january 31st, 2013 (day2)

U.S.-China Dialogue

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The Future of the Korean Peninsula

January 31st, 2013

(Day2)


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Session 1

JANUARY 31st, 2013

SESSION 1: CURRENT ECONOMIC SITUATION IN NORTH KOREA AND ITS

IMPLICATION ON NORTH KOREA’S NORMALCY

Presenter

Lee, Suk (Research Fellow, KDI)

Moderator

Choi, Jin-wook (Senior Fellow, Korea Institute for National Unification)

Discusssants

Lee, Seong-ho (Professor, Joong-ang University)

Andrew Natsios (Former Administer at USAID / Professor, Texas A&M

University)

Sun, Jian Hang (Professor, Central Party School of China, Institute of

International Strategic Studies)

Implication on North Korea’s normalcy

Lee, Suk

Research Fellow, KDI

Is the DPRK Economy Changing?

Suk Lee

Please do not cite

January 2013

<PART Ⅰ – Basic Picture>

1. Population

2. GDP and Growth Rate

3. Trade

4. Economic Polarization

5. Market 1 – Exchange Rate & Price

6. Market 2 – Size

7. Summary

Contents

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The Future of the Korean Peninsula Session 1

<PART Ⅱ - Current Status >

1. Observations

2. Economic Background

3. Interpretation: a hypothesis

<PART Ⅲ - Conclusion>

Contents

PART Ⅰ: Basic Picture

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1. Population

<Table 1> Total Population, 1946 ∼ 2008 (thousand)

DPRK ROK

Total Male Female Total Male Female

1946 9,257 4,629 4,628

1960 10,789 5,222 5,567 25,012 12,551 12,462

1970 14,619 7,127 7,492 32,241 16,309 15,932

1975 15,986 7,433 8,553 35,281 17,766 17,515

1980 17,298 8,009 9,289 38,124 19,236 18,888

1985 18,792 8,607 10,185 40,806 20,576 20,230

1993 21,214 9,678 10,845 44,195 22,243 21,952

1995 21,819 10,634 11,185 45,093 22,705 22,388

1996 22,114 10,782 11,332 45,525 22,925 22,600

2000 22,963 11,201 11,762 47,008 23,667 23,341

2003 23,310 11,305 12,004 47,859 24,090 23,770

2008 24,052 11,722 12,330 48,607 24,416 24,191


Official Claim BOK UN GDP Per Cap. GDP Per Cap. GDP Per Cap.

1990 232 1,146 147 735

1992 208.8 990 211 1,013 125 593

1994 154.2 722 212 992 83 384

1995 128 587 223 1,034 48 222

1996 105.9 482 214 989 106 479

1997 464 177 811 103 462

1998 458 126 573 103 456

1999 102.7 454 158 714 103 452

2000 106.1 464 168 757 106 462

2001 478 157 706 110 476

2002 490 170 762 109 468

2003 524 184 818 111 471

2004 111.6 546 208 914 112 473

2005 242 1,056 130 548

2006 256 1,108 138 576

2007 267 1,152 144 598

2008 248 1,065 133 552

2009 224 932 120 496

2010 260 1,074 123 504

2011 293 1,200

<Table 2> GDP, 1990 ~ 2010 (100 million dollar, dollar)

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<Table 3> Growth Rate (%)

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Official Claim 3.9 3.2 7.1 4 - - - - - - - -

BOK 1.3 3.7 1.2 1.8 2.1 3.8 -1.0 -1.2 3.1 -0.9 -0.5 0.8

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009

growth

(year)

<Fig. 1> Growth Rate, 1999 ∼ 2010 (%)

<Fig. 2> Growth & Trade , 1991 ∼ 2008 (%)


-8

-6

-4

-2

0

2

4

6

8

-40 -30 -20 -10 0 10 20 30 40

성장률

교역 증가율

8

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3. Trade

<Table 4> Export & Import, 2000 ∼ 2011 (million dollar)

2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

1. Export 708 1,338 1,467 1,683 2,062 1,997 2,557 3,702

China 37 499 468 582 754 793 1,188 2,464

ROK 152 340 520 765 932 934 1,044 914

Japan 257 131 78 0 0 0 0 0

2. Import 1,686 2,718 2,879 3,055 3,574 3,095 3,528 4,328

China 451 1,081 1,232 1,392 2,033 1,888 2,278 3,165

ROK 273 715 830 1,033 888 744 868 800

Japan 207 63 44 9 8 3 0 0

3. Total 2,394 4,056 4,346 4,738 5,636 5,092 6,085 8,030

China 488 1,580 1,700 1,974 2,787 2,681 3,466 5,629

ROK 425 1,056 1,350 1,798 1,820 1,679 1,912 1,713

Japan 464 194 122 9 8 3 0 0

9

3. Trade

<Fig. 3> Three Aspects of DPRK Support Trade Structure

Commercial Trade

Aid Cash for Regime

<북한지지 교역 구조 (DPRK Support Trade Structure)>Trade Structure that ROK and China serve to maintain DPRK economy/Regime

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3. Trade

<Table 5> Trade Deficit with China vs. Cash from ROK (million dollar)

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Deficit in DPRK-China

Trade

Including Oil import 232 214 582 765 811 1,279 1,095

Excluding Oil import 112 75 384 517 529 865 N.A

Cash from inter-Korean

Trade

Merchandise Trade Surplus 169 168 221 326 500 440 333

Tourism 13 15 14 12 20 20 0

Gaesung 0 0 3 7 14 30* 40*

Total 180 180 233 341 534 490* 347*

3. Trade

But the collapse of “DPRK Support Trade Structure” due to

ROK’ Economic Sanction on 4 May 2010

Currently China is the only important trading Partner

Increasing Export of Natural Resources to China

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4. Economic Polarisation

<Fig. 4> Proportion of Population Collecting Wild Food 2003-2005 vs. 2008

<Fig. 5> Proportion of Urban Population Receiving Food Assistance from Relatives/Friends

2003-2005 vs. 2008

4. Economic Polarisation

Pyongyang vs. Non-Pyongyang

Formal(plan) Sector vs. Informal Sector (Market)

Domestic Sector vs. Foreign Sector

Those who have vs. Those who have not (dollar)

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<Table 6> Market Exchange Rate and PriceYear/month/ date Exchange rate price

11.01-12 ~ 01-18 3,100 1,80011.02-08 ~ 02-14 3,000 2,20011.02-22 ~ 02-28 3,050 1,90011.04-05 ~ 04-11 3,000 1,50011.04-27 ~ 05-03 3,150 1,80011.05-13 ~ 05-19 2,550 1,80011.06-14 ~ 06-20 2,800 2,00011.06-28 ~ 07-04 2,700 1,90011.07-14 ~ 07-20 2,570 1,90011.08-02 ~ 08-08 2,540 2,10011.08-18 ~ 08-24 2,900 2,60011.08-31 ~ 09-06 2,900 2,60011.09-15 ~ 09-21 2,900 2,30011.10-01 ~ 10-07 3,100 2,40011.11-08 ~ 11-14 4,000 3,80011.11-26 ~ 12-02 4,500 3,85011.12-07 ~ 12-13 5,100 4,20012.01-15 ~ 01-21 4,400 3,200 12.02-04 ~ 02-10 3,650 3,000 12.02-25 ~ 03-02 3,750 2,800 12.04-19 ~ 04-25 4,150 2,600 12.05-30 ~ 06-05 4,370 3,000 12.06-08 ~ 06-14 4,450 3,200 12.06-22 ~ 06-28 4,300 3,300 12.07-07 ~ 07-13 5,400 5,300 12.09-24 ~ 09-27 6,370 6,800 12.10-22 ~ 10-29 6,300 6,000 12.12-10 ~ 12-17 7,800 6,400 13.01-02 ~ 01-09 9,100 6,700


<Fig. 6> Market Exchange Rate and Price

DPRK Price = Chinese(domestic) Price * exchange rate * mark-up rate

0

1000

2000

3000

4000

5000

6000

7000

8000

9000

10000

Exchange Rate Price

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<Fig. 7> Participation in Informal Economic Activities (DPRK Refugee Survey)

①: No participation ②: Participation in both formal and informal economic activities ③: Participation only in informal economic activities

<Table 7> Simulation Results-share of Market in Food Distribution, 1997 ~ 1998

1st Distribution

Secondary Distribution (redistribution of PDS rations in market)

0% 33% 47% 100%

PDS 80.61% PDS 80.61% 69.42% 65.55% 54.15%

Market 19.39% Market 19.39% 30.58% 34.44% 45.85%

Total 100.00% Total 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%


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7. Basic Pictures of the Economy

Small Country with very low per capita Income

Slightly Recovered from the 1990s’ Economic Crisis,

but Still in the Recession

Increasing Trade with China (& ROK), but not with others

Mixed Economy

with deteriorating formal sector (plan) and growing market

PART Ⅱ

- Current Issues

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A. No Control on Market activities

Unconstrained market activities since Feb. 2012

(only a few months after the death of Kim Jong Il)

Unusual compared to the death of Kim Il-Sung

Unexpected considering the declaration of

the “Strong and Prosperous Nation” of 2012

Tendency to accept such signals as the government’s new attitude also unusual

1. Observations

B. Pyongyang’s consumption boom through markets

State-led or tacitly approved consumption boom in

Pyongyang (known as the 5Ms or 6Ms)

* Money, Market, Mobile Phone, Motor Car, Middle Class

Increased consumption based on new housings or

other construction projects

Department store and new restaurants in Pyongyang

as a representative consumption pattern under growth

1. Observations

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C. Accepting ‘Chinese Standard’(?)

Accepting ‘Chinese Standard’ in Rason and Hwangeumpyung

‘Approval and Protection’ of Chinese investments inside North Korea

Movements in systematic labor dispatch to China and its approval

1. Observations

D. So-called ‘June 28 policy Measures’(?)

Spreading words of a new economic (reform) policy across the economy including SOEs, cooperative farms, PDS, and the trade sector

Nothing is certain for now

Nonetheless, it seems that discussions are taking place in parts of the North Korean government, where some members are keen to observe the reactions of the population coming out as a result of the initial spreading of words.

1. Observations

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<Figure 8> North Korea’s Monthly trade deficit with China, Jan.2005~Dec.2011

-50

0

50

100

150

200

6개월 간의 이동평균

12개월 간의 이동평균

(백만)


(USD, MM)

6-month moving average

12-month moving average

hs6

Increase in 2010 Increase in 2011

Amount Composition Amount Composition

Total 394,658,049 100.00 1,276,323,713 100.00

270111

(Anthracite)130,001,495 32.94 740,661,927 58.03

260111

(Iron Ores and Concentrates)96,521,760 24.46 126,279,679 9.89

720110

(Nonalloy pig iron)24,200,809 6.13 44,614,481 3.50

620193

(Men's or Boys' Anoraks, Wind-cheaters,

Wind-jackets, of Man-made Fibers)

18,021,477 4.57 36,575,639 2.87

620333

(Men's or Boys' Jackets, Blazers, of

Synthetic Fibres)

5,031,095 1.27 28,863,156 2.26


<Table 8> North Korea’s export increase to China by commodities – Top 5 (Unit: USD, %)

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<Table 9> North Korea’s trade with China, by province, 2008~2011 (MM USD, %)

Export Import Total

2008 2010 2011 2008 2010 2011 2008 2010 2011

Liaoning343.2 488.6 903.1 639.1 967.8 1,202.0 982.3 1,456.4 2,105.1

(45.52) (41.13) (36.65) (31.43) (42.49) (37.98) (35.24) (42.02) (37.40)

Jilin194.2 169.2 275.7 425.2 250.7 392.9 619.4 419.9 668.6

(25.76) (14.24) (11.19) (20.91) (11.01) (12.41) (22.22) (12.12) (11.88)

Heilongjiang1.1 0.4 3.1 503.6 375.8 574.6 504.7 376.2 577.7

(0.15) (0.03) (0.13) (24.77) (16.50) (18.15) (18.11) (10.85) (10.26)

Shandong105.5 269.3 632.4 89.2 149.2 242.2 194.6 418.6 874.6

(13.99) (22.67) (25.66) (4.39) (6.55) (7.65) (6.98) (12.08) (15.54)

Hebei16.7 127.7 314.6 33.6 56.0 78.2 50.3 183.7 392.8

(2.22) (10.75) (12.77) (1.65) (2.46) (2.47) (1.81) (5.30) (6.98)

Jiangsu60.3 102.5 256.9 84.0 92.8 125.6 144.2 195.3 382.5

(7.99) (8.63) (10.43) (4.13) (4.07) (3.97) (5.17) (5.63) (6.79)

Other33.0 30.2 78.3 258.7 385.4 549.6 291.7 415.7 627.9

(4.38) (2.54) (3.18) (12.72) (16.92) (17.36) (10.47) (11.99) (11.15)

Total 754.0 1,187.9 2,464.2 2,033.2 2,277.8 3,165.0 2,787.3 3,465.7 5,629.2


B. Change in the (central planning) economic system

during the late Kim Jong Il period

Division of economic sectors through “Waks”

• A Wak refers to a combination of overseas trading

permits and quotas

• A Wak also includes rights to domestic production

and production sectors related to overseas trade

• As a result, key economic sectors are divided

through Wak entitlements


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Independent control of sub-sectors by Wak holders

• Wak owned by separate ministries, army, state enterprises and individuals

Wak holders also connect the elite with the market

• Hence, Wak holders hold

Increased possibility for political factions or power groups to arise with independent control over certain economic sectors (ex. KPA)

Tendency for such groups to protect their own economic sectors


C. Emergence of a New Regime

The legitimacy issue

• Political legitimacy: succession

• Economic legitimacy: economic recovery or

at least providing expectations

Dollars for regime sustainability

• Previous channels: excessive dollar demand

• Solution: Secure new dollar supply channels or

at least redistribute previous channels


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A. Basic perspective

A transition towards an “all-out dollar collecting system (by the state)”

Redistribution of the (dollar) economy by a new leadership

Giving People Economic Expectations (or at least expectations for alleviated state control over the economy)


B. Pathway 1: Stealing Pocket Money

Pyongyang: Consumption boom – economic rent extraction by the state (ex. mobile phones)

• the more expensive/luxurious/exotic, the better

Pyongyang and others: Construction boom – market

sales – economic rent extraction by the state

• Money can buy everything

Nationwide: Market and corruption – economic rent

extraction by the state and state officials

• Market says that power is money


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D. Pathway 3: Power redistribution of the Inner Circle and the search for economic policy transition

KPA’s weakening / loss of control over the economy

Distribution of economic rents to new power holders (to the cabinet?)

Search for a new economic policy aimed towards improving and vitalizing the economy

Search for effective alleviation of economic control over the people


E. Outcomes

<1> Reform(?)• Dollars are in Pyongyang – Be Prosper! • Market as a place to exchange power for dollars –Exploit! • Use and exploit the market to extract more dollars• No dollar, No interests – Economic Polarization

<2> Opening(?)• Dollars are in overseas – Sell everything! • To sell to foreigners, listen to them to a certain extent• Where there is no dollar

– not interested wherever that may be


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<3> Reorganizing the power structure

Dollar equals power – those who hold the dollar hold power Take away their dollars if you want to get rid of them Distribute those extracted dollars to those who offer

‘personal loyalty’

<4> Coexistence of expectations and fear towards the economy (instability)

Some policy change signals – but objectives are unknown Best to keep my things safe (in the market)– instability Burden of initiating something under unstable markets - uncertainty


PART Ⅲ

- Conclusion

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Is this DPRK Economy Changing?

Answer) Yes.

Is it for “Normal” state?

Answer) Not Certain.

Conclusion

Thank You

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The Role of Education after Korea’s Unification

Lee, Seong-ho

Professor, Chung-Ang University

I.

With the indulgence of the audience, I would like to start the presentation with my late

father’s story since it is not merely his dramatic biography, but a part of the tragedy and

ordeal of Koreans who suffered from division of their homeland and separation among their

family members. My father, who was born and raised in Pyongyang, later escaped Kim Il

Sung’s regime and joined the South Korean Army during the Korean War; he was the first

son out of seven children and the only member in his family who managed to come down to

South Korea. Despite all his desperate efforts, he had never been able to communicate with

his siblings in North Korea, not to mention reunion, for more than fifty years before he

passed away several years ago.

At this moment, his generation is on the verge of disappearing, and his agony is not as

appealing to the minds of young Koreans as it used to be to those of his times; nevertheless,

this is not all negative. Discourses of unification are not as emotional as they used to be in the

past. People are more concerned with feasible scenarios of unification, and with the tasks and

problems the post-unification era, rather than simply raising their voices for such nationalistic

or even anachronistic political catchphrases as ‘one nation, one state’ and ‘independent

unification’. This is, I believe, an auspicious change.

This conference is significant in that it is dealing with the issues and strategies for unified

Korea from realistic and pragmatic perspectives, and all of its presentations are meaningfully

enlightening. At this point, I intend to add a few more remarks on the role and function of

education tackling the problems of unified Korea.

From the educational standpoints, unified Korea would face the following issues provided

that the unification presupposes market-based economy and democracy:

First, we should develop human resources in North Korea; training of North Koreans in skills

and technologies that are crucial to the knowledge-based economy of the 21st Century will be

a main educational focus.

Second, we have to inculcate the norms and values of open society and free market into the

minds of North Koreans so that they may adapt themselves to a totally new system of

economy and politics.

Third, we need to overcome the time-old antipathy and difference between North and South,

and thus to restore homogeneity between them via education; we particularly have to rectify

the ideological indoctrination by North Korean schools which may jeopardize the solidarity.

Fourth, we must strengthen a kind of civic education in South Korea that can prevent and

prohibit any prejudice and stigma against North Koreans which may imperil the sense of

community between the two parties and result in internecine rift in the post-unified society.

II.

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Let us start with the first point, i.e., training of North Koreans in updated skills and

technologies.

Even a layperson cannot deny that unified Korea would create a formidable challenge for

North Koreans largely due to the seemingly insurmountable disparity between the two areas

with regards to economy. One key factor to meet this challenge is education.

In other words, the educational task of top priority in unified Korea is to offer North Koreans

opportunities to learn skills and techniques which would enable them to participate in

production activities that are initiated by the advanced South Korean economy. It will be a

process of retraining of the people who have been educated in the schooling system of North

Korea on the one hand, and on the other a renovation of existing educational system,

especially the one in the North.

Some might argue that the educational system in North Korea is not lagging behind far and

thus that it would not require a large-scale reform. This contention can be rebutted as follows:

First, from very limited sources of information, we know that the current North Korean

education is basically an elitist one which imitates the traditional European dual-track system;

the majority of students end their 11 year compulsory ‘general education’ with high school

diploma. Approximately 2% of the total population is in higher educational institutions

whereas more than 7% is registered in colleges and universities in the South. This means that

the accesses of the public to advanced vocational training are restricted. Although the general

education for the mass emphasizes science and technology in secondary schools of the North,

furthermore, the overall quality of education is known to be not as advanced and competitive

as it is in the South, especially considering an enormous gap between the two areas in terms

of economy and standards of living.

Second, the schools in North Korea spend too much time on indoctrinating communist

ideology into students; the whole educational system puts its utmost priority on ideological

brainwashing and coercive conformity. Under these circumstances, schooling is primarily a

mechanism of perpetuating the status quo of the dictatorship, and individuals are merely

treated to be parts of the oppressive state apparatus. In short, human resources development

via education is extremely restricted, and even distorted.

At this point, I do not expect the existing educational system of South Korea to successfully

function as a mechanism which facilitates the adjustment of North Koreans; it also has to

change in the following directions:

First of all, the education in unified Korea should be more flexible so that it may satisfy

diverse needs resulting from the unification. The current schooling system which almost

exclusively focuses on the demands of the clientele whose main interest is to advance to

colleges and universities, not to enter into labor market with high school diploma.

Educational programs including regular school curricula aiming at practical training of

students who want to work with their completion of secondary education need to be

strengthened. At the same time, more schools should offer educational services to non-regular

adult students who seek for high school diploma.

Of course, we do have some secondary schools for vocational education; however, they will

not be sufficient to satisfy the exploding needs for occupational training after the unification

because not only students but also adults from the North will have to be re-educated and

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relocated in the new social and economic settings that will largely be based on the South

Korean structures – market-oriented economy and democracy.

Along with the reinforcement of vocational education both in quantity and quality, non-

vocational high schools or general high schools should make their educational practices more

adaptive and malleable so that they may accommodate supplications for diversified and

differentiated education. A wide variety of educational programs and services in accordance

with multifarious needs and distinct abilities of the clientele must be provided by the schools

of unified Korea.

Moreover, the current higher educational scheme may have to be modified to a considerable

extent. Despite the fact that there are many accolades for the expansion of college education

in South Korea, one of whom is President Obama of the U.S., I do firmly believe that it is

obviously a typical example of education inflation which causes problems such as

unemployment among college graduates, financial burden of tuition, delayed return of

educational investment, etc.

Therefore, I do strongly propose to restructure the present system of higher education of the

South so that it may be able to cope with the problems of education in unified Korea. Instead

of closing down existing four-year universities and colleges that are failing, I contend, we

need to convert them into two year technical schools which train students, especially those

who have graduated high schools in North Korea and seek for jobs above the level of manual

labor, with advanced skills and technologies.

In addition, the current higher educational institutions of the South will have to take charge of

retraining and redeveloping human resources that have acquired college diploma in the North,

including professionals such as medical doctors, attorneys, teacher, etc.

In unified Korea, in short, educational institutions of the South should initiate the tasks of re-

educating human resources of the North with proper skills and knowledge in order to enable

them to successfully adjust to a new environment.

III.

One of the most important functions of education from sociological perspectives is to adjust

individuals to social life by providing them with proper training in knowledge that is vital for

their survival. To use a sociological terminology, this is called ‘functional socialization’.

Socialization has one more significant aspect which is normative. Normative socialization

means inculcating the norms and values of a certain society into its individual members so

that they may internalize them into their minds. Without this normative side, the process of

socialization is doomed to be incomplete and insufficient.

In unified Korea, schools must become a primary agency of normative socialization; they

have to play a major role of educating citizens, especially those from the North, with ethical

principles and basic rules of open society and free market that are foreign to them.

We often hear complaints from employers in advanced societies about the low productivity of

their employees who have emigrated from socialist countries; this is not because these

employees are not well socialized in the functional sense, but because they have not had

opportunities to be properly socialized on the normative side.

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Related to the task of normative socialization, schools in unified Korea must become a key

player in overcoming the time-old antipathy and difference between North and South, and

thus in rediscovering homogeneity between them. We particularly have to pay attention to the

pernicious effects of the ideological indoctrination by North Korean schools; for, it has been

the quintessential foundation of North Korean education whose purpose is to amplify hatred

and enmity and to distort reality. This task will be painstaking and time-consuming since the

relics of indoctrination are extremely difficult to eradicate. However, belittling long lasting

effects of ideological brainwashing can result in ideological warfare which has been

aggravated in South Korea by staunch ideologues and demagogue politicians who parasite on

it.

Last, not the least, schools of unified Korea have to take charge against the stereotyping of

North Korean people. In doing this, they must strengthen a kind of civic education of unified

Korea that can prevent and prohibit any prejudice and stigma against North Koreans. They

also have to constantly remind and emphasize the fact that the travesties of North Korean

communism/socialism are the consequence of the failing regime, not of failing people. We

have to be keenly alert to that any attempt to stereotype North Korean people may easily

imperil the sense of community between the two parties and end up with internecine rift in

the post-unified society as the stigmatization of the Afro-Americans damaged the American

society for more than a few decades.

Before closing my representation, I would like to make one thing clear: I do not intend to

denigrate and discard North Korean education as a whole. The method of collectivistic

instruction and learning North Korean schools are known to engage might be an inspiration to

cure social illnesses caused by over-heated competition; their emphasis on manual work

could help students realize the significance of physical laboring in a society like South Korea

where hard work of manual laborers is not duly appreciated.

This is my concluding remarks:

We need economic and political strategies for unified Korea; for, we will have a new

structure in economy and politics. The emergence of a new structure is impossible without

changes in people’s mentality. And mental changes are brought about via education. This is

why we cannot overemphasize its role in unified Korea.

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“The Political Consequences of North Korea’s Economic Crisis”

Andrew S. Natsios

Former Administer at USAID,

Professor at Texas A&M University

One of the central questions South Korean and the American policy-makers should

consider in dealing with the North Korea problem is what the economic prospects are for the

country over the short and long term. North Korea’s sclerotic economy is damaging people’s

health, increasing food insecurity, and depressing the standard of living. The absence of

growth and of job creation affects the country’s internal political stability, its aggressiveness

in dealing with its neighbors, its government policy of fostering the illicit narcotics export

trade, its systematic counterfeiting of U.S. currency, its fraudulent insurance schemes, and its

sale of missile technology to other rogue states. From the South Korean perspective a

continuing anemic North Korean economy will make unification more difficult, and threatens

to impose a heavy economic burden for the South should unification take place. All of these

matters can be traced back to a large degree to North Korea’s economic malaise.

The evidence for depressed levels of economic growth is not definitive, as North Korea is

a closed society that uses information for propaganda purposes, and thus its publically

released data is suspect. However, economists from the Bank of Korea (Victor Cha, The

Impossible State, page 439) estimate little per capita GDP growth between 2000 and 2009

(2008 did see a one-time GDP rise of over 3%, but it was short lived). More recent studies

indicate no economic growth between 2009 and 2011, with very modest growth in 2012.

The famine that descended on the country between 1994 and 1998—peaking in the last

half of 1996 and the first half of 1997—was not only a function of a precipitous drop in local

food production, but also of the decline in family income caused by a collapse of the socialist

economic model as Chinese and Russian economic subsidies were withdrawn when the old

Soviet bloc economic system ended. The North Korean state could have imported food to

feed its population, which would have avoided the terrible loss of life and human suffering

from the famine, but it either did not have the economic resources to do so on the scale

required to prevent the famine, or perhaps it was because Kim Jong-il chose to use the

country’s limited foreign currency account for the party and military elites, whose loyalty

would determine whether the regime survived.

According to the Nobel prize-winning economist Amartya Sen (Sen, Poverty and

Famines, page 1), famines are not principally about food production alone, but about the

ability of people to command food through markets, through their own labor, and through

their wages and savings. Thus reforming the North Korean collective farm system may

increase food production, but it will not solve the hunger problem, as the unemployed or

destitute urban poor may not be able to buy food on the markets. Singapore does not produce

sufficient food locally to feed its population, but it is one of the wealthiest countries in the

world with no food insecurity because it can import food through private markets to meet

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public demand. Given that the public has more than sufficient family income to buy what

they need there is no food insecurity or hunger.

Severe food insecurity persists in North Korea because a cross-section of the population

can neither grow enough food to survive nor earn sufficient income to buy food on local

farmer’s markets (which provides, according some estimates, at least 50% of the population’s

food supply). It is not only the poor and destitute who are hungry. Some evidence suggests

the military ration system may be unable to provide enough food to feed its soldiers. This

may be because the system is breaking down because of corruption, mismanagement, or the

inadequate or inaccessible supply of food available for use in the military ration system. We

have creditable recent reports of hungry military units looting farms of their food stocks in

the rural areas, which the central government has complained about and insisted must stop. In

1998 I interviewed, in rural areas of China along the Tumen River, former soldiers of the

DPRK military who had deserted and escaped to China because they were so hungry.

The military’s inadequate diet has had political consequences. Hwang Jang-yop, the third

ranking member of the Politburo, who defected to South Korea in January 1997, reported

official (though secret) North Korean statistics showed that 500,000 people died of starvation

in 1995 and another million in 1996 (Hwang, North Korea: Truth of Lies, page 15). I surmise

many of these deaths were in the Northeast region which had been triaged by Pyongyang and

thus suffered higher death rates in the early stages of the crisis. The famine is the likely cause

of the coup plot planned by officers from the People’s Army 6th Corps assigned to the

Northeast region in Autumn1995 (Oberdorfer; The Two Koreas, 375) because the high

famine death rates and the refusal of the Pyongyang to ship an food to the Northeast region

(Natsios, The Great North Korean Famine, pages 217-218). The plot was uncovered by

internal security and the 30 officers involved were taken out and shot, and the 6th Corps was

abolished. A hungry military is not a recipe for political stability, particularly when, in the

case of North Korea, it is one of the largest land armies in the world.

Perhaps the most politically destabilizing phenomenon caused by chronic severe food

insecurity, and by the economy’s inability to produce sufficient jobs in North Korea to keep

the work force employed, is the unsanctioned population movements that began during the

great famine of the 1990s. Early in the country’s development Kim Il Sung adopted the

Stalinist system of travel permits to prevent people leaving their hometowns and

neighborhoods. It was not only the ever-present police force that enforced the permit system,

it was the requirement that the population could only get their monthly food rations from the

Public Distribution System (PDS) in their hometown or neighborhood; this kept people tied

to their hometowns. If you traveled without permission, you risked hunger and eventually

starvation. The effective collapse of the PDS during the famine and subsequently, the

permanent and widespread rise of farmer’s markets to feed the population independent of the

state, and pervasive corruption among police and border guards have made the travel permit

system ineffective as a means of population control. This has led to the movement of people

escaping to China during the famine and subsequently. In Blaine Hardin’s book Escape from

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Camp 14, the central figure Shin Dong-hyuk is the only known person to have escaped the

political prison camps and reports that the driving motivation for him to risk execution by

escaping the prison camps (and ultimately North Korea), was chronic life-long hunger. We

have seen a massive rise in defections to South Korea through the underground railroad in

China described by Melanie Kirkpatrick in her powerful new book, Escape from North Korea:

The Untold Story of Asia’s Underground Railroad. These defections have been made

possible by the breakdown of the travel permit system. This breakdown is in turn a function

of the collapse of the public distribution system, widespread hunger and starvation deaths,

and the rise of the farmer’s markets to feed the population.

Large-scale population movement to South Korea and China are likely should at some

point the North Korean government collapse, or internal conflict be ignited, because of the

troubled leadership transition of Kim Jong-Un and his uncle Jang Sung-taek to power (who

functions as a virtual Regent).. Because of the land mines and armaments in the DMZ, it is

unlikely that the movement will be across the border itself, but rather through the coastal

areas by boat to South Korea or across the Tumen and Yalu Rivers into China. These

population movements will be driven by economics and hunger as much as a desire for

individual freedom, a concept which most North Koreans probably do not fully understand. It

was mass population movement out of East to West Germany that was the immediate

precipitating factor bringing down Erich Honecker’s East German government.

The Prospects for Reform

It is certainly the case that the North Korean leadership understands that the famine of the

1990’s and their economic sclerosis generally is threatening the survival of the Kim dynasty

and the old order. We know this from Kim Jong Il’s now famous speech in the middle of the

famine that he gave to party cadre’s at Kim Il Sung University in December 2006 (a tape of

which was smuggled out of North Korea by Hwang Jong-yop when he defected to the South).

In that speech Kim said “The People’s Army is not being properly supplied with food. Seeing

that we face temporary difficulties, the enemies rave that our socialism will fall as well, and

they are looking for every possible chance to invade us. If they knew we did not have military

provisions, the U.S. imperialist might immediately raid us.” Given the destabilizing

consequences of economic malaise, the effect on their military preparedness, and continuing

chronic acute food insecurity, what are the prospects for economic reform in North Korea

that might remedy them? Simply put, without major reforms, the economic prospects are not

good over the short term.

Why then has Pyongyang not implemented any comprehensive Chinese-like economic

reforms? For two decades now, regime survival has been the central, abiding strategic

objective of the Pyongyang government, against which all policy initiatives are measured. In

the North Korean mind survival means avoiding risk, and this has meant no serious reform.

Any major reform would require confrontation with the North Korean military.

To ensure the loyalty of the massive North Korean military machine, Kim Jong-un's

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father, Kim Jong Il, gave the generals control over much of the economy (and much of the

rest of North Korea). The Kim dynasty called this the "military first policy", a strategy which

Victor Cha argues has led to the transformation of North Korean culture into “a military

culture.” (Cha: 92) Elements of the officer corps control commodity trading and many senior

generals are getting rich on the backs of the hungry population. Some reports suggest that the

wives of both military officers and the secret police in many areas are the merchants and

traders in the markets that have spread across the country.

Jang and Kim face a seemingly insurmountable task: any economic reforms they initiate

will run up against opposition from the military leadership. Jang and Kim have been purging

generals (and party officials at the provincial and ban levels) to ensure the loyalty of military

and party cadres to the new leadership and who will presumably support reform, but this has

created a class of disaffected officers and party elite who have lost their political power, and

thus access to wealth.

Economic reform requires Kim Jong-un and Jang Sung-taek to take control of the

economy from the military in order to change it. These reforms would include improving the

climate for foreign investment, building the transportation infrastructure needed to move

around inputs and outputs, creating some rudimentary enforceable system of business law to

protect investors, and creating a favorable regulatory system to allow new businesses to start

without being harassed by the bureaucracy. Instead of managing risk, Pyongyang has sought

to avoid it. More importantly, with Kim Jong-il’s death in December 2011, no political figure

has yet emerged who has aggregated enough power to force the reforms, who understands

what must be done, and who has the political will to take the risk of broad change. North

Korea has no Deng Xiaoping who led the capitalist revolution in China. It is not that there

have been no attempts.

Some evidence suggests that Jang Sung-taek may support economic reform. The

challenge will be for him and his nephew, Kim Jong-un to seize control of the economy from

the military, while still ensuring the loyalty of the officer corps, which now appears to be

turning against the new leaders. Kim Jong-un recently approved vouchers for military

officers to get access to more consumer goods in order to calm fears that they as a class face

declining living standards if they should lose control of the economy.

What evidence do we have that this disaffection is growing as the purges spread across

the country? State media reported that at a national meeting of police chiefs on November 23,

2012, at a conference of judges and prosecutors on November 26, and at a meeting of other

judicial officials on December 5, Kim Jong-un and Jang Sung-taek personally attended and

ordered the mobilization of the internal security apparatus for a national crackdown on what

Kim called "impure elements" and the arrest of those guilty of "nonsocialist phenomenon and

[stern punishment for] those engaged in such acts". The term "nonsocialist phenomenon" is

North Korean doublespeak for any criticism of Kim Jong-un and his inner circle. The very

existence of the crackdown suggests unrest may be growing; it is one way of purging

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dissenters and suppressing opposition before they reach enough mass to threaten the survival

of the regime.

What should the United States, South Korea, and Japan do about the North Korea

problem and its economic problem? The nearly singular focus of U.S. policy through three

Presidential administrations has been to prevent North Korea from getting nuclear weapons

and the means of delivering them—this policy has been a failure. North Korea’s nuclear

program continues, as does its development of long range missile technology. In addition to

the United States, South Korea and Japan have been concerned about the proliferation issue

because they are geographically within range of current North Korean technology. Because

of domestic pressure, Japan has also focused on the release of Japanese citizens who were

kidnapped by the North Koreans over the years. The ROK government, under the “Sunshine

Policy”, had encouraged investment in the North and, therefore, major South Korean

businesses have built factories in the North. We know that the workers in these factories

never see their own wages as they have been confiscated by Pyongyang. Nor did the

Sunshine Policy or the presence of South Korean business encourage any policy dialogue

with the North Koreans on economic reform.

The three allies should begin to redirect and broaden their engagement with North Korea

to address other critical issues such as agricultural reform, human rights, economic reform,

and the improvement of public services, such as health, sanitation, and water (which are in

abysmal condition). Any future initiatives of ROK with the DPRK on business investment

should include conditionality to insure that North Korean workers are allowed to keep the

wages they earn in South Korean factories in the North. While the North Koreans will resist

putting human rights on the agenda, the three allies should make any talks and technical

assistance on these other issues contingent on DPRK willingness to discuss the human rights

issue. We should not be too optimistic about the success of talks of this sort, because the

North Koreans will make their own calculation in determining how far they can go, but the

three allies should at least begin the process of changing the conversation to those issues

which will determine whether the North survives, is transformed, or collapses.

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A New Political Era, A New Korean Peninsula

Sun, Jian Hang

Professor, Institute of International Strategic Studies,

Central Party School of China

Introduction

2012 was a year of leadership change for the global society. With new national leaders taking

the stage in China, North Korea, South Korea and Japan; and US President Barak Obama

having successfully extended his term, Northeast Asia was ushered into an unexpected and

unforeseen era of new international and regional relations game play. As such, the world is

now watching how this new set of political circumstances can (or cannot) contribute towards

the region’s peace, security and future.

Security in the Korean Peninsula: a shared concern between China and South Korea

In 1991, Soviet Union’s dissolution and the end of Cold War brought to the global society an

era of relative peace and development. Unfortunately, due to various historical reasons and

other socio-political factors, the Korean Peninsula did not move on with the rest of world and

continued bearing the ghosts of the Cold War till today. At the turn of the 21st century, North

Korea’s alleged nuclear development projects further heightened the Peninsula’s political

tension, weakening the region’s peace and security time and again.

Geo-politically, South Korea and China are the two countries with the most direct

relationships with North Korea. Hence, even the slightest change in North Korea’s political

mood makes significant reverberations in China and South Korea. Given this case and the

current political context, it is naturally important for both China and South Korea to come

and work together on issues related to North Korea. Geo-politics aside, the following reasons

further accentuate the need for cooperation between China and South Korea:

1 In their respective modern historical trajectories, both countries had experience

immense civil and property losses brought about by wars and conflicts. This was

especially true in terms of economic development. In the case of China, the country

was poor and backward for a very long time because of constant attacks by and

conflicts with nations on imperialistic quests at that time. As such, China was a

country lagging behind in terms of development and surely South Korea went

through similar trajectory.

2 And yet both countries managed to turn things around, caught the world by surprise

and caught up with global development in just a few decades. In China’s case, it took

just over three decades and apart from attributing this success to numerous economic

reforms, another important contributing factor was the stability and relative peace in

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Northeast Asia. From one perspective, it can be said that without this regional

security, it could have been impossible for China to catch up. As such, one can only

imagine the kinds of damages China and South Korea were to suffer if fresh socio-

political chaos descends upon the Korean Peninsula. Given that the global economy

is still reigning itself from a massive downturn, it is crucial for the two countries to

focus on fine-tuning their respective development models. Having fresh disturbances

in the Peninsula will only waste away resources, making it even more important to

safeguard regional security and the stability of the Korean Peninsula.

Precisely because it is in China’s greatest interests to maintain regional stability, when it

comes to international attitudes towards North Korea’s nuclear development projects, both

China and South Korea are aligned with each other. Hence, any doubts about this can only be

attributed to a lack of understanding of China’s foreign policy and national interests. When it

comes to China’s policies towards North Korea’s nuclear development program, nothing is

more important than maintaining peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula.

Dissolving existing tension: a first step

Although China and South Korea are the first in line at the receiving end of the Korean

Peninsula’s political stability/instability, it does not mean that other countries in the region are

spared. Indeed, Northeast Asian countries and the global society must all come together and

work towards safeguarding the political stability of the Peninsula.

Judging from current circumstances, first on the list of measures should be achieving mutual

trust and resolving existing tensions between North and South Korea. This is because if both

side lack the required mutual trust and persist in opposing each other, tensions can never be

eased, thereby preventing beneficial policies from being meted out and might even lead to a

worsening of the Peninsula’s political climate. The current political context, where both

North and South Korea just underwent changes in their respective heads of state, provides

fresh, important opportunities where the above-mentioned tasks can be executed. On this note,

two points need to be raised:

1) In order to successfully relief existing political tension, both North and South

Korea should stop engaging in mutual military agitation and come up with some

direct and practical measures to allow for effective mutual communication. For

example, it is quite obvious that North Korea’s two-time nuclear capability tests and

the recent launching of a satellite had resulted in the worsening and complication of

ties between the two countries. With regards to this, the international society took a

unanimous and condemning stance.

Indeed, the incessant use of military tactics to provoke one another is not the smartest

way to go. Just in 2010 alone, over ten joint military exercises between the United

States and South Korea were held in and around the Peninsula, resulting in heightened

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tensions and retaliations from both sides. This goes to show that forcing cooperation

from North Korea through military provocations is not the best method to use.

2) Ever since Kim Jong-eun stepped up to be the North’s new supreme leader, the

nation’s attitude towards its counterpart in the South had been improving slightly from

time to time. Take state news broadcaster “Korean Central Television” for example.

Upon rebranding and rejuvenation, the broadcaster has since stopped airing programs

there were anti-South Korea and its leaders. Also, in his first New Year’s speech this

year, Kim expressed that in order for both countries to end division and work towards

unification, eliminating existing elements of conflict is the most crucial thing to do

first. In addition, Kim Jong-eun also recognized that the respect for and actualization

of the “June 15th North-South Joint Declaration” as the fundamental foundation for

unification.

With regards to this, some scholars from South Korea have expressed significant

optimism. According to a publication released by Korea Institue for National

Unificationgiven that Park Geun-hye was recently chosen to be the new South Korean

president, Kim Jong-eun’s attitude during his New Year’s speech suggested a

willingness to work more closely with Park’s new administration. Liu Hao Lie,

President of the Korean Political Science Association, also echoed this view and

explained that the phrase ‘the respect for and actualization of’ actually had a subtext

meaning for compromise with South Korea. Given that Park Geun-hye visited North

Korea as a civilian and had met Kim Jong-il before, it seems promising that both new

leaders can work together well in the future. Although nothing is set in concrete for

now, it is certainly not outrageous for people to start being optimistic about the

Peninsula’s future.

3) But this is not enough. Being an important institution, the Six-Party talks must also

be reactivated to fully realize this phase of the plan. Although some people reckoned

that since it had not achieved any substantial results and should therefore be

terminated, my opinion is that the Six-Party talks still has its potential and should be

given more time to realize its original goals of achieving cooperation from North

Korea and also stability within the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, if peace talks and

dialogue sessions are the way to go, then apart from the Six-Party talks, there are

currently no other stable and established dialogue institutions that are as influential

enough to help achieve its agenda. The joint statement on major international issues

by China and Russia was an example of how the international community still has

high hopes for the Six-Party talks in achieving its agenda. Signed in June 2011, both

countries jointly declared that only within the framework of Six-Party talks can North

Korea’s nuclear development issues be peacefully resolved and urged the relevant

countries (North and South Korea, United States, Japan) to return to the dialogue table

as soon as possible.

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China’s role in maintaining stability in the Korean Peninsula

China believes in the importance of peace, stability and security in the Korean Peninsula and

like South Korea, we insist on non-nuclear proliferation in North Korea. This has been

China’s stand and has been clearly communicated to the global community over and over. At

the same time, with regards to the pathway through which this goal can be achieved, China

believes that dialogue sessions and peace talks are the way to go. On this issue, China has

been working with the international community and undeniably put in great efforts along the

way.

Some people believe that since China still exerts great influence on North Korea, she should

use it and unilaterally resolve the North’s existing nuclear development issues.This is an

impractical solution for given the situation’s complexity, scale and how it involves the

national interests of surrounding countries, a multilateral, rational and scientific approach is

much better than unilateralism. Therefore, only through mutual cooperation within the

region’s countries, in partnership with global society, can the most appropriate solution and

framework be designed and actualized.

Judging from current circumstances, for Six-Party talks to restart and proceed smoothly, a

conducive political environment is the first quintessential factor to be provided. As such,

China does not wish to see any form of tension within the Peninsula and has been striving to

not worsen the current situation. Of course, different parties have different ideas about how

should the charged relationship between North and South Korea be neutralized. To prevent

any unnecessary conflicts, a multi-layered and multi-pronged approach is required and this is

where and why multiple parties must come together and work out the most appropriate

solution. No country can do this alone. The efforts of the international community is

inevitable.

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A New Political Era, A New Korean Peninsula

Sun, Jian Hang

Professor, Institute of International Strategic Studies,

Central Party School of China

抓住历史机遇缓和半岛形势

中共中央党校国际战略研究所教授孙建杭

2012年，地处东北亚的四个国家中、朝、韩、日及周边大国俄罗斯都产生了新的领导人，

美国总统虽然没有换，但奥巴马政府也进入了第二个任期。这是东北亚地区难得发生的一个形

势，这一形势对于朝鲜半岛的和平与稳定，能不能带来一个新的机遇呢，人们对此寄予厚望。

一、维护朝鲜半岛稳定是中韩两国的共同利益

1991年前苏联解体和冷战结束后，国际形势进一步朝着和平与发展的方向演变。然而令

人遗憾的是，由于种种历史和现实的原因，尽管冷战后全球范围内大国的对抗已为合作的趋

势所取代，但在朝鲜半岛，由冷战形成的对抗局面仍未完全改变。进入21世纪之后，围绕朝

鲜发展核武器的问题，朝鲜半岛的紧张局势进一步加剧，严重威胁着朝鲜半岛的和平与稳定

。

中国紧邻朝鲜半岛，韩国更是地处朝鲜半岛。朝鲜半岛的和平与稳定与中韩两国直接相

关。如果朝鲜半岛出现不稳定的形势，首当其冲的就是韩国与中国，影响最大的也是韩国与

中国。共同的地缘环境决定了中韩两国在维护朝鲜半岛和平与稳定的问题上具有共同的利益

。

第一、在近代历史上，中韩两国都曾饱受战乱之苦。战争和动乱不仅给人民带来深重的

灾难、生命和财产的巨大损失，而且对于国家的发展尤其是经济的发展，它也是一个最大的

破坏因素。中国之所以会长期贫穷落后，一个重要原因就是因为在近代很长一个时期，中国

曾不断遭受帝国主义列强的侵略和压迫，致使中国长期遭受战争和动乱。相信这一点，韩国

人民也有切肤之痛

第二、中韩两国都是在当今世界取得引人瞩目的发展成就的国家。中国的经验表明，30

多年来中国之所以能够取得如此成就，除了改革开放改策的推动，很重要的一个因素就是周

边的和平环境。从某种意义上甚至可以说，没有一个和平稳定的国际环境，中国的改革开放

也难以进行。因此可以想象，如果朝鲜半岛出现动乱的形势，必将对韩国和中国的经济发展

形成严重的干扰和破坏。尤其是在目前金融危机的冲击还未完全结束，中韩两国都面临着新

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的发展形势的重要关头，朝鲜半岛的和平与稳定对于中韩两国尤为重要。

正因为中韩两国有着维护半岛和平的共同利益，因此，在坚持朝鲜半岛应当实现无核化

的问题上，中韩两国的立场是一致的。因为这符合两国的最大利益。如果有人怀疑中国在这

个问题上的立场和决心，那说明它还不够了解中国的外交政策及其利益所在。对于中国在朝

核问题上的政策目标来说，没有什么比维持朝鲜半岛的和平与稳定更为重要。

二、维护半岛和平首先需要缓和目前的紧张局势

能否维持朝鲜半岛的和平与稳定，事关中韩两国的切身利益。同样也直接关系到整个东北

亚地区的和平与稳定，因此，除了中、韩两国之外，东北亚地区的相关国家及整个国际社会都

应当共同努力，维护朝鲜半岛的和平与稳定。从目前的形势来看，当务之急首先是要争取建立

互信、不断缓和朝鲜半岛的紧张局势。如果双方一直缺乏互信、严重对立的紧张局势缓和不下

来，那就恐怕什么事情都难以办成，不仅好的想法无法落实，事情还有可能向坏的方向演变。

因此，在目前这个阶段，首先要做的就是如何缓和双方严重对立的紧张局势。最近一个时期，

朝鲜和韩国都进行了新老领导人的替换，这方面应当存在新的契机。对此提两点建议；

首先、要缓和朝鲜半岛的紧张局势，双方应当减少或停止在朝鲜半岛的军事演习、采取实

际措施缓和直接的军事对峙并恢复朝韩双方的直接接触。勿庸讳言，朝鲜两次试验核武器及最

近发射卫星，是导致朝鲜半岛形势紧张并使之复杂化的一个重要原因，对此国际社会也是反对

的。但如果一味地用军事威慑的手段进行回应，恐怕也非良策。仅在2010年，美国联合韩国在

朝鲜半岛和周边举行的军事演习即达10次之多，其结果是造成双方的对抗情绪更为严重。事实

表明，单凭军事威慑的手段来迫使朝鲜就范的想法并不现实。

朝鲜新领导人上台之后，朝鲜并非没有任何变化。比如，据外界报道，朝鲜的“中央电视

台”改版之后就停止了对韩国领导人的攻击。在今年的新年贺词中，朝鲜新领导人金正恩提出：

“在终止国家的分裂、实现统一方面，重要的是消除北南之间的对抗状态。”并表示：“尊重

并履行北南共同宣言、是改善北南关系并早日实现统一的根本前提。”韩国民族统一研究院的

报告认为，“（新年贺词是）在朴槿惠政府即将上台之际表达了朝鲜对于韩朝关系改善的期待”

。韩国政治学会会长柳浩烈教授也指出，“比起无条件实践共同宣言，金正恩使用了‘尊重并

履行’这样的字眼，这是想给韩朝之间的折中方案留有余地，这点令人关注。”韩国新当选的

总统朴槿惠曾以平民身份去过朝鲜，并见过金正日，她对朝鲜应当有直接的认识。由此来看，

朝韩双方新领导人的上台能否成为缓和朝鲜半岛紧张局势的契机，目前虽然还难以定论，但人

们对此抱以期待可以说是不无理由。

其次，为了缓和朝鲜半岛的紧张局势，应当尽快重新启动“六方会谈”。“六方会谈”是

一个对话机制，应当让它继续发挥作用。有人认为，“六方会谈”没有效果，因而否定它的作

用。这种认识值得商榷。虽然“六方会谈”目前还没有取得解决朝核问题的最终结果，但亦不

应忽视它在解决问题过程中曾经起过的维持半岛稳定的重要作用。更何况，如果要用对话的方

式解决问题，除了“六方会谈”的机制，目前似乎还没有别的可行的替代方案。2011年6月16

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日，中、俄两国领导人共同签暑的《中华人民共和国和俄罗斯联邦关于当前国际形势和重大国

际问题的联合声明》明确提出，“双方一致认为，朝鲜半岛核问题只能在六方会谈框架内通

过政治外交方式解决，重申愿相互并同六方会谈其他各方继续密切协作，在恪守２００５年９

月１９日中朝俄韩美日联合声明的基础上尽快重启六方会谈进程。 ”这说明，国际社会对于

“六方会谈”还是有所期待的。

三、中国在维护朝鲜半岛稳定问题上的立场和作用

为了持久维持朝鲜半岛的和平与稳定，中国与韩国一样，坚决主张朝鲜半岛实现无核化。

中国的这一立场是明确的，也是一贯的。同时，关于解决朝核问题的途径，中国主张的是用对

话而不是对抗的模式。其着眼点正是在于维护半岛的稳定。为此，中国已经与国际社会一起做

了大量工作，尽了很大的努力。对于中国的作用国际社会有目共睹，也是予以了充分的肯定。

但对于中国的作用，也需要按照实事求是的态度，给予恰如其分的估计。有人认为，中国对朝

鲜有着很大的影响，中国应当利用自己的影响来解决朝核问题。这个想法并不切合实际。坦率

地说，朝核问题事关重大、情况复杂，牵涉到多方利益，单凭中国的影响和作用是无法解决的

。因此需要多方合作，尤其是在解决问题进程中遭遇困难和挫折的时候。目前的形势，尤为需

要东北亚地区国家和国际社会的共同合作。

要用对话的方式解决问题，需要有一个良好的氛围。因此，中国一直不希望朝鲜半岛出现

紧张局势，也绝不会做任何加剧紧张局势的事情。因为紧张局势无助于解决问题，只能加深各

方的对立情绪，使得问题更加难以解决。

当然，在如何缓和朝鲜半岛局势的问题上，有关各方的主张并不相同，应当说存在着一些

不同的认识和分歧意见。这就需要相关各方，包括中韩两国之间进一步加强多层次、多领域的

沟通，相互增进了解，扩大共识、建立合作。因为要维护朝鲜半岛的和平与稳定，无论如何也

离不开国际社会的共同努力。

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january 31st, 2013 (day2)

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