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Admissibility and weight of evidenceDIZON v. CTAISSUE: WoN the CTA and the CA gravely erred in allowing the admission of the pieces of evidence which were not formally offered by the BIRHELD: Yes. There must have been a formal offer by the BIR of the pieces of evidence it presented.DOCTRINE: . InVda. de Oate, we held that:From the foregoing provision, it is clear that for evidence to be considered, the same must be formally offered. Corollarily, the mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. InInterpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles[186 SCRA 385], we had the occasion to make a distinction between identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer as an exhibit. We said that the first is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit while the second is done only when the party rests its case and not before. A party, therefore, may opt to formally offer his evidence if he believes that it will advance his cause or not to do so at all. In the event he chooses to do the latter, the trial court is not authorized by the Rules to consider the same.However, inPeople v. Napat-a[179 SCRA 403] citingPeople v. Mate[103 SCRA 484],we relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following requirements are present, viz.: first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case.

LEJANO vs PEOPLEISSUES: 1. Main Issue: Whether or not Webbs documented alibi of his U.S. travel should be given more credence by the Court than the positive identification by Alfaro.2. Other issue: Whether or not the Court should acquit him outright, given the governments failure to produce the semen specimen that the NBI found on Carmelas cadaver, thus depriving him of evidence that would prove his innocence; and

HELD: 1. YES. Webb presented a documented alibi through (a) the travel preparations; (b) the two immigration checks; (c) details of US sojourn and; (d) the second immigration check.2. NO. Neither Webb nor his co-accused brought up the matter of preserving the specimen in the meantime.

DOCTRINE: For a positive identification to be acceptable, it must meet at least two criteria: (a) The positive identification of the offender must come from a credible witness; (b) The witness story of what she personally saw must be believable, not inherently contrived.

The Supreme Court found that Alfaro and her testimony failed to meet the above criteria. She did not show up at the NBI as a spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience.To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear and satisfactory evidence that: (a) He was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime, and (b) That it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.

Land Bank of the Philippines v. WycocoISSUE(S): Whether or not the just compensation arrived at was supported by evidence. HELD: NoDOCTRINE: In arriving at the valuation of Wycocos land, the trial court took judicial notice of the alleged prevailing market value of agricultural lands in Licab, Nueva Ecija without apprising the parties of its intention to take judicial notice thereof. Section 3, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence provides:Sec. 3. Judicial Notice, When Hearing Necessary. During the trial, the court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.After trial and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case.Inasmuch as the valuation of the property of Wycoco is the very issue in the case at bar, the trial court should have allowed the parties to present evidence thereon instead of practically assuming a valuation without basis

PEOPLE v. LAUGAISSUE(S): Whether or not the extrajudicial confession made by the accused before the bantay bayan is admissibleHELD: No.DOCTRINE: the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated to a "bantay bayan," particularly on the authority to conduct a custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of a state-related function and objective insofar as the entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided for under Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution, otherwise known as the Miranda Rights, is concerned.The Court, therefore, finds the extrajudicial confession of appellant, which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in evidence

PLDT v. Commissioner of Internal RevenueISSUE: Does PLDT have a claim for tax refund?

HELD: NO. Evidence presented by petitioner was not able to justify the necessity for a tax refund. RATIO: it cannot be determined from the above documents whether or not Petitioner actually remitted the total income taxes withheld from the redundant employees taxable compensation (inclusive of the separation pay/other benefits) for the year 1995.The amounts of total taxes withheld for each redundant employees cannot be verifiedagainst the Summary of Gross Compensation and Tax Withheld for 1995 due to the fact that this summary enumerates the amounts of income taxeswithheld from Petitioners employees onper district/area basis.

While the records of the case contain the Alphabetical List of Employee from Whom Taxes Were Withheld for the year 1995 and the Monthly Remittance Returns of Income Taxes Withheld for December 1995, the documents from which SGV traced the former to the latter have not been presented. Failure to present these documents is fatal to PLDTs case.

on CTA Circular 1-95 - It does not relieve respondent of its imperative task of premarking photocopies of sales receipts and invoices and submitting the same to the court after the independent CPA shall have examined and compared them with the originals. Without presenting these pre-marked documents as evidence from which the summary and schedules were based, the court cannot verify the authenticity and veracity of the independent auditors conclusions.

SILKAIR v. CIRISSUE(S): Whether or not petitioner has substantially proven its authority to operate in the PhilippinesHELD: No, Petitioners assertion that the CTA may take judicial notice of its SEC Registration, previously offered and admitted in evidence in similar cases before the CTA, is untenable.RATIO: Evidence already presented and admitted by the court in a previous case cannot be adopted in a separate case pending before the same court without the same being offered and identified anew.A court is not compelled to take judicial notice of pieces of evidence offered and admitted in a previous case unless the same are properly offered or have accordingly complied with the requirements on the rules of evidence. In other words, the evidence presented in the previous cases cannot be considered in this instant case without being offered in evidenceIt is an elementary rule in law that documents shall not be admissible in evidence unless and until the original copies itself are offered or presented for verification in cases where mere copies are offered, save for the exceptions provided for by law. Petitioner thus cannot hide behind the veil of judicial notice so as to evade its responsibility of properly complying with the rules of evidence. For failure of herein petitioner to compare the subject documents with its originals, the same may not be admitted.Given the above rules, it is clear that the CTA En Banc correctly did not admit petitioners SEC Registration and operating permits from the CAB which were merely photocopies, without the presentation of the original copies for comparison and verification during the trial.PEOPLE v. HERMANESQuickie: 4.January 14, 1998: As the prosecution was about to call its last witness, appellant, through its counsel, manifested his desire to withdraw his previous plea of not guilty and to change the same to a plea of guilty. The trial court allowed him to do so. Thus, appellant was re-arraigned and, with the aid of his counsel, he subsequently pleaded guilty to the crime charged. (The change in plea notwithstanding, the prosecution continued with the presentation of its last witness in order to establish appellants guilt and precise degree of culpability)July 14, 1998: appellant, through new counsel Atty. Mario Nicolasora, filed a manifestation in court denying that he wanted to change his original plea of not guilty to guilty. Consequently, the trial court ordered the withdrawal of appellants earlier plea of guilty and the reversion of his plea to not guilty.August 14, 1998: appellant, through counsel, filed a manifestation admitting responsibility for the November 2, 1995 rape, and asked for forgiveness from complainant and the public in generalISSUE: Whether the manifestation filed on August 14, 1998 can be held as an admission by the appellant of his guilt? (related to Rule 129)HELD: NO RATIO: A perusal of the manifestation filed by Atty. Nicolasora on behalf of appellant shows that it was signed only by Atty. Nicolasora, not by appellant. While we stated in People vs. Balisoro (307 SCRA 48 [1999]) that an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and that the same is conclusive as to him, it is also hornbook doctrine that the authority of an attorney to bind his client as to any admission of facts made by him is limited to matters of judicial procedure. An admission which operates as a waiver, surrender, or destruction of the clients cause is beyond the scope of the attorneys implied authority (People vs. Maceda, 73 Phil. 679 [1942]). In this case, Atty. Nicolasoras admission that appellant was heavily intoxicated at the time of the incident and that he had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed practically frittered away appellants case in favor of the prosecution. The manifestation cannot thus be held as an admission by appellant of his guilt.LIM & ERSANDO v HON. EXEC. SECRETARYDOCTRINE: are American troops actively engaged in combat alongside Filipino soldiers under the guise of an alleged training and assistance exercise?SC: We cannot take judicial notice of the events transpiring down south, as reported from the saturation coverage of the media. As a rule, we do not take cognizance of newspaper or electronic reports per se, not because of any issue as to their truth, accuracy, or impartiality, but for the simple reason that facts must be established in accordance with the rules of evidence. As a result, we cannot accept, in the absence of concrete proof, petitioners allegation that the Arroyo government is engaged in doublespeak in trying to pass off as a mere training exercise an offensive effort by foreign troops on native soil. The petitions invite us to speculate on what is really happening in Mindanao, to issue, make factual findings on matters well beyond our immediate perception.Asian Terminals Inc. v. Malayan Insurance Co. inc.DOCTRINE: Whether the court can take judicial notice of the Management Contract between petitioner and the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) in determining petitioners liability. NO.Finally, petitioner implores us to take judicial notice of Section 7.01, Article VII of the Management Contract for cargo handling services it entered with the PPA, which limits petitioners liability to P5,000.00 per package. Unfortunately for the petitioner, it cannot avail of judicial notice. The Management Contract entered into by petitioner and the PPA is not among the matters which the courts can take judicial notice of. It cannot be considered an official act of the executive department. The PPA, which was created by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 857, as amended, is a government-owned and controlled corporation in charge of administering the ports in the country. Obviously, the PPA was only performing a proprietary function when it entered into a Management Contract with petitioner. As such, judicial notice cannot be applied.

Expert Travel and Tours Inc. vISSUE(S): WON the lower and appellate courts erred in taking judicial notice of the said teleconferenceHELD: Yes. Even given the possibility that Atty. Aguinaldo and Suk Kyoo Kim participated in a teleconference along with the respondents Board of Directors, the Court is not convinced that one was conducted; even if there had been one, the Court is not inclined to believe that a board resolution was duly passed specifically authorizing Atty. Aguinaldo to file the complaint and execute the required certification against forum shopping.DOCTRINE: Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.Land Bank v. WycocoISSUE(S): Whether or not the just compensation ordered by the RTC was supported by substantial evidence considering it was based only on judicial notice of the prevailing market value of the land?HELD: No, the RTC should have allowed the parties to present evidence instead of assuming valuations without basis.DOCTRINE: Judicial notice is not judicial knowledge. The mere personal knowledge of the judge is not the judicial knowledge of the court, and he is not authorized to make his individual knowledge of a fact, not generally or professionally known, the basis of his action.LANDBANK V. SPS. BANALDOCTRINE: Here, the RTC failed to observe the basic rules of procedure and the fundamental requirements in determining just compensation for the property. Firstly, it dispensed with the hearing and merely ordered the parties to submit their respective memoranda. Such action is grossly erroneous since the determination of just compensation involves the examination of the following factors specified in Section 17 of R.A. 6657, as amended: (1) the cost of the acquisition of the land; (2) the current value of like properties; (3) its nature, actual use and income; (4) the sworn valuation by the owner; the tax declarations; (5) the assessment made by government assessors; (6) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the government to the property; and (7) the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land, if any.Obviously, these factors involve factual matters which can be established only during a hearing wherein the contending parties present their respective evidence. In fact, to underscore the intricate nature of determining the valuation of the land, Section 58 of the same law even authorizes the Special Agrarian Courts to appoint commissioners for such purpose.Secondly, the RTC, in concluding that the valuation of respondents property is P703,137.00, merely took judicial notice of the average production figures in the Rodriguez case pending before it and applied the same to this case without conducting a hearing and worse, without the knowledge or consent of the parties.Furthermore, as earlier stated, the Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special Agrarian Courts. In this regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is explicit on the necessity of a hearing before a court takes judicial notice of a certain matterMetropolitan Bank and Trust Co. v. Sps. MirandaQuickie: Petitioners contention - questions the authority of the RTC and the CA to take cognizance of the records of the foreclosure proceedings as basis for annulling the auction sale. It claims that the trial court may not take judicial notice of the records of proceedings in another case, unless the parties themselves agreed to it. Metrobank asserts that it did not give its consent to the trial courts examination of the records of the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. Further, the RTC did not even set a hearing for the purpose of declaring its intention to take judicial notice of the records of the extrajudicial proceedings.HELD: G.R - As a rule, courts do not take judicial notice of the evidence presented in other proceedings, even if these have been tried or are pending in the same court or before the same judge. This rule, however, is not absolute.EXC. - in some instances, courts have also taken judicial notice of proceedings in other cases that are closely connected to the matter in controversy. These cases may be so closely interwoven, or so clearly interdependent, as to invoke a rule of judicial notice.New Sun Valley Homeowner's v. Sangguniang BaranggayIt even wants this Court to take judicial knowledge that criminal activities such as robbery and kidnappings are becoming daily fares in Philippine society. This is absurd. 8.The Rules of Court provide which matters constitute judicial notice, to wit:Rule 129WHAT NEED NOT BE PROVED SECTION 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory.A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisions.(1a) The activities claimed by petitioner to be part of judicial knowledge are not found in the rule quoted above and do not support its petition for injunctive relief in any way.PCGG v. Sandiganbayan The Sandiganbayan should not be burdened with the duty to scrutinize the same pieces of evidence that it previously discredited and which, similarly, were reviewed and found insufficient by this Court. The respondent court simply took judicial notice of the findings of this Court in G.R. No. 140615, as these facts need not be proved. (Rule 129, Sec 1)

SECTION 1. Judicial Notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature, the measure of time, and the geographical divisionsSOLIDBANK v. MINDANAO FERROALLOY CORPORATIONJudicial Notice of Bank PracticesThis point brings us to the alleged error of the appellate court in taking judicial notice of the practice of banks in conducting background checks on borrowers and sureties. While a court is not mandated to take judicial notice of this practice under Section 1 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, it nevertheless may do so under Section 2 of the same Rule. The latter Rule provides that a court, in its discretion, may take judicial notice of "matters which are of public knowledge, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions."Thus, the Court has taken judicial notice of the practices of banks and other financial institutions. Precisely, it has noted that it is their uniform practice, before approving a loan, to investigate, examine and assess would-be borrowers credit standing or real estateoffered as security for the loan applied for.SPOUSES OMAR and MOSHIERA LATIP, v. ROSALIE PALAA CHUAthe CA took judicial notice of this supposed practice to pay goodwill money to the lessor in the Baclaran area. Neither the MeTC nor the RTC, with the former even ruling in favor of Rosalie, found that the practice was of common knowledge or notoriously known.We note that the RTC specifically ruled that Rosalie, apart from her bare allegation, adduced no evidence to prove her claim that the amount of P2,570,000.00 simply constituted the payment of goodwill money. Subsequently, Rosalie attached an annex to her petition for review before the CA, containing a joint declaration under oath by other stallholders in Roferxane Bldg. that they had paid goodwill money to Rosalie as their lessor. On this score, we emphasize that the reason why our rules on evidence provide for matters that need not be proved under Rule 129, specifically on judicial notice, is to dispense with the taking of the usual form of evidence on a certain matter so notoriously known, it will not be disputed by the parties.However, in this case, the requisite of notoriety is belied by the necessity of attaching documentary evidence, i.e., the Joint Affidavit of the stallholders, to Rosalies appeal before the CA. In short, the alleged practice still had to be proven by Rosalie; contravening the title itself of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court What need not be proved.Apparently, only that particular division of the CA had knowledge of the practice to pay goodwill money in the Baclaran area. As was held in State Prosecutors, justices and judges alike ought to be reminded that the power to take judicial notice must be exercised with caution and every reasonable doubt on the subject should be ample reason for the claim of judicial notice to be promptly resolved in the negative.Cuenco v. Talisay Tourist Sports Complex Inc. and Matias Aznar IIISection 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:SEC. 4.Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by a showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.A party may make judicial admissions in (1) the pleadings, (2) during the trial, by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations, or (3) in other stages of the judicial proceeding.The stipulation of facts at the pre-trial of a case constitutes judicial admissions. The veracity of judicial admissions require no further proof and may be controverted only upon a clear showing that the admissions were made through palpable mistake or that no admissions were made. Thus, the admissions of parties during the pre-trial, as embodied in the pre-trial order, are binding and conclusive upon them.Respondents did not deny the admission made by their counsel, neither did they claim that the same was made through palpable mistake. As such, the stipulation of facts is incontrovertible and may be relied upon by the courts. The pre-trial forms part of the proceedings and matters dealt therein may not be brushed aside in the process of decision-making. Otherwise, the real essence of compulsory pre-trial would be rendered inconsequential and worthless.Furthermore, an act performed by counsel within the scope of a "general or implied authority" is regarded as an act of the client which renders respondents in estoppel. By estoppel is meant that an admission or representation is conclusive upon the person making it and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.

MALAYAN INSURANCE CO., INC., Petitioner, vs.PHILIPPINES FIRST INSURANCE CO., INC. and REPUTABLE FORWARDER SERVICES, INC Malayan relies on the alleged judicial admission of Philippines First in its complaint that Reputable is a common carrier. Invoking Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules on Evidence that "an admission verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceeding in the same case, does not require proof," it is Malayans position that the RTC and CA should have ruled thatReputable is a common carrier. Consequently, pursuant to Article 1745(6) of the Civil Code, the liability of Reputable for the loss of Wyeths goods should be dispensed with, or at least diminished.It is true that judicial admissions, such as matters alleged in the pleadings do not require proof, and need not be offered to be considered by the court. "The court, for the proper decision of the case, may and should consider, without the introduction of evidence, the facts admitted by the parties." The rule on judicial admission, however, also states that such allegation, statement, or admission is conclusive as against the pleader, and that the facts alleged in the complaint are deemed admissions of the plaintiff and binding upon him. In this case, the pleader or the plaintiff who alleged that Reputable is a common carrier was Philippines First. It cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be made conclusive as against Reputable whose nature of business is in question.It should be stressed that Philippines First is not privy to the SR Policy between Wyeth and Reputable; rather, it is a mere subrogee to the right of Wyeth to collect from Reputable under the terms of the contract of carriage. Philippines First is not in any position to make any admission, much more a definitive pronouncement, as to the nature of Reputables business and there appears no other connection between Philippines First and Reputable which suggests mutual familiarity between them.Moreover, records show that the alleged judicial admission of Philippines First was essentially disputed by Reputable when it stated in paragraphs 2, 4, and 11 of its answer that it is actually a private or special carrier. In addition, Reputable stated in paragraph 2 of its third-party complaint that it is "a private carrier engaged in the carriage of goods." Such allegation was, in turn, admitted by Malayan in paragraph 2 of its answer to the third-party complaint. There is also nothing in the records which show that Philippines First persistently maintained its stance that Reputable is a common carrier or that it even contested or proved otherwise Reputables position that it is a private or special carrier.

People v. Alviz Appellants defense is primarily denial which is essentially a weak defense. A denial unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence is negative, self-serving and merits no weight in law, and cannot therefore be given greater evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.A denial cannot prevail over the positive identification of an accused by the prosecution witnesses.AZNAR v. CITIBANK NA 1.Whether or not the "On Line Authorization Report" is an electronic document."?2.Whether or not the "On Line Authorization Report" constitutes electronic evidence?3.Section 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that whenever any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either by (a) anyone who saw the document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.4.Aznar, who testified on the authenticity of Exh. "G," did not actually see the document executed or written, neither was he able to provide evidence on the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of Nubi, who handed to him said computer print-out. Indeed, all he was able to allege in his testimony are the following5.Even if examined under the Rules on Electronic Evidence, which took effect on August 1, 2001, and which is being invoked by Aznar in this case, the authentication of Exh. "G" would still be found wanting.Pertinent sections of Rule 5 read:Section 1. Burden of proving authenticity. The person seeking to introduce an electronic document in any legal proceeding has the burden of proving its authenticity in the manner provided in this Rule.Section 2. Manner of authentication. Before any private electronic document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its authenticity must be proved by any of the following means:(a) by evidence that it had been digitally signed by the person purported to have signed the same;(b) by evidence that other appropriate security procedures or devices as may be authorized by the Supreme Court or by law for authentication of electronic documents were applied to the document; or(c) by other evidence showing its integrity and reliability to the satisfaction of the judge6.Aznar claims that his testimony complies with par. (c), i.e., it constitutes the "other evidence showing integrity and reliability of Exh. "G" to the satisfaction of the judge." The Court is not convinced. Aznars testimony that the person from Ingtan Agency merely handed him the computer print-out and that he thereafter asked said person to sign the same cannot be considered as sufficient to show said print-outs integrity and reliability. As correctly pointed out by Judge Marcos in his May 29, 1998 Decision, Exh. "G" does not show on its face that it was issued by Ingtan Agency as Aznar merely mentioned in passing how he was able to secure the print-out from the agency; Aznar also failed to show the specific business address of the source of the computer print-out because while the name of Ingtan Agency was mentioned by Aznar, its business address was not reflected in the print-out. 7.Indeed, Aznar failed to demonstrate how the information reflected on the print-out was generated and how the said information could be relied upon as true.CITIBANK NA MASTERCARD v TEODOROISSUE(S): Whether the photocopies of the sales invoices or charge slips were competent proofs of the obligations of respondent?HELD: No. Petition is denied.Petitioner failed to prove that respondent had an obligation in the principal amount of P24,388.36, because the photocopies of the original sales invoices it had presented in court were inadmissible in evidence. Moreover, had they been admissible, they would still have had little probative value.HELD: The original copies of the sales invoices are the best evidence to prove the alleged obligation. Photocopies thereof are mere secondary evidence. As such, they are inadmissible because petitioner, as the offeror, failed to prove any of the exceptions provided under Section 3 of Rule 130 of the ROC, as well s the conditions of their admissibility. Because of the inadmissibility of the photocopies in the absence of the originals, respondents obligation was not established.Section 5 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states:SEC. 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.Applying the above Rule to the present case, before a party is allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original sales invoices, the offeror must prove the following: (1) the existence or due execution of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or the reason for its nonproduction in court; and (3) on the part of the offeror, the absence of bad faith to which the unavailability of the original can be attributed.The correct order of proof is as follows: existence, execution, loss, and contents. At the sound discretion of the court, this order may be changed if necessary.In the present case, the existence of the original sales invoices was established by the photocopies and the testimony of Hernandez. Petitioner, however, failed to prove that the originals had been lost or could not be produced in court after reasonable diligence and good faith in searching for them.Indeed, the loss of the originals and reasonable diligence in the search for them were conditions that were not met, because the sales invoices might have been found by Equitable. Hernandez, testifying that he had requested the originals from Equitable, failed to show that he had subsequently followed up the request.Finally, when more than one original copy exists, it must appear that all of them have been lost, destroyed, or cannot be produced in court before secondary evidence can be given of any one. A photocopy may not be used without accounting for the other originals.Before the appellees therein could be allowed to adduce secondary evidence to prove the contents of the original, they had to prove -- with the requisite quantum of evidence -- the loss, the destruction or the unavailability of all original copies of the documentEdsa Shangri-La v. BF Corporation Four factual premises are readily deducible from the above exchanges, to wit: (1) the existence of the original documents which ESHRI had possession of; (2) a request was made on ESHRI to produce the documents; (3) ESHRI was afforded sufficient time to produce them; and (4) ESHRI was not inclined to produce them. Clearly, the circumstances obtaining in this case fall under the exception under Sec. 3(b) of Rule 130. 3.1 In other words, the conditions sine qua non for the presentation and reception of the photocopies of the original document as secondary evidence have been met. These are: (1) there is proof of the original documents execution or existence; (2) there is proof of the cause of the original documents unavailability; and (3) the offeror is in good faith.Garcia vs vda de chuaRATIO: The best proof of marriage between a man and wife is a marriage contract which petitioner failed to produce. The lower court correctly disregarded the Photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented, this being a violation of the best evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces of evidence. Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates, passports and other similar documents cannot prove marriage especially so when the private respondent has submitted a certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has not solemnized said alleged marriage.ENGR. BAYANI MAGDAYAO, vs peopleThe mere fact that the original of the writing is in the custody or control of the party against whom it is offered does not warrant the admission of secondary evidence. The offeror must prove that he has done all in his power to secure the best evidence by giving notice to the said party to produce the document. The notice may be in the form of a motion for the production of the original or made in open court in the presence of the adverse party or via a subpoena duces tecum, provided that the party in custody of the original has sufficient time to produce the same. When such party has the original of the writing and does not voluntarily offer to produce it or refuses to produce it, secondary evidence may be admitted.

In this case, Olvis, the private complainant, testified that after the check was dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, he returned it to the petitioner upon the latters offer to pay the amount of the check by drawing and issuing two checks, one for P400,000.00 and the other for P200,000.00. However, the petitioner still failed to satisfy his obligation to Olvis

In his "Motion to Suspend Proceedings" in the trial court, the petitioner admitted that he received the original copy of the dishonored check from the private complainant and that he caused the non-payment of the dishonored check.

The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the need for the production of the original copy and the fact that the prosecution was able to present in evidence only a photocopy thereof because the original was in his possession

In fact the petitioner complained of the prosecutions violation of the best evidence rule. The petitioner, however, never produced the original of the check, much less offered to produce the same. The petitioner deliberately withheld the original of the check as a bargaining chip for the court to grant him an opportunity to adduce evidence in his defense, which he failed to do following his numerous unjustified postponements

NPC v. CODILLAWON photocopies are electronic documents as contemplated in Republic Act No. 8792 or the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Electronic Commerce Act, as well as the Rules on Electronic Evidence. NO. Having thus declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law.An "electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other models of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document.

The rules use the word "information" to define an electronic document received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that an electronic document is relevant only in terms of the information contained therein, similar to any other document which is presented in evidence as proof of its contents. However, what differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based document is the manner by which the information is processed; clearly, the information contained in an electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.

A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. By no stretch of the imagination can a persons signature affixed manually be considered as information electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced. Hence, the argument of petitioner that since these paper printouts were produced through an electronic process, then these photocopies are electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence is obviously an erroneous, if not preposterous, interpretation of the law. Having thus declared that the offered photocopies are not tantamount to electronic documents, it is consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law.Pilipinas Bank v. CAISSUE: WON petitioner has a right to insist that it be allowed to present Tubianosas testimony to shed light on the alleged true agreement of the parties, notwithstanding its statement in its Pre Trial Brief that it was presenting said witness for that purposePetitioners Complaint merely alleged that under the provisions of the Policy, it was entitled to recover from private respondent the amount it lost during the heist. It did not allege therein that the Policys terms were ambiguous or failed to express the true agreement between itself and private respondent.

Section 9, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly requires that for parol evidence to be admissible to vary the terms of the written agreement, the mistake or imperfection thereof or its failure to express the true agreement of the parties should be put in issue by the pleadings.

As correctly noted by the appellate court, petitioner failed to raise the issue of an intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the terms of the Policy, or of the failure of said contract to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto in its Complaint. There was therefore no error on the part of the appellate court when it affirmed the RTCs Order disallowing the recall of Tubianosa to the witness stand, for such disallowance is in accord with the rule that when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such other terms other than the contents of the written agreement.People vs TandoyISSUE(S): Whether such document was actually executed, or exists, and therefore the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.HELD: YesRATIO: The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.TIJING v. CAParentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress. Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.

CKH INDUSTRIAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and RUBI SAW vs. THE COURT OF APPEALSSection 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that "when the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement."

The so-called "parol evidence rule" forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that, at or before the execution of the parties' written agreement, other or different terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract. When an agreement has been reduced to writing, the parties cannot be permitted to adduce evidence to prove alleged practices which to all purposes would alter the terms of the written agreement. Whatever is not found in the writing is understood to have been waived and abandoned.

The rule is not without exceptions, however, as it is likewise provided that a party to an action may present evidence to modify, explain, or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleadings: (a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement; (b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto; (c) The validity of the written agreement; or (d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement.

Sps. Regalado v. CA In this case, private respondent Quirico Arcega was able to put in issue in his complaint before the Regional Trial Court the validity of the subject deeds of sale for being a simulated transactionMoreover, the parol evidence rule may be waived by failure to invoke it, as by failure to object to the introduction of parol evidence. And, where a party who is entitled to the benefit of the rule waives the benefit thereof by allowing such evidence to be received without objection and without any effort to have it stricken from the minutes or disregarded by the trial court, he cannot, after the trial has closed and the case has been decided against him, invoke the rule in order to secure a reversal of the judgment by an appellate court. Here, the records are devoid of any indication that petitioners ever objected to the admissibility of parole evidence introduced by private respondent in open court. The court cannot disregard evidence which would ordinarily be incompetent under the rules but has been rendered admissible by the failure of party to object thereto. Petitioners have no one to blame but themselves in this regard.FBC vs BloomfieldNotes:Contract agreement stated that Rudlin will pay 6.9 million to Financial Building Co. for the construction of the BF Resort Village. Rudlins contention was that after the execution of the contract agreement, there was a mutual agreement between the parties that the contract price was to be reduced to 6.0 million. Rudlins basis is Sec. 9, Rule 130. SC: Rudlin failed to provide competent evidence. 21.Rudlin cannot invoke the exception under (a) or (b) of the above provision. Such exception obtains only where "the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual intention of the parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument. In such a case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the contract, of the relations of the parties to each other, and of the facts and circumstances surrounding them when they entered into the contract may be received to enable the court to make a proper interpretation of the instrument." 22.Under the fourth exception, however, Rudlins evidence is admissible to show the existence of such other terms agreed to by the parties after the execution of the contract. But apart from the Bar Chart and Cash Flow Chart prepared by FBC, and the testimony of Rodolfo J. Lagera, no competent evidence was adduced by Rudlin to prove that the amount of P6,006,965.00 stated therein as contract price was the actual decreased amount that FBC and Rudlin found mutually acceptable. 004 MARTHA R. HORRIGAN, Petitioner, vs. TROIKA COMMERCIAL, INC Article 1377 of the Civil Code provides:"ART. 1377. The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity."

In a long line of cases,2 we have consistently held that the party who draws up the contract, in which obscure words or phrases appear, bears the responsibility for causing the ambiguity or obscurity, and hence, these must be construed against him

Also, under Section 17, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court"SEC. 17. Of two constructions, which preferred? When the terms of an agreement have been intended in a different sense by the different parties to it, that sense is to prevail against either party in which he supposed the other understood it, and when different constructions of a provision are otherwise equally proper, that is to be taken which is the most favorable to the party in whose favor the provision was made.

Luciano P. Canedo v. Kampilan Security and Detective Agency, IncPetitioner cannot simply rely on this piece of document since the fact of dismissal must be evidenced by positive and overt acts of an employer indicating an intention to dismiss.The import of the said Certification is that petitioner was assigned in NPC from November 20, 1996 up to May 7, 2003 and that on May 7, 2003, respondents terminated his assignment to NPC upon the latters request. This is the correct interpretation based on the true intention of the parties as shown by their contemporaneous and subsequent acts and the other evidence on record as discussed above.Section 12 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court states that in the construction and interpretation of a document, the intention of the parties must be pursued.Section 13 of the same Rule further instructs that the circumstances under which a document was made may be shown in order to ascertain the correct interpretation of a document.LICAROS V. GATMAITAN It is a conventional subrogation. The intention of the parties to treat the Memorandum of Agreement as embodying a conventional subrogation is shown not only by the "whereas clause" but also by the signature space captioned "WITH OUR CONFORME" reserved for the signature of a representative of Anglo-Asean Bank. These provisions in the aforementioned Memorandum of Agreement may not simply be disregarded or dismissed as superfluous.

It is a basic rule in the interpretation of contracts that "(t)he various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly." Moreover, under our Rules of Court, it is mandated that "(I)n the construction of an instrument where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all." Further, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that contracts should be so construed as to harmonize and give effect to the different provisions thereof.SALUN-AT MARQUEZ and NESTOR DELA CRUZ v ELOISA ESPEJO, ELENITA ESPEJO, EMERITA ESPEJO, OPHIRRO ESPEJO, OTHNIEL ESPEJO, ORLANDO ESPEJO, OSMUNDO ESPEJO, ODELEJO ESPEJO and NEMI FERNANDEZ,ISSUE(S): Whether the CA erred in utilizing the Best Evidence Rule to determine the subject of the contracts? YES.RATIO: In the instant case, there is no room for the application of the Best Evidence Rule because there is no dispute regarding the contents of the documents. The real issue is whether the admitted contents of these documents (DOS and VLTs) adequately and correctly express the true intention of the partiesThe Parol Evidence Rule excludes parol or extrinsic evidence by which a party seeks to contradict, vary, add to or subtract from the terms of a valid agreement or instrument. Thus, it appears that what the CA actually applied in its assailed Decision when it refused to look beyond the words of the contracts was the Parol Evidence Rule, not the Best Evidence Rule. The appellate court gave primacy to the literal terms of the two contracts and refused to admit any other evidence that would contradict such terms.However, even the application of the Parol Evidence Rule is improper in the case at bar. In the first place, respondents are not parties to the VLTs executed between RBBI and petitioners; they are strangers to the written contracts. Rule 130, Section 9 specifically provides that parol evidence rule is exclusive only as between the parties and their successors-in-interest. The parol evidence rule may not be invoked where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written document in question, and does not base his claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument.The instant case falls under the exceptions to the Parol Evidence Rule, as provided in the second paragraph of Rule 130, Section 9: However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:(1) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;(2) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto;

. Article 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered. Rule 130, Section 13 which provides for the rules on the interpretation of documents is likewise enlightening: Section 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. For the proper construction of an instrument, the circumstances under which it was made, including the situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to it, may be shown, so that the judge may be placed in the position of those whose language he is to interpret.Applying the foregoing guiding rules, it is clear that the Deed of Sale was intended to transfer the Lantap property to the respondents, while the VLTs were intended to convey the Murong property to the petitioners UNITED PLANTERS SUGAR MILLING CO., INC., (UPSUMCO), v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK (PNB) ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST(APT), AS TRUSTEE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,It is in that context that the question of parol evidence comes into play. The parol evidence rule states that generally, when the terms of an agreement have been reduced into writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.[35] Assuming that the Deed of Assignment failed to accurately reflect an intent of the parties to retroact the effect of condonation to the date of the foreclosure sale, none of the parties, particularly UPSUMCO, availed of its right to seek the reformation of the instrument to the end that such true intention may be expressed.[36] As there is nothing in the text of Deed of Assignment that clearly gives retroactive effect to the condonation, the parol evidence rule generally bars any other evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement, such as evidence that the said Deed had retroactive effect.SEAOIL PETROLEUM CORPORATION VS. AUTOCORP GROUP AND PAUL Y. RODRIGUEZAlthough parol evidence is admissible to explain the meaning of a contract, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the writing unless there has been fraud or mistake. Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid contract.The Vehicle Sales Invoice is the best evidence of the transaction. A sales invoice is a commercial document. Commercial documents or papers are those used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions. Business forms, e.g., order slip, delivery charge invoice and the like, are commonly recognized in ordinary commercial transactions as valid between the parties and, at the very least, they serve as an acknowledgment that a business transaction has in fact transpired. These documents are not mere scraps of paper bereft of probative value, but vital pieces of evidence of commercial transactions. They are written memorials of the details of the consummation of contracts.

The terms of the subject sales invoice are clear. They show that Autocorp sold to Seaoil one unit Robex 200 LC Excavator paid for by checks issued by one Romeo Valera. This does not, however, change the fact that Seaoil Petroleum Corporation, as represented by Yu, is the customer or buyer. The moment a party affixes his or her signature thereon, he or she is bound by all the terms stipulated therein and is subject to all the legal obligations that may arise from their breach.Oral testimony on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the case, depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence.Hence, petitioners contention that the document falls within the exception to the parol evidence rule is untenable. The exception obtains only where the written contract is so ambiguous or obscure in terms that the contractual intention of the parties cannot be understood from a mere reading of the instrument. In such a case, extrinsic evidence of the subject matter of the contract, of the relations of the parties to each other, and of the facts and circumstances surrounding them when they entered into the contract may be received to enable the court to make a proper interpretation of the instrument.Manuel Aloria v. Estrelita V. ClementeThe reliance by the Court of Appeals on the parol evidence rule is misplaced, because one of the exceptions to this rule is when a party puts in issue in his pleading the validity of the written agreement.As noted earlier, respondent denied in her Answer having participated in the preparation of the deed of sale basis of the cancellation of petitioners title and the issuance in its stead of her title. Forgery, however, "cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and whoever alleges it has the burden of proving the same." Other than her bare denial, however, respondent had not presented evidence against the genuineness of her signature in the deed of sale.A comparison between her acknowledged signature and the signature appearing above her name in the deed of sale reveals no marked differences. The presumption that respondents signature is genuine, thus stands. Upon the other hand, as reflected above, petitioner presented clear and convincing evidence that the signature attributed to him in the same document is forged.LUCIO CRUZ v. CA and CONRADO SALONGA ISSUE: WON the parol evidence rule is applicable in the case at bar.No, the parol evidence rule is not applicable in the case at bar. Section 7, Rule 130 is predicated on the existence of a document embodying the terms of an agreement, but Exhibit D does not contain such an agreement. It is only a receipt attesting to the fact that on May 4, 1982, the petitioner received from the private respondent the amount of P35,000. A distinction should be made between a statement of fact expressed in the instrument and the terms of the contractual act. The former may be varied by parol evidence but not the latter. Section 7 of Rule 130 clearly refers to the terms of an agreement and provides that "there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of the agreement other than the contents of the writing."The statement in Exhibit I of the petitioner's receipt of the P28,000.00 is just a statement of fact. It is a mere acknowledgment of the distinct act of payment made by the private respondent. Its reference to the amount of P28,000.00 as consideration of the "pakyaw" contract does not make it part of the terms of their agreement. Parol evidence may therefore be introduced to explain Exhibit I, particularly with respect to the petitioner's receipt of the amount of P28,000.00 and of the date when the said amount was received.Even if it were assumed that Exhibits D and I are covered by the parol evidence rule, its application by the Court of Appeals was improper. The record shows that no objection was made by the private respondent when the petitioner introduced evidence to explain the circumstances behind the execution and issuance of the said instruments. The rule is that objections to evidence must be made as soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably apparent. In the case of testimonial evidence, the objection must be made when the objectionable question is asked or after the answer is given if the objectionable features become apparent only by reason of such answer. For failure of the private respondent to object to the evidence introduced by the petitioner, he is deemed to have waived the benefit of the parol evidence rule.RAFAEL PAGSUYUIN and PEREGRINA PAGSUYUIN-SUBIDO, petitioners, vs.INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and SALUD PAGSUYUIN,25.As can be clearly gleaned from the foregoing, the rule making a writing the exclusive evidence of the agreement therein stated, is not applicable when the validity of such agreement is the fact in dispute. A contract may be annulled where the consent of one of the contracting parties was procured by mistake, fraud, intimidation, violence or undue influence (Art. 1330, New Civil Code). In fact, as early as 1919 in the case of Bough v. Cantiveros, this Court laid down the rule that where the validity of the agreement is the issue, parol evidence may be introduced to establish illegality or fraud.26.In the case at bar, petitioners relied heavily on the fact of notarial certification of the Deeds of Assignment by Notary Public Edmundo Tubio allegedly on the 13th of September, 1976 in the presence of witnesses Marietta Pagsuyuin-Javier and Federico Javier to deflect the admissibility of parol evidence.27.On the other hand, private respondent's evidence clearly shows that on September 7, 1976 a document was brought to her at the Manila International, Airport, which she signed that same evening (when she returned to her house) in the presence of witnesses Federico and Marietta Javier but they were not given copies thereof. Then on September 8, 1976 at around 6:00 a.m., Rafael Pagsuyuin went to the house of the private respondent Salud Pagsuyuin with more documents for signature. Relying on the assurances of petitioner Rafael that the same were additional copies of the documents they had signed in the evening of September 7, 1976, Salud and her witnesses signed without reading as petitioner Rafael was in a hurry and he only showed them the latter portion and refused to show the contents of the documents. After he had obtained their signatures, Rafael left the house of Salud again without leaving any copy of the document. As it turned out, the documents were denominated as Deeds of Assignment, contrary to the intent of private respondent. These testimonies were never satisfactorily rebutted by the petitioners.28.At this juncture, RTC findings:a.. . . the instruments of sale (Exh. "A" and "B") lacked the valid consent of the transferor Salud Pagsuyuin as there was fraud enlisted in making plaintiff sign the documents without understanding the contents thereofAir philippines corp vs penswell incThe products are covered by the exception of trade secrets being divulged in compulsory disclosure. The Court affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals which upheld the finding of the RTC that there is substantial basis for respondent to seek protection of the law for its proprietary rights over the detailed chemical composition of its products.

The Supreme Court has declared that trade secrets and banking transactions are among the recognized restrictions to the right of the people to information as embodied in the Constitution. SC said that the drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside from national security matters and intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code and other related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act), are also exempted from compulsory disclosure.JOSIELENE LARA CHAN, Petitioner, vs. JOHNNY T. CHANISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court correctly denied the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum covering Johnnys hospital records on the ground that these are covered by the privileged character of the physician-patient communication.HELD: DENIED. No. CA decision AFFIRMED. -Trial in the case had not yet begun. Consequently, it cannot be said that Johnny had already presented the Philhealth claim form in evidence, the act contemplated above which would justify Josielene into requesting an inquiry into the details of his hospital confinement. Johnny was not yet bound to adduce evidence in the case when he filed his answer. Any request for disclosure of his hospital records would again be premature.-For all of the above reasons, the CA and the RTC were justified in denying Josielene her request for the production in court of Johnnys hospital records-The physician-patient privileged communication rule essentially means that a physician who gets information while professionally attending a patient cannot in a civil case be examined without the patients consent as to any facts which would blacken the latters reputation. This rule is intended to encourage the patient to open up to the physician, relate to him the history of his ailment, and give him access to his body, enabling the physician to make a correct diagnosis of that ailment and provide the appropriate cure. Any fear that a physician could be compelled in the future to come to court and narrate all that had transpired between him and the patient might prompt the latter to clam up, thus putting his own health at great risk.Marcos vs Heirs of NavarroRTC granted respondents motion and disqualified Alvarez as a witness, ruling that her supposed testimony would be hearsay as she has no personal knowledge of the alleged handwriting of Andres, Sr. Also, there is no need for PO2 Alvarez to be presented, if she is to be presented as an expert witness, because her testimony is not yet needed.ISSUE(S): Whether PO2 Alvarez should be disqualified as a witness HELD: No.Section 21 disqualifies a witness by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. Section 22 disqualifies a witness by reason of marriage. Section 23 disqualifies a witness by reason of death or insanity of the adverse party. Section 24 disqualifies a witness by reason of privileged communication.The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein.As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and make known her perception to others.Respondents motion to disqualify her should have been denied by the RTC for it was not based on any of these grounds for disqualification. The RTC confused the qualification of the witness with the credibility and weight of her testimony.PEOPLE v. CAETE . In People v. Ancheta, this Court emphasized that a presiding judge enjoys a great deal of latitude in examining witnesses within the course of evidentiary rules. The presiding judge should see to it that a testimony should not be incomplete or obscure. After all, the judge is the arbiter and he must be in a position to satisfy himself as to the respective claims of the parties in the criminal proceeding. The Court finds nothing improper in the questions posed by the trial court. Neither are the questions prejudicial to the appellant or suggestive of any partiality of the trial court. It bears stressing that from the testimony of the private complainant, the appellant was wearing his short pants before he mounted her and even when he was already on top of her and managed to penetrate her sexual organ with his penis. The public prosecutor wanted the private complainant to explain to the court how the appellant could have inserted his penis into her vagina considering that he was still wearing his short pants. Although crudely and ungrammatically phrased, the question of the public prosecutor where did he let his penis exit considering that he is then wearing a short pants was not leading. The trial court should have overruled the objection and allowed the private complainant to answer the questionsParenthetically, under Sections 19 to 21 of the Rule on Examination of a Child Witness which took effect on December 15, 2000, child witnesses may testify in a narrative form and leading questions may be allowed by the trial court in all stages of the examination if the same will further the interest of justice. Objections to questions should be couched in a manner so as not to mislead, confuse, frighten and intimidate the child:Sec. 19. Mode of questioning. The court shall exercise control over the questioning of children so as to (1) facilitate the ascertainment of the truth, (2) ensure that questions are stated in a form appropriate to the developmental level of the child, (3) protect children from harassment or undue embarrassment, and (4) avoid waste of time.The court may allow the child witness to testify in a narrative form.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SALVADOR GOLIMLIM "BADONG"ISSUE: Whether or not a mental retardate is disqualified to be a witnessHELD: NO. A mental retardate or a feebleminded person is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness, her mental condition not being a vitiation of her credibility.That Evelyn is a mental retardate does not disqualify her as a witness nor render her testimony bereft of truth.Sections 20 and 21 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court provide:SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.SEC. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. The following persons cannot be witnesses:(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known their perception to others;(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and of relating them truthfully.6 Mercado v. VitrioloRosa F. Mercado filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, seeking his disbarment from the practice of law as he allegedly maliciously instituted a criminal case for falsification of public document against her, a former client, based on confidential information gained from their attorney-client relationshipAtty. Vitriolo: that his filing of the criminal complaint for falsification of public documents against complainant does not violate the rule on privileged communication between attorney and client because the bases of the falsification case are two certificates of live birth which are public documents and in no way connected with the confidence taken during the engagement of respondent as counsel. According to respondent, the complainant confided to him as then counsel only matters of facts relating to the annulment case. Nothing was said about the alleged falsification of the entries in the birth certificates of her two daughters. The birth certificates are filed in the Records Division of CHED and are accessible to anyone.ISSUE(S): 1.Whether or not Atty. Vitriolo violated the rule on privileged communication between lawyer-client relationship when he filed the criminal case. HELD: 1. No.RATIO: There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the communication. Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter declines the employment. On the other hand, a communication from a (prospective) client to a lawyer for some purpose other than on account of the (prospective) attorney-client relation is not privileged. The client made the communication in confidence. The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the communication to be confidential.A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third person other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which it was given.Applying all these rules to the case at bar, we hold that the evidence on record fails to substantiate complainants allegations. We note that complainant did not even specify the alleged communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All her claims were couched in general terms and lacked specificity. She contends that respondent violated the rule on privileged communication when he instituted a criminal action against her for falsification of public documents because the criminal complaint disclosed facts relating to the civil case for annulment then handled by respondent. She did not, however, spell out these facts which will determine the merit of her complaint. The Court cannot be involved in a guessing game as to the existence of facts which the complainant must prove.NERI v. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONSThe power to enter into an executive agreement is in essence an executive power. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Now, the fact that the President has to secure the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to Congress a complete report of its decision before contracting or guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish the executive nature of the power.

Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations: The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been recognized in this jurisdiction. In discussing valid limitations on the right to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG held that "information on inter-government exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national interest." The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of authority and expedition of decision which are inherent in executive action. Another essential characteristic of diplomacy is its confidential nature.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ARTEMIO INVENCION y SORIANO,Elven Invencion, an 8-year-old grade two pupil, testified that he is a half-brother of Cynthia and son of Artemio with his second common-law wife.ISSUE: WON the son of artemio is competent to testifyHELD: yesRATIO: As to the competency of Elven to testify, we rule that such is not affected by Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, otherwise known as the rule on filial privilege. This rule is not strictly a rule on disqualification because a descendant is not incompetent or disqualified to testify against an ascendant. The rule refers to a privilege not to testify, which can be invoked or waived like other privileges. As correctly observed by the lower court, Elven was not compelled to testify against his father; he chose to waive that filial privilege when he voluntarily testified against Artemio. Elven declared that he was testifying as a witness against his father of his own accord and only to tell the truth.FELICITO G. SANSON, CELEDONIA SANSON-SAQUIN, ANGELES A. MONTINOLA, EDUARDO A. MONTINOLA, JR., v. CA and MELECIA T. SY,4.As for the administratrixs invocation of the Dead Mans Statute, the same does not likewise lie. The rule renders incompetent: 1) parties to a case; 2) their assignors; or 3) persons in whose behalf a case is prosecuted.The rule is exclusive and cannot be construed to extend its scope by implication so as to disqualify persons not mentioned therein. Mere witnesses who are not included in the above enumeration are not prohibited from testifying as to a conversation or transaction between the deceased and a third person, if he took no active part therein.Jade is not a party to the case. Neither is she an assignor nor a person in whose behalf the case is being prosecuted. She testified as a witness to the transaction. In transactions similar to those involved in the case at bar, the witnesses are commonly family members or relatives of the parties. Should their testimonies be excluded due to their apparent interest as a result of their relationship to the parties, there would be a dearth of evidence to prove the transactions. In any event, as will be discussed later, independently of the testimony of Jade, the claims of the Montinolas would still prosper on the basis of their documentary evidencethe checks.ISSUE 21.Petitioners argue that the testimonies of Sanson and Celedonia as witnesses to each others claim against the deceased are not covered by the Dead Mans Statute; besides, the administratrix waived the application of the law when she cross-examined them.2.The administratrix, on the other hand, cites the ruling of the Court of Appeals in its decision on review, the pertinent portion of which reads:The more logical interpretation is to prohibit parties to a case, with like interest, from testifying in each others favor as to acts occurring prior to the death of the deceased.Since the law disqualifies parties to a case or assignors to a case without distinguishing between testimony in his own behalf and that in behalf of others, he should be disqualified from testifying for his co-parties. The law speaks of "parties or assignors of parties to a case." Apparently, the testimonies of Sanson and Saquin on each others behalf, as co-parties to the same case, falls under the prohibition. (Citation omitted; underscoring in the original and emphasis supplied)3.But Sansons and Celedonias claims against the same estate arose from separate transactions. Sanson is a third party with respect to Celedonias claim. And Celedonia is a third party with respect to Sansons claim. One is not thus disqualified to testify on the others transaction4.In any event, what the Dead Mans Statute proscribes is the admission of testimonial evidence upon a claim which arose before the death of the deceased. The incompetency is confined to the giving of testimony. Since the separate claims of Sanson and Celedonia are supported by checks-documentary evidence, their claims can be prosecuted on the bases of said checks.