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  • 8/12/2019 CIVREV DOCTRINES

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    1. Ladera vs. Hodges TOPIC:

    ISSUE: WON the house built on a land owned by another, should be regarded in law as immovable property

    HELD: Yes. The civil code enumerates among the things declared by it as immovable property the following: lands, buildings,

    roads and constructions of all kind adhered to the soil. The law does not make any distinction whether or not the owner of the

    lot is the one who built. Also, since the principles of accession regard buildings and constructions as mere accessories to theland on which it is built, it is logical that said accessories should partake the nature of the principal thing.

    2. Mindanao Bus. Co vs Cit!ssessor and Treasurer

    TOPIC: CL!SSI"IC!TIO# O" P$OPE$TY

    ISSUE: Whether the Ta !ourt erred in its interpretation of paragraph " of Art. #$" of the N!!, and holding that pursuant

    thereto, the movable e%uipments are taable realties, by reason of their being intended or destined for use in an industry.

    $ULI#%:

    &'(. )ovable e%uipment, to be immobili*ed in contemplation of Art. #$" of the N!!, must be the essential and principal

    elements of an industry or works which are carried on in a building or on a piece of land. Thus, where the business is one of

    transportation , which is carried on without a repair or service shop, and it+s rolling e%uipment is repaired or serviced in a shopbelonging to another, the tools and e%uipment in its repair shop which appear movable are merely incidentals and may not be

    considered immovables, and, hence, not subect assessment as real estate for purposes of the real estate ta.

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    &. Ma'ati Leasing and "inan(eCor) vs *earever Te+ti,es

    TO-!: !lassification of -roperty((/': Whether or not the machinery is a real property

    0'12: NO. t must be pointed out that the characteri*ation of the subect machinery as chattel by the private respondent isindicative of intention and impresses upon the property the character determined by the parties. As stated in (tandard Oil !o. of

    New &ork v. 3aramillo, ## -hil. 456, it is undeniable that the parties to a contract may by agreement treat as personal propertythat which by nature would be real property, as long as no interest of third parties would be preudiced thereby. The status of thesubect machinery as movable or immovable was never placed in issue before the lower court and the !A. )oreover, evengranting that the charge is true, such fact alone does not render a contract void ab initio, but can only be a ground for renderingsaid contract voidable, or annullable pursuant to Article $576 of the new !ivil !ode, by a proper action in court. There is nothingon record to show that the mortgage has been annulled. Neither is it disclosed that steps were taken to nullify the same. On theother hand, as pointed out by petitioner and again not refuted by respondent, the latter has indubitably benefited from saidcontract. '%uity dictates that one should not benefit at the epense of another. -rivate respondent could not now therefore, beallowed to impugn the efficacy of the chattel mortgage after it has benefited therefrom.

    -. Santos Evange,ista vs. !,toSuret Insuran(e

    ((/':0'12:t is true that the parties to a deed of chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house as personal property for purposesof said contract. 0owever, this view is good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. t is based, partly, upon theprinciple of estoppel. Neither this principle, nor said view, is applicable to strangers to said contract. )uch less is it in pointwhere there has been no contract whatsoever, with respect to the status of the house involved, as in the case at bar.

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    . Tsai vs C! ssue: whether or not the machineries mortgaged by 'verte to -8!O) can be considered as immovable property9

    0eld: No. While it is true that the controverted properties appear to be immobile bolted or cemented on the real property

    mortgaged;, a perusal of the contract of real and chattel )ortgage eecuted by the parties states so otherwise, as it can be

    ascertained that the true intention of -8!O) and 'verte is to treat such machineries and e%uipment as chattels. An

    immovable may be considered a personal property if there is a stipulation as when it is used as security in the payment of an

    obligation where a chattel mortgage is eecuted over it.

    /. Serg0s Produ(ts vs PCILeasing and "inan(e

    . Burgo Sr. vs. C3ie4 o4 Sta5 TOPIC: C,assi6(ation o4 Pro)ertIssue:whether or not petitioners+ assertion that real properties were sei*ed under the disputed warrants is correct

    He,d: /nder Article #$"

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    7. Lo)e8 vs Orosa 9r. IMMO!BLE P$OPE$TY ;!$T. -1ada TOPIC:Article #$" of the !ivil !ode, -aragraph 5: 'verything attached to an immovable in a fied manner, in such a way that itcannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the obect.

    ssue: Whether or not the erred in declining to annul the eecution sale of the pump and accessories subect of the action

    although made without the re%uisite notice prescribed for the sale of immovables9

    0eld: No, the !ivil !ode considers as immovable property, among others, anything >attached to an immovable in a fied

    manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the obect.> The

    pump does not fit this description. t could be, and was in fact separated from &ap+s premises without being broken or suffering

    deterioration. Obviously the separation or removal of the pump involved nothing more complicated than the loosening of bolts

    or dismantling of other fasteners.

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    1?. Ma(3iner and EngineeringSu)),ies In( vs. C!

    TOPIC: C,assi6(ation o4 Pro)ert((/': Whether the remedy of Beplevin may be applied to personal property0eld:The special civil action of replevin is applicable only to personal property. When the machinery and e%uipment in %uestionappeared to be attached to the land, particularly to the concrete foundation of said premises, in a fied manner, in such a waythat the former could not be separated from the latter without breaking the material or deterioration of the obect, it had become

    an immovable property under Art. #$"5;.

    11. Laure, vs %ar(ia Topic: public property

    ISSUE:whether or not public property intended for public use has become patrimonial property because the lot has been dlefor some years9HELD:The fact that the Boppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual 'mbassy service doesnCt automatically convert it to

    patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use. A property continues to bepart of the public domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part ofthe government to withdraw it from being such.

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    12. $a@u(o vs i,,egas Topic: property in relation to whom it belongs

    ssue: Whether Bepublic Act 5$D6 which converted the lot in %uestion >which are reserved as communal property> into

    >disposable or alienable lands of the (tateE is unconstitutional for depriving the !ity of )anila of the lots and providing for their

    sale in subdivided small lots to bona fide occupants or tenants without payment of ust compensation

    Buling: BA 5$D6 is constitutional. The lots in %uestion are owned by the !ity of )anila in its public and governmental capacity

    and are therefore public property over which !ongress has absolute control as distinguished from patrimonial property owned

    by it which cannot be deprived from the !ity without ust compensation and without due process. BA 5$D6 epressly provides

    that the properties are reserved for the purpose of communal property and ordered its conversion into disposable and alienable

    lands of the state to be sold to its bona fide occupants. t has been an established doctrine that the state reserves its rights to

    classify its property under its legislative prerogative and the court cannot interfere on such power of the state.

    1&. Ma(asiano vs Dio'no ssue:Whether or not an ordinance or resolution issued by the municipal council of -araFa%ue authori*ing the lease and use of publicstreets or thoroughfares as sites for flea markets is valid.

    0eld:Not valid. -roperties of the local government which are devoted to public service are deemed public and are under the absolutecontrol of !ongress. 0ence, local governments have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public propertiesunless specific authority is vested upon them by !ongress.

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    1-. $e)u@,i( vs. C! Topic: -roperty in Belation to whom it belongs Articles #$7G#D";

    Issues:

    $. Whether or not lease andHor mortgage of a portion of a realty ac%uired through free patent constitute sufficient ground

    for the nullification of such land grant9

    D. Whether or not such property should revert to the (tate once it is invaded by the sea and thus becomes foreshore

    land9

    He,d:

    $. 8y epress provision of (ection $$I of !ommonwealth Act $#$ and in conformity with the policy of the law, anytransfer or alienation of a free patent or homestead within five years from the issuance of the patent isproscribed. (uch transfer nullifies said alienation and constitutes a cause for the reversion of the property to the (tate.The prohibition against any alienation or encumbrance of the land grant is a proviso attached to the approval of everyapplication. -rior to the fulfillment of the re%uirements of law, Bespondent )orato had only an inchoate right to the

    propertyJ such property remained part of the public domain and, therefore, not susceptible to alienation orencumbrance. !onversely, when a Khomesteader has complied with all the terms and conditions which entitled him toa patent for

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    1. Provin(e o4 Aa@uanga de,#orte vs Cit o4 Aa@oanga

    TO-!: -roperty of -ublic 2ominionISSUE: What is the nature of the 50 lots and building in question. (For the purpose of determining whih among theseproperties shall be owned b! the "ro#ine of $amboanga% and whih shall be owned b! the &it! of $amboanga.'

    E)*:

    The principle is this: If the property is owned by the municipal corporation or municipality in itspublic and governmental capacity, the property is public and Congress has absolute control over it;if the property is owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is patrimonial and Congresshas no absolute control, in which case, the municipality cannot be deprived of it without dueprocess and payment of just compensation.The !ivil !ode classification is found in articles #D5 and #D# of the same !ode. /nder Art. #D#, property for public, use,consists of provincial roads, city streets, municipal streets, the s%uares, fountains, public waters, promenades and public worksfor public service paid for by said municipal corporations. All other property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and isgoverned by the !ode without preudice to provisions of special laws. /nder this classification, all the properties in %uestionsave two lots used as 0igh (chool playgrounds are patrimonial properties of Mamboanga -rovinceJ this includes the capitolsite, the hospital and leprosarium sites, and the school sites which are patrimonial as they are not for public use. They falloutside the phrase >public works for public service> because under the eusdem generis rule, such public works must be for free

    and for the indiscriminate use by anyone.

    Bepublic Act 5657 Act authori*ing transfer of buildings, properties, and assets of -rov. Of Mamboanga to !ity of Mamboanga;is valid insofar as it affects the lots used as capitol site, school sites and its grounds, hospital and leprosarium sites and the highschool playground sites @ a total of D# lots @ since these were held by the former Mamboanga province in its governmental

    capacity and therefore are subect to the absolute control of !ongress.

    $4. !haves vs -ublio 'states

    $. illarico vs. (armiento

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    17. 9avier vs. eriadiano TOPIC: Con(e)t o4 Oners3i)ISSUE: Whether or not a (o),aint 4or uieting o4 tit,e and re(over o4 )ossession it3 daages should bedismissed based on the ground of res udicata, citing an earlier decision of dismissal of a (o),aint 4or 4or(i@,e entr

    HELD:

    #O.There being no identity of causes of action between !ivil !ase No. 7D4 complaint for forcible entry; and !ivil !ase No.DD65G6 complaint for %uieting of title and recovery of possession with damages;, the prior complaint cannot bar the subse%uentcomplaint. !ivil !ase No. 7D4 is a complaint for forcible entry, where what is at issue is prior possession, regardless of whohas lawful title over the disputed property. A udgment rendered in a case for recovery of possession is conclusive only on the%uestion of possession and not on the ownership. t does not in any way bind the title or affect the ownership of the land orbuilding. On the other hand, !ivil !ase No. DD65G6 while inaccurately captioned as an action for >uieting of Title andBecovery of -ossession with 2amages> is in reality an action to recover a parcel of land or an accion reivindicatoria under Art.#5# of the !ivil !ode, and should be distinguished from !ivil !ase No. 7D4, which is an accion interdictal. Accion reivindicatoriaor accion de reivindicacion is an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land and seeks recovery of its fullpossession. t is different from accion interdictal or accion publiciana where plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better right topossess without claim of title. Thus, this !ourt has ruled that a udgment in forcible entry or detainer case disposes of no otherissue than possession and declares only who has the right of possession, but by no means constitute a bar to an action fordetermination of who has the right or title of ownership. There being no identity of causes of action between !ivil !ase No. 7D4and !ivil !ase No. DD65G6, the prior complaint for eectment cannot bar the subse%uent action for recovery, or petition to %uiettitle.

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    1=. Bustos vs C! TO-!: Bights included in ownership

    ((/': Whether or not spouses 8ustos can be eected f rom the land

    B/1NL: No. The stay of eecution is warranted by the fact that petitioners are now legal owners of the land in %uestion and

    are occupants thereof. To eecute the udgment by eecting petitioners from the land that they owned would certainly result ingrave inustice. 8esides, the issue of possession was rendered moot when the court adudicated ownership to the spouses8ustos by virtue of a valid deed of sale. -lacing petitioners in possession of the land in %uestion is the necessary and logicalconse%uence of the decision declaring them as the rightful owners of the property. One of the essential attributes of ownershipis possession. t follows that as owners of the subect property, petitioners are entitled to possession of the same. >An ownerwho cannot eercise the seven >+uses> or attributes of ownership @ the right to possess, to use and enoy, to abuse orconsume, to accessories, to dispose or alienate, to recover or vindicate and to the fruits @ is a crippled owner.>

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    2?. Heirs o4 $oan Soriano vsC!

    Topic: !oncept of Ownership Bights included in ownership;

    ssue: )ay a winning party in a land registration case effectively eect the possessor thereof, whose security of tenure rights arestill pending determination before the 2ABA89

    0eld: No. A person may be declared owner but he may not be entitled to possession. The possession may be in the hands ofanother either as a lessee or a tenant. A person may have improvements thereon of which he may not be deprived without duehearing. 0e may have other valid defenses to resist surrender of possession. A udgment for ownership, therefore, does notnecessarily include possession as a necessary incident.

    t is important to note that although private respondents have been declared titled owners of the subect land, the eercise oftheir rights of ownership are subect to limitations that may be imposed by law.

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    22. $odi, Enter)rises In( vs C! Topic: OWN'B(0-

    ssue:WON the Bepublic has the right to eect usurpers of the subect leased property.

    Buling:The owner has the right to enoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law. 'very ownerhas the freedom of disposition over his property. t is an attribute of ownership, and this rule has no eception. The B'-/81!being the owner of the disputed property enoys the prerogative to enter into a lease contract with BO21 in the eercise ofits us disponendi. 0ence, as lessor, the B'-/81! has the right to eect usurpers of the leased property where the factualelements re%uired for relief in an action for unlawful detainer are present.PPP

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    2&. Isaguirre vs De Lara Topic: Ownership

    ((/'(:

    a; whether or not the mortgagee in an e%uitable mortgage has the right to retain possession of the property pending

    actual payment to him of the amount of indebtedness by the mortgagorJ and

    b; whether or not petitioner can be considered a builder in good faith with respect to the improvements he made on the

    property before the transaction was declared to be an e%uitable mortgage.

    He,d:

    a; A mortgage is a contract entered into in order to secure the fulfillment of a principal obligation. t is constituted by

    recording the document in which it appears with the proper Begistry of -roperty, although, even if it is not recorded, the

    mortgage is nevertheless binding between the parties. Thus, the only right granted by law in favor of the mortgagee is

    to demand the eecution and the recording of the document in which the mortgage is formali*ed. As a general rule, themortgagor retains possession of the mortgaged property since a mortgage is merely a lien and title to the property does

    not pass to the mortgagee. 0owever, even though a mortgagee does not have possession of the property, there is no

    impairment of his security since the mortgage directly and immediately subects the property upon which it is imposed,

    whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted.

    b; With regard to the improvements made on the mortgaged property, we confirm the !ourt of AppealsC characteri*ation of

    petitioner as a possessor in bad faith. 8ased on the factual findings of the appellate court, it is evident that petitioner

    knew from the very beginning that there was really no sale and that he held respondentCs property as mere security for

    the payment of the loan obligation. Therefore, petitioner may claim reimbursement only for necessary epensesJ

    however, he is not entitled to reimbursement for any useful epenses which he may have incurred.

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    2-. Custodio vs C! Topic: Ownershipssue:

    Whether the the spouses are liable for damages for enclosing their property0eld:

    'very owner has an absolute right over his property and his act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which hemay lawfully perform in the employment and eercise of said right. Whatever inury or damage that may have been sustainedby others by reason of the rightful use of the said land by the owner is danu a@sue inuria.

    2. !@earon vs #a@asa

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    2/. %eran Manageent andServi(es vs C!

    TOPIC: DOCT$I#E O" SEL" HELPssue:WON the doctrine of self help applies.

    0eld:

    No. 8oth the )unicipal Trial !ourt and the Begional Trial !ourt have rationali*ed petitioner+s drastic action of bulldo*ing anddestroying the crops of private respondents on the basis of the doctrine of selfGhelp enunciated in Article #D7 of the New !ivil!ode.

    2. Caisi) vs Peo),e TOPIC: Art. 429

    Issue:WON acts of appellants are justified under Art. 429

    Held: Art 429,upon which appellants rely is obviously inapplicable to the case at bar, for, having been given D6 days from 3une

    4, $7"7, within which to vacate 1ot $6"GA, complainant did not, on 3une $, $7"7 @ or within said period @ invade or usurpsaid lot. (he had merely reained in possession thereof, even though the hacienda owner may have become its coGpossessor. Appellants did not >re)e, or)revent in actual or t3reatened ... physical invasion or usurpation.> They e+)e,,ed

    Lloria from a property of which she and her husband were in possession even before the action for forcible entry was filedagainst them on )ay $, $7"I, despite the fact that the (heriff had eplicitly authori*ed them to stay in said property up to 3uneD4, $7"7, and had epressed the view that he could not oust them therefrom on 3une $, $7"7, without a udicial order therefor.

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    27. Peo),e sv P,et(3a

    2=. !ndao vs I!C ;2 issues:inuring rig3ts and sur4a(erig3tsthe

    owner of a thing cannot make use thereof in such a manner as to inure the rights of a third person.> (! /T'B' T/O /T

    A1'N/) NON 1A'2A(. )oreover, adoining landowners have mutual and reciprocal duties which re%uire that each must use

    his own land in a reasonable manner so as not to infringe upon the rights and interests of others. Although we recogni*e the

    right of an owner to build structures on his land, such structures must be so constructed and maintained using all reasonable

    care so that they cannot be dangerous to adoining landowners and can withstand the usual and epected forces of nature. f

    the structures cause inury or damage to an adoining landowner or a third person, the latter can claim indemnification for the

    inury or damage suffered.

    &?. Ba(3ra(3 Motor Co vsTa,isaGSi,a Mi,,ing

    TOPIC:ISSUE: *O# Ledesa0s @onus is a (ivi, 4ruitHELD:T3e Court ru,ed t3at !rti(,e & o4 t3e Civi, Code;ta'e note t3at t3is (ase as de(ided in 1=&1 so t3e )rovisionsare di5erent no< (onsiders t3ree t3ings as (ivi, 4ruits: 1< $ents o4 @ui,dings 2< Pro(eeds 4ro ,eases o4 ,andsand &< in(oe 4ro )er)etua, or ,i4e annuities or ot3er sii,ar sour(es o4 revenue. It 3e,d t3at Ledesas @onusas not (onsidered a (ivi, 4ruit. T3e aount o4 t3e @onus as @ased u)on t3e tota, va,ue o4 t3e de@t se(ured

    3i(3 is not (onsidered an in(oe o4 t3e ,and.

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    &1. Euatoria, $ea,t vsMa4air T3eater

    TO-!:((/': Whether or not '%uatorial was the owner of the subect property and could thus enoy the fruits or rentals therefrom

    0'12: NO. Bent is a civil fruit that belongs to the owner of the property producing it by right of accession. !onse%uently andordinarily, the rentals that fell due from the time of the perfection of the sale to petitioner until its rescission by final udgment

    should belong to the owner of the property during that period. n the case, there was no right of ownership transferred from!armelo to '%uatorial in view of a patent failure to deliver the property to the buyer.

    &2. Igna(io vs. Hi,ario To)i(: $ig3t o4 !((ession

    Issue:

    Whether or not 0ilario, the owner in good faith, may eect a builder in good faith without choosing either to appropriate the

    building for himself after payment of its value or to sell his land to the builder in good faith.

    He,d:

    No. The owner of the building erected in good faith on a land owned by another, is entitled to retain the possession of the land

    until he is paid the value of his building, under article #"5. The owner of the land, upon the other hand, has the option, under

    article 54$, either to pay for the building or to sell his land to the owner of the building. 8ut he cannot, as respondents here did,

    refuse both to pay for the building and to sell the land and compel the owner of the building to remove it from the land where it

    is erected. 0e is entitled to such remotion only when, after having chosen to sell his land, the other party fails to pay for the

    same. 8ut this is not the case before us.

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    &&. Ignao vs Interediate!))e,,ate Court

    TOPIC: !CCESSIO# I#DUST$I!L

    ISSUE:WON Art. ##I of the !ivil !ode should be applied in order to settle the dispute in this case.

    HELD:&es. t is to be noted that the land in dispute used to be owned in common by the contending parties.Article ##I of the !ivil!ode cannot apply where a coGowner builds, plants or sows on the land owned in common for then he did not build, plant orsow upon land that eclusively belongs to another but of which he is a coGowner. The coGowner is not a third person under thecircumstances, and the situation is governed by the rules of coGownership.0owever, when the coGownership is terminated by apartition and it appears that the house of an erstwhile coGowner has encroached upon a portion pertaining to another coGownerwhich was however made in good faith, then the provisions of Article ##I should apply to determine the respective rights of theparties.PP

    8oth the trial court and the Appellate !ourt erred when they peremptorily adopted the >workable solution> and ordered theowner of the land, petitioner ?lorencio, to sell to private respondents, 3uan and sidro, the part of the land they intruded upon,thereby depriving petitioner of his right to choose. (uch ruling contravened the eplicit provisions of Article ##I to the effect that>the owner of the land . . . shall have the right to appropriate . . . or to oblige the one who built . . . to pay the price of the

    land . . .> The law is clear and unambiguous when it confers the right of choice upon the landowner and not upon the builderand the courts.PPP

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    &-. "i,i)inas Co,,ege In(. vs%ar(ia Ti@ang et. a,

    TO-!: Accession ndustrial((/'(:

    $. WON the owner of the land could automatically ac%uire the improvements made by the builder in good faith when

    the latter failed to pay for the land used when demanded by the landowner.

    D. WON the landowner has recourse when the builder in good faith fails to comply with the chosen demand by the

    landowner.

    0'12:

    $. The (upreme !ourt ruled in the negative. /nder the terms of Articles ##I and "#4 of the !ivil !ode, it is true that the

    owner of the land has the right to choose between appropriating the building by reimbursing the builder of the value

    thereof or compelling the builder in good faith to pay for his land. 'ven this second right cannot be eercised if the

    value of the land is considerably more than that of the building. n addition to the right of the builder to be paid the value

    of his improvement, Article "#4 gives him the corollary right of retention of the property until he is indemnified by the

    owner of the land. There is nothing in the language of these two articles which would ustify the conclusion that, upon

    the failure of the builder to pay the value of the land, when such is demanded by the landowner, the latter becomesautomatically the owner of the improvement under Article ##" of the !ivil !ode.PP

    D. The (upreme !ourt ruled in the affirmative. Where, as in the present case, the builder in good faith fails to pay the

    value of the land when such is demanded by the landowner, the parties may resort to the following remedies: $; The

    parties may decide to leave things as they are and assume the retention of lessor and lessee, and should they disagree

    as to the amount of rental, then they can go to the court to fi that amount J D; (hould the parties not agree to assume

    the relation of lessor and lessee, the owner of the land is entitled to have the improvement removedJ and 5; The land

    and the improvement may be sold at public auction, applying the proceeds thereof first to the payment of the value of

    the land and the ecess, if any to be delivered to the owner of the improvement in payment thereof.

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    &. Manoto' $ea,t vs Te(son TOPIC: !rt.--7

    Issue: *O# t3e res)ondent is a @ui,der in good 4ait3

    $u,ing: #o To @e deeed a @ui,der in good 4ait3 it is essentia, t3at a )erson assert tit,e to t3e ,and on 3i(3 3e@ui,dsF i.e. t3at 3e @e a )ossessor in (on(e)t o4 oner and t3at 3e @e unaare t3at t3ere e+ists in 3is tit,e or

    ode o4 a(uisition an Ja 3i(3 inva,idates it. It is su(3 a @ui,der in good 4ait3 3o is given t3e $ig3t toretain t3e t3ing even as against t3e rea, oner unti, 3e 3as @een rei@ursed in 4u,, not on, 4or t3e ne(essare+)enses @ut a,so 4or use4u, e+)enses

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    &/. Bernardo vs Bata(,an Topic: Accession !ontinuaJ Accession ndustrial Article ##I;

    ssue:whether or not defendant 8aticlan still has the right of retention over the parcel of land

    0eld:

    No. The !ivil !ode confirms certain timeGhonored principles of the law of property. One of these is the principle of accessionwhereby the owner of property ac%uires not only that which it produces but that which is united to it either naturally or artificially.Art. 5"5.; Whatever is built, planted or sown on the land of another, and the improvements or repairs made thereon, belong tothe owner of the land art. 5"I;. Where, however, the planter, builder, or sower has acted in good faith, a conflict of rights arisesbetween the owners and it becomes necessary to protect the owner of the improvements without causing inustice to the ownerof the land. n view of the impracticability of creating what )anresa calls a state of >forced coownership> vol. 5, #th ed., p. D$5;,the law has provided a ust and e%uitable solution by giving the owner of the land the option to ac%uire the improvements afterpayment of the proper indemnity or to oblige the builder or planter to pay for the land and the sower to pay the proper rent art.54$;. t is the owner of the land who is allowed to eercise the option because his right is older and because, by the principle ofaccession, he is entitled to the ownership of the accessory thing 5 )anresa, #th ed., p. D$5;. n the case before us, the plaintiff8ernardo, as owner of the land, chose to re%uire the defendant, as owner of the improvements, to pay for the land. The law, aswe have already said, re%uires no more than that the owner of the land should choose between indemnifying the owner of the

    improvements or re%uiring the latter to pay for the land. When he failed to pay for the land, the defendant 8aticlan herein losthis right of retention.

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    &. Heirs o4 $aon Durano Sr.vs U

    TO-!:

    ((/': WON T0' 0'B( O? 2/BANO W'B' 8/12'B( N 8A2 ?AT0.

    0'12: &'(. A purchaser of a parcel of land, cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable man upon his guard,

    such as when the property subect of the purchase is in possession of persons other than the seller. A buyer who could not

    have failed to know or discover the land sold to him was in adverse possession of another is a buyer in bad faith. n the samemanner the purchase of the property of 2urano from 2urano !o. could not have to be in good faith. 8ecause it is not

    disputed tat 2urano had ac%uired the property with full knowledge of spouses uy occupancy thereon. ?urther there even

    appears to be undue haste in the conveyance of the property to 2urano , as bulldo*ing operations by 2urano and !o. were

    still underway when the deed of sale to 2urano was eecuted on sept. $", $76H there was not even an indication 2urano

    !o. attempted to transfer theregistration in its name before it conveyed to 2urano

    &7. Ba,,atan vs C! TO-!: Article ##I

    ((/': WON the respondent !ourt of Appeals erred in a %uestion of law and gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of

    urisdiction when it did not dismiss the thirdGparty complaint due to nonGpayment of any filing of docket fee.

    0'12: !ourt of Appeals correctly dismissed the thirdGparty complaint against AA. The claim that the discrepancy in the lot

    areas was due to AA+s fault was not proved. The appellate court, however, found that it was the erroneous survey by 'ngineer

    uedding that triggered these discrepancies. And it was this survey that respondent Winston Lo relied upon in constructing his

    house on his father+s land. 0e built his house in the belief that it was entirely within the parameters of his father+s land. n short,

    respondents Lo had no knowledge that they encroached on petitioners+ lot. They are deemed builders in good faith until the

    time petitioner 8allatan informed them of their encroachment on her property. All the parties are presumed to have acted in

    good faith. Their rights must, therefore, be determined in accordance with the appropriate provisions of the !ivil !ode on

    property.

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    &=. S)ouses De, Ca)o vs!@iesa

    TOPIC: !rt.--7ssue: Whether or Not Article ##I of the !ivil !ode is applicable to a builder in good faith when the property involved is ownedin common.0eld: Article ##I of the !ivil !ode cannot apply where a coGowner builds, plants or sows on the land owned in common for thenhe did not build, plant or sow upon land that eclusively belongs to another but of which he is a coGowner. The coGowner is not athird person under the circumstances, and the situation is governed by the rules of coGownership.When, as in this case, the coGownership is terminated by the partition and it appears that the house of defendants overlaps oroccupies a portion of " s%uare meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs which the defendants obviously built in good faith, thenthe provisions of Article ##I of the new !ivil !ode should apply. )anresa and Navarro Amandi agree that the said provision ofthe !ivil !ode may apply even when there was coGownership if good faith has been established.

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    -?. Pa(i6( "ors In(. vsEsguerra

    TOPIC:!$TICLE --7 K -- !PPLIED BY !#!LO%YISSUE:WON the appellant has the right to recover the value of the unpaid lumber and construction materials that were used toconstruct si buildings owned by the appellee.

    HELD:&'(. Article ## of the !ivil !ode contemplates a principal and an accessory, the land being considered the principal,

    and the plantings, constructions or works, the accessory. The owner of the land who in good faith @ whether personally orthrough another @ makes constructions or works thereon, using materials belonging to somebody else, becomes the owner ofthe said materials with the obligation however of paying for their value. The owner of the materials, on the other hand, is entitledto remove them, provided no substantial inury is caused to the landowner. Otherwise, he has the right only to reimbursementfor the value of his materials. Although it does not appear from the records of this case that the land upon which the sibuildings were built is owned by the appellee, nevertheless, that the appellee claims that it owns the si buildings constructedout of the lumber and construction materials furnished by the appellant, is indubitable. Therefore, applying article ## byanalogy, we perforce consider the buildings as the principal and the lumber and construction materials that went into theirconstruction as the accessory. Thus the appellee, if it does own the si buildings, must bear the obligation to pay for the valueof the said materialsJ the appellant @ which apparently has no desire to remove the materials, and even if it were minded to doso, cannot remove them without necessarily damaging the buildings @ has the corresponding right to recover the value of theunpaid lumber and construction materials. WellGestablished in urisprudence is the rule that compensation should be borne bythe person who has been benefited by the accession. No doubt, the appellee benefited from the accession, i.e., from the

    lumber and materials that went into the construction of the si buildings. t should therefore shoulder the compensation due tothe appellant as unpaid furnisher of materials.

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    -1. Pe(son vs C! To)i(: Article ##I applied by analogyISSUE: Whether or not Article ##I shall be applied in determing whether -ecson is a builder in good faith when he built theapartment on the land he formerly owned.

    $ULI#%: NO. 8y its clear language, Article ##I refers to a land whose ownership is claimed by two or more parties, one of whom hasbuilt some works, or sown or planted something. The building, sowing or planting may have been made in good faith or in badfaith. The rule on good faith laid down in Article "D4 of the !ivil !ode shall be applied in determining whether a builder, sower orplanter had acted in good faith. Article ##I does not apply to a case where the owner of the land is the builder, sower, or planterwho then later loses ownership of the land by sale or donation.'lsewise stated, where the true owner himself is the builder ofworks on his own land, the issue of good faith or bad faith is entirely irrelevant. Thus in strict point of law, Article ##I is notapposite to the case at bar. Nevertheless, we believe that the provision therein on indemnity may be applied by analogyconsidering that the primary intent of Article ##I is to avoid a state of forced coGownership and that the parties, including the twocourts below, in the main agree that Articles ##I and "#4 of the !ivil !ode are applicable and indemnity for the improvementsmay be paid although they differ as to the basis of the indemnity. The (! also ruled that the trial court also erred in ordering thepetitioner to pay monthly rentals e%ual to the aggregate rentals paid by the lessees of the apartment building. (ince the privaterespondents have opted to appropriate the apartment building, the petitioner is thus entitled to the possession and enoyment ofthe apartment building, until he is paid the proper indemnity, as well as of the portion of the lot where the building has been

    constructed. This is so because the right to retain the improvements while the corresponding indemnity is not paid implies thetenancy or possession in fact of the land on which it is built, planted or sown. The petitioner not having been so paid, he wasentitled to retain ownership of the building and, necessarily, the income therefrom.

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    -2. Te(3nogas P3i,i))ines vsC!

    TOPIC:Right of Accession; Immovable Property; Accession Continua; Accession Industrial; Good Faith

    ISSUE: Is petitioner considered a builder in bad faith because, as held by respondent Court, he is "presumed to know

    the metes and bounds of his property as described in his certificate of title"?

    RULING:

    When petitioner purchased the land from Pariz Industries, the buildings and other structures were already in

    existence. The record is not clear as to who actually built those structures, but it may well be assumed that petitioner's

    predecessor-in-interest, Pariz Industries, did so. Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes good faith, and since no proof

    exists to show that the encroachment over a narrow, needle-shaped portion of private respondent's land was done in

    bad faith by the builder of the encroaching structures, the latter should be presumed to have built them in good faith. It

    is presumed that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same character in which it was acquired, until the contrary

    is proved. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his, and his ignorance

    of any defect or flaw in his title. Hence, such good faith, by law passed on to Pariz's successor, petitioner in

    this case|||

    Petitioner did not lose its rights under Article 448 of the Civil Code on the basis merely of the fact that some

    years after acquiring the property in good faith, it learned about and aptly recognized the right of private

    respondent to a portion of the land occupied by its building.The supervening awareness of the encroachment by

    petitioner does not militate against its right to claim the status of a builder in good faith. In fact, a judicious

    reading of said Article 448 will readily show that the landowner's exercise of his option can only take place

    after the builder shall have come to know of the intrusion in short, when both parties shall have become

    aware of it.Only then will the occasion for exercising the option arise, for it is only then that both parties will have been

    aware that a problem exists in regard to their property rights.

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    -&. Peasantvi,,e Dev0t Cor). vsC!

    TOPIC:

    Issue:

    $; Was Qee a builder in good faith9

    He,d:

    Lood faith consists in the belief of the builder that the land he is building on is his and his ignorance of anydefect or flaw in his title.

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    -. !gustin vs I!C To)i(:Alluvium or Alluvion Arts. #"G#"I;

    Issue:Whether or not private respondents own the accretion and such ownership is not affected by the sudden and abrupt

    change in the course of the !agayan Biver when it reverted to its old bed9

    He,d: &es. Art. #" states that the owner of the lands adoining river banks own the accretion which they gradually receive from

    the effects of the currents of the waters. Accretion benefits a riparian owner provided that these elements are present: $;

    deposit be gradual and imperceptible D; it resulted from the effects of the current of the water and 5; the land is adacent to the

    river bank. When the Biver moved from $7$7 to $74I, there was alluvium deposited and it was gradual and imperceptible.

    Accretion benefits the riparian owner because these lands are eposed to floods and other damage due to the destructive force

    of the waters, and if by virtue of law they are subect to encumbrances and various kinds of easements, it is only ust that such

    risks or dangers should in some way be compensated by the right of accretion. Also, respondentCs ownership over said lots was

    not removed when due to the sudden and abrupt change in the course of the riverJ their accretions were transferred to the other

    side. Art. #"7 states when the current of a river segregates from an estate on its bank a known portion of land and

    transfers it to another estate, the owner of segregated portion retains ownership provided he removes the same wHin D years.

    And Art. #45 states that whenever the current of a river divides itself into branches, leaving a piece of land or part thereof

    isolated, the owner of the land retains ownership. 0e also retains it if a portion of land is separated from the estate by the

    current.

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    -/. Cureg vs I!CTOPIC:

    Issue:

    T3e o@e(t o4 t3e (ontrovers in t3is (ase is t3e a,,eged ot3er,and o4 )rivate res)ondents toget3er it3 t3ea((retion o4 a@out &. 3e(tares t3e tota,it o4 3i(3 is re4erred to in t3is de(ision as t3e su@e(t ,and. In t3is

    (ase )etitioners (,aied to @e ri)arian oners 3o are entit,ed to t3e su@e(t ,and 3i(3 is an a((retion tot3e registered ,and 3i,e )rivate res)ondents (,aied to @e entit,ed to t3e &. 3e(tares a((retion atta(3ed tot3eir ot3er,and.

    He,d:

    T3e a,,egation o4 )rivate res)ondents t3at t3e ere in )ossession o4 t3e ot3er,and t3roug3 t3eir)rede(essorsG inGinterest 3ad not @een )roved @ su@stantia, eviden(e. T3e assai,ed de(ision o4 t3e res)ondent(ourt 3i(3 ared t3e de(ision o4 t3e tria, (ourt stated t3at sin(e t3e ot3er,and e+ists it is a,so)resued t3at )rivate res)ondents ere in )ossession o4 t3e su@e(t ,and t3roug3 t3eir )rede(essorsG inGinterest sin(e )rior to 9u, 2/ 17=-. T3e tria, (ourt re,ied on t3e testion o4 So,edad %erardo one o4 t3e)rivate res)ondents in t3is (ase an interested and @iased itness regarding t3eir )ossession o4 t3eot3er,and. "ro 3er testion on )edigree t3e tria, (ourt )resued t3at t3e sour(e o4 t3e )ro)ert t3e,ate "ran(is(o %erardo as in )ossession o4 t3e sae sin(e )rior to 9u, 2/ 17=- ;)). 1&G1-? $o,,o

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    -. iaar vs C! To)i(: Begistration of the land does not protect the owner against accretion.

    Issue:

    He,d: The rule that registration under the Torrens (ystem does not protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area

    of his registered land through gradual changes in the course of an adoining stream is well settled. >The controversy in the

    present cases seems to be due to the erroneous conception that Art. 544 of the !ivil !ode does not apply to Torrens registered

    land. That article provides that +any accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the currentbelong to the owners of the estates bordering thereon.+ Accretions of that character are natural incidents to land bordering on

    running streams and are not affected by the registration laws. t follows that registration does not protect the riparian owner

    against diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adoining stream.E Begistration does not

    protect the riparian owner against the diminution of the area of his land through gradual changes in the course of the adoining

    stream. Accretions which the banks of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the current become the property of the

    owners of the banks. (uch accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on running streams and the provisions of the !ivil

    !ode in that respect are not affected by the Begistration Act. We find no valid reason to review and abandon the aforecited

    rulings.

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    -7. da de #a8areno vs I!C TOIC: !CC"##IO$ $!T%&!'I##%": *3et3er or not t3e su@e(t ,and is )u@,i( ,and

    ("'): YES. T3e a((retion as anGade or arti6(ia,. !((retion as a ode o4 a(uiring )ro)ert under !rt. -

    o4 t3e Civi, Code reuires t3e (on(urren(e o4 t3ese reuisites: ;1< t3at t3e de)osition o4 soi, or sedient @e

    gradua, and i)er(e)ti@,eF ;2< t3at it @e t3e resu,t o4 t3e a(tion o4 t3e aters o4 t3e river ;or sea

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    -=. Heirs o4 #avarro vs I!C To)i(:Accession Natural((/': WON respondent appellate court palpably erred in appreciating the fact of the case and to have gravely misappliedstatutory and case law relating to accretion, specifically, Article #" of the !ivil !ode.B/1NL: The disputed land, thus, is an accretion not on a river bank but on a sea bank, or on what used to be the foreshore of)anila 8ay which adoined petitioners+ own tract of land on the northern side. As such, the applicable law is not Article #" of to!ivil !ode but Article # of the (panish 1aw of Waters of $I44. Article # of the (panish 1aw of Waters of August 5, $I44

    provides as follows: K1ands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part ofthe public domain. When they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of publicutility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coastGguard service, the Lovernment shall declare them to be theproperty of the owners of the estates adacent thereto and as increment thereof.En the light of the aforecited vintage but stillvalid law, une%uivocal is the public nature of the disputed land in this controversy, the same being an accretion on a sea bankwhich, for all legal purposes, the foreshore of )anila 8ay is. As part of the public domain, the herein disputed land is intendedfor public uses, and >so long as the land in litigation belongs to the national domain and is reserved for public uses, it is notcapable of being appropriated by any private person, ecept through epress authori*ation granted in due form by a competentauthority.>Only the eecutive and possibly the legislative departments have the right and the power to make the declaration thatthe lands so gained by action of the sea is no longer necessary for purposes of public utility or for the cause of establishment ofspecial industries or for coast guard services.

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    "6. 2el 8anco vs A! To)i(:!oGownership rights of each coGowner;

    Issue:

    whether or not !agbalite sland is still undivided property owned in common by the heirs and successorsGinGinterest of the

    brothers, 8enedicto, 3ose and )anuel -ansacola

    He,d:

    &es. t is not disputed that some of the private respondents and some of the petitioners at the time the action for partition wasfiled in the trial court have been in actual possession and enoyment of several portions of the property in %uestion. This doesnot provide any proof that the sland in %uestion has already been actually partitioned and coGownership terminated. A coGownercannot, without the conformity of the other coGowners or a udicial decree of partition issued pursuant to the provision of Bule 47of the Bules of !ourt, adudicate to himself in fee simple a determinate portion of the lot owned in common, as his sharetherein, to the eclusion of other coGowners. t is a basic principle in the law of coGownership both under the present !ivil !odeas in the !ode of $II7 that no individual coG owner can claim any definite portion thereof. lt is therefore of no moment thatsome of the coGowners have succeeded in securing cadastral titles in their names to some portions of the sland occupied bythem. t is not enough that the coGowners agree to subdivide the property. They must have a subdivision plan drawn in

    accordance with which they take actual and eclusive possession of their respective portions in the plan and titles issued toeach of them accordingly.

    "$. -ardell vs 8artolome

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    2. Caro vs C! To)i(:!oGowner+s right of legal redemptionIssue:WON the right of redemption still eists when the property sought to be redeemed is not coGowned anymore.He,d:Once the property is subdivided and distributed among coGowners, the community has terminated and there is no right tosustain any right of legal redemption.Also, while the coGowner+s right of legal redemption is a substantive right, it is eceptional in nature, limited in it+s duration and

    subects to strict compliance with the legal re%uirements. One of these is that the redemptioner should tender payment of theredemption money within 56 days from written notice of the sale by the coGowner. The (upreme !ourt ruled that this 56 dayperiod is peremptory because the policy of the law is not to leave the purchaser+s title in uncertainty beyond the established 56Gday period. t is not a prescriptive period but more of a re%uisite or condition precedent to the eercise of the right of legalredemption by the coGowner.

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    &. Bai,onGCasi,ao vs C! TOPIC:ISSUE:Whether or not the sale of the property is validHELD: &es but only with respect to their proportionate shares. The rights of a coGowner of a certain property are clearlyspecified in Article #75 of the !ivil !ode. Thus: Art. #75.'ach coGowner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruitsand benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it and even substitute another person in itsenoyment, ecept when personal rights are involved. 8ut the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the coG

    owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the coGownership.

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    . De,ia vs C! Topic:Issue: Is t3e )etitioners a(tion 4or )artition is a,read @arred

    He,d: YES.

    T3e i)res(ri)ti@i,it o4 t3e a(tion 4or )artition (an no ,onger @e invo'ed or a)),ied 3en one o4 t3e (oG

    oners 3as adverse, )ossessed t3e )ro)ert as e+(,usive oner 4or a )eriod su(ient to vest oners3i) @)res(ri)tion. In order t3at su(3 )ossession is (onsidered adverse to t3e (estui ue trust aounting to are)udiation o4 t3e (oGoners3i) t3e 4o,,oing e,eents ust (on(ur: 1< t3at t3e trustee 3as )er4oreduneuivo(a, a(ts aounting to an ouster o4 t3e (estui ue trustF 2< t3at su(3 )ositive a(ts o4 re)udiation 3ad@een ade 'non to t3e (estui ue trustF and &< t3at t3e eviden(e t3ereon s3ou,d @e (,ear and (on(,usive.T3e issuan(e o4 t3is ne tit,e (onstituted an o)en and (,ear re)udiation o4 t3e trust or (oGoners3i) and t3e,a)se o4 ten ;1?< ears o4 adverse )ossession @ %a,i,eo De,ia 4ro "e@ruar - 1=- as su(ient to vesttit,e in 3i @ )res(ri)tion. !s t3e (erti6(ate o4 tit,e as noti(e to t3e 3o,e or,d o4 3is e+(,usive tit,e to t3e,and su(3 ree(tion as @inding on t3e ot3er 3eirs and started as against t3e t3e )eriod o4 )res(ri)tion.

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    /. !gui,ar vs C! TOPIC: Terination o4 CoGoners3i)

    ISSUES:

    1. whether the trial court correctly declared respondent as in default for his failure to appear at the preGtrial and in allowingpetitioner to present his evidence e+G)arte

    2. whether the trial court correctly rendered the default udgment against respondent

    $ULI#%:

    $. The court affirmed the decision of the trial court, as regards the first issue, the law is clear that the appearance ofparties at the preGtrial is mandatory.A party who fails to appear at a preGtrial conference may be nonGsuited or

    considered as in default. n the case at bar, where private respondent and counsel failed to appear at the scheduled

    preGtrial, the trial, court has authority to declare respondent in default.

    D. With regard to the merits of the udgment of the trial court by default, which respondent appellate court did not touch

    upon in resolving the appeal, the !ourt holds that on the basis of the pleadings of the parties and the evidencepresented e+ )arte, petitioner and respondents are coGowners of subect house and lot in e%ual sharesJ either one ofthem may demand the sale of the house and lot at any time and the other cannot obect to such demandJ thereafter the

    proceeds of the sale shall be divided e%ually according to their respective interests. The court upheld the default

    udgment of the trial court

    Article #7# of the !ivil !ode provides that no coGowner shall be obliged to remain in the coGownership, and that each

    coGowner may demand at any time partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. !orollary

    to this rule, Art. #7I of the !ode states that whenever the thing is essentially, indivisible and the coGowners cannot

    agree that it be, allotted to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly

    distributed. This is resorted to $; when the right to partition the property is invoked by any of the coGowners but

    because of the nature of the property it cannot be subdivided or its subdivision would preudice the interests of the coGowners, and b; the coGowners are not in agreement as to who among them shall be allotted or assigned the entire

    property upon proper reimbursement of the coGowners. n one case, this !ourt upheld the order of the trial court

    directing the holding of a public sale of the properties owned in common pursuant to Art. #7I of the !ivil !ode.

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    . Toas Ca,udio Meoria,Co,,ege In(. vs C!

    7. $o@,es vs C! Topic: uieting of Titlessue:0eld: 8ased on Art.#4, an action to %uiet title is a commonGlaw remedy for the removal of any cloud or doubt or uncertainty on

    the title to real property.

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    ATTY. MARCIANO DELSON - 4C CIV REV 2ND SET OF DIGESTS

    /1. Soodio vs C! To)i(: !oncept of -ossessionISSUE: Whether or not -etition has established possession over the landHELD: &'(. n eectment cases, the only issue for resolution is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of theproperty involved, independent of any claim of ownership set forth by any of the partyGlitigants. Anyone of them who can proveprior possession de facto may recover such possession even from the owner himself. This rule holds true regardless of thecharacter of a party+s possession, provided that he has in his favor priority of time which entitles him to stay on the property until

    he is lawfully eected by a person having a better right by either accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria 2e 1una v. !ourt ofAppeals, D$D (!BA D4

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    /7. Di8on vs Sunta TOPIC: Theory of rrevindicability((/': What is the applicable law in this case

    B/1NL: Thus: >The controlling provision is Article ""7 of the !ivil !ode. t reads thus: +The possession of movable

    property ac%uired in good faith is e%uivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfullydeprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the same. f the possessor of a movable lost of which theowner has been unlawfully deprived, has ac%uired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return withoutreimbursing the price paid therefor.+

    An owner of a movable unlawfully pledged by another is not estopped from recovering possession. Where the ownerdelivered the diamond ring solely for sale on commission but the seller instead pawned it without authority, the owner is notstopped form pursuing an action against the pawnshop.

    /=. Ledesa vs. C!

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    ?. !8ar(on and !@o@o vsEuse@io TOPIC: !rt.-

    Issue:Whether or not the person in possession of the land in %uestion but ordered to leave certain premises is not allowed to

    harvest hisHher crops pending courts resolution9

    HELD:/nder the law a person who is in possession and who is being ordered to leave a parcel of land while products

    thereon are pending harvest, has the right to a part of the net harvest, as epressly provided by Article "#" of the !ivil !ode.

    Their act in harvesting the pending fruits was not only ustified by law but was not epressly prohibited by the court+s order,

    and was even ratified when the court ordered the suspension of the eecution. There was, therefore, no open, clear and

    contumacious refusal to obey a definite order of the court such as would constitute contempt.

    ?urthermore, a person who has been ordered to leave certain premises is ordinarily not prohibited from taking with

    him his own effects and possession, unless there is an epress prohibition to this effect.

    1. Cordero vs Ca@ra, TOPIC: "$UITS

    ISSUE:Whether or not defendants shall also account for the fruits of the disputed land.

    HELD:The defendants, by their own admission, are in possession of the disputed land. There is no evidence that they werepossessors in bad faith. 0owever, their good faith ceased when they were served with summons to answer the complaint.As possessors in bad faith from the service of the summons they >shall reimburse the fruits received and those which thelegitimate possessor could have received, ... Art. "#7, !ivil !ode.;

    2. Mendo8a and Enriue8 vsDe %u8an

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    &. $o@,es and Martin vsLi88araga Heranos

    TOPIC:ISSUE:Whether or not she has any right to retain the building until the said value is paid to her.

    HELD:&es. t is a fact that the value of the improvements in %uestion has not as yet been paid by 1i*arraga 0ermanos. Wherefore, if

    'varista Bobles and her husband are entitled to retain the building until the value of such improvements is paid them, 1i*arraga0ermanos have not yet any right to oust them from the building, nor, therefore, to be indemnified for any damages caused bythe refusal of the plaintiffs found on their legitimate rights. 0ence, due to the nonGreimbursement of the aforesaid usefulependitures, the possessor in good faith has the right of retention until she has been fully reimbursed with the same.

    -. Metro)o,itan *ateror'sand Seerage Sste vs C!