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CASEDOCTRINE

1.Tanada vs TuveraDoctrine of Constructive Noticea fiction that a person got notice even though actual notice was not personally delivered to him/her. Ignorantia juris non excusat or ignorantia legis neminem excusat (Latin for "ignorance of the law does not excuse" or "ignorance of the law excuses no one") is a legal principle holding that a person who is unaware of a law may not escape liability for violating that law merely because he or she was unaware of its content. -Executive Order 200, dated June 18, 1987, modifying Article 2 of the Civil Code, now provides for the publication of laws either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines as a requirement for effectivity.

2.People vs. Que Po LayPublication of circulars, those with prescription of penalties must be published before its effectivity. This is based on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provision, a law, regulation, or circular must first be published, and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and the penalties for violation thereof.

3.DM Consunji vs. CA This adjudication aims to prevent double compensation. That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy is the basis. The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private respondent, as plaintiff, to allege in her complaint that she had availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus, erroneous for petitioner to burden private respondent with raising waiver as an issue.

4.Cui vs. ArellanoGENERAL RULE: Rights can be waived.EXCEPTIONS:1. If the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals or good customs (LPPMG)2. If the waiver is prejudicial to a third party with a right recognized by law. NOTE: A stipulation requiring the recipient of a scholarship grant to waive his right to transfer to another school, unless he refunds the equivalent of his scholarship in cash is null and void. The school concerned obviously understands scholarship awards as a business scheme designed to increase the business potential of an educational institution. Thus, conceived, it is not only inconsistent with sound policy, but also with good morals.

Waiver Cui signed is void.

5.Bello vs. CaPetitioners falsely appealed a case to the Court of First Instance, which should have been taken directly to Respondent Court. The Prosecutor filed a petition to dismiss appeal. Petitioners invoked an analogous provision (Rule 50, Sec. 3)directing the Court of Appeals in cases erroneously brought to it to certify the case to the proper court.

This Court has in many cases involving the construction of statutes always cautioned against "narrowly" interpreting a statute "as to defeat the purpose of the legislator" " and stressed that "it is of the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result (of injustice or absurdity)" and that therefore "a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results".

6.Miciano vs. BrimoCase at bar: An alien testator (Turk) who made his will in the Philippines stated in the will that his property should be distributed in accordance with Philippine law, and not that of his nation.The provision in the will is not valid. The Turkish law should govern the disposition of his property pursuant to Article 16.

7.PIlapil vs. Ibay Somera(Art 16 and Art26)Private respondent, Geiling, obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.

8. Roehr vs. RodriguezDivorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children, must still be determined by our courts.

9.Garcia vs. Recio(Art 16 and Art26)Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.

10.Nikko Hotel vs. Reyes.As far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered through Ms. Lim's exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to bear alone (Volenti Non Fit Injuria -- to one who is willing, no harm is done).

11. Sps Quisumbing v. Meralco

Except as provided by law or by stipulation, a party is entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss as it has duly proven. Basic is the rule that to recover actual damages, not only must the amount of loss be capable of proof; it must also be actually proven with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or the best evidence obtainable.||

12.Gashem Shokat Baksh vs. CABreach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se but in the case at bar, Baksh acted contrary to morals. His fraudulent and deceptive prostrations of love to promise to marry her made her surrender her womanhood to him with the sincere belief that he would keep his promise.

13. Albenson Enterprise Corp vs. CAA party injured by the filing of a court case against him, even if he is later on absolved, may file a case for damages grounded either on the principle of abuse of rights, or on malicious prosecution. - The principle of abuse of rights is based upon the famous maxim suum jus summa injuria (the abuse of a right is the greatest possible wrong). However, in order that it will be actionable, the following elements of an abuse of right under Article 19 must be present: 1. There is a legal right or duty; 2. Which is exercised in bad faith; 3. For the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another

14. University of the East vs. JaderConsidering that the institution of learning involved herein is a university which is engaged in legal education, it should have practiced what it inculcates in its students, more specifically the principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent for the latter's actual damages, SC held that respondent should not have been awarded moral damages.||

15. Tenchavez v. EscanoThe acts of the wife in not complying with her wifely duties, deserting her husband without any justifiable cause, leaving for the United States in order to secure a decree of absolute divorce, and finally getting married again are acts which constitute a willful infliction of injury upon the husbands feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy for which No. 10 of Article 2219 authorizes an award for moral damages.

16.Abunado vs People(art 36(prejudicial question) and art40)A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. ||| The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner's marriage to Narcisa had no bearing upon the determination of petitioner's innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted||

17. Beltran vs. peopleThe rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.||| He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.|||In the present case, the accused need not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than the proof of a final judgment. More importantly, parties to a marriage should not be allowed to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the competent courts. So long as there is no such final judgment, the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes.

18. Te vs. CAA prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.No prejudicial question when one case is administrative and other is civil

19.Quimiguing vs. IcaoA conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations.

It is true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective.

20. Geluz vs. CAAward for damages does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality.

In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive. In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its mother's womb.

21. De JEsus vs. Syquia It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is yet unborn is no impediment to the acquisition of rights.

22. Limjuco vs. Estat of Pedro FragranteIn this jurisdiction there are ample precedents to show that the estate of a deceased person is also considered as having legal personality independent of their heirs. In the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of estates of deceased persons, it has been the constant doctrine that it is the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the decedent, instead of the heirs directly, that becomes vested and charged with his rights and obligations which survive after his demise. Under the present legal system, such rights and obligations as survive after death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of the deceased.

23. Dumlao vs. Quality PlasticsArt 37 and 42 of Civil CodeA dead person cannot be validly served with summons. He had no more civil personality and his juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations was lost through death.

24. Mo Ya Lim Yo vs CIR

Steps that should be taken by an alien woman married to a Filipino citizen in order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The alien woman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino, citizen and that she is not disqualified from acquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, which should be accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited section from becoming naturalized Filipino citizen, the Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or decision granting or denying the petition.Declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to her co-appellant Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen

under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizens, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.||| (Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No. L-21289, [October 4, 1971], 148-B PHIL 773-877)

25.Frivaldo vs ComelecLack of Citizenship a Continuing Disqualification? The records show that the Honorable Supreme Court had decided that Frivaldo was not a Filipino citizen and thus disqualified for the purpose of the 1988 and 1992 elections. However, there is no record of any "final judgment" of the disqualification of Frivaldo as a candidate for the May 8, 1995 elections.**Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again, as the occasion demands.

Repatriation of Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.*It is true that under the Civil Code of the Philippines, "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." But there are settled exceptions to this general rule, such as when the statute is CURATIVE or REMEDIAL in nature or when it CREATES NEW RIGHTS.

The citizenship requirement in the Local Government Code is to be possessed by an elective official at the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of the term of office to which he has been elected.||| (Frivaldo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120295, 123755, [June 28, 1996], 327 PHIL 521-598)

26.Uytengsu vs RepublicActual and substantial residence not merely legal residence is necessary to dispense with the filing of a declaration of intention, it is even more necessary during the period intervening from the filing of the petition for naturalization to the date of the hearing thereof. In this connection, it should be remembered that, upon the filing of said petition, the clerk of court is ordained by law to publish it with a notice of the date of the hearing to give the government sufficient time to check the truth of the statements made in said declaration of intention, if any, and in the application for naturalization, especially the allegations therein relative to the possession of the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law.

Where the petitioner left the Philippines immediately after the filing of his petition for naturalization and did not return until several months after the first date set for the hearing thereof, notwithstanding his explicit promise, under oath, that he would reside continuously in the Philippines "from the date of the filing of his petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship", he has not complied with the requirements of section 7 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, and, consequently, not entitled to a judgment in his favor.||| (In re: Uytengsu v. Republic, G.R. No. L-6379, [September 29, 1954], 95 PHIL 890-899)

27. Romualdez-Marcos vs Comelec

*minor follows the domicile of his parents.Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. *To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 1.An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;2.A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and3.Acts which correspond with the purpose.In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue.In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with "domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return.In respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.

an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. ||| (Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 119976, [September 18, 1995], 318 PHIL 329-466)

28. Star Paper vs Simbol

bona fide occupational qualification exception requisites:(1) that the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the job involved; and, (2) that there is a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job||| (Star Paper Corp. v. Simbol, G.R. No. 164774, [April 12, 2006], 521 PHIL 364-379)bona fide occupational qualification exception: unless the employer can prove that the reasonable demands of the business require a distinction based on marital status and there is no better available or acceptable policy which would better accomplish the business purpose, an employer may not discriminate against an employee based on the identity of the employee's spouse..||| (Star Paper Corp. v. Simbol, G.R. No. 164774, [April 12, 2006], 521 PHIL 364-379)

29. PT&T vs. NLRCThe requirement of notice to both the employees concerned and the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) is mandatory and must be written and given at least one month before the intended date of retrenchment. In this case, it is undisputed that the petitioners were given notice of the temporary lay-off. There is, however, no evidence that any written notice to permanently retrench them was given at least one month prior to the date of the intended retrenchment hence termination illegal.

petitioner's policy of not accepting or considering as disqualified from work any woman worker who contracts marriage runs afoul of the test of, and the right against, discrimination, afforded all women workers by our labor laws and by no less than the Constitution.||| (PT&T v. NLRC, G.R. No. 118978, [May 23, 1997])

30.Estrada vs EscitorThe Court held in this case and under these distinct circumstances (act of signing a declaration pledging faithfulness under the rules of Jehovans witnesses) Escritors conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion.

31. Goita vs Campos-RUedaThe mere act of marriage creates an obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife . This obligation is founded not so much on the express or implied terms of the contract of marriage as on the natural and legal duty of the husband; an obligation, the enforcement of which is of such vital concern to the state itself that the law will not permit him to terminate it by his own wrongful acts in driving his wife to seek protection in the parental home. A judgment for separate maintenance is a judgment calling for the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of the sovereign. This is done from necessity and with a view to preserve the public peace and the purity of the wife

32. Republic vs Abriol(2015 book)Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence. must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act. Their understanding should not be affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism

33. Enriquez vs. VelezPhilippine law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and a woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but not in the Philippines

Petitioner had a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from legally marrying Vitaliana.

The provisions of the civil code unless expressly providing to the contrary as in art 144 when referring to a spouse contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis - a - vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully wedded spouse to her, in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.

34. Cosca vs. Palaypayon(Art 6 and Art34)The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts or certificates of those marriages he solemnized without a marriage license, he as the solemnizing officer is the one responsible for the irregularity in not complying with the formal requisites of the marriage and under Art 4(3) of the Family Code, he shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

35. Wassmer vs. Velez

Breach of promise to marry when actionable wrong Ordinarily, a mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the necessary preparations and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good customs, for which the erring promisor must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the New Civil Code.

36. Navarro vs. DomagtoryJudges may solemnize a marriage only within his court's jurisdiction Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction." Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. [NOTE: This statement is erroneous because the law clearly provides that a judge has authority only if he or she solemnizes within his or her jurisdiction. Non-observance of this rule is not a mere irregularity because it generally makes the marriage null and void. It is submitted, however, that since the principal issue in the Domagtoy case involves the liability of a judge and not the validity of a marriage, the said statement of the Supreme Court is merely an obiter dictum and, therefore, does not create a precedent. (Sta. Maria)] Instances when a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom As Article 8 states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or courtroom only in the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either spouse was at the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party.

37.Aranas vs OccianoMarriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void A marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.

38.Lim Tanhu vs RamoleteEvidence of marriage Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, the declaration of the contracting parties that they take each other as husband and wife "shall be set forth in an instrument" signed by the parties as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage. Accordingly, the primary evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract. When secondary evidence may be availed of While a marriage may also be proved by other competent evidence, the absence of the contract must first be satisfactorily explained. The certification of the person who allegedly solemnized a marriage is not admissible evidence of such marriage unless proof or loss of the contract or of any other satisfactory reason for its non-production is first presented to the court.

39. Vda De Chua vs. CaBest evidence rule The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a marriage contract. The lower court correctly disregarded the photostat copy of the marriage certificate, this being a violation of the best evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces of evidence.

40.Republic vs. Ca and CastroEffect of proof of lack of record Inability of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license issued. The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a certificate of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license to the contracting parties.

41. Van Dorn vs RomilloThe divorce obtained in Nevada is valid as aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines provided they are recognized to be valid according to their national law in accordance to the nationality rule.

Thus,respondent, would have no standing to sue to have claim over conjugal assets as he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him. Likewise, Alice Van Dorn is not obligated to provide support for respondent.

42. Republics vs, OrbecidoThe twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26, which are (1) there is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner, and (2) A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, are likely present.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.

Considering the present petitions lack of proof, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter another marriage. Accordingly, for Obrecidos plea to prosper, he must prove his allegation that his wife was naturalized as an American citizen and show that the divorce allows his former wife, Lady Myros, to remarry. For the court to declare such, Obrecido must submit the necessary evidences in his favor.

43. Republic vs. Bayot(sta maria book)In obtaining a divorce, Rebecca (1) chose her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship (2) secured personally said divorce as an American citizen, (3) as an American citizen, she was bound by the national laws of the U.S.A. (4) the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their Agreement. Hence, the Supreme Court affirmed that the divorce, which was validly obtained in another country through Rebeccas American citizenship, is recognized in the Philippines.

44. Republic vs. DayotThe marriage between Jose and Felisa Dayot is void ab initio. It was discovered that they only lived together for 5 months before their marriage was celebrated. Since they did not live together for at least 5 years, they did not satisfy the requirement of Art. 34 of the Family Code, which clearly provides that a marriage will only be exempt from a marriage license if the couple have lived together for at least 5 years without any legal impediment before contracting their marriage.

45. Ninal vs. Bayadog( MArriage exempt and Void marriages)Marriage exempt: It was only 20 months that had elapsed from the time Pepitos 1st marriage was dissolved. Hence, his marriage to Norma Badayog is void ab initio since it does not satisfy the requirement of Art. 34 of the Family Code, which states that no license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.

Void marriages: Pepitos marriage to Norma Badayog is void ab initio for lack of marriage license.

This case is an example of a direct attack, which means filing a case precisely putting forth as principal issue the nullity of the marriage. It is a suit precisely filed to assail the validity of a marriage or to assert the nullity of a marriage for the Court to issue the proper judicial declaration.

A direct attack is necessary for this case. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of the child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the Court may pass upon the validity of a marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case.

46. Manzano vs. SanchezLegal separation does not dissolve a marriage. The couples, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao, are not capacitated to remarry. Even if they have already spent 7 years living together as husband and wife, it does not sever the ties of a subsisting marriage. Hence, respondent judge Sanchez solemnized a void bigamous marriage.

47. Mariategui vs. CAThe spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.

48. Chi Ming Tsoi vs. CASenseless, protracted and constant refusal to comply with the essential marital obligations by one or both of the spouses although he, she or they are physically capable of performing such obligations.

49. Domingo vs. CA(void marriages and art40) The nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their union is defective. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and would rest on a very shaky foundation.On the other hand, the clause on the basis solely of a final judgment delaring such marriage void in Article 40 of the Code denotes that such final judgment declaring the previous marriage void is not only for purpose of remarriage.The prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations governing them.

50. Republic vs. CA and Molina (pls include guidelines)Guidelines: PROBE- PIG

1. PI is permanent and incurable;

2. Root cause of PI must be: Medically and Clinically identified; Alleged in the Complaint; Sufficiently proved by experts; Clearly explained in the decision3. Marital Obligations refer to Art. 68-71, 220,221 and 225 of FC;

4.Plaintiff has the burden of proof;

5. Incapacity proven to be existed at the time of the celebration of the marriage;

6. Trial Court must order the Prosecuting Attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor- General to appear for the State;

7. Interpretations of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church of the Philippines while not controlling should be given great respect;

8. Illness is Grave enough to bring about disability to assume essential marital obligations.

51. Louel Santos vs. CAPsychological Incapacity must be characterized by:1. Juridical Antecedence- must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage;2. Incurability- must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party involved; and3. Gravity- must be grave/ serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage

52. Republic vs, QUintero-Hamano(Toshio the Abandonner) The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. Psychological Incapacity should be proven beyond that which is merely substantial.

53.Choa vs. CHoaPsychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. It must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a neglect in the performance of marital obligations. A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute psychological incapacity.

54. Dedel Vs. CA(3 doctrines)1. As enunciated in Santos v. CA - psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support.

2. Article 36 is not to be equated with legal separation in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.

3. the trial court has no jurisdiction to dissolve a church marriage. The authority to do so is exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman Catholic Church.

55. Republic vs. Rodolfo O. De GarciaEmotional immaturity, irresponsibility, or even sexual promiscuity, cannot be equated with psychological incapacity.

56. Velrio Kalaw vs Fernandez.The Supreme Court cleared that it is not the frequency of the mahjong sessions but it is the fact that the wife should have known that bringing her children of very tender ages along to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber. Psychological Incapacity exists in this case due to a parent's inability to observe her marital obligations and that to keep her in that marriage may result to the corruption of the sanctity that the law so clearly seeks to preserve and protect.

Note: The SC did not relax the rules to the set point that the Molina doctrine was set aside. It was in fact done so in accordance with the above-mentioned and pursuit of its ratio.

57.Corpuz vs. Sto TomasAn alien spouse cannot claim under the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code because the substantive right it establishes is in favour of the Filipino spouse. Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Art 26 of the Family Code.

58. Morigo vs. PeopleA marriage is Void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between the parties by a solemnizing officer but instead they just merely signed a marriage contract.

59. Weigel vs. Sempio Dy

It was not necessary for Lilia to prove that her first marriage was vitiated with force because it will not be void but merely voidable. Such marriage is valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet been made, it is clear that when she married Karl, she is still validly married to her first husband. Consequently, her marriage to Karl is void. Likewise, there is no need of introducing evidence on the prior marriage of Karl for then such marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration before he can remarry.

60. Valdes vs RTCIn a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed by the provisions of Article 147 or Article 148, as the case may be, of the Family Code.|||

61.People vs ARagon*take note this case was before the enactment of the Family Code

A subsequent marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse is illegal and void from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity as dis tinguished from mere annuable marriage.|||(People v. Aragon, G.R. No. L-10016, [February 28, 1957], 100 PHIL 1033-1036)

62. Mercado vs. Tan"for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential." The Court further noted that the said rule was "cast into statutory form by Article 40 of the Family Code." Significantly, it observed that the second marriage, contracted without a judicial declaration that the first marriage was void, was "bigamous and criminal in character."||| (Mercado v. Tan, G.R. No. 137110, [August 1, 2000], 391 PHIL 809-827)

63. Republic vs. Nolasco

4 requisites for the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41|||1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code; 2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry; 3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and 4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee."|||(Republic v. Nolasco, G.R. No. 94053 (Resolution), [March 17, 1993])The Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the British Embassy, he secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of many millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.||| (Republic v. Nolasco, G.R. No. 94053 (Resolution), [March 17, 1993])

64. Republic vs. Lukban

*JURIS TANTUM- rebuttable presumptionA petition for judicial declaration that petitioner's husband is presumed to be dead cannot be entertained because it is not authorized by law, and if such declaration cannot be made in a special proceeding much less can the court determine the status of petitioner much less can the court determine the status of petitioner as a widow since this matter must of necessity depend upon the fact of death of the husband. This the Court can declare upon proper evidence, but not to decree that he is merely presumed to be dead.||| (In re Lukban v. Republic, G.R. No. L-8492, [February 29, 1956], 98 PHIL 574-578)*case was before the enactment of the family code

65. .Armas vs, Calisterio

Old Civil CodeArt. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless: "(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or "(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to Articles 390 and 391.||| (Armas v. Calisterio, G.R. No. 136467, [April 6, 2000], 386 PHIL 402-411)A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary as long as the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in these exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid "until declared null and void by a competent court." It follows that the burden of proof would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the second marriage.||| (Armas v. Calisterio, G.R. No. 136467, [April 6, 2000], 386 PHIL 402-411)

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