hearing transcript - 17 september 2003 afternoon

8/8/2019 Hearing Transcript - 17 September 2003 Afternoon

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Hearing Transcripts

1061 A. No, that was a mistake in transcription.2 Q. And I think the Inquiry is aware that the LiveNote3 services very kindly checked, at our request, whether

4 the word "the" or "a" had been used.5 LORD HUTTON: Yes.6 MS ROGERS: It is accepted that it was a rare slip by7 LiveNote that the word Mr Gilligan had used was "a", not8 "the".9 LORD HUTTON: I certainly accept that.10 MS ROGERS: It is not a suggestion that you had changed your11 evidence.12 LORD HUTTON: No.13 MS ROGERS: Mr Gilligan, thank you.14 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much, Mr Gilligan.15 Thank you, Ms Rogers.16 I will rise now and sit again at 2 o'clock.

17 (1.10 pm)18 (The short adjournment)19 (2.00 pm)20 MR RICHARD SAMBROOK (called)21 Examined by MR CALDECOTT22 Q. Mr Sambrook, you gave evidence to this Inquiry on23 13th August. Have you been following the evidence24 since?25 A. I have, yes.

1071 Q. Are you aware that both Mr Dyke and Mr Davies have given2 evidence to the effect that there are lessons to be3 learnt by the BBC?4 A. I am, yes.5 Q. Is that a view you share?6 A. Yes, it is. I think there are a number of lessons that7 the BBC will have to take from this.8 Q. Can I just run through some possibilities and get your9 comments on them? Mr Gilligan referred, this morning,10 to the fact that the 6.07 broadcast was in fact produced11 live and not scripted. Have you any comment to make12 about that?13 A. I think it is clear that any report which sets out a set14 of serious allegations should be carefully scripted in15 advance.16 Q. Mr Gilligan also referred, in his evidence this morning,17 to the fact that on Radio 4, on 26th June, you described18 his source as a senior and credible source in the19 Intelligence Services. Was it right that there was20 a conversation between you and Mr Gilligan shortly after21 that broadcast?22 A. My recollection is that it was the morning of23 Friday 27th when Andrew Gilligan told me the identity of24 his source; and at that point it became clear to me he25 was not a member of the Intelligence Services.

1081 Q. Can you tell us why no correction was broadcast, putting2 that right?3 A. I felt myself to be in a dilemma over it. Clearly it


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4 would be preferable to be absolutely accurate about it;5 but equally, again as Mr Gilligan indicated earlier, we6 had a dilemma because we did not wish to do anything7 which might lead to the identification of our source;8 and by narrowing the scope for the search for the9 source, which was clearly already under way, to those

10 people closely involved in the dossier who were not11 members of the Intelligence Services, it seemed to me12 would be likely to help significantly in their13 identification.14 So I was uneasy about the fact that we were not15 correcting something that -- an error I had clearly16 made. My view was that on balance we owed a greater17 duty of confidentiality to try to help prevent the18 identification of Dr Kelly.19 Q. Can I move on now, please, to the question of notice to20 a party criticised or to be criticised on a programme?21 In the context of this particular case, what was your22 view about no notice being given to Downing Street

23 before the broadcast?24 A. I indicated in a conversation with the Today Programme25 team that my view on it was that the allegations were

1091 such that they should have been put to Downing Street in2 advance. The programme team's view was that their3 experience was that Downing Street refused to comment4 ever on intelligence matters and that Downing Street5 were also happy for ministries to take the lead; and6 that as this was in broad terms a defence issue, and7 they already had the Defence Minister, Mr Ingram,8 booked, it was right to try to extend the bid for

9 Mr Ingram. I mean, I noted the sort of custom and10 practice they referred to, but again my view was that11 the allegations were such that they should probably have12 been put to Downing Street in advance and I told them13 that.14 Q. We have seen the correspondence in your first round of15 evidence. There was clearly a live dispute between16 Kate Wilson of the MoD on the one hand and Mr Gilligan17 of the BBC on the other as to what took place in18 a telephone conversation between them on the evening of19 28th May. Did you form any view about the procedures20 which the BBC had followed in relation to that dispute21 which gave you concern?22 A. Yes, when it became clear that there was a difference of23 view over what notice had been given to the Ministry of24 Defence, on I think it was that Sunday, I asked25 Miranda Holt, who is one of the Today Programme's day

1101 editors, to come in and go through the programme's2 computer records to see if we could put together exactly3 what calls had been made, which she did, which formed4 the basis of the letter to Ben Bradshaw which was showed5 earlier.6 It was clear that although they had noted times and7 some individuals or initials who had made calls, there8 was no note of the content of those calls. Indeed, in a9 conversation I had with Andrew Gilligan about what he


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10 may or may not have said to Mrs Wilson, although he said11 this morning that he spoke about cluster bombs but her12 also extended the bid to WMD and outlined the13 allegations that have been made, he had no note of that14 conversation and could not be precise about what he had15 said. Therefore it seemed to me that actually a better

16 note should have been taken.17 Q. Can I, please, just move on to some matters involving18 you rather more closely? The reply to Mr Campbell's19 substantially long letter of complaint of 26th June was,20 in part, drafted by you?21 A. It was, yes.22 Q. Do you accept that there were some errors in that letter23 as to what Dr Kelly had in fact said to Mr Gilligan?24 A. Yes, I do.25 Q. Had you looked at Mr Gilligan's notes at the time that

1111 you drafted that reply?

2 A. No, I had not, no.3 Q. Do you accept, with hindsight, that you should have4 done?5 A. Yes, I think if I had been able to go through6 Andrew Gilligan's notes in some detail and gone through7 them with him in some detail, we might have got to8 a point where we realised these were not comments that9 were directly attributable to Dr Kelly; and clearly10 I regret that.11 Q. Was Mr Gilligan involved in the drafting process of that12 letter?13 A. Yes, he was.14 Q. I do not think we need turn the passages up, but did

15 Mr Gilligan consent to the letter going out in the form16 that it did?17 A. Yes he did. Indeed, part of the reason why Mr Gilligan18 spent most of that day in our offices, as the letter was19 being drafted, was that he could be consulted on matters20 such as that.21 Q. I want to go into a little more detail, to the22 circumstances in which you received Mr Campbell's23 letter. Can you, first of all, tell us what time you24 received it on 26th June?25 A. My recollection is I received it at about 4 o'clock in

1121 the afternoon.2 Q. When did you become aware that that letter had been3 leaked by or on behalf of Mr Campbell into the public4 domain?5 A. At about the same time, it became clear. We were6 getting calls from other journalists to the effect they7 had seen the letter and had it released to them.8 Q. Had you any forewarning from Mr Campbell that he was9 going to do that?10 A. No, I had not.11 Q. Was there a deadline for reply imposed by Mr Campbell in12 his letter?13 A. Yes, he asked for a reply by the end of the day.14 Q. Do you follow the Lobby briefings at all, Mr Sambrook?15 A. I had a number of them, at that time, drawn to my


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16 attention by BBC staff who attended the Lobbies. And of17 course they are available on the Internet shortly18 afterwards.19 Q. Were you following the Lobby briefings on the morning of20 26th June?21 A. Yes, I was.

22 Q. Can we please have up on the screen BBC/5/101?23 If we could please scroll down towards the bottom of24 the first page -- I am not going to go through these in25 detail because I think it is common ground that the

1131 questions with those bullet point marks beside them at2 the bottom of the page, and indeed over the top of the3 next page, very closely if not verbatim match the4 questions asked by Mr Campbell in his letter.5 A. Yes, that is right.6 Q. This briefing, we can see, is the 11 am briefing.7 I just want to ask you about some passages on

8 page 5/102, that is the page we are on. Could you just9 look, please, at the first long paragraph, in effect the10 third paragraph, starting: "Asked if we had...". Do you11 see that?12 A. Yes.13 Q. If you go three lines is, halfway through the line:14 "... the PMOS said that as Alastair Campbell had15 underlined to the Foreign Affairs Select Committee16 yesterday, we had repeatedly asked the BBC questions17 about these matters, but we had not yet had a18 satisfactory response."19 Then a couple of lines further on:20 "... as Mr Campbell had said yesterday, extensive

21 private correspondence unfortunately had not managed to22 resolve the issue, particularly since the BBC's answers23 kept changing. Pressed as to why Downing Street would24 not be sending a letter to the BBC, the PMOS said the25 questions were based on what had already been broadcast

1141 by the BBC. So far, we had failed to obtain any2 satisfactory answers."3 Then the next paragraph, please, about four lines4 in, starting at the end of a line:5 "We had been in lengthy correspondence with them, as6 he had set out, to obtain satisfactory responses to our7 questions."8 Had any of those questions listed in that briefing9 ever been put to you before by Mr Campbell in anything10 like that form?11 A. No, they had not. The letters -- we had had three12 letters from Downing Street, one from Ann Shevas and two13 from Mr Campbell which obviously have been looked at14 earlier in this Inquiry. They had concentrated on the15 question of the coverage of denials, on whether the BBC16 had abided by its own producer guidelines and so on.17 But they had not had questions set out in that form or18 in that detail. Indeed some of the issues raised in19 those questions had not been raised with us before.20 Q. What decision did you in fact make as to when you should21 reply by?


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22 A. We believed it was wrong to try to rush out a reply23 within a couple of hours that day. I talked to my24 deputy, Mark Damazer and also to the Director General,25 and we agreed that we would have to reply the next day.

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1 Q. What was the extent of the media interest in your2 pending reply?3 A. There was enormous media interest. We were being called4 almost relentlessly, wanting to know when the BBC was5 going to reply and what our response would be. So there6 was a very high expectation that we would have to meet7 the deadline set to reply by the end of that day. So8 I released a brief statement that evening to say we9 would not be meeting that deadline but we would reply as10 soon as possible.11 Q. Looking back at the matter now, do you have any comment12 to make on the timetable you set for yourself?13 A. I think, clearly, it would have been better if we had

14 given ourselves more time to respond. It was extremely15 difficult given the degree of public and media pressure16 upon us at that time, but with hindsight, and given that17 new questions were raised in a new way, I think we18 should have taken longer to consider exactly what was19 being asked of us.20 Q. One matter that you addressed in your evidence first21 time round was the fact that you did not focus22 specifically as closely on the 6.07 broadcast as you23 might have done. Could I just ask you to look, please,24 at CAB/1/352? This is the first page of Mr Campbell's25 letter of 26th June. If we could scroll down a little

1161 way, please. If you just look at the quote there. It2 is from Mr Humphrys. It is an introduction. It reads3 as follows:4 "'Mr Campbell will answer questions about5 allegations made on this programme by Andrew Gilligan6 that the case for going to war was exaggerated,7 specifically that one of the dossiers presented by8 Mr Blair had been sexed up to make it appear that Saddam9 was a greater threat to the West than the intelligence10 justified.'11 "That is one of many statements on the BBC by12 reporters and presenters making clear that Mr Gilligan13 made these allegations..."14 That summary of what the BBC was saying, do you15 agree with that as a fair summary of the gist of at16 least many of the broadcasts, or not?17 A. Yes, I think I do.18 Q. Can I just ask you, very briefly, about the e-mail sent19 by Mr Gilligan to Mr Maples and Mr Ottaway? Did you or20 anyone else, to your knowledge, at the BBC ever21 authorise that e-mail or ever be consulted about it?22 A. Absolutely not. I think it was an improper e-mail to23 have sent and I do not think it would be right under any24 circumstances. I appreciate that Mr Gilligan felt25 himself to be under a great deal of pressure and may

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1 have made a misjudgment in those circumstances, but2 I certainly was not aware of it and I do not believe3 anybody within the BBC was aware of it or could have4 authorised it.5 Q. Could you give us, please, in outline how the editorial6 process for a story of this kind would work?

7 A. Well, the reporter would come to one of the day editors8 on the Today Programme to outline the story that they9 wished to run. The day editor would discuss it with the10 reporter and, if they thought it was a serious one,11 refer it up to the programme editor, which is what12 I believe happened in this case.13 With a story involving an anonymous source, and14 clearly involving serious allegations, I would expect15 a discussion or consideration by the programme editor of16 a number of issues, such as the credibility of the17 source, the extent to which the source could genuinely18 have knowledge of the matters that they were discussing,19 their reliability, what their motive might be for giving

20 evidence -- giving this information, what steps might be21 taken to corroborate or verify what they were saying,22 and so on, and I understand that Kevin Marsh indeed had23 a detailed conversation with Andrew Gilligan along those24 lines before transmission; and was satisfied that25 Dr Kelly's status and reliability and locus on the

1181 issues on which he was talking about merited the2 broadcast.3 Q. Do you know whether lawyers were involved in this4 particular story before it was broadcast on 29th May?5 A. No, I do not believe they were.

6 Q. Mr Gilligan gave some evidence about a distinction7 between some stories where lawyers would be brought in8 and some where they would not. Was that a distinction9 that you recognised, or not?10 A. Yes, absolutely. I think if we are running a report11 which we believe there are serious allegations of12 dishonesty or there may be other legal sensitivities, we13 would always bring in a lawyer in advance of broadcast14 to consider the allegations we are making and to agree15 a script.16 Q. Can I ask you a hypothetical question? If you had seen,17 in advance, the 6.07 broadcast, including the "probably18 knew it was wrong" passage, what would your view have19 been about whether or not it would have been appropriate20 to involve lawyers?21 A. I think if I had seen that allegation being made about22 the Government in advance, I would have said it was23 essential to have a lawyer involved.24 Q. Can I just ask you, lastly, one other matter? I think25 we heard from Mr Dyke that as a general proposition the

1191 BBC are broadcasting 40 hours of material for every hour2 of time. What would the figure be solely for news?3 A. About 5 hours of news programming for every hour of4 realtime.5 Q. And how many different news programmes are there within6 the BBC?


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7 A. It is about 120.8 Q. And how many of those are radio news programmes?9 A. It is about half and half, roughly, radio and10 television.11 Q. Are those different programmes under some central12 editorial control or do they very much have their own

13 teams?14 A. The programmes have their own programme teams and each15 programme has its own editor who reports in to16 departmental heads, so the head of radio news and head17 of television news, for example, although each editor18 would be making their own judgments about their19 programme's content each day. And there would be one or20 two conversations a day probably with that head of21 department or senior manager.22 MR CALDECOTT: Thank you very much Mr Sambrook. Would you23 stay there, please?24 LORD HUTTON: Yes Mr Sumption.25 Cross-examined by MR SUMPTION

1201 Q. Mr Sambrook, you are on record as saying that the BBC2 was not making any allegations against the Government,3 but only reporting allegations made by its anonymous4 source.5 A. Yes.6 Q. You told the Inquiry last time round that it was most7 unusual for the BBC to broadcast allegations derived8 from an anonymous source; do you remember that?9 A. Yes.10 Q. Would you agree that that is because it is only in11 special circumstances that that course can be justified?

12 A. It is certainly unusual that -- I mean, there are13 different sorts of anonymous sources, in one sense14 anonymous sources are used in journalism every day. But15 in setting out circumstances of this kind it is unusual.16 Q. So allegations critical of third parties it would be17 unusual to rely on an anonymous source and there would18 have to be some special circumstances?19 A. Yes.20 Q. When the BBC broadcasts serious allegations against21 public figures coming from an anonymous source,22 presumably the BBC is concerned to some extent at least23 with the question of whether those allegations are true?24 A. Whether they are credible.25 Q. Whether they are true?

1211 A. I do not believe we are always in a position to judge2 the absolute truth of the allegations that are being3 made. What we have to consider is: are they credible4 allegations coming from an individual who himself is5 credible and has some locus on the subject on which they6 are talking or discussing, if we believe their views are7 sufficiently weighty to be placed in the public domain.8 But quite often we are unable to judge for ourselves the9 absolute truth of what they are saying.10 Q. You certainly cannot judge beyond reasonable doubt. But11 the source, at the very minimum, has to be worthy of12 belief?


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13 A. Yes.14 Q. Presumably, that is because when a reputable news15 organisation puts into the public domain a serious16 allegation coming from an anonymous informant, it is17 presenting those allegations to the world as worthy of18 belief?

19 A. Yes.20 Q. When that news organisation is the BBC, that is21 something that will carry particularly weight, is it22 not, because of the BBC's worldwide reputation as23 a broadcaster with the highest standards of journalism?24 A. Well, I certainly hope we enjoy that reputation.25 Q. It is a reputation that you have and which you wish to

1221 conserve, is it not?2 A. Indeed.3 Q. Would you agree that the more serious the allegation,4 the greater the care which you would expect the BBC to

5 take to ensure that it can be properly supported?6 A. Yes.7 Q. These were exceptionally serious allegations, were they8 not?9 A. Well, I think one thing I should make clear is that I do10 not think the programme or indeed the BBC, in those11 early weeks, ever took the wording of the 6.07 broadcast12 or that phrase within the 6.07 broadcast to be the13 definitive version of the allegations that we were14 making. I think our view was the definitive version was15 the scripted version, in the news bulletins at16 6 o'clock, 7 o'clock and 8 o'clock and at 7.32.17 The live two-ways at 6 o'clock are deemed by the

18 programme, although it is certainly true the audience19 does not necessarily perceive them this way, as a sort20 of preview for the major reports that are coming up21 during that day's programme. So I think the mindset on22 the programme, and I think this continued for some time23 afterwards, was that the definition of this item, in the24 BBC's view, were the scripted versions of it and the25 6.07 was something that had strayed from what we

1231 believed to be the core allegations we were making or2 that our source was making.3 Q. Leaving aside the mindset of the programme, you very4 fairly accept the audience would not necessarily have5 perceived it the same way?6 A. Indeed.7 Q. In practice it is the most dramatic and gravest8 allegation which will attract the most attention rather9 than the allegation which is scripted?10 A. Depending on how often it is repeated and how many11 people hear it, yes.12 Q. Yes. But if you make a sufficiently dramatic13 allegation, other media will catch on to it, will they14 not?15 A. They may do, yes.16 Q. They are professional followers of each other's copy,17 are they not?18 A. They are.


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19 Q. Now, you have already I think agreed in your earlier20 evidence, and indeed I think it is implicit in the21 evidence you have given today, that the 6.07 allegation22 that the Government probably knew that the 45 minutes23 point was wrong before putting it into the dossier was,24 in fact, going to strike people as an exceptionally

25 grave allegation. I think you have accepted that?

1241 A. It clearly had that effect.2 Q. Yes. It was an attack, was it not, on its face, on the3 integrity of those who had been involved at the highest4 levels in the production of the dossier?5 A. In the way it was phrased, it clearly would have had6 that effect. It is a different question about intent.7 Q. Yes, I understand that. Even in the 7.32 broadcast, the8 allegation was, was it not, that the Government had put9 the 45 minute point into the dossier against the advice10 of the Intelligence Services, who had told them that

11 they regarded it as questionable?12 A. Words to that effect, yes.13 Q. Yes. You were aware, I imagine, when you came to14 consider this in the course of June, that the dossier15 had actually said that it reflected the views of the16 JIC?17 A. Yes.18 Q. So, if you accuse the Government of putting information19 into the dossier which was contrary to the views of the20 Intelligence Services you are effectively accusing them21 of presenting the dossier to Parliament on a false22 basis?23 A. I would say two things. Firstly, I do not think we were

24 ever specific about who in Government might be, if there25 was any bad faith indeed to be attributed, who might be

1251 guilty of that bad faith. Secondly, when we spoke about2 it against the wishes of the Intelligence Services I do3 not believe we ever said or intended or expected people4 to understand that would necessarily mean the heads of5 those services or the JIC. Clearly a number of people6 from the Intelligence Services were involved in7 assessing and drawing up the information for that8 dossier and it may well have been a number of them who9 were still concerned about its presentation.10 Q. The thrust of your allegation was that the Government11 had put information into the dossier against the advice12 they had received, was it not?13 A. The thrust of the allegation was that material had been14 put in there against some advice from those involved in15 compiling or assessing it; but who was responsible for16 that act we were never specific about.17 Q. The advice that they had received would have been advice18 relating to intelligence, would it not?19 A. It would.20 Q. And you are aware, presumably, that the advice which the21 Government receives, the organ which is responsible for22 giving the Government advice on the effect of23 intelligence sources is the JIC?24 A. Indeed.


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25 Q. Now, anyone who had seen the dossier and saw the

1261 description in the dossier itself about how this system2 works would have appreciated that what you were saying3 was that the dossier had been presented to the public on

4 the basis that it reflected the advice received from the5 JIC, when in fact it did not.6 A. No, I do not think we were ever clear about where --7 whether the JIC were aware of any misgivings there may8 have been lower down the chain. All we were suggesting9 was that there were misgivings lower down the chain and10 at some point in that chain somebody took the decision11 to include it, against the advice of those below them.12 We never suggested that had to be the JIC level.13 Q. What you did suggest was that it was the Government14 which had overturned the advice.15 A. Clearly the dossier was compiled by a machinery of16 Government, yes.

17 Q. You are also, I imagine, aware that Mr Gilligan in fact18 said in the 7.32 broadcast that such mistakes can be19 made honestly, however, the Government knew this20 particular information was, as he put it, questionable?21 A. Yes.22 Q. You were aware of that?23 A. Yes.24 Q. Do you not regard that as an attack on the good faith of25 those responsible for publishing the document?

1271 A. I took the view that this was what his source had told2 him.

3 Q. I see. You now know that is in fact not exactly what4 had been said, do you not?5 A. Indeed.6 Q. In the 7.32 broadcast, John Humphrys said, I will7 certainly show you the transcript if you would find that8 helpful, but you may remember the graphic phrase he9 used, that the Today correspondent, this was10 Andrew Gilligan, had discovered evidence that the11 dossier was cobbled together at the last minute with12 some unconfirmed material that had not been approved by13 the Security Services.14 A. Yes.15 Q. That is a statement by the presenter of the BBC's16 flagship radio news programme, is it not, that that is17 evidence to that effect that the BBC has discovered?18 A. Yes.19 Q. It is clearly an endorsement by the BBC of the20 allegation, is it not?21 A. No, I would not say that.22 Q. You would not?23 A. No, I would say it is a description of the allegations24 that the BBC is reporting.25 Q. So if a BBC presenter says that the BBC has discovered

1281 evidence of a fact, you do not regard that as an2 endorsement by the BBC?3 A. I think a credible and well placed source expressing


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4 their view could, in a general conversational sense, be5 described as evidence.6 Q. When you came to investigate this matter in June and7 early July, what steps did you understand to have been8 taken by the editorial staff of Today before the9 broadcast went out, to satisfy itself that the source

10 was authoritative and the allegation was credible?11 A. I understood that Andrew Gilligan had done a number of12 things before broadcast; that he had attempted to13 corroborate the allegations with two other of his14 contacts, neither of whom had confirmed it but neither15 had denied it. He had taken a number of steps in terms16 of researching partly Dr Kelly's background but also the17 dossier.18 Q. Forgive me, I do not want to be at cross purposes. What19 I am getting at is steps taken in exchanges between20 Mr Gilligan and the editorial staff.21 A. Sorry, I was trying to go through all the checks that22 had happened.

23 Q. Forgive me.24 A. In terms of when Andrew Gilligan had brought the story25 to the attention of the editorial staff on the

1291 programme, as I understand it the day editor,2 Miranda Holt, realised this was a serious story and said3 that the editor, Kevin Marsh, needed to take a view on4 it. Andrew, as I understand it, showed the notes that5 he showed Miranda Holt to Kevin Marsh and discussed the6 item with him. Kevin had a specific conversation about7 who the source was, not their name but the kind of8 position that they held, what Andrew Gilligan understood

9 to have been his source's role in the compilation of the10 dossier, track record of his source, how long11 Andrew Gilligan had known him, whether he had proved12 reliable in the past and so on.13 They, I think, also discussed whether or not the14 source might have some malicious or mischievous motive15 in making these allegations and concluded that he did16 not. They also looked at whether there was any other17 information at the time or in the news at the time that18 lent some support to the kinds of allegations being made19 and concluded, for the reasons we have heard earlier in20 the Inquiry, that there were a number of Intelligence21 Service briefings to journalists, there were a number of22 reports in newspapers, there were comments from people23 like Hans Blix and so on questioning the nature of some24 of the intelligence in the run up to the war in Iraq and25 they felt that that was broadly supportive and that

1301 therefore the allegations being made here fitted within2 that context.3 After having a conversation along those lines and4 Kevin having considered it on his own to some extent, he5 took the decision it should be broadcast.6 Q. Could you please look at BBC/14/31. You have no doubt7 seen this document several times, it is a transcription8 of shorthand notes taken at the Governors' meeting of9 6th July, most of which you attended.


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10 A. Yes.11 Q. I do not want to take bits out of context, it is quite12 a long document, but just to give you what I understand13 to be the context. There is, at this stage in progress,14 a discussion about whether the matter should have been15 put to No. 10.

16 A. Yes.17 Q. That is not what I am going to ask you about at the18 moment. The discussion appears to take a different turn19 about three quarters of the way down when Dame Pauline20 Neville-Jones, who I think was the governor with the21 strongest reservations about what happened, raised the22 question of the quality of your reporting, do you see23 that?24 A. Yes.25 Q. That is an introduction to the discussion which goes on

1311 for the next page or so. Perhaps you could now look at

2 the next page, if we could go over to that. Halfway3 down you will see that DG, which is Dermot Gleeson,4 asked:5 "Was it vetted properly? If it was vetted?"6 You reply:7 "The story has changed. Originally Kevin Marsh said8 he had vetted it which would have been normal procedure.9 But since then transpires he did not. Have been on the10 record saying we will look at it."11 A. Yes.12 Q. As I understand it, what you are saying there is that13 you had originally believed that Kevin Marsh had vetted14 it, because he had told you he had, but it had turned

15 out, on further investigation, that he had not vetted16 it?17 A. No, I am afraid that is completely wrong. What this18 refers to is the Mail on Sunday article that19 Andrew Gilligan submitted. It does not refer to the20 original report.21 Q. I see. This is not concerned with the report at all?22 A. No, as you can see -- as it goes on, it is quite clear,23 we have Gavyn Davies, I think:24 "I think it is relevant Andrew Gilligan made the25 allegation in the Mail on Sunday" and so on. This is

1321 a conversation about the Mail on Sunday article.2 Q. The conversation certainly turned to the Mail on Sunday.3 You say it was all, even earlier, about the Mail on4 Sunday?5 A. Absolutely.6 Q. We have certain observations from Mr Marsh himself which7 are included in an e-mail on 27th June which you will8 find at BBC/5/118.9 When did you first see this e-mail?10 A. When it was disclosed for the Inquiry.11 Q. I see. Now, as I understand it, partly from documents12 and partly from Mr Dyke's evidence, Stephen Mitchell is13 somebody who, from time to time, looks into matters14 which one might loosely call regulatory for the senior15 executives; is that wrong?


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16 A. No, Stephen Mitchell is the head of Radio News who17 reports to me. It is Stephen Whittle who is the18 controller of editorial policy.19 Q. You are quite right to correct me on that. If we could20 look at what Mr Marsh says:21 "Some thoughts -- clearly I have to talk to

22 Andrew Gilligan early next week. I hope that by then my23 worst fears -- based on what I'm hearing from the spooks24 this afternoon -- aren't realised. Assuming not, the25 guts of what I would say are:

1331 "This story was a good piece of investigative2 journalism, marred by flawed reporting -- our biggest3 millstone has been his loose use of language and lack of4 judgment in some of his phraseology.5 "It was marred also..." that is a point about the6 Mail on Sunday and the Spectator.7 "That is in many ways a result of the loose and in

8 some ways distant relationship he's been allowed to have9 with Today."10 Have you discussed with Mr Marsh his views as11 reflected in this document?12 A. I had discussed, before this document, in broad terms13 his views of Andrew Gilligan as a reporter and indeed14 with Stephen Mitchell as well, yes.15 Q. Can you tell us why it is, what is the loose language16 which Mr Marsh is drawing attention to as possibly17 fulfilling his worst fears?18 A. I am not sure that the loose language is related to the19 worst fears. I think that is a separate point.20 Q. Leaving the fears, let us concentrate on the loose

21 language.22 A. As I said, this was not flagged up to me at the time.23 I only knew about it after it was disclosed to this24 Inquiry. My understanding of what Kevin was talking25 about is we should have had a consistent phrase for

1341 capturing the allegations that Dr Kelly was making, both2 for presenters and for reporters and within the report3 scripts, and it would have been a lot better if we had4 been entirely consistent on that.5 Q. You had not seen this document, as I understand your6 evidence, by the time you briefed the Governors' meeting7 on 6th July?8 A. That is correct.9 Q. Do you think you should have done?10 A. I think if Kevin Marsh or Stephen Mitchell had had real11 concerns about the nature of the reporting or indeed12 about the nature of the way we were dealing with the13 Government's complaint, I would have expected them to14 bring those to my attention. I am not clear that this15 e-mail necessarily represents serious concerns.16 LORD HUTTON: You think it does not represent serious17 concerns?18 A. My personal view about it is that it is much more19 saying -- it is entitled "from here"; my personal view20 about it is that it is an e-mail from a programme editor21 to his line manager saying that in future we would be


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22 better to have a more disciplined use in terms of23 scripting materials and not doing live two-ways and so24 on; and it is an attempt to look forward at how things25 should be managed in the future. Again, this was not

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1 flagged up to me at the time. All I can say is that, I2 mean, I know both Kevin Marsh and Stephen Mitchell3 extremely well and I believe if they had serious4 concerns about the quality of the journalism or indeed5 our response to the Government, they would have raised6 it directly with me and they did not.7 MR SUMPTION: Is it not a source of concern if grave8 allegations are made against public figures on the basis9 of loose use of language and lack of judgment in the10 phraseology? Is that not a source of concern?11 A. If that is their view then it would be, yes.12 Q. Well, it does seem to have been Mr Marsh's view; and13 what exactly did the Governors, when they came to

14 consider this, know about the views of the editor of the15 programme itself, ie Mr Marsh?16 A. Well, they -- I do not think the Governors were17 particularly interested in the editor's view; they were18 interested in my view; and I shared with them the view19 I had had for a considerable period of time, and which20 was certainly partly informed by Mr Marsh and by21 Mr Mitchell, which was that Andrew Gilligan was in some22 respects a good reporter.23 There are two aspects to journalism. There is the24 finding out of the information and there is then how you25 present it. My view for some time would be that

1361 Andrew Gilligan is extremely good at finding out2 information but there are sometimes questions of nuance3 and subtlety in how he presents it which are not all4 that they should be. Indeed, in my evidence to5 the Inquiry on August 13th we talked a little bit about6 some of the issues that arose during his reporting of7 the Iraq War in that context, and I was frank with the8 Board of Governors about that, my view of9 Andrew Gilligan in those terms. I think I described him10 as a reporter who paints in primary colours rather than11 something more subtle.12 Q. If you had known that Mr Marsh's views were as reflected13 in this e-mail at the time of the Governors' meeting,14 would you have thought it right to draw their attention15 to the fact?16 A. I think it is hypothetical because I was not -- I did17 not see this e-mail.18 Q. Yes, I know it is hypothetical but I would still like19 your answer to the question.20 A. No, I think the Governors would have wanted to know what21 my view was.22 Q. Right. They would not have been interested in the views23 of Mr Marsh, as the editor of the programme that was24 being complained about?25 A. Well, only if they significantly differed from mine.

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1 Q. I see. Do you share the views expressed here?2 A. I have already told you what my views of3 Andrew Gilligan's reporting were.4 Q. Let us look at Mr Marsh's proposals for change, to5 ensure this sort of thing does not happen again. I do6 not want to go through all of them, but do draw my

7 attention to anything else that you think I am leaving8 out. The third bullet point:9 "That all his proposed stories are discussed with10 me, in detail as early as possible in the process --11 face to face if possible."12 Does it look as if he did not discuss this piece in13 good time face to face with Mr Gilligan?14 A. No, I do not think you can necessarily draw the15 conclusion from these proposals that they are all things16 that failed to happen on this occasion. I think they17 are simply an encapsulation of what Kevin's view of good18 practice would be, some of which -- much of which19 happened on this occasion in advance.

20 Q. This is a statement by Mr Marsh of lessons to be learnt21 from what had happened in this particular case, is it22 not?23 A. Yes, but I would also expect him to outline good24 practice from the past as well as changes for the25 future.

1381 Q. Well, he is not outlining good practice in the past, he2 is proposing changes to the future. All these bullet3 points are proposed changes which represent lessons4 learnt from what had actually happened over these5 broadcasts.

6 A. Yes, but I know that Andrew Gilligan did discuss the7 story with him in advance, face to face.8 Q. The fourth bullet point is:9 "That anonymous sources pass an explicit credibility10 test with me."11 Does it look as if no explicit credibility tests had12 been passed at editorial level before the piece was13 broadcast?14 A. No, I know that Andrew Gilligan did discuss the15 credibility of his source and they had an explicit16 conversation about it in advance of broadcast.17 Q. The next bullet point but one is that:18 "That we agree on a script or on core elements of19 a script that he does not subsequently vary."20 That clearly was something that did not happen in21 the case of the 6.07 broadcast?22 A. That is true.23 Q. And had particularly serious consequences in the light24 of what was actually said?25 A. As it appears now, yes.

1391 Q. Yes. Now, when the broadcast had been made and the row2 had broken out, you, personally, had to look into what3 had happened and decide for yourself whether proper4 journalistic standards had been applied?5 A. Yes.6 Q. As I understand it, correct me if I am wrong, you had to


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7 do that first of all in order to brief yourself to8 answer Alastair Campbell's complaints and particularly9 to write your long response of 27th June?10 A. Yes.11 Q. And secondly you had to do it in order to brief the12 Governors on 6th July?

13 A. Yes.14 Q. As I understand it, from your evidence, you did not read15 Mr Gilligan's notes of what the source had said to him16 before writing to Alastair Campbell on 27th June,17 although you now feel that you should have done; you18 did, however, read those notes before briefing the19 Governors?20 A. Yes, I did.21 Q. And equally you had known since 27th June both that the22 informant was Dr Kelly and that Dr Kelly was not23 a member of the Intelligence Services?24 A. Yes.25 Q. Now, as I understand it, it is not something you

1401 actually said but it was the impression I gained from2 your evidence-in-chief just now, as soon as Dr Kelly was3 identified by name by Mr Gilligan you realised who he4 was and that he was not a member of the Intelligence5 Services; is that right?6 A. Yes.7 Q. Who did you understand Dr Kelly to be?8 A. I understood him to be a scientific adviser to the9 Government on weapons of mass destruction and10 particularly biological weapons.11 Q. Which ministry did you understand him to be working in?

12 A. Well, he seemed to me to be advising both the Foreign13 Office and the Ministry of Defence.14 Q. Yes, he had described himself as a chief biological15 weapons adviser to the Ministry of Defence; is that16 a description that --17 A. Well I looked him up on the Internet and it seemed he18 had a dual title relating both to the Foreign Office and19 to the Ministry of Defence.20 Q. The BBC's own database of contacts refers to him as21 somebody who:22 "... works for the MoD, is employed by the Foreign23 Office but is [this is actually out of date] seconded to24 the UN at the moment."25 Did you look up that?

1411 A. No, I did not.2 Q. But if somebody had told you he works for the MoD but is3 employed by the Foreign Office, you would have assumed4 he was seconded to the MoD and that he worked there?5 A. Yes. As I said, what I did at the time was to look him6 up on the Internet and I think one of the first things7 that came up was a mention of him from the LSE8 conference in which he had titles both relating to the9 Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence.10 Q. Would you agree the public impression created by11 Mr Gilligan's broadcasts on 29th May, whether or not he12 intended it, was that his source was a senior member of


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13 the Intelligence Services?14 A. No, I think he gave the impression that he was close to15 intelligence, but I do not think, other than the handful16 of occasions which you raised with Andrew Gilligan, that17 he -- I do not believe Andrew Gilligan set out to give18 that impression at all that he belonged to the

19 Intelligence Services.20 Q. I am not asking what his purpose was, I am asking you21 whether you agree that that was in fact the impression22 that was created, whether he intended it or not?23 A. I do not think it was created by Andrew Gilligan.24 I think when this story happened, quite quickly a number25 of people -- I would need to check the script but

1421 I think even Adam Ingram on that first morning referred2 to him as "Security Services". It very quickly got into3 the bloodstream of the way this issue was discussed,4 both by the BBC, I accept, but also outside of the BBC.

5 Q. It was not actually Adam Ingram, Mr Sambrook, it was6 John Humphrys who told him that was the position.7 A. Certainly by the time John Reid was being interviewed he8 was talking about Intelligence Services. The point I am9 trying to make is that it was very quickly in the10 bloodstream of everybody discussing this issue that11 intelligence was used in a very broad sense in terms of12 describing the source.13 Q. If you look at BBC/1/15, you will see that at the fourth14 entry down this page, this is part of the transcript of15 John Humphrys' interview with the Minister:16 "Oh well I'll tell you. Again it isn't a question17 for me to take any words but if, well hang on a minute

18 er Mr Ingram if I may, you've asked me the question.19 What we have here is a source, within the Intelligence20 Service."21 That was the conclusion presumably Mr Humphrys had22 drawn from listening to Mr Gilligan's broadcasts that23 very morning?24 A. It was an assumption he made, I assume, yes.25 Q. Do you not accept it was a natural one?

1431 A. Well it was clear that the BBC's source dealt with2 intelligence and was close to intelligence because they3 had been involved in this dossier, yes. So it was an4 assumption that I think quite a number of people made.5 Q. Yes. Now, if you look at BBC/4/247, you will see that6 in the first chunk of an extract from the transcript of7 extracts from the World at One on the same day,8 Nick Clarke says in the third sentence:9 "The Today Programme this morning reported the views10 of an anonymous member of the Security Services who cast11 doubt on the status of the dossier published with12 a foreword by Tony Blair last September."13 A. Yes.14 Q. That is a clear statement that the source was a member15 of the Security Services, is it not?16 A. Yes.17 Q. And the position was that whatever Mr Gilligan may have18 intended, the result of what he had done is that the BBC


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19 itself, on a number of occasions in the course of that20 day and later, was describing this as a report based on21 a senior member of the Intelligence Services, was it22 not?23 A. I absolutely accept he was described in that way both in24 the BBC and by a number of other people -- as I said,

25 this association of intelligence got into the

1441 bloodstream in the way our source was described.2 Q. You yourself were under that impression, were you not?3 A. When I gave my interview to the Today Programme on the4 morning of the 26th, I did refer to him as Intelligence5 Services erroneously. As I have said, I did not know6 Dr Kelly's identity at that stage.7 Q. You referred to it in that way because that is what you8 had understood Mr Gilligan to be saying?9 A. Well, by this time it was not simply Mr Gilligan who was10 saying this. It was being widely discussed by all

11 broadcasters and in the newspapers, and the association12 with the Intelligence Services was being widely made by13 a number of people, obviously including Government14 Ministers, stemming from the general coverage.15 Q. By the general coverage you mean the way in which it was16 covered by the BBC, which was the origin of all this.17 A. Yes, though by 26th June clearly a lot of other news18 organisations, besides the BBC, were covering it.19 Q. Yes. Until Mr Gilligan told you, on the 27th, that his20 source was Dr Kelly, Mr Gilligan had never sought to21 correct this impression, had he?22 A. No.23 Q. You realised the position on the 27th, as I understand

24 your evidence?25 A. Yes.

1451 Q. Not because Mr Gilligan said it in terms but because the2 moment that he identified the source as Dr Kelly, you3 realised he was not a member of the Intelligence4 Services?5 A. Yes, I think we may actually have had quite an explicit6 conversation about that. Whether it was raised by him7 or me, I do not know. But we explicitly acknowledged in8 that conversation that he was not a member of the9 Security Services.10 Q. Would you accept that if an allegation is made that11 things have been put into the dossier contrary to the12 advice that the Government has received from the13 Intelligence Services, it will lend a great deal of14 authority to that report to say that the source was15 himself a senior member of the Intelligence Services?16 A. Clearly, that we were saying it was a senior source,17 whether being a member of the Intelligence Services adds18 additional seniority or additional credence I think is19 subjective.20 Q. If the allegation is that the advice of the Intelligence21 Services has been disregarded, do you not accept that it22 lends weight to that to say: and we have been told this23 by a senior member of the Intelligence Services?24 A. Well, whenever we made the primary story, we were quite


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25 careful, other than the Radio 5 example you used, to use

1461 the phrase "a senior official involved in drawing up the2 dossier".3 Q. You were not actually, Mr Sambrook. You say apart from

4 the 5 Live broadcast, but I have just shown you the5 World at One on the same day.6 A. I meant in Andrew Gilligan's reporting.7 Q. I see. I am looking at the BBC as a whole. Your answer8 would not be right, would it?9 A. No.10 Q. When you were told that it was Dr Kelly on 27th June,11 and for whatever reason you realised he was not a member12 of the Intelligence Services, that must have caused you13 some considerable concern?14 A. Yes, I was concerned about it.15 Q. You would not have wanted to perpetuate that16 misunderstanding given the currency that it had

17 obtained, would you?18 A. No.19 Q. Could you look at CAB/1/360 for a moment, please?20 I just want to turn to a slightly different matter to21 get this in chronological sequence.22 This is part of your letter to Alastair Campbell.23 I do not wish, you will be relieved to hear, to refight24 every aspect of this battle in the course of this25 afternoon, but if you look at the bottom of page 360,

1471 you quoted Alastair Campbell's question:2 "Does it still stand by the allegation made on that

3 day that both we and the intelligence agencies knew the4 45 minute claim to be wrong and inserted it despite5 knowing that."6 We can read your answer:7 "Andrew Gilligan accurately reported the source8 telling him that the Government 'probably knew that the9 45 minute figure was wrong' and that the claim was10 'questionable'."11 At this stage the BBC's line was: there is12 a difference between our reporting what the source had13 said and our making an allegation for our own part; and14 that is a point that you make several times in this15 letter, including under this particular heading?16 A. Hmm, hmm.17 Q. Had Andrew Gilligan actually told you: well, this is18 definitely what my source told me?19 A. I cannot remember the exact words he used, but certainly20 we understood that everything he had said was a proper21 representation of his conversation with Dr Kelly.22 Q. That is the impression that he accepts that he had given23 in his original broadcast; but you had Andrew Gilligan24 available to you I think in a next door room or25 something when this was being drafted?

1481 A. Yes.2 Q. Presumably, since you were drawing the distinction3 between what the BBC was saying and what the source had


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4 said to the BBC, you must have said to him: is this what5 your source told you?6 A. Yes.7 Q. And he must have said: yes, it is?8 A. Yes.9 Q. It was after drafting this letter, about a week after,

10 in fact, that you saw Andrew Gilligan's notes?11 A. Yes.12 Q. Just to make sure we are looking at the right document,13 as I understand it that means the notes that he drew up14 for Miranda Holt rather than the printed out text from15 his personal organiser?16 A. No, I saw the printed out text from his personal17 organiser.18 Q. Did you not see the Miranda Holt version?19 A. Not at that stage, I do not think, no.20 Q. When did you first see the Miranda Holt version?21 A. I cannot remember, it was probably some time that week.22 The first notes I remember seeing were the printout from

23 his personal organiser. I was aware other people had24 seen the Miranda Holt notes and discussed them with25 Andrew.

1491 Q. The fact is you saw both versions in the first week2 of July?3 A. I think I certainly saw the printout of the organiser4 notes then. I cannot remember if I saw the Miranda Holt5 notes then or later.6 Q. Do you remember whether you saw the Miranda Holt notes7 before you appeared before the Governors on the 6th?8 A. I do not recall for sure. I cannot remember.

9 Q. Did you find in either set of notes anything that10 supported Mr Gilligan's broadcast statement that his11 source had been one of the senior officials in charge of12 drawing up the dossier?13 A. No, that was not in the organiser notes, no.14 Q. Were you troubled that a description of himself which15 was of some importance was not in fact included in16 Mr Gilligan's note, in either version?17 A. No, not particularly, because it was quite clear that18 Mr Gilligan had not taken a verbatim note. He was also19 quite clear that he had discussed and agreed this20 description in advance; and by the end of that week we21 were also discussing Susan Watts' report where almost22 exactly the same description had been arrived at23 independently.24 Q. Dr Kelly did not describe himself to Susan Watts as one25 of the people in charge of drawing up the dossier, did

1501 he?2 A. I cannot remember the precise description but it is very3 close to a senior official I think she says intimately4 involved in drawing up the dossier, I think that is the5 phrase.6 Q. Are you thinking of the transcript of what was said to7 Susan Watts on the telephone on 30th May?8 A. No, I am thinking of her report on 2nd June.9 Q. Yes, I see. So you were not concerned that there was


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10 nothing in the note to vouch for the description of the11 source's precise functions?12 A. No, I was clear that the note was not going to be13 a verbatim copy of the conversation that he had had or14 that necessarily everything he had broadcast was going15 to be fully represented in that note. That did not

16 strike me as particularly surprising. I clearly had17 a conversation with Andrew about exactly what had been18 said and the extent to which his conversation backed up19 those elements of his reporting which were not in the20 notes and he assured me that it did.21 Q. Mr Sambrook, I can quite see that a note is only22 a summary of the most important matters. But from the23 BBC's point of view, it was of absolutely critical24 importance, was it not, to satisfy itself that this was25 an authoritative and credible source?

1511 A. It was, yes.

2 Q. Yes. So the absence of any information which enabled3 you to take a view about that from Mr Gilligan's note4 must have been a source of concern?5 A. Well, in terms of the credibility of the source, once he6 had told me who David Kelly was and I had had an7 opportunity to independently research Dr Kelly's8 background, I took considerable comfort from that in9 terms of his seniority and credibility.10 Q. Yes, but what mattered as far as his credibility was11 concerned was what David Kelly had to do with the12 preparation of the dossier. That was what mattered, was13 it not?14 A. It was, yes.

15 Q. You did not find any information about that on the16 Internet or elsewhere, did you?17 A. No.18 Q. Mr Gilligan was the only source of information you had19 about that?20 A. He was, although clearly from the things that had been21 reported from the conversation, Dr Kelly did have some22 close contact and close involvement with the dossier23 because of the things he spoke about.24 Q. Yes, but there is a world of difference between somebody25 who reads intelligence material on his special subject

1521 and somebody who is actually in charge in a managerial2 or editorial sense in the preparation of a Government3 paper, is there not?4 A. I agree with that. But clearly the process of the5 compilation of this dossier was not something that I was6 clear about or ever likely to be. However, I was clear7 that Dr Kelly was a world renowned expert on the issues8 he was discussing and he did have some involved with the9 dossier because of the detail in which he spoke about it10 and he was a highly credible figure. So in terms of the11 credibility of the source, I took comfort from that.12 Q. The suggestion that he was in charge of drawing up the13 dossier or one of those who was in charge of it, it was14 a brand new piece of information which you had on15 Mr Gilligan's authority and was not supported by


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16 anything in his note?17 A. Well, he used two descriptions, "one of those in charge"18 or "a senior official involved", and it seemed to me19 highly credible that either of those descriptions might20 fit.21 Q. Would you agree that at least as practised by the BBC,

22 it is normal if you make a serious allegation against23 public figures to give them advance notice? I think you24 have accepted that in principle?25 A. Yes.

1531 Q. You were shown, a few minutes ago, the letter which you2 wrote on 28th June --3 A. Yes.4 Q. -- about this. Would you like to see it again?5 A. By all means, yes.6 Q. It is BBC/5/153.7 Directly or indirectly the information that you

8 included in this letter must have come from Mr Gilligan;9 do you agree?10 A. Some of it came from Mr Gilligan, some of it came from11 Miranda Holt and the Today Programme team.12 Q. She could only have got it from Mr Gilligan.13 A. Well, I mean, some of the details about the timings of14 phone calls from members of the Today team came from her15 and not from Andrew Gilligan, who may not have been16 aware of those.17 Q. Let us look at the second bullet point:18 "At 6.30 pm Andrew Gilligan spoke to Kate O'Connor,19 the MoD press officer, about the cluster bomb interview20 and added there would be another story running on WMD."

21 A. Yes.22 Q. That is something that could only have come from23 Andrew Gilligan.24 A. No, it was also the Today Programme's understanding that25 that phone call took place.

1541 Q. Since there was no written record of Mr Gilligan's2 conversation --3 A. Yes, I had spoken to Andrew Gilligan about it.4 Q. You had spoken to him about it?5 A. Yes.6 Q. Had he confirmed the accuracy of this statement? I am7 not suggesting you showed him the letter. Had he said8 something to you, to this effect?9 A. I spoke to him first and then wrote the letter. I did10 not show him the letter before I sent it. What was said11 to me was that he had spoken to Kate Wilson, as she now12 is, he said Kate O'Connor, I think that may have been13 her maiden name --14 Q. Yes.15 A. -- at about 6.30 in order to expand the bid from cluster16 bombs to WMD. He told me that he had outlined the17 allegations to be made but he could not remember exactly18 what he had said.19 Q. But was that an exchange which was fairly reflected, as20 you saw it, in this particular paragraph?21 A. I suppose so, but I was not trying to be forensic about


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22 that particular bullet point, but yes.23 Q. You were presumably trying to be accurate because you24 were writing --25 A. Indeed.

155

1 Q. -- in order to correct the record.2 Mr Whittle told the Governors, on 6th July, in your3 presence, that Andrew Gilligan had also said that he had4 told the press office of the Ministry of Defence that5 the WMD story was not for them?6 A. Hmm, hmm.7 Q. Do you remember that?8 A. I do.9 Q. Were you, yourself, told that by Mr Gilligan?10 A. Yes. He did say that it was not an issue that he was11 expecting them to respond in detail on, but he wanted to12 expand the bid for Adam Ingram.13 Q. The point he was saying he had put to the Ministry of

14 Defence press office was that the WMD story was not15 a matter for the Ministry of Defence and what he meant16 by that presumably, as you appreciated, was that it was17 a matter for No. 10?18 A. Well, my understanding of it, at the time, was that the19 primary purpose for the call was to expand the bid for20 Adam Ingram to include WMD, to outline some detail of21 what the allegations were going to be; and what he said22 during that conversation, he indicated he was not23 expecting a detailed response then from the MoD, he was24 simply trying to expand the bid and give him some sense25 of what it was they were going to have to respond to.

1561 I accepted his explanation of that.2 Q. Yes. His explanation was in fact not consistent with3 his suggestion now that he explained the gist of the4 allegations to the MoD press office, was it?5 A. No, he was always quite clear that he had outlined -- he6 was never specific about the terms in which he had done7 it, which was a problem for us, which is why we then8 said we need to take better notes of these kind of9 conversations. But he was always clear he had outlined10 the nature of the allegations that were going to be put.11 Q. Would you agree that proper journalistic standards may12 require the BBC to retract a statement after it has been13 broadcast if it finds that it cannot be properly14 supported?15 A. Yes.16 Q. So if the BBC were to discover, after broadcasting17 a serious allegation from an anonymous source, that18 there was in fact no reliable basis for what that source19 had said or the way in which the BBC had summarised it,20 as a matter of general policy would the BBC regard it as21 right to retract that?22 A. Yes, if it was clear that we had got something wrong.23 Q. And that would be so even if you were satisfied that, at24 the time, proper journalistic standards had been25 observed?

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1 A. Yes.2 Q. And was that why you made it clear to the Foreign3 Affairs Committee, on 1st July, that if they were4 unanimous and had concrete evidence to support that5 conclusion that the dossier had not been sexed up, you6 would retract?

7 A. Yes.8 Q. Who took the decision that that would be the BBC's9 attitude?10 A. I think it was a position that we -- I think it was11 a decision probably taken by myself and my deputy12 Mark Damazer. But we certainly discussed it at some13 point with the Director General.14 Q. What did you mean by "concrete evidence"?15 A. Documentation.16 Q. Documentation?17 A. Hmm.18 Q. Ie drafts?19 A. Yes.

20 Q. One of the points that has been made from time to time21 is that Mr Scarlett did not appear before the Foreign22 Affairs Committee.23 A. Yes.24 Q. Was his evidence what you had in mind by "concrete25 evidence"?

1581 A. Yes, I think it might have been.2 Q. If Mr Scarlett had given evidence that he had supervised3 all of the drafts and was entirely happy with the4 document as laid before Parliament, would you have5 regarded that as concrete evidence?

6 A. It is difficult to hypothesize when you do not know the7 terms in which he might have done it.8 Q. Let us suppose he did it in the most unequivocal9 possible fashion.10 A. That would clearly have lent weight to that fact.11 I think what we said was on the basis of concrete12 evidence because we could not understand why, given much13 of this intelligence had been declassified, it was not14 possible to see some of these drafts and quite quickly15 settle the point.16 Q. It was obvious why you could not see the drafts.17 A. Well, not to us at the time.18 Q. It was not obvious to you. I see. Well, I am not going19 to argue that point with you.20 Would you accept that if Mr Scarlett had,21 unequivocally, said that he was happy with the document22 as published, that would have satisfied you?23 A. I do not think it would have satisfied the point that24 there may well have been some dissent about the25 presentation of intelligence in the ranks below

1591 Mr Scarlett of which he was unaware.2 Q. You certainly would have had, at the very least, to3 retract parts of what had been said, would you not?4 A. Parts, yes.5 Q. Was it therefore the BBC's position that they were not6 prepared to take at face value Mr Scarlett's statement,


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7 which was by now known, that he and the JIC were8 entirely satisfied with the dossier as published unless9 he appeared before the Foreign Affairs Committee and10 satisfied them of it? Was that their position?11 A. No, we had reported Mr Scarlett's position to the extent12 that it had been reported second-hand -- we reported the

13 Warsaw press conference. We had reported the14 Prime Minister's comments in the House of Commons and so15 on. But really the point I am making is there may well16 have been aspects of the story which were correct of17 which Mr Scarlett was unaware.18 Q. I am a little puzzled by the fact that you would have19 attached a great deal of weight to Mr Scarlett's view20 and it would have caused you to retract at least part of21 the broadcasts, but only if he not only allowed that22 statement to be made publicly but said it to the Foreign23 Affairs Committee and persuaded them.24 A. Well, all I am really saying is we fully reported25 Mr Scarlett's support for the Prime Minister. If

1601 Mr Scarlett had given evidence to the Foreign Affairs2 Committee, I am sure it would have been very powerful3 evidence. But without knowing what he said or what4 documentation may or may not have been brought forward5 to support it, it is quite difficult for me to6 hypothesise about any impact it would have given on our7 position.8 Q. Mr Dyke has given evidence and you I think have9 associated yourself this afternoon with that evidence,10 to virtually quote him, I think, that he wished that he11 had paused in late June and ordered a full investigation

12 of the whole issue.13 A. Yes.14 Q. That is one of the points that Mr Dyke made which you15 associate yourself with?16 A. I certainly think we should have paused and considered17 at greater length the charges that were being levelled18 against us. Whether that amounts to a full19 investigation of the whole issue, I am not sure. But20 I certainly think the letter of the 27th was written21 under considerable pressure, particularly the deadline22 imposed on us by Mr Campbell, and if we had not been23 under that pressure to respond then the errors in that24 letter of the 27th might not have been made.25 Q. There was not in fact a careful examination of all the

1611 allegations that had been made, how far they could be2 supported by Mr Gilligan's notes and what conclusions3 should be drawn from that before the Governors' meeting,4 was there?5 A. There was an investigation and examination. What we did6 not do was go through the personal organiser notes in7 point by point detail with Andrew. If we had done that,8 I think it might have pointed up the two errors that we9 made in that letter. But we certainly went through10 every point that Mr Campbell raised in his letter. We11 discussed them in some detail, both with Andrew Gilligan12 and with Kevin Marsh, and we just discussed them between


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13 ourselves as a senior editorial team before coming out14 with that letter.15 I would not want anybody to think that the letter16 was written purely in haste. We spent as much time as17 we had over it and we went into considerable detail on18 all the points that Mr Campbell made.

19 Q. The truth is that the investigation that had been20 carried out by the time the Governors met on 6th July21 was no fuller than the investigation that had been made22 before you wrote that letter, except in this respect:23 that you had, by now, looked at both versions of24 Mr Gilligan's notes?25 A. We had seen Mr Gilligan's notes, that is true. We had

1621 also, by that time, identified many similarities in2 Ms Watts' reports as well with the reports3 Andrew Gilligan had made, which had taken us some time4 to get to because I was abroad when her broadcasts

5 originally went out. I think that also lent some6 support to the broad thrust of the allegations that7 Mr Gilligan's source was making.8 Q. In the press release following the meeting of the9 Governors, it was said that the BBC had never attacked10 the good faith of the Prime Minister.11 A. That is also what I said in my Today interview on the12 26th.13 Q. Did anyone draw the Governors' intention to what14 Mr Gilligan had in fact said at 6.07?15 A. No, it was not at the forefront of our minds. Indeed,16 it was not at the forefront of our minds in drafting the17 response of the 27th because it was raised there by Mr

18 Campbell for the first time, as the third of those19 12 questions, and indeed in the previous three letters20 from the Government the wording of the 6.07 broadcast21 had never been referred to you and their complaints were22 much more about whether we had abided by the producer23 guidelines, the strength given to denials and a number24 of other issues, such as the description of the JIC.25 They had never drawn the precise language of the 6.07 as

1631 being the core of their complaint. Indeed, even when we2 got the letter of the 26th where it was raised for the3 first time in that list of questions, I took the core of4 their complaint to be that John Humphrys paragraph on5 the front page.6 Q. So nobody said, as I understand your evidence, to the7 Governors at that meeting: there is a problem about the8 6.07 broadcast, which was unscripted, and where9 Mr Gilligan appears to have gone further than he should10 have done?11 A. No, because at that time the Government's complaint was12 all-encompassing. They were not saying: we have13 a problem, we have a complaint about the 6.07 broadcast.14 They said: we have a complaint about the entirety of15 these allegations. I think Mr Campbell's letter to the16 Director General on the 26th said "the story is 100 per17 cent wrong". This was an all or nothing complaint, not18 a complaint about a phrase in one version of


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19 19 broadcasts.20 Q. It was a number of complaints, one of which related21 specifically to the 6.07 broadcast.22 A. I accept that the wording of the 6.07 was raised for the23 first time in the letter of the 26th, yes.24 Q. In fact you had at 6.07, whether you intended to or not,

25 attacked the good faith of the Government, had you not?

1641 A. On reflection I can see that. At the time, I do not2 think that was sufficiently recognised, no.3 Q. Did anyone point out to the Governors that the dossier4 had said that it reflected the views of the JIC and5 Mr Gilligan had broadcast, at 7.32, an allegation that6 the Government had actually inserted things contrary to7 intelligence advice? Was that point made to the8 Governors?9 A. No. As I have explained to you before, we saw the core10 allegations that were being made about the scripted

11 items rather than 6.07, and again, even in that12 allegation we did not accept that the reservations of13 the Intelligence Services necessarily referred to the14 heads of those services or the JIC; and I believe we15 always thought of it in terms of people lower down the16 chain who had been involved in the assessment and17 production of the dossier, who were concerned, and at18 some level unspecified in the BBC's broadcast, that19 stuff had been included against their advice.20 LORD HUTTON: May I just ask you on that point, Mr Sambrook,21 if we look at BBC/1/4, which is the first page of the22 transcript, if we can scroll down that, please. Yes,23 just there. You see the passage there beginning:

24 "Well, erm, our source says that the dossier, as it25 was finally published, made the Intelligence Services

1651 unhappy..."2 Then if we go over to the next page which is the3 commencement of the broadcast at 7.32, about halfway4 down that passage:5 "... Andrew Gilligan has found evidence that the6 Government's dossier on Iraq that was produced last7 September was cobbled together at the last minute with8 some unconfirmed material that had not been approved by9 the Security Services."10 Now, there is a reference to the Intelligence11 Services being unhappy and then there is a reference to12 "had not been approved by the Security Services".13 A. Hmm.14 LORD HUTTON: I think later there is a reference at 006 to15 Mr Gilligan, where he said "most people in intelligence16 were not happy"; but if one looks at the first two17 references, that gives the picture, does it not, that it18 was the entirety of the Intelligence Services, or would19 it not apply certainly to the heads of the Intelligence20 Services?21 A. I accept that reading can be taken from it.22 LORD HUTTON: You say "can be taken from it". Is that not23 the only reading if you just look at those passages?24 Once they were heard by someone listening to the


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25 broadcast: "the Intelligence Services".

1661 A. I think all I can say, my Lord, is that in the2 programme's mind, and indeed in ours for some time, that3 was not what we believed to be the allegation that had

4 been made.5 LORD HUTTON: Is the important thing not what the listeners6 take it to mean?7 A. I agree with that, yes.8 LORD HUTTON: Yes.9 MR SUMPTION: You have accepted that there was no basis in10 Mr Gilligan's notes for the assertion that that point11 had been made to him by Dr Kelly, the conscious12 misfeasance point.13 A. It was not in his notes, yes.14 Q. Was that point made to the Governors?15 A. Yes, I said to the Governors that his notes were not16 verbatim, were not -- not every that he had broadcast

17 was contained in his notes but that Mr Gilligan asserted18 that what was not there was a proper reflection of his19 conversation with Dr Kelly. The one point the Governors20 challenged me on was whether the name "Campbell" was21 represented in the notes and I told them that it was,22 next to a phrase about transformation of the dossier.23 And that was really the only point that they wanted to24 have more clarification about the notes on.25 Q. You see, Mr Sambrook, when you wrote the 27th June

1671 letter you had not seen Mr Gilligan's notes; and when2 you subsequently saw them you realised that there might

3 be a problem about the unequivocal way in which you had4 answered Mr Campbell's question whether the BBC stood by5 the 6.07 allegation.6 A. when I saw his notes I had the conversation with Andrew7 about those elements of his broadcast which were not8 captured in his notes and he continued to assert that9 his conversation with Dr Kelly backed up those comments,10 and I took him at face value.11 Q. So he continued to tell you that that was what Dr Kelly12 had actually told him?13 A. He continued to say it was a proper -- he did not say it14 was a direct quote at that point but he did say it15 continued to be a proper reflection and interpretation16 of what Dr Kelly had told him, which is what I think17 I said in my evidence on the 13th.18 Q. You have told us that by this stage the notion that the19 source was a senior member of the Intelligence Services20 had got into the bloodstream. But you, by now, knew at21 the Governors' meeting that the source was not a senior22 member of the Intelligence Service.23 A. Yes.24 Q. Now, was that point made to the Governors?25 A. No, because the Governors again did not press me on the

1681 identity of the source or where the source came from.2 As I explained earlier, the dilemma I found myself in,3 and I had some unease over it but nevertheless it was


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4 a dilemma I faced, was about clarification of that point5 against anything which might assist the identification6 or narrow the scope for identification of our source.7 Given the climate and the high public attention at that8 time, I believed our primary responsibility was to9 continue to try to protect the identity of the source

10 and therefore decided not to proceed with that11 clarification in public. The Governors did not question12 me about it specifically in any way.13 Q. But the Governors had no reason to doubt what the BBC14 had itself been saying for weeks, namely that this was15 a senior intelligence source, what you yourself had said16 in the Today Programme on the 26th.17 A. That is true, though it is also true that after the18 27th, when I was aware of Dr Kelly as the source, I took19 every step I could to ensure that future communications20 accurately described him. I am aware that the21 Governors' statement did not but I was not consulted22 about that statement before it was released.

23 Q. The problem is that the Governors were under the24 impression that it was a senior intelligence source.25 You knew that in fact it was not.

1691 A. I do not altogether accept that, I am afraid. I think2 that the description of the source was not solely an3 Intelligence Service source, which seems to be the4 implication of what you are saying. There were many5 varied descriptions of the source, some of which6 suggested he came from the Intelligence Services, many7 of which did not. So my view is that there was a very8 confused picture of where the source may have sat.

9 Q. Well, you have just yourself confirmed, have you not,10 that the Governors' press release immediately after this11 assumed that he was an intelligence source.12 A. It did.13 Q. You say you were not consulted about that. But would14 you not agree that it is a rather serious matter that15 the Governors of the BBC should have endorsed the16 journalistic standards of the broadcast on the basis17 that the source was a senior member of the Intelligence18 Services, without appreciating that that description was19 wrong?20 A. I think it is regrettable that their press release21 referred to Intelligence Services, yes. Whether -- the22 extent to which they derived comfort themselves from any23 idea they may or may not have had that he was an24 Intelligence Service source I cannot speak to.25 Q. The only other matters I want to ask you about

1701 Mr Sambrook concern a couple of press releases. Could2 you look, please, at BBC/3/25? This is a press release3 of 9th July. Were you here when I asked Mr Gilligan4 about this?5 A. I was, yes.6 Q. In that case, we can take it quite shortly. Did you7 have any involvement at all with the issue of this press8 release?9 A. I was aware of it. I do not remember directly drawing


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10 it up, no.11 Q. When were you aware of it?12 A. On that evening.13 Q. Were you aware of it before it was actually issued?14 A. I may have been, I cannot recall exactly.15 Q. Were you consulted about its terms?

16 A. Not that I recall in detail, no.17 Q. Do you regard it as satisfactory -- given that you, at18 this time, knew that the source was Dr Kelly -- that the19 BBC should put out a public statement saying20 Mr Gilligan's source does not work in the Ministry of21 Defence?22 A. I remember precisely what our view was about it because23 I remember a mobile telephone conversation I had on the24 way back into the office that evening, where we were25 discussing the Ministry of Defence press statement. And

1711 our view was that the original Ministry of Defence press

2 statement had two facts in it: 1. That the individual3 had known Mr Gilligan for a number of months and it4 appeared to say, quite firmly, words to the effect that5 it was an MoD official.6 Our view -- my understanding of Dr Kelly, and indeed7 that of Andrew Gilligan, was that Dr Kelly had a roving8 role and was not kind of directly line managed by the9 MoD, and also that Andrew Gilligan had known him for10 a number of years. Our view in the first few hours of11 that evening was that it was quite likely they had12 actually identified somebody else and not13 Andrew Gilligan's source. It was not clear until14 I think the next day that actually Dr Kelly who had been

15 identified.16 Q. Knowing as you did that Mr Gilligan's source was in fact17 Dr Kelly, did you regard it as a fair and honest18 statement, on the part of the BBC, to say that19 Mr Gilligan's source does not work in the Ministry of20 Defence?21 A. Well, I think what we were trying to say is he was not22 a Ministry of Defence official directly; and I think23 that the Ministry of Defence statement had indicated24 that. It is as simple as that.25 Q. So with no gloss at all you regard it as a perfectly

1721 fair statement to make, do you: Mr Gilligan's source2 does not work in the Ministry of Defence?3 A. Of course I understand the point you are making, but4 I have to say at the time I think we regarded it was5 perfectly fair, yes.6 Q. It is pure trouble making, is it not?7 A. No, I do not agree with that.8 Q. Did you accompany Mr Gilligan when he gave evidence to9 the Foreign Affairs Committee second time round?10 A. No, I did not.11 Q. The other press release I want you to look at is at12 BBC/6/261.13 This is a press release issued by the BBC's Director14 of Communications, Sally Osman, on behalf of15 Andrew Gilligan. Were you consulted about this?


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16 A. No, I was not.17 Q. Can you help us at all on the circumstances in which18 a decision was made that a press release in these terms19 should be put out?20 A. I believe this was the day I had made the announcement21 that Dr Kelly was our source, which had obviously caused

22 a lot of media and public interest. And I think that23 part of that interest was suggesting, therefore, that24 following Dr Kelly's evidence to the FAC that25 Andrew Gilligan had not properly represented his

1731 comments and his reporting of it; and my understanding2 was that Andrew Gilligan wanted to send out this press3 statement to, in his view, correct that. But beyond4 that, those are the circumstances under which it arose5 but I was not consulted about the terms of it.6 MR SUMPTION: I see. I will not ask you any more about it.7 Thank you.

8 LORD HUTTON: We will rise now then for five minutes.9 (3.22 pm)10 (Short Break)11 (3.27 pm)12 Cross-examined by MR DINGEMANS13 Q. Mr Sambrook, first of all can I deal with the letter of14 27th June? Can I take you to BBC/5/119 which is page 115 of the letter? You make the point, in your first16 paragraph, that you did not answer on 26th June because17 you wanted time to examine fully the questions you asked18 and to write a considered reply.19 Do I take the gist of your evidence to be this: that20 although you had hoped to write a considered reply, this

21 was not it?22 A. Yes. At the time under the deadline of responding by23 the end of that day, to take an extra 24 hours in the24 climate in which we were at this time seemed to be25 taking a significant extra time. What I have said today

1741 is on reflection I think we should have withstood the2 pressure to reply and have taken longer and considered3 at greater length.4 Q. Because if we go on to page 124 there is part of this5 letter which says at the bottom of the page:6 "Does it still stand by the allegation made on that7 day that both we and the intelligence agencies knew the8 45 minute claim to be wrong and inserted it despite9 knowing that."10 It says this:11 "Andrew Gilligan accurately reported the source12 telling him that the Government 'probably knew that the13 45 minute figure was wrong' and that the claim was14 'questionable'."15 Both those aspects of the answer are simply wrong16 and unsupported by the evidence, are they not?17 A. As I now understand it, that is the case. At the time18 Mr Gilligan, I think, told me that that was a proper19 reflection of what his source had told him.20 Q. Can I then turn to the meeting you had on 3rd June at21 The Times. Mr Baldwin told us about this in evidence.


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22 He said that you were, as it were, doing the rounds of23 media; is that right? You were going round to various24 media outlets?25 A. Yes, at the time there was a great deal of briefing of

175

1 newspapers going on, particularly by the Government, to2 be fair; and I felt it would be useful for me to speak3 to the editors of a number of newspapers so they could4 at least try to understand the BBC's position even if5 they did not sympathise with it.6 Q. Was there any discussion about the source for7 Mr Gilligan's story at that meeting?8 A. Yes. As I said in my evidence on the 13th, I was asked9 about the source and I used the phrase that10 Andrew Gilligan used at 7.32 that it was a "senior11 source involved in the compilation of the dossier",12 I think I said. I was then asked by Mr Baldwin whether13 we had attempted to go back to the source and check

14 whether we was happy with the way that his allegations15 had been reported; and I said that we was unavailable16 due to the nature of his work. This is a phrase that17 Andrew Gilligan had used when I had asked the same18 question of him at some stage in the preceding days.19 Mr Baldwin then pressed me further to say: does that20 mean he is abroad? And I did not wish to --21 I understood that Dr Kelly might be in Iraq but I did22 not know for certain and I did not wish to say yes or23 no, either to mislead or to help direct people towards24 Dr Kelly if he was in Iraq. So I said "something like25 that", intending it to cover a range of possibilities.

1761 Q. Could I take you to the article written by Mr Baldwin on2 5th July? It is BBC/6/5. He says this in the first3 paragraph:4 "The source for bitterly contested allegations that5 Downing Street 'sexed up' its dossier on6 Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction is7 a military expert who is now based in Iraq, BBC insiders8 are claiming."9 Did you tell Mr Baldwin that the source was based in10 Iraq?11 A. Absolutely not.12 Q. Mr Baldwin also appears to know that the person is13 a weapons of mass destruction military expert. Did you14 tell him that?15 A. Absolutely not.16 Q. Mr Baldwin said that parts of that information had come17 from BBC insiders. Did you know anything about that?18 A. I knew nothing about that at all, no.19 Q. If it had come from BBC insiders, it would have been20 plainly inappropriate for that information to have been21 disclosed, would you accept that?22 A. I think it would have been extremely inappropriate and23 I would be very surprised if anybody within the BBC had24 made those sorts of comments to Mr Baldwin at all.25 Q. On 8th July in his article Mr Baldwin said this: some

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1 executives, BBC executives, have hinted that he may be2 in Iraq searching for weapons of mass destruction. Such3 loose talk convinced Downing Street that he is a weapons4 of mass destruction specialist at the Foreign Office,5 which appears to be picking up the same point. No doubt6 you would condemn, if BBC executives were the source of

7 that information, anyone leaking that information?8 A. I would completely condemn it. I have no doubt9 whatsoever that it was not possible for Tom Baldwin to10 reach those conclusions from any conversation I had.11 Q. Anything you had said to him?12 A. Yes.13 Q. He did not provide us, beyond saying there were two14 persons who had spoken with Mr Marsh, any further15 details of the BBC executives.16 A. Yes.17 Q. Have you undertaken any investigations to see whether or18 not those claims were right?19 A. We have not.

20 Q. You have not?21 A. No. I am afraid that the BBC insiders get quoted22 a great deal in the newspapers. It is not really23 possible to investigate all of them.24 Q. Finally, can I turn to the question of editorial25 concerns and whether those were passed on sufficiently

1781 to the Governors? It is right, is it not, that by the2 time of the Governors' meeting on 6th July there were3 real concerns about the language that had been used by4 Mr Gilligan in his broadcast?5 A. There was certainly concern that there -- we had not

6 been consistent and that the range of interpretations7 was being drawn from the way we had reported the

hearing transcript - 17 september 2003 afternoon

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