GR No. 137873 April 20, 2001Consunji vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS:At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego.On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.D. M. Consunji then sought the reversal of the CA decision.ISSUES:Whether or not the petitioner is held liable under the grounds of negligence.Whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of death have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker’s right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both actions,RULING:The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing or transaction speaks for itself) is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. It has the following requisites: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3)the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises. Petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident.The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmen´s Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. In the course of availing the remedies provided under the Workmen’s Compensation law, the claimants are deemed to have waived theirknown right of the remedies provided by other laws. The Court of Appeals, however, held that the case at bar came under exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioner´s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Had the claimant been aware, she would’ve opted to avail of a better remedy than that of which she already had.

  Persons and Family Relation 29PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF THE LAW, EXCEPTIONSD.M. CONSUNJI, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGOG.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2010Facts: Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from theRenaissance Tower, to his death. Jose Juego‘s widow then filed a petition for damages in theRegional Trial Court against the deceased employer. The employer raised the defense that Maria Juego already availed of the benefits provided by the State Insurance Fund. Considering the ruling inPacarra vs. Cebu Autobus Company, an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from theemployer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen‘s Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinarycivil action against the tort fees for higher damages but he cannot pursue both actionssimultaneously. The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego.On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional TrialCourt.Issue: Whether or not respondent is prohibited from recovering damages under the Civil Code.Ruling:No. Respondent is not barred from recovering damages under the Civil Code although shehas already availed the benefits of the State Insurance Fund. The respondent‘s case is an exceptionbecause private respondent was not aware of petitioner‘s negligence when she filed her claim for

benefits from the State Insurance Fund. She was not only ignorant of the facts, but of her rights as well. The decision of the court is affirmed

FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL.G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960

Facts:Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher inthe Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years youngerthan she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made nopromise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insuranceunderwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the petitioner, since oneevening in 1953, when after coming from the movies; they had sexual intercourse in his cabin onboard M/V "Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledadadvised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child,Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However,subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez. On October 4, 1954,Soledad Cagigas filed with said of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damagesfor alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness tosupport the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry the complainant. Upon her motion,said court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00 amonth, which was, on February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. The judgment of the RTC is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima, as thenatural daughter of defendant, and confirming the order pendente lite, ordering defendant to pay tothe said child, through plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth dayof every month sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of four thousand five hundredpesos (P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory damages; the sum of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00)as moral damages; and the further sum of five thousand pesos (P500.00) as attorney's fees forplaintiff, with costs against defendant. On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmedthis decision, except as to the actual and compensatory damages and the moral damages, which wereincreased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.Issue: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise tomarry?Ruling: The Supreme Court held that seduction does not exist in the present case thus the petitioneris not morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger thanthe complainant —  who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a formerhigh school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be —  when she became intimate withpetitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she"wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy." Thus the complainant is not entitled to award of damages

BUYCO vs PNBGR No. 14406, June 30, 1961

Facts: The petitioner was indebted to respondent which was secured by a mortgage of real property. Petitioner is a holder of Backpay Acknowledgment Certificate that is more than sufficient to cover the loan which he offered as payment for the deficit on April 24, 1956. Respondent denied the offered payment due to its amended Charter which provides that "...the authority herein granted shall not be used as regards backpay certificates", enacted on June 16, 1956 as RA 1576. Petitioner filed this case praying that the respondent be compelled to accept his Backpay Acknowledgment Certificate as payment of his obligation.

Issue: Can RA 1576 be applied retroactively?

Decision: NO. "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided" (Art. 4, New Civil Code). This has bearing on the case at bar inasmuch as the herein mentioned Act does not contain any provision regarding its retroactivity. Therefore, the present case should be governed by the law at the time the offer in question was made.

Iloilo palay and corn Planters assn. vs Feliciano 13 SCRA 377 (Quico's version)Facts: On December 26, 1964, Jose y. Feliciano, chairman and general manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, wrote the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400 metric tons of rice, thru a government agency which the president may designate, pursuant to the recommendation of the national economic council as embodied in its resolution no. 70, series of 1964.On December 28,1964, the cabinet approve d the needed importation after the said referral of the president. The chairman Jose y. Feliciano of the rice and corn administration announced an invitation to bid for said importation and set the bidding for February 1, 1965. The said facts were all pursuant to a certain provision in republic act 2207.Considering the said importation is contrary to RA 3452 which prohibits the government from importing rice and that there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same, the petitioners together with Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as taxpayer, filed the instant petition before this court asking for a writ of preliminary injunction against the respondents.

Issue:WON RA 2207 was impliedly repealed by RA 3452?

Held:Republic Act 2207 still stands. RA 3452 only authorizes importation during normal times, but when there is shortage in the local supply of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, we have to turn to RA 2207. These two laws, therefore, are not inconsistent and so implied repeal does not ensue.A repealing clause in an Act which provides that “all laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly” is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts.The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. Here there is no such inconsistency.Wherefore, petition is dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this court is hereby dissolved. Cost against petitioners.

Facts:On Dec 26, 1964 respondent Feliciano wrote to the President of the Philippines urging immediate importation of 595,400 metric tons of rice. On Dec 27, 1964 The President submitted the said letter to his cabinet for consideration, and the cabinet approved the needed importation Dec 28, 1964. The President designated respondent Feliciano through the Rice and Corn Administration to undertake the importation, and thus respondent Feliciano announced an invitation to bid setting the bidding at Feb 1, 1965.Petitioner Iloilo Palay and Corn Association filed an instant petition before the Supreme Court considering that said importation is contrary to RA 3452 which prohibit the government from importing rice, seeking to restrain respondents from  conducting said bid.Petitioners prayed for issuance of preliminary injunction which the Court granted.Respondents answered that they anchor on the validity of the importation on RA 2207, which they believe still stands.

ISSUES:1. whether or not the importation in question is illegal because it is prohibited by RA 3452, section 10 which provide that importation of rice and corn is only left to private parties.2. whether or not RA 2207 has already been repealed by 3452

RULING:

The petition is dismissed

1. The abovemention importation is legal, because RA 2207 is still in effect. Section 2 of said Act provides that should there be an existing or imminent shortage in the local rice supply of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, the President may authorize such importation.2. Contention that RA 2207 has already been repealed by RA 3452 is untenable. The clause of RA 3452 repealing all laws inconsistent to RA 3452 does not apply to RA 2207 due to the clause's nature. Said clause of RA 3452 is not an express repealing clause, because it fails to identify or designate Act or Acts that it intends to repeal.The two laws refer to different methods applicable ro different circumstances. RA 3452 only authorizes importation during normal times, while RA 2207 is to be in effect in times of national emergency.

Lidasan v. Comelec G.R. No. L-28089 October 25, 1967

Facts:A statute, RA 4790, took effect on June 18, 1966. The republic act was entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur". RA 4790 creates a new municipality of Dianaton within Lanao del Sur with the seat found in Togaig, a barrio within the municipality of Buldon in Cotabato and additionally it annexes several barrios of two municipalities(namely that of Parang and Buldon) in Cotabato, which is also outside of Lanao del Sur. Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang, Cotabato requested for certiorari and prohibition and declare RA 4790 as unconstitutional as its Title is misleading and invoked the provision of the Constitution that the title of a bill is to be couched in a language sufficient to notify the legislators and the public and those concerned of the import of the single subject thereof.

Issue:

Whether the title of RA 4790 "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur" satisfies the provision of the Constitution that the title of an act must be sufficient to notify the public and others concerned of its substance.

Decision:

No. RA 4790 entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur" is misleading since this not only creates a municipality (namely, Dianaton) within Lanao del Sur but also annexes several barrios of the two municipalities of Cotabato, that of Parang and Buldon. Thus, RA 4790 is deemed unconstitutional.

FACTS: Bara Lidasan was a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, Republic Act No.  4790, entitled “An Act Creating the Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur,” was passed. Lidasan however discovered that certain barrios located in Cotabato were included in Dianaton, Lanao Del Sur pursuant to RA 4790. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.]  Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precincts for voter registration in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed a case to have RA 4790 be nullified for being unconstitutional. He averred that the law did not clearly indicate in its title that in creating Dianaton, it would be including in its territory several barrios from Cotabato.ISSUE: Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in another province – Cotabato – to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that “No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill”?HELD: No. The said law is void. The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult toperceive. Such title did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to the adjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that it is to the prejudice of his own province. These are the pressures which heavily weigh against the constitutionality of RA 4790.

Teoxon vs. Members of the Board of Administrators

  Facts:·          Teoxon filed a claim for disability pension for having been permanently incapacitated from work and that he was first awarded only P25.00 monthly, thereafter increased to P50.00 a month contrary to the terms of the basic law (which says that he should receive a higher amount).·          Teoxon filed his suit for mandamus against members of the board of administrators, his claim was for a higher pension and payment of moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney �s fees.·          The court dismissed the petition stating that the Board is authorized to promulgate regulations to carry into effect the provisions of the law.·          The court also said that Teoxon �s disability is not complete and therefore he cannot be entitled to complete disability allowance.·          Teoxon appealed the lower court �s decision, arguing that his right as conferred by law takes precedence to what the administrative rules and regulations of respondents provide is indisputable.

Issue:  whether or not there has been a failure to apply the doctrine that when there is a repugnancy between the statute and the rules issued in pursuance of it, the statute prevails

 Held: Yes there has been a failure to apply the doctrine that when there is a repugnancy between the statue and the rules issued in pursuance of it, the statute prevails.  The decision of the lower court was reversed, petition for mandamus was granted. The Veteran �s Bill of Rights states that �the persons mentioned in sections one and two hereof who are permanently incapacitated from work owing to sickness, disease or injuries sustained in line of duty, shall be given a life pension of one hundred pesos a month for each of his unmarried minor children below eighteen years of age, unless they are actually receiving a similar pension from other government funds, and shall receive in addition the necessary hospitalization and medical care. � The court said that the regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. The statue requires adherence to, not departure from, its provisions. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. Therefore the members of the board of administrators should adhere to the veteran �s bill of rights and grant him the right amount of pension.

 Article 22; its application.             In Republic, et al. v. Lacap, G.R. No. 158253, March 2, 2007 the SC had the occasion to once again say that Article 22, NCC was formulated as basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order, x x x designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience, x x x guides human conduct that should run as golden threads through society to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of justice. (Advance Foundation Construction Systems Corp. v. New World Properties and Ventures, Inc., G.R. Nos. 143154 & 143177, June 21, 2006, 491 SCRA 557, 578; Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Court of Appeals, 319 Phil. 312, 317 (1995)). The rules thereon apply equally well to the Government. (Palma Development Corp. v. Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga Del Sur, 459 Phil. 1042, 1050 (2003); Republic v. Court of Appeals, No. L-31303-04, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 453, 480). Since respondent had rendered services to the full satisfaction and acceptance by petitioner, then the former should be compensated for them. To allow petitioner to acquire the finished project at no cost would undoubtedly constitute unjust enrichment for the petitioner to the prejudice of respondent. Such unjust enrichment is not allowed by law. 

LORENZO M. TAÑADA vs. HON. JUAN C. TUVERA146 SCRA 446

April 24, 1985

Facts: Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon approval. The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for publication of some of the decrees. The court ordered the respondents to publish in the official gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general force and effect. The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not. The publication means complete publication, and that publication must be made in the official gazette. In a comment required by the solicitor general, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and therefore be dismissed. And on the clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the new civil code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative, that the publication when necessary, did not have to be made in the official gazette.

Issues:(1) Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette(2) Whether or not publication in the official gazette must be in full

Held:

(1) The court held that all statue including those of local application shall be published as condition for their effectivity unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.(2) The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws.

D.M. CONSUNJI vs. COURT OF APPEALSGR No. 137873April 20, 2001

FACTS: On November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death. On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego´s widow, filed in the RTC of Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceased´s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses, the widow´s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund. The RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff. On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner (Consunji) is negligent and should be liable.

Held: The decision of the CA is affirmed. The claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmen´s Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. The CA held that the case at bar came under exception because private respondent was unaware of petitioner´s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from the State Insurance Fund.

EMETRIO CUI vs. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY2 SCRA 205May 30, 1961 Facts: Cui was a law scholar at the Arellano University; he paid the tuition fees but it was returned to him at the end of every semester. Before Arellano awarded the scholarship grant, Cui was made to sign a contract covenant and agreement saying that he waives his right to transfer to another school in consideration of the scholarship grant and if he transfers, he shall pay the tuition fees awarded to him while being a scholar. He transferred to another school to finish his last term in law school. When he was about to take the Bar, his TOR at Arellano was not issued

unless he pays the amount of the tuition fees that were returned to him when he was still their scholar. He paid under protest.

Issue: Whether or not the provision of the contract between plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the former waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarship grants in cash, is valid or not.

Held: The waiver signed by Cui was void as it was contrary to public policy; it was null and void. Scholarship grants, as pointed out by the Director of the Bureau of Private Schools in Memorandum No. 38, are awarded in recognition of merit and not to attract and keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda value. To look at such grants as a business scheme designed to increase the business potential of an educational institution is not only inconsistent with sound public policy but also good morals. Consequently, the waiver signed by the student, waiving his right to transfer to another school unless he refunds to the university the equivalent of his scholarship grants, is null and void. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reverse and another one shall be entered sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with interest thereon at the legal rate from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of this case, as well as the costs, and dismissing defendant’s counterclaim. It is so ordered.

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY vs THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS176 SCRA 778August 25, 1989

Facts: 10 November 1972, herein private respondent Restituto Tobias, a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering operations manager, discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions, which caused Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp loss of several thousands of pesos. He reported it to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to the Executive Vice President and General Manager Herbert Hendry. A day after the report, Hendry told Tobias that he was number one suspect and ordered him one week forced leave. When Tobias returned to work after said leave, Hendry called him a “crook” and a “swindler”, ordered him to take a lie detector test, and to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature and initials for police investigation. Moreover, petitioners hired a private investigator. Private investigation was still incomplete; the lie detector tests yielded negative results; reports from Manila police investigators and from the Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner are in favor of Tobias. Petitioners filed with the Fiscal’s Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases against private respondent Tobias, but were dismissed. Tobias received a notice of termination of his employment from petitioners in January 1973, effective December 1972. He sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO); but Hendry wrote a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Tobias, then, filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of petitioners. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private respondent, ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs; hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.

Held: Yes. The Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be indemnified: when Hendry told Tobias to just confess or else the company would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail; his (Hendry) scornful remarks about Filipinos ("You Filipinos cannot be trusted.”) as well as against Tobias (“crook”, and “swindler”); the writing of a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty; and the filing of six criminal cases by petitioners against private respondent. All these reveal that petitioners are motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause damage to private respondent.

The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09055 is AFFIRMED.

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSEPH G. BRIMO, JUAN MICIANO, Administrator, petitioner-appellee, vs ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant50 Phil. 867November 01, 1927

Facts:Andre Brimo opposed the appeal of Juan Miciano, administrator of the estate of the deceased Joseph Brimo. The property was said to be in the Philippines and the testatrix wished that the distribution of his properties and everything in connection with it be in accordance with the Philippine laws. Oppositor-appellant Brimo claimed that the will of the testatrix is not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality. The errors he (oppositor) assigned in his opposition were the following: (1) the approval of said scheme partition, (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance, (3) denial of the motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition, (4) the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro Lanza of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business, and (5) the declaration that the Turkish laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the Turkish laws.

Issue:Whether or not Philippine laws shall be applied on the estate of Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen who have resided for a considerable length of time in the Philippines.

Held:Article 10 of the old Civil Code of the Philippine law was applied on the estate of Joseph Brimo, where it was provided, “nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount of the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may be situated.” However, the oppositor did not prove, though was granted ample opportunity to introduce competent evidence, that said testamentary dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish laws. Therefore, there is no evidence in the record that the national law of the testatrix was violated in the testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and executed; thus, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.

Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner, vs. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents174 SCRA 653June 30, 1989

Facts: This is a SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari and prohibition to review the order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI. Petitioner, a Filipina, and private respondent, a German national, got married on 7 September 1979 before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. They lived together for some time in Malate, Manila––where their only child Isabella Pilapil Geiling was born on April 20, 1980. However, on 15 January 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the marriage of Pilapil and Geiling on the ground of failure of their marriage.

27 June 1986, private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to said respondent, petitioner “had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982, and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983”. Several motions for dismissal were filed by Pilapil. She also filed a motion to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Issues:(1) Whether or not the family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity of the petitioner are also covered by the foreign law of her former husband.(2) Whether or not private respondent has the legal capacity to initiate an action for adultery against the petitioner.

Held:(1) The petitioner’s family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity are all bound to Philippine laws, regardless of where she lives. However, Philippine laws recognize decrees validly and legally obtained abroad, because if not, the enjoyment of rights of a foreign spouse who obtained a divorce decreed by his national law would eventually injure or be prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would still be valid under her national law.(2) As a consequence of the divorce decree, private respondent, being no longer the husband of the petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the action for adultery under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed the suit. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other; hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner’s motion to quash is SET ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent. SO ORDERED.

WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents.G.R. No. 142820June 20, 2003

Facts: Petitioner Wolfgang, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent Carmen, a Filipina, on 11 December 1980 in Hamburg, Gemany. Early 1981, the marriage was ratified in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. They had two daughters, Carolyne and Alexandria Kristine. Private respondent filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Makati on 28 August 1996. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss but was denied by trial court. A motion for reconsideration was filed by private respondent but was again denied by the trial court. In 1997, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese and granting the custody of the children to the father. It was June 14, 1999 when public respondent issued an order granting the petitioner’s motion to dismiss, but was partially set aside on September 1999 for the purpose of tackling issues regarding property relations of the spouses as well as support and custody of their children. Petitioner assailed for the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction, and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge.

Issue: Whether or not the Philippine courts can determine the legal effects of a decree of divorce from a foreign country.

Held: Yes. Our courts can determine the legal effects of a divorce obtained from a foreign country such as those concerning with support and custody of the children. In this case, the decree did not touch as to who the offending spouse was. The trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and education of the best interests of the children. After all, the child’s welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody. WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental

custody, including the care, support and education of the children, namely Carolyne and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, vs. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondentG.R. No. 138322October 2, 2001

Facts: Rederick, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree of divorce purportedly dissolving the marriage was issued by an Australian Family Court. On 26 June 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a “Certificate of Australian Citizenship” issued by an Australian government. Subsequently, Recio-Garcia nuptial took place in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City on January 12, 1994. In their marriage application for marriage license, respondent was declared as “single” and “Filipino”. Since October 22, 1995 Garcia and Recio lived separately without prior dissolution of their marriage. While they were still in Australia, their conjugal assets were divided on May 1996, in accordance with their declaration secured in Australia. March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in the trial court, on the ground of bigamy––respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her in 1994. She claimed that she only learned of Recio’s marriage to Samson in November 1997. In his answer, Recio averred that as of 1993, he had revealed to petitioner his prior marriage to an Australian citizen, that it had been validly dissolved by decree of divorce in 1989, making him legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.

Issues:1. Whether or not a Filipino, who became a naturalized Australian citizen, is still bound by Philippine Laws.2. Whether or not the respondent has legal capacity to marry the petitioner after the Australian decree of divorce.3. Whether or not a former Filipino need not to present any document proving his divorced marriage with a foreigner which he obtained abroad.

Held:1. No. Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13, and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.2. No. In this case, respondent failed to prove his legal capacity to remarry even if he showed the Australian divorce decree, which he said was a public document, a written official act of an Australian family court, and thus needs no further proof of authenticity and due execution. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license. The Court ruled that presentation solely of the divorce decree, which is what the respondent did, is insufficient.3. Yes. The burden of proof lies with “the party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.” Since the divorce was a defense raised by the respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating it falls squarely upon him. The Court still stands that compliance with the rules on evidence must be demonstrated. WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantive justice, we REMAND the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence which conclusively show respondent’s legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of declaring the parties’ marriage on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No costs. SO ORDERED.

NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners, vs. ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. “AMAY BISAYA”, respondentG.R. No. 154259February 28, 2005

Facts: This is a petition for review on certiorari regarding the reversing decision of the Court of Appeals in the decision of the Trial Court and thus, making the petitioners liable for damages through the abusive conduct of petitioner Lim, imposing upon them P200,000 as exemplary damages, P200,000 as moral damages, and P10,000 as attorney’s fees. Plaintiff Roberto Reyes (Amay Bisaya) was having coffee at the Nikko Hotel lobby on October 13, 1994 at around six in the morning when Dr. Violeta Filart, a long-time friend, approached him and invited him to a party at the penthouse where the hotel’s former manager’s birthday was being celebrated. He consented and carried the latter’s present. At the party, when he was helping himself at the buffet table, Ruby Lim, one of the petitioners, approached him and asked him to leave in a loud voice enough to be heard by those around the buffet table. Then, a Makati policeman accompanied the embarrassed Amay Bisaya in leaving the penthouse. Ruby Lim accepted the fact that she asked Mr. Reyes to leave but not in the manner he claimed. She said she politely asked Mr. Reyes to finish his food and leave the party as the celebrant wants the party to be intimate, and that he was not invited. On the other hand, Dr. Filart denied Amay Bisaya’s claim that she invited him to the party.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Lim’s conduct was abusive enough to make the petitioners liable for damages caused to plaintiff.

Held: No. The Supreme Court ruled that any damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lim’s exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone. The plaintiff failed in proving the ill-motive of the petitioners. It was from his confession that when Ms. Lim approached him, they were very close that they nearly kissed each other. Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when she requested the latter to leave the party, it is apparent that the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have been no intention on her part to cause him embarrassment. It was plaintiff’s reaction to the request that must have made the other guests aware of what transpired between them. Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out. Therefore, we find the petitioners not guilty of violating Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution dated 09 July 2002 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Spouses ANTONIO and LORNA QUISUMBING, petitioners, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY (MERALCO), respondentG.R. No. 142943April 3, 2002

Facts: This is a petition for review filed by petitioners regarding the February 1, 2000 Decision and the April 10, 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals where the decision of the trial court is set aside, the complaint against MERALCO is dismissed, and plaintiffs-appellees are ordered to pay defendant-appellant the differential billing of P193,332.00 representing the value of used but unregistered electrical consumption. Spouses Antonio and Lorna Quisumbing, plaintiffs-appellees in this case, are the owners of a house and lot located at No. 94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City which they bought from Ms. Carmina Serapio Santos. On March 3, 1995, around 9am, defendant-appellant’s inspectors headed by Emmanuel C. Orlina were assigned to conduct a routine on the spot inspection of all single phase meters at the house owned by the spouses. The inspectors performed their standard operating procedure by first asking permission from the secretary of the couple before they proceed to the inspection of the house. Later, the inspectors found out that there were few ‘illegal’ markings on the meter which made defendant-appellant temporarily disconnect electrical services that will only be restored unless the couple will pay P178, 875 representing the differential bill. However, at around 2pm, the electric service was reconnected as instructed by defendant-appellant’s officer. Plaintiff-appellees filed a complaint for damages with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction despite the immediate reconnection.

Issue:

Whether or not the act of the defendant-appellant’s inspectors in immediately disconnecting the electrical service of MERALCO constituted a violation of rights of the plaintiffs-appellees, making the respondent liable to pay damages to petitioner.

Held: Yes. Respondent had no legal right to immediately disconnect petitioners’ electrical supply without observing the requisites of law which, in turn, are akin to due process. Public utilities have a clear duty to see to it that they do not violate nor transgress the rights of the consumers. Any act on their part that militates against the ordinary norms of justice and fair play is considered an infraction that gives rise to an action for damages. Such is the case at bar. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed CA Decision is MODIFIED as follows: petitioners are ORDERED to pay respondent the billing differential of P193, 322.96; while respondent is ordered to pay petitioners P100,000 as moral damages, P50,000 as exemplary damages, and P50,000 as attorney’s fees. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, vs. ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee5 SCRA 200May 30, 1962

Facts: This is an appeal brought before the Court of Appeals upon the decision of the trial court dismissing the complaint of plaintiffs-appellants, who are the parents, brothers and sisters of Lolita, based on their claim that defendant Alfonso––a married man who works as an agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory, staying in Gasan, Marinduque, an adopted son of a Chinese named Pe Beco who is a collateral relative of Lolita’s father––deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita’s affection, causing moral damages to plaintiff. Because of the frequency of his visits to Lolita’s family who has allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs both in Gasan, and Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affairs reached the knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita. Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home on April 14, 1957.

Issue: Whether or not defendant caused moral damages to plaintiff, when as a married man, he pursued his love affair with Lolita.

Held: Yes. No other conclusion can be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy, succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has committed an injury to Lolita’s family contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code. WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney’s fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.

PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, plaintiff-appellant, vs. VICENTA F. ESCAÑO, ET AL., defendants-appellees15 SCRA 179 November 29, 1965

Facts: Out of their love affair, Vicenta Escaño and Pastor Tenchavez secretly got married on 24 February 1948 before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. Their marriage was duly registered in the local civil registrar. Later in their marriage, Vicenta’s parents, Mamerto and Mena Escaño, found out of their secret marriage; however, she continued living with her parents than eloping with her husband. Pastor went to Manila, leaving his wife in Cebu. Vicenta later went to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental “to escape from the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society.” On 24 June 1950, she applied for a passport where it is indicated the she is “single”. After approval of the application, she left for the United States and there, on August

1950, filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor on the ground of “extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character”; marriage was decreed divorced as “final and absolute” in Nevada on October 1950. She then sought papal dispensation for her marriage to Tenchavez. In 1954, Vicenta married an American and begotten children. She acquired American citizenship in 1958. Herein petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta Escaño and her parents, whom he alleged to have influenced her from living with him.

Issue: Whether or not parents-defendants shall pay petitioner for damages.

Held: No. There is no evidence that the parents of Vicenta, out of improper motives, aided and abetted her original suit for annulment, or her subsequent divorce; she appears to have acted independently, and being of age, she was entitled to judge what was best for her and ask that her decisions be respected. Her parents, in so doing, certainly cannot be charged with alienation of affections in the absence of malice or unworthy motives, which have not been shown, good faith being always presumed until the contrary is proved. Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages. While this suit may not have been impelled by actual malice, the charges were certainly reckless in the face of the proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give vent to their prejudices or spleen. WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows; (1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant Vicenta F. Escaño; (2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escaño to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees; (3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escaño and the estate of his wife, the deceased Mena Escaño, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees. Neither party to recover costs.

ST. LOUIS REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CONRADO J. ARAMIL, respondents133 SCRA 179November 14, 1984

Facts: This case is about the recovery of damages for a wrongful advertisement in the December 15, 1968 and January 5, 1969 issue of the Sunday Times where St. Louis Realty Corporation misrepresented that the house of Doctor Conrado J. Aramil belonged to Arcadio S. Arcadio. Moreover, there was violation of Aramil's right to privacy. Trial court through Judge Leuterio awarded P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as moral damages and P2,000 as attorney’s fees. Had it not been a late action for publication of rectification and apology––which only took place 15 April 1969 issue of Manila Times–– Doctor Aramil could have not suffered mental anguish and his income would have not been reduced by about P1,000 to P1,500 a month. Petitioner assailed the decision of the Appellate Court when it affirmed the trial court’s decision. Furthermore, the corporation contends that the decision is contrary to law and that the case was decided in a way not in conformity with the rulings of this Court and still continues to argue that the case is not covered by article 26.

Issue: Whether or not the case filed against St. Louis Realty Corporation is covered by Article 26 of the new Civil Code.

Held: Yes, this case is covered by Article 26 of the Civil Code. St. Louis Realty's employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times. Through that negligence, persons who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted, lingering impression that he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental anguish.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner. SO ORDERED.

LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioner, vs. HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANIIA, BRANCH XXXII HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B. ABAYAN, respondents160 SCRA 441April 15, 1988

Facts: This petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction was filed by petitioner when the Court denied his motion for reconsideration due to lack of merit. Private respondent Paz Abayan filed an information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato. She also filed with the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court a civil action for declaration of nullity of marriage to petitioner because of a prior marriage of petitioner. In his answer petitioner claimed that his second marriage was void because it was solemnized without a valid marriage license and that violence, intimation and undue influence were employed by Paz to obtain his consent. Prior to the date set for the trial of the criminal case, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings of the case because the civil action raises a prejudicial question which must first be determined before the criminal case can proceed.

Issue: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of First Instance of Manila should be suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question.

Held: The respondent judge answered in the negative. The Court sustained him. The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that the issue before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the herein private respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit. Petitioner Donato failed to prove that his consent to the second marriage has been obtained by the use of threats, force and intimidation. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.SO ORDERED.

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, VS. HON. MANUEL ROMILLO JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON, respondents139 SCRA 139October 8, 1985

FACTS: Alice Reyes, the petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the United States. They were married in Hong Kong in 1972 and they established residence in the Philippines. They had two children and they were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. The petitioner remarried in Nevada to Theodore Van Dorn. The private responded filed against petitioner stating that the petitioner’s business is a conjugal property of the parties and that respondent is declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court, where respondent acknowledged that they had no community property as of June 11, 1982.

Issues:a. Whether or not their divorce in Nevada, USA in 1982 is recognized in the Philippines.

b. Whether or not the private respondent as petitioner’s husband is entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets

Held: The policy against absolute divorce covers only Philippine nationals. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are valid according to their national law. The divorce the parties obtained from the Nevada Court released both parties from marital ties, thus, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. He is estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

DOROTHY B. TERRE vs ATTY. JORDAN TERRE211 SCRA 6July 3, 1992

Facts:Complainant Dorothy Terre was married to her first cousin while respondent Jordan Terre, who is a member of the Philippine Bar, with the knowledge of her marriage still courted her and have convinced her to marry him since her prior marriage is void ab initio.

Later, respondent disappeared, and abandoned Dorothy and their first-born Jason. Complainant found out that Atty. Terre married one named Helina Malicdem. Upon knowing of this, she filed an administrative case to disbar respondent. Jordan claimed that his marriage to complainant, which he believed in good faith, was null and void from the beginning; thus, does not need a judicial declaration of nullity. He also denied that Jason was his son to Dorothy.

Issue:Whether or not a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is needed in order to contract a second marriage.

Held:YES. A judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential, for through it, a person can be determined as to be legally free to contract a second marriage.However, in this case, the marriage between Dorothy and Atty. Jordan is deemed to be void since the complainant's first marriage has not obtained a judicial declaration nullifying it. The respondent was not charged of bigamy, but was proved to be guilty of gross immoral conduct, a factor that affected his moral fitness for membership in the legal profession.WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent Jordan Terre and to STRIKE OUT his name from the Roll of Attorneys. A copy of this decision shall be spread on the personal record of respondent Jordan Terre in the Bar Confidant's Office. A copy of this Resolution shall also be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and shall be circularized to all the courts of the land. SO ORDERED.

CRESENCIO LIBI and AMELIA YAP LIBI, Petitioners, vs HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, FELIPE GOTIONG and SHIRLEY GOTIONG, respondentsG.R. No. 70890September 18, 1992

Facts: Julie Ann Gotiong, daughter of respondent spouses, and Wendell Libi, son of petitioners, were sweethearts for more than two years before their death. Julie broke up with Wendell upon finding out of his sadistic and irresponsible character. Wendell kept on pestering Julie Ann with demands for reconciliation but her persistent refusal caused him to threaten her. 14 January 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell died, each from a single gunshot wound of the same firearm. Private respondents claimed that it was Wendell who deliberately caused their daughter's death, and his, respectively. Spouses Libi contended that a third party, probably a person related to Wendell's work as a Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU) agent, must have caused his death and Julie's. Gotiong spouses filed a civil case against the Libi spouses to recover damages arising from the latter's vicarious liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint for insufficiency of the evidence, and denied defendants' counterclaim for lack of sufficient merit. On appeal to respondent court, the lower court's decision was set aside.

Herein petitioners seek for the reversal of judgment of respondent court promulgated on 2 January 1985 sentencing defendants-spouses Libi to pay to plaintiff P30,000.00 for moral damages, P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, P20,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs.

Issues: Whether or not respondent court correctly reversed the trial court in accordance with established decisional laws; and Whether or not Article 2180 of the Civil Code was correctly interpreted by respondent court to make petitioners liable for vicarious liability.

Held: The court ruled that the Libi spouses are and should be held primarily liable for the civil liability arising from criminal offenses committed by their minor son under their legal authority or control, and who lives in their company. It is also proven that defendants-appellees utterly failed to exercise the requisite diligentissimi patris familias in preventing their minor son from committing this crime by means of the gun of defendants-appellees which was freely accessible to Wendell Libi for they have not regularly checked whether said gun was still under lock, but learned that it was missing from safety deposit box only after the crime had been committed. ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

BELLIS vs. BELLISG.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967

Facts:Amos Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas, and of the United States. By his first wife

whom he divorced he had five legitimate children, by his second wife, who survived him, he had three legitimate children, and three illegitimate children. Before he died, he made two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties and the other disposing his Philippine properties. In both wills, his illegitimate children were not given anything. The illegitimate children opposed the will on the ground that they have been deprived of their legitimates to which they should be entitled, if Philippine law were to be applied.Issue:Whether or not the national law of the deceased should determine the successional rights of the illegitimate children.

Ruling:The Supreme Court held that the said children are not entitled to their legitimes under the Texas Law, being the national law of the deceased, there are no legitimes.The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed.

Intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.

PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL BANK vs. ESCOLING.R. No. L-27860 March 29, 1974

Facts:

Linnie Jane Hodges, a married woman and a citizen of Texas, USA, was a domiciliary of the Philippines at the moment of her death. With respect to the validity of certain testamentary provisions she had made in favor of her husband, a question arose as to what exactly were the laws of Texas on the matter at the precise moment of her death (for while one group contended that the Texan law should result to renvoi, the other group contended that no renvoi was possible).Issue:Whether or not Texas Law should apply.

Ruling:The Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be presented in the probate court. Texas law at the time of her death (and not said law at any other time).

FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS ET AL.G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960

Facts:Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher

in the Sibonga Provincial High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than she, used to go around together and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up teaching and became a life insurance underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the petitioner, since one evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies; they had sexual intercourse in his cabin on board M/V "Escaño," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima, was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant married one Romanita Perez. On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas filed with said of her child, Chris Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry the complainant. Upon her motion, said court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimony pendente lite, P50.00 a month, which was, on February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month.

The judgment of the RTC is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima, as the natural daughter of defendant, and confirming the order pendente lite, ordering defendant to pay to the said child, through plaintiff, the sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth day of every month sentencing defendant to pay to plaintiff the sum of four thousand five hundred pesos (P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory damages; the sum of five thousand pesos (P5,000.00) as moral damages; and the further sum of five thousand pesos (P500.00) as attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costs against defendant. On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to the actual and compensatory damages and the moral damages, which were increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.Issue:

Whether or not moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to marry?

Ruling:The Supreme Court held that seduction does not exist in the present case thus the petitioner is not morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant — who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be — when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy." Thus the complainant is not entitled to award of damages.

TE vs. TEG.R. No. 161793 February 13, 2009

Facts:In January 1996, Petitioner Edward Kenneth Ngo Te decided to court Rowena Ong

Gutierrez Yu-Te after seeing her in a Filipino-Chinese association in their college. He decided to court Rowena after learning that her close friend had a boyfriend. They shared the same angst towards their families and developed a closeness with each other. In March 1996, Rowena asked Edward that they elope despite being bickering about being young and jobless. Edward eventually gave in to Rowena’s plans, left Manila, and sailed for Cebu that month with P80,000 pension. He provided the traveling money and she purchased their boat ticket. Because of their house accommodation, daily sustenance and joblessness, their pension lasted for only a month. After Edward proceeded to his parents’ home, Rowena kept on telephoning him and threatening him that she would commit suicide. Edward agreed to stay with Rowena at her uncle’s place.

On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s uncle brought the two to court to get married. He was 25 years old and she was 20. They continued to stay at her uncle’s place but he Edward was being treated like a prisoner. In one instance, Rowena insisted Edward to claim his inheritance so they could live independently but this request was angrily denied by his father who insisted that Edward go home else, he would be disinherited. After a month, Edward escaped from the house of Rowena’s uncle and stayed with his parents. His family hid him from Rowena when she called. In June 1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena but, unmoved by Edward’s persistence that they live together, she decided that they should separate ways. On January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the annulment of his marriage with Rowena on the ground of psychological incapacity.

On August 23, 2000, the Office of the City Prosecutor submitted an investigation report stating that it could not determine if there was collusion between the parties and therefore, recommended trial on the merits. Upon the findings of the clinical psychologist of psychological incapacity of Edward (dependent personality disorder) and Rowena (narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder), the Regional Trial Court declared the marriage null and void. However, the Appellate Court reversed and set aside the Trial Court’s decision on the ground that the clinical psychologist did not examine the respondent and merely banked on the testimony of the petitioner. 

Issue:Whether or not the marriage is null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity

given the petitioner’s totality of evidence.

Ruling:Yes. The courts must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the

expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties. The psychological assessment adequately, sufficiently and decisively points to Edward’s dependent personality disorder and Rowena’s narcissistic and anti-social personality disorder. Also, the Regional Trial Court viewed, at first-hand, the witnesses’ deportment. With Edward’s affliction of dependent personality disorder, he cannot assume the essential marital obligations of living together, observing love and respect and rendering help and support because he is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, allows others to make most of his important decisions, tends to agree with people even when he believes they are wrong, has difficulty doing things on his own, volunteers to do things that are demeaning in order to get approval from other people, feels uncomfortable or helpless when alone and is often preoccupied with fears of being abandoned. The petitioner followed everything dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.Rowena’s affliction with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume the essential marital obligations.

This finding takes into account her disregard for the rights of others, her abuse, mistreatment and control of others without remorse, her tendency to blame others, and her intolerance of the conventional behavioral limitations imposed by society.Moreover, as shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous marriage they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void, reversing and setting aside the decision of the appellate court.

REPUBLIC v. DAGDAGG.R. No. 109975 February 9, 2001

Facts:On September 7, 1975, Erlinda Matias, 16 years old, married Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20 years old, at the Iglesia Filipina Independent Church in Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. The marriage certificate was issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of on October 20, 1988. Erlinda and Avelino begot two children. The birth certificates were issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija also on October 20, 1988. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would disappear for months, suddenly re-appear for a few months, and then disappear again. During the times when he was with his family, he indulged in drinking sprees with friends and would return home drunk. He would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and if she refused, he would inflict physical injuries to her.

In October 1993, he left his family again and that was the last that they heard from him. Erlinda learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he escaped from jail and remains at large to-date. In July 1990, Erlinda filed with the RTC of Olongapo City a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication in the Olongapo News, a newspaper of general circulation. On the date set for presentation of evidence, only Erlinda and her counsel appeared. Erlinda testified and presented her sister-in-law as her only witness.

The trial court issued an Order giving the investigating prosecutor until January 2, 1991 to manifest in writing whether or not he would present controverting evidence, and stating that should he fail to file said manifestation, the case would be deemed submitted for decision. The Investigating Prosecutor conducted an investigation and found that there was no collusion between the parties. 

However, he intended to intervene in the case to avoid fabrication of evidence. Without waiting for the investigating prosecutor’s manifestation, the trial court declared the marriage of Erlinda and Avelino void under Article 36. The investigating prosecutor filed a Motion to Set Aside Judgment on the ground that the decision was prematurely rendered since he was given until January 2, 1991 to manifest whether he was presenting controverting evidence. The Office of the Solicitor General likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision on the ground that the same is not in accordance with the evidence and the law. Since the trial court denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Solicitor General appealed to the CA. The CA affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that “Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated not only because he failed to perform the duties and obligations of a married person but because he is emotionally immature and irresponsible, an alcoholic, and a criminal.”

Issue:Whether or not Avelino Dagdag is psychologically incapacitated.

Ruling:Erlinda Matias and Avelino Dagdag contracted marriage on September 7, 1975. They begot two children. A week after the wedding, Avelino started leaving his family without explanation. He would from time to time, disappear and suddenly reappear for a few months. He was always drunk and would force his wife to submit to sexual intercourse and inflict physical injuries on her if she refused. On October 1993, he left his family and was never heard from him again. Erlinda was forced to work and learned that Avelino was imprisoned and that he escaped from jail. Erlinda filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the grounds of psychological incapacity. Since Avelino could not be located, summons was served by publication. Upon trial, Erlinda presented Virginia Dagdag who attested to the psychological incapacity of Avelino. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of respondent without waiting for the prosecutor’s manifestation. The Court of Appeals affirmed trials’ court decision. The court contented that Erlinda failed to comply with guideline No. 2 which requires that the root cause of psychological incapacity must be medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by experts, since no psychiatrist or medical doctor testified as to the alleged psychological incapacity of her husband. Furthermore, the allegation that the husband is a fugitive from justice was not sufficiently proven. The investigating prosecutor was likewise not given an opportunity to present controversy evidence since the trial court’s decision was prematurely rendered.

D.M. CONSUNJI, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGOG.R. No. 137873 April 20, 2010

Facts:Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, to his death. Jose Juego’s widow then filed a petition for damages in the Regional Trial Court against the deceased employer. The employer raised the defense that Maria Juego already availed of the benefits provided by the State Insurance Fund. Considering the ruling in Pacarra vs. Cebu Autobus Company, an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmen’s Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tort fees for higher damages but he cannot pursue both actions simultaneously. The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.

Issue:Whether or not respondent is prohibited from recovering damages under the Civil Code.

Ruling:No. Respondent is not barred from recovering damages under the Civil Code although she

has already availed the benefits of the State Insurance Fund. The respondent’s case is an exception because private respondent was not aware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for benefits from the State Insurance Fund. She was not only ignorant of the facts, but of her rights as well. The decision of the court is affirmed.