refined rullings (nov. 2012)

7/27/2019 Refined Rullings (Nov. 2012)

1/8

November 2012 Philippine Supreme Court Decisions on Civil Law

Posted on December 14, 2012 by Rose Marie M. King-Dominguez Posted in Civil Law,

Philippines - Cases, Philippines - Law Tagged co-ownership, contract, damages, filiation, laches,

land registration, lease, marriage, mortgage, sale, succession, will

Here are select November 2012 rulings of the Supreme Court of the Philippines on civil law:

Civil Code

1. Co-ownership; validity of partition contracts. Contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, thesubdivision agreements forged by Mendoza and her alleged co-owners were not for thepartition of pro-indiviso shares of co-owners of Lot 733 but were actually conveyances,

disguised as partitions, of portions of Lot 733 specifically Lots 733-A and 733-B, and portions of

the subsequent subdivision of Lot 733-C. It cannot be overemphasized enough that the two

deeds of absolute sale over portions of substantially the same parcel of land antedated the

subdivision agreements in question and their execution acknowledged too before a notary

public. Rupeta Cano Vda. De Viray and Jesus Carlo Gerard Viray v. Spouses Jose Usi and Amelita

Usi, G.R.No.192486. November 21,2012.

Sales; Art 1544; elements of double sale. A double sale situation, which would call, ifnecessary, the application of Art. 1544 of the Civil Code, arises when, as jurisprudence

teaches, the following requisites concur: (a) The two (or more) sales transactions mustconstitute valid sales; (b) The two (or more) sales transactions must pertain to exactly

the same subject matter; (c) The two (or more) buyers at odds over the rightfulownership ofthe subject matter must each represent conflicting interests; and (d) Thetwo (or more) buyers at odds over the rightful ownership of the subject matter must

each have bought from the very same seller. Rupeta Cano Vda. De Viray and JesusCarlo Gerard Viray v. Spouses Jose Usi and Amelita Usi, G.R.No.192486. November

21,2012.

2. Constructive delivery; execution of public instrument only prima facie presumption of delivery.Article 1477 of the Civil Code recognizes that the ownership of the thing sold shall be

transferred to the vendee upon the actual or constructive delivery thereof. Related to this

article is Article 1497 which provides that *t+he thing sold shall be understood as delivered,

when it is placed in the control and possession of the vendee. With respect to incorporeal

property, Article 1498 of the Civil Code lays down the general rule: the execution of a public


2/8

instrument shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, if

from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be inferred. However, the

execution of a public instrument gives rise only to a prima facie presumption of delivery, which

is negated by the failure of the vendee to take actual possession of the land sold. *A+ person

who does not have actual possession of the thing sold cannot transfer constructive possession

by the execution and delivery of a public instrument. In this case, no constructive delivery of

the land transpired upon the execution of the deed of sale since it was not the spouses Villamor,

Sr. but the respondents who had actual possession of the land. The presumption of constructive

delivery is inapplicable and must yield to the reality that the petitioners were not placed in

possession and control of the land. Sps. Erosto Santiago and Nelsi Santiago v. Mancer Villamor,

et al.; G.R. No. 168499. November 26,2012

Sales; contract of sale; purchasers in good faith. A purchaser in good faith is one whobuys property without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such

property and pays its fair price before he has notice of the adverse claims and interest

of another person in the same property. However, where the land sold is in the

possession of a person other than the vendor, the purchaser must be wary and must

investigate the rights of the actual possessor; without such inquiry, the buyer cannot be

said to be in good faith and cannot have any right over the property. Sps. Erosto

Santiago and Nelsi Santiago v. Mancer Villamor, et al.; G.R. No. 168499. November

26,2012.

3. Damages for violation of right to privacy; inviolability of diplomatic residence. As alreadyexhaustively discussed by both the RTC and the CA, Nestor himself admitted that he caused thetaking of the pictures of Lavinas residence without the latters knowledge and consent. Nestor

reiterates that he did so sans bad faith or malice. However, Nestors surreptitious acts negate

his allegation of good faith. If it were true that Lavina kept ivories in his diplomatic residence,

then, his behavior deserves condemnation. However, that is not the issue in the case at bar.

Nestor violated the New Civil Code prescriptions concerning the privacy of ones residence and

he cannot hide behind the cloak of his supposed benevolent intentions to justify the invasion.

Hence, the award of damages and attorneys fees in Lavinas favor is proper. Nestor N. Padalhin,

et al. Vs. Nelson D. Lavia. G.R. No. 183026. November 14,2012.

4. Filiation; support; entitlement; clear and convincing proof of filiation. Time and again, this Courthas ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order

for support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an irritant to the family or the lives

of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear and

convincing evidence. Antonio Perla v. Mirasol Baring and Randy B. Perla; G.R. No. 172471,

November 12, 2012.


3/8

Filiation; open and continuous possession of status. To prove open and continuouspossession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the

manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child

as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, whichcannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal

not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat the

child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously.

Here, the single instance that Antonio allegedly hugged Randy and promised to support

him cannot be considered as proof of continuous possession of the status of a child. To

emphasize, *t+he fathers conduct towards his son must be spontaneous and

uninterrupted for this ground to exist. Antonio Perla v. Mirasol Baring and Randy B.

Perla; G.R. No. 172471, November 12, 2012.

Filiation; proof; Certificate of Live Birth; not competent proof of paternity when putativefather had no hand in preparation; Baptismal Certificate; per se not a competent proof

of filiation or circumstantial evidence to prove filiation. Just like in a birth certificate, the

lack of participation of the supposed father in the preparation of a baptismal certificate

renders this document incompetent to prove paternity. And while a baptismal

certificate may be considered a public document, it can only serve as evidence of the

administration of the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries

with respect to the childs paternity. Thus, baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible

in evidence as proof of filiation and they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial

evidence to prove the same. Antonio Perla v. Mirasol Baring and Randy B. Perla; G.R.

No. 172471, November 12, 2012.

5. Laches; elements. The elements of laches must be proven positively. Laches is evidentiary innature, a fact that cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings. Evidence is of

utmost importance in establishing the existence of laches because there is no absolute rule as to

what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to the

particular circumstances. Verily, the application of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of

the court as its application is controlled by equitable considerations.

Laches is not concerned only with the mere lapse of time. The following elements must bepresent in order to constitute laches: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under

whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made for which the complaint

seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant having had


4/8

knowledge or notice, of the defendants conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to

institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complaint

would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in

the event the relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred. Jack

Arroyo v. Bocago Inland Devt Corp. (BIDECO), G.R. No. 167880 November 14,2012

6. Lease; rescission in reciprocal obligation. Article 1191 of the Civil Code provides that the powerto rescind obligations is implied in reciprocal ones, in case one of the obligors should not comply

with what is incumbent upon him. A lease contract is a reciprocal contract. By signing the lease

agreement, the lessor grants possession over his/her property to the lessee for a period of time

in exchange for rental payment. Indeed, rescission is statutorily recognized in a contract of

lease. The aggrieved party is given the option to the aggrieved party to ask for: (1) the rescission

of the contract; (2) rescission and indemnification for damages; or (3) only indemnification for

damages, allowing the contract to remain in force. Sps. Socrates Sy and Cely Sy v. Andoks Litson

Corporation. G.R. No. 192108. November 21, 2012.

7. Marriage; petition for nullity of marriage; AM No. 02-11-10; appearance by the Office of theSolicitor General still required. The Resolution nowhere stated that appeals by the OSG were no

longer required. On the contrary, the Resolution explicitly required the OSG to actively

participate in all stages of the proceedings. Arabelle Mendoza v. Republic of the Philippines and

Dominic Mendoza, G.R. No. 157649. November 12, 2012.

Marriage; psychological incapacity; three basic requirements. To entitle petitioner spouse to adeclaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the totality of the evidence must sufficiently

prove that respondent spouses psychological incapacity was grave, incurable and existing prior

to the time of the marriage. Arabelle Mendoza v. Republic of the Philippines and Dominic

Mendoza, G.R. No. 157649. November 12, 2012.

Marriage; psychological incapacity; totality of evidence proving incapacity required. Even if theexpert opinions of psychologists are not conditions sine qua non in the granting of petitions for

declaration of nullity of marriage, the actual medical examination was to be dispensed with only

if the totality of evidence presented was enough to support a finding of his psychological

incapacity. This did not mean that the presentation of any form of medical or psychological

evidence to show the psychological incapacity would have automatically ensured the granting of

petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. What was essential, we should emphasize herein,

was the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological

condition. But where, like here, the parties had full opportunity to present the professional and

expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of the alleged


5/8

psychological incapacity, then the opinions should be represented and be weighed by the trial

courts in order to determine and decide whether or not to declare the nullity of the marriages. It

bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all other cases they try, must always base their

judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on the totality of

evidence adduced in the course of their proceedings. Arabelle Mendoza v. Republic of the

Philippines and Dominic Mendoza, G.R. No. 157649. November 12, 2012.

8. Marriage; psychological incapacity; elements. Psychological incapacity under Article 36 of theFamily Code contemplates an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic

marital obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of

marital obligations or ill will. It consists of: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the essentials

of marriage; (b) the inability must refer to the essential obligations of marriage, that is, the

conjugal act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, and the procreation

and education of offspring; and (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological

abnormality. Proving that a spouse failed to meet his or her responsibility and duty as a married

person is not enough; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be incapable of doing so

due to some psychological illness. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo de Quintos, Jr., G.R.

No. 159594. November 12, 2012.

Marriage; psychological incapacity; expert evidence; thorough and in-depth assessmentrequired. The expert evidence presented in cases of declaration of nullity of marriage based on

psychological incapacity presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by thepsychologist or expert to make a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence

of psychological incapacity. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo de Quintos, Jr., G.R. No.

159594. November 12, 2012.

Marriage; psychological incapacity; proof of natal or disabling supervening factor required. It isnot enough that the respondent, alleged to be psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in

complying with his marital obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a

natal or supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element in the respondents

personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his essential

marital obligations must be shown. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo de Quintos, Jr.,

G.R. No. 159594. November 12, 2012.


6/8

Marriage; psychological incapacity; Santos and Molina guidelines. The pronouncements inSantos and Molina have remained as the precedential guides in deciding cases grounded on the

psychological incapacity of a spouse. But the Court has declared the existence or absence of the

psychological incapacity based strictly on the facts of each case and not on a priori assumptions,

predilections or generalizations. Indeed, the incapacity should be established by the totality of

evidence presented during trial, making it incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove

the existence of the psychological incapacity. Republic v. Court of Appeals and Eduardo de

Quintos, Jr., G.R. No. 159594. November 12, 2012.

9. Mortgage; mortgagee in good faith relying on Torrens Certificate of Title; Indefeasibility.Primarily, it bears noting that the doctrine of mortgagee in good faith is based on the rule that

all persons dealing with property covered by a Torrens Certificate of Title are not required to go

beyond what appears on the face of the title. This is in deference to the public interest in

upholding the indefeasibility of a certificate of title as evidence of lawful ownership of the land

or of any encumbrance thereon. In the case of banks and other financial institutions, however,

greater care and due diligence are required since they are imbued with public interest, failing

which renders the mortgagees in bad faith. Thus, before approving a loan application, it is a

standard operating practice for these institutions to conduct an ocular inspection of the

property offered for mortgage and to verify the genuineness of the title to determine the real

owner(s) thereof. The apparent purpose of an ocular inspection is to protect the true owner of

the property as well as innocent third parties with a right, interest or claim thereon from a

usurper who may have acquired a fraudulent certificate of title thereto. Philippine Banking

Corporation v. Arturo Dy, et al., G.R. No. 183774. November 14, 2012

10.Property; accretion; elements; By law, accretion the gradual and imperceptible deposit madethrough the effects if the current of the water belongs to the owner if the land adjacent to the

banks of rivers where it forms. The drying up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up

riverbed belongs to the State as property of public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a

law vests the ownership in some other person. Republic of the Philippines v. Arcadio Ivan Santos

III and Arcadio Santos, Jr. G.R. No. 160453. November 12, 2012

11.Property; builder in good faith; not limited to those claiming ownership over property; builder ingood faith; landowners options. Article 448 of the Civil Code applies when the builder believes

that he is the owner of the land or that by some title he has the right to build thereon, or that,

at least, he has a claim of title thereto. In Tuatis, we ruled that the seller (the owner of the land)

has two options under Article 448: (1) he may appropriate the improvements for himself after


7/8

reimbursing the buyer (the builder in good faith) the necessary and useful expenses under

Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code; or (2) he may sell the land to the buyer, unless its value is

considerably more than that of the improvements, in which case, the buyer shall pay reasonable

rent. Communities Cagayan, Inc. v. Sps. Arsenio (deceased) and Angeles Nanol, et al. G.R. No.

176791. November 14, 2012

12.Quieting of title. The issues in a case for quieting of title are fairly simple; the plaintiff need toprove only two things, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title

to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) that the deed, claim,

encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting a cloud on his title must be shown to be in

fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy. Stated

differently, the plaintiff must show that he has a legal or at least an equitable title over the real

property in dispute, and that some deed or proceeding beclouds its validity or efficacy. Joaquin

G. Chung, Jr., et al. Vs. Jack Daniel Mondragon, et al.; G.R. No. 179754. November 21, 2012.

13.Quieting of title; legal or equitable title in quieting of title. An action for quieting of title isessentially a common law remedy grounded on equity. The competent court is tasked to

determine the respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, not only to place things

in their proper place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not

disturb the other, but also for the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every

cloud of doubt over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the

improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems best. But for

an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) theplaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject

of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud

on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance

of validity or legal efficacy. Dionisio Mananquil, et al. v. Roberto Moico; G.R. No. 180076.

November 20, 2012.

14.Succession; will; attestation clause; statement of number of pages; mandatory requirement;substantial compliance only when evidence aliunde is not necessary.The law is clear that the

attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is written. The purpose of

the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of its pages

and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages. While Article 809 allows substantial

compliance for defects in the form of the attestation clause, Richard likewise failed in this

respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will and testament

that it consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are

written cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages


8/8

including its acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere examination of

the will itself but through the presentation of evidence. Richard B. Lopez v. Diana Jeanne Lopez,

et al., G.R. No. 189984. November 12, 2012.

refined rullings (nov. 2012)

Documents