hearing transcript - 20 august 2003 afternoon

8/8/2019 Hearing Transcript - 20 August 2003 Afternoon

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22 Q. "Here is a first draft of the Q and A ..."23 Then, over the page at page 116, you will see what24 I understand to be the Q and A, is that right?25 A. That is right.

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1 Q. If you go to page 117, as I understand the way that2 works, you take the last question on 117. The question3 is:4 "What is new in this report?"5 Do you see that?6 A. Hmm, hmm.7 Q. "Material based on secret intelligence which has never8 been released before. The Executive Summary spells out9 (paras 4 and 5) the most important areas which go beyond10 previously published material."11 Presumably, that therefore was the instruction you12 were being given. Presumably this is information13 provided by others and not worked out by yourself, is

14 that the case?15 A. That is the case. I think the question anybody, to be16 honest, looking at this document would have asked first17 off is: what is new in here? What is it that makes the18 Prime Minister so concerned about the threat that19 Saddam Hussein poses? What is the new intelligence, if20 you like, that underpins that? I think it was21 important. I think one of my earlier e-mails brought22 that, that people could differentiate between what was23 old and what was new.24 Q. Could I ask you, please, to go to page 119. You may or25 may not be able to help with this, but look at the last

1391 entry on page 119:2 "Could Iraq mount a CBW attack on the UK Mainland?"3 You will recall a moment ago I showed you an e-mail4 from Jonathan Powell which said there needed to be5 a penultimate paragraph, he did not quite say where,6 making it clear there was not a current and immediate7 threat. As far as I can see from the dossier, no such8 paragraph was put in. I do note in fairness this is one9 of the items you seemed to be asked to cover as part of10 the Q and A. Do you recall the genesis of this last11 paragraph on page 119:12 "Could Iraq mount a CBW attack on the UK Mainland"?13 A. I cannot say I recall reading this Q and A with the14 degree of thoroughness perhaps you are implying I ought15 to have done. What I can recall in respect of this16 particular point is on the flight to America, when the17 Prime Minister met President Bush at Camp David, he made18 the point very clearly that no-one has said that19 Saddam Hussein posed a direct threat to the20 United Kingdom but his belief was that we would not be21 able to avoid being drawn into a conflict in the region.22 Q. We know that on 24th September the dossier was published23 and the Prime Minister gave a speech in the House of24 Commons saying, I can quote from an extract, that:25 "Saddam has existing and active military plans for the

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1 use of chemical and biological weapons which could be2 activated within 45 minutes".3 We know also there was substantial press activity.4 Certainly the Evening Standard, the Sun and the Daily5 Star all had big headlines saying, "Either at 456 minutes", or I think in the Sun's case something like:

7 "He's got them, let's get him".8 A. We all like to express ourselves in different ways.9 Q. To what extent would newspapers, when they talk to you10 at these briefings, either informally or formally, to11 what extent would you give them a steer as to the type12 of thing that you think is important?13 A. Well, I think in respect of this document the document14 spoke for itself. I think my previous e-mails indicate15 that we should not have any pre briefing, that we should16 take out the assertions and the rhetoric and we should,17 in effect, let the intelligence judgments that are being18 brought forward by the JIC speak for themselves. The19 question that journalists always ask in respect of news

20 is by definition: what is new? And this was obviously21 something that was new.22 Q. It is a point which Mr Gilligan commented on, but after23 25th September, when you have these headlines, many of24 which focus on the 45 minutes point, the 45 minutes25 claim appears, so far as one can make out, to disappear

1411 from public view in the press and on the television.2 I wonder if you can help on this. Presumably it is your3 job, as one of the official spokesman, to present or4 rather to represent the case the Government believes to5 be correct?

6 A. That is right.7 Q. Presumably at the briefings you get you will be given8 information as to an idea on what particular lines you9 should be adopting in the press briefings, is that10 right?11 A. Up to a point, yes.12 Q. And therefore, presumably, the Government, one would13 expect, give you all relevant instructions or14 information or points which they want to have15 highlighted which they might think are not being16 properly highlighted?17 A. Well, in respect of this, I think the fact that we did18 not keep coming back to this particular point shows19 several things really. Firstly, that it was not a point20 that we were labouring, but we certainly were not rowing21 back from it. Secondly, if you like, that the media22 dynamic had shifted, and shifted fairly quickly, on to23 the diplomatic process, and I did not think it24 appropriate to, if you like, at a briefing, reiterate25 what was already on the public record and set out by the

1421 Prime Minister.2 Q. Just so far as those things which you yourself were3 told, you yourself never received any, as it were,4 instructions or any direction to the effect that you5 ought to be reiterating this 45 minutes point?6 A. Neither reiterating it nor not mentioning it.


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7 Q. We know that on 9th February The Independent led with8 the story that:9 "Intelligence agencies in the United States and10 Britain believe that their intelligence was being11 politicised."12 We see that at BBC/4/121.

13 A. Right.14 Q. Again, a related story appears on 24th February 2003 in15 The Observer which reports disagreement between the16 Intelligence Services and Downing Street and refers to17 fairly serious rows between one member of the JIC and18 Mr Campbell. I think you can see that at CAB/1/357.19 I do apologise, I think -- yes, this is a letter20 from the BBC which sets out the various press coverage.21 I think there will be a reference to an Independent22 article. Is this page 357? I think 357, "Unease in the23 Security Services", perhaps.24 "For example:25 "Peter Beaumont..."

1431 Do you see that?2 A. I do.3 Q. Were you told that you should put out any briefing to4 deny these two stories?5 A. I do not recollect that, no. I mean, it certainly does6 not reflect any knowledge of any relationship that7 I know that Alastair Campbell had with anyone on the8 JIC.9 Q. But I am just asking you, you were not told: we have to10 deny these stories?11 A. No, and I think in respect of -- if I can just give

12 a short explanation which the Inquiry may find helpful,13 when I say that we make judgments in respect of what we14 deny, clearly there are an awful lot of things that are15 written about the Government that are inaccurate or we16 believe are inaccurate but a judgment has to be taken as17 to whether, if you like, they are worth denying.18 Sometimes you could find yourself in a position where19 the very fact that you give a denial of itself ensures20 that the story continues. So, for example, people might21 have ignored this story, I do not know. I do not know22 whether anyone followed it up. The fact that23 Downing Street issues a denial, in essence, can24 legitimise the story for other media outlets.25 Q. As I understand it, you were on a family holiday from

1441 24th to 31st May 2003, is that right?2 A. I was.3 Q. It was in that period that Mr Gilligan's broadcast4 appeared on the Today Programme. At least on the5 following day, major newspapers carried similar stories6 and there was quite a bit of coverage in the Sunday7 papers as well.8 Now, when you got back from holiday, did you have9 any discussions with anyone about Mr Gilligan's article10 or indeed about any of the other press articles that11 began appearing at this time?12 A. Well, it was clear that this issue was dominating the


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13 news agenda almost to the exclusion of everything else,14 as far as we were concerned.15 Now, I recollect that my colleague, Mr Kelly, was16 with the Prime Minister at the G8. I am sure I would17 have spoken to him. I think Alastair Campbell was going18 to a funeral in America; and I am sure I would have

19 spoken to him; but essentially my job or the job I saw20 I needed to do on return from holiday was basically to21 get myself up to speed, having missed the broadcast.22 Q. And were you told which of these various stories you23 should focus on?24 A. Well, it was not so much which story as which claim.25 Q. Which claim in that case. Were you given an idea as to

1451 which claim you should focus on?2 A. Well, I think it was so obvious I do not think I needed3 to be told as such; but clearly there was a very serious4 charge being levelled against the Government that was

5 tantamount to misusing intelligence to mislead6 Parliament.7 Q. That was really Mr Gilligan's piece in that case?8 A. Yes.9 Q. We know from Mr Campbell there was a lunch between10 certain members of the Government and BBC executives on11 12th June 2003. He believed you were one of the people12 there.13 A. I was, yes.14 Q. At this stage, Mr Campbell had written privately to the15 BBC asking them to withdraw the allegations --16 A. That is right.17 Q. -- that had been made by Mr Gilligan. Was there any

18 attempt made at this lunch to try to settle these19 differences in an informal way?20 A. No, the issue did not come up in fact. I have to say,21 I wondered whether the Prime Minister would raise it.22 In the end he did not. It was on the day of the23 reshuffle. It was an unusual event and I think perhaps24 the weight of the unsaid meant that not very much was25 said at all.

1461 Q. On 19th June 2003 Mr Gilligan gave evidence in front of2 the Foreign Affairs Committee.3 A. Hmm, hmm.4 Q. You are obviously aware of that now. Were you aware of5 it at the time?6 A. Yes.7 Q. Did you have a look at his evidence at the time?8 A. I would have skimmed it. I do not think I read it in9 a fantastic amount of detail, no.10 Q. As I understand it, the real sting of Mr Gilligan's11 charge was that the Government knew that the information12 being added to the dossier was probably false, and13 indeed they had ordered the dossier to be sexed up, and14 those are very serious allegations indeed.15 A. I would not disagree with that.16 Q. Can I just ask you to look at Mr Gilligan's evidence to17 the Foreign Affairs Committee, just briefly. It is at18 FAC/2/145.


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19 One of the things that seems to emerge from20 Mr Gilligan's evidence in front of the Foreign Affairs21 Committee is that he does not really seem to repeat the22 particular allegation which I have just been making. If23 you look at page 145, at the foot of the page there is24 an entry:

25 "Mr Pope: Just on this issue of the 45 minutes,

1471 I want to be very clear about what your source is2 alleging. Is your source alleging that the 45 minutes3 did not exist in the assessment that was inserted by4 Alastair Campbell?"5 He is being asked really in terms: was this sort of6 really put in there by Mr Campbell.7 "Mr Gilligan: I will quote his words again. He8 said, 'It was real information. It was the information9 of a single source'. My source did not believe it was10 reliable. He believed that that single source had made

11 a mistake, that he had confused the deployment time for12 a conventional missile with the deployment time for13 a CBW missile. He did not believe that any missiles had14 been armed with CBW that would therefore be able to be15 fireable at 45 minutes' notice. He believed that claim16 was unreliable.17 "Mr Pope: But that view was not necessarily shared18 by the Joint Intelligence Committee because they did19 have, albeit a single source, evidence of the 4520 minutes.21 Mr Gilligan: That is right, absolutely, yes.22 "Mr Pope: Has your source made any wider23 allegations or expressed concerns about No 10 in general

24 and Alastair Campbell in particular interfering in25 intelligence assessments?

1481 "Mr Gilligan: He expressed concern that2 Downing Street had spoiled its case against Iraq by3 exaggeration. I want to make it clear that my source,4 in common with all intelligence sources I have spoken5 to, does believe that Iraq had a weapons of mass6 destruction programme. His view, however, was that it7 was not the imminent threat described by the8 Government."9 It is fair to say there that Mr Gilligan really10 seems to be rather backtracking from the very serious11 allegation he undoubtedly does appear to have made in12 his original broadcast on 29th May.13 A. It would appear so. If I could make one observation14 which I think may be helpful to the Inquiry in terms of15 how I felt about this particular charge. I always16 regarded the charge that we had inserted intelligence17 against the wishes of the Intelligence Services as18 referring, if you like, to the generic or the19 collective, so that therefore those parts of the20 Intelligence Services which were equipped to make those21 judgments about what went in the dossier, i.e. the Joint22 Intelligence Committee, which is why it was so important23 to us that the denial that we issued was issued with the24 authority of the JIC.


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25 I never saw this, if you like, as the fact that some

1491 people within the Intelligence Services were unhappy.2 I always thought that the charge was that we had done3 this against the issues of the Intelligence Services,

4 e.g. those parts of the Intelligence Services involved5 in this, and in that respect I regarded that as the JIC.6 Q. It is fair to say that Mr Gilligan, certainly, is not7 suggesting there that the JIC was unhappy with what went8 in, rather the reverse, is he not?9 A. Well, I am not sure that was entirely clear from what10 had been reported heretofore.11 Q. You see the reason I mention it is this: you are one of12 the official spokesmen and therefore it is very13 important you know as it were what is being said in the14 press and what lines can be put out. But despite that,15 it seems that on 26th June, you put out a press briefing16 which appears at CAB/1/181, or maybe you or Mr Kelly

17 puts out a press briefing, setting out a series of18 questions that you want the BBC to answer.19 A. That is correct.20 LORD HUTTON: Sorry, this is CAB/1?21 MR KNOX: CAB/1/181.22 If I can ask you to look at page 182:23 "In answer to further questions about the BBC, the24 PMOS said that there were a number of questions still25 outstanding."

1501 A. Yes.2 Q. "Did the BBC still stand by the allegation it had made

3 on 29th May that No. 10 added in the 45-minute claim?4 "Did it still stand by the allegation made on the5 same day that we had done so against the wishes of the6 intelligence agencies?7 "Did it still stand by the allegation made on that8 day that both we and the intelligence agencies had known9 that the 45-minute claim was wrong?"10 Those three really are the most serious allegations.11 Then the next one is about ordering the "sexing up".12 A. Yes, that is right.13 Q. What seems slightly strange is that if you had looked at14 Mr Gilligan's evidence would it not perhaps have become15 apparent that this dispute was perhaps being blown up16 more than was necessary given that Mr Gilligan himself17 did not seem to be standing by what he had initially18 said and all you needed to do was speak to the BBC and19 say: surely Mr Gilligan is withdrawing those three20 claims, look at his evidence before the FAC?21 A. Well, I think we had got to the point where private22 correspondence with the BBC, asking them to withdraw23 those claims, had proved unproductive. So as24 a consequence of that, Alastair Campbell had made the25 points that he had made at the Foreign Affairs Committee

1511 hearing. Now, you draw my attention to what Mr Gilligan2 said at the Foreign Affairs Committee, I agree those are3 interesting points. They were not points that the BBC


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4 were prepared to acknowledge publicly.5 Q. On 29th June 2003, and I can take you to the document if6 you need to be reminded, but Mr Campbell put out a press7 announcement effectively saying that he was prepared to8 let the matter of the argument between the BBC and the9 Government be rather -- rather leave the matter to the

10 Foreign Affairs Committee to decide effectively the11 dispute between the BBC and the Government. Do you12 recall that?13 A. I recall him putting out a statement on the Sunday,14 which essentially indicated we did not think there was15 much point carrying on the correspondence in the light16 of what was being said by the BBC.17 Q. Can I take you to 4th July 2003? Can you recall18 anything -- this is Friday 4th July. We know now that19 Dr Kelly had come forward on 30th June and written20 a letter to his line manager saying he had had some21 contact with Mr Gilligan. Can you recall when you first22 found out about this matter?

23 A. Yes. I was first aware on Friday 4th when I was told24 privately by Alastair Campbell.25 Q. And can you recall what Mr Campbell told you?

1521 A. To the best of my recollection, he said that somebody2 had come forward of their own volition who thought that3 they could potentially be the source of4 Andrew Gilligan's story; that this individual had done5 so because a colleague had pointed out similarities6 between his views and the views expressed by Mr Gilligan7 at the Select Committee. He also said, as far as I can8 recall, that the individual concerned was not a member

9 of the Intelligence Services.10 Q. Did you express any views on how the matter should be11 handled?12 A. No, I do not believe I did. I mean, I was interested to13 hear of this development. I think I asked Alastair:14 what happens now? He said that it was being handled by15 the MoD and we would obviously just have to wait and16 see.17 Q. Over the weekend did you have any communication about18 this matter with anyone?19 A. I spoke to my colleague, Mr Kelly, who was, if you like,20 the duty PMOS over the weekend. I called him on Sunday21 evening. We often speak on Sunday evening, just so that22 one can appraise the other of how the weekend had gone.23 And it was clear that obviously Tom had found out about24 this as well.25 Q. On Sunday 6th July, the BBC put out a press

1531 announcement. Can I ask you to look at CAB/1/376?2 Presumably, as official spokesman, you would have read3 this or taken an interest in this announcement?4 A. Yes, I watched Gavyn Davies deliver it live on5 television.6 Q. Can I ask you to go over the page to page 377, in the7 fourth paragraph down beginning "Finally..."8 "Finally, the Board wishes to place on record that9 the BBC has never accused the Prime Minister of lying,


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10 or of seeking to take Britain into war under misleading11 or false pretences.12 "The BBC did not have an agenda in its war coverage,13 nor does it now have any agenda which questions the14 integrity of the Prime Minister."15 When you read that, what was your reaction?

16 A. My reaction to the statement was, to be honest, one of17 surprise that the board of governors said as much as18 they said on the eve of a report from the Foreign19 Affairs Committee which had not come out. I think we20 had made the point in respect of, if you like, accusing21 the Prime Minister of lying that we felt that the charge22 of inserting intelligence against the wishes of the23 Intelligence Services knowing it probably to be wrong24 was tantamount to that.25 Q. Exactly. But you see what is rather peculiar, or might

1541 be thought to be peculiar, is that instead of clarifying

2 the dispute and saying well, you did say this in the3 past but are you now backing down, in other words you4 did say what Mr Gilligan said in the past but now, in5 the light of your statement, you are presumably6 withdrawing that, no such question appears to be asked7 of the BBC. That is fair to say, is it not?8 A. Yes. I mean, I think we had been seeking to resolve9 this privately for several weeks; and I think, if you10 like, the moment for that had passed and we were on the11 eve of a major report from the Foreign Affairs12 Committee.13 Q. On Monday 7th July, the Foreign Affairs Committee was14 due to report. Can you recall if you went to any

15 meetings on Monday 7th July?16 A. Yes. I was at a meeting with the Foreign Secretary in17 Alastair Campbell's office from 9 o'clock, where we read18 the Foreign Affairs Committee report and --19 Q. Can I just stop you there, Mr Smith. Before that20 meeting, did you have any meetings with anyone else,21 before that meeting?22 A. Yes, I had the standard 8.30 meeting of communications23 professionals in the study in Downing Street.24 Q. Did you meet Ms Pam Teare from the MoD at that meeting?25 A. I did. Sorry, the reason I started on the second

1551 meeting was I thought you were referring to the Foreign2 Affairs Committee.3 Q. I apologise.4 A. I did, yes.5 Q. You met Miss Teare at that first meeting?6 A. I recollect that I did, yes.7 Q. What was, briefly, discussed at that meeting?8 A. I think Alastair, Ms Teare and myself had what probably9 amounted to a one-minute conversation in which Ms Teare10 said that, to the best of my recollection, the11 individual who had come forward was neither a member of12 the Intelligence Services nor a member of the Senior13 Civil Service.14 Q. Was anything said about putting out an announcement15 about this?


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16 A. No. No. There was a recognition that things would be17 handled by the MoD and I think Pam was going back to the18 Department to find out what exactly that meant.19 Q. Then you have a meeting I think you said at about20 9 o'clock on the same morning?21 A. That is right.

22 Q. Where was that meeting held?23 A. That meeting was held in Alastair Campbell's study.24 Q. Can you briefly just say what was discussed at that25 meeting?

1561 A. It was essentially a meeting at which those present read2 the Foreign Affairs Committee report for the first time3 and worked out how we responded to it.4 Q. Can I take it this was an advance copy of the Foreign5 Affairs Committee report?6 A. Yes. I think as a courtesy we get it an hour before7 publication.

8 Q. Was anything said in this meeting about putting out9 a press announcement in relation to the person who had10 come forward saying he had spoken to Gilligan?11 A. No.12 Q. Was anything said about sending this man to the ISC?13 A. No.14 Q. The Intelligence and Security Committee.15 A. No.16 Q. Was any discussion had about asking this person to go17 before the Foreign Affairs Committee?18 A. No, and I should point out that apart from an oblique19 reference by the Foreign Secretary at that meeting to20 the fact that a potential source had come forward, there

21 was no discussion about it whatsoever.22 Q. We know that at 10 o'clock the Foreign Affairs Committee23 report was published; and then, I think, there was24 a briefing at about 11 o'clock about the findings of the25 Foreign Affairs Committee; is that right?

1571 A. That is right, yes. My colleague Mr Kelly did that.2 Q. Can I just ask you, please, to look at CAB/1/201?3 LORD HUTTON: I think perhaps, before we go on to that, we4 will just adjourn for five minutes.5 (3.12 pm)6 (Short Break)7 (3.15 pm)8 LORD HUTTON: Yes. You were at CAB/1/201.9 MR KNOX: Do you have that, Mr Smith?10 A. I do, yes.11 Q. This is the press briefing, 11 am, Monday 7th July. Was12 this your press briefing or Mr Kelly's?13 A. Mr Kelly.14 Q. You will see in the second paragraph down:15 "The PMOS said that the BBC's central allegation had16 always been that which had been made on [Monday17 morning]: that No. 10/Alastair Campbell had inserted the18 45-minute intelligence into the document; that it had19 done so probably knowing it to be wrong; and that it had20 done so against the wishes of the intelligence agencies.21 Not only did the FAC report contain no evidence to


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22 support this assertion, but paragraph 11 stated clearly23 that Mr Campbell had not played any role in the24 inclusion of the 45-minute intelligence, and had not25 exerted, or sought to exert, improper influence ..."

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1 You will see dropping down to the next paragraph:2 "The PMOS said that we also noted that the3 BBC Governors' statement yesterday had not specifically4 defended the original allegations."5 A. Hmm, hmm.6 Q. Is there any reason why, in the light of those factors,7 you felt that the dispute, if I can put it this way,8 with the BBC was not all over?9 A. Well, I think had it not been for the fact that somebody10 had come forward on the Friday, or whenever they came11 forward, and we became aware of it at the time that we12 did, I think this may very well have been the end of13 this.

14 Q. Can you recall having any other discussions about this15 matter on Monday 7th July?16 A. Yes, I can.17 Q. And would you like to say, in your own words, what18 happened?19 A. Yes. That evening at around 6 o'clock I went into20 Alastair Campbell's office -- his office is very near21 Tom and mine, and I wander in and out -- and he was22 speaking to somebody who I was to discover was the23 Defence Secretary.24 Q. How did you discover that?25 A. That after I had walked into the room the phone call was

1591 put on speaker phone, so I could hear and participate.2 Q. And what was being said in this conversation?3 A. Alastair floated the idea that the news that an4 individual had come forward who could be the possible5 source be given that evening to one paper.6 Q. And what did Mr Hoon say to that?7 A. To the best of my recollection, he said that he would8 see where things stood.9 LORD HUTTON: I beg your pardon, he said that?10 A. He would check where things stood. I am not aware that11 he said a huge amount.12 MR KNOX: Did Mr Campbell explain to Mr Hoon why this would13 be a good idea?14 A. To the best of my recollection, I think his concern was15 that the Prime Minister would be appearing before the16 Liaison Committee the next day, and he wanted to ensure17 that the Prime Minister was not put in a difficult18 position if the matter was brought before him and it was19 not public.20 Q. Did you say anything to Mr Campbell in this21 conversation?22 A. Very little beyond -- I mean, I should point out that23 this particular conversation, the speaker phone part of24 it must have lasted I would have thought two minutes25 max. My part in it was to say that I was prepared to

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1 stay late in the office as Alastair had to leave2 immediately.3 Q. And what did you do afterwards?4 A. I reflected on what I had heard and thought that it was5 a bad idea. I said as much to Tom and asked whether he6 agreed; and he did, so I said that the best thing was to

7 get Alastair on the phone so we could tell him.8 Q. And did you tell him?9 A. I did, yes.10 Q. And he agreed?11 A. He did.12 Q. And after that did you do anything --13 LORD HUTTON: Sorry, why did you think it was a bad idea?14 A. For two principal reasons. Firstly, that I thought the15 Government was within its rights to make an announcement16 of this sort and to do that in the way that it chose;17 and it seemed somewhat complex to have the story appear18 in one newspaper and then be subsequently confirmed that19 evening by the Ministry of Defence.

20 Secondly, this was, if you like, completely news21 from nowhere is perhaps the best way to describe it, in22 as much as nobody, outside a small circle in Government,23 had had any idea about it. I felt that it would24 potentially transform the nature of the Prime Minister's25 appearance at the Liaison Committee and that before

1611 anything like this was to happen then the Prime Minister2 should be informed.3 LORD HUTTON: What did you mean by saying you thought that4 the Government was within its rights to announce this5 matter in its own way, but what were the rights that you

6 have in mind?7 A. What I am referring to, my Lord, is the fact that I felt8 that the Government should not be in the position where,9 if you like, it is responding to this news. The fact10 that somebody had come forward in this way I felt was11 important, relevant information and in the public12 interest in the context of what, you know, had been said13 both in Parliament and outside.14 LORD HUTTON: When you say the Government should not be in15 a position of responding, that would be responding to16 the report that appeared in the one newspaper, is that17 what you had in mind?18 A. Yes, I thought that if the decision was taken to make19 this information public, then the Government should make20 it public itself.21 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Yes, thank you.22 A. I should also point out that Alastair is somebody for23 whom I have got great respect and admiration. I am24 always very frank in the advice I give him.25 LORD HUTTON: Yes.

1621 MR KNOX: After giving Mr Campbell this advice, did you do2 anything else in relation to Dr Kelly on this evening?3 A. I went round to the private office. I have to say, as4 far as I was concerned, that was the end of that5 particular matter, that that was not going to happen and6 that was fine. But I did realise that obviously this


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7 was moving forward, and that I ought to try and acquaint8 myself with what was happening. So I went round to the9 private office where I saw some of the papers in10 relation to the potential source.11 Q. Did you talk to anyone?12 A. I asked, to the best of my recollection, Jonathan Powell

13 who had been conducting the interviews. I can only14 assume I meant which part of the Ministry of Defence,15 but he said -- and I clearly remember this -- he said:16 Martin someone, and I said: is that Martin Howard, who17 is probably one of only five or six people at the MoD18 that I actually know. He said: yes, it was, as far as19 he remembered. That name rang a bell. I said: well, in20 that case, he is a very good man because I have known21 him in the past from his time as director of22 communication.23 Q. Did Mr Powell express a view as to whether or not this24 man was or was not the source of Mr Gilligan's story?25 A. He said, to the best of my recollection, that the MoD

1631 felt that this individual was the source of the story,2 but that Andrew Gilligan had embellished his account.3 Q. When you went home that evening, did you do anything on4 the way home?5 A. Yes, I was confused, having, to be honest, looked at the6 papers. I was confused as to how -- given I now knew7 what I knew about the status of this individual, that he8 was not a member of the Intelligence Services, let alone9 a senior intelligence source who I always assumed would10 be a member of the JIC, I could not understand how it11 was that the BBC continued to stick to their guns, if

12 you like so forcefully. And I wondered whether the13 individual concerned was actually one of the other three14 sources whom Andrew Gilligan had subsequently referred15 to.16 Q. Did you read anything?17 A. Yes, I took Andrew Gilligan's evidence with me on the18 train and read that; and I came across the point which19 I thought was very germane, that in his answer to20 John Maples he made clear he had only spoken to one of21 his four sources in respect of the WMD dossier prior to22 his broadcast, and given I now knew from what I had seen23 that he had discussed the 45 minutes claim, this seemed24 to me to be pretty significant.25 Q. Did you pick up on the passage I drew your attention to

1641 a moment ago, before the short break, where Mr Gilligan2 appears to backtrack a little from his original Today3 Programme? Did you pick up on that or not?4 A. I did not, to be honest. I was more interested in the5 point I have already highlighted to you.6 Q. When you got home, was there anything waiting for you7 there?8 A. Yes, the two statements had been sent through to me,9 which were the two statements which the MoD had sent10 over to Downing Street. I had not asked to see them,11 but they had been sent over, so I read them.12 Q. Can I go to CAB/1/48? At this page and following there


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13 are various drafts of documents. I am not going to ask14 you to explain all of them.15 A. Yes.16 Q. At page 48 there is a handwritten note for the attention17 of Wendy, Duty Clerk.18 A. That is what I received, yes.

19 Q. You got this?20 A. I got this and the two statements.21 Q. Can I ask you, in that case, to look at page 49 of22 CAB/1.23 A. Yes, that is right.24 Q. Was this one of the statements sent over to your home25 that night?

1651 A. I believe it was, yes.2 Q. And then CAB/1/50?3 A. That was. I had a clean copy of that.4 Q. A clean copy of page 50?

5 A. Yes.6 Q. You will see, going back to CAB/1/48:7 "Two draft statements attached, one based on the8 defensive lines prepared on Friday. The other reflects9 further discussions today but requires further10 checking."11 Had you yourself been party to any of these further12 discussions?13 A. No, I have outlined almost in their entirety the sum14 total of my contacts that day about this particular15 issue. I should also point out it was a day that was16 dominated as far as we were concerned by the FAC report.17 Q. Moving on to Tuesday 8th July, you have been faxed these

18 two versions. Did you, yourself, do anything when you19 got in first thing in the morning, in relation to these20 two versions of that draft?21 A. Yes, I did. I was particularly concerned about the22 second, and I agreed with the comment which had been23 written on the front page that the statement represented24 a high risk approach as we cannot be sure that he is25 Gilligan's single source. In particular, I was slightly

1661 troubled by one phrase there which I thought was2 a hostage to fortune.3 Q. That phrase being?4 A. Andrew Gilligan might have "misled his employers".5 Q. This is at CAB/1/50. You felt putting that in could be6 extremely risky?7 A. I think we may believe this individual was indeed8 Andrew Gilligan's source but it seemed to me fairly9 high -- yes, fairly high risk, potentially perhaps10 defamatory to say he actually misled his employers. We11 did not actually know that.12 Q. Did this express some concern that you could not be sure13 that Dr Kelly himself or the man who had come forward14 was telling the truth?15 A. No, on the contrary -- that he was telling the truth.16 No. It did not reflect that. It reflected the point17 I have already made, that to say that somebody has18 misled his employers is potentially quite a serious


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19 thing to say about somebody.20 Q. Did you yourself type these versions up on to your21 computer?22 A. When I got this -- I should also point out I thought it23 was germane that the point that I had come across in24 Mr Gilligan's evidence to the Select Committee,

25 I thought that point was germane to this statement. So,

1671 yes, I came in and I typed up what I thought was2 a better draft.3 Q. I wonder if you can help us by looking at these4 documents, whether any of those is the draft you typed5 up. If you could go to CAB/1/52, this looks to be6 exactly the same thing.7 A. That is right. It is not that. It is the one that8 concludes something about the ISC, I think.9 Q. CAB/1/55?10 A. Yes, that is the one.

11 Q. This is one you drafted without the reference to12 Mr Gilligan possibly misleading his employers?13 A. That is right, but inserting, I should say, the point in14 respect of the Select Committee.15 Q. I think you say inserting the point in respect of the16 Select Committee. Is it right, if you go back to17 CAB/1/50, that the possibility of going to what is18 called there the Intelligence Service Committee had been19 raised in the initial draft sent over to you?20 A. The point I am making is inserting the point about21 Mr Gilligan's evidence to the Select Committee. The22 point in respect of the ISC was already there. I think23 the fact that I said something about the ISC meant I was

24 not entirely clear what it referred to.25 Q. After you do this early in the morning, do you then go

1681 to a meeting?2 A. Yes, there is a preparatory meeting that the3 Prime Minister was having with some of his staff before4 the Liaison Committee, a fairly routine thing where we5 would think of the difficult questions and throw them at6 him.7 Q. And shortly after that we have an e-mail which is dated8 9.16 am which is at CAB/1/54, which is from you to the9 private secretary to Mr Tebbit at the MoD.10 A. That is right.11 Q. CAB/1/54:12 "This is a revise of version 2 reordering a bit with13 a different penultimate para which asks the question but14 doesn't point the finger."15 Can I ask you to explain briefly what you mean by16 the phrase "but doesn't point the finger"?17 A. Perhaps I should say what the whole phrase means which18 asks the question: is this individual Andrew Gilligan's19 source but does not point the finger at him in terms of20 saying, "and he might have misled his employer".21 Q. Did you attend any further meetings that morning in22 relation to this letter?23 A. I do not believe that I did, no.24 Q. Was there any second meeting with the Prime Minister


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25 that you attended, a drafting meeting at all, or did you

1691 discuss the drafts at all, this morning?2 A. There was a very short meeting, or should I say I was3 present when he got back from the Liaison Committee and

4 essentially left the room before another meeting started5 in relation to this issue. And I subsequently went6 round to see the Prime Minister, I think about 1.30 on7 that day.8 Q. And what was the purpose of that?9 A. I think that was actually a meeting that started off, as10 far as I was concerned, being a discussion about some of11 the points that had been raised in relation to how the12 media were reporting the Prime Minister's13 Liaison Committee appearance, and he was asking me14 whether, given I was going to put in the briefing that15 afternoon, whether there were any points of16 clarification I needed to enable me to do that.

17 Q. Did you then have any further discussions about the18 drafts of the proposed press announcement?19 A. What happened at the end of that particular meeting20 which, as I say, started off being a discussion about21 preparing briefing lines, was that a number of us went22 back to my office, including Sir Kevin Tebbit, to work23 on this statement. It was decided to go back, I think,24 to my office and to my machine in as much as there was25 already something that approximated to the MoD draft on

1701 that machine.2 Q. Who was part of this drafting team that went back to

3 your office?4 A. Sir Kevin, John Scarlett, Jonathan Powell,5 Alastair Campbell, Tom Kelly and myself.6 Q. Can I just ask you to look at CAB/1/56? This looks like7 one of the documents that was being drafted. Was this8 a document that was being drafted as it were in9 Committee around this time?10 A. If I can make two points. Firstly, in respect of the11 fact it says "created 12.35". This was in fact work12 done on the document that I had created at 7.40 that13 morning, just as a point of clarification in terms of14 the times; but the computer for some reason shows 12.3515 but there is apparently an IT explanation for that.16 But, yes, this was the document which we had been17 working on. Essentially Sir Kevin Tebbit had come back18 with his draft from the MoD and we had been working19 through that.20 Q. As part of the proposed press announcement, the MoD21 prepared some questions and answers which one can see at22 MoD/1/62. Can I just ask you to look at those.23 Did you yourself see this document on 8th July, or24 not?25 A. I did, although I made no contribution to it. If I can,

1711 for the sake of clarity, point out that I offered to2 Pam Teare that morning to send over what I thought would3 be some of the questions that might flow as a result of


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4 this announcement it looked that we were likely to have5 to make. She said she had the matter in hand and she is6 very professional and a very good operator.7 Q. You will see the third or fourth paragraph down:8 "What is his name and current post?"9 "We wouldn't normally volunteer a name.

10 "If the correct name is given, we can confirm it and11 say that he was senior advisor to the Proliferation and12 Arms Control Secretariat."13 I want to ask you two things: first of all, were you14 present when the decision was made to make a press15 announcement?16 A. I had been -- I suppose yes, I was, in as much as I was17 present at the meeting when the news came back from the18 ISC that the route which had been proposed in the19 morning at the meeting, which I had not attended, was20 not going to be pursued.21 Q. So the ISC route cannot be pursued, therefore we will22 put out a press announcement?

23 A. That is right, in as much as that was what was reported24 back from the ISC, that they were prepared to go down25 a certain route provided there was a press statement.

1721 Q. Who is present at the meeting that then decides to make2 this press statement?3 A. I think it was basically a collective view that we had4 reached the point where we were going to have to put5 this into the public domain.6 Q. Can I ask you just to name the people who were7 actually -- so far as you can recall, the people who8 were actually present when this decision was made?

9 A. The individuals that I have set out to you.10 Q. Sorry, but they would be, just to remind us?11 A. The names that I went through before.12 Q. Most recently?13 A. At that meeting, yes.14 Q. As far as these questions and answers are concerned at15 MoD/1/62, can you recall being a party to any16 discussions when the strategy was adopted of confirming17 the correct name if it was put to the MoD?18 A. No. And I ought to point out that from my perspective19 this was obviously a very sensitive personnel issue,20 which was being handled by a Whitehall department, which21 directly it could be argued affected Downing Street and22 particularly the Downing Street communications23 directorate. So I did not think it proper to immerse24 myself or seek to inject myself in that level of detail25 into the process.

1731 Q. We know that the press announcement, the MoD press2 announcement went out at about 5.45. Did you receive3 a copy of it?4 A. I did.5 Q. Did you do anything once you got a copy of it?6 A. Once I got a copy of the statement and the Q and A,7 I think I copied it round my press office with an e-mail8 essentially saying: all calls to the MoD.9 Q. We know that later that evening the BBC put out


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10 a response to the MoD announcement. Did you discuss11 that response with anyone?12 A. The response actually came out just as I was leaving the13 office; and I can recall making the judgment to go and14 make sure I caught the train so I was not late home,15 thinking that Tom would be able to deal with anything

16 that flowed from it. So I spoke to Tom when I got to17 the station, who informed me what it had said and how we18 were responding to it.19 Q. We know on Wednesday 9th July that Dr Kelly's name was20 eventually revealed.21 A. Yes.22 Q. You, I take it, had no part to play in that at all?23 A. No.24 Q. Before the name got out, did you, yourself, get the25 impression that there was great pressure from the press

1741 to get hold of the name?

2 A. Yes. I think it was inevitable once an announcement of3 this sort was made that there would be a lot of4 scrutiny. I did not come under any particular pressure,5 although I should point out that given Tom was doing the6 briefings on that particular day, the journalists tend7 to gravitate towards the individual who is doing the8 briefings, in terms of phone calls.9 I do have a very clear recollection of10 a conversation I had with Alastair Campbell as we were11 both leaving Downing Street simultaneously that12 afternoon. I think we had it in the hallway. It was13 basically a sort of "how is it going?" sort of14 conversation, and he said he was coming under a lot of

15 pressure from journalists to give them the name but that16 he was not helping them.17 Q. Did you talk to Mr Powell at all on this day?18 A. (Pause). Quite possibly. Sometimes our conversations19 are e-mail or electronic, should I say, rather than20 oral.21 Q. We know that on 10th July Dr Kelly's name was public in22 the press. You, I think, were responsible for giving23 a press briefing on that occasion. Can I just ask you24 to look at CAB/1/92?25 A. Yes.

1751 Q. This is from the Chief Press Officer to you. Presumably2 this was, effectively, some assistance as to how to3 handle press questions about why did you leak Dr Kelly's4 name?5 A. Exactly so.6 Q. And this was the, as it were, line it was suggested you7 should take?8 A. It was the fact.9 Q. And I think it is fair to say that at the press briefing10 that day this was effectively what you told the11 journalists?12 A. Yes. I think the issue was raised after a fairly13 extensive briefing on Iraq and the whole issue of14 weapons of mass destruction, so it came up, I think,15 fairly late during the briefing but I think I was


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16 directly asked the question and responded appropriately.17 Q. We know that eventually Dr Kelly went before the Foreign18 Affairs Committee on 15th July. Did you, yourself, have19 any expectations as to how he would perform in front of20 that Committee?21 A. (Pause). Expectations, no. I mean, I think it is

22 perhaps worth pointing out, for the benefit of23 the Inquiry, my perception of how I saw Dr Kelly during24 this period. I thought that he was somebody who had25 perhaps been unwise to have the sort of contact that he

1761 had had with a journalist, but that he was somebody who2 had been misrepresented, in as much as he had not or did3 not have the knowledge to make the judgments that he was4 reported to have made. I also believe the fact that he5 had come forward voluntarily, the fact that he had not6 changed his story in relation to his interviews with the7 MoD, indicated that that was the case.

8 How did I think that he would perform? To be9 honest, it was not the performance I was expecting.10 Q. It was not the performance you were expecting?11 A. No. I expected him to be more confident.12 Q. Finally, Mr Smith, are there any matters you would like13 to raise with this Inquiry into the circumstances of14 Dr Kelly's death?15 A. There is just one point I would like to refer to which16 I thought might come up and has not during the course of17 this, but I do have a strong recollection of somebody --18 in fact of Kevin Tebbit saying, I think during it must19 have been the briefing, that the meeting we had to20 discuss the statement, that that meeting -- I have

21 a strong recollection that in answer to a question, it22 may even have been a question from me, I cannot23 recollect, he said that the reason why -- or that24 Dr Kelly accepted that his name would come out, but that25 he did not want to be in the first wave of publicity,

1771 which, if you like, accounted for the strategy which the2 Ministry of Defence were pursuing. And I think it is3 just important to set that out because I think it4 informs some of the judgments that were taken.5 Q. Is there anything else?6 A. There is not.7 LORD HUTTON: But you recollect Sir Kevin Tebbit saying8 that?9 A. I do, yes.10 LORD HUTTON: How clear are you in your recollection of11 that?12 A. Pretty clear.13 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you very much indeed Mr Smith.14 A. Thank you.15 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Kelly, please.16 MR SAMUEL THOMAS KELLY (called)17 Examined by MR DINGEMANS18 Q. Can you tell his Lordship your full name?19 A. Samuel Thomas Kelly.20 Q. What is your occupation?21 A. I am the Prime Minister's official spokesman, one of the


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22 two Prime Minister's official spokesmen.23 Q. How long have you been in that role?24 A. Since June 2001, immediately after the last election.25 Q. What were you doing before that?

178

1 A. I was Director of Communications at the Northern Ireland2 office in Belfast.3 Q. Before that you had worked as a journalist?4 A. Before that I had worked for the BBC for 16 years in5 a variety of roles in Belfast and London.6 Q. Can I just ask you, very briefly, about the dossier?7 I will not repeat the material that has been put to8 Mr Smith, I hope for obvious reasons, but it is plain9 from the material we have seen this afternoon that there10 were rounds of e-mails going round; and I think you have11 made some detailed comments.12 Did you have any view on whether or not you thought13 it appropriate to be making those sort of comments on

14 intelligence material contained in the dossier?15 A. Well, I was very clear in my view that I was being asked16 to comment, if you like, as a sounding board rather than17 as someone who is going to make a substantive18 contribution to the dossier. I also needed to, if you19 like, get sight of some of the drafts, so as to be20 prepared to answer questions on the document. I never21 saw myself or indeed any of the copy recipients whose22 e-mails we have seen this afternoon as being part, if23 you like, of the essential team involved in drawing up24 the dossier.25 Q. There was a comment made by the Foreign Affairs

1791 Committee at FAC/3/34. Just on this general point, when2 they had considered the language of the dossier, at3 paragraph 100 -- it should be flashing up fairly4 shortly -- going down the page, they, having looked at5 various matters:6 "... conclude that the language used in the7 September dossier was in places more assertive than that8 traditionally used in intelligence documents. We9 believe that there is much value in retaining the10 measured and even cautious tones which have been the11 hallmark of intelligence assessments and we recommend12 that this approach be retained."13 Do you think there was anything in the contributions14 that you were making -- we have seen the nature of them15 from the e-mail -- that contributed to this perception16 that the language was hardening, as it were?17 A. That was certainly not my aim and I do not believe that18 was the effect. I think, as I say, I was trying to act19 as, if you like, a fresh reader, a sounding board,20 rather than someone who expected his comments to affect21 the substance of the dossier in any way.22 Q. Leaving the dossier and coming forward to the broadcast,23 where were you on 29th May?24 A. I was in Kuwait awaiting to board a Hercules aircraft25 with the Prime Minister and his party to Iraq.

180


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1 Q. And what were the first reports you heard of the2 broadcast?3 A. Well, I had a phone call from the duty press officer in4 London who recalls me saying to him: well, I have had5 a phone call from you this early, it must be something6 big and it must be something trouble.

7 Q. And was that your perception at the time?8 A. Once he had told me what the charge was in the9 Andrew Gilligan report, my immediate instinct was that10 this was a very, very serious charge to make indeed and11 my immediate instinct was that it was wrong.12 Q. Right. What did you do about it?13 A. I was standing next to Alastair Campbell; and I asked14 him about it, because while I was clear in my own mind15 that it was wrong, I thought it was such a severe charge16 that I had to be certain before I authorised the press17 officer to give a response. Alastair told me that it18 was wrong and therefore I asked the press officer to19 give a very strong denial to the BBC and to make sure

20 that that denial was reported on the BBC and also to21 make sure that that denial went out to other outlets as22 well.23 Q. I think we have heard from Mr Campbell yesterday, so you24 will forgive me if we do not go over the same ground --25 A. Of course.

1811 Q. -- that the issue continued to dominate the2 Prime Minister's trip to Poland as well. Did you go to3 Poland as well?4 A. Yes, I went to Poland as well. From the next morning it5 was obvious from the media brief that the story was

6 running not just in the British press but in the world7 press, that he was going to be asked about it at the8 Polish press conference, which indeed he was. I then9 asked both the Prime Minister and Alastair Campbell if10 I could make it clear that the Prime Minister's very11 strong denial on that day had been -- was not just an12 ad lib response but was based on conversations with13 John Scarlett and his deputy. They both agreed that14 I could do that; and I did that because I wanted to15 underline to the journalists that this was not just16 a casual response, it was a very considered response and17 a very considered categorical denial.18 Q. And then there was correspondence, we have seen it,19 I will not take you to it if that is all right. Were20 you party to any of the discussions relating to those21 letters?22 A. I think I may have been consulted on a sort of fairly23 informal basis; but I do not actually recall having24 contributed at all to the writing of those letters.25 Q. There came to be a lunch with the BBC. We have heard

1821 about that from Mr Campbell. Mr Campbell's recollection2 was that it was him and the Prime Minister from the3 Downing Street side. We have heard from Mr Smith that4 he was there. Were you there as well?5 A. I was there as well.6 Q. Did you raise this issue at all with the BBC?


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7 A. Well, the issue was not raised formally at the lunch;8 but I did take the opportunity, on the way out of the9 lunch, to grab a quick word with Richard Sambrook, the10 director of news at the BBC who I had known from my time11 in the BBC quite well, to underline to him that this was12 not just another complaint, as we saw it, but was

13 a serious complaint and that it therefore should not be14 dismissed in that way. In fairness to Richard Sambrook,15 he also underlined to me that the BBC genuinely believed16 that the charge was right.17 Q. The charge was right?18 A. The charge made in the Andrew Gilligan report that we19 had inserted material into the September dossier against20 the wishes of the intelligence agencies knowing it to be21 false, a charge which I felt went right to the heart of22 the Government's integrity.23 Q. So Mr Sambrook effectively repeated that charge, you24 say, at the lunch?25 A. He did --

1831 Q. The informal discussions after?2 A. This was a private conversation, and I do not want to3 exaggerate its significance because it began as4 I remember at the top of the stairs in No. 10 and5 carried on just until the front door, but what he6 relayed to me was that the BBC believed its report to be7 right.8 Q. We then come to the 26th June. You give the Lobby9 briefing. There were a series of questions devised at10 CAB/1/182. I do not think we need necessarily to look11 at them. These were questions you devised to try to

12 bring clarity to the argument, is that right?13 A. Yes, I think it is important to outline why I did so, if14 I may. I was responding to an interview which15 Richard Sambrook had given to the Today Programme on16 that morning, which was the morning after17 Alastair Campbell had appeared at the FAC, in which he18 had characterised our complaint as an attack on the19 independence of the BBC.20 I thought that we needed, throughout this, to try to21 bring this dispute to an end as quickly and quietly,22 frankly, as possible. Therefore, I did not want it to23 degenerate into a general battle with the BBC. I wanted24 to sharpen the debate and that was the point of those25 questions.

1841 I think it is important to know that the first three2 questions relate to how I saw the charge, right from the3 beginning, which was an attack on the integrity of the4 Government, on the Prime Minister and on the5 intelligence agencies; and that is why I regarded it as6 so serious.7 Q. In fact I think we see on 26th June those questions get8 repeated in Mr Campbell's letter?9 A. Yes.10 Q. We have seen the BBC response.11 Let us go forward, if we may, to the end of the12 week, the first week in July. When do you first become


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13 aware that someone has come forward to the Ministry of14 Defence?15 A. I will be honest and say I cannot remember at what point16 over the weekend but I was the duty official,17 Prime Minister's official spokesman that weekend, so18 I would talk to Alastair Campbell. At some point during

19 that weekend, I think probably on the Sunday,20 Alastair Campbell indicated to me in some way that21 someone had come forward. What I picked up however was22 there was still a considerable degree of caution as to23 whether this was indeed the source for Andrew Gilligan's24 report.25 Q. Were you given a name at that stage?

1851 A. No.2 Q. And you do not recall being told this on the Friday3 night, you think it was probably the Sunday?4 A. I do not recall being told it on the Friday night.

5 I think it probably was the Sunday, but, again, I do not6 pretend to have precise knowledge of when I was told.7 Q. When you are duty press officer at Downing Street what8 does that mean? You sit at No. 10 waiting for the phone9 to ring?10 A. No, we have staff in No. 10 who do that. But I am at11 home in Northern Ireland but I am calling journalists if12 I need to or if they need to speak to me and I am13 available also, you know, to talk to Alastair Campbell14 as well.15 Q. So that weekend you were at home?16 A. Yes.17 Q. But you have a discussion with Mr Campbell?

18 A. Yes.19 Q. And the gist is he says someone has come forward but20 there is some doubt?21 A. That is the gist of it.22 Q. Did you discuss any sort of strategy at that stage with23 Mr Campbell?24 A. No, not that I am aware of.25 Q. Monday morning are you back in Downing Street?

1861 A. I am back in Downing Street. I arrive at about2 9 o'clock. I am doing the Lobby that morning and we are3 just about to get the advance copy of the FAC report.4 Q. From the Ministry of Defence?5 A. I am not sure how we got it, but we got the advance copy6 of the FAC report.7 Q. Sorry, of the FAC report?8 A. The FAC report, sorry.9 Q. And that obviously takes up most of your time that day,10 is that fair?11 A. I am up against it for time. I am having to speed read12 the report and my main focus is on that.13 Q. Did you have any discussions relating to Dr Kelly on14 that day?15 A. Well, as I went into the meeting, from memory, I think16 the Foreign Secretary was making some reference to the17 fact that someone had come forward. It was a fairly18 elliptical reference but because I had been alerted by


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19 Alastair Campbell I knew what he was referring to. We20 then went round to --21 Q. Were you given a name at that stage?22 A. I do not think so. I am not sure to be honest at what23 stage I did learn the name, but I do not think it was at24 that stage. I do not think it was on the Monday.

25 Q. I interrupted.

1871 A. We then went round to the Prime Minister's Office where2 my primary purpose was to ensure that I understood the3 Prime Minister's view of the FAC report and indeed that4 I was understanding the report correctly, because I was5 going to have to brief on it within a very short period.6 Q. So you were dealing with the FAC report?7 A. Yes.8 Q. Did you have any other conversations later that day9 relating to Dr Kelly?10 A. Well, my colleague, I think, has relayed the

11 conversation which I had not remembered about the12 suggestion that we leak the fact that someone has come13 forward, but now that he has mentioned it, I do remember14 thinking that we should play it straight and that we15 should just let events take their course.16 Q. That relates to what Mr Smith told us earlier on today?17 A. That is correct, yes.18 Q. About there was a discussion with Mr Campbell about19 leaking it to a paper. He thought it a bad idea. He20 spoke to you and went back to Mr Campbell and told him21 it was a bad idea.22 A. What we actually did was stayed in our office and again23 had a conversation with Alastair Campbell on speaker

24 phone in which we both explained why we thought it was25 a bad idea.

1881 Q. And on the 7th July were you dealing, at all, with the2 proposed MoD press statement?3 A. No, I think I had left the office by the time that the4 drafts came through; and the first that I saw them was5 on the Tuesday morning, the 8th July.6 Q. So let us go forward to 8th July. That is the Tuesday,7 is it?8 A. Yes.9 Q. And do you have discussions relating to Dr Kelly on the10 Tuesday?11 A. Well, again, at that stage I would stress I was talking12 about an official having come forward rather than13 Dr Kelly.14 Q. You still do not know his name?15 A. As far as I know, I do not know his name and I do not16 think he was referred to by name at the meetings17 I attended. We were preparing the Prime Minister for18 the Liaison Committee and the question did come up as to19 whether the Prime Minister should, in any way, give any20 indication that an official had come forward. It was21 decided that it would be premature to do so.22 Q. Right. The Prime Minister goes off to the23 Liaison Committee and he comes back. Do you see him24 afterwards?


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25 A. Yes, I do see him briefly afterwards for a brief

1891 follow-on meeting. I am not aware of having made any2 significant contribution to that conversation.3 Q. And is anything then said about Dr Kelly?

4 A. Well, again, it is part of the continuing discussion as5 to how he is being handled, but again I cannot remember6 anything else of significance.7 Q. We know that his name is given to the Clerk to the ISC8 who says that Ann Taylor does not want it like that, she9 would rather a press statement was made.10 A. Yes.11 Q. Were you aware of that?12 A. I was aware of that and I was aware that they formed the13 background as to why we went down the press statement14 route.15 Q. Right.16 A. I think my own view was that it was always likely we

17 would have to go down that route, but Ann Taylor's18 response confirmed that.19 Q. Right. Why did you think it always likely you were20 going to have to go down the press statement route?21 A. Because I thought that everybody concerned would be22 anxious to avoid any suggestion of a cover-up.23 Q. Right. I have asked questions of --24 A. Yes.25 Q. -- others about that. Will I be forgiven by you if I do

1901 not go through the same questions?2 A. You will be forgiven by me.

3 Q. Did you have any input into the drafting of the MoD4 press statement that went out that night? We have heard5 about this from Mr Smith. It rather seems, from what he6 was saying, that it was on his computer.7 A. It was on his computer, and, because he had been dealing8 with it in the morning, I was content to leave him to be9 in the lead on it. Again, I do not think I need detain10 you because I think my contribution was making11 suggestions about wording rather than detail.12 Q. Just minor contributions?13 A. Minor contributions. I was quite content with the way14 that the process was going. One of the points I should15 make about that however, I think it is quite an16 important point, is that Jonathan Powell did emphasise17 to Sir Kevin Tebbit before he went back to the MoD that18 the MoD had to be 100 per cent content with the press19 release and that it reflected MoD thinking before it20 went out. In other words, it was an MoD press release,21 it was not a No. 10 press release.22 Q. Right. And we know that Ms Teare went back. We heard23 from her yesterday.24 A. Yes.25 Q. Did you have any involvement in the defensive Q and A

1911 that we have seen?2 A. No. Again, I did see it but I made no contribution to3 it.


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4 Q. And on 9th July, at CAB/1/85, there is a Lobby briefing.5 Is there anything to which you were party?6 A. Yes, the Lobby briefing -- sorry. Something has come up7 on the screen.8 Q. This is an e-mail from you to John Scarlett:9 "Clare S ...", who is that?

10 A. Clare Sumner.11 Q. "... asked me to point out that I said at Lobby this12 morning that there is no discrepancy between the source13 and Gilligan over how long they have known each other --14 the source has briefed, properly, G and others for15 years, but only met as an individual one-to-one for16 months. I gather this might be important for the ISC17 clerk."18 A. Yes.19 Q. What were you being told about this?20 A. I think it is important to set the context, if I may,21 for this Lobby briefing.22 Q. Yes.

23 A. That context had been set by the BBC response to the MoD24 statement the night before, which had challenged two key25 parts of the MoD statement, one of which was the fact

1921 that the MoD statement said, as reflected here, that the2 source or the official had known Mr Gilligan for months.3 The BBC said it had been for years. That is one reason4 why I thought the MoD had got the wrong person.5 The other point was that the BBC said their source6 did not work for the MoD; and those were two key points7 which I felt I was going to have to deal with at that8 Lobby.

9 Q. And then you, I think, dealt with it at that stage?10 A. Yes.11 Q. The MoD statement has been made the night before; the12 defensive Q and A material is being deployed throughout13 the day by the MoD. You, I think we were told by14 Mr Smith, were the duty officer on that day?15 A. Yes, I was.16 Q. And did you get any telephone calls on this subject?17 A. Do you mean following the BBC statement on the --18 Q. Well, following the MoD statement and indeed following19 the BBC statement.20 A. Yes, I did. I was frankly somewhat surprised at the21 speed of the BBC response; and by its content. On first22 reading, I thought it meant that we had got the wrong23 person. On second reading, I felt it was more ambiguous24 and it was what I would call a non-denial denial. So25 I got calls from journalists asking for a response and

1931 I said I was not able to give a detailed rebuttal but2 I did feel it was a non-denial denial, and most of them3 agreed with that analysis. I knew, however, I was going4 to have to answer questions on the following day on the5 detailed points and so it turned out to be.6 Q. Were you involved in deploying the defensive Q and A7 material?8 A. No, I saw the defensive Q and A material as a matter for9 the MoD rather than us to get into. Because this was an


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10 MoD official because he was being dealt with under MoD11 personnel procedures, I felt it better, frankly, that12 they deal with the defensive Q and A, rather than13 myself.14 Q. We know that during the course of the 9th July his name15 is obtained by various journalists. Were you party to

16 that process at all?17 A. No. I was asked questions at the Lobby and I tried --18 I felt uncomfortable doing the Lobbies that day because19 I think I was trying to juggle a number of different20 pressures, if you like. I was trying to juggle the need21 to try to protect Dr Kelly's name for as long as22 possible, though, again, I was aware that Dr Kelly had23 accepted that his name would become public.24 Q. Who had told you that?25 A. Kevin Tebbit. I had heard at one of the meetings.

1941 Q. He had said that?

2 A. He had said that.3 Q. Yes.4 A. I accepted that as a realistic assessment of my own5 judgment as to what might happen.6 So I was trying to protect Dr Kelly's identity. But7 I was also trying to clarify the apparent discrepancies8 between the MoD statement and the BBC's response to it.9 And I was also being asked questions by journalists as10 well. So I was trying to juggle, if you like, a number11 of different pressures.12 Q. We then come to the 10th July. His name is out and he13 has been invited to go to the ISC and FAC.14 A. Yes. Yes.

15 Q. Can I take you to a document, CAB/1/93.16 This is an e-mail from Jonathan Powell to17 Clare Sumner but it is copied to the PMOS. Does that18 mean you and Godric Smith share an e-mail box as well?19 A. Well, what tends to happen is we are both copied into20 the same e-mails.21 Q. Right. What is said is:22 "Tried PM out on Kelly before FAC and ISC next23 Tuesday. He thought he probably had to do both but need24 to be properly prepared beforehand. I passed this on to25 the MoD."

1951 That is 14.50. If we look to the top of the page2 there is a response within two minutes. I accept it is3 obviously a short response but, put in that context, you4 appear to e-mail back to Jonathan Powell and say this:5 "This is now a game of chicken with the Beeb -- the6 only way they will shift is they see the screw7 tightening."8 Can you explain to his Lordship what you meant by9 that?10 A. Well, I would stress that the language is one, you know,11 that, if you put out of context and up on a screen like12 this, is not one that perhaps I would normally use but13 I was talking to a close colleague with whom I talk on14 a very regular basis, and one whom, in particular, I had15 talked a lot to about this issue.


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16 I had, throughout this whole dispute, been of the17 view that we should try and look out for any way at all18 of de-escalating the dispute consistent with getting the19 original charge corrected. I had done that through my20 private conversation with Richard Sambrook, through my21 strong support for Alastair Campbell's initiative in

22 sending a letter to the BBC governors before their23 meeting, but also by consistently talking to Jonathan24 about whether there was any possibility of the BBC25 taking a step back, not backing down but taking a step

1961 back.2 However, by Thursday 10th July we had seen, in very3 quick succession, the very rapid response of the BBC to4 the MoD statement. We had also seen the5 Defence Secretary's initiative in sending the name6 privately to the BBC Chairman rejected; and we had also7 seen David Kelly's name becoming public, and the BBC

8 still saying that they were not going to shift their9 position.10 So I think it was at that point I felt the penny11 finally dropped with me, if you like, that I could not12 see a way of resolving this issue in a private, quiet13 way, it was going to have to be through a public debate.14 That is what I meant I think by saying "this is now15 a game of chicken". It did not mean I regarded it as16 a game but it was something that I did not think we were17 going to be capable of private resolution.18 Q. How were you going to tighten the screw?19 A. Well, tightening the screw I meant by continue to keep20 the focus on the narrow issues I had highlighted in my

21 Lobby of 26th June and on establishing the facts. As22 I said, I had come reluctantly to the view that the BBC23 genuinely believed their story was true, partly because24 of my conversation with Richard Sambrook, and therefore25 what we were confronted with was a genuine belief on

1971 their part which could only be challenged by the facts2 becoming known and therefore we had to keep trying to3 establish the facts.4 Q. This is a comment made in the context of Dr Kelly5 appearing before the two Committees?6 A. Well, at that stage --7 Q. Looking at the e-mail, is it not?8 A. Well, at that stage, the only way in which I thought the9 facts could be established was by saying what version of10 events, if you like, was correct.11 LORD HUTTON: That would involve Dr Kelly giving evidence to12 the Committee, would it?13 A. Well, my Lord, I always believed that once his name14 became known that the pressure for him to appear before15 the Foreign Affairs Committee would be inescapable,16 particularly given the pressure that they had mounted17 for Alastair Campbell to appear before the same18 Committee. Dr Kelly had become one of the two key19 players in this episode; and therefore I thought it20 unlikely that the Foreign Affairs Committee would accept21 he should not appear before them.


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22 MR DINGEMANS: I mean, just trying these propositions with23 you -- at this stage you had the ISC report. We have24 seen extracts from that in Alastair Campbell's letter of25 12th June which effectively said the intelligence

198

1 justified the inclusion of the 45 minutes claim.2 On the Monday you had the FAC report. Now, the ISC3 report had not been widely publicised, Alastair Campbell4 complained about that in his letter. We have had the5 FAC report and Alastair Campbell tells us that was not6 good enough because that was split on party political7 lines. Were you aware that was his view?8 A. Yes, I was aware that was his view, that it would have9 been better had the Committee produced a unanimous10 report.11 Q. And we have had the governors' report from the BBC and12 I think the view in Downing Street was that was slightly13 mealy mouthed and still purported to support the

14 original broadcast.15 A. Yes, I think the governors' meeting -- I will be honest16 and say I was disappointed in the governors' meeting17 because I did see it as one of the opportunities that18 could have been grasped for what I termed privately an19 exit strategy.20 Q. We know, because you told us and others have told us,21 that the Government perceived this as a very significant22 charge. We know Dr Kelly has come forward and we now23 know he is going to be put before the ISC and the FAC.24 We also know this: if you interview Dr Kelly as25 Mr Hatfield did, he is going to say: I did meet him,

1991 I did say some things but I do not know whether I am the2 source. Mr Hatfield concluded on 4th July: no, you are3 not the source.4 In fact if you put him before the FAC without5 knowing whether or not he is the source, the FAC are6 likely to conclude that he is not the source, and indeed7 that is what he did.8 Is this an answer to the question about what this9 game of chicken is: that effectively you are now at10 a stage of trying to get the BBC to confirm that11 Dr Kelly is the source of Mr Gilligan's story?12 A. Well, firstly I would emphasise again I did not regard13 it as a game, anything but --14 Q. Sorry, strategy then, if you would prefer?15 A. No, I do not recognise a strategy either. Where I had16 always been was I thought that we had to establish the17 facts, because I understood the facts to be that the18 story was wrong; and therefore the reason why I thought19 that it was inevitable that Dr Kelly would have to20 appear before the FAC was my reading of the pressure21 that would come from the FAC Committee members, and in22 terms that is why I thought it was inevitable.23 LORD HUTTON: But I think, Mr Kelly, Mr Dingemans is putting24 a slightly different point to you, which was that if you25 considered that Dr Kelly by giving his account could

200


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1 show that Mr Gilligan's report was wrong, how could you2 think that when Mr Hatfield considered that he was not3 the source and it turned out that the FAC, themselves,4 later thought also that he was not the source?5 A. I think what had changed was that Martin Howard, who6 I had known as director of communications in the

7 Ministry of Defence, had himself become convinced that8 Dr Kelly was the source. I accept that I knew that9 Dr Kelly himself continued to suggest that he could not10 see how he was the source.11 But I think the underlying point I would make would12 be that in a sense I suppose my view was it was not for13 us to judge whether he was or was not, at that point,14 but we did believe that there was a genuine reason to15 believe that he could well be; and given that belief it16 would have been wrong constitutionally for us not to17 make that fact known; and then it would seem to me18 highly likely that the FAC, in those circumstances,19 would want to question Dr Kelly.

20 MR DINGEMANS: We know that Dr Kelly then does give evidence21 and the BBC have not confirmed, by this stage, as they22 do later, that he is the source. And so this strategy23 does not work. The FAC write a letter, quite an24 intemperate letter, saying: you have not treated this25 man well and we do not think it is the source.

2011 That was always likely to happen, was it not, unless2 the BBC had confirmed by the time he gave evidence that3 he was the source?4 A. It was always a possibility but, again, I think that it5 would have been wrong for us to have used that as

6 a reason for Dr Kelly not to appear at the FAC.7 Q. We know that you, at one stage, became aware of8 Dr Kelly's name. When was that?9 A. Again, I cannot honestly be clear in my own mind at what10 stage it was on the Tuesday or Wednesday.11 Q. But around then?12 A. Around that time. I have racked my brain but I cannot13 actually remember. I think it was more likely the14 Wednesday but I cannot say that for sure.15 Q. What were you told about Dr Kelly's qualifications and16 involvement in the dossier?17 A. What I was told is what was in the Ministry of Defence18 statement, that he was a WMD expert, that he was not an19 intelligence expert, that he was not a member of the20 Senior Civil Service, that he was not a member of the21 Defence Intelligence Staff. And frankly, in arguing the22 case, what he was not was more important to me than what23 he was.24 Q. So did you know he had seen the draft of the dossier25 dated 5th September?

2021 A. No I did not.2 Q. Did you know he had taken part in the meeting on3 19th September when detailed comments were sent back on4 the draft?5 A. No, I did not.6 Q. Because, can I now take you to an event which happened


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7 after Dr Kelly's death? It is CAB/16/3.8 LORD HUTTON: Mr Dingemans, we are at 4.25.9 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, I think I have five more minutes.10 LORD HUTTON: Very well.11 MR DINGEMANS: I am grateful my Lord. This was a report in12 the Independent on Monday 4th August. It suggested

13 that:14 "Downing Street would seek to defend itself over the15 death of David Kelly by portraying the scientist as a16 'Walter Mitty' character who exaggerated his own role in17 the Government's intelligence case against Iraq."18 We will come on to what you actually said. At the19 time that the briefing or discussions that gave rise to20 this report were made, had you at this stage any further21 details of Dr Kelly's own role in the drafting of the22 dossier?23 A. No, I did not. What I had been told and what I had24 checked repeatedly was whether it was still correct to25 say that Dr Kelly was not centrally involved in

2031 decisions surrounding the dossier; and I was told that2 that was correct, that it was wrong to say that he was3 centrally involved in the decisions surrounding the4 dossier, and that, therefore, he would not have been in5 a position to make the kind of judgments that6 Andrew Gilligan implied.7 Q. Can I take you to CAB/16/2, which is your statement?8 A. Yes.9 Q. Just pick it up first of all at the third paragraph.10 A. Sorry, I do not have that.11 Q. Sorry, it is on the screen.

12 A. No, not my statement.13 Q. On your screen. CAB/16/2.14 A. Yes.15 Q. The third paragraph:16 "I deeply regret, therefore, that what I thought was17 a private conversation with a journalist last week has18 led to further public controversy."19 Was this conversation attributable, unattributable,20 off the record? We have heard all sorts of descriptions21 of discussions.22 A. It was a background discussion which my understanding23 was that it would not appear anywhere. But could24 I maybe my Lord just --25 Q. I think what we heard from journalists before was that

2041 background discussions were not to be attributed, not2 even to be sourced but could be used as it were for3 information for the future; is that right on background4 discussions?5 A. No, the way in which I understood what I was saying was6 that I did not want to be quoted in any way at any stage7 about this story; and that particularly because8 the Inquiry was about to sit.9 Q. Did you want to influence, at the least, the thinking of10 the journalist? I mean, otherwise, why say it?11 A. I wanted simply the journalist to be aware of the12 possible questions and issues from the Government's


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13 perspective. I was not expecting what I said to be14 reported in any way. It was a mistake, as I admit in15 the statement, even to have been sucked into that16 conversation or to be drawn into that conversation, and17 I accept that it was a mistake to have had those kinds18 of conversations in that climate; and, as I said on the

19 day after this article appeared, I unreservedly20 apologise to the Kelly family that words of mine intrude21 into their grief at that time. Whatever my motives, it22 was a mistake that led to that intrusion and I have to23 take responsibility for that mistake.24 Q. Can I just ask you this: does your e-mail that we saw,25 the game of chicken e-mail, or this statement that you

2051 made, in the circumstances you have described, reflect2 at all the mindset of No. 10 in relation to any of these3 issues?4 A. The answer to that is: no. I think the game of chicken

5 e-mail, I think I have explained the context in which6 I made that comment, which was at the end of the period7 in which I had been privately arguing within No. 10 that8 we should try to hold the door open for as long as9 possible for any BBC step back, and very reluctantly10 I had come to the conclusion that that was not going to11 be possible and in an internal e-mail to a colleague12 I expressed that frustration.13 Again, if I was going to do it again perhaps I would14 not have used that analogy, but it was not meant to15 suggest that I thought either for myself that this was16 a game or that within No. 10 it was thought to be17 a game.

18 Q. Is there anything else that you know about the19 circumstances surrounding Dr Kelly's death that you can20 assist his Lordship with?21 A. No. Thank you for your time.22 Q. Is there anything else you would like to add?23 A. No.24 MR DINGEMANS: I am sorry, my Lord, about the time.25 LORD HUTTON: No. Thank you very much. We will rise now

2061 and sit again at 10.30 tomorrow morning.2 (4.30 pm)3 (Hearing adjourned until 10.30 am the following day)456789101112131415161718


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2071 INDEX2 PAGE3 SIR KEVIN REGINALD TEBBIT (called) ............... 145 Examined by MR DINGEMANS ..................... 167 MR GODRIC WILLIAM NAYLOR SMITH ................... 1108 (called)910 Examined by MR KNOX .......................... 110

1112 MR SAMUEL THOMAS KELLY (called) .................. 1781314 Examined by MR DINGEMANS ..................... 178151617181920212223

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hearing transcript - 20 august 2003 afternoon

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