hearing transcript - 22 september 2003 afternoon

8/8/2019 Hearing Transcript - 22 September 2003 Afternoon

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Hearing Transcripts

1091 adjournment. I am really in his hands.2 MR SUMPTION: I think it would be more satisfactory, given3 it is 5 to 1, if he made a clean start at 2 o'clock.

4 But we are in your Lordship's hands.5 LORD HUTTON: Very well, I will rise now and sit again at6 2 o'clock.7 (12.55 pm)8 (The short adjournment)9 (2.00 pm)10 LORD HUTTON: Yes Mr Sumption.11 MR ALASTAIR CAMPBELL (called)12 Examined by MR SUMPTION13 MR SUMPTION: Mr Campbell, you have been through the story14 of your role in the preparation of the dossier in your15 evidence at phase 1 and there are only certain points16 which I want to ask you about again.

17 On 9th September 2002 you wrote a memorandum to18 Mr Scarlett describing certain aspects of the procedure19 for preparing the dossier, in which you said that you20 would be making comments with the assistance of an21 informal group of officials.22 You then, on 17th September, made a number of23 comments to Mr Scarlett in writing, some of which came24 from the Prime Minister and some of which were your own.25 Can I ask you: on whose instructions were you

1101 assuming the role of making comments on drafts of the2 dossier?

3 A. In the first instance on the instructions of the4 Prime Minister and also because John Scarlett had asked5 me to offer him presentational advice on the draft that6 he submitted in the second week of September.7 Q. Can you tell us why it was you as the Government's8 director of strategy and communications who came to be9 performing this function?10 A. I think what the Prime Minister expected of me in this11 particular communications exercise, if you like, was to12 perform my role, which I traditionally would perform, on13 something which crosses Departments, which is the role14 of coordination. The second point is that this was15 a document that was to be presented to Parliament and to

16 the public, not just at home but also overseas. It was17 a major communications exercise. The other point18 I would make is that the Joint Intelligence Committee,19 for very obvious reasons, do not have the expertise or20 the personnel to do that kind of job.21 Q. The dossier said in its executive summary that it22 reflected the views of the JIC, which is the organ23 responsible for advising the British Government on24 intelligence matters.25 Do you think it appropriate that the Prime Minister

1111 or you as a member of his staff should be making

2 suggestions about such a document?3 A. Well, the Prime Minister ultimately has responsibility


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4 for the intelligence agencies. This was, as I said5 a moment ago, a document that he was presenting to6 Parliament. He was going to have to be answerable to7 Parliament for every word in it. Equally, those of us8 whose job it is to help the Prime Minister and other9 Ministers put the Government's case to the media and,

10 through them, to the public were going to have to be on11 top of the detail; and I would say that I was making12 presentational points in accordance with the job that13 the Prime Minister and Mr Scarlett had asked me to do.14 Q. I am going to show you the comments that you made on15 17th September in a moment. But before I do that, do16 you have any view of your own about whether your17 comments and the fact that it was you who was making18 them was liable to affect the objectivity of Mr Scarlett19 or the JIC or their staff?20 A. I do not believe it should have done and I do not21 believe it would have done and certainly not Mr Scarlett22 and the senior representatives of the agencies who sit

23 on the JIC.24 LORD HUTTON: Mr Campbell you said in reply to Mr Sumption25 a moment or two ago that it was the responsibility of

1121 the Prime Minister, or words to this effect, to make the2 Government's case. What do you mean by the Government's3 case?4 A. No, the point I was making, my Lord, is that when the5 dossier was presented to Parliament, the Prime Minister6 was the person who was going to have to stand at the7 dispatch box and take all the questions upon it and be8 answerable to Parliament for its contents. So the point

9 I was making is that he had to be confident. That was10 a document worthy for him to present to Parliament and11 for him to have sufficient confidence in it to be able12 to answer all the questions of MPs and the public.13 So we never saw this as a document that was making14 a particular case for a particular policy in relation to15 Iraq. What it was doing was setting out the facts on16 Iraq's WMD as the British Government understood them to17 be.18 MR SUMPTION: As the British Government understood them to19 be from what sources?20 A. From the Joint Intelligence Committee.21 Q. Could we have CAB/11/66, please? This is the first page

22 of your memorandum to Mr Scarlett of 17th September23 which I mentioned a moment ago. Would you like to go24 through the points that you have listed here on the25 second page, 67, and explain, briefly, what point you

1131 were making in relation to each one?2 A. Well, on point 1, when I say "in light of the last3 24 hours..." that refers to the fact that Saddam Hussein4 had announced that he was intending to allow the UN5 inspectors back in.6 Now, the Prime Minister and the Government's view7 was that this was almost certainly another ploy. When

8 I talk about making "more of the point about current9 concealment plans", I am simply making the point, given


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10 that we knew he had an infrastructure for concealing his11 WMD programme, that that should be brought out more in12 the dossier. And I then say "it would be stronger if we13 said that despite sanctions and the policy of14 containment, he has made real progress", ie real15 progress in the development of his programmes. My

16 understanding is that John Scarlett agreed with that17 point; and I think one sentence was added to the text.18 Q. When you said "it would be stronger if we said that19 despite sanctions on the policy of containment, he has20 made real progress", what did you mean by "stronger"?21 A. What I meant by that is that the point we were making22 there would be brought out more effectively and more23 clearly.24 Q. Can you move on to point 2, please?25 A. Point 2 relates to what I spotted as an inconsistency

1141 between the executive summary, which said definitively

2 that Saddam and his son Qusay had or have authority to3 launch chemical and biological weapons, and the point in4 the main body of the text which said Saddam may have5 delegated that authority. I had been present at6 discussions where I thought that was a definitive piece7 of information, if you like.8 Q. What was the definitive piece of information?9 A. That that authority had indeed been delegated. So10 I could not really understand why it said one thing in11 the summary and something different in the main body.12 In the event John Scarlett, presumably having13 checked against the assessments and against the raw14 intelligence, reported that the intelligence only

15 supported "may have".16 Q. Point 3.17 A. Again, the draft of the 16th September referred to the18 fact that Saddam had sought to secure uranium from19 Africa, but did not follow the point through, and20 I was -- wanted to know whether in fact he had been21 successful in that. So I say "can we say he has secured22 underlined uranium from Africa". Again the answer came23 back from John Scarlett: no, he had not and the text24 stayed exactly as it was in the September 16th draft.25 Q. What about point 4?

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1 A. Point 4 related to an issue that had been well2 documented, I think, in public already about these3 aluminium tubes. I was simply making the point that4 that might be something that was appropriate for the5 executive summary. John Scarlett, at one point, did put6 it in the executive summary, but when the final dossier7 was published in fact it was not there, for reasons8 which have nothing to do with any comment that I made.9 Q. Point 5?10 A. Point 5 again was a factual question, could we be "clear11 about the distances by which he is seeking to extend12 [the] missile range." The draft had worked on extending13 its range beyond 150 kilometres. I wanted to know if we

14 could say how far beyond. The answer came back was it15 200 and that went into the final product.


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16 Q. Point 6?17 A. Point 6, again you may recall when I first gave evidence18 that we covered this point, I thought that was19 unnecessary rhetoric.20 Q. Point 7.21 A. Point 7, again it was a factual question, how much of

22 the 3 billion of assets generated outside UN control23 was illegal. The answer came back that all of it was24 illegal and the word "illegal" was inserted into that25 part of the dossier.

1161 Q. Point 8?2 A. Point 8, I asked about whether we could be specific3 about the quantities of some of the munitions that were4 mentioned. The answer came back that we could not and5 that point did not change.6 Q. 9.7 A. Point 9 I think referred to some of his chemical

8 weapons. In the event, that part of the dossier, again9 without any comment or input from me, was actually --10 was done in a different way. So that point became11 irrelevant.12 Q. Were you suggesting that the point should be13 strengthened?14 A. No, I was making an observation that it just read very15 weakly.16 Q. Did you have a view about how that should be dealt with?17 A. No.18 Q. Do you remember how it was dealt with?19 A. It was -- as I say, it was -- John Scarlett came back20 and said that particular word, according to the

21 intelligence, could not be improved upon.22 Q. Right. Point 10.23 A. Point 10, again this was the observation of an24 inconsistency. This was in relation to the 45 minute25 intelligence. The summary said that some of these

1171 weapons could be ready within 45 minutes and in the main2 body of the text it said the Iraqi military may be able3 to deploy them. I pointed out that the main body was4 therefore weaker than in the summary.5 Q. Did you --6 A. And the outcome of that -- John Scarlett, at that time,

7 said that he would check that against the raw8 intelligence. As it transpired, Julian Miller and his9 team were already on to that point. When John Scarlett10 talked in his response to me, he said: the language that11 you queried has been tightened. That as I understand it12 had already been done. So on that particular point,13 I had no input or influence whatever.14 Q. At the time when you wrote this memorandum did you have15 any view about how the inconsistency pointed out in16 paragraph 10 should be resolved?17 A. No, I did not, and I did not suggest a view. What is18 more, I did not chase up how John Scarlett resolved it.19 I left that entirely to him.

20 Q. Point 11.21 A. Point 11 related to what were called in the dossier dual


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22 use facilities, in other words facilities that could be23 used as both civil and -- sorry, both for civilian and24 for military purposes. I pointed out that "could" again25 sounded weak and suggested "capable of being used" was

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1 a better way of expressing it. I believe that was2 incorporated into the text.3 Q. Do you remember why?4 A. I do not, no.5 Q. Point 12?6 A. Point 12, I suggested that in a short section on a foot7 and mouth disease vaccine plant that a reference to its8 probable renovation was not necessary. John Scarlett9 agreed with that and the sentence was removed.10 Q. Point 13.11 A. Point 13, I simply made a factual observation that12 I suspected that when they wrote 1991, that was either13 a typographical error or a factual error because it was

14 actually 1998.15 Q. 14.16 A. Point 14 was actually a point that both the17 Prime Minister and I had made; and this was perhaps more18 complicated than some of the others, and this was an19 issue, I think, where my role in offering presentational20 advice was important because the fact is that I did not21 actually understand the way that it had been described22 in the September 16th draft that I saw. And23 Julian Miller, as a result of my failing to understand24 it, actually came and explained it to me and it did25 become clear.

1191 If I can just explain the point that I, as it were,2 did not get. I could not understand why it appeared to3 take less time to build a nuclear device without4 sanctions -- sorry, I beg your pardon, with sanctions5 than it did without sanctions. What Julian Miller came6 and explained to me is what the intelligence was based7 upon was Saddam Hussein's efforts to acquire the8 material illegally. In the end what happened is that9 there was quite a long discussion about this and10 eventually the text, I think, was made more clear.11 Q. Point 15.12 A. What I was trying to suggest here was that given that

13 the Prime Minister, in a sense, wanted to communicate to14 the public the reasons why he was becoming more and more15 concerned about this issue, I was actually suggesting,16 if you like, as an editorial presentational device, that17 within the dossier it was explained on such and such18 a date this assessment with these facts went in; on such19 and such a date this assessment with these facts went20 in. And John Scarlett did not do it in that way. He21 addressed the point in a different way.22 Q. Over the page, page 68. Point 16. Was that an23 important point?24 A. No.25 Q. Do you want to say anything about it?

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1 A. Simply that Ed Owen, who works for the2 Foreign Secretary, had said to John Scarlett in an3 e-mail that I had seen that he felt there were too many4 bullet points in the executive summary, and I did not5 agree with that.6 Q. In your evidence a moment ago, and in fact in your

7 memorandum to Mr Scarlett on 9th September, you had8 referred to your comments being made from9 a presentational point of view?10 A. Yes.11 Q. Would you describe these comments as being made from12 a presentational point of view?13 A. I would.14 Q. Are there any exceptions?15 A. I do not believe there are, no, because at -- I mean16 I think it is important to understand the dynamic of the17 professional relationship that was at the heart of this,18 namely the professional relationship between myself and19 Mr Scarlett. Mr Scarlett was in control of the contents

20 of the dossier. He had asked me for advice on21 presentation. Both of us were conscious of the fact22 that this was a -- the expectations surrounding this23 publication were huge; that the media and24 Parliamentarians were likely to pore over every word.25 John Scarlett will freely admit it is not an area he

1211 has expertise in and I was able to offer the sort of2 advice he wanted.3 Q. Taken together, were these suggestions and comments4 trying to alter the message conveyed by the dossier so5 as to make it more powerful or increase its impact?

6 A. No. I think if you look at the totality of the comments7 that I made, both my own comments and those from the8 Prime Minister, I think you could say that some were9 clearly neutral, if you like, if you are looking at the10 comments that are made about the structure of the11 document. Some you could say, I think fairly, that they12 were suggestions that would strengthen the text. Others13 are suggestions that would weaken parts of the text.14 But the overall aim was actually to seek to provide15 greater clarity.16 Q. Could you look at CAB/42/2, please? This is a letter17 addressed to Clare Sumner following your evidence to the18 Foreign Affairs Committee in which a committee clerk

19 asks you to provide some additional information and20 a note on certain matters.21 The second bullet point asks for:22 "A full list of the changes requested by23 Alastair Campbell to the September dossier, with an24 indication of which were made and which were not made.25 No reasons are required in respect of those not made."

1221 A. Hmm, hmm.2 Q. What did you understand that you were being asked to do3 here?4 A. In relation to that second point?

5 Q. Yes.6 A. I understood I was being asked for a list of changes and


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7 how John Scarlett, on behalf of the JIC, responded to8 those requests for changes.9 Q. You did not include, in your memorandum to the FAC, all10 of the 16 points which we have gone through from your11 memorandum of 17th September. Can you identify the ones12 that you did not include?

13 A. It would be difficult without having the version -- the14 memorandum that I finally sent.15 Q. You did not include, I think this is established, item16 10 for example?17 A. Hmm, hmm.18 Q. Which related to the 45 minutes point?19 A. That is right.20 Q. Why was that?21 A. Because I was -- in relation to point 10, as I said22 a moment ago, I was pointing out an inconsistency23 between the executive summary and the text. I was not24 suggesting how that inconsistency should be addressed.25 I was, therefore, not making the request for a change.

1231 This point about 45 minutes had never been a big issue2 in relation to the planning of the dossier; and the3 final point I would make is that we knew, at that stage,4 that the ISC would be looking at all of these issues5 anyway.6 So I provided what I was asked to provide, which is7 a list of the request for change and John Scarlett's8 responses.9 Q. I want to ask you next, if I may, about the dispute with10 the BBC between 29th May and Dr Kelly's death. You have11 already given evidence about the successive stages of

12 this dispute, and I am not going to ask you to go13 through the history again.14 Can you summarise for us the reasons why you took as15 strong a line as you did?16 A. Well, the first thing I would say is it was not me that17 was taking that -- just me, should I say, that was18 taking the strong line. The Prime Minister and other19 members of the Government took a very strong line on20 this, firstly because these were, in his and the21 Government's view, grave allegations, about as grave as22 could be levelled against the Prime Minister. If they23 were true then it was not just a case of me having to24 resign, the Prime Minister would have had to resign.

25 I think it is also fair to say that I had, if you

1241 like, political instincts that led me to believe that2 this could do very serious damage to the standing of the3 Prime Minister and the Government. It came in the4 middle of what was a pretty concerted campaign against5 the Prime Minister by the opposition and parts of the6 media on the theme of trust.7 I think the other point I would make finally is it8 was the fact that it was the BBC. The BBC is not like9 the Mail on Sunday or the Daily Mail. The BBC is10 probably the most respected media organisation in the

11 world, and rightly. These allegations were going to go,12 as indeed they did, right round the world the moment


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13 they were made.14 Q. What, in summary, was your objection to the way in which15 the BBC sought to respond to your concerns during June16 and the first half of July?17 A. I think my main objection was born of the sense that18 I felt nobody was taking our denials and then, following

19 the denials, our complaints at all seriously.20 As I say, this story went right round the world. It21 was followed up by media organisations here in very22 large number and they gave considerable space to it.23 And the central allegations that started this24 controversy, the BBC and other parts of the media were25 not covering in my view the denials of the

1251 Prime Minister and others fairly or fully and they just2 were not taking our complaints seriously.3 Q. You have described how you thought these were very grave4 allegations. Did the BBC, so far as you could judge

5 from their responses, regard them as grave allegations?6 A. I do not know. I mean I cannot really -- I can only7 make my own judgment upon what they have said publicly8 and what they said to me. But I did not get the sense9 that they were taking them seriously at all. I think to10 them it was just another story to kick around on the11 Today Programme.12 Q. Do you think that there were times during this six or13 seven week period that you expressed yourself more14 strongly than was appropriate, given the view you took15 about the gravity of the allegations?16 A. Well, I think as I indicated both -- as indeed17 I recorded in my diary, and I indicated when I first

18 gave evidence, I think perhaps on the Channel 4 News19 interview, although I stand by the substance of what20 I said, I think the manner in which I said it, at times,21 left something to be desired. But I think it is22 important to understand the sense of anger and23 frustration that is building when you have been accused24 of something very, very serious which you know you have25 not done, when your efforts to seek to resolve it

1261 privately are met with a mixture of disdain and2 indifference, and then when it becomes a public issue3 that the allegations are then sort of redefined and the

4 BBC just try to sort or wish away what they had said and5 try to pretend they had never said it.6 I think that -- I do not make any effort to disguise7 the fact, I was extremely angry, I was very frustrated,8 I was increasingly dispirited about the whole thing, for9 all sorts of reasons. Professional reasons; I felt10 I was not actually doing my job properly in getting11 corrected allegations I knew to be false and were12 damaging the Prime Minister and the Government.13 Political reasons, to which I have alluded to earlier.14 And also personal reasons; it is pretty unpleasant to be15 accused of this kind of thing without a shred of16 evidence and without anybody, it seems, remotely taking

17 seriously the complaint that has been made.18 Q. You have spoken about your own reactions. Are you


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19 talking about your own personal reactions alone or was20 that frustration shared by others?21 A. I think the frustration was shared right through the22 Government because, from the Prime Minister down,23 through the Cabinet, through the intelligence agencies,24 the people that work for me, we all knew the allegations

25 were false; and it is a very difficult thing to try to

1271 deal with.2 Q. I want to ask you, if I may, about two specific points3 which have been raised by certain of the BBC's4 witnesses.5 First of all, it has been said that you did not6 specifically refer to the 6.07 broadcast allegation7 where Mr Gilligan said that the Government probably knew8 that the 45 minutes point was wrong at the time that9 they put it in until about a month after Mr Gilligan's10 original broadcast when you included it in your letter

11 of 26th June.12 What do you say about that?13 A. Well, it is not true. My first letter -- bear in mind14 it is important to understand the whole context of this.15 Not just me but the Prime Minister had been denying this16 on a daily, sometimes twice daily basis since the story17 was first aired. My first letter -- including on the18 floor of the House of Commons, and with specific regard19 to the 45 minutes point.20 My first letter on 6th June said:21 "With regard to the report on the BBC Today22 Programme last Thursday at 0607 (transcript enclosed),23 can you explain to me how it conforms with the BBC's own

24 guidelines, in particular the following three".25 So I attached the transcript, I set out the three

1281 areas of the BBC producer guidelines where I believed2 they may be in breach and I send that to Mr Sambrook.3 How anybody can say from that that I did not raise the4 specific report and the specific allegations that were5 made, I do not understand.6 Q. The second point --7 LORD HUTTON: I think the suggestion is that you complained8 about the reports as a whole and the BBC says there were9 a number of reports on that morning and you did not

10 single out the couple of sentences that said that the11 Government probably knew that the 45 minutes claim was12 wrong.13 A. Well, that, my Lord, is why I attached the transcript of14 the 0607 report.15 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Was it just that report that you16 attached?17 A. There were a number of reports which I felt were18 inaccurate.19 LORD HUTTON: Yes.20 A. The point was this was the report that did the damage.21 LORD HUTTON: Hmm.22 A. This was the report that went round the world. This was

23 the report that the rest of the media here and overseas24 picked up. These were the allegations that were being


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25 levelled against the Government. It was setting out to

1291 Mr Sambrook: here is the transcript. You can judge the2 guidelines as well as I can but these three guidelines3 in relation to the use of a single source I believe need

4 looking at. Added to which, since May 29th, when the5 story was first broadcast, this story was the biggest6 story not just in Britain but in other parts of the7 world as well.8 So the idea that by this stage Mr Sambrook or9 anybody else at the BBC was not aware of the allegations10 that we meant, as I say, I do not have it to hand but11 the quote of the Prime Minister on the floor of the12 House of Commons is very, very clear. He talks about13 how with the backing of the JIC Chairman he was making14 clear that nobody in Government committed this offence15 in relation to the 45 minutes intelligence. So I do not16 think Mr Sambrook or Mr Dyke or anybody else could have

17 been in any doubt about what we were saying.18 MR SUMPTION: The second point which has been suggested by19 some of the BBC witnesses is that it is said the dispute20 had gone quiet by late June, until on 26th June you21 needlessly revived it. What do you say about that?22 A. I do not accept that. Why was I at the Foreign Affairs23 Committee in the first place? As the Chairman of the24 Foreign Affairs Committee said, I was there to answer25 the allegations made against me by the BBC. Added to

1301 which, on the morning of my appearance, I think2 overnight some British soldiers had been killed. That

3 was the lead story on the Today Programme. The second4 story was my appearance at the Foreign Affairs5 Committee.6 I think there were six separate items about it on7 the Today Programme. There was a report by their8 political correspondent Norman Smith who said that the9 reason I am appearing is because the Government has10 realised this story is not going to go away. My11 evidence, long before I said a word, the BBC took the12 decision they were going to cover it live and, like13 other networks, they covered it live. Normally when the14 Prime Minister leaves Downing Street to go to15 Prime Minister's Questions there are a couple of camera

16 crews in the street. The street was packed; and the BBC17 journalists and others were saying they were there for18 me, not the Prime Minister. So I think to suggest this19 story had somehow gone away really does not stand up to20 much examination.21 Q. Can I ask you about another point please? Evidence has22 been given that on the evening of 7th July 2003 you had23 a discussion with Godric Smith in which you suggested24 that Dr Kelly's name should be given out to an evening25 paper. Can you tell us, please, exactly what your

1311 suggestion was, why it was made and what became of it?

2 A. No, it was not a discussion with Godric Smith, it was3 a discussion with the Defence Secretary, part of which


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4 Godric Smith heard on my speaker phone in the office,5 and I was not suggesting to Godric or to Mr Hoon or to6 anybody else that the name of the person who had come7 forward be put into the public domain. I was suggesting8 in advance of the Prime Minister's Liaison Committee9 appearance that the fact of somebody coming forward

10 should be put into the public domain. And there was11 a very -- I hesitate even to call it a proposal, it was12 a thought which was very quickly rejected by the13 Defence Secretary, Godric and Tom Kelly both though it14 was a bad idea. But more importantly I raised it with15 the Prime Minister, he thought it was a bad idea and16 nothing came of it.17 Q. During the period between your having this thought and18 it being sat on by all those people, did you have a view19 about how the name would be conveyed to the press?20 A. No, I was not suggesting the name be conveyed.21 Q. Sorry, the fact that somebody had come forward.22 A. What my thought was based on was the idea of whether

23 this should happen, not how. Had the decision been24 taken that it should have been taken forward, then we25 would have had a discussion about how to do that, but

1321 I was not envisaging doing it in anything other than an2 open way, making clear that this was information that3 would come from the Government.4 Q. Mr Dingemans put to Mr Hoon that no doubt the suggestion5 was that it should be done anonymously. When6 Mr Dingemans puts that question to you, what will your7 answer be?8 A. If he does put that question to me in those terms, that

9 was not what I had in mind.10 Q. What did you have in mind, if anything?11 A. Well, what I had in mind at that point was -- I mean12 bear in mind on 7th July I had been busy all day with if13 you like helping to organise the Government's response14 to the Foreign Affairs Committee report. Come the late15 afternoon, early evening, I am starting to turn my mind16 to the Prime Minister's forthcoming appearance at the17 Liaison Committee and what I had in mind was something,18 a plan, that allowed the Prime Minister when he appeared19 at the Liaison Committee to be able to avoid what20 I think could have been a very difficult situation had21 he been asked about this, the question whether we knew

22 anything about the source.23 What I had in mind was a chain of events which ended24 if you like with the Prime Minister being able to say:25 I am aware of these reports, I am aware somebody has

1331 come forward, it is being handled by the Ministry of2 Defence. My worry was if there was nothing in the3 public domain at that time, either he would be put in4 a position where he could leave himself open to the5 charge of being misleading, in other words if he said6 nothing when he did know something that would be7 difficult or he would be put in a position where he, the

8 Prime Minister, would be launching if you like yet9 another fire storm around this issue.


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10 MR SUMPTION: Thank you very much Mr Campbell.11 Cross-examined by MR CALDECOTT12 Q. Mr Campbell, I have a bundle for you which just may be13 easier than the screen if you want to look at it. One14 for Lord Hutton. (Handed).15 Mr Campbell, in the course of preparing the dossier

16 were you shown any JIC assessments?17 A. No.18 Q. Were the contents of any JIC assessments read out to you19 or summarised during the preparation of the dossier?20 A. Almost certainly they will have been summarised because21 the discussions that I had been having would no doubt22 have been -- would have involved people who were seeing23 JIC assessments the whole time.24 Q. Do you in fact have security clearance to read JIC25 assessments?

1341 A. I do.

2 Q. Could you, please, look at FAC/2/297? This is your3 evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee.4 A. Is this coming on the screen?5 Q. You can either look at it on the screen or the first6 page of your bundle if you prefer. Question 1054. To7 give it some context, can we look at the end of 1053?8 We see that Mr Illsley is asking you questions. This is9 in the context of the September dossier. He says:10 "... did you see raw intelligence material that11 Security Services had or were you provided with12 assessments from the senior intelligence community?"13 You say: "In relation to this?" "This" is the14 September dossier we are on here.

15 Mr Illsley then goes on:16 "In relation to the first dossier now. In general,17 the intelligence you were able to see up to September18 before and after, did you see raw intelligence or was19 this material provided to you as assessments from the20 Intelligence Services?"21 You say this:22 "Again, I am not sure how much or how little of this23 I am supposed to divulge but I certainly saw the Joint24 Intelligence Committee assessments on which the25 September report was based."

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1 That would appear to read to anyone, would it not,2 that you did see JIC assessments in the course of3 preparing the September dossier?4 A. I can see why you might say that; and I would just point5 you back to Mr Illsley's question, to the part where he6 says "you were able to see up to September before and7 after". It is a point I was also asked at the8 Intelligence and Security Committee where I made clear9 that I saw the JIC assessments after the production of10 the dossier, not least in relation to preparing myself11 for the Parliamentary inquiries that the May 29th12 reports led to.13 Q. Let me make two suggestions to you about that. First of

14 all, the words "up to September before and after"15 I suggest are a reference to the first version of the


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16 first dossier evolving, as we know, from the spring17 until the beginning of September, that is up to18 September; then of course we get the revamped version19 developing in the course of the month of September.20 I suggest that is the distinction Mr Illsley was making.21 Secondly, he was not interested at all, was he,

22 whether you saw them after publication of the dossier?23 He was interested in what material you had had as24 a basis for preparing the dossier. So why did you say25 in the context of a question like that that you had seen

1361 the JIC assessments on which the September report was2 based?3 A. Well, again, you would have to ask Mr Illsley what he4 meant by the question. I can only explain and stand by5 the answers that I gave.6 Q. Do you accept that Mr Illsley was only concerned with7 the material you had while you were preparing the

8 September dossier? He was not remotely interested in9 what you had seen after publication?10 A. As well, as I say, you would have to ask Mr Illsley11 that. I know what I saw whilst I was working on the12 dossier and I know what I saw afterwards.13 Q. How many meetings did you attend at which JIC14 assessments were discussed in your presence?15 A. Prior to the ...?16 Q. Prior to publication of the September dossier.17 A. Prior to publication. I mean, I could not give you an18 answer to that. I attended meetings with the19 Prime Minister, I attended meetings with Mr Scarlett and20 with others. Some of them may have been discussing what

21 they knew to be material from the JIC assessments.22 Q. What about intelligence officials being present, apart23 from Mr Scarlett? How many meetings did you attend24 where there were SIS or DIS officials present?25 A. Well, the meetings I was chairing had intelligence

1371 officials present, both from SIS and DIS; and I think2 I gave evidence when I first appeared at the Inquiry3 about another meeting that I had with the4 Prime Minister, had with the head of the SIS and5 a serving SIS officer.6 Q. Were those officials there to bring you up-to-date with

7 any new intelligence and its effect?8 A. The meeting with the Prime Minister?9 Q. No, the meetings you chaired at which there were10 security officials present.11 A. No, they were not meetings about intelligence. They12 were meetings to discuss the presentation of the13 dossier.14 Q. What were the security officials doing there, unless15 they were interested in how the specific intelligence16 would be presented in the dossier in terms of its17 wording?18 A. Well, that is exactly why they were there.19 Q. They were not there for mere presentation, were they?

20 A. No, they were there because they are intelligence21 officials who were involved in the preparation of


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22 a dossier that the Prime Minister was intending to23 present to Parliament which was the JIC's best24 assessment of Saddam Hussein's WMD programmes.25 Q. Is it right to describe the September dossier as

138

1 a distillation of the joint intelligence assessments2 being presented to the Prime Minister?3 A. I would say it is more than that because it also4 included historical background information. But it5 certainly included the core of the JIC assessments that6 had been presented to the Prime Minister.7 Q. I mean, there is no mystery about this. If you look at8 FAC/2/290, those are in fact your own words in answer to9 a question before the Foreign Affairs Committee. It is10 question 1030. I do not think we need the question. If11 we look at your answer at the top of that page:12 "... this is the distillation of the Joint13 Intelligence Committee assessments that were being

14 presented to the Prime Minister."15 A. I think that is fair enough.16 Q. Broadly speaking, the idea was to put the public in the17 place of the Prime Minister so they could share and18 hopefully agree with the judgment the Prime Minister19 himself had made; is that fair?20 A. What led to this dossier was the fact that the21 Prime Minister was constantly having to explain to22 Parliament and the public that he was seeing23 intelligence, it was making him more and more concerned24 and he wanted to share some of that with the public,25 that is right.

1391 Q. I am right, am I not, that as early as 5th September it2 had been agreed between you and Mr Scarlett that there3 should be a substantial rewrite of the dossier with4 Mr Scarlett in charge of the project?5 A. I know we met on the 5th and again on the 9th. As6 a result of those meetings it was made clear right round7 the system, right round every Department likely to be8 involved in the production of the dossier, that anything9 that went before was now in the hands of John Scarlett10 and it was for him to rewrite it as he saw fit.11 Q. Again I do not disagree with that answer, it is just at12 CAB/11/17 for the record, this is an e-mail, I think --

13 is Sandra Powell one of your assistants?14 A. She is.15 Q. From her on your behalf to Jonathan Powell, Chief of16 Staff at Downing Street. Some of these pages have17 multiple e-mails but it is the middle one, in fact:18 "Re dossier, substantial rewrite with JS [that is19 Mr Scarlett] and Julian M [Miller, that is, chief of the20 assessment staff] in charge ..."21 Right?22 A. That is right.23 Q. "... and be in shape Monday thereafter."24 So next Friday, and then be in shape Monday25 thereafter. Friday is 13th September --

140


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1 A. Hmm, hmm.2 Q. -- and Monday is 16th September.3 A. Yes.4 Q. So the plan was that by 16th September the draft, if not5 in final shape, was hoped to be in near final shape; is6 that right?

7 A. I think what I am saying there is that by the time8 John Scarlett and his team had rewritten the entire9 dossier, he would get back from the States and by that10 Monday there would be something else to look at.11 Q. Can you just help me: Parliament was being specifically12 recalled to debate this issue?13 A. That is right.14 Q. Can you tell me when it was that -- was it15 25th September that they sat for the first time?16 A. 24th or 25th, I cannot remember.17 Q. Timing of publication was to coincide with the recall of18 Parliament?19 A. Correct.

20 Q. Can you tell me, I genuinely do not know, when the21 recall of Parliament was actually fixed for that date of22 25th September?23 A. It would have been -- I think normally you have to give24 at least two days' notice for a recall of Parliament25 like that, so it would have been in the days up to the

1411 24th. I think the Inquiry has a copy of my diary where2 I record a conversation with the Speaker when he was in3 New York on the 11th. The reason I remember it was the4 11th, he was there for the commemoration of5 September 11th, and we had a discussion then; and then

6 Jack Straw had a discussion and there were discussions7 between the Speaker's office and No. 10 that followed8 that. I think it was in the week before the 24th.9 Q. We know there is a planning meeting on 9th September;10 and we know that that leads to a memo that you write11 afterwards which starts at CAB/6/2. I will just wait12 for that to come up.13 Do you know precisely who attended that meeting?14 A. This is my meeting on the 9th.15 Q. Yes, which I think is the origins of this memo. This is16 not a minute, this is something you send out later in17 the day to Mr Scarlett?18 A. Yes. I could not tell you exactly who was there.

19 Certainly myself, John Scarlett, I recall David Manning20 being there for a part of the meeting, Jim Poston who21 was then the head of the CIC. There were two or three22 representatives of the Foreign Office. There were23 representatives of the MoD and DIS and there were24 representatives of the Security Service.25 Q. I think you said there were three very senior SIS

1421 officers present?2 A. No, I had a separate meeting prior to this with3 John Scarlett and three SIS officers. Again, I would4 have to check with their memories as well, but I think

5 only one of them stayed or two maybe stayed for the6 whole meeting.


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7 Q. What was the purpose of that first meeting?8 A. As I explained when I first gave evidence, there had9 been a number of reports, specifically one in the10 Daily Telegraph and one in the Financial Times, and the11 SIS officers, one wanted to convey to me and I think12 through me to the Prime Minister that these reports did

13 not reflect their views or the views in their view of14 the agencies; and we also then had a discussion about15 how the dossier process might evolve. Then we had the16 broader meeting, and that led to this outcome.17 Q. Was there any discussion at either meeting of the JIC18 assessment which was finalised on the very same day,19 9th September?20 A. None that I can recall.21 Q. Could you, please, just look at CAB/6/3, which is the22 second page of your memo produced as a result of this23 meeting.24 A. Hmm, hmm.25 Q. About five lines in do you see from the top:

1431 "The media/political judgment will inevitably focus2 on "what's new?" and I was pleased to hear from you and3 your SIS colleagues that, contrary to media reports4 today, the intelligence community are taking such5 a helpful approach to this in going through all the6 material they have."7 A. Hmm, hmm.8 Q. Surely you must have asked, must you not, what the9 latest intelligence was, at least in outline at this10 meeting?11 A. No, what they were saying was that they -- it was not

12 the case that those who had been asked to take part in13 this exercise were in any way being resistant to it, and14 I felt it important, and I think John Scarlett did as15 well, given that this note was going to be circulated so16 widely, that their view as representatives of the17 leadership of SIS was being put down in print like that18 and communicated. But it was not -- they were saying,19 indeed I think the same day, as I recall it, I remember20 the Foreign Secretary saying to me he had had21 a discussion with Sir Richard Dearlove, who had made the22 same point to him. They were going to be as helpful as23 they possibly could be, bearing in mind the obvious24 issues of security and source protection. That is the

25 point I am making there.

1441 Q. It looks as though it was on about this date that the2 decision was made that there should be a section in the3 dossier expressly dealing with JIC assessments.4 A. Well, that was not an outcome of that meeting. The5 point about the JIC assessments was the one that I made6 in the note that Mr Sumption took me through a short7 while ago, which was that I felt it was important, it8 was possible to do, to convey, through the dossier, to9 the public that sense of mounting concern, which can be10 expressed through the JIC assessments. But I was not at

11 that stage articulating that.12 Q. Mr Campbell, what is puzzling me is this. You are


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13 a communicator. This is a very important document.14 A decision is made about this date to go public with the15 JIC assessments. It just seems extraordinary that you16 were not interested to know what the updated17 intelligence on Iraq at least broadly was at this stage.18 A. I am not saying I was not interested in that. In my

19 view it was always going to be the case that the JIC20 assessments were going to be the basis of this because21 that is what the Prime Minister has been seeing, that is22 what was giving him cause for concern. They were the23 concerns they wanted to communicate to the public.24 Q. When did the 45 minutes claim first come to your25 attention?

1451 A. When I first read the September 10th draft.2 Q. And you had not heard of it until then?3 A. I had not.4 Q. When you read the 10th/11th draft you presumably

5 assumed, it having been drafted by the chief of6 assessment staff, that it reflected accurately the JIC7 assessment?8 A. I certainly assumed it would reflect accurately what the9 intelligence community thought at that time. Whether it10 came from an assessment or raw intelligence it frankly11 was not for me to know, but the --12 Q. Sorry to interrupt you, Mr Campbell. I just want to be13 clear about this: are you saying that you never realised14 that the 45 minutes claim was based on a final JIC15 assessment as opposed to something else?16 A. No, I am not saying that. I assumed that it did, but17 when I first --

18 Q. Thank you.19 A. -- read the draft of the dossier on September 10th, and20 I have to say that this 45 minute point has taken on21 huge significance following the May 29th allegations of22 the BBC. At the time it was a very small minor part of23 the dossier.24 Q. It took on huge significance on September 25th in the25 media of this country, did it not, Mr Campbell?

1461 A. I do not think it did. As Mr Dingemans showed me the2 front page of the Evening Standard, and that -- it is3 true that the Evening Standard, which is one newspaper,

4 led on it. I think two other national newspapers made5 that their main point. My point is in the Government,6 in its presentation, it did not. It was not a big deal.7 Q. Can we go back, please, just for a moment, to CAB/6/2,8 the front page of the minute you wrote afterwards? As9 I understand it, at this stage the position was already10 agreed on 5th September, Mr Scarlett was doing11 a substantial rewrite and he was in charge?12 A. Hmm.13 Q. Your interest, you say, and this is the word you14 frequently use, was presentational?15 A. Hmm, hmm.16 Q. Can I ask you this: why were you chairing a meeting on

17 9th September with these senior people present? Why was18 Mr Scarlett not chairing it?


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19 A. I was chairing a meeting because the Prime Minister had20 asked me to look at the presentational aspects of the21 dossier. In terms of the status, if you like, of myself22 and John Scarlett, I think for anything with regard to23 the content of the dossier John Scarlett was, if you24 like, superior to me. I was making points about

25 presentation, which I think were legitimate and

1471 appropriate and which the Prime Minister would have2 expected me to do. But I do not think it struck anybody3 in that meeting as odd that it took place in my room and4 that I chaired the meeting.5 Q. It was a very important meeting, was it not?6 A. It was an important meeting in terms of the planning of7 the dossier, certainly.8 Q. Why were minutes not taken of that meeting?9 A. The note that is there on the screen is an accurate10 account of the outcome of that meeting.

11 Q. What it actually says at the beginning is:12 "At our discussion this morning, we agreed it would13 be helpful if I set out for colleagues the process by14 which the Iraq dossier will be produced."15 A. Which is what the meeting was about.16 Q. Did nobody make any notes at that meeting of what17 actually took place?18 A. I did not. I have a lot of meetings, they are not19 routinely minuted. I am not a minister. The point20 about this note is it set out accurately the outcome of21 our meeting; and that is, in my view -- we are all busy22 and that is the important thing from that meeting.23 Q. You see, it is a planning meeting for a wholly

24 unprecedented publication of intelligence material to25 the general public, I think for the first time.

1481 A. No, we had the Al-Qaida document.2 Q. There had been one before, you are quite right. I stand3 corrected. This was a rather wider --4 A. It was.5 Q. Nobody took a live note of what was said at that6 meeting, nobody?7 A. I did not, my staff did not and I believe that the note8 that was sent out was an accurate account of the outcome9 of that meeting. I think that was sufficient for its

10 purpose.11 Q. You do understand that there is a problem with12 accountability if you do not have contemporary notes of13 what is agreed at meetings?14 A. Well, if I had to -- as well as the people I have15 working for me to do the jobs that they do, also had to16 have an infrastructure to take notes of every single17 meeting that I have, then that would be a considerable18 additional cost to the Exchequer.19 Q. Can you have a look at the bottom of CAB/6/3, please?20 This is the second page of your note:21 "In the meantime, I will chair a team that will go22 through the document from a presentational point of

23 view, and make recommendations to you. This team,24 I suggest, will include John Williams..."; he is Press


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25 Secretary at the Foreign Office?

1491 A. Head of News at the Foreign Office.2 Q. Mr Hammill, from the Foreign Office also?3 A. The CIC, which is based in the Foreign Office.

4 Q. Mr Bassett, your special adviser?5 A. Well, the Prime Minister's special adviser6 Q. Is that not Mr Bradshaw? I thought Mr Bassett worked7 for you and Mr Bradshaw for the Prime Minister. Maybe I8 have it the wrong way round.910 A. They both work for me but we all work for the11 Prime Minister.12 Q. It sound as if we are both right.13 A. Yes.14 Q. I want to ask you about this line in the middle:15 "Writing by committee does not work..."16 A. Hmm, hmm.

17 Q. "... but we will make recommendations and suggestions,18 and you can decide what you want to incorporate."19 A. Hmm, hmm.20 Q. That means, does it not, that you are going to make21 recommendations and suggestions about the writing?22 A. This group did not happen.23 Q. Can you just answer the question please about the24 specific sentence?25 A. What I am saying there is, as you rightly say when you

1501 read it out, that this team would make recommendations2 and suggestions and John Scarlett could decide what he

3 wanted to incorporate. I am simply making the factual4 point that in fact in the end we did not set up the team5 because John Scarlett took control of the writing in its6 entirety.7 Q. Why at this very early stage, before you had even seen8 a draft from Mr Scarlett, were you talking about making9 writing suggestions as part of the planning process?10 A. Because at that stage, and I think again I recorded this11 at the time, and I think this was raised by Mr Dingemans12 when I first appeared, what this meeting decided was13 that John Scarlett would be in charge and No. 10 would14 give him whatever support he wanted.15 Now, the other thing that was happening was that

16 there were people from other Departments who were17 wanting, quite rightly, to be involved and I was seeking18 to bring those people in. But it was clear, from this19 moment, that John Scarlett was in charge; and20 John Scarlett and his team took over the writing of the21 dossier.22 Q. Can we just look at the last sentence on that subject:23 "Once they are incorporated..."24 A. Hmm, hmm.25 Q. What is "they"? That is your writing suggestions, is

1511 it?

2 A. Yes.3 Q. So once your writing suggestions are incorporated,


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4 "... we need to take a judgment as to whether a single5 person should be appointed to write the final version."6 A. Yes.7 Q. Now, Mr Scarlett's evidence I think was that he had8 already made it clear that he was to be in charge at the9 meeting.

10 A. Yes.11 Q. Why were you suggesting that some other single person12 should be appointed to write the final version after13 Mr Scarlett had made that clear?14 A. I think it is fair to say Mr Scarlett and I at this15 stage were in a management process by which we were16 making clear and we were laying down what was going to17 happen on this dossier. There were all sorts of parts18 of the Government that may have thought they had19 a vested interest in being involved, and indeed to20 a greater and lesser extent some were involved. But by21 this point Mr Scarlett and I were very, very clear about22 the process that would follow.

23 Q. You would be aware, Mr Campbell, would you, that the24 language of JIC assessments is an exercise in precision?25 A. Well, that is again not -- I mean, I am not an

1521 intelligence expert. I think sometimes intelligence can2 also reflect imprecision but, yes, I agree with the3 basic premise of your question.4 Q. I do not want to ask you about the final JIC assessment5 if you never saw it or had it read to you in terms on6 the 45 minutes. Did you or did you not have it --7 A. I did not.8 Q. Could we please look at BBC/29/9? You will appreciate,

9 Mr Campbell, I do not have the time to debate the whole10 dossier and I am going to focus on the 45 minutes as the11 main area of controversy.12 A. Hmm, hmm.13 Q. This is a construct produced by us with the agreement of14 the Inquiry just to make it a little bit more15 manageable.16 A. Is this in the folder as well?17 Q. It should be. It is a document headed "The 45 minutes18 claim as it appeared in the draft of 10/11 September19 2002". It has a rather big heading.20 A. 29/0009.21 Q. It is on the screen.

22 A. I will stick with the screen. It is okay.23 Q. This is a draft you received after the 9th September24 meeting we have been talking about and we see the way it25 is dealt with, first of all in the executive summary at

1531 the top of the page; and do you see the words:2 "Recent intelligence adds to this picture. It3 indicates that..."; do you see?4 A. Yes.5 Q. Then we see the wording of the 45 minutes claim?6 A. Hmm.7 Q. You would agree, it is perfectly obvious, that a summary

8 is designed to summarise the text, the text is not9 designed to summarise the summary?


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10 A. Hmm, hmm.11 Q. Then we see the text which uses a different word, last12 sentence of paragraph 13:13 "Within the last month intelligence has suggested14 that the Iraqi military would be able to use their15 chemical and biological weapons within 45 minutes of an

16 order to do so."17 You would have assumed, would you not, this having18 been drafted by the Chief of Assessment Staff, under the19 supervision of the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence20 Committee, that this language would accurately reflect21 any JIC assessment on which it was based?22 A. I would, but also I would say that in a drafting process23 that anybody working in the drafting process would24 assume that any inconsistencies would be picked up, as25 indeed they were.

1541 Q. But you agree with me that you would to look to the main

2 text, first of all, to see where the JIC assessments are3 reflected?4 A. I think you would read the dossier from start to finish5 and certainly presentationally the executive summary was6 bound to be probably the most important part of the7 document.8 Q. Did you have any problem with the wording either in the9 executive summary or in the main text as it was10 expressed in the 10th/11th September draft?11 A. Well, the only problem that I had in any part of the12 dossier that related to this point was the one that13 I drew Mr Sumption's attention to earlier.14 Q. So let us be quite clear about this. Insofar as

15 Mr Scarlett ever talks to you about the 45 minutes claim16 in relation to this draft, you say you have absolutely17 no problems at all with the way it is put here?18 A. I am saying the problem that I had was the one that19 I drew attention to.20 Q. Let us look here, Mr Campbell. There is no21 inconsistency in this version between the executive22 summary and the main text, "indicating" and "suggesting"23 being, both of them, in the land of possibility rather24 than certainty. Three lines up in the main text it is25 a suggestion, and in the opening line it is an

155

1 indication in the executive summary. Broadly similar2 words and there is no inconsistency that any ordinary3 mortal would see there, do you agree?4 A. Yes. But can I just add to that that was not something5 that struck me at the time. What struck me at the time6 was the inconsistency that I pointed out.7 Q. That is a later version. I am interested in this8 version.9 A. Well, I have to tell you when I first read the dossier,10 and I think this goes for quite a lot of people who read11 it both within the Government and when it was published12 outside the Government, I am not sure this 45 minutes13 point carried quite the weight that you think. And

14 I drew attention to the 45 minutes point in the way that15 I did -- there is no point me pretending that I can


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16 remember how I reacted when I first saw that draft.17 Q. Can I just show you DOS/2/7, please? The next page if18 you want to see it in hard copy if it is easier. It is19 just to point out to you that in fact that word20 "indicates" governs a whole series of judgments and not21 just the 45 minutes claim.

22 A. Hmm, hmm. That may be so. But I do not think that is23 a point for me.24 Q. You got that draft, did you, on 11th September or the25 10th? Can you remember which?

1561 A. I think I am right in saying I first received the draft2 on the 10th and I read it that evening.3 Q. Is it right that you arranged a meeting with Mr Scarlett4 for 6 o'clock on 11th September in reaction to that5 draft?6 A. I do not know is the answer to that.7 Q. Could you look at CAB/11/32, please? This is from

8 Mr Matthews to Alison Blackshaw, another one of your9 assistants, I think?10 A. Hmm, hmm.11 Q. 11th September, just after midday. You will see12 underneath that:13 "Alastair Campbell is meeting John Scarlett tonight14 at 6.00 pm to discuss the Iraq dossier."15 Do you see that?16 A. Hmm, hmm.17 Q. "Others in attendance will be..." Then these are all18 Downing Street staff, are they not?19 A. Hmm hmm.20 Q. Tom Kelly, Godric Smith, Phil Bassett and Danny Pruce?

21 A. Hmm, hmm. I have no reason to assume that meeting did22 not go ahead.23 Q. I think we know from Mr Scarlett that it did.24 A. Hmm, hmm.25 Q. Mr Scarlett gave evidence that some e-mails were put to

1571 him; and he said he remembered the broad effect of those2 e-mails being mentioned. I just want to show one or two3 of them to you. CAB/11/25, an e-mail from you to4 Mr Bassett, your senior special adviser. It is the top5 of that page:6 "Re draft dossier (J Scarlett version of 10 Sept).

7 "Very long way to go, I think. Think we're in a lot8 of trouble with this as it stands now."9 What trouble did you understand him to be meaning10 there, Mr Campbell?11 A. I think he is saying that he was not terribly impressed12 with the draft; but I was impressed by the draft and13 actually thought it did form the basis of a very strong14 document.15 Q. He meant political trouble, did he not?16 A. I do not believe so.17 Q. Can I just show you another one from Mr Bassett who we18 know attends this meeting with Mr Scarlett. CAB/11/23.19 This is sent to you and Mr Godric Smith and Mr Pruce,

20 all of whom are attending this meeting. About four21 paragraphs in:


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22 "Crucially, though, it's intelligence-lite. It23 feels like this is the least possible intelligence24 material the intell people are prepared to let go25 (despite the fact that we say at a couple of points

158

1 eg para 2 that it's everything the Govt knows on the2 issue~-- which it clearly isn't)."3 How does Mr Bassett know it clearly is not all the4 intelligence available on that issue?5 A. I do not know and I do not know that he does.6 Q. If he does not know that it is, it is an expression of7 considerable frustration, is it not?8 A. I think I dealt with some of these e-mails when I first9 gave evidence and I stand exactly by what I said then,10 that there were -- within the office, people were making11 comments, trying to be helpful. But at this stage it12 was absolutely clear who was in charge, that was13 John Scarlett, and who within No. 10 was communicating

14 with John Scarlett, and that was myself,15 Sir David Manning and Jonathan Powell; and not, with16 respect, Phil Bassett, Danny Pruce or any other people17 on this e-mail.18 Q. Mr Bassett is a senior special adviser, is he not?19 A. He is a special adviser. He no longer works in No. 10,20 he works for Lord Faulkner. But I am not sure special21 advisers are -- I think I can say I was a senior special22 adviser. I think the rest are pretty much of equal23 rank.24 Q. You see, Mr Bassett is at the meeting, he sends this25 e-mail two and a half hours before the meeting. These

1591 sentiments were expressed in strong terms to Mr Scarlett2 at the meeting, were they not?3 A. No, they were not, and the discussion that mattered was4 the discussion that I was having with John Scarlett and5 any discussion that the Prime Minister, Sir David6 Manning or Jonathan Powell were having with7 John Scarlett.8 Q. Read on:9 "All intelligence material tends to read like10 unevidenced assertion, and we have to find a way to get11 over this (a) by having better intelligence material,12 (b) by having more material (and better flagged-up) and

13 (c) more convincing material (eg by printing some of it14 eg as appendices, with names, identifiers etc blacked15 out."16 Do you see that?17 A. Hmm, hmm.18 Q. Are none of these sentiments pointed out to Mr Scarlett19 two and a half hours later?20 A. Not to my recollection, no, because any discussion I was21 having with John Scarlett was based on -- I did not22 agree with this assessment. I did not agree that23 the September 10th draft was not a good document, it24 was. Obviously, as John Scarlett himself said, there25 was a lot of work to do on it and that work was done.

160


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1 But it was done according to the principles we had2 agreed and that were set out in that note3 of September 9th.4 Q. Can we look at BBC/29/10 which is the next draft of5 16th September. At this stage I want to point out one6 thing to you. Do you see at the bottom that

7 a conclusion has been added by Mr Scarlett? Indeed, yet8 again there were more than one, but this is the one we9 focused on:10 "We judge that the current position is as follows:11 "... Some weapons could be deployed within12 45 minutes of an order."13 Do you see that?14 A. I do, yes.15 Q. Whose idea was it to have a conclusion?16 A. It was John Scarlett's idea to have a conclusion.17 Q. Are you sure about that?18 A. I am sure about that.19 Q. Can you go back to CAB/11/23, please; Mr Bassett's

20 memorandum to you. Just after the passage I read out:21 "It needs to end. At the moment it just stops.22 A conclusion, saying something -- making a case which is23 compelling. At the moment, it isn't."24 Are you sure it was not Mr Bassett who suggested to25 Mr Scarlett that there should be a conclusion which was

1611 compelling?2 A. I am sure. And as I said the last time I appeared, I am3 not even aware that Mr Scarlett would have been made4 aware of these e-mails, I doubt that he was. There5 is -- Mr Scarlett had the idea of writing a conclusion,

6 he drafted a conclusion. He raised the conclusion with7 me later and I knew that he had doubts about it himself.8 I read the conclusion he drafted and I agreed with those9 doubts and ultimately there was no conclusion.10 Q. Can we, please, just go back to BBC/29/10, which is the11 next version of 16th September. We see at the12 beginning, and it is rather maddening having to jump13 backwards and forwards, but the phrase it indicates that14 in the first draft, in the executive summary, has15 suddenly become:16 "And it allows us to judge that ..."17 And again, you have seen that the conclusion is in18 emphatic terms:

19 "We judge that ... weapons could ..."20 Do you see the beginning and the end?21 But in the middle we see three lines in:22 "The Iraqi military may be able to deploy these23 weapons within 45 minutes of a decision to do so."24 Again on page 17 of the dossier, point 5:25 "The Iraqi military may be able to deploy chemical

1621 or biological weapons."2 Now, the main text had been supplied to JIC members3 for comment by this stage, had it not, and they had come4 on it? This is the 10th/11th September version.

5 A. Sorry, this is now the 16th, is it?6 Q. This is the 16th. We have moved on one.


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7 A. Hmm, hmm.8 Q. The first version had been to the JIC members, I think9 circulated by Mr Scarlett on about 11th September, and10 you may not have known this, but they were asked11 particularly to focus on section 6 of the main text, and12 this is what we have, the main text with the word "may"

13 in it, in both cases; do you see?14 A. Hmm, hmm.15 Q. You would agree, looking at it, the executive summary16 and the conclusion are plainly in stronger terms, are17 they not?18 A. As I say, the only point I made in relation to this is19 the inconsistency I pointed out between the executive20 summary and the text, which I think was the first from21 the main text that you read.22 Q. You were given the 16th September draft on the morning23 of 17th September. We can see that from the minute24 which Mr Sumption showed you at CAB/11/66.25 "As I was writing this, the Prime Minister had read

1631 of the draft you gave me this morning, and he too made2 a number of points."3 Then we get his points.4 A. Yes.5 Q. And then we get yours at the bottom of the page.6 A. Hmm, hmm.7 Q. I am not going to go through all of them because we will8 be here until next week if I do. But if we look at9 point 1 which you were asked about.10 A. Concealment?11 Q. Yes. It is right, is it, in fact that when you

12 subsequently give evidence to the FAC you only mention13 the first sentence of 1, not the second?14 A. I will have to take your word for that. I do not have15 the FAC memorandum, unless you can -- I have it16 somewhere, I can find it.17 Q. I can put it up for you on the screen. Give me18 a minute. It is CAB/1/266.19 A. Actually I can read -- I have not seen the evidence,20 I beg your pardon. Yes.21 Q. CAB/1/266. The second paragraph is point 1.22 A. Yes.23 Q. "I suggested that in the light of Iraq's agreement24 of September 16 to allow UN inspects to return to Iraq,

25 we should further address the issue of Iraq's current

1641 concealment plans as assessed by the JIC."2 Do you see?3 A. There is nothing on the screen at the moment at all.4 Q. I do apologise. CAB/1/266, please.5 A. Yes. It is quite a long way down, I think.6 Q. CAB/1/266. Can we go on to the next page, please? That7 is it. It is the second paragraph on that page, do you8 see?9 A. Yes.10 Q. You will see that that paragraph deals with the first

11 sentence of paragraph 1 of your memo that we were just12 looking at.


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13 A. Yes.14 Q. That is all it deals with. If we go back to CAB/11/67,15 we will see that there is a second sentence:16 "Also in the executive summary, it would be stronger17 if we said that despite sanctions and the policy of18 containment, he has made real progress, even if this

19 echoes the Prime Minister."20 A suggestion from you, prefaced by the words "it21 would be stronger".22 A. Hmm, hmm.23 Q. Can we now look, please, at CAB/3/25? You will see, at24 the very top of the page, that suggestion is adopted25 almost verbatim, top two lines of that page.

1651 A. Yes.2 Q. Why did you not tell the FAC about that suggestion3 prefaced by the words "it would be stronger"?4 A. I mean, I do not know and I do not think it is a very --

5 within the discussions we were having, either myself and6 John Scarlett or myself and the FAC, I do not think it7 is a very big point. I agree with you that for the sake8 of completeness it could easily have gone in. I do not9 think -- I would have had nothing to worry about that10 being expressed in exactly the way you have expressed11 it.12 Q. Can I just point out to you the uses of the word13 "stronger", "weak" and "weaker" in this memo. Bottom of14 the first page, CAB/11/66, I just want to put this15 suggestion to you:16 "... my detailed comments on the draft, which is17 much stronger."

18 A. Hmm, hmm.19 Q. Was that in fact reflecting the request you had made to20 him at the meeting on 11th September?21 A. No, it is an observation that the dossier as it goes22 through the drafting process is improving and becoming23 clearer, becoming the kind of document that the24 Prime Minister would feel comfortable about presenting25 to Parliament.

1661 Q. Can we go back again to CAB/11/67, the next page,2 please? I just want to point out to you this recurrence3 of this formula. The second and third line of 1:

4 "It would be stronger if ..."5 A. Hmm, hmm.6 Q. Paragraph 2, second line:7 "... it is weaker 'may have'."8 A. Hmm, hmm.9 Q. Paragraph 10:10 "... 'may' is weaker than in the summary."11 Paragraph 11:12 "... 'could' is weak, 'capable of being used' is13 better."14 A. Hmm, hmm.15 Q. Paragraph 15:16 "It would be stronger if..."

17 What you were concerned to do was to strengthen the18 language of the dossier, were you not, through these


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19 suggestions or at least most of them?20 A. I was keen, and this is the job the Prime Minister asked21 me to do, to make sure that the dossier as presented to22 Parliament was a strong, clear, consistent document that23 allowed him effectively to explain to the British public24 the reality of the threat posed by Saddam Hussein's WMD.

25 That is my job in these circumstances; and I think if

1671 you are saying "strong" equals "sexed up", I do not2 accept that at all. If you are saying "strong" equals3 a good, solid piece of work that does the job that the4 Prime Minister wants it to do, then I agree with that.5 Q. Would it be sexing up -- sorry.6 LORD HUTTON: Carry on, Mr Caldecott.7 MR CALDECOTT: Would it be sexing up the dossier to change8 the text, to strengthen the text to match the summary9 rather than to lower the summary to match the text,10 Mr Campbell?

11 A. It would depend on the circumstances that you were12 putting. None of it would be sexing up unless you were13 doing something improper in relation to the intelligence14 judgments. This dossier could only be as strong as15 a public document as the underlying intelligence16 assessments allowed it to be.17 Q. Why were you commenting on the intelligence judgments at18 all?19 A. I was not. I was commenting upon a draft of a document20 that the Prime Minister was expected to present to21 Parliament and the public. And I was doing so in my22 capacity as the Prime Minister's adviser, and in this23 instance John Scarlett's adviser because that is what he

24 had asked me to do, on presentational issues.25 Q. The response you got from Mr Scarlett on the 45 minutes

1681 point is at CAB/11/71; and obviously I accept that this2 is mainly a point for him, but all he says is:3 "The language you queried on the old page 17 has4 been tightened."5 A. Hmm, hmm.6 Q. Do you see that?7 A. I do. I am aware of that.8 Q. He had adopted a change which you had initiated, had he9 not?

10 A. No. May I say, I do not think there would have been11 anything improper had he done so because I had pointed12 out an inconsistency and it was for John Scarlett to13 resolve that in whatever way he and Julian Miller and14 Julian Miller's team wanted. But, as I understand it15 from Mr Scarlett, that is a point Mr Miller had already16 spotted. I do not accept that in me saying on page 17,17 two lines from the bottom, "'may' is weaker than in the18 summary" I am doing anything more than pointing out what19 is an inconsistency, which is one of the points the20 Prime Minister had asked me to undertake.21 Q. I do not understand what it was that Mr Miller had22 spotted.

23 A. The inconsistency.24 Q. Okay, he spotted an inconsistency between the main text


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25 and the summary of the main text?

1691 A. Correct.2 Q. The answer is perfectly obvious, you have to downplay3 the summary so it matches the text, it is very simple,

4 is it not?5 A. No, the answer depends --6 Q. The summary is too strong.7 A. The answer depends upon the underlying intelligence8 assessments which Mr Scarlett and Mr Miller have. They9 are not a matter for me.10 Q. But you knew it had been round to JIC members, it had11 been round the agencies, and we have a draft on12 16th September which talks about "may". What business13 was it of yours to suggest that "may" might be14 strengthened?15 A. I am not suggesting "may" might be strengthened. I am16 pointing out that in one place it is more definitive

17 than in another. That is an inconsistency. And this is18 a document which -- I mean the JIC, their job, most of19 the time, is obviously to prepare assessments to be read20 by small numbers of other experts. This was a document21 to be read by the public. And that -- it was being22 presented by the Prime Minister. It was going to23 attract massive attention around the world. I was doing24 the job on this the Prime Minister asked me to do. And25 this was a very, very, very small part of it. This was

1701 not an important part of those discussions.2 Q. You were writing a foreword at this time, were you not,

3 for the --4 LORD HUTTON: Mr Caldecott, before we proceed, could we just5 try to see where we are on this point because I think it6 is of some importance. As I understand it, you are7 suggesting to Mr Campbell that if he strengthens the8 document from the point of view of presentation that is,9 to use the term that was used in Mr Gilligan's report,10 "sexing up" the dossier.11 Mr Campbell, as I understand his evidence, is saying12 that if he makes presentational points which, I think he13 accepts, may strengthen the document, that is14 permissible provided it does not alter the intelligence.15 Mr Campbell, I think, is suggesting that on his

16 understanding that is not sexing up the document.17 First of all, is that the way in which you are18 putting the point to Mr Campbell?19 MR CALDECOTT: My Lord, I fully accept that to a substantial20 degree this must be a point for Mr Scarlett because21 after all he is responsible for the ultimate draft.22 LORD HUTTON: Yes.23 MR CALDECOTT: However, there is a point which I have yet to24 come to, which is why I will be --25 LORD HUTTON: I do not want to anticipate, but I think it is

1711 an important point and I want just to be clear what the

2 difference between you and Mr Campbell so far is.3 Mr Campbell, have I correctly summarised the point


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4 that you have been making in the point I put to5 Mr Caldecott?6 A. You have.7 LORD HUTTON: Yes.8 MR CALDECOTT: The point I want to develop with you --9 actually, if the stenographers want a break now, it

10 would be convenient, if they want one.11 LORD HUTTON: Yes. I will rise.12 (3.22 pm)13 (Short Break)14 (3.28 pm)15 LORD HUTTON: Yes Mr Caldecott.16 MR CALDECOTT: Mr Campbell, just to remember the chronology,17 there is a draft of 16th September that you get on the18 morning of the 17th. We were debating the differences19 between the wording and the text, your suggestion or20 your comment to Mr Scarlett about the tension between21 the executive summary and the main text. Just for22 completeness, at BBC/29/11, perhaps you can take this

23 from me, the word "may" becomes "are" in the main text24 as a consequence of your exchange, or you would say as a25 consequence of your exchange and Mr Miller's further

1721 work, and I will explore that with Mr Scarlett.2 I do want to ask you about this is that before you3 actually got a copy of the 16th September draft, you had4 already been drafting, had you not, a foreword for the5 Prime Minister?6 A. I do not know when I began drafting the foreword, but it7 was around about this time.8 Q. Let me try to help you. If we look at CAB/11/38,

9 please, this looks a surprisingly uninformative10 document, but if one looks at that little paper there,11 you see "foreword" almost illegibly underneath it; do12 you see?13 A. I do.14 Q. 16th September, 3.42, subject: draft.15 A. Hmm, hmm.16 Q. Annexed to it we get a first draft of the17 Prime Minister's foreword, which I think you were18 writing?19 A. I drafted a foreword based on a discussion with the20 Prime Minister and my colleagues.21 Q. All I wanted to ask you about was a passage on

22 CAB/11/40, the second page, the top of that page, the23 first paragraph, last three lines where you see24 a reference to WMD. Then:25 "And the document discloses that his military

1731 planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within2 45 minutes of an order to use them."3 A. Hmm, hmm.4 Q. This is not a very long document. You plainly had5 selected 45 minutes as a message worth including in the6 Prime Minister's foreword?7 A. Well, more to the point the Prime Minister had. Can

8 I also just say I can see from that and the line above,9 for example, "internal" when it should be "intention"


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10 and also some of the question marks on page 1, that is11 my secretary typing up my first handwritten version12 before it comes back to me.13 Q. I do not quarrel with you at all Mr Campbell about this14 being an early draft. Indeed, that is the point I make.15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Why were you as it were formulating an account of the17 45 minutes point before the text had been finalised in18 the dossier itself?19 A. I was, I think, at the right time in the process, given20 that the foreword obviously was going to be an important21 part of the document overall, it would be the first22 thing that anybody getting the document would read, this23 was the right time to start drafting the foreword.24 I had a discussion with the Prime Minister, I think with25 David Manning, with Jonathan Powell, certainly with

1741 John Scarlett, and I based -- I started a draft based

2 upon what the Prime Minister wanted to say. And3 certainly that was one of the points that he felt was4 worth covering.5 Q. One thing I think we can agree on, having looked at6 these three drafts, is that the wording of the7 45 minutes claim has been changing, has it not?8 A. Within the foreword or within the dossier?9 Q. Within the text and within the executive summary.10 Forget the foreword for a moment, I am talking about the11 dossier.12 A. Yes.13 Q. Of course come the Foreign Affairs Committee you were14 personally very focused on the 45 minutes claim because

15 of the allegations made by Mr Gilligan?16 A. Hmm, hmm.17 Q. I want to ask you about an answer you gave to Mr Ottaway18 at FAC/2/279. His question at question 987:19 "You use some rather interesting wording in your20 memorandum that to suggest it was inserted against the21 wishes of the intelligence agencies was false. Was it22 put in at your suggestion?"23 That is the 45 minutes claim.24 A. Yes.25 Q. "No" you say. I am not suggesting you did insert it.

175

1 "It existed in the very first draft and, as far as I am2 aware, that part the paper stayed like that."3 A. Hmm, hmm.4 Q. How were you able to give that answer when you knew5 there had been a number of changes to the 45 minutes6 claim in the drafts?7 A. I think I am right in saying in the foreword the8 45 minutes point did not change. I accept and agree9 that within the various points of the different drafts10 of the dossier where the 45 minutes point was put that11 they were changing, but I do not think the central12 thrust of the point changed at all. I mean I accept13 that -- bear in mind, again, at this point I have not,

14 as we have for the purposes of this Inquiry, sat down15 literally and gone through every draft and every e-mail


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16 and every note and all the rest of it. I think the17 central point I am making is that the 45 minutes point,18 the thrust of that point, stayed the same throughout;19 and I certainly had no influence upon it whatever. And20 you skirted by -- you said you are not suggesting that21 I inserted it, but I mean --

22 Q. I did not skirt by it. I expressly made the point in23 fairness to you actually.24 A. I am grateful for that; but I think it is important that25 I am allowed to set the context for my FAC appearance,

1761 which is that I was being accused of that very thing,2 and that is what I was there to defend myself against.3 Q. Mr Campbell, am I right that you are saying that you did4 not look through the drafts for the purpose of your5 giving your evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee?6 A. I did not look through every draft, no.7 Q. Could you please look at FAC/2/288, answer 1021:

8 "Mr Chidgey: ... anything you can give us to9 demonstrate otherwise would, of course, be very10 helpful...", that is no political interference.11 "Mr Campbell: As I say, I do not think I can make12 that judgment for the intelligence agencies who were13 producing the various drafts as they evolved, but in14 relation to the changes that I was suggesting on either15 changes that I was suggesting or that I was putting16 forward to the Chairman of the Joint Intelligence17 Committee on behalf of the Prime Minister, and I have18 gone and looked at all of them..."19 A. I have gone and looked at all of the drafts that I saw20 which were in the file that I had on the dossier; and

21 the drafts that I saw were the 10th September and the22 16th September and the final draft that was sent to me23 I think days before publication.24 This was a drafting process. Julian Miller and his25 team were in charge of that, John Scarlett was in charge

1771 of the document; and I was there, at the FAC, to defend2 myself against very, very serious charges; and I -- it3 is easy now -- you can pick this word and that word but4 I stand by my evidence to the FAC and the defence I was5 making myself against those charges.6 Q. It is a very simple point, a change from "may" to "are"

7 is a material change. You had looked at all the drafts8 on the 45 minutes claim, you must have known about that9 change and you did not tell the FAC about it.10 A. Sorry, you are now going back to point 10 of my memo.11 Q. No, I am going back to your oral evidence to the FAC12 where you say the drafts stayed the same on the13 45 minute claim throughout, and you say that you had14 looked at all of them.15 A. The central point on 45 minutes I do not believe changed16 substantively. I pointed out an inconsistency and17 John Scarlett and Julian Miller addressed that18 inconsistency.19 Q. One more passage, Mr Campbell. FAC/2/305. We now have

20 questions from Mr Maples. Here he is specifically21 asking you about the tension between the executive


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22 summary and the main text because for reasons I will23 have to explore with Mr Scarlett, there in fact remained24 some tension even in the dossier as published. Three25 lines down -- he is quoting here from the dossier:

178

1 "I suggest to you that the summary is a much2 stronger statement than actually what the main body of3 the document says. Can I give you another example4 before you respond to that. On the 45 minutes piece on5 page 19 of the dossier it says, and this it seems to me6 is a much lower degree of certainty remark,7 'Intelligence indicates...' -- not, 'The JIC has8 concluded' -- '... that the Iraqi military are able to9 deploy chemical or biological weapons within10 45 minutes.' The summary says, 'Some of these weapons11 are deployable within 45 minutes.' I am putting to you12 that there are three respects in which the summary is,13 I would suggest, almost fundamentally different from

14 what the body of the document suggests."15 So he is right on the point that we have been16 exploring. I just want to point out three lines in the17 middle of your answer:18 "That document was the document which was presented19 to us. The changes we made in relation to it had20 nothing to do with the overriding intelligence21 assessments."22 Again, the clear implication is that the document23 that was presented to you was the same as the document24 which was published in relation to the 45 minutes claim25 and these tensions that Mr Maples is pointing out to

1791 you.2 A. I stand by my answer there.3 Q. Very well. Now, you produced a supplemental memorandum,4 did you not, for the FAC?5 A. I did.6 Q. You were taken through it by Mr Sumption; and I am not7 going to go through all the numbered points. Can we8 quickly look, please, at CAB/1/266 which is the second9 page of it. Apart from the fact that you promote point10 6 to the top of the page, will you take it from me that11 the remaining paragraphs are all in the same order as12 they appeared in your original minute? So the second

13 one is point 1, that is the second paragraph is point 1;14 the third is point 2 --15 A. Sorry, I think we just need to go down a little bit16 more.17 Q. Has it not come up? I am sorry. They are all in18 chronological order apart from the very first one which19 is the comment about the wording about the human rights20 record, do you remember that?21 A. Yes. No, we need to go further down.22 Q. The rest follow in sequence?23 A. I will take your word for that, yes.24 Q. The position is this: that you put this memorandum25 together with Mr Scarlett?

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1 A. I did, yes.2 Q. You had in front of you your memo and Mr Scarlett's3 reply?4 A. We did.5 Q. And the 45 minute claim at this point was at the centre6 of the controversy?

7 A. It certainly was, yes.8 Q. You have told us, and I will not revisit the9 questioning, as to why you say you excluded the10 45 minutes claim, point 10, from your memo.11 A. Yes.12 Q. Will you please go back to CAB/1/266, the previous page?13 About six lines up:14 "The JIC Chairman first sent me a draft of the15 dossier on September 10.16 "To the best of my recollection, and that of [the]17 Chairman of the JIC, I did not make any comments on the18 text of the draft at that stage.19 "On September 17 he sent me a further draft.

20 "As far as we recall, our discussions on the text21 took place over September 17 and 18. The following are22 the changes I requested, and the responses of the JIC23 Chairman."

hearing transcript - 22 september 2003 afternoon

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