hearing transcript - 3 september 2003 afternoon

8/8/2019 Hearing Transcript - 3 September 2003 Afternoon

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Hearing Transcripts

941 doubt.2 Q. And there is a difference, I take it, from your answer3 between "indicates" and "shows"?

4 A. Yes.5 LORD HUTTON: This might be a convenient time to rise.6 MR DINGEMANS: In fact Dr Jones will not be the next witness7 at 2 o'clock because we have the video link. I am8 sorry, you will have to wait to finish off your evidence9 after lunch.10 (1.05 pm)11 (The short adjournment)12 (2.00 pm)13 LORD HUTTON: We are having Mr A now, are we?14 MR DINGEMANS: It is someone called Mr A. We are not going15 to see his face.16 MR A (called)

17 Examined by MR DINGEMANS18 Q. Mr A we cannot see you. Can you see us?19 A. Yes, I can see you.20 Q. Can you tell us what your current occupation is?21 A. Currently I am a casually employed civil servant with22 the Counter Proliferation Arms Control Department.23 Q. Have you ever made Dr Kelly?24 A. I have met him on many occasions since I first met him25 in 1992.

951 Q. Where did you meet him in 1992?2 A. I would have met him out in Bahrain as we helped the

3 missions for UNSCOM, the United Nations Special4 Commission, prepare their missions into Iraq.5 Q. Did you get on well with him?6 A. Very well, initially as professionals working in the7 same field, and later on socially.8 Q. What were you doing from 1999 onwards?9 A. From 1999 onwards, along with Dr Kelly, we worked on10 a number of issues for the Foreign Office and the11 Ministry of Defence relating to the situation in Iraq.12 Q. Did you have anything to do with the drafting of13 the September dossier?14 A. I was invited to a meeting at the Ministry of Defence on15 19th September.

16 Q. Who invited you to that meeting?17 A. Dr Kelly invited me and suggested I had some valuable18 contributions to make to the process of that meeting.19 Q. And where was the meeting held?20 A. It was held in the Old War Office.21 Q. And who else was present at the meeting? I do not need22 names but were they Foreign and Commonwealth Office23 personnel?24 A. They were Ministry of Defence personnel.25 Q. And what part of the Ministry of Defence?

961 A. The Defence Intelligence Service.

2 Q. What was discussed at this meeting?3 A. A draft of the dossier had been produced and the purpose


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4 of the meeting was to check it, once again, for errors5 of fact, errors of language and the totality of the6 document as a whole.7 LORD HUTTON: Mr A, we have heard evidence from8 Dr Brian Jones this morning. Was he at the meeting?9 A. He was.

10 LORD HUTTON: Did he chair the meeting?11 A. He did chair the meeting.12 LORD HUTTON: Thank you. Yes.13 MR DINGEMANS: How many other people, apart from you,14 Dr Kelly and Dr Jones, were at the meeting?15 A. Another 7 or 8 apart from myself, Dr Kelly and Dr Jones.16 Q. Had you seen any earlier drafts of the dossier?17 A. I had not.18 Q. Do you recall the nature of the discussions?19 A. It was a page by page fact checking exercise. We were20 going through it fairly swiftly in order to catch any21 last minute items that had been incorrectly stated or22 needed amplification.

23 Q. Did you make any particular comments on the dossier?24 A. Yes, I did. There were errors of detail and there were25 errors of emphasis, in my view.

971 Q. Can you help us what areas you thought there were errors2 of detail on?3 A. The detail appears to be covered in one of the documents4 already submitted to you. And that is, I believe,5 CAB/3/79.6 Q. Right. Can we look at CAB/3/79? This is a letter dated7 19th September from the DIS to the JIO assessment staff.8 If we scroll down the page. Can you see that now

9 yourself?10 A. I have a copy myself in front of me.11 Q. We are looking now, and it begins:12 "Page 4, paragraph 5, 4th bullet;13 "Suggest change ..."14 And the rationale is language. Is that what you are15 talking about in terms of detail?16 A. Yes, I have been through the document, myself, in the17 past couple of days. I have not seen the document18 before, but I can see, within that document, perhaps 1219 changes which I believe were suggested by Dr Kelly and20 about four changes I believe were suggested by myself.21 These, of course, represent changes which were accepted

22 and forwarded to the assessment staff for change or23 inclusion.24 Q. Right. Changes that were accepted in the discussion25 group that you were having?

981 A. That is correct.2 Q. And can you help us with the changes that Dr Kelly3 suggested?4 A. I would say pretty much the majority -- I can go through5 them point by point but I have possibly 12 to 14 points6 which I believe come from Dr Kelly.7 Q. Can you very quickly take us through those?

8 A. Certainly. At the bottom of the first page:9 "Amend to: '... with her team at al-Muthanna...'"


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10 The next four points completely, down to "aflatoxin.11 "4.6 tons of growth media". Moving down the page, the12 "al-Dawrah Foot and Mouth Vaccine Institute". The13 "facility ... used to store biological agent". The14 point beneath that dealing with UNSCOM establishing that15 in 1987.

16 Q. That is at the bottom of the second page, is it?17 A. That is at the bottom of the second page.18 Q. Going to the third page now.19 A. The first point:20 "... is known to have tested."21 About halfway down the page "add additional sentence22 ... 'specified timeframe'", and the next two points23 beneath that.24 Q. They were all Dr Kelly's suggestions, were they?25 A. Looking back at my recollection of the meeting,

991 I believe those were all suggested by him.

2 Q. And there was a letter being drafted or these points3 were being noted and then put into the letter; is that4 right?5 A. I believe so. As I say, I have not seen this document6 before three days ago. Therefore it looks like the7 formal response from the DIS to the assessment staff.8 Q. And you said that there were points on detail that you9 commented on. Were there any points on emphasis?10 A. Indeed, I made a comment on the al-Qa'qa' phosgene plant11 and the tone adopted in relation to that.12 Q. Can I just pull up another document for us back here13 because we do not have anything to look at, at the14 moment. It is DOS/1/75 at paragraph 10.

15 A. I do not have a copy of that in front of me.16 Q. Well, this is the dossier itself, as published, and we17 can see if we scroll down to paragraph 10 -- can I help18 you by reading out what it says:19 "Parts of the al-Qa'qa' chemical complex damaged in20 the Gulf War have also been repaired and are21 operational. Of particular concern are elements of the22 phosgene production plant at al-Qa'qa'. These were23 severely damaged during the Gulf War, and dismantled24 under UNSCOM supervision, but have since been rebuilt.25 While phosgene does have industrial uses it can also be

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1 used by itself as a chemical agent or as a precursor for2 nerve agent."3 Is that the passage you are referring to?4 A. That is indeed. I have a copy of that in CAB/3/43 also5 paragraph 10, word for word identical.6 Q. What were your concerns about that?7 A. My concerns were that it really was a non-issue, and it8 was wrong for the Government to make such a fuss about9 the phosgene production plant at al-Qa'qa'. I had10 visited there as part of a UN inspection team and many11 other inspection teams had visited the plant. It is12 true that phosgene was used as a toxication during the13 First World War, but some 6 million tons or so,

14 I believe, are manufactured worldwide every year, and15 this was a small expensive way of producing phosgene


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16 dedicated to a particular process, a legitimate process17 within the al-Qa'qa' plant. Therefore to state it was18 of particular concern against a background in which the19 Iraqi armed forces had never weaponised phosgene nor20 shown any intention of doing so was, for me, the wrong21 emphasis. My quarrel was with the phrase "of particular

22 concern".23 Q. What we are looking at at DOS/1/75 is the final version.24 That rather suggests that your concerns were not25 accepted.

1011 A. That is correct.2 Q. What was Dr Kelly's attitude to the dossier, apart from3 those specific comments that you have already4 identified?5 A. Both of us believed that if you took the dossier as6 a whole it was a reasonable and accurate reflection of7 the intelligence that we had available to us at that

8 time.9 Q. And after the meeting, did you have any further10 involvement in the drafting of the dossier?11 A. I did not.12 Q. Did you have any other communications with Dr Kelly13 about the dossier?14 A. I did. I e-mailed him about --15 LORD HUTTON: Just before we move there, Mr A, did Dr Kelly,16 at that meeting, make any reference to the statement in17 the dossier that chemical and biological weapons could18 be ready for use within 45 minutes?19 A. I think all of us touched on the subject in one way or20 another. It was a statement which seemed to rather beg

21 more questions than it answered; and for those of us22 without access to the source intelligence, it really23 made us ask further questions. Since we did not have24 access to that intelligence, no assurances about its25 origins or its implications could be given.

1021 LORD HUTTON: Was Dr Kelly critical of that statement or did2 he raise questions about it? Can you be a little more3 specific on that point?4 A. Certainly. I think all those of us without access to5 that intelligence immediately asked the question: well,6 what does the 45 minutes refer to? Are you referring to

7 a technical process? Are you referring to a commander8 control process? And if your assessment causes you to9 immediately ask questions, then we felt that it was not10 perhaps a statement that ought to be included. But the11 discussion about it was general, and did not relate to12 Dr Kelly or any other person at the meeting feeling13 particularly that it should not have been included.14 LORD HUTTON: Thank you.15 MR DINGEMANS: You were about to tell us of the further16 contact you had had with Dr Kelly about the dossier.17 A. Indeed. About six days later, on the 25th, I e-mailed18 him. He had asked for a little bit of background on the19 phosgene plant and I had dug some old stuff out of my

20 files.21 Q. Did that follow a newspaper report?


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22 A. It did. As I sadly predicted, the Iraqis had23 immediately invited journalists to go to the al-Qa'qa'24 plant and see for themselves no proscribed activities25 were taking place.

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1 Q. Can I just interrupt you and ask for MED/5/1 to 2? We2 are going to look at The Guardian, page 2 for 25th3 September 2002. Is that the newspaper report that you4 are going to refer to?5 A. It is indeed.6 Q. What this says in paragraph 2 is:7 "Mr Said, director general of the al-Qa'qa' military8 industrial complex, near Baghdad, said that at least one9 of the chemical warfare allegations in relation to his10 plant was easily refutable: 'it is a pretty stupid11 mistake for the British to make.'12 "He expected to be bombed anyway..."13 Then he went on to talk on about various other

14 matters and make specific comments on it. Is that the15 article you were referring to?16 A. It is indeed. I wrote to David on that day that I was17 with the manager of al-Qa'qa', that it was a pretty18 stupid mistake for the British to make.19 Q. Can I pull up CAB/29/15? Can you see what we are20 looking at or not?21 A. CAB/29/15. I do not believe I can.22 Q. Right. This is an e-mail from someone who is blanked23 out to David Kelly and it is dated 25th September 200224 timed at 14:58:10 "research department of ..."25 Is that the e-mail you sent to Dr Kelly?

1041 A. That is the e-mail I sent to Dr Kelly.2 Q. Why did you send him this e-mail?3 A. As I say, he had asked me for a little bit of background4 material on al-Qa'qa'. I was able to dig it out and in5 passing I made the comment that The Guardian newspaper6 interview of the manager of al-Qa'qa' had resulted in7 what I had suggested would happen at the meeting of8 19th September.9 Q. Well, you say in the second paragraph:10 "Casting your mind back to Thursday's rushed little11 meeting..."12 Is that the meeting that you are telling us about at

13 the moment?14 A. It is, indeed.15 Q. "... you will recall me pointing out that the phosgene16 [plant] was too small to be interesting, and regarded by17 UNSCOM as legit dual use. I was assured that rebuilding18 had gone on.19 "I also pointed out that the bulk world usage of20 phosgene, and the small size of the unit. You will21 recall [blank] admitted they were grasping at straws."22 I do not know need to know who "blank" was. Was23 blank at the meeting?24 A. Blank was at the meeting. It was a conversation I had25 with blank after the meeting where I expressed my view

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1 that to include it in the document really was not going2 to serve any useful purpose.3 Q. Why did this person say they were grasping at straws?4 A. I cannot remember if he used those exact words. I may5 have paraphrased, in my e-mail to David, exactly what6 blank felt about it, but it was a conversational aside

7 at the end of the meeting, that I was simply making the8 point that not taking my advice was not a good idea.9 Q. You then say:10 "My annotations are on [blank] draft -- you'll11 remember [blank] was keen to relieve me of possession of12 the dossier at the end of the meeting!"13 You have put exclamation marks. Was there any14 significance behind that?15 A. Not at all. I was shown a copy of the draft 20 or16 30 minutes before the meeting. I read the relevant17 parts very quickly, made some notes on it and then18 handed the draft back.19 Q. You say in the penultimate paragraph:

20 "So all in all -- having read page 2 of21 The Guardian -- I'm with the manager of al-Qa'qa: 'it is22 a pretty stupid mistake for the British to make'."23 A. Indeed, that was my opinion then and it remains my24 opinion.25 Q. Then you go on, last paragraph:

1061 "Another example supporting our view that you and2 I should have been more involved in this than the spin3 merchants of this administration. No doubt you will4 have to more to tell me as a result of your antics5 today. Let's hope it turns into tomorrow's chip

6 wrappers ..."7 Had you and Dr Kelly discussed whether or not you8 felt you should have been more involved with drafting9 the dossier?10 A. We had. We, ourselves, had not been directly involved11 before; but as a result of the work that summer, where12 both of us had been involved in drafting the13 International Institute of Strategic Studies report on14 Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, we felt that the UK15 Government was missing a trick by not including us in16 the loop in the preparation of Her Majesty's17 Government's dossier.18 Q. You make the comment about the involvement of the spin

19 merchants of this administration. Who were you20 referring to?21 A. Well, it is really a general comment from the working22 level within the DIS about perceived interference and23 really that --24 Q. Sorry to interrupt. What was the perception?25 A. The perception was that the dossier had been round the

1071 houses several times in order to try to find a form of2 words which would strengthen certain political3 objectives.4 Q. And was that a view widely shared within the DIS?

5 A. I am not able to comment on that since I was not working6 at the DIS at the time.


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7 Q. You refer to his "antics today". What was that?8 A. I believe he was attending another meeting, but I cannot9 recall exactly which meeting he was attending.10 Q. And you express the hope that it turns into tomorrow's11 chip wrappers. Can you just explain formally what you12 mean by that?

13 A. Well, news is often unimportant two or three days after14 it has been published and that was the sentiment I was15 seeking to express, that really we could move past this16 little difficulty of a dossier which had one or two17 errors in it. You must remember our view that the18 dossier as a whole was quite a decent dossier and19 represented a reasonable summation. It is just that it20 included some points which could have been left out.21 Q. After publication of the dossier, were you ever22 contacted by anyone in relation to the dossier?23 A. Some journalists had approached my home telephone number24 seeking for informed comments but I was unable to help25 them since I had not been involved in the production of

1081 the dossier apart from that particular meeting.2 Q. Were you authorised to speak to journalists?3 A. I was not authorised to speak to journalists and said4 very little other than: thank you very much and no5 I have nothing to say, before putting the phone down.6 Q. When did you last visit Dr Kelly?7 A. I last visited his home -- it would have been about8 a week before the 2nd July. He last visited my home on9 10th July.10 Q. When you visited his home, if it is the week before, it11 is about 26th June, is that about right?

12 A. It is about then, yes.13 Q. Did he speak to you about any letters he was going to14 write to the Ministry of Defence about press contacts?15 A. He did not.16 Q. Did he speak to you about whether or not he had spoken17 to Mr Gilligan?18 A. He never mentioned Mr Gilligan at all.19 Q. Either on 26th or on 10th July?20 A. On neither occasion did he mention Mr Gilligan.21 Q. Did you see Dr Kelly after 26th June?22 A. Yes, I did. We underwent some training together at23 RAF Uxbridge and RAF Honnington in preparation for our24 imminent deployment to Iraq. And shortly after that

25 training he visited my house on the 10th to drop off

1091 some malaria medication.2 Q. When you saw him at RAF Uxbridge and RAF Honnington, how3 did he seem?4 A. He seemed his normal self, chatty, friendly, gregarious5 and it was only when he was called away on the Monday we6 were at Honnington, which I believe is the 7th --7 Q. 7th July?8 A. 7th July, that he -- we began to think that perhaps9 there were other matters afoot which would involve him.10 Q. Who is "we"?

11 A. Those people being trained to deploy to Iraq.12 Q. How did Dr Kelly seem when he was called away?


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13 A. He simply turned his phone off and turned -- rather14 ended the call and said: I have to go to London15 immediately; and made preparations to leave the16 training.17 Q. Did you overhear the conversation?18 A. No, I did not.

19 Q. When you saw him on 10th July, where were you?20 A. I was at home, preparing to fly the next day.21 Q. We do not want to know exactly where your home is. Can22 you give us a general description of the area, perhaps23 by county?24 A. Certainly, Wiltshire.25 Q. And you saw him on 10th July?

1101 A. Yes.2 Q. We have heard that he spent the night of the 9th July at3 a hotel in Weston-Super-Mare then, I think, travelled4 down on 10th July to Cornwall. Did he tell you that he

5 was travelling anywhere?6 A. It was slightly odd. He rang me on the morning of the7 10th to tell me he had the medication for me.8 Q. What medication was this?9 A. It was paladin, it is an anti-malarial medication.10 Q. Who had given him that?11 A. The doctor at RAF Honnington had given him the12 medication for the three of us who were about to deploy13 to Iraq on Friday. She had made a slight error in the14 prescription and was giving us some more.15 Q. Right. And he rang you to say that he had the16 medication -- sorry, I interrupted.17 A. Yes. He rang to say he had the medication and was quite

18 happy to drop it off. This was quite odd. I was quite19 happy to travel the short distance to his home to pick20 it up. But he almost insisted he dropped it off.21 Within about half an hour to an hour he arrived at my22 house.23 Q. Sorry to press you, whereabouts in Wiltshire? Can you24 give a town that you are near?25 A. I am near Swindon.

1111 LORD HUTTON: Was Mrs Kelly with Dr Kelly at this time,2 Mr A?3 A. It is possible that she could have been in the car. I

4 myself did not understand how the whole5 Weston-Super-Mare/Cornwall trip works in the chronology.6 David had parked some distance from my house and walked7 100 yards up the road to my house.8 Q. Do you have a drive?9 A. I am afraid not.10 Q. Was 100 yards the closest he could park?11 A. Yes, that is the problem.12 Q. And how did he seem to you when you saw him on13 10th July?14 A. He was distracted. Our conversation would normally15 include a significant part relating to work, but he16 seemed to want nothing more than to have a cup of coffee

17 and walk through my garden talking about the garden, so18 that is what we did.


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19 Q. Was that usual behaviour for him?20 A. It was not. I would characterise his behaviour as being21 somewhat distracted at this point; and he clearly did22 not want to talk much about work.23 Q. Was that usual?24 A. It was not. Our friendship was based partly on work

25 but -- mostly on work, and really a large part of our

1121 meetings would consist of talking of matters of2 professional mutual concern.3 Q. Had you by this stage become aware of the Ministry of4 Defence press release on the evening of 8th July which5 referred to an unnamed official coming forward?6 A. I had not. I picked up the paper shortly after he left7 and he was named in that paper; but at that point I did8 not know he had been named.9 Q. And he did not volunteer anything about that to you?10 A. He did not. I mentioned briefly whoever the mole was

11 probably had some explaining to do. It never crossed my12 mind for a moment that they possibly could be referring13 to David. The reason for that is I knew he had been14 charged with the responsibility of giving background15 briefings by both the FCO and MoD for many years and16 I believe that his authorisation covered all his media17 contacts.18 Q. Had you ever discussed retirement plans or Dr Kelly's19 retirement plans?20 A. We often did. He was approaching the end of a long and21 meritorious career and he still had, he believed, a lot22 to offer. It was unclear to him exactly how he would23 deal with his retirement. But a significant change did

24 occur over the period of the winter 2002 to the spring25 of 2003.

1131 Q. What was that change?2 A. I would say that before the autumn of 2002 he had every3 intention of working in an official/semi-official or4 academic capacity in the field which he had made his own5 for the past 30 years. But when we discussed the6 subject in May or June of 2003 he did say to me that the7 events of the winter and the spring had made him think8 very seriously as to whether his previous ideas of9 continuing on were realistic and maybe he ought to just

10 draw a line under the whole experience when it was over.11 Q. Did he tell you what events he was referring to?12 A. David had been in great demand throughout the winter and13 the spring, by various people, and had done a lot of14 work and a lot of travelling; and I do not think15 necessarily that he had the support that he thought was16 necessary. I say in that that he found it really quite17 frustrating at times dealing with people who were not18 fully aware of the issues.19 Q. "Dealing with people", what sort of people?20 A. He was never indiscrete enough to mention which21 departments or individuals he was having difficulty22 with; but of course Government -- this is a consensual

23 process and you can have opinions and people cannot take24 your advice. If people do not take your advice, this


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25 can be seen to be quite difficult.

1141 Q. Did he refer, in this context, to the dossier at all?2 A. He did not. That more or less did turn into yesterday's3 chip wrappers for a period over the winter, and it was

4 subsumed by the February dossier to some extent which5 had its own particular problems.6 Q. Is there anything else surrounding the circumstances of7 Dr Kelly's death that you can assist his Lordship with?8 A. Not at all, but I can tell you about a meeting held in9 Baghdad some 8 days after David's death. Some 30 former10 colleagues of David actually gathered, which in a sense11 was fairly impressive, to remember the man and his12 achievements. And we felt that his loss is actually13 a sorry loss for the Iraq Survey Group and we miss his14 expertise and his friendship greatly.15 Q. Is there anything else you would like to say?16 A. Not at all.

17 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed, Mr A.18 A. Thank you.19 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, I am afraid we will need a couple of20 minutes to disconnect.21 LORD HUTTON: I will rise.22 (2.28 pm)23 (Short Break)24 (2.30 pm)25

1151 DR BRIAN FRANCIS GILL JONES (continued)2 Examined by MR DINGEMANS (continued)

3 LORD HUTTON: Sit down again, please, Dr Jones.4 MR DINGEMANS: Dr Jones, I am sorry to have interrupted your5 evidence.6 You have told us about the three categories of7 concern you had in relation to the 45 minutes comment.8 You had also dealt with the other matter highlighted on9 that.10 When you were having your meeting on 19th September11 in DIS, was the person who we have heard of as Mr A12 present?13 A. I believe so, yes.14 Q. I do not know whether the voice was distorted or whether15 you might have been able to recognise him?

16 A. That was the only -- I think the only occasion I ever17 met Mr A; and so I am not familiar -- you know, I am not18 familiar with his voice. I am virtually certain it was.19 Q. He sounded fairly forceful about certain matters. Was20 that a fair impression?21 A. (Pause). My recollection of the meeting does not22 coincide exactly with what you have just heard. In the23 main parts I think it does. The reason for the meeting,24 from my perspective -- well, the meeting was not held25 for the reason that Mr A thinks it was, and it did not

1161 gather the information for the particular document you

2 showed.3 Q. Right.


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4 A. Some of it may have come from that meeting, but that was5 not the purpose of the meeting. The purpose of the6 meeting, and I think the description of it of "rushed"7 and "little" were probably correct. It was a rushed8 little meeting; but I actually called it at the9 suggestion of one of my staff, who was aware of the

10 problem in my mind over the fact that Dr Kelly -- and11 that David had told me that he thought the dossier was12 good, on the one hand, and my staff and indeed my13 impressions of it were that it was not completely good.14 Q. So it was to iron out those differences of perception?15 A. It was to iron out those differences. As far as the16 presence of Mr A, you know that was an additional bonus,17 if you like, that he had come in and he was the CW18 expert in --19 LORD HUTTON: He was the what expert, sorry?20 A. The CW, sorry, the chemical warfare expert. David being21 the biological warfare expert. We could just sit down22 and briefly chew over the things really in order to try

23 to, you know, settle this problem I had in my mind.24 I have a great deal of respect for David Kelly's input25 to this, and I was really worried about there being some

1171 contradiction.2 MR DINGEMANS: Right. It seems from what Mr A had said that3 the invitation was extended by Dr Kelly. Did you invite4 Mr A or did Dr Kelly?5 A. I did not. The way in which it happened was that on6 that morning a member of my staff, knowing that I had7 these worries, said to me that David was coming in and8 Mr A was coming in with him, would I like a small get

9 together just to try to resolve some of the issues that10 existed? I said: that is a very good idea. And we had11 a meeting, I think in the late morning; and we did have12 a round table discussion of aspects of the dossier. But13 I do not think it was a very long meeting and it14 certainly did not itemise matters that I was going to15 put or a member of my staff was going to put in16 a response to the assessment staff.17 Q. Mr A referred to the letter at CAB/3/79. He identified18 a number of comments that Dr Kelly had made and he19 identified Dr Kelly as being the source of those20 comments. Did that accord with your recollection?21 A. That could well have been the case, but you will recall

22 that Dr Kelly was looking at the dossier the day23 before --24 Q. Yes.25 A. -- and he will have been passing comments, I imagine, to

1181 members of my staff who would then have incorporated2 them in the comments they would send on. So it does not3 surprise me that these additional comments, where my4 staff thought that they contributed to the process,5 would have been taken and used in that way. Indeed, it6 is why they -- you know, why they were welcomed in to7 help in this exercise.

8 Q. The letter of 19th September we can see on the screen,9 was that sent after your meeting with Dr Kelly and Mr A


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10 and your other assessment staff?11 A. I do not know. I mean, that did not originate in my12 branch. It almost certainly includes comments that my13 branch will have fed to this --14 Q. Person coordinating?15 A. Coordinating this.

16 Q. So this is the letter from your branch, reported up17 comments?18 A. Yes.19 Q. And the coordinator, having heard all the comments from20 DIS, then put this letter together?21 A. I think that is what it represents, yes.22 Q. Do you remember what dossier you were looking at on23 19th September? We have one at CAB/3/22 which, in the24 top right-hand corner, has some handwriting,25 19th September on it.

1191 A. My recollection is that David was coming in to look at

2 the latest version of the dossier.3 Q. That day?4 A. So, I would -- my best guess would be that it was that5 version.6 Q. We are told that the 19th September 2002 has been7 written on after the event to help us try to follow the8 progress of the dossier but is taken, as it were, from9 computer records. So you think it was a dossier that10 you got in that day?11 A. I believe so. There was one, as I think I mentioned12 earlier, that they had been working on the day before;13 and as far as I can remember, and I cannot be absolutely14 certain about this, I believe that at that stage my CW

15 expert said, when the new dossier arrived: they still16 have not taken these comments that I am rather bothered17 about. So I do not think the two versions, as far as we18 were concerned -- those pieces of the dossier that were19 primarily of interest to us, I do not think they had20 changed greatly between the two.21 LORD HUTTON: Do you remember, Dr Jones, the draft of the22 dossier that you looked at of 19th September, was it in23 the same form as the dossier that was finally published24 on 24th September? Do you remember that?25 A. (Pause). I think it was -- I think it was close to

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1 that, to the final version.2 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Might it have been exactly the same3 or -- I appreciate it is very difficult to remember4 precisely.5 A. Yes, yes.6 LORD HUTTON: -- is it the position it might have been the7 identical document or it was certainly close to it?8 A. I believed, I think, at the time that this was the9 version as it would appear and that the only comments10 that were required on it were very minimal and there11 were going to be no further major changes.12 LORD HUTTON: Yes.13 A. I was surprised when I refreshed my memory last week at

14 the Ministry of Defence to see that there had been, in15 fact, another version on the 20th. I cannot recall that


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16 that was the case, but that is what the record showed17 and I can believe that.18 MR DINGEMANS: Right. You saw another version, handwriting19 in the top right-hand corner with the 20th on it?20 A. No, I do not think I saw that.21 Q. No, no, not at the time, but last week?

22 A. No, I saw reference to it in a chronological list of --23 Q. Of dossiers?24 A. Of dossiers, yes.25 Q. Do you remember -- it is slightly unfair -- how many

1211 dossiers there were listed there?2 A. No.3 Q. What was the latest dossier that you recall there?4 A. Well, I believe it was the one on the 20th was the last5 draft. But I cannot be certain about that.6 Q. After the meeting on 19th September, your CW expert, and7 I imagine that is a different --

8 LORD HUTTON: Sorry, may I just ask: you said that the9 purpose of that meeting was to really resolve an issue10 which was that some members of your staff had11 reservations about the dossier, whereas Dr Kelly had12 told you that he thought it was a good dossier. That13 was the purpose of the meeting, as I understand it.14 A. Yes.15 LORD HUTTON: How was that matter resolved at that meeting16 or was it resolved?17 A. Well, it was resolved to my satisfaction and to the18 extent that David made it clear that his comments on the19 dossier did not relate to the latest intelligence, which20 he had not seen; that it was mainly about those parts of

21 the dossier dealing with the historical aspects and the22 information he had acquired in his duties as an23 inspector. Those were the parts that he was focusing24 on.25 LORD HUTTON: Yes.

1221 A. And his position was that they were very sound and the2 general thrust of the document he found -- he thought3 was good.4 LORD HUTTON: Please correct me if I am in any way wrong in5 my understanding. Was it the position that Dr Kelly6 then did not express a view about the 45 minute claim,

7 in that it was based on recent intelligence which he had8 not seen?9 A. I cannot recall that he expressed a view on it.10 LORD HUTTON: Yes.11 A. It may well be that, as you heard from the last witness,12 there may have been some general discussion about it.13 In fact, I think that was probably likely. But -- and14 I think probably the context of the meeting was that my15 staff expressed reservations about it, but since he will16 not have seen it, I do not think there could have been17 a detailed discussion of it because it would not have18 been appropriate at that time.19 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you.

20 MR DINGEMANS: After the meeting, a letter is written, we21 have seen that letter, which incorporates various


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22 comments and --23 A. Sorry, which --24 Q. We have seen the letter, 19th September letter.25 A. The one that was --

123

1 Q. Yes. Do you want to see it again?2 A. I do not think so. I mean, you should be clear that3 that letter or that minute was not as a result of the4 meeting.5 Q. No, sorry. Well, comments are passed up to the6 coordinator, who then writes the letter.7 A. Yes, as far as I am aware. It might have been done8 before we had the meeting, I do not know.9 Q. Were any comments passed up, as a result of the meeting,10 to the coordinator by your group?11 A. Not as a -- no. No, they were not.12 Q. Right. But by then, comments had been passed up by your13 CW expert that had not been accepted in the subsequent

14 drafts?15 A. They had been passed up several times during the course16 of the preparation of the dossier.17 Q. Was your CW expert happy or unhappy about this?18 A. He remained unhappy that significant -- that comments he19 had made that he felt were significant had not been20 incorporated.21 Q. So what do you do in those circumstances?22 A. Well, these circumstances are quite unusual.23 Q. Can you tell us why?24 A. Well, I mean the whole dossier was unusual. It was not25 something we did. If I think about that in the same

1241 context as the normal product of the assessment process2 and the JIC assessment process, it would, in fact, be3 very unusual to arrive at a point where a paper was4 about to be published, not in the wider sense but5 published as a secure paper --6 Q. The JIC assessment finalised?7 A. Yes, where significant differences remain. Part of that8 process in the normal production of a JIC assessment9 would involve a meeting within the DIS of analysts with10 our two representatives on the Joint Intelligence11 Committee, at which arguments would be put to them, if12 there were outstanding issues, for them to take into the

13 full Committee to discuss. And that happened fairly14 often, that there would be one or two things and the15 Chief of Defence Intelligence and his deputy would look16 at those and decide whether they would represent them or17 otherwise.18 Q. At the Joint Intelligence Committee meeting?19 A. Yes, yes. And usually issues were either resolved20 before that or resolved as part of that process.21 Q. Because the Chief of Defence Intelligence would say,22 "Look, you are being silly about this; for reasons A, B,23 C I am not going to represent this argument in the Joint24 Intelligence Committee" or "You have persuaded me,25 I will see what I can do".

125


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1 A. That is exactly it.2 Q. Did that happen in this case?3 A. No. There was, I believe, a slight difference in4 process here, in that these latest dossiers were -- the5 latest drafts of the dossier, I think, were being6 modified between major JIC meetings, as I understand.

7 Q. Right.8 A. So -- sorry.9 LORD HUTTON: Carry on please, Dr Jones.10 A. So I think some of these issues were -- probably must11 have been, as far as I can see, dealt with out of12 committee, as it were, by members of the JIC.13 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Scarlett told us that he set up a drafting14 committee, sub-committee, I hope I represent it fairly,15 from the Joint Intelligence Committee and his joint16 intelligence assessment staff which was responsible for17 drafting the dossier.18 A. That is right, yes.19 Q. And that is what you refer to as being a slightly

20 unusual process, is it?21 A. No, no. The involvement of the assessment staff in the22 drafting of the papers was normal process.23 Q. What was abnormal?24 A. (Pause). I am -- I think "abnormal" is the wrong word.25 What was unusual or what did not follow the normal

1261 practice was that this was not a paper that was going2 through the process by which it was examined and argued3 over at a full meeting of the Joint Intelligence4 Committee at the stage that we are talking about.5 Q. Right.

6 A. Unless there was an extraordinary one, of which I am7 totally unaware, I would think that the last meeting8 before publication, which was a Tuesday, would have been9 the previous Wednesday.10 Q. Right.11 A. And here we are into the Thursday and the Friday of that12 cycle.13 Q. So the -- and I think Mr Scarlett has already told us14 this -- Joint Intelligence Committee committee meetings15 are the Wednesday. If you work back on the dossier: the16 dossier is published on 24th September; we know there17 are some versions, 20th you refer to or late on the18 19th, maybe the same one, which are produced after the

19 Joint Intelligence Committee had met.20 A. Yes, I think that just working backwards there would21 have been a meeting on the 18th, I believe.22 Q. Right. Do you understand there to have been a full23 meeting of the Joint Intelligence Committee which24 considered the final draft of the dossier?25 A. I am not aware that there was one, but I am not sure

1271 that there was not one.2 Q. Right. Would you normally know of meetings of the Joint3 Intelligence Committee?4 A. I think I would have known if there was one on this

5 matter, but again I cannot be absolutely sure.6 Q. Their usual meetings are the Wednesday. You would have


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7 known there was an extraordinary, in the sense of not8 the usual time, meeting?9 A. I would be surprised if I did not know. But, I mean,10 one cannot be absolutely certain. There was a lot going11 on. But I am not aware that there was; but if someone12 told me that there was one, I would not argue with it.

13 Q. Is that why you considered the process -- I used the14 word "abnormal", you did not like that, you said15 "unusual". Is that why you considered there was an16 unusual process?17 A. Well, yes, in the sense that the task that was being18 undertaken was different from the normal process.19 I mean, we had maybe produced one paper that was a bit20 like the dossier before, and this was really, you know,21 unusual in its -- the whole thing was a little unusual.22 So it was not necessarily surprising that it did not23 follow exactly the same process. It was not surprising24 to me then.25 Q. Was the perception, right or wrong, that the Joint

1281 Intelligence Committee had not considered in committee2 the final draft before it was published something that3 was commented on by others?4 A. No, I think it has only sort of dawned on me that was5 the case retrospectively. I mean, I do not remember6 thinking that -- I do not remember thinking that, at the7 time. The impression I had was that on about8 19th September, as it may have been the 20th September,9 as it were, the shutters were coming down on this10 particular paper, that the discussion and the argument11 had been concluded. And it was the impression that

12 I had, at that time, that our reservations about the13 dossier were not going to be reflected in the final14 version.15 Q. As a result of this, did you take any action?16 A. Yes, I wrote a minute to my director making it clear17 that there were problems with this, and I copied that18 to --19 Q. Can I call up a minute and you can tell me if it is the20 right one?21 A. -- my deputy director.22 Q. It is MoD/22/1. If we scroll down.23 A. Yes, that is the one.24 Q. You send it to various people; and it said:

25 "... has been involved in the generation of the Iraq

1291 dossier which, in the last two weeks has involved2 a number of iterations which have incorporated new3 intelligence. It is my understanding that some of the4 intelligence has not been made available to my branch.5 Because of this they have had to express their6 reservations on several aspects of the dossier. Most of7 these have been resolved. However, a number remain in8 the document at reference and it is important that9 I note for you at this stage the remaining areas where10 we are unable to confirm the statements made on the

11 basis of the information available to my branch."12 Was that the background against which you wrote the


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13 note?14 A. That was, yes.15 Q. Then you make a number of points:16 "Although we have no problem with a judgment based17 on intelligence that Saddam attaches great importance to18 possessing WMD we have not seen the intelligence that

19 'shows' this to be the case. Nor have we seen20 intelligence that 'shows' he does not regard them only21 as a weapon of last resort, although our judgment is22 that it would be sensible to assume he might use them in23 a number of other scenarios. The intelligence we have24 seen indicates rather than 'shows'..."25 That I think picks up a point you were making

1301 shortly before lunch, is that right?2 A. Yes, that is right.3 Q. At 3:4 "We have a number of questions in our minds relating

5 to the intelligence on the military plans for the use of6 chemical and biological weapons, particularly about the7 times mentioned and the failure to differentiate between8 the two types of weapon."9 Is that a reference to the 45 minutes point?10 A. It is, yes.11 Q. "4. We have not seen intelligence which we believe12 'shows' that Iraq has continued to produce CW agent in13 1998-2002, although our judgment is that it has probably14 done so. Whilst we are even more convinced that Iraq15 has continued to produce biological weapons agent (on16 the basis of mobile production intelligence) we would17 not go so far as to say we 'know' this to be the case."

18 That is on BW, is that?19 A. Yes, that is right.20 Q. That is a thing that Dr Kelly would have known about; is21 that right?22 A. Yes.23 Q. Over the page:24 "Finally, I note we are pleased that the claim that25 Iraq used aflatoxin against the Shi'a uprising in 1991

1311 has been excluded from the dossier but we are concerned2 that the claim in relation to mustard remains as we3 consider the evidence to be weak."

4 To a lawyer who reads people moaning about words all5 the time, it might seem that this is a usual sort of6 minute to write. Would that be a fair impression?7 A. No, if we revert to our comparison with the normal JIC8 product, I think I had only had cause to express this9 sort of reservation after the shutters had come down, if10 you like, on one occasion, maybe two. I can remember --11 I can clearly remember one, but there may have been12 another. But, you know, in 15 years of dealing with13 this process it was very unusual to have to do that.14 Q. Did you get a response?15 A. My director -- who I should explain was only recently in16 post, he had only been in post a few weeks, had come

17 from outside the intelligence area -- was, you know,18 having a difficult time then, shall we say, coming to


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19 terms with all this. And he did write me a note saying:20 thank you for your minute; and I think that was the only21 response I had.22 Q. You got the impression he did not really mean it when he23 said "thank you".24 A. He may well not have meant it, but I do not know -- no,

25 I cannot really comment on that. I mean, we had had

1321 a discussion about it, and he was aware of my2 reservations, you know, 24 hours earlier.3 Q. At MoD/4/11 we can see a letter that is dated4 8th July 2003, which refers to the fact that, halfway5 down:6 "Your records will show that as [then there is7 a title] and probably the most senior and experienced8 intelligence community official working on 'WMD', I was9 so concerned about the manner in which intelligence10 assessments for which I had some responsibility were

11 being presented in the dossier of 24 September 2002,12 that I was moved to write formally to your predecessor,13 Tony Cragg, recording and explaining my reservations."14 Do you know anything about this letter?15 A. Yes, I wrote it.16 Q. That is from you, is it?17 A. Yes.18 Q. And I think we have seen the terms of that letter.19 LORD HUTTON: Now, was Mr Tony Cragg someone separate and20 distinct from your director or is he the same?21 A. Yes, he is my -- he was my director's boss.22 LORD HUTTON: I see.23 A. So he is --

24 LORD HUTTON: He was the Deputy Chief of Defence25 Intelligence.

1331 A. Yes, that is right.2 LORD HUTTON: He was your director's boss?3 A. Yes, that is right.4 LORD HUTTON: Yes, I see. Thank you.5 MR DINGEMANS: Can I take you to a document? It is SJW/1/596 and take you to the bottom of that. Taking it down the7 page, if that is all right, this is said to be a tape8 recording of Dr Kelly in conversation with Ms Watts.9 And if I pick it up just before the bottom of the page

10 you can see:11 "DK: I wouldn't go as strongly as to say that12 particular bit, because I was not involved in the13 assessment of it, no. [He is talking about the14 45 minutes] I can't say that it was against MY advice.15 I was uneasy with it. I mean my problem was I could16 give other explanations, which I've indicated to you,17 that it was the time to erect something like a scud18 missile or it was the time to fill a 40 barrel multi19 barrel rocket launcher.20 "45 minutes might well be important and I mean21 I have no idea who de-briefed this guy, quite often it's22 someone who has no idea of the topic and the information

23 comes through and people then use it as they see fit."24 Do you recall Dr Kelly expressing those sort of


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25 comments?

1341 A. No, I cannot recall that he did that.2 Q. But you recall there was some discussion about the3 45 minutes around the table?

4 A. I think there almost certainly was.5 Q. It is just you --6 A. And there may have been some general comments raised, as7 indeed the last witness mentioned, about an issue like8 that. I mean, they would obviously, with their9 background and experience, try to fit something into10 that, having read it in the draft dossier. I mean, they11 did parallel concerns that we were trying to deal with.12 Q. Ms Watts says:13 "So it wasn't as if there were lots of people saying14 don't put it in don't put it in, it's just it was in15 there and was seized upon, rather than No. 1016 specifically going against."

17 Dr Kelly is reported as saying this:18 "There were lots of people saying that -- I mean it19 was an interesting week before the dossier was put out20 because there were so many things in there that people21 were saying well we're not so sure about that, or in22 fact they were happy with it being in but not expressed23 the way that it was, because the wordsmithing is24 actually quite important and the intelligence community25 are a pretty cautious lot on the whole but once you get

1351 people putting it/presenting it for public consumption2 of course they use different words. I don't think

3 they're being wilfully dishonest I think they just think4 that that's the way the public will appreciate it best.5 I'm sure you have the same problem as a journalist don't6 you? Sometimes you've got to put things into words that7 the public will understand."8 Is that a fair reflection of what was going on in9 the week before the dossier was published?10 A. (Pause). Not completely. I think it depends on what11 one's perception of "lots of people" were. I mean12 people around -- a few people around me were; and13 letting me know about it.14 Q. And a few people obviously then around Dr Kelly, because15 he was around the same sort of people.

16 A. He, I think, would have been aware to some extent of17 that. I do not think -- as I think I mentioned earlier,18 I do not think it was a matter of if we are still on the19 45 minutes, I think we are --20 Q. Well, generally.21 A. It was a matter of saying, you know: do not put that22 in -- it was the way it was qualified which was the23 issue, I believe.24 Q. Over the page, at the top of page 60:25 "In your heart of hearts [this is Dr Kelly still]

1361 you must realise sometimes that's not actually the right

2 thing to say but it's the only way you can put it over3 if you've got to get it over in two minutes or


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4 three minutes.5 Ms Watts: Did you actually write that section which6 refers to the 45 minutes or was it somebody else?7 "Dr Kelly: I didn't write THAT section, no. I mean8 I reviewed the whole thing. I was involved with the9 whole process. In the end it was just a flurry of

10 activity and it was very difficult to get comments in11 because people at the top of the ladder didn't want to12 hear some of the things."13 Was that a fair comment?14 A. (Pause). I mean, I think David was involved in the15 whole process to the extent that he had visibility of16 the whole -- the complete drafts of the dossiers or at17 least by the time I returned from leave on the 18th18 I think he was seeing them. His -- I mean, he did not19 contribute to the process of the analysis of the latest20 intelligence, so he was not involved to that extent.21 Q. Now if --22 A. His description of the flurry of activity was certainly

23 right and I think I have explained that. I mean,24 I think -- I think the end of that, "Because people at25 the top didn't want to hear some of the things".

1371 I mean, whether that was the case or not, I do not know.2 It was certainly difficult to get the things done and it3 was more difficult than usual, and we were disappointed4 when we did not succeed. But the exact cause of that5 one can only guess at. One cannot -- I was not in6 a position to know, and I do not know whether he knew7 any more than I did.8 Q. If members of your staff had given this sort of

9 information to journalists about the discussions that10 had taken place in your branch relating to concerns11 about the dossier, what would your reaction have been to12 that?13 A. (Pause). I would have thought that they were acting14 well beyond the bounds of what they should have been15 doing. I would have been very disappointed and very16 annoyed.17 Q. Can I take you to one final reference, CAB/29/15? This18 is the e-mail -- I think you were in while Mr A was on19 the screen. This was Mr A's e-mail. Just at the bottom20 of CAB/29/15 Mr A makes the comment:21 "Another example supporting our view that you and

22 I should have been more involved in this than the spin23 merchants of this administration."24 Mr A has explained what he meant by that. Was there25 a perception, right or wrong, amongst DIS personnel that

1381 spin merchants were involved with the dossier?2 A. Well, "spin merchants" is rather emotive. I think there3 was an impression, right or wrong, and I do not know,4 I did not allow that to concern me as this process --5 I think there was an impression that there was an6 influence from outside the intelligence community.7 Q. And were people in the intelligence community happy with

8 that?9 A. No, I do not think -- well, I cannot comment on the


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10 broader intelligence community. I think the people who11 had been involved on my staff and possibly others --12 I mean, one cannot make a general statement about this.13 But certainly those people that were working directly14 with me were concerned and unhappy; in the way I think15 I described earlier in my evidence, in the way that

16 people can be unhappy. But I think there was17 a realisation that this was a different process; and18 I think, at the end of the day, what they were very keen19 to do is have any assessment reflect as accurately as20 possible the product of their work.21 Q. Is there anything else surrounding the circumstances of22 Dr Kelly's death that you can assist his Lordship with?23 A. I do not think so, no.24 Q. Is there anything else you would like to say?25 A. No. No.

1391 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much indeed Dr Jones.

2 A. Thank you.3 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Green, please.4 MR ROY JAMES GREEN (called)5 Examined by MR DINGEMANS6 LORD HUTTON: Just sit down, please, Mr Green.7 A. Thank you, my Lord.8 MR DINGEMANS: Can you tell his Lordship your full name?9 A. Yes, Roy James Green.10 Q. What is your occupation?11 A. I am a forensic biologist.12 Q. Who do you work for?13 A. I work for Forensic Alliance Limited.14 Q. And is that a private company or a publicly owned

15 company?16 A. Forensic Alliance is a private forensic company,17 probably the largest independent supplier of forensic18 science in this country.19 Q. What does being a forensic biologist mean that you do?20 A. It is basically looking at evidence from crimes,21 interpreting the evidence that you find and giving an22 opinion on what you feel that evidence means.23 Q. Were you involved in the investigation into Dr Kelly's24 death?25 A. Yes, I was and I still am.

140

1 Q. And when was your first involvement?2 A. May I refer to my notes, if that is all right?3 Q. Yes, of course.4 A. I received a phone call on 18th July.5 Q. At what time, morning, evening?6 A. It was around about dinner time.7 Q. Around about?8 A. Dinner time.9 Q. What did you do as a result of that?10 A. I attended Harrowdown Hill accompanied by one of my11 colleagues.12 Q. What was the name of your colleague?13 A. Dr Eileen Hickey.

14 Q. What time did you get to Harrowdown Hill?15 A. We arrived at the scene at just gone 2 o'clock.


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16 Q. 2 o'clock in the afternoon?17 A. Yes.18 Q. Who was there?19 A. There were lots of people there, but specifically there20 was Senior SOCO John Sharpley, Principal SOCO21 Mark Scholar.

22 Q. What did you see when you arrived?23 A. Sorry, there were some other people. DCI Alan Young;24 the pathologist, Dr Hunt; a photographer Mr McGee(?);25 and another senior SOCO, Katie Langford(?).

1411 Q. What did you see when you arrive?2 A. Well, immediately we went to a tent to put on protective3 clothing and so forth.4 Q. Right.5 A. And I was then shown through a taped common access path.6 Q. Yes. Leading up to?7 A. Leading up into the wood; and there was a blue tent

8 there, which contained the body of Dr Kelly.9 Q. When you arrived at the body, what did you do?10 A. Well, basically the start of it is just to have a look11 and see -- just to take it all in and make notes and12 measurements and try to get some sense of what could13 have happened.14 Q. How long were you doing that for?15 A. It was sort of a gradual process. As I say, I arrived16 at just gone 2 and left at about 7, so it was quite17 a while. But during that time I will have gone back to18 the original tent, the changing tent, to report what19 I was seeing to DCI Young.20 Q. Yes.

21 A. And to make arrangements for toxicology work that needed22 to be done.23 Q. How long were you on the scene for that day?24 A. In total, from just gone 2 until 7, so just short of25 five hours.

1421 Q. Did you spend your whole time looking at the body and2 then coming back and making reports?3 A. I also examined a gate further down the path.4 Q. Right. What did you do that for?5 A. I was told that there was a gate there and in case there6 might have been any blood staining on there; it was just

7 a precaution really.8 Q. Did you find anything on the gate?9 A. No, nothing.10 Q. Did you find anything around the body area of interest?11 A. Yes. There was blood distribution.12 Q. Where had the blood come from?13 A. It appeared that the blood had originated from14 Dr Kelly's injured left wrist.15 Q. Right. I think we have heard from an extract that16 Mr Page has read out to us that the ulnar artery was17 severed. Did you understand that to be the case at the18 time?19 A. Obviously injuries are a pathologist's domain. However,

20 the blood distribution was what I would expect to see if21 an artery had been severed. There was bloodstaining


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22 typical of that sort of injury.23 Q. What do you expect to see in such circumstances?24 A. Well, when veins are severed the blood comes out under a25 low pressure, but when arteries are severed it comes out

143

1 on a much higher pressure and you get spurting of blood,2 you get a phenomenon known as arterial rain, where you3 have a great deal of smallish stains all of about the4 same size over the area.5 Q. Did you find that arterial rain?6 A. Yes.7 Q. On what?8 A. On the nettles -- there were nettles alongside the body9 of Dr Kelly.10 Q. And did you look for the distribution of blood?11 A. Yes.12 Q. We have heard from some ambulance personnel, and they13 said they were not specifically looking, for obvious

14 reasons, at the distribution of blood but they noted,15 just on their brief glance, not very much blood. What16 were your detailed findings?17 A. Well, there was a fair bit of blood.18 LORD HUTTON: There was -- I beg your pardon?19 A. A fair bit of blood, my Lord. The body was on leaf20 litter, the sort of detritus you might find on the floor21 of a wood, which is -- and that is very absorbent, so22 although it may not have appeared to them there was that23 much blood, it would obviously soak in.24 MR DINGEMANS: A bit like blotting paper in some respects?25 A. Yes.

1441 Q. What else did you see around the body?2 A. There was a bloodstained watch and a knife to --3 Q. Was the knife bloodstained?4 A. Yes, it was, yes. There was a Barbour hat/cap near5 Dr Kelly's left shoulder and then out from that there6 was an Evian water bottle, the cap of which was just7 a bit further along. These were -- the bottle was about8 25 centimetres from the shoulder.9 Q. Did you examine the vegetation around the body?10 A. Yes.11 Q. Did you form any conclusions from that examination?12 A. Well, the blood staining that was highest from the

13 ground was approximately 50 centimetres above the14 ground. This was above the position where Dr Kelly's15 left wrist was, but most of the stainings were16 33 centimetres, which is approximately a foot above the17 ground. It was all fairly low level stuff.18 Q. What does that mean?19 A. It meant that because the injury -- most of the injuries20 would have taken place while Dr Kelly was sitting down21 or lying down.22 Q. Right. When you first saw the body, what position was23 it in?24 A. He was on his back with the left wrist curled back in25 this sort of manner (Indicates).

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1 Q. Did you make any other relevant discoveries while you2 were looking around the area?3 A. There was an obvious large contact bloodstain on the4 knee of the jeans.5 Q. What do you mean by a "contact bloodstain"?6 A. A contact stain is what you will observe if an item has

7 come into contact with a bloodstained surface, as8 opposed to blood spots and splashes when blood splashes9 on to an item.10 Q. Which means at some stage his left wrist must have been11 in contact with his trousers?12 A. No, what I am saying, at some stage he has knelt --13 I believe he has knelt in a pool of blood at some stage14 and this obviously is after he has been injured.15 Q. Any other findings?16 A. There were smears of blood on the Evian bottle and on17 the cap.18 Q. And what did that indicate to you?19 A. Well, that would indicate to me that Dr Kelly was

20 already injured when he used the Evian bottle. As an21 explanation, my Lord --22 LORD HUTTON: Yes.23 A. -- when people are injured and losing blood they will24 become thirsty.25 MR DINGEMANS: They become?

1461 A. Thirsty, as they are losing all that fluid.2 Q. You thought he is likely to have had a drink then?3 A. Yes.4 Q. What else did you find?5 A. There was a bloodstain on the right sleeve of the

6 Barbour jacket. At the time that was a bit -- slightly7 unusual, in that if someone is cutting their wrist you8 wonder how, if you are moving across like this, how you9 get blood sort of here (Indicates). But if the knife10 was held and it went like that, with the injury passing11 across the sleeve, that is a possible explanation.12 Another possible explanation is in leaning across to get13 the Evian bottle that the two areas may have crossed.14 Q. Had crossed?15 A. Yes.16 Q. We know, in fact, the wrist which was cut was the left17 wrist, is that right?18 A. That is correct.

19 Q. And we know that Dr Kelly was right handed.20 A. I was not aware of that, but yes.21 Q. Were those all your relevant findings?22 A. The jeans, as I have talked about, with this large23 contact stain, did not appear to have any larger24 downward drops on them. There were a few stains and so25 forth but it did not have any staining that would

1471 suggest to me that his injuries, or his major injuries2 if you like, were caused while he was standing up, and3 there was not any -- there did not appear to be any4 blood underneath where he was found, and the body was

5 later moved which all suggested those injuries were6 caused while he was sat or lying down.


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7 Q. And was that the extent of your investigations that day?8 A. Not entirely. I assisted in some of the removal of the9 clothing and the photography of the clothing, just10 providing a steadying hand for some items. I was11 present when the tablet packets were found and the12 mobile phone in his pocket.

13 Q. You mentioned the tablet packets; those were the14 Coproxamol tablets?15 A. That is correct, yes.16 Q. How many packets were there?17 A. There were three blister packs.18 Q. Yes.19 A. It was noted at the time that one tablet remained in it,20 so there were 29 missing, because each one had the21 capacity for 10 tablets.22 Q. They were packets of 10 each, were they?23 A. Yes.24 LORD HUTTON: Were the packets actually found -- in what25 part of the clothing?

1481 A. They were in Dr Kelly's Barbour jacket, my Lord. I have2 a photograph --3 LORD HUTTON: I think it suffices to have your evidence,4 thank you. And it was the pathologist who found them,5 was it? He took them out, did he; Dr Hunt?6 A. It was -- Dr Hunt was present, yes.7 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you.8 MR DINGEMANS: Were you present while any other relevant9 discoveries were made?10 A. I do not believe so. I was there from the time that11 Dr Kelly was in the blue tent till the time just before

12 the body was about to be removed. As I left, the hearse13 was approaching. So it was my understanding that the14 body was then going to be taken for the post-mortem.15 Q. That concluded your investigations on the day, did it?16 A. On that day, yes.17 Q. And what further investigations did you make?18 A. Well, since then I have had upwards of -- I could count19 them but at a guess 50 items sent to the laboratory.20 Q. To analyse?21 A. To analyse, to carry out DNA profiling, to look at some22 of the staining in a little more detail.23 Q. Right. And you have carried all that out and reported24 back to Assistant Chief Constable Page or through his

25 senior investigating officer?

1491 A. Well, my examinations are still ongoing.2 Q. Right.3 A. I have provided a spreadsheet with a kind of --4 a snapshot of where we are today about what items have5 been examined, what has been found on them, which items6 were profiled, the results of those profile tests,7 although I have not put my evidence down in a statement8 form as yet.9 Q. Because you are just finishing off the testing of that10 material?

11 A. Exactly.12 Q. I think when all that is concluded Assistant Chief


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13 Constable Page is going to come back and tell us the14 results.15 Subject to that, is there anything else that you16 know of relating to the circumstances of Dr Kelly's17 death that you can assist his Lordship with?18 A. I do not think so, my Lord.

19 LORD HUTTON: Very well. Thank you very much indeed,20 Mr Green.21 MR DINGEMANS: Thank you for coming at short notice.22 A. You are welcome.23 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Is that a conclusion of the evidence for24 today?25 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, no. Mr Lamb is coming, just to be

1501 signed off formally.2 LORD HUTTON: I see. Yes.3 MR PATRICK LAMB (continued)4 Examined by MR DINGEMANS

5 Q. I am sorry to have brought you back. When you gave your6 evidence in two parts earlier on I did not ask you, as7 I had asked everyone else, was there anything else you8 knew, and at that time that was because you had just9 reported the contact that David Broucher had made with10 you; is that right?11 A. That is correct.12 Q. And in fact in the interim we have heard from13 David Broucher and he has given his evidence.14 A. Certainly.15 Q. And I think you have had a holiday?16 A. Absolutely, yes indeed, or part of a holiday.17 Q. Can I just ask you two quick questions in fact, now that

18 I have got you back?19 First of all, on 5th June I think we had heard from20 the Foreign Affairs Committee that there was a meeting21 between the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Foreign22 and Commonwealth Office. Do you recall that?23 A. Sorry, you heard on 5th June?24 Q. Yes, 5th June, which is shortly after Mr Gilligan's25 broadcast, and the Foreign Affairs Committee I think

1511 probably announced either that day or the day before2 they were going to set up an investigation. Do you3 recall visiting them on some --

4 A. Excuse me, yes. There was a -- I think it was the5 correct date. I think it was the Wednesday morning, if6 the 5th June was a Wednesday.7 Q. I have not looked, sorry.8 A. Again, if I am correct, there was a half day course and9 a meeting which took place and an opportunity for10 Whitehall civil servants to acquaint themselves with11 Committees, and in particular the Foreign Affairs12 Committee, and I was one of the people quite by chance13 on that course on that very morning.14 Q. Right.15 LORD HUTTON: I think the 5th June was a Thursday actually.16 A. I am very sorry.

17 MR DINGEMANS: We have also heard from you last time on18 17th June you met Mr Howard at a reception and had


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19 mentioned the contact Dr Kelly had reported to you that20 he had had with Mr Gilligan.21 A. Correct.22 Q. And Mr Howard had then reported to Mr Tebbit and there23 was an interview going to be arranged for Dr Kelly to be24 seen on 24th June. Mr Howard told us that it was you

25 that was to notify Dr Kelly of that interview. Do you

1521 recall that?2 A. No. I think that is incorrect because I, as I said,3 mentioned to Mr Howard on 17th June that Dr Kelly had4 told me in passing that he had spoken to both5 Mr Gilligan and Ms Watts. I reported that on that6 occasion in the context of a wider conversation7 concerning a separate and other issue, which was the8 press reporting concerning a British expert who was9 commenting on whether or not trailers which had recently10 been discovered in Iraq were either for the production

11 of hydrogen, as was claimed, or whether they were for12 the production of biological weapons.13 There had been an article, I believe in14 The Observer, in which an unnamed, as at that point, BW15 expert had claimed they were not for the production of16 biological weapons. So there was concern as to who the17 source of that particular story was.18 There was a degree of suspicion that it was19 Dr Kelly, as the source of that particular story. That20 has, in fact, now or subsequently been confirmed by21 The Observer newspaper itself.22 It was in the context of that wider conversation23 that I mentioned to Mr Howard that I knew, from

24 a conversation with Dr Kelly, that he had spoken to25 Mr Gilligan and Ms Watts. But after that I had no

1531 further involvement whatsoever and I certainly was not2 requested to contact Dr Kelly to inform him.3 Q. Right. Did you in fact tell Dr Kelly of your4 conversation with Mr Howard?5 A. I did not, no.6 Q. I am sorry to have brought you back to answer this final7 question: is there anything else that you know then of8 the circumstances surrounding Dr Kelly's death that you9 can assist his Lordship with?

10 MR DINGEMANS:11 A. No, sir.12 MR DINGEMANS: Thank you very much.13 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much. Mr Lamb, I think it was14 entirely proper of you to bring to the attention of15 the Inquiry Mr Broucher's recollection.16 A. Thank you.17 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, that is the end of the evidence for18 today.19 LORD HUTTON: I will sit again at 10.30 tomorrow morning.20 (3.30 pm)21 (Hearing adjourned until 10.30 am the following day)22

2324


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1541 INDEX2 PAGE3 MR ALEXANDER RICHARD ALLAN (called) .............. 2

45 Examined by MR KNOX ......................... 267 ASSISTANT CHIEF CONSTABLE MICHAEL ................ 198 PAGE (called)910 Examined by MR DINGEMANS ..................... 191112 MR STEPHEN JOHN MACDONALD (called) ............... 491314 Examined by MR DINGEMANS ..................... 491516 DR BRIAN FRANCIS GILL JONES (called) ............. 58

1718 Examined by MR DINGEMANS ..................... 581920 MR A (called) .................................... 962122 Examined by MR DINGEMANS ..................... 962324 DR BRIAN FRANCIS GILL JONES ...................... 11725 (continued)

15512 Examined by MR DINGEMANS (continued) ......... 117

34 MR ROY JAMES GREEN (called) ...................... 14156 Examined by MR DINGEMANS ..................... 14178 MR PATRICK LAMB (continued) ...................... 152910 Examined by MR DINGEMANS ..................... 1521112131415

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hearing transcript - 3 september 2003 afternoon

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