. But the citation is a mere reiteration of Sec. 1, Rule 70 of theRulesofCourt.Thecasedoesnotprovideforrigidstandardsinthedraftingoftheejectment complaint.ThecaseofCoTiamcov.Diazjustifiesamoreliberalapproach,thus:...Theprinciple underlyingthebrevityandsimplicityofpleadingsinforcibleentryandunlawfuldetainercasesrests upon considerations of public policy. Cases of forcible entry and detainer are summary in nature, for theyinvolveperturbationofsocialorderwhichmustberestoredaspromptlyaspossibleand, accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure should be carefully avoided. 5.ID.; ID.; ID.; QUESTION OF POSSESSION IS PRIMORDIAL WHILE THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP ISGENERALLYUNESSENTIAL.Theissueinvolvedinaccionreivindicatoriaistherecoveryof ownershipofrealproperty.Thisdiffersfromaccionpublicianawheretheissueisthebetterrightof possessionorpossessiondejure,andaccioninterdictalwheretheissueismaterialpossessionor possession de facto. In an action for unlawful detainer, the question of possession is primordial while the issue of ownership is generally unessential. 6.ID.;ID.;ID.;PARTYONLYSEEKSTORECOVERPHYSICALPOSSESSIONOFTHE PROPERTY;CLAIMOFOWNERSHIPOVERTHESUBJECTPROPERTYWILLNOTDEPRIVE THEMUNICIPALTRIALCOURTOFJURISDICTION.Neithertheallegationinpetitioners' complaint for ejectment nor the defenses thereto raised by respondents sufficiently convert this case into an accion reivindicatoria which is beyond the province of the MTC to decide. Petitioners did not institute the complaint for ejectment as a means of claiming or obtaining ownership of the properties. Theacknowledgmentintheirpleadingsofthefactofpriorownershipbyrespondentsdoesnot constitute a recognition of respondents' present ownership. This is meant only to establish one of the necessaryelementsforacaseofunlawfuldetainer,specificallytheunlawfulwithholdingof possession.Petitioners,inalltheirpleadings,onlysoughttorecoverphysicalpossessionofthe subjectproperty.Themerefactthattheyclaimownershipovertheparcelsoflandaswelldidnot deprive the MTC of jurisdiction to try the ejectment case. 7.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PENDING ACTIONS FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF DEED OF SALE AND TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE AND QUIETING OF TITLE ON THE SAME PROPERTY WILL NOT ABATE THE EJECTMENT CASE; RATIONALE. Even if respondents claim ownership as a defense to the complaint for ejectment, the conclusion would be the same for mere assertion of ownershipbythedefendantinanejectmentcasewillnotthereforeoustthemunicipalcourtofits summary jurisdiction. This Court in Ganadin v. Ramos stated that if what is prayed for is ejectment or recoveryofpossession,itdoesnotmatterifownershipisclaimedbyeitherparty.Therefore,the pending actions for declaration of nullity of deed of sale and Transfer Certificates of Title and quieting of title in Civil Case No. MAN-2356 will not abate the ejectment case. In Drilon v. Gaurana, this Court ruled that the filing of an action for reconveyance of title over the same property or for annulment of thedeedofsaleoverthelanddoesnotdivesttheMTCofitsjurisdictiontotrytheforcibleentryor unlawfuldetainercasebeforeit,therationalebeingthat,whiletheremaybeidentityofpartiesand subject matter in the forcible entry case and the suit for annulment of title and/or reconveyance, the rights asserted and the relief prayed for are not the same. 8.ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;ID.;LOWERCOURT'SADJUDICATIONOFOWNERSHIPISMERELY PROVISIONAL. In Oronce v. Court of Appeals, this Court held that the fact that respondents had previously filed a separate action for the reformation of a deed of absolute sale into one of pacto de retro sale or equitable mortgage in the same Court of First Instance is not a valid reason to frustrate thesummaryremedyofejectmentaffordedbylawtotheplaintiff.Consequently,anadjudication madeinanejectmentproceedingregardingtheissueofownershipshouldberegardedasmerely provisionaland,therefore,wouldnotbarorprejudiceanactionbetweenthesamepartiesinvolving title to the land. The foregoing doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases where the only issue to be settled is the physical or material possession over the real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure. The Court reiterated this in thecaseofTecsonv.Gutierrezwhenitruled:Wemuststress,however,thatbeforeusisonlythe initialdeterminationofownershipoverthelotindispute,forthepurposeofsettlingtheissueof possession, although the issue of ownership is inseparably linked thereto. As such, the lower court's adjudication of ownership in the ejectment case is merely provisional, and our affirmance of the trial courts' decisions as well, would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties involving title totheproperty,ifandwhensuchactionisbroughtseasonablybeforetheproperforum.Thelong settled rule is that the issue of ownership cannot be subject of a collateral attack. In Apostol v. Court ofAppeals,thisCourthadtheoccasiontoclarifythis:...UnderSection48ofPresidentialDecree No. 1529, a certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled,exceptinadirectproceedingforthatpurposeinaccordancewithlaw.Theissueofthe validityofthetitleoftherespondentscanonlybeassailedinanactionexpresslyinstitutedforthat purpose. Whether or not the petitioners have the right to claim ownership over the property is beyond the power of the court a quo to determine in an action for unlawful detainer. D E C I S I O N TINGA, J p: InaDecision1dated6January1998,theFormerFirstDivisionoftheCourtofAppealsoverturned the decisions of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City, ruling instead that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the subject complaint for unlawful detainer. This petition for review prays for the reversal of the aforesaid Court of Appeals' Decision. The case originated from a complaint for ejectment filed by petitioners against respondents, docketed asCivilCaseNo.2376,beforetheMTCofMandaueCity,BranchI.Inthecomplaint,petitioners alleged the fact of their ownership of three (3) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 36466, 36467 and 36468. Petitioners likewise acknowledged respondent Elizabeth Ong's ownershipofthelotsprevioustotheirs.On26January1995,Atty.JosephM.Baduel,representing MandauePrimeEstateRealty,wroterespondentsinformingthemofitsintenttousethelotsand askingthemtovacatewithinthirty(30)daysfromreceiptoftheletter.Butrespondentsrefusedto vacate, thereby unlawfully withholding possession of said lots, so petitioners alleged. RossRicaSalesCenter,Inc.andJuanitoKingandSons,Inc.(petitioners)hadacquiredthelands fromMandauePrimeEstateRealtythroughasalemadeon23March1995.Inturn,itappearsthat MandauePrimeEstateRealtyhadacquiredthepropertiesfromtherespondentsthroughaDeedof AbsoluteSaledated14July1994.However,thislatterdeedofsaleandthetransfersoftitle consequentialtheretoweresubsequentlysoughttobeannulledbyrespondentsinacomplaintfiled on 13 February 1995 before the Mandaue RTC against Mandaue Prime Estate Realty. 2 Per record, this case is still pending resolution. Meanwhile,theMYCresolvedtheejectmentcaseon24April1996,withthedecisionordering respondentstovacatethepremisesinquestionandtopeacefullyturnoverpossessionthereofto petitioners. Onappeal,theRTCrenderedon1March1997ajudgmentaffirmingtheMTC'sdecisioninits entirety. On8May1997,respondentsfiledanoticeofappeal.However,onthefollowingday,theyfileda motion for reconsideration. On23June1997,theRTCissuedanOrderwhichconcurrentlygaveduecoursetorespondents' noticeofappealfiledon8May1997;deniedtheirmotionforreconsiderationdated9May1997,3 and granted petitioners' motion for immediate execution pending appeal. In a Petition for Certiorari with Injunction filed with the Court of Appeals and treated as a Petition for Review,theappellatecourtruledthattheMTChadnojurisdictionoversaidcaseastherewasno contractbetweentheparties,expressorimplied,aswouldqualifythesameasoneforunlawful detainer. Thus, the assailed Orders of the MTC and RTC were set aside. Petitionersthentookthisrecoursevia PetitionforReviewunderRule45oftheRulesofCourt.The principal issues raised before this Court are: (i) whether the RTC decision has already become final and executory at the time the petition for review was filed; (ii) whether the allegations in the complaint constitute a case for unlawful detainer properly cognizable by the MTC; and, (iii) whether petitioners, as registered owners, are entitled to the possession of the subject premises. We resolve the first argument to be without merit. The following sequence of events is undisputed: (1)On 1 March 1997, the RTC rendered the questioned decision affirming the judgment of the MTC. (2)On 28 April 1997, respondents received a copy of the aforementioned decision. (3)On 8 May 1997, respondents filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. SAcaDE (4)On9May1997,respondentsfiledlikewisewiththeRTCaMotionforReconsiderationofthe aforementioned 1 March 1997 decision. (5)On23June1997,theRTCofMandaueissuedanOrderdenyingrespondents'Motionfor Reconsideration. (6)On 9 July 1997, respondents received a copy of the aforementioned 23 June 1997 Order. (7)On 24 July 1997, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals their motion for an additional period of ten (10) days within which to file their Petition for Review. (8)On 30 July 1997, respondents filed with the Court of Appeals their Petition for Review. Petitioners assert that the Petition for Review was filed beyond the fifteen (15)-day period for appeal. Theytheorizethattheperiodstartedrunningon28April1995,thedateofreceiptoftheRTC decision,andendedon13May1997.Accordingtothem,thisreglementaryperiodcouldnothave been interrupted by the filing on 9 May 1997 of the Motion for Reconsideration because of the filing onedayearlieroftheNoticeofAppeal.ThisNoticeofAppealdated8May1997,albeitthewrong mode of appeal, expressly manifested their intention to file a petition for review to either the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court. 4 Petitionersfurtherarguethatrespondents,afterhavingfiledtheNoticeofAppealwhichwasgiven duecoursebytheRTC,cannottakeaninconsistentstandsuchasfilingaMotionfor Reconsideration.Suchfiling,therefore,didnottollthefifteen(15)-dayperiodwhichstartedrunning from the date of receipt of the RTC decision on 28 April 1997 and ended on 13 May 1997. Respondents,intheirComment,5submitthatthefilingoftheNoticeofAppealdated8May1997 wasimproper,andassuchdidnotproduceanylegaleffect.Therefore,thefilingoftheMotionfor Reconsiderationimmediatelyonthefollowingdaycuredthisdefect.TheRTCrefusedtosubscribe respondents' position. It justified the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that the respondents had already filed a Notice of Appeal. The Order dated 23 June 1997 stated: On record is a Notice of Appeal by Certiorari filed by Defendants on May 8, 1997. Likewise filed by Defendants on May 9, 1997 is a Motion for Reconsideration. ConsideringtheNoticeofAppealfiledearlierwhichthecourtherebyapproves,theMotionfor Reconsideration is DENIED. The Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal being meritorious, is GRANTED. 6 (Emphasis in the original.) Strangely enough, the Court of Appeals passed no comment on this point when it took cognizance of respondents'positionandreversedtheRTC.ButdoesthisnecessarilymeanthattheRTCwas correct when it declared that the Motion for Reconsideration was barred by the filing of the Notice of Appeal, no matter how erroneous the latter mode was? Rule 42 governs the mode of appeal applicable in this case. Sec. 1 provides: Section 1.How appeal taken; time for filing. A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the RTC renderedintheexerciseofitsappellatejurisdictionmayfileaverifiedpetitionforreviewwiththe CourtofAppeals,payingatthesametimetotheclerkofsaidcourtthecorrespondingdocketand other lawful fees, depositing the amount of P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only withinwhichtofilethepetition forreview.Nofurtherextensionshallbegrantedexceptforthemost compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days. Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with the MTC and affirmed by the RTC, petitioners should have filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals and not a Notice of Appeal with the RTC. However,weconsiderthistohavebeenremediedbythetimelyfilingoftheMotionfor Reconsideration on the following day. Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court allows the withdrawal of appeal at any time, as a matter of right, before the filing of the appellee's brief. Applying this rule contextually, the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration may be deemed as an effective withdrawal of the defective Notice of Appeal. Perforce, the period of appeal was tolled by the Motion for Reconsideration and started to run again from the receipt of the order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. A Motion for Additional Time to File the Petition was likewise filed with the Court of Appeals. Counting fifteen (15) days from receipt of thedenialoftheMotionforReconsiderationandtheten(10)-dayrequestforadditionalperiod,itis clear that respondents filed their Petition for Review on time. Petitioners invoke to the ruling in People v. De la Cruz 7 that once a notice of appeal is filed, it cannot be validly withdrawn to give way to a motion for reconsideration. The factual circumstances in the two cases are different. DelaCruzisacriminalcase,governedbycriminalprocedure.Section3,Rule122oftheRulesof Court provides that the proper mode of appeal from a decision of the RTC is a notice of appeal and an appeal is deemed perfected upon filing of the notice of appeal. In the case at bar, a petition for review before the Court of Appeals is the proper mode of appeal from adecisionoftheRTC.Sincethefilingofthenoticeofappealiserroneous,itisconsideredasifno appeal was interposed. Nowonthesecondandmoreimportantissueraisedbypetitioners:whethertheComplaintsatisfies the jurisdictional requirements for a case of unlawful detainer properly cognizable by the MTC. TheMTCconsidereditselfashavingjurisdictionovertheejectmentcomplaintanddisposedofthe same in favor of petitioners. Said ruling was affirmed by the RTC. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts and found the complaint to be one not for unlawful detainer based on two (2) grounds, namely:thattheallegationsfailtoshowthatpetitionersweredeprivedofpossessionbyforce, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth; and that there is no contract, express or implied, between the parties as would qualify the case as one of unlawful detainer.

We disagree with the Court of Appeals. The complaint for unlawful detainer contained the following material allegations: xxx xxx xxx 3.That plaintiffs are the owners of Lot No. 2, which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36466 of the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City, Lot No. 1-A which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36467 of the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City and Lot No. 86-A which is covered by T.C.T. No. 36468 of the Register of Deeds of MandaueCity,allsituatedintheCityofMandaue.CopiesofsaidTransferCertificateofTitlesare hereto attached as Annexes "A", "B", and "C" respectively and made an integral part hereof; 4.That defendant Elizabeth Ong is the previous registered owner of said lots; 5.That as the previous registered owner of said lots, defendant Elizabeth Ong and her husband and co-defendant Jerry Ong have been living in the house constructed on said lots; 6.ThatonMay6,1995,plaintiffs,throughtheundersignedcounsel,wrotedefendantsaletter informingthemortheirintenttousesaidlotsanddemandedofthemtovacatesaidlotswithin30 daysfromreceiptofsaidletter.CopyofsaidletterisheretoattachedasAnnex"D"andmadean integral part thereof; 7.Thatdespitedemandtovacate,thedefendantshaverefusedandstillrefusetovacatesaidlots, thus, unlawfully withholding possession of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use of their lots; 8.That in unlawfully withholding the possession of said lots from the plaintiffs, plaintiffs have suffered damages in the form of unearned rentals in the amount of P10,000.00 a month xxx xxx xxx 8 Well-settledistherulethatwhatdeterminesthenatureofanactionaswellaswhichcourthas jurisdiction over it are the allegations of the complaint and the character of the relief sought. 9 Respondentscontendthatthecomplaintdidnotallegethatpetitioners'possessionwasoriginally lawful but had ceased to be so due to the expiration of the right to possess by virtue of any express or implied contract. IASEca The emphasis placed by the Court of Appeals on the presence of a contract as a requisite to qualify the case as one of unlawful detainer contradicts the various jurisprudence dealing on the matter. In Javelosa v. Court of the Appeals, 10 it was held that the allegation in the complaint that there was unlawful withholding of possession is sufficient to make out a case for unlawful detainer. It is equally settledthatinanactionforunlawfuldetainer,anallegationthatthedefendantisunlawfully withholdingpossessionfromtheplaintiffisdeemedsufficient,withoutnecessarilyemployingthe terminology of the law. 11 Hence, the phrase "unlawful withholding" has been held to imply possession on the part of defendant, whichwaslegalinthebeginning,havingnoothersourcethanacontract,expressorimplied,and which later expired as a right and is being withheld by defendant. 12 In Rosanna B. Barba v. Court of Appeals, 13 we held that a simple allegation that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from plaintiff is sufficient. Based on this premise, the allegation in the Complaint that: . . . . despite demand to vacate, the defendants have refused and still refuse to vacate said lots, thus, unlawfully withholding possession of said lots from plaintiffs and depriving plaintiffs of the use of their lots; 14 is already sufficient to constitute an unlawful detainer case. In the subject complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the registered owners of the lots covered by TCTNos.36466,36467and36468.Bytheirimpliedtolerance,theyhaveallowedrespondents,the formerownersoftheproperties,toremaintherein.Nonetheless,theyeventuallysentaletterto respondentsaskingthatthelattervacatethesaidlots.Respondentsrefused,therebydepriving petitionersofpossessionofthelots.Clearly,thecomplaintestablishesthebasicelementsofan unlawful detainer case, certainly sufficient for the purpose of vesting jurisdiction over it in the MTC. Respondents would like to capitalize on the requisites as cited in the case of Raymundo dela Paz v. Panis. 15 But the citation is a mere reiteration of Sec. 1, Rule 70 16 of the Rules of Court. The case does not provide for rigid standards in the drafting of the ejectment complaint. The case of Co Tiamco v. Diaz 17 justifies a more liberal approach, thus: ...Theprincipleunderlyingthebrevityandsimplicityofpleadingsinforcibleentryandunlawful detainercasesrestsuponconsiderationsofpublicpolicy.Casesofforcibleentryanddetainerare summary in nature, for they involve perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible and, accordingly, technicalities or details of procedure should be carefully avoided. 18 Moreover, petitioners fail to mention any of the incidents of the pending case involving the annulment ofdeedofsaleandtitleoversaidproperty.Petitionersknowbetterthantoquestionthisinan ejectment proceeding, which brings us to the nature of the action in this case. Respondents insist that the RTC, and not the MTC, had jurisdiction over the action, it being an accion reivindicatoriaaccordingtothem,onthegroundthatpetitionerswereconstantlyclaimingownership overthelandsintheguiseoffilinganactionforejectment.IntheirComment,19respondents maintainthattheyoccupythesubjectlotsasthelegalowners.Petitioners,ontheotherhand,are seekingrecoveryofpossessionunderaclaimofownershipwhichistantamounttorecoveryof possessionbasedonallegedtitletothelands,andthereforeiswithintheoriginaljurisdictionofthe RTC, so respondents conclude. This contention is not tenable. The issue involved in accion reivindicatoria is the recovery of ownership of real property. This differs fromaccionpublicianawheretheissueisthebetterrightofpossessionorpossessiondejure,and accioninterdictalwheretheissueismaterialpossessionorpossessiondefacto.Inanactionfor unlawfuldetainer,thequestionofpossessionisprimordialwhiletheissueofownershipisgenerally unessential. 20 Neithertheallegationinpetitioners'complaintforejectmentnorthedefensestheretoraisedby respondents sufficiently convert this case into an accion reivindicatoria which is beyond the province of the MTC to decide. Petitioners did not institute the complaint for ejectment as a means of claiming orobtainingownershipoftheproperties.Theacknowledgmentintheirpleadingsofthefactofprior ownership by respondents does not constitute a recognition of respondents' present ownership. This is meant only to establish one of the necessary elements for a case of unlawful detainer, specifically theunlawfulwithholdingofpossession.Petitioners,inalltheirpleadings,onlysoughttorecover physical possession of the subject property. The mere fact that they claim ownership over the parcels of land as well did not deprive the MTC of jurisdiction to try the ejectment case. Evenifrespondentsclaimownershipasadefensetothecomplaintforejectment,theconclusion wouldbethesameformereassertionofownershipbythedefendantinanejectmentcasewillnot therefore oust the municipal court of its summary jurisdiction. 21 This Court in Ganadin v. Ramos 22 stated that if what is prayed for is ejectment or recovery of possession, it does not matter if ownership is claimed by either party. Therefore, the pending actions for declaration of nullity of deed of sale and TransferCertificatesofTitleandquietingoftitleinCivilCaseNo.MAN-2356willnotabatethe ejectment case. In Drilon v. Gaurana, 23 this Court ruled that the filing of an action for reconveyance of title over the samepropertyorforannulmentofthedeedofsaleoverthelanddoesnotdivesttheMTCofits jurisdiction to try the forcible entry or unlawful detainer case before it, the rationale being that, while theremaybeidentityofpartiesandsubjectmatterintheforcibleentrycaseandthesuitfor annulment of title and/or reconveyance, the rights asserted and the relief prayed for are not the same. 24 In Oronce v. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court held that the fact that respondents had previously filed a separateactionforthereformationofadeedofabsolutesaleintooneofpactoderetrosaleor equitable mortgage in the same Court of First Instance is not a valid reason to frustrate the summary remedyofejectmentaffordedbylawtotheplaintiff.Consequently,anadjudicationmadeinan ejectmentproceedingregardingtheissueofownershipshouldberegardedasmerelyprovisional and,therefore,wouldnotbarorprejudiceanactionbetweenthesamepartiesinvolvingtitletothe land. The foregoing doctrine is a necessary consequence of the nature of forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases where the only issue to be settled is the physical or material possession over the real property, that is, possession de facto and not possession de jure. The Court reiterated this in the case of Tecson v. Gutierrez 26 when it ruled: We must stress, however, that before us is only the initial determination of ownership over the lot in dispute,forthepurposeofsettlingtheissueofpossession,althoughtheissueofownershipis inseparably linked thereto. As such, the lower court's adjudication of ownership in the ejectment case ismerelyprovisional,andouraffirmanceofthetrialcourts'decisionsaswell,wouldnotbaror prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property, if and when such action is brought seasonably before the proper forum. IECcaA The long settled rule is that the issue of ownership cannot be subject of a collateral attack.

In Apostol v. Court of Appeals, 27 this Court had the occasion to clarify this: ...UnderSection48ofPresidentialDe