hearing transcript - 26 august 2003 afternoon

8/8/2019 Hearing Transcript - 26 August 2003 Afternoon

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Hearing Transcripts

1021 (The short adjournment)2 (2.00 pm)3 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Scarlett, we have looked at the memo of

4 10th June 2003, CAB/18/49, which was Sir David Omand's5 response to your minute of 9th June. Effectively, in6 paragraph 2, he appears to conclude that he was7 attracted by the idea that someone working in8 consultation with other people would look at matters,9 effectively; is that right?10 A. Yes, that is right.11 Q. Then we get a report from them on 9th July. Can I take12 you to CAB/18/51? We can see this is a memo from13 someone at Head of Security Policy Division, to you,14 copied to Sir David Omand:15 "You asked me to do some initial work on the16 reported leaks to the media about the Iraq WMD dossier."

17 Then:18 "... an analysis of the published accounts of the19 '45 minutes' leaks to Gilligan."20 Then if one continues over the page to paragraph 5,21 there is reference to:22 "... full analysis of the press reports and FISC23 transcripts at Annex A and references to Gilligan's24 source at annex B."25 Can I take you on to annex B, which is page 55, and

1031 ask you one question in relation to it. It is towards2 the bottom of the page, at paragraph 4. You can see

3 this is someone who appears to have done an analysis of4 knowledge of matters; for example, we can see, if we go5 up to paragraph 3, the previous one is:6 "Gilligan's latest meeting with source.7 "Gilligan initiated the latest meeting ..."8 He tells us where he got that from, the FAC9 transcript, The Mail on Sunday article. Then if you go10 down to paragraph 4:11 "Source's knowledge of opposition to 45 minute12 claim.13 "The source has first or second-hand knowledge of14 the opposition to inclusion of the 45-minute claim. He15 stated the 45 minutes claim was included in the dossier

16 against our wishes because it wasn't reliable."17 Then the transcript is noted, and comment:18 "If source's claims concerning the double sourcing19 of most of the JIC items is correct, it confirms a close20 knowledge of the intelligence used for the dossier."21 I am just wondering about the heading "Source's22 knowledge of opposition to 45 minute claim."23 It appears to be written on the basis that there was24 opposition to the 45 minute claim. Do you agree with25 that analysis of the document?

1041 A. Well, no, I do not. I think it is an honest mistake.

2 The purpose of this document was not to analyse whether3 or not there was opposition to the 45 minute claim. The


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10 electronically within your Department, within your team.11 It would be very helpful if it was possible for us to12 have copies of those earlier drafts so that we could13 satisfy ourselves that there were no attempts to change14 the essence of the document in order to pursue15 a particular political point. Is that possible?"

16 Mr Campbell said this:17 "Can I say again on that the JIC would have to be18 content that they were willing to do that but that is19 certainly something I can take back and ask them if they20 are."21 Did Mr Campbell in fact ask you whether he could22 release copies of the dossier to the Foreign Affairs23 Committee?24 A. It was mentioned, briefly, by him to me; and I replied25 that I was quite sure that my colleagues on the JIC

1071 would not be happy for the drafts to be released to the

2 FAC.3 Q. And why is that?4 A. Well, there were two reasons. The first was that5 discussion of the drafts and all the various questions6 which would have arisen from the drafts, which would7 have quickly got into matters of intelligence because8 the drafts were very closely linked to underlying9 intelligence and whether or not it could have been10 included in the changes that were made and so on, was11 properly a matter for the ISC. And it is with the12 Intelligence and Security Committee that the Government13 deals, as a Committee of Parliamentarians set up by14 statute on intelligence matters.

15 That is the first point. The second point was even16 leaving that matter aside, to pass over drafts, work in17 progress, advice which is being formulated but is only18 being formulated and is not anything which has been sort19 of signed up to by the officials working on it, is, as20 it were, revealing that process of formulation of advice21 by officials, as I say, for Ministers. It falls22 directly into that domain. It is an area where23 certainly colleagues on the JIC I knew, but officials24 I think more widely, feel strongly should remain25 confidential for the good conduct of Government

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1 business.2 Q. We have heard from Mr Campbell, and indeed almost3 everyone else who has come from the Government to talk4 about this claim, that this was the most serious of5 claims that could ever be made against the Government,6 how important it was to set the record straight. Would7 this not have been a public way of setting the record8 straight?9 A. It would have been. I have never been in any doubt10 myself that presentation, if you like, of the full11 drafts would reveal that the whole process was one of12 integrity, and honest and rigorous and well founded.13 But that does not get away from the fact that putting

14 forward the drafts in the way suggested here would not15 have had the support of my colleagues; and I would not


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16 have wanted to put it to them.17 I might add there that separately and later the18 drafts were handed to the Intelligence and Security19 Committee, in response to their requests, and they20 are -- have been with the Intelligence and Security21 Committee since then; but amongst my colleagues on the

22 JIC, when that matter was being discussed, the worries23 and concerns that I have just expressed to you were24 forcefully expressed to me.25 Q. Can I now take you to your next involvement with

1091 Dr Kelly? You have had a discussion with Mr Howard2 in June, after The Observer article. Do you have any3 other dealings in relation to Dr Kelly in June at all?4 A. No.5 Q. When is the first time, in July, that you are made aware6 that Dr Kelly is under discussion again?7 A. It is on the evening of Friday 4th July. I can be

8 precise; at a meeting with Sir David Omand at 17.30 or9 thereabouts.10 Q. Right. You have a meeting with Sir David Omand. What11 is discussed?12 A. Well, I was due to meet him anyway, which is how I know,13 because it was in my diary. David said to me,14 straightaway, that he wanted to tell me and seek my15 advice about a development which had been reported to16 him by Sir Kevin Tebbit from the Ministry of Defence.17 As I understood it, and that was the case, it had been18 reported to him by telephone. Briefly, somebody had19 come forward to the MoD to indicate that they might be20 the source for the Gilligan story; and David gave me his

21 name.22 Q. So you, on the Friday evening, or early Friday evening23 know the name of Dr Kelly?24 A. Yes.25 Q. And I think you are joined, we have heard from

1101 Jonathan Powell and Sir David Manning, by them at about2 6 o'clock, is that right?3 A. No, not quite right. David Omand and I went -- arranged4 to go across to David Manning's office in No. 10, and at5 our initiative, to brief him as a member of the Prime6 Minister's Office on this development.

7 LORD HUTTON: What did you think was the significance of8 this development? I mean, what went through your head9 when you were told that someone had come forward and10 said he had had a meeting with Mr Gilligan, Mr Scarlett?11 A. It did depend, of course, on what I actually knew about12 what this person said at this point, which was not very13 much and was not paper based in any way, it was an oral14 briefing; but I was told, and David knew, that there had15 been a meeting in a London hotel, that the question of16 45 minutes had been discussed, no details, and that17 Alastair Campbell's name had been mentioned. It was --18 but there were other details which did not fit. I did19 not learn immediately anything more about that. So what

20 went through my head was that there was a serious chance21 that this was indeed the source who was being quoted by


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22 Mr Gilligan.23 LORD HUTTON: What went through your head then that you24 thought there was a serious chance this might be the25 source? Did you have any further thoughts as to what

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1 that might lead to or what its significance might be, or2 not at that stage? Can you help me with that?3 A. It is always unwise to claim that one has all sorts of4 rational thoughts in retrospect which one does not have5 at the time.6 LORD HUTTON: Quite.7 A. I was aware -- it was my view, as I have already stated,8 that Mr Gilligan's story was wrong.9 LORD HUTTON: Yes.10 A. And, therefore, either somebody had given him a wrong11 story or he had added to a story that he had been12 given --13 LORD HUTTON: Yes.

14 A. -- by somebody, as it were, speaking genuinely, whatever15 his opinion or knowledge happened to be, partial16 probably. So it was one or the other.17 LORD HUTTON: Yes.18 A. And that being the case, and I thought it was quite19 likely to be the second, when I heard that somebody had20 come forward who did seem to have had some discussion21 with Mr Gilligan about this, was saying that it was not22 at all the account that Mr Gilligan had broadcast,23 I clearly thought: well, this might be the answer to24 what has happened. But I stress the word "might"25 because, of course, I have learned over many years to be

1121 careful in these situations.2 LORD HUTTON: But the answer to what? To what would it be3 the answer?4 A. Well, my Lord, how this situation had arisen, what5 information had been genuinely passed to Mr Gilligan at6 the initial meeting and that he had had with his source,7 and then whether or not he had added to it.8 LORD HUTTON: Yes.9 A. That, to my mind, was a sort of critical issue at the10 centre of the affair, to explain how these allegations11 had arisen and on what they were or were not based.12 MR DINGEMANS: So you have the meeting then in No. 10 in

13 I think Sir David Manning's office.14 A. Indeed.15 Q. You discussed the matters you have outlined to his16 Lordship, is that right?17 A. Well, not exactly. We passed -- David Omand and18 I explained to David Manning what we had understood from19 Kevin Tebbit. We gave him the name, mentioned the name;20 and I told him what I had already said to David Omand,21 that I had one recollection of this name in relation to22 The Observer article.23 Q. Yes. Was anything decided at that meeting?24 A. Nothing was decided at that meeting. The meeting was25 joined by Jonathan Powell. It was noted that this was

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1 relevant, this issue, to two big events which were due2 to happen very shortly: one was the publication of the3 FAC report, due on the Monday morning -- since this was4 late Friday evening, this was virtually immediately; and5 the meeting of the BBC governors, which I think had very6 shortly before been announced for the Sunday evening.

7 Q. Were there any conclusions reached at the meeting?8 A. My only other memory of the meeting was this was9 something that might need to be dealt with as10 a disciplinary matter and certainly would need to be11 dealt with as a personnel matter within the Ministry of12 Defence structures and would have to be handled13 accordingly.14 Q. Can I take you to CAB/19/2, which are some notes from15 minute books we have now been provided. It says:16 "John Scarlett, 4/7/3."17 You can see from the top it is an extract from18 Sebastian Madden's minute book. It says:19 "David Kelly.

20 "-- MoD PACS.21 "(FCO secondee)22 "-- Not Gilligan's source but had met him in23 a hotel?24 "Next steps.25 "-- disciplinary offence. Not OSA."

1141 I imagine that means "Official Secrets Act", does2 it?3 A. That is right.4 Q. Then Kevin Tebbit writing to, who is that?5 A. Sir David Omand, Sir David Manning, John Scarlett,

6 et cetera.7 Q. "Line to take.8 "Saying no action being taken to make [it looks9 like] the name public."10 A. "To make things public", yes.11 Q. And:12 "SDO to warn Matthew/SDM."13 So Sir David Omand to warn?14 A. Matthew Rycroft; that would be the private secretary in15 No. 10.16 Q. And SDM?17 A. Sir David Manning.18 Q. That is a note of the meeting you appear to have had

19 before you went over to No. 10.20 A. Yes, it must have been because I do not recall Sebastian21 Madden coming with us when we went to No. 10.22 Q. Then CAB/11/3. This is a document you produced after23 the event, but is described as an aide memoir, "Meetings24 at which I was present". If we go to the bottom of25 CAB/11/4 you can see it is your document, John Scarlett,

1151 dated 21st July 2003. Going back to 4th July, this is2 your note of the meeting:3 "MoD official has come forward [name given] sounds4 like Gilligan's source. Noted that normal MoD

5 procedures must be followed and appropriate legal advice6 taken."


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7 Did you know or did anyone tell you what the normal8 MoD personnel procedures were?9 A. No.10 Q. Do you know whether or not any legal advice was taken at11 this stage?12 A. No. That is a reference to David Manning, it was, at

13 the meeting, who said that it might be necessary or we14 would need to consider the question of legal advice, but15 there was no further discussion at that point.16 Q. Then you can see the reference to BBC governors and the17 FAC, which you have told us about.18 A. Yes.19 Q. That is on 4th July. Do you actually see20 Sir Kevin Tebbit's letter?21 A. Yes, I do, shortly before I go home.22 Q. Which is at MoD/1/35. I am not sure we need to see that23 again unless there is anything you want to identify in24 that.25 A. No.

1161 Q. On 5th July I think you are told about a second letter2 Sir Kevin Tebbit is going to write?3 A. Yes.4 Q. That is because he has read an article in The Times that5 morning and he has told us he came into work?6 A. Yes.7 Q. What were your discussions that weekend?8 A. They were very brief. I was told by the Cabinet Office9 duty officer that we had a copy sent to me of10 Kevin Tebbit's letter very briefly what with that was.11 I did not go into the office to look at it. I discussed

12 it over the phone or I heard about it over the phone.13 I then spent some time at home looking through the14 transcripts from the Foreign Affairs Committee and the15 meeting with Andrew Gilligan, because I knew, although16 I could not remember all the details, there had been17 discussion there about the precise nature and number of18 Andrew Gilligan's sources.19 Q. You dictated, on Monday morning, a document. Can I take20 you to CAB/1/46?21 A. Yes.22 Q. Is this the document you put together, thinking about it23 over the weekend, as it were, and dictate up -- if you24 go down to the bottom of the page you can see John Muir,

25 7th July.

1171 A. Yes, that is my private secretary.2 Q. You dictate the following that you:3 " ... agree with Kevin Tebbit's letter of Saturday4 that the finger points strongly at David Kelly as5 Gilligan's source."6 That was your analysis, was it?7 A. Yes, based on my reading of the transcripts and my8 knowledge of the affair generally, that was what I was9 thinking very first thing on Monday morning.10 Q. Then you attached two copies of the FAC transcript which

11 you thought made that proposition good, as it were.12 Then you say this:


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13 "If he could have referred to any corroborating14 information he would have done so. If this is true,15 Kelly is not telling the whole story.16 "Gilligan must have got the 45 minute single17 intelligence report item from somewhere, presumably18 Kelly."

19 A. Yes.20 Q. That is because you worked out that Mr Gilligan had said21 two things that were not known to the public, is that22 right?23 A. Yes.24 Q. One, that the 45 minutes was late.25 A. Yes.

1181 Q. And two, that it was single source.2 A. Yes. Yes.3 Q. So those two things Mr Gilligan must have found out from4 someone?

5 A. Yes.6 Q. If Dr Kelly is the single source, then it must have been7 through Dr Kelly?8 A. Yes, if there was only one source -- and that was the9 meaning of the FAC transcripts, that there was only one10 source. If there had been a conversation as described11 by Dr Kelly between himself and Mr Gilligan at that12 time, then either it -- the chances of it also13 containing references or being the point at which14 Mr Gilligan learned these two items of information or15 there being some other conversation with another source16 and that Mr Gilligan was not regarding Dr Kelly as17 a source at all, those were the two possibilities. But

18 if he was not regarding Dr Kelly as a source at all, it19 sort of seemed to me extremely unlikely he would not20 have made some reference to him, the existence of such21 a conversation, in his conversation with the FAC as22 corroboration on a point where he was under some23 pressure to explain why he was placing so much reliance24 on one particular source.25 Q. So you have worked out over the weekend that Dr Kelly

1191 has not given the full story to the Ministry of Defence2 or probably not given the full story to the Ministry of3 Defence?

4 A. Well, as I understood it, on the basis of very partial5 knowledge of what had actually happened between Dr Kelly6 and the MoD, because I had seen the letter giving7 a fairly brief summary of the interview between Dr Kelly8 and Mr Hatfield and the MoD and conclusions, but it gave9 very few details actually about that interview. And10 also I heard a brief oral account and I had seen or11 heard of Kevin Tebbit's letter of Saturday -- so I did12 not have a full understanding of that. But on the basis13 of what I had been told, these important points about:14 where did Mr Gilligan get the knowledge about the report15 arriving late and it being based on one intelligence16 report, where did he learn that from?

17 Q. Because if we go back to MoD/1/34, which is the letter18 of 4th July that I think you said you saw on the Friday


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19 night --20 A. Yes.21 Q. -- and go to the bottom of the page, second bullet as it22 were, you can see that:23 "On the issue of 45 minutes [this is after24 Dr Kelly's interview on 4th July], raised by Gilligan,

25 he said he did not know to what it refers (not having

1201 access to the intelligence report)."2 That is the comment you considered at the least3 doubtful after what your analysis had shown over the4 weekend?5 A. Well, it seemed possible, maybe more than possible that6 it did not tell the full story.7 Q. Going then back to CAB/1/46, that is why you recommend8 a "security style" interview. Do you want to explain9 what you mean by that?10 A. I made this comment very quickly on the Monday morning,

11 before I went off to another meeting. I had tried to12 ring David Omand just to make these points to him by13 telephone but he was engaged elsewhere. This note here14 I therefore dictated to my private secretary. It was15 for David Omand only, it was not copied more widely, and16 it was my advice to him. It was not an action document17 in any way. What I meant was that the interview that18 had taken place so far seemed to me to leave important19 questions uncovered, these needed to be pursued, and so20 a further interview was necessary. That interview would21 need to be thorough and forensic, and designed to reach22 as satisfactory an answer as possible, one way or the23 other, to these outstanding questions. I thought and

24 meant no more than that.25 Q. Right. Then I think on 7th July in the morning you go

1211 to --2 LORD HUTTON: I think the suggestion has been that those3 words rather convey someone is to be quite seriously4 grilled.5 A. I thought, my Lord, no more than I have just said.6 LORD HUTTON: Yes.7 A. That I thought there were some outstanding facts/points8 here which needed to be got clear, and that a further9 interview was going to be necessary and it would need to

10 be more thorough than was the impression I had of the11 interview which had taken place on the Friday. I did12 not give it any more thought than that.13 MR DINGEMANS: You then attend a meeting with the14 Prime Minister; is that right?15 A. Yes.16 Q. And I think there are two meetings, one at 9 o'clock and17 one at 9.30?18 A. There is one shortly after 9 o'clock and then one at19 9.30.20 Q. They are mainly discussions about the Foreign Affairs21 Committee report.22 A. Indeed.

23 Q. There is a brief discussion about Dr Kelly. What is24 said at that stage, at the first meeting?


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25 A. At the first meeting, very briefly, the Prime Minister

1221 had asked to see me, so I had left a separate meeting2 I was attending in Alastair Campbell's office about the3 Foreign Affairs Committee report. I went to see him.

4 I was with him for a very short while. Jonathan Powell5 was the only other person there. He wanted to know what6 the arrangements were for discussing the Foreign Affairs7 Committee report. I told him what was planned, we would8 be coming along at 9.30. Then there was a brief9 reference to the fact that somebody had come forward10 from the MoD and that we -- I mean, I knew that he knew11 about it and he probably wanted to know whether I knew12 about it. I cannot quite remember. And I recall that13 I mentioned Dr Kelly's name certainly at that meeting,14 but I am afraid I do not know whether the Prime Minister15 already knew the name, and the Prime Minister commented16 that it was going to be necessary to know more and to

17 learn more; and that was it. I then rejoined the18 meeting in Alastair Campbell's office.19 Q. Then, do you have a further meeting with the20 Prime Minister at about 9.30?21 A. Well, I along with others who had been in22 Alastair Campbell's office went, as agreed, to the23 Prime Minister's Office where a meeting was already in24 progress.25 Q. And was anything said about Dr Kelly at that meeting?

1231 A. Most of that meeting was on the FAC report and how to2 react to it.

3 Q. Yes.4 A. There was a discussion, at the end, about Dr Kelly.5 Kevin Tebbit was at the meeting. There was, as6 I recall, discussion as to whether he might or might not7 be Mr Gilligan's source.8 It was noted, I do remember Kevin Tebbit saying that9 there were a number of points where his story10 importantly diverged from Mr Gilligan's. He also did11 say that he had been explicit in saying he had not said12 anything about Alastair Campbell. It was sort of -- it13 was agreed, at the end, that he could be the source. It14 was impossible to know, without knowing more. And there15 was consensus around the meeting that he should be

16 interviewed again.17 Q. Can I take you to your note? We have looked at your18 note for 4th July. It is CAB/11/3. For 7th July this19 is a note you make, scrolling down the page. First20 meeting:21 "Brief discussion of whether Dr Kelly should be the22 source. Prime Minister states that it must be handled23 according to proper MoD and Civil Service procedures."24 Was there at that stage any discussion about what25 those proper procedures were?

1241 A. No, but the Prime Minister did state it.

2 Q. At the 9.30 meeting, again with the Prime Minister and3 others that you list, then you say this:


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4 "Brief discussion of MoD source. If he appeared5 before a Committee, would he be likely to support or6 otherwise the Government position? JSC"...7 That is you I imagine, is that right?8 A. Yes.9 Q. "... to seek advice from MoD. Was he/was he not the

10 source? No further decision possible without knowing11 more about his contact with Gilligan."12 Why was it important or does it appear to have been13 important to find out whether he supported or otherwise14 the Government position?15 A. Whether or not it was important, it was not quite put16 like that. It was -- there was a discussion, a brief17 discussion, as to whether -- if, at some point, Dr Kelly18 was questioned in public before a Committee, as19 mentioned here, if that happened, what were his views on20 the question of Iraq and Iraqi WMD? Were these21 consistent with what the Government itself had been22 saying and was saying or were they not? It was a

23 recognition that this was a point on which the24 Government, you know, could usefully be informed, should25 know what the situation was. It was no more than that.

1251 Q. No firm decisions were taken then because everything was2 awaiting the further interviews?3 A. Yes.4 Q. We know he was interviewed later on that day by5 Richard Hatfield, Martin Howard and Dr Wells was there.6 A. Yes.7 Q. And we have seen notes of that. Was any report made8 back to you after the meeting, after the interview?

9 A. Martin Howard telephoned me at the end of the day to10 give a brief verbal account of how the interview had11 gone. It was very brief; and the points that I recall12 from that telephone conversation were, first, that13 Dr Kelly had repeated the same points that he had made14 on Friday, and, in particular, had repeated his15 conviction that he could not be the source for16 Mr Gilligan.17 Q. Right.18 A. But that he had seemed less sure, on this occasion, than19 he had before; and that in particular I quite clearly20 remember Martin saying that he had begun to comment:21 well, he was not quite sure of what had been said on

22 particular points and that maybe it could be that23 Andrew Gilligan had led him on, but that was not defined24 further.25 LORD HUTTON: Just going back to your note on the 9.30

1261 meeting on 7th July and the passage Mr Dingemans has2 referred you to:3 "Brief discussion of MoD source. If he appeared4 before a Committee, would he be likely to support or5 otherwise the Government position?"6 That might be read as meaning that whether or not he7 would be produced before a Committee might depend on

8 whether he would be likely to support or otherwise the9 Government position.


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10 A. It might be read like that, my Lord, but it is not my11 memory of the discussion. My memory was that if he12 appeared before a Committee, whether or not the13 Government wanted it, what would he say? And there was14 interest in knowing that in advance.15 LORD HUTTON: Yes.

16 MR DINGEMANS: So Mr Howard has reported to you now the17 second meeting. In relation to that, Mr Howard says:18 I think he must be the single source.19 A. Yes. I should add --20 Q. For the reasons you have given.21 A. He did say that as well.22 Q. If he was the single source, then Dr Kelly must have23 said: the 45 minutes was single sourced and it was added24 late. Did you say to Mr Howard: well, what did he say25 about these two points?

1271 A. I do not think I did.

2 Q. Looking through the notes of interview, it does not look3 as if Dr Kelly was asked about that. Do you know4 anything about that?5 A. I am afraid I do not remember enough detail of the notes6 of the interview to answer that.7 Q. Right. Was there any sort of understanding that: we8 would leave aside those difficult areas about what you9 have actually said to Mr Gilligan if you are a person10 not able, as it were, to support the central thrust of11 Mr Gilligan's report?12 A. Not at all; no.13 Q. You have had this discussion, then, with Mr Howard?14 A. Hmm, hmm.

15 Q. Was there anything else that happened on the 7th July,16 the Monday, so far as you recall?17 A. Not that I recall.18 Q. Did you have any input into any draft press statements,19 at that stage, or discussions about draft press20 statements?21 A. No, I did not.22 Q. Or defensive Q and A material?23 A. No, I did not.24 Q. On 8th July we know the Prime Minister is going off to25 a Liaison Committee meeting. I think you attend

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1 meetings at Downing Street; is that right?2 A. It is right.3 Q. The first meeting is at what time?4 A. About 8.15.5 Q. What is discussed then in relation to Dr Kelly?6 A. Only one point. The Prime Minister was concerned that7 he might be asked, at the Liaison Committee, whether,8 for example, any leak inquiry was under way, whether9 there was a serious effort to identify the source,10 whether he had any idea or the Government had any idea11 as to who the source might be.12 Q. And we have heard that a form of holding answer was13 agreed.

14 A. Yes.15 Q. That enquiries were under way; but as I understand it,


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16 he was not asked about that?17 A. That is right.18 Q. He comes back from that at about 11.30 or 11.45 on the19 Tuesday.20 A. Yes.21 Q. Are you present at a meeting then?

22 A. I was not present at the very beginning of a meeting but23 I joined it very quickly.24 Q. What was discussed there?25 A. Well, the basis of that meeting was the outcome of the

1291 second interview, which was reported to the meeting by2 David Omand.3 Q. Which you have already heard of briefly the night4 before.5 A. Yes. I think David Omand gave some more detail; and he6 had it anyway officially from Kevin Tebbit, as7 I understand. Kevin Tebbit was not present at that

8 particular meeting, at that time, and so David Omand9 reported the results. The conclusion of the second10 interview was that the chances of Dr Kelly being the11 single source for Mr Gilligan were significantly higher12 than they had been before.13 Q. And that was what prompted you to take -- everyone at14 the meeting to take a course of action?15 A. Well, the subsequent discussion at that meeting was16 based on that assessment.17 Q. That he was the single source?18 A. Not that he was definitely, but that there was a much19 higher chance or that there was a very serious chance20 that he was.

21 Q. I think it has been stressed that there should be22 Ministry of Defence personnel procedures followed?23 A. Yes.24 Q. What does the meeting conclude? What is the conclusion25 of that meeting at 11.30/11.45?

1301 A. That meeting concluded that the ISC, Intelligence and2 Security Committee, should be informed, in a letter,3 that someone had come forward who might be the source4 for the Andrew Gilligan report; that they should also be5 told that there were important differences between this6 person's account of the conversation and Mr Gilligan's

7 reported account; and that that person would be8 available for interview by the ISC if the ISC so wanted;9 that that would be a letter sent to the Chairman of the10 ISC; that it would be copied to the Foreign Affairs11 Committee, but it would be sent, as it were, for action12 to the ISC; that it should not name the person13 concerned.14 Q. All that is decided at the meeting; is that right?15 A. That was the provisional decision, if you like, at that16 meeting; but it was dependent on further discussion,17 detailed discussion, with the Ministry of Defence.18 Q. Because I think you have stressed that everyone was keen19 that Ministry of Defence personnel procedures be

20 followed.21 A. Yes.


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22 Q. A provisional decision is reached at that meeting; and23 there is no-one from the Ministry of Defence there, is24 there?25 A. Yes, because we were waiting for Kevin Tebbit to arrive

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1 for the meeting.2 Q. I think he has told us he was handing out medals for3 HMS Nottingham down in Portsmouth.4 A. Yes.5 LORD HUTTON: May I ask you, Mr Scarlett, at that stage if6 the ISC was to be informed that a source had come7 forward but the person was not to be named and the8 letter to the ISC was to be copied to the FAC, did it9 occur to you that it was then probable that in some way10 or another the name would come out into the public11 domain?12 A. The discussion, my Lord, that we had at that meeting was13 based on a sort of number of assessments or assumptions.

14 One of those was that the fact that somebody had come15 forward would, whatever the Government did, become16 public knowledge quickly, possibly very quickly.17 LORD HUTTON: Yes.18 A. Secondly, that Dr Kelly had been told that a public19 statement would probably be made and that he had20 accepted that, and that he had also been told that it21 was very likely that at some point, it was not defined,22 to my knowledge, his name would become known as the23 person who had come forward and that he knew that.24 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Why was it decided that his name should25 be sent to the ISC? What, they were at the present

1321 time, investigating, what, the reasons for the war2 or ...3 A. No, the ISC, my Lord, were in the early stages of an4 inquiry into the role of intelligence in Iraq.5 LORD HUTTON: Yes.6 A. That they had been collecting documentation in support7 of this inquiry and that they were to begin having oral8 sessions with witnesses the following morning. Indeed,9 I was due to be the first witness before them. So their10 inquiry was, as it were, getting underway.11 LORD HUTTON: Yes.12 A. That was the inquiry with which the Government were

13 cooperating with all matters relating to intelligence.14 Indeed, the inquiry was about the role of intelligence15 in Iraq.16 LORD HUTTON: Why inform the ISC that this source had come17 forward? The reason may be obvious but I would just18 like you to say.19 A. No, it was our view and the view of the meeting, and20 this was a recommendation made to the meeting initially21 by David Omand, that the ISC were the proper body to be22 investigating all aspects of the role of intelligence in23 Iraq, including those aspects relating to the September24 public assessment and including the controversy which by25 then existed around that assessment. So they were the

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1 right Committee to be dealing with it.2 LORD HUTTON: We have heard that the ISC conduct their3 proceedings in private.4 A. Yes, my Lord.5 LORD HUTTON: They report to the Prime Minister.6 A. Yes, my Lord.

7 LORD HUTTON: Do their reports ever become public or are8 they kept private?9 A. No, all their reports become public, but they are10 subject to redaction by agreement between the Government11 and the Committee; if that redaction is justified on12 national security grounds only.13 LORD HUTTON: They are published by whom, by the Prime14 Minister's Office or by the ISC?15 A. I think by the Government.16 LORD HUTTON: They are made public in any event?17 A. Yes.18 LORD HUTTON: Thank you.19 MR DINGEMANS: Was anything said about Dr Kelly's continued

20 cooperation at this stage, with the interviewing21 process?22 A. At that stage only what I have already said.23 Q. Can I just take you to CAB/11/6? This is a note that24 I know you did not make but is dated 21st July and it is25 made by Sir David Omand. If one goes to the top of the

1341 page, and this is in relation to the 7th July meeting,2 Kevin:3 "Kevin Tebbit said the MoD were considering calling4 him back to talk to him again. He reiterated that5 Dr Kelly had come forward of his own volition. As far

6 as the MoD was concerned, no question of an offence7 under the Official Secrets Act. Dr Kelly's continued8 cooperation was therefore essential."9 A. Yes.10 Q. Had anyone asked Dr Kelly whether he wanted to be sent11 off to the ISC?12 A. My understanding was that he had been told that he would13 be likely -- he might very well be called before14 a Committee if his name became public, and that he15 accepted that would happen.16 Q. After the meeting you would go away to draft a letter?17 A. Yes.18 Q. Which I think we see at CAB/18/68 to 69.

19 A. Yes.20 Q. This is a document that is not sent; is that right?21 A. Yes, that is right. I should say that I was doing this22 because it had been agreed at the meeting that23 David Omand would -- it was his suggestion that the ISC24 should be informed and that he should write to the25 Chairman of the Committee. But David Omand was about to

1351 go on an official trip to Canada and literally had no2 choice but to leave straightaway. So it was agreed3 I would take over from him and represent him and that4 I would draft a letter.

5 This is the draft which I put together after the end6 of that meeting and it was -- certainly it was never


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7 sent, but it was produced as the basis for initial8 discussion at a meeting at 1330. And it reflected the9 provisional agreement and discussion which I have just10 described.11 As you can see, it is entitled "Letter from12 Sir Kevin Tebbit..." Well, that is what it says because

13 that is what, you know, was recorded as the draft. My14 memory of the meeting certainly is that it was agreed15 that David Omand should write, but there was some16 discussion as to whether the ISC should be properly17 informed by the security intelligence coordinator or the18 Ministry of Defence, and probably what I drafted19 reflected that discussion. I simply do not remember.20 Q. Can I take you down to the third paragraph of that21 letter:22 "This individual is an expert on WMD but was not23 'one of the senior officials in charge of drawing up the24 dossier'. He is not a member of the Intelligence25 Services. Nor is he a member of the Senior Civil

1361 Service. He did not have access to the intelligence2 report on 45 minutes and was not involved in discussions3 about whether or how this information should be used in4 the September dossier. He says that he made no5 allegations or accusations about the issue related to6 the dossier, in particular that the 45 minute7 intelligence had been inserted by Mr Campbell or8 Downing Street against the wishes of the intelligence9 community.10 "He made no other comment about Alastair Campbell.11 When asked by Mr Gilligan why the 45 minute report was

12 in the dossier, he commented that 'it was probably for13 impact'."14 That letter appears to be written on the basis that15 Dr Kelly knows nothing about all these things. Did you16 know, at this stage, that Dr Kelly was probably the17 source for Mr Gilligan's accurate claims that the18 45 minutes was added late and single sourced?19 A. I did not know that, at that time.20 Q. But you suspected it?21 A. Yes, I did.22 Q. And yet, I mean, it is only a draft.23 A. Yes.24 Q. But it is fair to say this, is it not: there is not much

25 hint of that suspicion in the draft letter?

1371 A. Can you just go back to the earlier -- beginning?2 Q. Yes.3 A. What is written there answers the point as to whether he4 would have had the kind of access which would have been5 necessary to have stood up the Andrew Gilligan report.6 Q. But you are just looking at one part of the7 Andrew Gilligan report; and I have asked Mr Gilligan8 about all his report, part of it in relation to claims9 that the Government knew it was false. And we asked10 whether or not there was anything to support that. But

11 part of the report was the 45 minutes was late; and part12 of the report was that the 45 minutes was single


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13 sourced. If that came from Dr Kelly, it rather suggests14 that Dr Kelly's access to intelligence was slightly15 higher than you are putting it in this draft letter.16 A. Well, I am not sure I would agree with that. Whoever it17 was who was Mr Gilligan's source was making his18 statements many months after the fact of the compilation

19 of the dossier; and so whoever it was might have been20 hearing things from somebody who was involved.21 Q. And did you, at this stage, think: we are now about to22 put him before the Intelligence and Security Committee,23 we are going to write a letter, we had better find out24 what he actually did do in relation to the September25 dossier, or were no enquiries made?

1381 A. We did not discuss making any further interviews, as2 I recall, at that meeting.3 Q. But you have decided he has to go away for what you call4 a "security style" interview, and you have explained

5 what you mean by that, and he has gone off for that6 interview.7 Surely another thing to chase down would be what he8 actually did in relation to the September dossier? That9 would have been, one assumes, a fairly easy enquiry to10 make.11 A. At this particular stage, at this particular discussion,12 I had not seen a full account of the second interview.13 We had heard the conclusions of the second interview,14 not the detail.15 Q. Right. So you write this draft letter. But you get16 some further communications from the Intelligence and17 Security Commission, is that right?

18 A. Committee, yes.19 Q. Sorry, Committee.20 A. Yes, we receive a message from them some time after21 13.30, after a further meeting has convened.22 Q. What are you told?23 A. I should explain at the end of this meeting, and before24 going to Canada, Sir David Omand had communicated with25 the Clerk of the Committee to tell him what was

1391 proposed, and the Clerk had then replied, reporting2 a comment from the Chairman, that the Chairman did not3 wish to receive the letter that was proposed but would

4 be content if there were to be a public statement which5 would contain a reference to the fact that the person6 concerned would be available for interview with the7 Intelligence and Security Committee. That was the8 message which came back from the Clerk.9 Q. So what did everyone decide to do, issue a public10 statement?11 A. There was no decision to do anything; but the next step12 in the discussion in the 13.30 meeting was to put to one13 side this draft here of a letter and to look at14 a possible draft for a public statement.15 Q. Did you look at any drafts for public statements?16 A. There was some initial drafting of the main points to be

17 covered at that meeting in the Prime Minister's office,18 and then the meeting came to an end.


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19 Q. Can I take you to MoD/1/56, which is actually the press20 statement as is issued.21 A. Yes.22 Q. There are some various comments we have seen that have23 been made on it in the past. You do not appear to have24 written anything on the press statement.

25 A. No, I did not.

1401 Q. Did you make any contribution to the drafting of it?2 A. Not specifically. I was present at the discussion in3 the Prime Minister's office which initially set out the4 terms of the press statement. And then I was present at5 a meeting in Godric Smith's office, where the press6 statement was drafted in more detail.7 Q. You can see here that if one looks at the end of the8 first paragraph:9 "The official has told us that he made no10 allegations or accusations about the dossier and, in

11 particular, did not suggest that any material had been12 added to the dossier by Alastair Campbell or13 Downing~Street against the wishes of the intelligence14 community. He is not a member of the Intelligence15 Services or the Defence Intelligence Staff."16 You have told us before the meeting at 11.30 you had17 not actually seen the notes of the second interview.18 A. Hmm.19 Q. We are now about to put out a press statement to the20 world at large, and everyone is obviously concerned not21 to mislead anyone. Has anyone yet checked to see22 whether Dr Kelly had anything to do with the September23 drafting of the dossier?

24 A. This statement, again, was drawn up -- in fact, it was25 drawn up in some detail in the presence of Kevin Tebbit,

1411 who by that time had joined the meeting; but the whole2 subject was subject to agreement by the Ministry of3 Defence, who were the people who held the details of the4 second interview.5 Q. Well, had you checked --6 A. I had not checked.7 Q. And did anyone tell you that they had checked to see8 what Dr Kelly --9 A. They did not.

10 Q. Did you not think that it was something that ought to be11 addressed?12 A. I do not recall any discussion of that point in the13 meeting.14 Q. We know on 8th July that Mr Howard is also writing to15 you -- this is CAB/1/77 -- about Dr Kelly's views of the16 Iraqi WMD programme. If we scroll down we can see that17 in paragraph 1:18 "What reflects points made by David Kelly in his19 letter [which we know to have been 30th June] and his20 interviews."21 Then he talks about his knowledge of WMD programme:22 "No unease about the dossier."

23 On the 45 minute deployment issue, at the bottom, he24 says his standard view is he does not know the


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25 intelligence and is not familiar with an Iraqi weapons

1421 system.2 The only other point, over the page, to note was3 that 30 per cent change of CW production capability, and

4 he distinguishes between production and possession.5 A. Yes.6 Q. Why is this letter being written to you?7 A. Because I had asked for those views to be reported to me8 on 7th July. I had taken that away as an action which9 I understood had been left with me after the early10 morning meeting on 7th July in the Prime Minister's11 Office.12 Q. If we go back to CAB/1/77 and go to the top, we can see13 some handwriting. Whose handwriting is that?14 A. Sadly it is mine.15 Q. I think we have managed to work out some more of what it16 says:

17 "See over the page and the attached extract from18 Gilligan's evidence to the FAC."19 A. Yes.20 Q. "Note ..."21 You will have to help me with the second word?22 A. "Also".23 Q. "... that Kelly may state his view, if given the chance24 by the FAC, that the trailers are not for BW production.25 It is not clear ..."

1431 "To me" is that?2 A. Even I cannot read that. It seems to be "to me".

3 Q. "... how widely the FAC will go in their questioning."4 Was there concern that the FAC might go widely in5 their questioning?6 A. It was the same point that had been registered on the7 Monday, and I was writing this on the Thursday, that it8 would be useful to know what he would or would not say9 at the -- for example, before the FAC. Useful in the10 sense that it is just always useful to know points which11 have an impact of one kind or another on the position of12 the Government, no more than that. So I am addressing13 that particular interest by writing this comment.14 The main purpose of this manuscript note is to draw15 the attention of the addressees to what is over the

16 page, the underlined bit, which relates to his views on17 the likelihood of production and possession of weaponry,18 because that is very closely similar to the views19 recorded by Andrew Gilligan as being held by his source.20 It is not identically the same; and in my view that21 underlined strongly the chance that he was actually22 Mr Gilligan's source. That is why I sent that note23 through to No. 10.24 LORD HUTTON: Mr Scarlett, may I just ask you: are you able25 to make any comment on the penultimate line of the first

1441 page of that letter, that Dr Kelly says that his

2 standard view is that he does not know the intelligence3 and is not familiar with an Iraqi weapons system that


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4 matches that sort of timescale? Now, I think that5 Dr Kelly had suggested to someone else that the source6 for the 45 minutes reference might have confused it with7 some multiple barrelled Iraqi weapon. Are you able to8 make any comment -- and if, for security reasons, you9 cannot please just say so, but are you able to comment

10 on that comment by Dr Kelly: he is not familiar with an11 Iraqi weapons system that matches that sort of12 timescale?13 A. I can only make a limited comment, my Lord.14 LORD HUTTON: Yes.15 A. Which, I think, may not be relevant; but certainly16 Andrew Gilligan, when quoting his source, said that the17 source believed that the report was relating to warheads18 for missiles.19 LORD HUTTON: Yes.20 A. Which, in fact, it was not; it related to munitions,21 which we had interpreted to mean battlefield mortar22 shells or small calibre weaponry, quite different from

23 missiles.24 LORD HUTTON: Yes.25 A. So it is possible that Dr Kelly, who, as I sti ll

1451 understand it, never did see or probably did not see the2 original report, was in a state of genuine confusion3 about what the report actually said.4 LORD HUTTON: Yes.5 A. And that could explain that particular comment, but I am6 not sure.7 LORD HUTTON: Yes. I see. Thank you.8 MR DINGEMANS: That is 8th July, Mr Howard's writing to you.

9 Can I take you to CAB/11/134, because you get an e-mail10 from Claire Sumner on 7th July to Alastair Campbell but11 copied to you and David Manning and Jonathan Powell:12 " I am being chased by the Clerk on this -- what is13 the view?"14 There is a reply on behalf of David Manning:15 "I see no reason for Alastair to do this. He has16 been exonerated by the FAC [obviously the report of17 7th July]. ISC should concentrate on intelligence18 issues, talking to heads of agencies and Chairman of19 JIC."20 Was that your view as well, that it would really be21 appropriate for the ISC to concentrate on intelligence

22 issues, the heads of agencies and yourself, rather than23 speak to someone like Dr Kelly?24 A. I did not have a strong view one way or the other on25 this, and I did not record one.

1461 Q. On 8th July we know that the press statement is issued.2 There is also some defensive Q and A material that is3 issued. Were you party to any discussions in relation4 to that?5 A. No, I was not.6 Q. Do you have any view on the propriety or otherwise of7 that defensive Q and A material?

8 A. No, I do not.9 Q. If we turn to CAB/1/87, we can see a further exchange on


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10 9th July, with you being copied in, from Claire Sumner11 to Alastair Campbell confirming he is going to appear12 from 8.30 to 9.45 on 17th July and will have to leave13 promptly:14 "I asked where they were with other interviews.15 "The ISC Clerk told me that the Committee were not

16 interested in interviewing Andrew G as he could not say17 anything more to them than the FAC.18 "He said that on the source they were waiting for19 David Omand to write to them with correspondence. He20 implied that he did not believe it was the source so21 could not see the point of ISC seeing him and said they22 were not interested in the BBC/AC row."23 Did you see this e-mail?24 A. I did.25 Q. What was your view on it?

1471 A. Well, my immediate view was that the Clerk had, for

2 understandable reasons, sort of misunderstood the3 situation because he was resting his view on the view4 which had been taken at the end of the week before by5 the -- that is right, the end of the week before by the6 FAC, and that was a view which I thought was unlikely to7 be true and so the other thought which went through my8 mind was that when the Committee -- if the Committee9 came to the view that indeed he was the source, then10 they would take a different view.11 Q. But one of the things that would convince them that he12 was the source was showing them he had actually made the13 comments about the 45 minutes and --14 A. I am sorry, can I just correct myself there? I am

15 muddling that up. The FAC conclusion, of course, had16 not been recorded at that stage. I am sorry, I am17 getting my dates wrong.18 Q. On the --19 A. In fact, he did not believe it was the source. That20 must be based -- the view of the Clerk of the ISC there21 must be based on the fact that the source had said, you22 know, he was not the source.23 Q. The Clerk of the ISC must have seen, by then, the24 Ministry of Defence press statement because that is25 issued on 8th July.

148

1 A. Yes.2 Q. So it is obviously basing it on that.3 A. Yes.4 Q. But one reason the Clerk may have been muddled was5 because the press statement did not say: Mr Gilligan was6 right about the 45 minutes being added late, he was7 right about it being single source. But that is not8 surprising because Dr Kelly would have known that for9 this reason: namely his involvement in the drafting with10 the dossier in September.11 A. Sorry, can I ask you to repeat that? I am not quite12 sure I am following you.13 Q. The MoD press statement, I have already asked you about

14 whether or not that was accurate.15 A. Yes.


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16 Q. Because it did not tell anyone that Dr Kelly had an17 involvement in drafting the dossier in September, did18 it?19 A. That was because at that stage, to be clear about this,20 I and the others involved did not know that he had had21 any involvement, even of a minimal kind, in the drafting

22 of the intelligence parts of the September dossier.23 Q. But on 7th July you had noted in your note that Dr Kelly24 must or there was a strong probability that Dr Kelly was25 not telling the whole truth about what he had said to

1491 Andrew Gilligan because he must have got the 45 minutes2 from someone.3 A. Yes, but he could have learned that from somebody who4 was involved in the drafting of the dossier.5 Q. He is sent off or offered to the ISC on that basis, that6 it was assumed that he must have picked it up in general7 conversations?

8 A. No, I do not think that is a fair representation of what9 happened at all.10 Whether or not he was the source for11 Andrew Gilligan's knowledge about the 45 minute report12 coming in late and being based on one report, the13 conversation which he reported as having had with14 Andrew Gilligan meant there was a very high chance that15 he was Andrew Gilligan's single source.16 Q. I have asked you about Mr Howard's letter to you. Can17 I just take you to another document, CAB/1/106, which is18 a letter of 14th July which is from Colin Smith of the19 Counter Proliferation Strategy CPD, and he writes in20 1(a):

21 "DCDI is to brief David Kelly this afternoon for his22 appearances tomorrow before the FAC and the ISC, and23 will strongly recommend that Kelly is not drawn on his24 assessment of the dossier (but stick to what he told25 Gilligan). Kelly is apparently feeling the pressure and

1501 does not appear to be handling it well."2 Were you party to any discussions about what3 Dr Kelly should or should not be drawn on in front of4 any of the Committees?5 A. Only very briefly, in the following sense: that I had6 a brief conversation, I cannot remember on which day,

7 with Martin Howard where I noted to him that it was8 going to be important that Dr Kelly had proper support9 before he appeared before the Foreign Affairs Committee10 and received a briefing. By that I meant, but I am not11 sure whether I spelled it out, that if he was going to12 be appearing and might be asked about a range of13 questions, it was going to be necessary for it to be14 clear that he was not speaking as a spokesman of15 Government policy for the Ministry of Defence, that the16 views he might have on areas of expertise were his own17 particular views and other experts might have other18 views. That was the issue that was in my mind.19 I recall Martin saying to me that he was giving him

20 very detailed support but of course he would be able to21 say what he liked before the Committee. That was the


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22 end of that conversation.23 Q. So do the terms of the letter slightly surprise you,24 that it is being recommended -- strongly recommended --25 that Kelly is not drawn on his assessment of the

151

1 dossier?2 A. (Pause). You know, at the time I had no particular, you3 know, thoughts about that point. I honestly cannot say4 that I, you know, dwelt on it.5 Q. I did not ask for your views at the time but now. Are6 you slightly surprised by the terms of that letter?7 A. Not really.8 Q. And why is that?9 A. (Pause). I am not even completely sure that this is an10 accurate record of this discussion. This record is11 a note made, I think, by somebody in the FCO who12 attended a meeting which I chaired on 14th July.13 I recall DCDI, Martin Howard, talking about his briefing

14 of David Kelly that afternoon. I do not recall15 particularly what he said. And I do also recall him16 saying that Dr Kelly was beginning to show signs of17 feeling some pressure. So I do remember him making18 these comments; but I am not sure that the rest of it is19 accurate. It is not an official record of the meeting,20 it is an internal note within the FCO.21 Q. Perhaps we can have the official record when you go22 back, if there are other records of this meeting.23 A. Certainly, if there are.24 Q. That is very kind.25 LORD HUTTON: Did you make any comment or did you ever send

1521 any minute or e-mail to anyone about Dr Kelly being2 under pressure if he went to give evidence before the3 FAC or the ISC?4 A. No, I did not, my Lord. I would add that I saw the5 management of that to be a matter absolutely for the6 Ministry of Defence, who were in possession of all the7 information and I was not.8 LORD HUTTON: Yes.9 MR DINGEMANS: Can I help you in relation to your last10 question. At CAB/11/4, Tuesday 8th July, and we know11 this is a minute made after the event, if one scrolls12 down the page, 1330 meeting:

13 "Discussion of how BBC will react (will they be14 ready to discuss this in a business-like way). If15 Dr Kelly name becomes public will Government be16 criticised for putting him under 'wider pressure'? PM17 repeats that MoD must remain in charge and follow their18 procedures."19 That is all I have been able to see where you draft20 anything referring to pressure; is that right?21 A. Yes. I recall that discussion. There was a brief22 conversation around: well, if his name does become23 public following on from a public statement of the kind24 that the meeting had been discussed, would the25 Government be criticised in any way and, if so, what

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1 for? I said: that, well, the Government would possibly2 be accused of putting him under pressure to allow the3 public statement to have been made and there was no4 further discussion of that point as I recall. I was5 just registering that point.6 Q. Can I just ask you one further question in relation to

7 the dossier before I ask you your final question. I am8 sorry, I missed it this morning. It is CAB/11/77. This9 is an e-mail from Jonathan Powell to you on10 17th September which is the same date, at the bottom of11 the page, that Mr Campbell writes his memo if that helps12 to orientate you.13 A. Yes.14 Q. "The dossier is good and convincing for those who are15 prepared to be convinced.16 "I have only three points, none of which affect the17 way the document is drafted or presented.18 "First the document does nothing to demonstrate a19 threat, let alone an imminent threat from Saddam. On

20 other words it shows he has the means but does not21 demonstrate motive let alone the rest. We will need to22 make it clear in launching the document that we do not23 claim that we have evidence that he is an imminent24 threat. The case we are making is that he has continued25 to develop WMD since 1998, and is in breach of those

1541 resolutions."2 Going back to 77 and up the page, because that is3 how the e-mails work, you respond saying:4 "We are now doing a note on Iraq and AQ."5 Is that Al-Qaida?

6 A. Yes, indeed.7 Q. "The dossier mentions about eight sites."8 Then there is an intervention from Felicity Hatfield9 on behalf of Alastair Campbell.10 Jonathan Powell, at the top, responds on those other11 points, but at the bottom of that says:12 "The threat argument will be a major problem in the13 press Parliamentary assault after the dossier comes out.14 We need to flag up in the point in the preface at15 publication and during the debate. We need to set the16 test for ourselves at a level we can meet."17 We have also seen another e-mail in which he said18 that the dossier ought to make it clear there is no

19 current threat, I think as he put it. Can I take you to20 his actual words which is CAB/11/53, where he says that21 in the penultimate paragraph:22 "You need to make it clear that Saddam could not23 attack us at the moment. The thesis is he would be24 a threat to the UK in the future if we do not check25 him."

1551 A. Sorry, which?2 Q. This is the bottom of that page.3 A. I see. Yes.4 Q. You do not appear to have been copied into this e-mail?

5 A. No, I was not.6 Q. Were you aware of these suggestions being made?


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7 A. I was not aware of that e-mail and have not seen that8 before. On the other e-mail, which was either sent to9 me or was copied to me --10 Q. And you respond to?11 A. Yes, and I respond to on the points which I saw as being12 relevant to me, I did not understand, and I still do not

13 understand, or take that memo to be a request or14 suggestion to me that the dossier and the text of it15 should be changed in any way to reflect the point which16 Jonathan Powell was making. I took it to be a reference17 to what he thought should be stated in a political18 statement, which -- whatever political statements were19 being made in relation to the launching of the dossier.20 But in any case, even if he had asked for that to be, as21 it were, put into the dossier, I am not sure I would22 have seen it as a statement which would have fitted23 easily into the way that the dossier was construct. But24 he did not ask so it was not something I pursued.25 Q. Is there anything else relating to Dr Kelly's death that

1561 you can assist his Lordship with?2 A. I do not think there is.3 Q. And is there anything else that you wanted to say?4 A. No, there is not.5 LORD HUTTON: Could we just go back to CAB/11/4? Could we6 scroll down a bit. Thank you. That is it. Yes.7 Now, Mr Scarlett, the note there:8 "If Doctor K name becomes public will Government be9 criticised for putting him under 'wider pressure'?"10 You say that is a point that you raised?11 A. Yes.

12 LORD HUTTON: One might have expected there be some sort of13 response from someone at the meeting to the effect that14 we have no option but to put him before the ISC or we15 may be accused of a cover-up if we do not reveal his16 name. Do you recollect any comment? One would have17 thought there would be some sort of response to the18 point that you made?19 A. There was not, my Lord, and that may be because it was20 understood by everybody at the meeting to be the case21 that Dr Kelly had been warned and was aware of the fact22 that his name, or rather that the public statement would23 be made saying that somebody would come forward and that24 his name was very likely to come out and that he

25 accepted that. So that was part of the underlying

1571 assumption on I which the discussion was taking place.2 So I am not sure I find it, even in retrospect,3 particularly surprising that no comment was made to my4 point, but as I recall no comment was made.5 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Scarlett.6 Thank you. This would be a convenient time to rise,7 I think.8 (3.15 pm)9 (Short Break)10 (3.20 pm)

11 SIR DAVID OMAND (called)12 Examined by MR DINGEMANS


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13 MR DINGEMANS: Can you give his Lordship your full name.14 A. David Bruce Omand.15 Q. What is your occupation?16 A. I am the Security and Intelligence Coordinator in the17 Cabinet Office.18 Q. How long have you held that post for?

19 A. I took up that post last September, on the retirement of20 Sir Richard Wilson as Cabinet Secretary. I was21 appointed by the Prime Minister to a new Permanent22 Secretary post as Security Intelligence Coordinator. In23 that post I have day-to-day responsibility for a number24 of the functions traditionally associated with the25 Cabinet Secretary's post, including accounting to

1581 Parliament for the Single Intelligence account and2 acting as line manager for the Chairman of the Joint3 Intelligence Committee, as you have heard earlier today;4 and through him, the Cabinet Office assessment staff and

5 security policy division. My major responsibility,6 however, is overseeing cross-Government work on civil7 contingencies and counter terrorism, often popularly8 referred to as "homeland security".9 Q. Did you have any involvement in the drafting of the10 dossier?11 A. As a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee I took12 my share of collective responsibility in --13 Q. You were a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee at14 the time, were you?15 A. Yes, I had been, in previous jobs, a member of the JIC16 for a total of some five years. When I took up my new17 position I decided to rejoin the Committee.

18 Q. Were you a member at the time that the dossier was being19 drafted from 5th September?20 A. Yes.21 Q. Were you on the drafting committee of the Joint22 Intelligence Committee?23 A. No.24 Q. I think we have heard that there were meetings of the25 Joint Intelligence Committee itself on 5th and

1591 9th September, where assessments were considered in2 relation to the 45 minutes point, and various drafts of3 the dossier were produced. Did you have any hand in

4 producing those drafts of the dossiers or reviewing5 them?6 A. I was part of that process; I attended those meetings7 and I did offer comments to John Scarlett on the8 handling of the dossier.9 Q. On the handling of the dossier. Were you aware or10 copied into the e-mails, we have seen some of them, for11 example from persons in the Communications Department12 about the dossiers?13 A. No, but John Scarlett kept me in touch. We meet very14 regularly and he kept me in touch with his work on the15 dossier.16 Q. Right. Did you, for example, see the memorandum that we

17 have seen this morning from Alastair Campbell, dated18 17th September, and Mr Scarlett's response of


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19 18th September?20 A. Yes, I did see those documents.21 Q. You saw those. Were you aware of any general22 unhappiness with the fact that communications personnel23 were assisting in presentational aspects of the dossier?24 A. None whatever. And can I say that I do see

25 John Scarlett very frequently; I have complete

1601 confidence in him and I am sure he would have spoken to2 me immediately if he had felt there was any unease.3 Q. Were you aware of any unhappiness lower down the scale,4 for example within the Defence Intelligence Staff?5 A. Not at all.6 LORD HUTTON: Not at -- I beg your pardon?7 A. Not at all.8 MR DINGEMANS: Meaning there might have been unhappiness and9 you were unaware of it or you knew that was going on in10 the DIS?

11 A. That I was not at all aware of any unhappiness.12 Q. You were not, for example, having contact with members13 of the DIS at this stage?14 A. No. There are three members of the Joint Intelligence15 Committee from the Ministry of Defence: the Director16 General for Policy, Chief of Defence Intelligence and17 the Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence; and they18 participated in our debates and discussions in the JIC.19 At no stage was any unease reported.20 Can I also add here that we did debate, in the JIC,21 the decision to produce the dossier. We debated at22 length how we would protect sources and methods; and23 I saw it as my particular responsibility to ensure that

24 the whole exercise was conducted in a way that did not25 endanger our intelligence.

1611 Q. There had been press reports there were rows between2 yourself and Mr Campbell; are those reports true?3 A. No.4 Q. And that there were rows between a Mr Lander and5 Mr Campbell; are those reports true?6 A. To the best of my knowledge, no.7 Q. You certainly did not see any?8 A. No.9 Q. And Mr Scarlett and Mr Campbell; you were not aware of

10 any rows?11 A. No, and I certainly would have been aware if there had12 been any disagreement over the handling of the dossier.13 Q. You have seen, I think, because you were here earlier14 on, the conclusion that the FAC came to about the fact15 that the dossier should have been in more traditional16 language, as they expressed it. First of all, do you17 accept that the dossier was not in "traditional",18 whatever that might mean, intelligence language?19 A. No, I do not accept that. I think the dossier was20 a faithful reflection of the underlying intelligence21 assessments that the JIC had reached; and very great22 care was taken, throughout the process, to ensure that

23 that was the case.24 Q. We have seen an e-mail today, CAB/23/15. That e-mail


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25 is -- I think we were told by Mr Scarlett -- from

1621 someone on the Joint Intelligence Committee back to, as2 it were, the agencies. It says:3 "Unsurprisingly they [as in No. 10] have further

4 questions and areas they would like expanded."5 Towards the bottom of the e-mail:6 "I appreciate everyone, us included, has been around7 at least some of these buoys before, particularly8 item 4. But No. 10 through the Chairman want the9 document to be a strong as possible within the bounds of10 available intelligence. This is therefore a last (!)11 call for any items of intelligence that agencies think12 can and should be included."13 Were you aware of the e-mail at the time?14 A. No.15 Q. It gives the impression that there is a bit of a sort of16 looking into cupboards to see if there is anything that

17 has been overlooked that might be put in the dossier.18 Would that be a fair assessment of the e-mail?19 A. I think you have to remember the Joint Intelligence20 Committee itself was anxious to produce as strong21 a document as possible, consistent with the protection22 of intelligence sources and methods.23 Q. Were you party to the final meeting of the Joint24 Intelligence Committee that signed off the dossier?25 A. Yes.

1631 Q. And everyone assented to that?2 A. Yes, they did.

3 Q. Turning on to February 2003, we have heard that4 Mr Gilligan comes by a document, a secret document,5 relating to the links between or absence of links6 between Al-Qaida and Saddam Hussein. I think we have7 also heard that that did not come to Mr Gilligan from8 Dr Kelly, from Mr Gilligan's evidence. Were you aware9 of that leak?10 A. Yes, and I was concerned by it.11 Q. Were any steps taken?12 A. I discussed with Sir Kevin Tebbit, the Permanent13 Secretary at the Ministry of Defence, the possibility14 that there could be a source of compromise of classified15 information within the Ministry of Defence, and he

16 reassured me that he too was taking steps to investigate17 whether that might be the case.18 Q. And forwarding on then to 29th May, we have the19 broadcast by Mr Gilligan on Today. Did you in fact hear20 the broadcast?21 A. Yes, I did.22 Q. And your reaction to it?23 A. Extreme surprise.24 Q. Were you party to any action as a result of that?25 A. No, although I did raise it with my office when I came

1641 in about 8 o'clock that morning to check that something

2 was being done and that the story would be responded to;3 and as far as I know the answer to that was: yes, it was


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4 being handled by the No. 10 press office.5 Q. We have seen documents with Mr Scarlett of 4th June6 about a leak inquiry and some reports up to you on7 10th June and your memos, and there is a final analysis8 on 9th July. If it is all right with you I will not9 take you through those documents.

10 A. It is.11 Q. But those suggest that attempts were being made to12 identify the source of the leak; is that right?13 A. That is correct. It was difficult to pin down where14 this source or sources of compromise might be; and,15 therefore, it did not seem justifiable to launch16 a formal leak investigation, which involves the17 appointment of an outside investigator who would then18 conduct an extensive series of interviews with all those19 who would have seen the relevant documents, not knowing20 where to start. That meant we had to try to narrow the21 field down, which is why we asked the security policy22 division to see if they could undertake a preliminary

23 investigation.24 Q. We have seen the results of that. Did you hear of25 Dr Kelly's name at all during June?

1651 A. No.2 Q. Before your first involvement in July, had you heard of3 Dr Kelly before?4 A. I had not.5 Q. What was your involvement in relation to Dr Kelly?6 A. When I was telephoned about 5.30 on the Friday,7 4th July, by Sir Kevin Tebbit, who informed me that an8 individual, Dr Kelly, had come forward.

9 Q. What discussion did you have with anyone as a result of10 that?11 A. I discussed the situation with Kevin Tebbit. He told me12 he was going to write to me and seek my involvement, my13 help, in ensuring the matter was handled properly and14 that there was proper interdepartmental coordination of15 what clearly could be a difficult case to handle.16 I agreed to this; and he said he would write to me.17 I then spoke to John Scarlett, as you have heard, and18 asked him if he knew of Dr Kelly and if Dr Kelly had19 been involved in the drawing up of the dossier, since20 that clearly would be an important pointer as to whether21 or not this could be the source of the stories.

22 Q. So you raised, on that Friday, the issue of whether or23 not Dr Kelly had actually been involved with drawing up24 the dossier?25 A. Yes, and I was assured by John Scarlett that he had not

1661 been part of John Scarlett's central assessment team's2 work.3 Q. He was not a member of the Joint Intelligence Committee4 or indeed the Assessment Committee for the Joint5 Intelligence Committee.6 A. Correct.7 Q. Were any steps made to find out what involvement, if

8 any, he had had with the final drafts of the dossier?9 A. At that stage, no. My assumption was that that would


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10 indeed happen.11 Q. Your assumption was that that would happen?12 A. Yes, that this would be checked up on as part of the13 Ministry of Defence's investigation of Dr Kelly's14 involvement.15 Q. Right. So you did not raise it expressly.

16 A. No.17 Q. You assumed it would just be dealt with.18 A. Yes.19 Q. We have then heard you go over to No. 10, and there is20 a meeting at which you are joined by Mr Powell and21 Sir David Manning; is that right?22 A. Yes. I suggested to John Scarlett that we should try to23 speak to Sir David Manning as soon as possible, since he24 was involved in the coordination of work on the Foreign25 Affairs Committee inquiry which was due to report on the

1671 Monday, and recall that I had been telephoned at 5.30 on

2 a Friday afternoon and the report was due out on the3 Monday. So there was very little time if anything was4 to be done in respect of that publication.5 LORD HUTTON: I have asked at least one other witness,6 Sir David, as to the reason why these very senior7 officials, including yourself, all assembled to discuss8 this report with Sir Kevin Tebbit. I mean, it does seem9 a galaxy gathering to discuss this matter, if I may so10 put it. Do you have any comment on that?11 A. I think the explanation lies in the front pages of the12 newspapers, that this was an issue which had dominated13 political debate in the country for a considerable time14 and showed no signs of diminishing. It was a matter of

15 intense interest and concern to the Prime Minister, in16 view of the nature of the allegations which were being17 made. It was a matter of concern to me, because it was18 directly challenging the integrity of a process for19 which I was responsible.20 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you.21 MR DINGEMANS: Was anything decided on 4th July?22 A. Friday, 4th? We discussed, at the meeting, the23 likelihood of Dr Kelly being the single source to which24 Mr Gilligan had referred.25 We came to the conclusion that we did not have

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1 enough information, at that stage, to take any action,2 and that that would be our recommendation. This3 followed the advice from Sir Kevin Tebbit, particularly4 in view of the discrepancies which they had noted5 between Dr Kelly's account and the account given by6 Mr Gilligan. We could not be certain that Dr Kelly was,7 indeed, responsible for this story.8 Q. So why was that not the end of the matter?9 A. Simply because if it turned out, on further10 investigation, that there was more behind this, then it11 could represent an explanation of the story which, as12 I have said, had been dominating political debate in the13 country.

14 Q. So what was decided to be done on that Friday evening?15 A. To seek more information. Firstly, to await the arrival


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16 of Kevin Tebbit's letter to see exactly what terms he17 was reporting this in to us and to urge the Ministry of18 Defence to see if they could clarify the inconsistencies19 which Kevin Tebbit had told me of but only in the most20 general terms.21 Q. Did you see Sir Kevin Tebbit's letter of 4th July to you

22 that evening?23 A. Yes, I did.24 Q. I think we see it at MoD/1/34. You have heard my25 questioning of Mr Scarlett, so I need not go to the

1691 relevant passages, but in that letter it is made2 perfectly clear that Dr Kelly is saying that he did not3 say anything about the 45 minutes or anything material4 about the 45 minutes to Mr Gilligan; in particular, he5 had not said that the information was single source and6 he had not said that it was added late.7 Were you aware of that on 4th July?

8 A. Yes.9 Q. What did you think of those, as it were, denials by10 Dr Kelly?11 A. My thought was that there were a number of12 possibilities: that Dr Kelly might not have been, on13 this first interview, revealing all that he could say on14 the matter, for quite understandable reasons; or that he15 was genuinely coming forward to help the Ministry clear16 up a misunderstanding, and that he had been seriously17 misrepresented in the reporting. There was, therefore,18 more than one possibility; and at that stage we really19 could not be certain what the situation actually was.20 Therefore, my recommendation to the meeting was that we

21 should take no action in respect of the Foreign Affairs22 Committee, although their report was due imminently on23 the Monday.24 I was, at the same time, anxious that the group of25 officials, senior officials as Lord Hutton has referred

1701 to us, should properly consider the point about the2 Foreign Affairs Committee because we would be placed in3 a very false position if we had sat on information which4 was very relevant to a report by a Parliamentary Select5 Committee, which was imminent.6 LORD HUTTON: Sir David, I think it may be obvious again but

7 I would just like to ask you: when you say that Dr Kelly8 may not have revealed all "for understandable reasons",9 would you be good enough to spell out what those10 understandable reasons are? It may well be obvious but11 I think it would be helpful if you would state them.12 A. That Dr Kelly may have come forward in a genuine wish to13 clear matters up but he had minimised his participation14 in the meeting with Mr Gilligan in order to protect15 himself from any action by the Ministry of Defence.16 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you.17 MR DINGEMANS: You say there that one of the concerns was18 not to be in a false position of not cooperating, as it19 were, fully with a Parliamentary Committee. But is it

20 not right that the Foreign Affairs Committee had21 actually asked for drafts of the dossiers as a way of


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22 sorting out this dispute between Mr Gilligan and23 Mr Campbell and they had not been provided?24 A. I think I would put the point the other way round, that25 the Foreign Affairs Committee was already, as they

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1 eventually recorded in their report, annoyed with the2 Government at not, as they saw it, fully cooperating.3 For them to have discovered we had been sitting on4 relevant information would have compounded the events.5 Q. Why were not copies of the earlier drafts of the dossier6 disclosed? I mean, that would have assisted in making7 the points that you make about the dossier.8 A. For the reasons that Mr Scarlett has explained, that the9 process -- the close examination of the process of10 putting together the dossier would reveal more about the11 nature of the intelligence underlying the assessments12 than we thought would be safe.13 Q. Is that how it ends on 4th July, with you having

14 received a copy of Sir Kevin Tebbit's letter?15 A. Yes. Having had the discussion, Jonathan Powell having16 said he would mention this to the Prime Minister, he17 then rang me back to say he had mentioned it to the18 Prime Minister and the Prime Minister agreed with our19 assessment that no action should be taken until we had20 further information about what exactly all this was21 about. I relayed that back to Kevin Tebbit by22 telephone.23 Q. Then what happens on 5th July?24 A. On 5th July I receive a second letter from Kevin Tebbit.25 Q. Yes. We have seen that. It picks up an article by

1721 Mr Baldwin in The Times on 5th July.2 A. That is right. And I speak to Kevin Tebbit more than3 once on the Saturday to discuss whether this sheds more4 light on the possibility of it being the source. We5 agreed that prima facie it does that but there remain6 these inconsistencies.7 Sir Kevin drew to my attention the fact that8 Richard Hatfield, the personnel director, believed, on9 the basis of the first interview, that Dr Kelly was not10 the single source and therefore we were proceeding with11 some caution on the matter.12 The other event on the Saturday was that I was rung

13 by the resident Duty Clerk at the Foreign Office, who14 passed on a message from the Foreign Secretary that in15 his view we did not have enough information, at the16 moment, to warrant informing the Foreign Affairs17 Committee.18 Q. Did you have any contact with anyone on the Sunday?19 A. Yes. I spoke to Sir Kevin Tebbit again; and I was rung20 by the Prime Minister, who was at Chequers.21 Q. And he rang you in the morning or in the afternoon?22 A. In the morning, about 11.30.23 Q. What did you discuss with the Prime Minister?24 A. I updated him on the basis of my conversations with25 Kevin Tebbit and on the basis of the second letter. We

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1 discussed the options for informing the Foreign Affairs2 Committee, which effectively -- and you have had this3 confirmed, I think, by the Chairman of the Foreign4 Affairs Committee -- might well have meant their5 postponing the publication of their report. We6 discussed whether we knew enough to be certain to

7 trigger such an action. And my advice, which the8 Prime Minister endorsed, was that we should follow the9 recommendation of the Ministry of Defence and await10 further information from the reinterview of Dr Kelly.11 Q. So it is decided, or provisionally decided, over the12 weekend that Dr Kelly should be reinterviewed; is that13 right?14 A. Yes. The Ministry of Defence were intending to do that.15 I discussed it with Kevin Tebbit. I made sure that the16 Prime Minister was aware of that and that he agreed this17 was a sensible course to follow.18 Q. We have seen a note that you prepared on 21st July, so19 it is after the event but obviously closer to it. It is

20 CAB/11/5, at the top from Sir David Omand, dated21 21st July 2003. Going down to the bottom there is22 a review of the weekend decision not to inform the FAC23 before the publication of the report that Dr Kelly had24 come forward:25 "There was some questioning from the PM about what

1741 we knew about Dr Kelly, and whether we could find out2 more about his views."3 It looks as if that is the only reference to the4 weekend discussions before you turn to 7th July; is that5 right?

6 A. Yes.7 Q. Was anything else said or did anything else happen on8 the weekend that is relevant to this Inquiry?9 A. Not that I recall.10 Q. I think you write a letter to Sir Kevin Tebbit at11 MoD/1/42. It appears to be dated 5th July. No doubt12 you can confirm that is just a typo in the top?13 A. It was typed on my laptop at home, which automatically14 inserts a date. The letter was started on the Saturday15 but I reopened it and finished it on the Sunday without16 correcting the date.17 Q. Right. so you started on the Saturday, finished off on18 the Sunday, and that is your response to

19 Sir Kevin Tebbit.20 That brings us up to the Monday morning, is that21 right?22 A. That is correct.23 Q. What happens on the Monday morning?24 A. On the Monday morning, the -- where are we? (Pause).25 Q. Do you have a meeting with anyone?

1751 A. Yes, I just -- if you will excuse me -- want to get my2 thoughts in order.3 LORD HUTTON: Certainly. Take whatever time you wish,4 Sir David.

5 A. The first thing on the morning of the 7th was the6 receipt of the message from John Scarlett, to which


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7 I think you have already referred.8 MR DINGEMANS: Yes.9 A. Giving John's assessment. I had conducted a parallel10 assessment over the weekend for my own purpose, looking11 at the statements which had been made and trying to12 compare those, and had reached more or less the same

13 conclusion as John Scarlett.14 Q. That?15 A. That there was a prima facie case for believing this was16 the single source and that reinterview was the next17 step.18 Can I also add, my interpretation -- I did not19 discuss this with John Scarlett -- of what was meant by20 a "security style interview" is the kind of interview21 you are giving me, that is carefully prepared,22 determined to get to the truth, and courteous.23 Q. That is very kind of you.24 We have seen the note that Mr Scarlett made, and25 that is CAB/1/46. Did you produce any similar note?

1761 A. You have referred to the record that I made, which was2 after the event of the meetings that followed.3 Q. Yes, but no contemporaneous note?4 A. No contemporaneous note, no.5 Q. Is this fair: your provisional view on 7th July is that6 Dr Kelly is likely to be Mr Gilligan's single source?7 A. Likely to be, but still with a considerable uncertainty8 about the inconsistencies. Now, my hunch was that9 a further reinterview would be able to explain away some10 of those inconsistencies, such as how long Mr Gilligan11 had known Dr Kelly, if he was the source, and other

12 matters; that it would be possible to clear those up.13 But at this stage I could not be certain about that.14 Q. But one major inconsistency must have been Dr Kelly15 saying, "I am not the single source", you thinking it at16 least likely that he was, and Mr Gilligan reporting for17 the first time two pieces of information that were not18 in the public domain, namely single sourcing and late19 addition of the 45 minutes claim. That was obviously20 crucial, was it not, to chase down?21 A. Indeed, although, as I think you have already heard this22 afternoon, it is perfectly possible, given the23 timescales involved, that Dr Kelly, who had close24 contacts with members of the Defence Intelligence Staff,

25 could well have picked up the points about the

1771 45 minutes.2 Q. So that is a possibility. The other possibility is he3 actually knew anyway because he was involved in the4 drafting of the dossier or making suggestions.5 A. At that stage I did not think that. I was not aware of6 that being the case.7 Q. No-one is, as far as you know, chasing it down, you just8 assumed that the Ministry of Defence are likely to do9 that?10 A. No, my assum

hearing transcript - 26 august 2003 afternoon

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