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Korean War

2nd Infantry Division - Command Report - February 1951

Headquarters

Korean War Project Record: USA-7

Folder: 050005

Box: 05

File: 05

National Archives and Records Administration

College Park, Maryland

Records: United States Army

Unit Name: Second Infantry Division

Record Group: RG407

Editor: Hal Barker

Korean War Project

P.O. Box 180190

Dallas, TX 75218-0190

http://www.koreanwar.org

Korean War Project 2ID-00100360


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HEa.DQ,UARTERS -" 2d Infantry Division

APO 248 e/o Postmaster San Francisco California

C 0 l"l M A N D. R E P 0 R T

(CSHIS-5 (Rl))

Period

' .

From: 1 February 1951 Through: 28 February 1951

Approved

Ma.j Gen Commanding

Copy Number __ ~ • ._--~~~


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February 1951

Section I. Command Report

B. Personnel (G-1)

0. Intelligence (G-2)

D. Operations (G-3)'

E. iosistics (G-4)

F~. EVa.,l ua t1on and. Recommendations

G. Staff

Section II. Supporting Documents: (Appendices)

A. Chief of Staff's Journal

B. Personnel (G~l)

1. G-1 Journal

2. Personnel Pe.riod ic · Heports and ROK Personnel Report

3. Personnel Daily Summary

4. Station Lists

5. General Orders (2d Inf Div and 8th l~my)

6. Miscellaneous

~ _/ 0. Intelligence ( G-2)

1 a. G-2 Journal and ~<:ile (1-185) 1-3 Feb 51

b. G-2 Jou.rnal a.na File (186-400) 4-6 F'eb 51

c. G-.::. Journal end File (401-599) 7-9 Feb 51

d. G-;:;J Jourm1.l :s,nd File (600-902) 10-13 Feb 51

e. G-2 Journal a~'ld File (903-1223) 14-~7 Feb 51

f. G-2 Journal and File (1224-1436) 18-21 Feb 51

g. G-2 Journal and File (1439-1636) 22-25 Feb 51

h. G-2 Journal and File (1637 -1826) 26-28 Fetr 51

2. Periodic Intelli;;ence Reports

D. Operations (G-3)

1 a. G-3 Journal r:md File 1-2 Feb 51 -

b. G·-3 Journal and File 3-4 Feb 51

c. G-3 Journal and File 5-6 Feb 51

d. G-3 Journal and File 7-8 Feb 51 •


R:~~~~~Cj'iD AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIV~S

;.....,.

""' .l • G~3 Journal and File 11-12 Feb 51

g. G-3 Journal and File 13-14 Feb 51

h. G-3 Journal and File 15-16 Feb 51 '""'

i. G-3 Journal and File 17-18 Feb 51

j. G-3 Journal and File 19-20 lt,eb 51

k. G-3 Journal and File 21-22 Feb 51

1. G-3 Journal and File 23-24 Feb 51

m. G-3 Journal and File 25-26 Feb 51

n. G-3 Journal and File 27-28 Feb 51

2. Periodic Operations R::ports ... 3. Operations .Orders

4. Operations Instructions

5. Letters of Instrtlction

6. Operations Plans

7. Training I~!emoranda

Q u. Miscellaneous Operations Ds.ta

E. Logistics (G-4)

F.

1 a. G-4 Journal and File 1-15 Feb 51

b. G-4 Journal and File 16-28 Feb 51

2. Periodic Logistics Reports 1-28 Februa.ry -1951 Copies :Nu.mber 149-176 d: '!

3. Armor Statqs Reports

Staff Section Reports

1. Chemical

2. ADE

3. Ordnance

4. Quartermaster

5. Signal

6. Surgeon

7. Finance

8. Inspector General

9. Public Information Officer

10. Provost Marshal


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12. Special S?r:vic~

13. Chaplain

14. Army Aviation Section _"-)l

G. Miscellaneous (Special f3tudies and Reports)

1. After Action Report of the 23d Regimental Combat Team from 29 January 1951 to 16 February 1931

Sec·tion III. Subordinate Unit Reports

A. 9th Infantry Regiment

B. 23d Infantry Regiment

C. 3.Sth Infantry Regiment

vti. Division Artillery

E. 15th Field Artillery Battalion

F. 37th Field Artillery Battalion

G. 38th Fl.eld Artilllery Battalion

H. 503a Field Artillery Battalion

v1:. 82d AAA A'II Bn { SP)

J. 72d Tank Battalion

K. 2d ~g,_~neer Combat Battalion

)


(February 1951) ~

On 25 January, the United. Nations launched what Lieuten-

• ant General Matthew B Ridgway, Eighth Army Comma_nd.er, announced

as a nlimited objective attack." n1is was to consist primarily

of aggressive patrols directed to penetrate enemy held areas to

depths of 12 miles from firmly established bases. The patrol

base line assigned to the 2d Infantry Division was the X Corps

.M-M Line in its sector. This was a line which ran from a point

" se~ral \'!piles north of Yoju in an easterly arc through the vil-i ' .

lage of/Anchang-ni to a point app~oximately four miles south-

east of Wonju. The ~d Division was the left flank unit of the

American X Corps. The 24th Division, which was ori the IX Corps

right flank advanced abreast of the 2d Division. To. the right

flank of the 2d Division was the. 8th ROK Diviston. 1 '. ,;

As the February period opened., the 125th CCF Division .•.

was reacting violently to a probing attack by the 23d RCT on

the tunnels area four miles south of Chipyong, employing its

373d and 374th CCF Regiments in the, holding action and. counter

attack. It was immediately obvious "!:-hat the enemy was committed

to hold this area--which was the key to a c.omplex road network·

and which, in the United Na.tions b.and.e, would threaten the en

tire CCF positions south of the Han R1ver,2

The 3d Bs.ttalion and attached French Bat~al1on of the 23d.

RCT (supported by the 37th FA Battalion (•) .and Battery H:, 82d

AAA Battalion) were placed under heavy attack at 0450 hours pn

1 February. When the information was received by division, it

instructed the 9th Infantry~ which was 'in division reserve, to

1. App D-2: POR. 507, 1 ~eb 51 . 2. X Corps PIR, 1 Feb 51


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~ relieve the 2d Battalfon, 2 d Infantry,. at the village of

Munmang-ni. The 2d Battalio'Q., 23d RCT was then instructed. to

displace to Iho-ri to take over the a~mmitments of the let Bat-

talion which commenced im~ediate movement to the· tun>Jels area

to reinforce its parent organization. t

The heaviest fighting d.uring the day occurred in the ' . . .

sector of the French Battalion on Hill 453 (CS8442). The ~--/ . . . .

enemy attacks were here repulsed in hand to hand. fighting.

The 37th Field Artillery Battalion brought heavy fire to bear

on the attacking units, ammunition resupply (as well as re

supply of rations, gasoline, and signal equipment) being ef

fec·teo by air drop.* By the end. of the day, the let Battalion

had joined the defending· force and the enemy pressure had. de-

l creased.

A very important factor in the successful defense of

the tunnels area had been the tactical air support. Over 80

sorties were flown against the attacking enemy in the tunnels

. area and against the. enemy roadblocks .established a'long the

Yoju--Chipyong road which the 1st Battalion, 23d Infantry,

and the 2d Reconnaissance Company had been forced to destroy

before they could effect a reinforcement of the surround.ed

unl t.2

Enemy losses were very severe during the fighting of

1 February in the tunnels area. Over 1;.300 enemy, d.ead were

counted and total casualties from the combined ground, artil

lery, and air action were estimated to be over 3,6oo.3

The heavy attack ··against the 23d RCT did not affect the "' planning for a newiy projected operation designated as "Oper-

*The rug~ed terrain forced heavy reliance on air drops a. nd carry1 ng partie!!! throughout the period..

l~ App D-2: 2. App C-1: 3. App D-2:

POR 507, 1 .Feb 51 After Act.ion· Report, 23d RCT, 29 Jan 51-16 Feb 51 FOR 508, 2 Feb 51

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., ~ · .. S~n - tion Roundup." It was contempl-..ted that the 2d Division·

., ..

would establish its main defense line along the X crorps Q-Q

Line, a curved line from C'bipyo:p.g to Ghodong-ni \ihich fol-

lowed the old P-P Line closely except at .i.ts western projec

tion where it curved to the north to include the yillage of

Chipyong. The western flank of the 2d Division was also ex

tended at this time to include the town of Hajin and extend

ing north to ~5 087463. The 2d Division was to support

the 8th ROK Division in its drive north along the Hoengsong

--Hongchon axis ±-rom its defense base on the Q.-Q Line.. Sup

port forces, consisting of artillery and supporting infantry

units, and tatik and infantry teams were to be attached to the

ROK d.i vis ion for tactical control. Supply of· these Support

{~Teams was to remain with the 2d Division supply agencies.

The movement to the Q-Q. Line was completed by 1200 hours

on 3 February. The 187tb A/B RCT.had relieved the 8th ROK Divi

sion in its former sector to the right flank of the 2d Division

and the 8th had."begun to assemble in the general area of Sokong-,~ . .r .

ni--Nopyong-ni five miles to six miles in the rear of the Q-Q

Line. The let Battalion of the 9th Infantry established de

fenses at Yanghyon-ni while the. '2d Battalion assumed the re

sponsibility for security of the mounta..in pass in the vicinity

of 059025 through which passed. the MSR to the 2d. Battalion po

sitions and to the 23d ROT. The 3d Battalion, 9th Infantry,

patrolled the ivonju--Yoju road•

The 38th Rc"T concentrated its forces in the Hoengsong

; ·· area d.uring the first few days of the period preparatory to

··: \_

carrying out its proposed commitments in support of the 8th

ROK Division.

· The X Corps plan for Opere.tion Roundup envisaged a.

double envelopment of the_ enemy in the vicinity of Hongehon •.

The 5th and 8th ROK Divisions were to be employed in the at-


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Line was to support t~e attack of the .8th ROK Division by

artillery and armored support protecte'fi by_· infantry units

organic to the 2d Division.

The 2d. Division Head.quarters moved from Worhyon to

Noda-ri on February 2d to permit closer supervision of all

units during the anticipated maneiuver.l On 3 Februai"y, Op

erations Plan No 7, which directed the establishment of four

support forces, was published. This plan was superseded on !

the following day by)PPerations Orders No 22 and 23, the first ----- '

was limited to specific ord.ers in regard to artillery support . to the Korean unit, the~ second, established the organization

of the armored support teams.

Operation Order 22 called for the organization of two ;I~ . .

J sm:lport forces, designated Support Force 21 and. Support Force t

/ 22, which were to provide the artillery support to the 8th ROK ;i ¥ Division. Support Force 21 was to consist of the 15th Field ~-(

7 Artillery Ba.tt+J,:ion; Battery A, 503d. Field Artillery Battalion; f

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X ~ .. v ~ f· t

Battery D, 82d. AAA ~ttalion s.nd the 1st Batt~lion of the 38th

Infantry which was to provide close-in support. Support F·orce

22 was to consist of one battery of the 37th Field Artillery

Battalion, a section of the 82d All BAttalion, and a rifle

~ company of the 23d Infantry, all to be de signa ted by the O.om-f;. \. \ manding Officer of the 23d RCT.

Operat;ton OrEier 23 d.irected establishment of Support .

Team A be organized by the 9th RCT with Company K and the 3d

Platoon of its Tank Company while Support Team B was co~posed

of Company .L of the 38th Infantry and the 3d Platoon of its

Tank c-ompany. Each of th$se teams was to 'be further sub

divided. into smaller teams capable of independent action. The

1. App D-2i POR 5081 2 Feb 51

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.. support teams were to operate und.er the operational control

of the Commanding General of the 8th ROK Division •

/ . / Operation Roundup commenced on. 5 February, the 38th

j RCT limiting its activities to close-in patrolling to prevent ,·

\ any poseibili ty of fights caused by improper ide~tifica.tion

'\ \ of the Korean units during the period. that the 8th ROK Divi-

sion moved through its zone.l

The 23d RCT, at·ter the "Twin Tunnels'' operation of 1

February, bad continued its attack on Chipyong on 3 February.

The to1jlrn was secured ·late in the day against sporad.ic resis

tance. The regiment began to build a perimeter defense a.round

the· city immediately, concentrating its defenses on the high

ground which surround.ed it, The defensive posi tiona were not

on the most dominating terrain. To defend the highest terrain

features in the c·hipyong area would. have required more troops

than were available. The Regimental .Commander, tl~refore,

concentrated on a tight perimeter defense on inferior ground

improved to the maximum for a defensive stand. The 1st Ranger <:·

Company, attached to the 23d RCT, and Company B. comprised the

regimental reserve. 2 Thome hills wh1c h were too d.istant to

be easily defensible were covered. by .. the fire of supporting

105mm and 155mm batteries.

fl. As the 8th ROK Division s~emed. to lack a.ggressi venese·

during ita initial maneuverings, the Commanding General of

I . 8 ~ the 2d Division alertea tne 3 tb RCT Commander to prepare his • n

.t1 ~ H 3d. Battalion for possible commitment in the saemal area to I. \\ support .and energize the Korean d.i vision. This wa.s not to be \ '\ · '\ .done, however, unless the 8th Division failed to a.d.vance or~ \\

' ~· bogged down during the 6th of February.3

1. App D-lb: J-70, G-3 Journal, 4 Feb 51 2. App G-1: .After Action Report, 23d RCT, 29 Jan 51-16 Feb 51 o. App D-lc: J-:-114, G-3 Journal, 5 Feb 51


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The situation along the 25 mile front was very fluid.

during the early period of Operation Roundup. As it was 1m-

possible to cover the entire area from fixed defensive posi

tions, the 9th RCT continued its constant aggremeive patrols

Which combed the central sector in an attempt to ·4W'ipe o:ut the

great numbers of small, infiltrating enemy units. The con

stant threat to the division sector from enemy along the Han

River cort:"idor to the Division left flank made 1m imperative

that the 9th be immediately available should. this threat d.e

velop.l '·

Although the CCF 125th Division withdrew completely

from the 23d R<lT area after ita abort! ve attempt to drive the

regiment from the tunnels area, tb.ere were constant probing

attacks of Nortb Korean units which frequently infiltrated to

considerable depth. Enemy pa.trols in the Hoengsong area were

particularly active.2

In an attempt to inflict casualties and create confusion

while conaerrlng divisional manpower, the use of air support

and. artillery fires was greatly increased by'the division.

The Fscc·, functioning at Division Headquarters, proved its

great value as a coordinating agency. d.uring this period.

The 8th ROK Division ran into .trouble shortly after

launching its attack a.nd. reports were soon received by 2d

Divi,~ion Headq_uarters of attacks· by a OCF division. K¥.l.A.G of

ficials, when queried as to .the validity of tj;;e reports, said

that they had been greatly exaggerated. 2d. Division Artillery

reported. that a ROK unit had. stampeded when_ some 9th Infantry . . ... -~--··-- ·.

Tanks fired into a sm~ll enemy patrol group to their rear.3 ~

There was, however, 11 ttle doubt that a considerable number

1. App D-lc: J-114, G-3 JOurnal, 6 Feb 51 2. .A.pp 0'~2:. PIR 107, 6 .Yeb 51· 3. App D-ld: J-9~, ·~3· Journal~. 7 F$b 51

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of enemy patrols were continuing a.reconnaiseance of the area

along the Q,-Q Line.

The lst Bs.ttal1Qn, 9th Infantry, launched an attack

against the town of Sogu, approximately five miles east of

c-nipyong on the 7th to eliminate·tb.e automatic weapons which

had been located in this area •. This attack was coordinated

with the 3d Battalion, 23d RCT, whi.ch advanced on the s,a.me

objective from the west. i't.e enemy resisted these attacks

stubbornly, utilizing an unusual numper of automatic support

ing weapons. Although the attacking elements were successful

in taking enemy held hills in the approaches to. the town, they

were unsuccessful in taking Sogu. ·· They did, however, succeed

in localizing this enemy unit and confining it to a constricted

sector. 1

On 9 February,. the 3d ~OK Divisi-on was attacned to the

X crorps for operational control and d:irected to move by motor

marches to an assembly art!a immed.1ately northwest of Roeng-

song. It was to report to the assembly area no later than I , . ·'

..,t

ocsoo hours on ll February prepared for immed.iate tactical em

ployment.2

Weather conditions and visi"b1li ty were adverse on the

9th and attacks launched by tbe 23d and 9th B.Cfs :ma.de 11 ttle

progress. Patrols of the 38th .ROT reported no enemy eontact.3

By the lOth of Febrt\a.ry, i.t had. become obvious that

there wa.a a large enemy bu11~-up north of the 23d. RCT and 1 t

became apparent that the enemy was preparing an offensive not

only to d.r1ve the 23d from its pe~imeter in the Cbipyong area

·but. to push baak the entire front. Thousands of enemy troops

moving south, had been observed from planes operating in the

area.. · There· had been numerous reports from friendly agents

1. 2. 3.

App D-ld: App D-le: App D-2:

-J-llt5, G-3 Jottrnal, 8 Feb 51 J-20, G-3 Journal, 9 Feb 51.

POR 516, 9 Feb. 51

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By •• it .. J~A?.A Oaiel:__ ¥• of continuous move.ments into the area and itldieations of a

pre-assault concentration of troops during the daylight hours

of the lOth. '»

A company of the French Battalion came under extremely

heavy enemy fire and. was able to extricate 1 tself only after. f .

consid.erable ~;~.rtillery had been placed. on the enemy positions.

Priority of fire of the 37th Field .t\,rtillery Battalion ws.s

returned to the 23d ROT to permit the greatest volume of fire

on the massing enemy forces·.l

There was little activity along the division front on

the 11th. Nevertheless, Eighth Army was anticipating a heavy·

attack along the entire front, a.nd X. C:orps qs notified that

the 8th ROK Division was to remain in position. There was to

be no further movement north or west unless cleared by Eighth

Army. Later in the day, a. report was received that the route

of vTi thdra.wal bad 'been cut behind the lOth and 16th ROK Regi

ments. Enemy activity began to increase toward nightfall.

Th~3d RCT· had planned an attack on Hill 583 to be

launched on the morning ~f the 12th but this was cancelled by

division and all units were instructed to limit their acti v-

i ties to short range .combat patrols.. Heavy enemy attacks were

~oon .launched along the entire line and the 38th Infantry re

ported that there ~e increasing evidence of a ROK collapse.

Its Support Tea.m had fallen baek to positions behind. the 3.d

Battalion bringing wounded soldiers with it. The 1st Battalion,

a pa,rt of Support Force 21, under 8tb. ROK control, was still

not heavily engaged on the evening of 11 February but de-

sired instructions as it .no longer bad liaison with the 8.th

ROK Division. X Oorps, when queried, ~ranted permission for

Support Force 21 to withdraw to ;tb.e brid.ge near Hakta.m-

1. App D-le: J-102, G-3 Journal, 10 Feb 51


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A'.lthi lftVD '18S"JoL_ ., By _Ji_..;_ HAP.AOaie_3_· _ 0269

ni, approximately four miles north of Hoengsong.l Tb.e Support

Force was to secure the bridge to permit witndrawa! of the UN

units still north of Hoengeong. The direction for the with• ·"'

drawal of the Support Force and the Support Team had been

given at 0230 hours on the morning of l2 February. At thia . . . t

time, the ROK Division, which had.faced the attack of four

aommunist Divisions and had lest over 8,000 men, waa disin

tegrated. By 0300· hours, the outposts of tb.e Support Ferce

were under general attack.2

The withdr~wing S•pport Force 21 came under immediate

heavy fire frem both hills and rice paddies adjacent to the

Hongchon--Hoengsong road. Trucks were knocked out, the dr1 v

era killed or captured. Wrecked equipment, blocking the road,

forced the eventual abandonment of 14 105mm howitzers and five

155mm howitzers.* The bridge site to which the Support Force

had been directed to move was already.under enemy control and,

at 1100 hours, the Support Force was directed to puab ita way . ~-.....·

through the enemy block and continue its withdrawal to Hoengsong.

The 38th Infantry aommanding Officer had been notified·

by Diviaion at 0950 hours, 12 Februa;ry, to do all in his power

to cover the withdrawal of Support Force 21. The X Corps, how

ever, did not return the units-to control of the 2d Division

until 1107 hours when inatructions were issued directing the

division to.reconatitute the 38th ROT and attach to it all

element• of Support Force 21~3

In an attempt to clear. the road for the witb.drawing

unit, the aommanding Officer of the 38th Infantry directed

a relief force to the 3d Battalion to link up with the Sup- ~

· *Seven 105mm howl tzers a.nd all of the 155mm b.ow1 tzera were recovered in Marc~h by recovery teams operating under the direction of G-4. .· · ·

1. App D-lf: 2. App :0..2: 3. App D-1g:

J-14, G-3 .Journal, 12 Feb 51 l?OR 518, 12 Feb 51 J-58, G-3 Journal, 12 Feb 51

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port Force. Over half of the members of thia relief element ' .

were either killed or wounded. The Support Foree, which had

been driven back 500 yards ~fter its initial attempt ·to pene-~ J:."' .

tra te the en-emy biock and make contact ~-ri th the 3d Ba. tta.lion

of the 38th RCT, mad.e another attempt in the late afternoon f

and successfully completed the link-up and the continuation

of the wi thd.rawal into Hoengsong. All 2d Di vtsion Artillery _

Forward Obaervsrs with tbe 8th ROK Division b..ad. been lost d.ur

ing the :fighting and artillery support during the withdrawal

waa controlled by aerial observers.l

In view of the disorganization of the 8th ROK Division, ' . .

. and the danger of ~ major crommunist breakthrough, X Corps di-' .

rected the 187th A/Pi~ RCT to reinforce. the 2d Division units

in t~e north of Wonju. The 8th. Division at this ·time was in

the process of assembling its remnants at Cbupo-r1.2

As. the defense of the road hub, aupply points, and Oi-47

Landing Strip at Wonju was vita.l to the aucces.s of tb.e defense ~ .......... {

. against tbe'attacking forces, the Assistant Division <:rommander,

Brigadier General George a· Stewart, was directed to take charge

of all units in the Wonju area and organize. the defense. His

orders were . to hold Wonju, whatever the coat.

Arriving on the evening of 12 February, General Stewart

called together all commanders of lG>cal unita {including tech

nical and service organizations) and' instructed them that de ..

fenses. were. to be established and that they would be held-

there was to be no w1,thdrawal, . no evacuation. He then com

menced the establishment of a peri~eter de:fenae of the Wonju

area. ·In order to provide the maximum disruption of the ad-~

vancing CCF units, ,upporting artillery was placed. in poai tiona '·.

from which it could mass fires on every approach to the Wonju ·. ,·.;,

1. Conference Notes, After .A.ction Critique, Obupo-ri, 5 March 51 2. App D-lf: J-86, .G-3 Journal, 12 Fe':> 51

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defenses. A .. small reierve was maintained to counter-attack ~

any enemy penetrations and did successfully close the gaps

the Chinese. were able to force in the.!"defense perimeter.

Liaison pilots were instructed to remaln in tb.e air· through--,,·-·

out the daylight hours l'Tith the mission of ·keeping the closest

possible surveillance of enemy. movement to prevent surprise

attack or massing of enemy troops.

The primary defense line established by General Stewart

followed the high ground.approximately 4,000 yartb north of

Wonju. The Netherland' a Detachment (whieb had lost its command

ing of'ficer during the desperate fighting on the previous day)

was on the left, with the 2d Battalion of the 38th ROT and the

3d and lst Batta·lions of the l87th A/B ROT to the right, in

that order._ The 2d Batt&lion of the l87th A/B was the reserve

force for these defenses. The 18th ROK Regiment established

defensive blocks to the east and a ROK Ranger Company estab

lished defensive blocks to· the west. The 2d Battalion of the - ~-...,·~-,..,.{ i.

17th Infantry, 7th Division, which had. been guarding a pass

on the Wonju--C.bechon road assumed responsibility for the rear"

The enemy was strangely quiet on the 13th, and the defenders

worked feverishly to prepare. for tpea~~:oa.ult they knew would

soon eome.

At 0330 hours on the mC)rni ng of the 14th, a heavy enemy . .

attack wes launched in the 2d .Battalion, 38th RCT, area and

Company G was forced to give way. Company K of ·t.he 187th was

thrown into the gap and. the position was ·restored. The Nether-,

landers also were forced. to give a..' '11 ttle ground in the face

of he~vy pressure, after itif'licting heavy casualties on the

enemy.

. At first light, the liaison pilots took. off and sooo.

reported an enemy column of trOops', estlma.ted .. _at two divisions, .... '

moving down the Som River, evidently.t(), encircle the positions •

•• ' .·· -11-.

\


Vi.o....,.......,,""'..._..i •-u

• A•Jtl'.o liND 1 Bf I o( . ., By _t,f-.~ HA?..A Oaie3_··-

As they moved do\>m the river, segments would leave the column . . . . ' .

to move towards Wonju. The order was given to bring all avail

able supporting fires on the ~dvancit;lS troops. Enemy losses

during the hours that followed were· staggering and the pilots

reported that the stream literally ran red with tjle blood of • • '. ' - ' • ; • '"1. f~. ..,

the dead and dying Chinese. ·Still, .'the column ad.vanced. The

car~ge continued until the afternoon when the pilots reported

that it was breaking up and that what appeared to be leaderless·

bands of survivors were attempting to escape to the north.

It had been a decisive victory, the enemy abandoning

Wonju as a primary target and shifting his main effort to the

west. General Stewar.t t'Urned over • the defense of ·the no longer

seriously threatened city to· the a·ommand.ing General of ths 187th

A/B ROT.

With the shift in effort; the 23d ROT faced greatly in-' ~- (

creased pressure. X ctorps had notified the di vie ion on 11 Feb

ruary to prepare to move its 9th RCT to Yoju on three hours ~-··v

notice. At this time 1 t . was s. ntic ipa ted that the 2d would. a-

gain establish its d.efenie line- along the arc between Yoju and , ' . .

/ Wonju. The d.i vision was also told to prepare blocking poai tiona

I between MUnmang-ni and Hungbo:ri; on the morning of the 13th,

li the 2d. Division expressed. its c'oncern to X'C':orps at tb.e exposed

r position of the 23d RCT. Corps replied that it desired and had ~~ t ;·

recommended a general w1 tbdrawal to the . Yoju--Wonju line but·

\, that it was the personal desire o:f .the' crommand.ing General of ~-.

~:\Eighth Army that the Chipyong perimeter be held at all· costs.l

By evening o:f the 13th, 1t Was evident that the enemy I

had decided to eliminate the 23d ROT perimeter at C'hipyong.

The 23d. was at this time .placed. under .heavy: small-arms, auto-,·

matic weapons, and mortar fire. A direct hit on the Command

1. App D-lg: J-56, G-3 ,Jg';rrMiJ;!Tl3 ·~e~. 51 ' ;~~ ~ ... t~~ ~ ·~ 'l,,,; ... ~ '

-12...;

.,

'•·· :1


I Ml;. Nl\ II~ARCHIVES u'-l,ll....n\.1\JII~Ji,;;IJ \

• ..... t .:• A!.!~ ·.lftVD 18S'Jo( :;

By .. :t~ ~ P.AP.A Oaie _3'--•• _ :~ ~~~~~--~--~·~--~ • ~E-1

00 73• 04 .

Post had 1til1ed the S-2 and wounded. the Commanding Officer.

To prevent enemy infiltration, B;..26 bombers. dropped flares

over the area throughout the ?ight.l .:!'

The O'ommand.ing Gene:r:al, Eighth Army, visited X Corps on

the morning of 14 February where. he oriented. the.corps Staff

on the overall s~tuation, and listed specific requirements

to be followed by all units in the de-fense: {1) Major units

were to be maintained intact. (2) No equipment was to be

abandoned. · (3) .·wonju was to be held and the enem~ attack

checked in that area at whatever cost. (4) The 23d Infantry

was to remain in the Ob.ipyong area and the highest priority

was to be given to the opening of the V.LSR to this cut-off

unit. General Ridgway then. promised that Eighth Arrry would

give all possible aid in stemming the attack and reminded the

sta.ff tha.t all echelons were to be impressed .\<ri th the impor

tance of every hour--and that the action of one small, deter

mined unit could, by an unyiilld:ing defense, influence the en-

tire situation.

The Commanding General, X Corps, held a conference of his·

division commanders that afternoon to d.iscuss ·tteneral Ridgway's

comments and a new operation order. Lieutenant Colonel John

H Chiles, X Corps G-3, was at this time ··rs leased by Corps and

assigned to the 2d Di v1siori to replace the wounded Colonel Paul

L Freeman as comme.nding of'ficer of the 23d ROT. 2

( /

The 27th British Brigade wa.s e,t"·,a .. ched. to the. 2d Division

effective 1200 r.ours T-.Yltb 'the •. sole mission of clearing the ~15R

between Ibo-rl and Obipyong in conjunction with. the 5th Cavalry

.Regiment.3 The 5th Cavalry was to take the road. from Koksu-ri

to Chipyon.g which· paralleled the road. taken by the British Bri-

i

1. .ri.pp D-lg: J-128, ~3 Journal, 13 Feb 51 2. D.'aily Summary, C/8 Office, X C'orps, 14 Feb 51 3. .h.:pp D-2: Daily Summary, G-3 Jourpal, 14 Feb 51

II"' ...... r··r ~

Srbi<L.r wl3.;;.,

. . ~

- :. J

\


; ;

· ...... ,. C274

gade but was to the west ,of it.

The devastating ef::re·c .. t of the massed and· accurately

placed artillery fire and the excellent tactical air support

had halted. the attacking enemy forces and it was decided to . . ' f

establish a. de.fense line between Cbipyong a:nd Wonju. The RO.K

6th Division and the 27th British Brigade were attached to tt-1e "f:

2d Division and Operations Instructibns published at 1500 hours ".. 1 ;

. . .

directed that d.isposit·ron of the units· would. be with the left I .

flank anchored by tbe 23d ROT lfith the remaining front-lin~ . ' , '

,l • '

units, in order ofttht.ir position along the line, being the . .

27th British Brigade, the 6t~ :~OK. i)i vision, -t'he 9th RCT and

the 3~th RCT.l

The 6th ROK Divisi'on moved into Yoju shortly before

midnight prepared to take ovc;;r its defense _positions on the

morning of the 15th.2 . . '

Shortly after midnight on the morning of the 15th, the

23d RCT reqtiested an emergency airdrop o~ ammu~ition as the

enemy wast.~getin hitting the perimeter. from all sides and. the ~ . . '

.·,

am:muni tion shortage was critical. This request was irnmed.iately

acted upon by G-4 and cargo planes began load.ing in Japan for

an airdrop at first light,.~·· .· :: " .. ·· ' I ~ ;

Shortly before noon, the 23d. RCT reported. that the 5th

Cavalry was at Koksu-ri, approximately five miles south of

Cbipyong, and advancing slowly. Early in the afternoon, in

response to a query from the 2d DiVision, the X ~.orps deli·n

ea ted the boundary between the 2d. and the 187th A/B· on the

main defense line as being D'B0236, a 'little over four mi'les , ' ' . . .

~est of Wonju.4 At this .time; the entire 38th RCT was placed

l. App D-4: 2. App D-lg: 3. App D-lh: 4. A.pp D-lh:

OI 30, 141500 Feb 51 J-120,: G-3 Jour.na.l, 14 Feb 51 J-18, G-3 Jotirna.1,.15 Feb 51 J-58, G•3 JournaF.15 Feb 51.

··. S~Ci2EP' -14.;. ·.·

...


-~~~-: ...... =·:~·~~~·~ '.··• A·~tt'.o(--iivi>:iBil-;,( -~- ,l,' -~ By_!!_~~ARA Oaie3·~· .. .,....... ;;;. .. --~ac.-a. '

~ .. :·S~T··· :: ...

. in division reserve ~nd. ~bv~d:into (!.~ ~s~~~b1y· a~ea· in Munmang-"I • ,.,) '· •

ni. 1

Late in ·tbe afternoon, . .the 23d ~?T reported"' .that the

5th Cavalry was within 1,000 yards of tne Obipyong perimeter ·,

and that the enemy v-ras fleeing in panic.. Very heavy casualities

were inflicted on the retreating Chinese, the 23d uti:)..izing :. . . . · ..

all weapons to the maximum. By nightfall,~~- tanks and approx-

imately -~ecompanying infantrymen of· the 5th Cavalry Regi-- . --· •'

ment had entered the perimeter and. tb.e 'ene~y ~cti vi ty had ceased. 2

There was 11 ttle aptivity on the i6th. Everything wa.s · ::-;_

quiet in the 23d ROT sector· and the supply trains o:r the 23d

f ipa.lly rea.c hed Ohipyong- where some l'Tere .lmmedia te ly loaded

with wounded and ~etu~ned.· t~ 't-he r~ar uilde~ a tank escort.3

Shortly before midnight,. X Clorps notified tl').e 2d Division th.at • • ,Y .<

its boundary would be changed. a.t noon on the 17th. The bound-'

ary change was to greatly narrow the 2d Division rr·ont. The

left limi U:pg point of :th~ new Division ·:rront was to be at CS

.9435 .. the right limiting point atDS0236, a t'ront of' less than ' '

8,000 meters compared to its previous front of' 39,000 meters. I ,·' '',

i'rom its new dei'ense line on the X Corps L-L Line (an east-

west line running Just north of'.:4nchang~,n1·; in t.he 2d Division .. ·-,;. · ..

sector), it was to ·patrol, to ~h~ J•t1 Lipf4. approximately five

to seven miles north. The 27th British Brigade and. the 6th

ROK Division were released. from a.ttacbment and attached to IX

C:brpe. The 23d RC'l' and attachments were also· attac.hed to IX

C:orus and further a.ttfac.hed to the 1st Cavalry Division. It - . . ,· '

was to remain under IX o·orps control until the let <la.val:ry . '

could take over its defense: p~rime.ter at Chipyong at which

time the 23d RCT and, attachments were to return-to 2d Division

1. A.pp D-lh: 2. App D-lh: 3. A.pp D-lh:

J-69·, _G-3 Jo1.1rna.l, 15 Feb 51 J-102, G-j. Jotirna.l, 15 Feb 51 · J-.87, ~3 _Jour,~l:, .16 Feb 51

' . . .,.. ' ~ . -. · . ..: ....... ~ .. :.~- . ,f""·c~ .......... r .\f.·~. . . ·•

:!iit .. \--,.·~\.r~~-.:· ~ -15-. <

·~ . ·.····


--.'W ..... """'\o#Vlt t""""'""""

: '·' A~tlir .llND 18flo( Y.

BY· 'Zi ·. HA?.A Date3 • · .· · ~---- -- ~' ,.,., .. ' • ...

0276

control.!

The 9th arid 38th 'ROTs b~ganto. tak~· oVe.r their new de-: . ~ ' l . 1 i ' ··, ' •

:renee commitments on the 17th 'while me·.· 23d prepared for 1 ts . . : \ .

move from Chipyong to Wonju via·Yoju, Iho-ri and Munme.ng-ni.2

The 9th moved. its 1st and. 2d:_,.Ba.ttalions to the Q.erense line

on the left of the d.i vision sect.or.·while the 2d Battalion took

over the right. <. :.

The primary problem on.· the U~th. ~as the mo~ment of the

23d RCT from its positiOn at Chipyong i~to tne 2d Division zone

responsibility. . '

It .ws.s directed. to .mo:ve ·into. the Wonju sector

' . Ob.upo-ri rrom where it was ·to:. launch an a tta.ck to the north-

east.3 ,•'.

' , ..

. ·.' .. '. ' ~ . . ,~ ·~ ,- : .

The movement of the 23d'.RCT was completed by nightfall

of the 18th and X Corps extended the 2d Division zone to the ' '

east another 8,000 meters at 0800 on 19· February. This placed

Wonju arid :{ioengsong back in the 2d Division sector. Two ba.t-··r·:?; ·.··

talions of. the 187th wez;-e attached. to the 2d Division effective ... .. .., ·, ' ,"t ' ..

on 1200 h.ours 19 February with instructions that they were to .. ; ~. . . c· ~. ~ ~ ..

remain until relief or: fro.nt:li~e units by the 23d RCT could

be efrected. ,..-,. .' " > ·' ; I\ " '· ~· : ' .. :.L ·':: c :;' :' '

'; ·:-. tl '' ·:·, . : ~. ~.

There was, at this time.,· a noticeable decrease of enemy

activity in' the d.i vision sector" and the X. Corps notified di vi-·",·'' .r

sion that it was to gain: and maintain contact with the enemy. 4

X <rorps published its Operation. Ord.er 14 at 1800 hours

on the 19th which called f'or a coordinated attack by the IX . ·: 1

and X crorps :to destroy'tfhe e!lemy in theHoengsong, Pyo~cnang, . ·wonju area. (This was.: the opera.tion which was to· be given

wid.e publicity as "Opert,tio~;·K1ller:/' the code designation

1. App D-li: 2. App D-1is 3. APP D-li: 4. App D-lj:

_.{ '·"'"-·!· I • ' ··,, ..

i'.

J•26, G-3 Jqurnal, 17 Feb' 51 J-81, G-3.Journa.l, 17 Feb 51 J-60, G-3; Journa.l, 18 Feb 51 J-5, G-3 ·Journal, 19 Feb~ 51

~f.'ib. f)..,.-~ ~)·,.:..~~,; ~ '· t-. l." . . ; ·'<

'-16·~ ··,;,., ..

. . ,,·,,


u c. \.tl..i"\\>i:> 1 nc u

A~ihc f(fVD 1BfJo(

• .... By •. :i~.- ~A?AOa1e_3_•-

. ·&E"eRET first announced on 21 Feb~uary) •1 Enemy forces remaining in

• ••• ,., • • • • ,. ' '· -· •. j.

this area were still estima.t,ed at· a. total .or 67,000 of which

all but 28,000 were Chinese remnants ot ·the 39th, 40th,. 42d,

·ana 66th Ohinese Armies. The. III ROK Corps was to protect . '

the right flank of the X US Oorps. The .2d Infantry Division

was to co~inue its defense of the L-L Line until the 1st

Marine Division passed through its defense line at which time

the Division (-) was. to assemble in the Sillim-ni--Ohupo-ri-

Chechon areas. The 38th RCT was to ~as·semble in Ohupo-ri where ...

it was to remain as X c·orps reserve. The 2d Battalion of the

, at Mudo-ri.2

187th A/B RCT was to be: returned to. its. parent organization • ~ . 1. : . • : ,' . ' . ·, ·. ·.~: .~: " i, . ' ..•

Activity during the 19th was limited. to preparations

for the new mission. Obntact patrols sent out during the day

returned with negative results. No.enemy contacts were re

ported.3 .. On ~bruary 20th, X COrps announced that D-Day and

H-Hour of ".opera.tion Kill~r'' would be 1100 hours on 21 Feb

ruary. The 2d Division was to begin movement to its new pe-

s 1 t1ons by 11UO hours on the 21st. .The 2d Division waa to at

tack at D-Day; plus on~. 4 All un1 ts :we;e; ·to·. be clear of Mokkye-: J. ,_ ·-·r . ':' .. · .

dong by 1800 hours as t-he Marines were: to .be passing up the

road towards Wonju with a 300 vehicle convoy at that time. 5

The 2d Division publis.hed its Operation Orde·r 24 at r

1400 hours. Tb.is directed the. 9tb. JiCT to move to ~n assembly

area near Sil11m-ni from where it was to attack north on order

to Haanhung-n1 via Songgye-:-ri. The 23d waa to move via Cb.upo

ri· and Ohechon to an assembly area at No-dong from where it

1. App D-lkt 2. App D-1j: 3. App D-lj: 4 .J: ,-·A.pp D-lj: 51' Jt.pp D-lj:

J-50, G-3 Journe.1, 21 Feb 51 J-19, C-3 Journal, .19 Fe·b 51 Daily Summary,. G-3 Journs.l, 19 F~_b 51 J-42, · G-3 Journal, 20 Feb 51 J -13 , G-3 J ourna.l, . 20 Fe ·b 51

crt"""':r~·r-T . . .__<_.\ __ ;I: 1:,..." ·:

. -17...; ••


f)"78' vt:.

Tb.e French Bat-

talion was to move to Chechon as· division reserve. The 38th ;.,. ..

RCT was to assemble at Ctmpo ... ri as X Cforps reserve while the

Netherland's Detachment ~ssume'd. responsibility for .the local . ; .:. ' . . ·, " . ' .·.. ,. . '

security of crn.eehon. The 2d Division Command Post was to move

from Noda.-ri to Cbupo-ri.l '•'

The 23d RCT, which was to be on tb,e .right of the 29.

Division commenced its move to .No-dong th•t after.~oon. From

this assembly _.a, the. 23d was to strike north to Ungy<}..ri 1

a village on the important. road between Hoengsong ·and Pangn1m

ni.2 ..... '"

Tne 2d Division jumped of·r on schedule on 22 February.

Although no enemy oppositi~n ,was . fn1caunte~ed, the<. advance was -·· .. ,.,

slow ·because of the difficult terrain and the quagmired roads

resulting from sudden thaws· and a heavy .rain the previous,

evening. Visibility was •·limi ted thoughout the day and truck

traffic wasrbrought to a standstill by mid•afternoon. The / . . . . '~ ·. ·. '·

15th Field ~'Artillery· Battalion commenced a training program

on the 22d to bring its pro:f'.icieney up to the hig):J. standards

achieved prior to its heavy losaes north. of Hoengsong. The

38th. Infantry also initiated: a training program to integrate .--·, .

the replacements which were·· filli:rlg i:ts deple.ted. ra.nl[s .3 :! ... ; ·, •. ~·: :.·!

The first. enemy resistance, consis.ting of small arms

·and AW fire, encountered by.the~2d Division on "operation

Killeru was directed at the ··9th. ROT by an edtre~eb.ed enemy . '

.approximately eight miles northeast of Sillim•ni. The enemy

positions were blanketed with. mortar and artillery fire ._and

the enemy w1tbdrew.4

High water do~tinued to be a proplem aDd the bridge ' . ' .

l. App D-3: Op 0 24, 20 Feb. 51 . 2. App D-lJ: .J-23, G-3 .rourrial,·. 20 Feb 51 3. App D-21.. POR 527, 22 Feb, 51·.· ,· , · · 4. A.pp D.i~t, J-34, G-3. Journal,.: 23 'Feb .. 51

Q.CJ..;....DC·T .· · .. ~~·

··' .. -·

-18..;.


··-· ,,._....., .... .,.._vr.l trn:NI'\ilVNALARCHIVE$

....... ,.

• ... ·sEeR&

C279·

. ,.·. ' .... acrose the Han River near ChuUgju was washed away. The dis-

.. ''•i :,,',•' 'f' I

placement of artillery was ~lted by the deep mud.~ A request

was made to X Corps for art' ~i~:·drop of. eu~plies to the for

ward units but this· request ·.was ~enieQ.. The .. division then • ,,> ''t

notified. X Corps that the pa.ra.m~unt problem duri~ the advance

was one of logistics and recommended one of the following three

alternatives as .t.he only solution to the logistic problem: (1)

That ROK personnel be provided as supply bearers. (2) !bat the

2d Division be supplied by air drop. (3) That the 2d Division

adve.nce be halted until the necessary road networks could be '" ....... .,J

built. In reply, X Corps stated that a1r.drops were doubtful ~ .~. : .' (: -~ •·. .·

but that bearers would be provided,. In any event, the ad vance . 1." 1'

was to be continued.l .. ;, :. ' . ~

.. ~ ... \ .. Lengthy advances were ·made.on 24 February despite the

extremely adverse weather and terrain condi tiona. By night-. . ' . '; ·. '• ~· .... . . ' ' . . . '

fall both the 9th and 23d RaTs. ~d.· c~ossed the X Corps L-L

Line in the division sector, and were approaching the impor-,.. . . ... , ; .

tant road. between Ha~nhu~-ni and Ungyo-r1.2

On 25 February the X Corps directed the 2d Division tq

continue its advance to the Arizo,na· Line where 1 t was to ee-. . ..

tablish blocking posi tlons tO deny it$ use: to the enemy. This ' ' ' ' .,.,. . :-~;.;.;,~·~~/ I ' "' o..

line followed the Hoengsong-:-Pangnim:.:..ni: roaa., an. impDrtan,t . . :-.:r:,.:·

route of withdrawal for ~nemy forces tp1 the·east. ·Hoengsong

.. -, .. ~-··.

was, at this time, already 'in the hands' of. the 1st I~rine

Division. Both the 23d and the 9th continued their advances

d.uring the day and the 9th RCT was within a short distance of

Haanhung-n1 on the J-J Line.3

On 26 February,. the 2d 'Division requested that one of

the four battalions attached to the 38th RCT be released to

1. App D-11:. 2. App D-lm: 3. App D-lm:

· J-71, G-.3 Jour;pa.l, · 23 )'el;> ·. 5l Daily Summary, ·a-3 Journal, 24 Feb 51

. Daily. Sum~ary,. G-.3 :~O'Lll'na.l, "25 .Feb .~1

.. . _;J.g_

; '.· ~--

". : .,,

I'( I' •",; ''<"

.. .


'C230

. ·· ·sEOREOl- . Division control as the.commitment of the 3StP. had reduced

the Infantry strength available for the, advance by 45 percent. . ·,

This request was turned dow1l• ~-The 9~-h :RCT succeeded in taking ~. ' ' .

Haanhung-ni in the early afternoon anQ. sent one battalion east

on the road _to U.ngyo-ri· to contact the 23d ROT which had not

yet taken its obJective because of the difficult_terrain.l

The 23d moved ··1. ts 2d Bat.t~lion and 37th Field Artillery . ' .,~~~ .: '

Battalion into the 7th Divisio·n 'zone into poalt:tions from which ., ,,

it could launch an attack west to link up with the 9th and com

plete the destruction of. the enemy in the area. 2 '

The d.irection of 'the attack changed from northeast to

due north on the 27th of February. The b_ound.ary between the '· I .. · ~~;; ' '

IX and X Corps was now a nor'th-south line approximately four ... ,,:

miles east of Hoengsong. The 3d ROK·Division was the left

flank of the X Corps. The boundary. betwe~n the .2d Division ·, •. . '

and. the 3d. ROK Division ·lttas the ·ohunchon River (inclusive to ' '

the 2d) to the Arizona Line· and ·from the Arizona Line it went .,... • ••• • ' ' ' j. '.·· ·; .,, , •• '

.·north up a j'alley to DS3152. .A.ll X Corps units were directed . ~ ~.

to expend every effort to close the enemy escape route by

securing the Hoengsong--P..angni:m•ni ~oad and 'Seizing the high

ground n~rth of the road.3

'!'he 23d. ROT moved 'its. ls'.t Battalion. to the -road to

block the enemy forces ari ven· from Yngyo-ri by. the 2d Battal

ion Which was a.ttac'king from~· thE! east~ The 9th Infantry re

mained in position throughout the day and made preparations • : '• i' • ....

to send a meeting force to th~ 72d Tank Battalion which had . .

been halted by snipers while bringing supplies to the advancing ' . ·,

regiment. On the following morning, the 1st &\.ttalion of the

·23d ROT entered Ungyo~ri artd commenced movement to the west to

join forces with the 9th RCT.4.' .

1. 2. 3. 4.

App D-lm: App D-lm: App D-ln: App D-ln:

J-34, G-3 ~o1lr~al:, 26 Feb 51 .. Daily summ•ry •• G-3 'Journal, ·26 :p:eb .51 J-4~ G-3 ·Journal,· 27. Fe.'Q<Sl ... · J-22, Go-3 Journal, 28 Feb 5i·

OEPRr"T... , . .._;>v !1. 't f:+: ·. ~-~

-2b-:,\'

,_. .... :-'

'. ~ . l

•


~· ..

·. @.C' f' D C"T .;J~

At 1300 hours, the division was informed by X Corp•

that its right boundary between it.and the 7th US Division .,

was to be extend.ed to the east approxiirlat,ely 5,000 meters in

a line roughly north from Ungol. The new mission of tbe 2d.

Division was to drive north to the Arizona.Line ill its assigned

eector, build up strong defensive patrol bases, and patrol.

north to the .T-T Line (an east-west,oombat patrol boundary

paralleling and approximately 5,000 meters north of the Ari

zona Line) .1

The primary effort on the last day of the period. was

the readjustment of positions and preparatio~e for the con

tinuation of the drive to the Arizona Line. To increase the

frontline units for the widened division front, the 38th In

fantry took over the security commitment of the French Battal

ion in Chechon, releasing the French to the operational control . 2

of the 23d RCT.

The 2d Infantry Division had fought superbly during the

month of F~bruary and sustained heavy losses. Now, rapidly re

placing its losses, it was again moving forward in the attack.

~. .

,.,•· .... ·.···

I. '

1. App D-ln: 2. A:pp D-ln:

J~29, G-3 Journal, 28 Feb 51 Daily .Summary, G-3 J~urna.i,: 28 Feb 51

., ' .- -. ; J'. ~. ,. . : • ~--: •


. .... 0282.

;"·; .

. ,~ •

GEOGRAPHIC .. , LOCATIONS*· ' ' '

UNIVERSAL TRANSVERSE MERGATOR

Ohechon DS3009 Noda-ri DS0113

DS8147 ,

D~3316 C111pyong-n1 Nodong ,.·, •' '

Chungju DR0591 Nopyong-ni DS0845

Cbupo-ri DS2209 Pangnim-ni DS5043 ,·, ... :: ,":! ,

Haanhung-ni DS2641, · Pyongc hang DS4534

Hajin 057463 . Saemal DS0752

Haktam-ni DS0~45 Slllim-ni DS1920

Hoengsong DS1949 ·,.,,

~ogu 058849

Hongchon DS027l. Sokong-ni 058943

Hungho-ri 058920 Songgye-dong 052926

Iho-ri CS8327 · Ungyo-ri .· DS3843

Koksu-ri 057842 Wonju. DS0734 -

Mokkye 7 dong DS0104 Worhyon DS0804

Mudo-ri D.S3415 Yang~yon-ni 059735

Munmang-ni 059528 _Yogu 057929

*All place names are ·_~h()Wn on the. Korea 1:250,000 A.MS :Map Seriet L552 (Sheet numbers NJ 52-10, NJ 52-14, and. NJ 5?-15) •. 7:'hey also appea;r,ot(the Korea 1:50,000 L571 series of the same area. I .

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S-taff .Section Repor.t of c-i, 2d Inr&ntry Division

for

Februaryl951

'.fhe actual strength of the 2d Infantry Division con

tinued. to be ·below '.fable of Organization strength during the

month of February. Battle casualties were excessive during

the first half of the period especially in the let and 3d

Battalions ~f the 38th Int"antry and the 15th Field Artillery

Battalion which had been surrounded by the enemy and forced

to oreak tbrough an.enemy roadblock. Losses for the month,

including both battle and non ... ba.ttle, totalled 3,844. Off

S·etting these losses were gaills of 4,316 of which approx- ·

. ·ima tely one-third were returnees. The net·, gain for tl1e month

was 472 which broug,ht the division strength to 14,147, still

over 4,700 below authorized strength.

As in the months of December and J~nua.ry, the shortage ..

or basic infantrymen and artillerymen was serious throughout

the month. There was a. critical shortage or noncommissioned

oft•icers and junior· officers (lst and 2d lieutenants) quali

fied ror leadership in the combat elements.

l.Jia.ny of the replacements received during the month were

rar below acceptable standards for duty with a combat division.

Many .of these carried with them records which clearly indicated

thaj; they were not to be assigned to f'rontline units. It is

believed that the administrative procedures and personne·l

screenings in the Replacement 'Channels should: be reviewed to

see if these misassigrunents cannot be eliminated. This would.

1. The supporting docume~ts for this report are. Appendix B-1 (The G-1 Journal) and Appendix B-2 (The Personnel Period.ic Reports). · · ' · ·


•• < •' ' ; ' ~ ' -. v .~ . -"

greatly lessen the administre.ttve loca.,d .on the already over-

worked. personnel sections ot· the divisional units.

As much of the action during tb.e period. was over

terrain impassible to vehicular traff'ie, a. request was made

for 500 ROK Army personnel to serve as carriers and litter .

bearers. Although the request was approved, no Koreans had

beenreceived by the end or February to :rill th1s request.

Civil a:r1·a1rs activities were limited to the control

and. screening o!' the large numbers of refugees who passed

through the division zone during the period. Almost 20,000

Korean men, women; ·and· ehild.J;en passed. through the area to

escape the. Communists driving down from the north. With the

exception of 600 retained. to ~·orm carrying· parties for the

division, all men of military age were turned over to ROICA.

ot:ticials. Three-:rourths or the southbound traffic occurred.

during the t'irst two weeks Of' the period, the mass evacuation

slowing rapidly after the Koreans realized that the 2d Divi

sion had stopped the onslaugtft of' 12 Communist divisions.

Straggling was a: minor problem during the period, less

then 100 stragglers being apprehended. by the Military Pollee

and being returned to their units. The ·lflil.ita.ry discipline

was excellent and no serious violations of' Army Regulation$

were reported during.the month.

The already high moraJ,e ot the d.i vision improved

greatly during the month. There were many !actors which

contributed: (1) The magnificent holding action along the

Wonju•Chipyong line prov-ed the 2d Division the superior of

overwhelming enemy :forces and demolished the fable that the'

Communists would. !'orce eva.cua.tion t·rom .Korea. (2) The R & R

program continued in high,geq and. soldiers listening to the

retu.rnees began to plan their own vaca.tions in Japan. (3) - '

Newspapers'and magazines were distributed to all tactical

-2-'


issued. to the units and popular films- were loaned to all

units which had projectors.

By the end of February, the division had published

or received in orders from higher headquarters 2,345 awards

for valor and meritorious service· and there remained a large

number of recommendations to be considered. These concrete

evidences that the acts of heroism bad been noted and re-

membered. also heightened the morale of the troops.

With the exception of a few minor delays caused. by

the adverse weather, postal service. w.as adequate, all in

coming mail being flown directly to Chungju. Tb.e tact.ical

units of the div1s1,.on made daily pick-ups from the APO.

Criticism on delays in payment of troops, initiated

in the Zone of the Interior, resulted in an investigation

within the Division. The compla.in.ts were, generally, lack

ing in factual basis; individuals who had not been paid for

several months had either refused payment when it was offered ;, .

or had received advance payments before they arrived in the

Korean Theater.. In addition, ·many soldiers fail to understand

pay and allotment pro'?ed.ures, resulting in erroneous self

computations of pay due.

Ten key officers of the division were lost to the d.ivi

sion during the month either as battle casualties or through

transfers. These included:

Col Paul L Freeman Col Isster W Teter Lt Col John W Keith Lt Col Marinus P A DenOuden Lt Col Elmore F Berendt Major Arthur H Earnshaw Major Edgar L Parker Jr Major Harold W Shoemaker Major Reginald E Ivory Major Kenneth T Koeber

, c..::t{ ~l ;~ '~·· '" .. _ ; ·. '

CO 23d ROT Div A.G. CO 15th FA CO Dutch Det. Div S1g 0 S-4 15th FA S-3 15th FA

. S-2 23d Inf Div JA Asst {}-2

WIA Trfd to .F:SCOM MIA KIA Trfd to x Corps KIA WIA KIA Trfd to ZI Trfd to X Corps


•

( .

Il'lTE LLI GENCE 1 - . . ·- '

Staff Section Report of ,G-2, 2d Infantry Division

for

February 1951

Identification of enemy units in the 2d Division area h.&d

been a primary concern during the month of January. The effi

ciency of the collecting agencies was reflected during the month

in the· speed and ac·curacy with w·hich the Enewy Order of Battle

was prepared. During the :mo.nth of February, dissemination of

information on projected plans, and combat efficiency was grea.tly·

increased. As in the past month, the medium for the d.iasemi.na.tiGn

o-r special information wa.s the Annex to the daily Periodic In

telligence Reports.

Many of the prisoners captured. d:ur.ing the month spoke of

an i.mpend.ing "Fourth Pbase Offensive." A document captured during

the period gave what is co.nsidered the most accurate interpreta

tion of the 11 Phaaeat1 in the enemy scheme of operations and this

document (a st&ff officer' a nOtes of an address given on the 4th

of February by CCF Genera.l Peng, Tub. Huai, Commanding General

of the. joint 1'-(TCPA-C.CF Headquarters) .is here briefly summarized:

Three phases of the, Kore,an War were conroleted during the pe

riod between the 25th of October and the end of January. The 1':"1rst

Phase ranged fr?m the south bank of the Yalu River to the line a

long the Cbongchon River • * The Second. Phase ranged from the Chong

chon River Line to a line south of the Ta.edong River be lo":t Pyong

yang. The Third Phase ranged from the line south of the Taedong

1. The supporting documents for this report are the PIRs contained in Appendix C-2.

*The heavy assault against tbe 2d. Division in the Kuja~dong and Kunu-ri sectors was the. cli.mlitX of this phase •

-1-


River to a line south .of the He.n River.

It had been the intention of the CCF to destroy the. entire ~~f

UN Forces during the let Pna.se s.nd then complete the subjuga.,tion

of all ROK sympathizers on the Korean Peninsula. In order to

accomplish this, the Communists purposely fe 11 back 1 n ~front of

the advancing Eighth Army hoping to lure the· attacking unit so

deeply into their trs.p that extrication would prove impossible.

It was the Chinese plan to offer just enough opposition initially

to exhaust the advancing troops. The eventual offensive, although

inflicting heavy losses in men and meteriel, failed in its ultimate

objective and the UN Forces were successful in their withdrawal.

Lacking mobile equipment, the Chinese were unable to follow up

their initial advantage and the offensive ground to a. h9.lt.

The Chinese then stopped to strengtben the liberated. areas,

~stablish coastal defenses, and replenish supplies. Recognizing

the need for haste, they launched. their Second Phase before they

had succeeded in builcUng up adequate reserves of personnel and.

supplies. This aga.in forced a halt at the Taedong River, although

UN oppos1t1on to this advance was minimal.

The Chinese were successful in crossing the Han River dur

ing the Third Phase and. e-stablishing strong beachheads but, i;gain,

the phase ws.s a t&tctical rather than a strategic success because

they were unable to destroy UN Forces ~ncL lacked the mobility

to keep up with tne withd.ra,wing units.·

The Chinese began to propagandize their Fourth Phase Of

fensive towa.rd the end of January. · This was to be a decisive at

tack which was to end with the destruction of all UN Forces and

the complete occupation of· the Korean Peninsula. The CCF and NK

units were i~formed that ~.rmor, a.rtillery, and air would support

the units in the attack. It was. intend.ed. tha.t there should be a

three to four month rest bet-ween the Third and Fourth Ph.ase but

:-2-


~ECRCf'-- •. _,._ ' ' '! •'' ,., l ' .. ;

the uLimited. Objective Offensive," initiated by the UN Forces

d.uring the last week of Js.nuary forced the Communists to move up

the time of the atta.ck .• The Communist s.;;tren~th for ·this attack ~ .. . .......

was assembled. in the central sector and the major effort was .ex-

pended down the Chunchon corridor splitting into two prongs a.t

Hongchon, one attacking down the road to Hoengsong and w·onju, the

other driving southwest in the direction of the Chipyong sector.

It was this attack which stopped. the 8th ROK Division and inflicted

the he~.vy losses on the Support Force 21 ma,de up of 2d Division

units. This attack ended in complete failure because of the mag

nificent defensive effort of all 2d Division units particularly of

the 23d RCT in Chipyong.

When it became obvious thhitt further offeneive effort would

destroy the combat potential of the OCF without accomplishing the

purpose of the attack, the CCF again withdrew to f~Ldit reinforce

ments and. to permit the units to regroup prior to again renewing

the attack in a projected .Fifth Ph.a.se Offensive.

On several occasions during tb.e month, the enemy resor-ted to

trickery to approa.ch UN Units 1'fithout being fired. on. They were

particularly successful in t.heir atten:-;pts to infiltrate to the OJ?

of the Netherlands Detachment on the night of 12 Februa:try. As the

enemy group approached the CP, alert guards opened fircbut ceased

firing Wben the lead.er of the approacbin.g group Shouted, n0kay,

we're ROKs, Okay, Oka.y, E.OKs. n The group was not identified as an

enemy force until it had e·ntered the perimeter. In the ensuing

fire flght, the commander and five b.eadquarters personnel of the

Dutch Force were killed., 14 were wounded; eight members of the hea.d

qu:arters disappea.red and are. listed as missing in action.

The following list of the Communist Forces was prepared and

was published on 20 February by the <?rder of &1. ttle Team after the

Communist Offensive had be~n blunted:


RE~ROOUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

42d Army 40th Army

Corps Troops 2,500 Corps Troops 2,500 124th Div 9,500 118th Div 10,000 125th Div 6 5~"·0 119th D.iv 6,000 ' (,.'

126th Div 61000 120th Div . 4* 200 24,500 23,000

39th Army 66th Army

Corps Troops ll5th Div 116th Div 117t~ Div

12tb Div 7th Div 6tb Div

2,500 Corps Troops 10 ,oco 196th Div 6,000 197tb Div 8~~00 198th Div

27,000

37th Army

Corps Troops 1C9th Div 111th Div

2,500 7,000 8,000

17,500

2,500 10,000 9,000 s,ooo

29,500

II Corps

5,000 4,ooc 3,500

·12,500

31st Div 9tb Div 26 Div

27th Div

4,000 3,000 4,500 21500

1'4,000


!he month or February divides itseir, tate tour distinct

actions, each of waich provides the basis tor extensive diseus

sien which cu. -.e· tend. 111. the narrative summary of the coDliBalld

repert tor tae aou.th. . nese. tour actions are briefly the RC'r

23 4efense or tae twin twmels area; the momenteus clef ease or

the Cllipyong-ni commtmication center; the calamitous empleyment

or support forces with ROK un.its; and the cletermiaed defeD.se

ot the Wonju area by.RCf 38 and the: 18?th Airborne RC!.

Eacb of the February actions highlights operaticm.al lessons

worthy of discussion.

The twiJl tmmels detente was waged by two infantry batta

liem.s acainst ·an enemy posessi.Dg tremendoas superierity m au-'

'bers. In this action the forces involved were assured from th.e . . begim11D.g 'by the Division Cemmu.der that "It necess-ary, tbe

entire diTision will be. moved -llp to do the job." !be lm.owledge

or this wb.olehearte4 s11pport is Mlievea to have 'beQ. a nry

· sicaitieaat moral prep acatast despair. The careful selectiaa '

. or defensive positias and mwcration or defeasive tires paid . goo4 41v14ea4s during the aotioa. Bnemy readbleets to the

South or the perimeter causecl little concern to a terce assure« . ,,~

that re1aforeements were forthcoming.

As B.CT 23 completed· the twin tmmels action ancl attaeked

in.te the Ch1prcmg-a1 area, an operation Ro~4up spearheacled by

ROE: forces was laacb.ed !D: a ~ouble' envelopment ot Hongehon.

!~e employment of strong_support forces with ROK anits was

, undertaken in. the natee Gt an experiment to explore another

poss1bl~ meu.s o:t obtaimhg •ere 4ependaltle pertormace trom

ROE:' s. Operation Bowiiup procresse~ slowly from the ntset


REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

••l••••·· ...... ~~--··;* a~l!·••~•·-~·~·~· . til' e-ete ~tiUtll~~:.if·~~~ifi.Bistj;~·~ .. ~ · e$sq -·-~-~-.. ~~;~··~~ ........ . we*i.._ ·.et tJte aa ... ts.~:s·~~~flt\··· .... :~;~---t.eai-ttl\8e·.··~tarke4 ttte··.tt~ta.t· -·~·~·· .l'i· tk. ' . '., ., ''i:·''

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eitemt"'toad'Dlocls to:~~-·· .~~~1.~>~-e .a .• ltitt .• p a$. ·~.r~•-.J• wtt• t ~ -·.• > • ; '

· aall iletMile1Ql4 .,,..,...IJ.._rJ t•••• · Per•-~i .. l.sse.s ~:t .ter.l.._ mea, 't•lllt .~att•rtea .t a,s-tll.ler,-•. &~~' 'Y'as·t q}lutities

of •·ct\l1,.e~tt at't~st ·-·' t •• .,, d tlJ.ls me,tll~4 ot ... StiJpo-rt.

· D•· wit·kbata1 ._.; ·itfp·J~ tof!•e ~··~t·s. ~ v~e~tt,- •~ ' '

WaJa ·e*9l•te·t, p~·· · 1rere pat· '•to etf•et te. 4efeacr at Jaol4 . ' F

t».~· uimr ••rtJl ef J••!•· _. fltllJ• ••t'•n~e foree wis · e·llll1prise4

pr.1tnar·U, ot ·-~ ~~ 8lif t!lt ~ltjt~L ~otrae fiC!. A. ulttei ••-· . . .

, maacl bl the \f&f\1 tr .. 1f&;a celearl.:f 111 ·Gr:i'et .•• jas a~eempllskei

ttf·' pl,ttag the •••·••:•• JJ:1.Pts•ieD e~.,~i;>a« .. . .f.a .full ·. , -_,·. :.~· ·. ._-_· .· '>¥J,):mgh< <·.~~~-:~;.:(·;.

· eGJt&-.· S.llsq~e:l\t' ilducls rjf!~i'hp•> ...... ,!IRe

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~· t)le west ·et··.Wea!• ·tJ.te ··••·•- -~tt~··:• . ._1,,......1 . ' ' . . . ,., '! '·. ' ' ....

was. ~r ..,.,. Dis a•<t1ra .e~--~-t11'elr je~ct;r•te:t the .

prness flf.· i •••· --- --~ ••. a ''dlle·tR a't•'"'· . Ike· ·- ,' . ,. . . ' . .··,

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·. paa1ttG!tt re~terei· tlle ,erf.mJtet ··!a.alaecra\ltte .~e'191i' •• re_.,., . . . . . . . . .

plJ ~as f0S·S11>+~·< . ~~Jttl,f ..... -~\t~·~~· ~·~"":l''lJf -~~ l:tep at ·~· ~·~ alt,~ie~<-.e.;•••~~- . ati-·~··~_. ~ ·~~·,~•·- · ·~~aelley ••ttl'l•• ·· ~··•• * P't"'¥,a·· a..ti"'ti.,llua!~J~s~. ••L oer)&M 1._ et ~--~~~-·' ~lfllle na*lltaf 4·-*•t••--.i '\ ,; ' ( ' ·.·. ; . '.< ',:·~ .• ~' ., ' :; ···~::;-.: ·--~ I: . • ' . \, ' ' • '. : ' •

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REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONA~ ARCHIVES

I JlJ<'!On;ii.fi~ L I'

. (

~ Vll c~C)" n~·e3-·2'J •f VJ ~- fV"ltW"' v,..J, --r....:J./ -·· ,:~.·~·-····--·-- -··- ... _,

' < '·

aa alltU•a1a,1Ctlt jtt)IRt. sJ,Pa.:tea''U &appleme•t to the$.&

air ir()ppe4. the sac:ee~t •Gt· the CfltwG.tc-•1 bastic

hJ armeacl elemeDts ·:rto» oatsY.• tae·',erilreter iemastratei ' -, . ' . .

. .

the e:tte'et:l.'t'ea·ss ot · an~ca1- la aela · a alsaten · aacl tke les1r-

ab111tr Of COAStatly llaiataitdq SOale atmor a· ieep. reserYe

pesttiGBs for reltef type m1ss:l.es.

~o iastaaeea 'wlteretn f'riencUy p~treli were ambusbei

·poutei ap tile ciucer• of extremelr leg ruge moter!zea

patrols and reatftrm,el tb:e 11eeessity tor p~trel acneleat liT

boun4s m n1•h ·the •oy1Jlg eleme,at. is alwars ewere4'by •·, •

stat1onarr "•s• of tire •. Pro-~ u4 ae~~r• reta.ltatory JDea-

sares .......... -. aca1ast .ea,my aabasa ferees m each mstace.

!Ill Pe~Jnarr, t:)le p~actiee i·er . aul>eruc · letters et tastrao-• . • • . • l •

t1qs was begu to tao.ilitate r~feremee, aDcl aec.-.tiltl, for t)lese.

p\tblicatias. !b.ese lett•rs. ot iastraottas osverecl'A matitute . . .. ' ' . ., . . '

ot subjects 1B~lll41D.g the att$dazute of . select perso1mel at a . .

·X Corps. patHi leacle~, o.-rse ·· at sllltseqaent ce.rses by .clivi-·- . . . ' .

s·10Dal uits; m1nef'1$ld reper1:1ag; lltiluat1a of' tke b!lge1-

CompaJ17; seouitr· of supplies · ~· etta~~ · ~.29 . aa4 :1.2'

lligllt lOJDl&'at-clllent SllppGrt r·.: 1JltCtJ7 uits; aad' JlaSS:btg of

artillery aai ·taak weap·••· !h~ qsteJD.ot"ptt~titsah, tll'Str••

tt•al matter ta· le·tters ot h'lsvact.tes )rwet· a kieh17 satis-

facterr atmia1stra.t1V. teyelep_.t 1a tkat these ];ettera· al'e

autb.entieatei )1 .!C of' s t-3 h~teai or' tb.•r .td.ll..tut hlleral.

Also,' the system estald1shes a: sepal'~~., ott aee« tu• ciealiq

with · eperat1onal atter·s as i1stmgla.1sttea tnm· the atil1a1'8'trat1.e. ' . / .

.. L1a1sa co.-ttmeats tor Jte-.rauy were ataermail,- Ilea..,.· as

1n acldltia to tJ>o ettioers tor lateral 11•1s8Jl, tlree ettte•rs · - .

were reqtd.red a ••asia· to X torps Jleaaqwtera~ ' ·

fate eatiauatioa of . tke pra•tiee, 1a1tiatei 1a ,J'.U&1!7,

et attaell!Bg a!pleecraphe« lt2~,eoo e:!tut1e overlats to eaeh

Per:lette O,erat1oas ieport t.1« ·11Jlcb: to ct._; a e1ear, g:raplate'

pietare of tke day to ·aa,. aetl• tree of the aca-esseatials 11)J4e:~

· o so etten ob.scnt.re tile 1J1g' :Jti•t•e, .. ot l&J!I'cer: scale · .-.erl.cys. SE:CREf

3


REPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

fllt . .eatb.er IV- ·Peltl'ilafT as tor the _.., part a4arse

,fer .,eratioas. llea..,. c~ifews ser1eu11 halllJeJ.et veJlietLlar

mwell81!ilt aad protaeet ·s1foUea streams as a441t1eal. ••steeles

- aO'fement. Ill all, .. aly seve:a. cays were ~averallle ~or grouul

aucl air eperatioas. .


S£CHf!T. LOGISTICS

Stat·r Section Rep·ort of G--4:, 2d Infantry Division

for.

February 1951

Supply problems during the month of February were

-gree.tly intensified· by the length of the supply lines, the

poor, rough mountainous road.s and the sno;w and. ice on the few

roads available.

Railhead for the Division was at Obeclion, 'truekheads

were established at Oh'llngju and Yojti find an emergency air

d.rop zone and airhead ·was es.tablia-hed at Cltu:ngju. During the

-month supnly bases wer6 moved to Wonju and1 later, as the ta .. c

tical picture cna:ngea. and the Division shifted its ·base, the

bases were moved back to Chechon.

Critical shortages continued to exist in the division as

the result of the large _losses in North ·Korea at the ba.ttlt;) of

Kunu•ri. Primary items in short supply were vehicles of all

types, winter clothing and equipment, spa:re parts for weapons,

engines for 2 1/2 ton trucks, vehicular spare_ parts, and var-••• , ~ ' ... < " .,

ious items or QM T/0 & E equipment such as tent stoves, ranges,

-Colems.n lanterns, typ~v-rriters, etc.

The Division supported. not only its organic units but

also various Corps units logistically. _At times the number

of tr-oops supported logistically ran from 18,000 to 22,000

personnel.

In order to clear the requisitioning :tiles o:r the "Divi-

. sion technical services and to correct accounts o:t' short~ges,

a letter was prepared and sent to a·ll .units stating that all

requisitions were cancelled and. ·that. new consolid:ated requi

si tiona would be submitted. Thls action was necessary as. ·many

" -1-


SECRET. requisitions lie.d been only pa.J:>tia.lly filled !"rom army stocks

and then back .ordered and thi.s. process had repeated itself so

many times that recora.s were becoming' ,incorrect and. units

were not indicating on new requisitions whether they were

consol1.da.ted items, or new requisitions.

This procedure eliminated. any lneorreet status reports

and materially aided the division technical services in re-

establishing records which had been sadly disorganized by

the losses at Kunu-ri. Also many record files of' units were

lost or destroyed during this action.

The use of' air drops ror supply was used successfully

d.uring the month to assist the 23d RCT in their battle t·or

Cnipyong-n1• Without the air drop the 23d ROT would have ·oeen . .

unable to bold their ground. a.nd successfully defeat the enemy

which had ·completely surrounded their positions. The value of

cargo planes for the resupply or units cout off by the enemy or

in areas impa.ssible to vehicles cannot be overemphasized.; drop

techniques were conJta.ntly improved. One example of tne im

provement in drop. technique. was the attachment o1· two para

chutes to each drum or gasoline instead of the one customarily

used in Janu.e.ny. During the air' drops on Wonju, when only one

parachute was used, almost 20%· .or tt1e 55 .gallon drums -ourst

When they bit the grOJJ,!ld.. ~en the .exped.1ent $~ 1:1!Sing a

double parachute rig was adopted, loss~s rrom burst c~ne

were almost entirely elimlm.tect.

Whenever poseib:le, alternate supply routes were mapped.

for utilization sbt\lld the pr.tmary road be cut off or become

impassible. One 1mporta.nt substitute road was the Chungju

Yoju road. which was in the IX vorps Sector. The Corps par

mit-ted. the 2d Divis ion to use this road for the logistic sup-

port .of the 23d RCT. -

Helicopter evacuation to• the 2d Division Clearing pla-

-2-


·~·

~-~~~==--~~~--~--~~~

8:

toons e.nd to the !-'Iobile Army Surgica.l Hospi te.l and subse-

quent air evacuation .by C-47 a,ided materially in saving the

lives of sericusly wounded ms,n. The. helicopter once again

proved to be a pri.me factor in the medical evacuation chain

and the greatest need ·is for better and. larger helicopters ..

As in all previous periods the entire problem of supply

could, be summarized in th..ree phrases--wide dispersion of units,

ruge-ed terrain, and inadequacy of transportation.

·sce:~:c.T-


EVALUATION and RECCNKENDATIONS

Cardinal princiules to the efficient functioning '-n a

comba.t unit are (1) Unity of Command, (2) Clee>.r Cut Zones of

Responsibility. Two actions occuring during the month of Feb

ruary clearly illustrG::ted the v«tlue of th$se two principles.

W::en the CCF commenced the-ir Fourth Phase drive down the cen-

trill co,...ridor of the Korean Pen~nsula, they split their forces

1 nto two roughly equs,l groups s.t Hongchon; one group. moving

to the southwest toward Chipyong, tl::le other moving down the

Hongchon-Hoengsong Roa.d. The 23d ROT, a. cohesive, well-tra.ined,

sW:oothly functioning tea.m, succeeded. in smasning the enemy in

its defensi. ve. s.ction, at small cost in human life. Supoort

Force 21, Eol special te.sk force orgsnized to give artillery

support to the 8th ROK Division c; nd assigned to the 8th D1 vi-

s ion for opera.tional control,, was forced to operi.te in a com

mand vacumm for many crucial hours. The high cost in lives and

equipment was high. The lesson--of the essentiality of clear-cut

command responsibility and unified organ~zation--w~s very clear.

Another lesson, specifically mentioned by the X Corps Commander

during an after-action ccnference at Chupo-ri on 5 M•rch, was

the, neceesi ty for the senior· officer cif a un1 t to assume 1m

mec1ia.te command when the norma.l chain of command is broken

and for this commander to notify the next higher bea.dquarters,

with which he has contact, of !::lis tassumptton of command.

There was a constant improvement in the utilization of

supporting fires during- the month. On several occasions, areas

which had been held by 'strong enemy elements fell quickly ~fter

they were subjected to li.rtillery fire and aerial bombardment.

It is felt, however, that subordinate unit commanders still

do not fully utilize the·supporting fires available to them

-1-


. NATIONALAF<CHIVES

SE;CRET. and that all commanders should conti·nue to develop the co-

ordinGLted fires of supporting arms.

It is impor'ttlnt that all men an.e warned of the many de

ceptions pra.cticed by the ene1py. }ilany of the Corrmunists spea.k

English, often they join groups of refugees to facili ta.te in

filtration, they frequently pose as ROK units to permit them

to pass mllchine gun fire lanes before their identity is recog-

nized. Tha.t they l'Tere successful in these deceptions on numer-

ous occ2s1ons indicates ~. need for greiter Cetut1on and the

"ridest possible diss.emins,tion of information on the ruses they

rns.y be expected to use~

The use of ";:;ulsa. t1ng patrols" wa.s expa.nded during the

month of February. c·omba t pa.trols '!'noved forward until they

contacted and engaged the enemy, if they la.cked the strength

to overcome t':le enerey resistance, they fell back until a larger

combat team could be sent forward to join them in the combat

action.. Combi.t patrols were supported to the utmost by artil-

lery and air •.

The execution of the 2d Infantry Division actions dur

ing the rrontb of Februa.ry indicated, in every insta.nce, the

overall excellence of.the fig':lting team. The division, which

had been so badly battered at Kunu-ri, had welded its veterans

and replacements into a unified team of high esprit 'IITi th the

coura.ge, the professional knowledge, lii.nd the lea.dersbip to

give it the top ra.nk in the UN fighting forces.

-2-


DECLASSIFIED d' . t·.'tinonty .. ~--~ 1~flo(__ •

B~ _!~~:~~- ·. -...... ,.

':# Sl 2d Infar£i;Ciibls ion Staff

for period·

1 February 1951 -:28 February 1951

Cormnandin~ General Maj Gen Clark L Ruffner 015968 USA

Asst Division Commander B.rigGen George C Stewart - 015,49 USA

Deputy &sst Div Commander Colonel James P Barney Jr 012796 Armor

Artillery Officer ~rig Gen Loyal _M Haynes 08379 USa

Chief of Staff Colonel Gerald G Epley 018770 GSC

A sst Chief of Staff, G-1 Lt Col James D Tanner 052132- GSC

Asst Chief of Staff, G-2 Lt Col Ralph L Foster 022669 GSC

Asst Chief of Staff, G~3 Lt Col Claire E Hutchin __ 021092_ GSC

Asst Chief of Staff, G-4 Lt _Colonel Frank C Sinsel 028998 GSC

Adjutant General Colonel Lester W Teter (1-14 Feb 51) 051312 AGO

Actg Adj Gen Major 19lwin C McLaughlin (15-31 Feb 51) 044423 - AGO

Aviation Officer Major· Robert L Hoffman _ 01176669 FA

Chaplain Colonel Etlward J DeJY'.Lars 029128 OhC

Chemical Officer Lt Col Richard 0 Gordon 024440 CmlC

Engineer Officer Major Edmond H Leavey Jr - 024698 CE

Finance Oft'icer .Lt Col Orville A Lesley .039629 FO

Major Sumter R Nelson 0420240 Ini'

Headquarters Commandant

Historian (

Captain Fred J lltleyer 0463996 Inf

Inspector General Lt Col_ Herman C Duvall 0436250 IGC

Staff Judge .tidvoca te lV'J.B.j or Reginald E Ivory 01502388 JAGC


UtvLr.\:1\:>!rJ-C.U

A•Jtnority •• ~-~ 1Bflof__ ·' ,~ th' _!L HAP.A Oaie~--~~ ~. -------

~nanoe Off~er ~~1- Jack· L Grubb 021180 Ord

Provost l~larshal Lt Col Henry C Becker 041944 C!-iF

Public Information Officer ~ '•Capt Bernard 0 A Bailey 01EA5729 GSC

Quartermaster Lt Col Arnold C Gilliam 031570 Q.MC

Sign:1l Officer Lt Col Elmore F Berendt ( 1-20 li'eb 51) 0216733 Sig C

Lt Col Theodore A Brunner (21-31 Feb 51) 0404814 Sig C.

Special Service Officer Major Victor E Strom 01283163 Inf

Surgeon Lt Col ·wilbur D Dice 023671 MC

T I & E Captain Jerry L ?eavy 01289617 GSC

Transport.a tion Officer 1-lajor George H Huffman 0494380 GSC

Regimental Com£at Team Commanders

9th Resimental Combat Team Colonel E:iwin J Messipger 018503 Inf

23d Regimental Combat Team Colonel P,:=tul I. Freeman ( 1-14 Feb 51) 017704 Inf

Lt Col John H Chiles 020295 . Inf

( 15-28 Feb 51)

33th Regimental Combat Team Colonel John C Coughlin Ol.SB98 Inf ·

..


·'· r._',

. ' . ~

· .. ~·\

... / /


rPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES.

,. _...,_....,tWWitt.._IJ'.

AuL~on:yAI/W> :7851o 1 \·

•• !~:zg·N~~~~~::-~, I

'j 0284

.. ;, Headquarter;s 1 ·.x ·. Gorps . 'APO 909

.. _ .... ~b~ ra:q,o~itig:·~xf.:Xa~t,fro~ a e~ptU:r~~::1en~m:y. booklet .entitled 11 A 00llE!I!t~g~ ,or~.comb~t ~:P~~iencefilu·· i$ ta$e!l 'from Eighth Army Pm No .. 377 .. It 1~. reproduce·d,·be.oa:u~e-·of•;its4nt-erest and because e-lements of X Corps composerl the · for:ce :opposing the. Chfne~e~ · . ... . . . . · .

: 0 c" •' > ·-·' -~ ' '.~' ·:, ; c< '

·~. '.··.-. ' ' ::>·:: ?' _., ;;),"·-.·. ;, ,: .~ ( ·_.- ._. _=. ~' :·;, ·; : ':" •. ;~.:. :~~ ~~'· ~~~- .· ,·- ~~- ~~- ~-. ;· ·,y - . ' '-, '- .'; /- ; ' :· ~-:T:lie 117-tQ.· cp~ Dfvisio~,. )t)ih:/:tqF '~trr1:i i.n,.aoqperation .with. other

CCF troop'S, v~~s ac:;:3,~;gn~d .rtl!e. ll!issio~ ::(lf:;an,n~i4t:Lng th~ ~ain UN rear fore& $tatio.neQ.·J.i:'l.;; the:.~s~eas. north o.f.~~OENGS()NCh~:·1049,. ·The ll5th and ll6th Divis:f.ons~ 39,t:n· CGl(Al-lllYi 1r~re ~h,$~ .cormnmi~eq to cut orr other enemy forces statiqned.at GHIPYONG•NI qs 8048 in order to praV'ent the enemy from escaping. and to intercept.·.enenty re:tnf~reernents. .

r·. ~ !'-~· }. ·-: '· ,..·.< "· ··._ . ..,. ;;·,

>Jl~ ,the .n~r.n~g.of;· .. 2._;~~~ryaey-,.l9~~,.?~~···•ccii' ,·ro:rce~ •. ~s~ed fiorward to the .:l.i:ne •... JJ.X)k~ng<TAN$dN"(l;-7NI,;,CS;·~39.J .,.SIN<?HAAJQ-,.~I. QS 9145i• SANGMUR.AN•NI OS 945.0:.. ··f!nQ. HAMU;Fl.:A)l~tti: ~S ;1#9• ··At '•t.b:~s pd:$nt the~ .Y'ere. ~erpporcarily stalemat• . ed by :a ,part of.: the Jd. tiEN.·'l,'UI (Regiltlenth the _US. 2nd D~yision. On the same nigh"~;, the 'l16tl'l Division :pUshed west !':rom s:ntOH.Al-lG•Nl to T:ANSONG·N! and the!l·:cont;nut)({ :br·t~e .cli.:re~:rt(ioA·.of.·GlW~-NI CS 82:39; .. along highways and via mountairlous·are~s to,the·south~ to·c"\lt.off·the retreat of_the ene!JlY forces in the ·OHIPYONG.:.In area so that. they eould not eaoape sou·th to YOJU. It ~was: also the mission of the: U6th Division to prevent enemy reinforce-ments "~.m reachili~.· the YO River~ , , . .i . , . . • • •

,, The ·ln~in :r~rce:·of the 115th ''pivi~iotl ( 343;d and ,344th· .Regiments). rnshed . forw~rd. from ·"S()KKONG.~NI :·CS 894)~. along rai,lrqad$ n<>.rthwat'4 ·to MANOO·RI CS 8144 ·and KUDUN ,~QS, 8443 • The· 34,tli· ~egin.l~!'lt, as the • r~se~e force of the a:rmy· .... {TN two chs:racte~s ~l:legtbleY,w~s·,:t;;nrawn out in a security line extending ·no:J;theast in. the._direction· of~MUNMAK. · · .

\ ~ ,•i ..:, i.

At dawn'~n the. 14th.of Februaeyi95ll the116th-Divisiont pushing forwatd to miUAM .. Nl, annih,ilated,-.,two:·eompani~sr of: the ·Y$-·23rd•Eegirnent. The ll5th ·Div:;t,sig!J' s:1~o ar::riy~d;Eit; KT;T;rm:N:<,ithout .enco\l:nt:er:tng .. aey forces en t()ute ~ , On• the· ~tn~··.n.~gp:t the ll?th· .Div:is:ton .. c()Jllmenl;fed an enveloping maneny~:·ppu$h~ng ferward·.~toward:th,~ .. ene,ffiy for~es in CHIP!CONG.oNI, and su,rrou.ndecLth~ are~ .in cooperation with the l19th Division, 126th Division and a rogi~~ent be1ong"ing to ~he 125th Division. The US Forces (French battalj,on, RrtiJ;l~:;,·y !>att~lt?n~;:apd;,:~;'J.';an].~; ·T4 'l'Ul {Battalion), amounting to more than six thql);~13.nd. j_n st:re.ng\h) ,.w~re'. surr.ounded on a narrow strip of. high. ground one or .tw·o mile.s to th~ west .ot PQNGMI SAN CS S04S north of CHIPYONG•NI. .· . . ,. . .. . .. · . . . . .

-. .. . .

On: th~ ··15tlr of F~bruary 195i, th~ si~\la.tloh was at·~ standstill with no advances beihg made by eith'Elr ~side •. :A;~ daM:l of the 16th, a command was received, ordering· otir for.oes to :e:arry cru~. att urgent interception operation. The fo~lowing is a summary, of the e?Cper~~peea and lessons derived from the battle and .the variqus St[tgt:)s of d.~s Pl'0.gre~s1' A. Progress of battle.

. " ' ' ' ,.

1. · Attack; The attack oommenoed at 141700 February 1951; .the attack• ing troons ·successively advanced. ill the· diredtion of CHil'YONG-NI.. At 142.310 the 2nd B~tta11on, :34Jrd Regiment; encountered .and immediately engaged the erteJn1 at KANHYON CS 79$. On re~iv:tng this in:t'ormaticn., tho

' ·' _.·. . -. - .· (


· u~.;.vL.I"\~vlfli;U · JFPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ~. RCHIVfS r · .. .. · AuL~on:yAfifi)·'78!27DI

a.,.rw .NAPA D~t~ i)~;}.Y f .

0285

-·~· --··-- ·-._ -~·-·.« _;_-. , . ·,(i . .. :.,-.:~:·ff {·,, \; -~1:t~f:·:; .. ~--.:·.~}r,-.;~~ .. ~~:~~·.\·;·~ :",. _ '"·.<:~·'··< '.~ R~g~m~~t: .~l!le'Qi·~~y:.qi:SR~'!i¢h~gr··:f¢·V~ .,~ol!l:P~n:ie.s• .to·•OC<;.~f'Y·•the· hUltop to th,e·P?U:~\l. ~f':MA.$~~; tlJ.:e;<m~n t"oic~ .p(;; ,th,e 3rd,J3at.t.elio,tt"Vr$S; dispatched to Pl.Sh,·Qn aJ.,o~~.Jat~~··\~'~if4Ye1 •• Q~pgnt~e;:;~~.ok· ci~l~ 40 min,y,tes to occupy KA11l11Y9l'h :• ~~rly ~~!}lmQ.~~~.~.~n~~~<.Y~e~e )t~.~led .· S,nd . five captured as the enemy was lorced. 't;o, .. tl;e .!lt~eet'~·"?l ~~ON;.hoiJv:~yer, due to .the 3rd Battalion'.s los.~ 9~ .. ~4:r:~~·:t,,qA, ·1~l~;~n~~~~·~·~1~h~:·5n4.·· Ba*tc.~ion~:was. not established;. Rr·~"~~~;,tlil~. ;l~tt$r.~~ .. foJ,:±~~ng-'~·~p:;~~~·.yic;tory. ·; .· ·

' - - - •• y ~. -· ' ' - '·. • ' '

'-~·-·_ :. .·' >-:.' _.:~ .. J ~.-:./·:.·. ., .. ,;,_J;?:i.:.i·-Y":" l:/?<~.,~1\"J:.- ::"t~·)\:-~_:,~·~:::,:~; :~:,;~· ... _;:.·.- .. ·:_ - - .. ·- .. - ~ .· ;" y~en, Cconta~~;:,~~~ es;~~J>li.sl_l!d :wfiilii,tJte; 3d Jla,ttalion, ~:t was after

150300.;, .At .. that· time informati-On was· received fran the interrogation or . pri$oners ·that; t~~'" .en~my~:rorce~;:wer:~:· h4,g~;L1. concentT1li;e4. and .constructed st..ro~, fieJ4 W~f:~,f3) #O. ~'t,' ~ee~~~ tntpGS3ibl~· tt) aQhieve Victory before dayl:>reak.:: .Th;i~i $nfcQrmat1•la..,Wal! ~et:lori;~d. :t~.~:th&<J)~ivision,~ whereupon the regiment<tres~ord-ered j;o1:def&'nd }jiASAll•~·'.and:wal:t" ~f(;)r~the~:attack to be continued on the. night, o'f. :~t:h&··;l~th~~,,·:>,;"'·.· · ~;;,.· .... ·· r:,}.:,~: ,: . · ... · · . · · · . ,

The £'~st:.:~ttalion"~ot;th~:~)44ih'·~;g~ent, 115th Dirtsion, arrived at its ;lin~ .. c:,f .. depar,t.ure,.from ·whi-cli' two .. unsuecassf¥1 attacks had already been launcll,ed,;b:r: t;h,e 356tb R,~.giln~nt1 .,~'1.9th,;,p,t.vi·&~n., -at 1.41990•.· The 1st Bat tal• ton: sta~'ted:cto,~ttf.f~ at,~l424GnJ•:·~t :o~~·'!irepower was:: not' adequately o:rganiz,ed: .pa~au..s~ ·of•':then~r,;emyts' ~ap~;l~r"'tir~ pow.er ant}) the open terrain. F.or th~s. ·ree!So~:"~;,f;~iiLed·~~ach>:~@:~, ~~' ~~~ ti-!lles we. ~ttaq:!ced, with our troopS.· :s\lff~~ngx,·~~~yy, ·•~ll;~l't;~~~.•c·. ;; •?>:;\, ·

·· Pn .J.464bo::t~~'':3d;:k:;h~i~~~~~\t~d·£ri,:.¥he; ~~unt~in .. a~~IS on the· east, on the ,~o~~t.<?~~,'tPiie.;·Reg4tl1e.pt;jt~f.tl!i ~~. ~m~vw~.·· At 142loo :the .3d ·Battalion arriy~~ at .its ~!;o~ o~.;4eps~t~~~ ''-,!;t, th$::~ :t;i:me ·the 3~7th :Regimen-t h8d laumQb~q~ .th~e; a:t;;tacks. ·on a ·.small 4illtC1p . .30Cl met.ers to the southea$t or the railroad' stetio.n, ·but was uneuocessM,. ·tosing mox-e than half of its force.s. •. Tbe :3d J3att~li·on was mor~··suc~s&ful. Starting to attack at , 150100; •·.·it· occup:t~d the . .fj;rst·J:li~tOP•ll1itl;in 40 minutee, ·taking the s.econd and .• third; hill,tope:· in·sue'cession;:,· .:I:t.;;; if,t~. 1~04'0 February: 1951 before any. feyther progress.· into: th~·~;ei,le111y:;~EtE!'l!t·· ~aS: mSd~ • The. ;fteg~znent gave an . order to o~ase'· attacking; r.acpn~ct:ructectth& ·f'i~l!bw.orks immedta.tely, and hold the .oooup$~d pos{tion~, firml'i··~· ~epa.~yi~n:for1 :<;(mtinu!pg the·· attack on the night.of·th~ ~5tlt;, .••. · ..• c: .. ,,;;:,·.c•' .

,"····2 •. ·cDef~~~r::On·,tlle··'l;tn.,~ .. th~ 343.I"i Reg!~ent di~tohed its 2nd Battalii.on··to.: nold .the .~~ ·pea.ks: of. MASAN. 'nle 4th and .5th Companies of the lst Battalion h~ld fast, ancf ~he :6~h Company was heid in reserve. Seve~Efl. en~nty;· eo\lhteractt~'9ks lat,tfl~~q::)at'rt$;1:', ou,r: ~roops,ee~sed to• attack, were repulse<i:t.. :After· @il>r:~al$';,:·• ;9111'. -~pp$* .J~¥E1~¢e of· ;tha surrounding ·t~:r:aJn-,·,ndc¢!.v.er~nc~~ration,t suff):~r:~&:·h~avy. casualtie;s· f!-om enemy air and art,iller)i attae,~s-;; • H~'\lfe~rr,: b¢oa]J;se · 9~~ <>ll~~ ~ely• tro.op adjustments, and the' dete~inat4.on•:•of. th;e;:l~t BattaUonr~toh>had •beaten.b~ck sixteen enemy oounteratt;ac~s ~.h~l~ ~};J.-e~~ing la~n.it'!o:n (1R Si.9},' th~ efrelllY failed to take our· 'D'Ol'Fit:ions,; , , · ·~. >·; · . ::~, , · · c , . ·, , , · . , •

. . '"· ~- '·~~-. .. - :·: ··>~, _..--r-·-.~ ~·: -\:

At 1600 more' than ~0 en~rny c~a%J.kS coming to reinforce CHIPYONG•NI from the direction of KOKSU-1\l) 's'urpri;eed us ... by being almost at the door of the Regimental CP be fore . thef:.,~l?,r~~ ,%~,co:VEJ~~Ii! •·. seriou~ly threatening the fianks and rear of the 2d Battal:1;atl'• · 'l!'h~: R:ogime~t: inunediately ordered the dis• . placement· of the 2d Battalton to the .positions• occupied by the. 3d Battalion. The . tanks oomin·g up to ohal"~e .our.•. r~~r ,~nd, .f'la#ks. were subj ectad to . cross fire between our·fst ana ~d Battalions, laying in ambush,. which completely annihilated<a COJt1pany>or enem;y:, infantry ~~mi,ng up on the tanks. Twenty others,. from the battalion' oommalider ·down,. were captured. We also destroy-· ed four tanks and one motbr> vehicle. '. ·· ·· · ·

!'· ' , ·~<I,,, , ;.-· "., ,

The 3d Battalion of,<the 344th, ,Regiment, .after· occUpying three hilltops situated south.:east· or· thE! railway statipn, ,was prev.ented by daybreak £~m making any fUrther exploi}.atlon of' its succes~ and ordered its 9th Company to hold . the_ occupied positipns • • ·~he company in turn . ordered one o£' its platoons to hold the posi~i~s, with gria heavy machine ~' while themain force &f the CO!rtp~y top}(; .C().ve:t • at.: the p~se pf the hill.., .· The ene~ launched four coU%1terattaOlcf with ,~m~;ll ·· ulp.ts {p~atoofls) ·between OS()O hou:t·s and 13M

<2, ;-:.;~·

/I


rPROOUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHI\lES. · ·

f'·

. ,·

~}\!) 6 .... ·\Pki~b

- ;:i:;~: ~'~~. :{~ •· . ~ . '

: : • :.~.: : •.• ·, :. ;~i< ~,·:; 'J·,! ' :•~i~; ;: , • ;,>:;c :··~; .. ;c~\·f"'< :3.•;.;'{ · ;;~ '•' :> ·· ' ' · .. hours,.suppGrt~ql;ty.mort·~,filt~i.:•.·.f;~ell.6f':·~the,$~ .. attac~s::rifUing, the aneJIIY' a~!!lin ... at~<*~; ·i#·~~,.~~::1'QQ~ . .h9ur~ cW~~r·~~, ~wg}'.?()tt · •·$trafhrg, · .. bombing and d:roppin~t. gasoli®:t!~~s:.;(,1"~r.;q.~c)· •. ~.··.!~itl;t.t.he ·~s~~ions in· fl~ines, the troops sti;tl. re~ail\~d f~~t!~, peAt'.$nt·~ b~~k~tt6th~t tWP';Jenel15Y ®unterattaoks • A. t .lS:OO :hours, .enemy[tankS·E"irrlyed;o,·•~e :¢omf:)ant,· a~ter suffering heavy losses, WaS :unAble ·tO• C(}pe JVith,,~;t,(l~'$1: neW'.'Stt~atlon··· ~e ·etltire battalion moved to conoGntrate at pos*t.~t>il,s'-:i$urrou~ing 911!1)~ ps e146 below M.AlifGMI-SAN CS 8046.

· · .:- .>. ,:> :~~::_t;': __ -~: ,~·~:: .. ,:<,~sr~-or--~.~}::-~ :-~·-.·~:'_{;-: __ . :),{ ·;:·:,-~~~>{:.~::_.:',!~,\·:~ ,!,_;,.~\·_::.·:_;;,, ·:.·::~ .. ~:-\ · :~~~. :-::.· _·: ..... · _ _ . · . ,,Oll t}l,a,.·,l5;th,,,t}l~JJ.:;l:,~bJ)i~~'9~·(ft1tendf3~:t9 CQntinu~ the attack at night,. but. -re~ved .. order1!. from.t.h:9 "39th .. oc;r Army in ,the afternoon, order .. tng i~.tp,. ~9n;tinue the atta<;k 91'1~'tha nig~t. e>f tht:J J6th, ~n cooperation with the 4othc A'~my, . .a~d.•to make ,other .;;z.aop.'~4a~stments • Furjiher. orders were gi Vfm ·to· :tltrt· ll7th: :Pi vis,ion •. toi ;talc~. {)~~ ,th~ :d~'f~nse of, ·t;~e areas surround ... ing, CRU~N;r~ .cs .$.339:an~.tbe: ll6;6h.;;Diiriaion,~>t<>. advanc~.·~o. the .south of KOKID· RI CS iz42. tO, 'tnterc~pt "eJiemj- I!~fnf~rcem~n'#:: ti()m:t,ng trotll' the south. The entir~ 42d. Ar!ttJ:.waa,,,di~tri;bUted: arctun~~'!H~RI;,..,~orth. of,.IDNMAK to intercept

eneni:·~~~:;:~:t~~;~:·,~:~~~:·:~si~~~~4:(;~; ' ~ .·:·::. ' ' .. ' '' ' : ,, ' .. . . :I'he.,~:f~?th DtvJ-~4~~;·~~4~,·M1~~ ,fi:!~:~~~;i;i!g , 84Sit1$tln&rlts~. : · ·,

:. ~i\. < -~ .. ·:~';, ;,.·.~-~ ·- · ·.·:·/:+.~:';·~,;.;, .:~~ ·. ;-·~:i··_:fh.}:;~·~:::- K~i~~{t .. h,:~~~<J~;:::;~-~:,-:·_~;; .·;;,:~ ;' >:; ~1~· .:.::::-.•.. ·~-~ -~· .. -~- ~ ~-: ·_ . ': •· (~- ·"';~ · ~ . ... . .~:.~Wnpc,.··34;3tb~gi~~ri;1;::~~s,·:o~f:d~rn~?.tf!::~4P!q:¥ANG CA 794:5 .and areas to the

south • .. · Th~ 3.4:4~h:.~fi~g:t~~n~:"'fet~ ~~;afffl~~~'J'()pt~.~n~ or S~~DA~, ,,~GMI .. SAN c.s .. S04~.,f!nd .tp~;:~~~S.d3Glol'tih)pf·.~q.M:f.o,S~~: V\1.~~·: i:t.~. main. force remaining at SOKPUL. CiS. 8045., ... Tha··.345th ·Regiment ·was 'ordered to··MUCHON CS 82A3 end mountE~in areras to ·th~ eas:t. with Dd.vi$!0n':·,Cl:LTemaining at .KUDUN •

.,. : . , . : .. :·:·.~J<~:-.-,::._::~/,~f:·;,~::.."-A -~.(t.fr~~·:_~--~,.\'.:··~-i'_.··_;}. ',~-:'":-_ :::~:"'~:,;~-- ?-, .··:·/ ...

. The;·:va.r.iou:s.-~ffgtment!3~·cij;st~i.Jll1:tk.P .. :tn.~.#' :f'o;raes. a~ follows• The 343d Regiment ordered ··one p1$t¢6n;of·,~t$,;ls1f'B~ttalion 'tio MASAN ·CS 7947; the main positions or the Regiment were the ones then occupied by its 1st and Jd Bat.talions • The 344t.h Regimen~ dispa~hed the 1st Company .of its 1st Battalion to hold the enemy,' its 2nd Battalion to the mountain areas west of. CH:qqANG-NI cs ·B3t6;' ~e ~3d ~~:b#~t~i~:,~p ~~l:Nl)U OS 814~4 with its main fore~,: r'~maining::at~ M:~GM;t ... ~AN,, ~Jl'9.::c'!b,.e· }'e~g~~p;~al·GP at. ;~OKPP'~. · .

-· -.' ·., ·, - ,_. .); ,. ';'>~j :::'~.; .: -~-~ <,:::<~--. . : ' .. ~ ;: ~ . :~-:·:~~-~_>.·;' \, ... ·· i~.~:~J:. ~-;: < "~·~·_:.,~ .· ~:· ~{:'.'?. r~~<_~~.~ :~;~: .: , ~. .· .\. --~ -. ~~':'~ :~ ~ .· :. , !·a~··) D!serige,g~m~:ritt::i At .:t603'Q l)~'Ql"U,i~;~ry. '19~1, • the. ll5th Division r.eoeiv ..

cd a c¢ded ·6r'd~r· :r:rom·,,;: ~ .• (TN, 1;1,~~~~4-e)( or(\ertng imtnedf~~e displacement. Howeve,r,.~au.~:'tc. i~b!l~e.~·~~~:it~cqn·\~t\::t~~ftroop~,,h~ving .. fought for. 24 hours w.ithput~~,J!~s.~.,;:;~,h~J~n?;~(j~~~tt~t*~·~;~~~ o,?~~~:i~· o!'. :t~ •• .,~t:;uation, it was not pos~ipl:.e:tp :~~i71~,.qut•·tt}je d~~~~O,~!l)~P!t-:~)-:mrn~41ately.upotl ·re~eiving the orcmr.~~'iz.HQVH'ltrer:;..,;~.f!i'd~i'r!;P-g·th~{co~:tng ,day~~t\}r, and.'fe.~~i;ng .. envelopment by the enemy ;it', ~n~,.~p~,;t~e ;.O~:t:{£r,ien.~Y;,,.;1Jn~~~: ~itpqr.en,,. it .. ,was decided to .ordpr, . .;t,he• •.v~~a;t}S·~r~itnenJ,s ~P :Q~:cy"·.;cPU1i.;..:.t:tte :d~spl~cement •

. · '.. --·\ .. _ . . '; ,-- .. ··: -,: :·· .... '

The 34Jd Rogillient pro~eedef ~o KPSQNG cs ~548, the 344th Regiment to MAEW04·Ll·Q'~.~P?,f.;4,•;·;the::3!r,~b'~e£~t:;zrt,,;to,1J!APP~l9,:PS 8·?49,, and. ~e Division CP ·to. CRQ!I~0Wj 05.:8944.•:/. ~4.9i·'i~riQu.s:e:tm:i;t,~,,.~rv~ved,•at th9~··respective pos~tions at 1100 hours on/the 16th, thoU:€h vii:th s'certa!n amount of confusion.

B. Critique.

1. · In the conduct· oit~ho ?nlt:~re'r6~121:lign, . or the battle command, we hsve undoresyim,at~~. ~P:.e en.'{;lP.!·• ::I.n;·Yi.fJ,W pf .~~i.t.past cl1(J.raeter.istios in

. bat.tle,, ~e··ex~c~~f the; f3#?~!:.· tf'tl~e~·t·~~.IP:YONG·NI, afljer-~e anomy at . ,;HOENGSONQ 'flas'.:annil:t:Uatec;i. ~ ... >,~;", '}. · · ··· · .

;, ''" •'\,'~";' ,,•,,·; ,·•,,•,1;;"'7{~/,;,."··~:·,"£,,',~~·->:'"".,1•'"'o··~'' ,'" '·""'>

· . .' 2~·.: tlnr~!iii~l\i;,;·~~~··\~~e~,~·~~tt~£~6~~. W$ thd\lght th~ e~emy had merely field WQrk~ wl:u:m :j;~ey ;h,a~ oxgan~21ed ~ql'{: pQip:t~hiJf defe;nse, .. al)d. other such de{en~~ w~rk, a~,~~~er~;;~;wtr:e~eJ:l~~~~l~m·e:~t~;,.;~ttoetera,. with tanks acting as moblle fortresses .. · We. t}Ot onl,y did ne>t organize, coordinate, . and have. the attacking uni~:;~:u~~l'; ~ 9entrallzed ·QOntr!land,. QUt evan two regiments of the same division fail,ed tp C()ordi.n~t~ their m0vements, resulting in a "You fight, I x-e~t'' attitud~,. . · ,,. · ·... .··.·· . ··.· · ·

. ., " ·;.·' ~: .. _', <;",, f-·, . '.,

.J •.. Owi~· tt{ $l~uff1~i~~{ ~i~~; .. FJl'ld~;pnd;r~~timation .. of the enemy, the mobile fl:ttaeks ,g,mer:all,y .l;~9~~d } 11at~.~~k...,th,e~~t;rQng*' preparations, hence

' ; ' ,;:, •, " . '" ' ;, ~ . ' ' . . ' ' . ; ·.. '- ·, ' .. '··. . . ' '. ,_,, . . .,


LIL.VI.J"\IJIJII 1& .. 1.1-,~RODUCED AT THE NATIONALARGf·!I~V.ES

A~L~on~m-~7&5/c 1

Bylf:L.NftM D~t~ /J:-.ifi ~

_,.

viola-ting ,i,he, p:r~~ip;J;~; ;,t:;'the, ,,''·i~~:f,:_Q11~c~,; on~ :slowu ta~~.i~al technique. Officens dld ... not surv~y- the- tenrain:-~in. detail_ and familiarize themselves eccol'dilfg ,~() the .principlt:l gf 1nel;)i.~f,?.,.~e;"fe~e, [)tit instead, engaged the enemy hastily witPQUr'td.~-4e~lJ.tri;.~:Pf:~Prara:~fpn~~'~:•· -----~ _. .-. __ ·· ·· . - ·

__ -- _ :4_,. ---W~·did nc,>;t: orgafid,_ze. a~<.t-.,e!ll-:p!L~Y\4rt~l.lery fir-e.,-,~nd:-the artillery unita la,e;g~q ~hehtnd•: '\lAtantry \'11e,a~s-.;tpO;,;.··W.~re .not exp1o:I.tedto their fulLcB:pa~ltY~ - fool'•:.4:t;lst:~Aqe., 'Ph~,l~t~,_.~at-t~l;io~,. 344tl:J Regiment, launched thre$ s~cee:s..sty:e attscks<~n .a S1llaJ.1~hilJ_~_o:q_ at thfJ south_ of the railway stati:'Pn, .:a~·- ~~u;,}l· .of tbe '#:w·~e •. ~'\i-~eel<:~;.r,Si~ in. turn be~ause of la.ck of fi_re suppor~:• · · · · · -- · .

, ,5~._, Oh···:-th~:.h!~.~t;'~.A~[·:~;. :£~t£~~:F~~A~~trg~ the. ene~ .and· retreated, the Witbdl'a~-a~"'<?l ,o,~~ln~~.,f,q~,cq~ · .. w,~~:·~o:t;,.,s~~~te~.e~eeuted.. .The enemy was close.,<_f.achlg :U.,s:9n: 't:he, ;~~.~~ np,;t~-~-~~-~!?PTJS ,wer~,~loe.ely oop.centrated; het;t~e, .th9Y.,glt,PA~-:·;~-·~.~.Be-~1U~.P~ n~g'J,g~-P,~·, QJ!',,~P,a~ ntght, Iet we sp.f'f~red gra:ate;r. lqs~eS:':AA~·-tl:l,e1,f<Q:lR~;ng:,~~Y:~,:i::-fptr:tll-~t·SJ1ee, the.,positions on MASAN OS '1P>47 e~~~d'.fiCCQl,IIGP,S;t~c :pn1_r on,:. CPI!l~Y. at 111'1-ost, .yet the- entire 2d Bat tal .. ionr ,,4.~~ Regimen~,_ _:was oJ;:de~ed:,_~, 4~·1'em;pttha.t hlll where: e~oh enellzy' shell inflteted: several;1-~¢a,a,~;L:t~e~~ ,ll'~·-ba,y>&,"(?een taught•:a le~;son at. the expense of bloodsh.e4~ · · ,,.;-,, · ,; .,,,,-;

·• 6. tf.he~ car6~~.~~~~-~~ $p~~~~if.W~Vement, if time allows, construct as many field :works. as pqss.ible ~p.i;J.e, the, t;zioops advance.. Besides the many advantag~~: :to. be gaip:eq~ f't:Pil!·. th~s:e -fie~-d, works; in· offenJ~e or defense, they will ~1so help~ to· .. decrease ~the·nu:m-b~u;·:iQf:_ oa'fmal-ties suffered, by reinforcementsra ~-, th~y. ar.e . .'be;i~ JQr9ll,gh1J·:j~:g,4:;t>:01Jl;:·t.l\e .riaar •

. :·~1.:. ;Offio~~~':-~t.:,th~-triid~le·;~~-tk{i6~~f ranks were unable. to take adventage of opportunities, assume ini~iative.'al1d coordinate ·their movements at the right -moment~.•::' They7. fa·iU;,pd· t() .. t.ak~t a~-ta-ge ot- opport-unities ·by.. Which the·:. enemy· coul!d.,ha:ve\ beerh;C~ll'lplote~y;.~;nihile:w~i.- ·For instance, when the 2d Battal!Pn; ·:343d·~lt:egim,en~,:')Wa~E)~:tt-Sek$~·,~AS:A;N·, .. ~nemy ~r-aops were discove:Ired .tO: be···I!IO\ljJng· at.:t~a-:baser:,of; ·t·h~· t:nount~m in disorderly ;formation bu·t·di-d· n~t·~'at~tA~ki·";tnfoH'~~y1~ -Jini·;a:not[petr ;inatance,, the: ;3.d Battalion of the 343d Rogiment•1PJl~:·:~t$":l;>~~;tngs{;l'e~1:'1ti!lg,!-n ~~ck- of. cooperation. The 1st Battalion, 344th ltegimant"r'dfd not conipJ,:ete' :tts mia:sion to attack the enemy. The · 3!l<Sattal!:Oti ~r;;: :t'tie, :344:b)l' R~g~ent· <1.-i:d, -npt exploit .its success and contii1\l'e t~t:L att,ai.c1t ia:fte-l}'Lit('~he•d-~c~tipi;~(ii;£he~·hilltOpS on ~th,$ front; instead it wa4.ted·;ror th,e:,:e~ernY,''l'Zlthout:;;4.aun'al1big:,,afl -&ttaalc whieh could have in· flicted hff&v~e:r ~a-s~l ti~{!: :~pon, ~h~ ~~~Y: ·~~ · · . ,,, ,

. 8; · .Inaacuracy of combat rep()rt~: During the course of the battle, the· 34.:3d Regiment ·sent in a repo:rt stating that it had entered CliiPYONG-NI an4 .!ias, ,9rganizing attacks to be l'auhched against PONGMr'·SAN, ·-while ootually it h,ed'. not e~en. ~!'~fH~Eid.ip~,~ailtop,d-~::/~!'~l;l:again,. the 344th Regiment false:ty .~~parte!l,;co,~pU,:t;~9i:i:::'of :th~;)j:iis't~:!stege, ·preventing the higher comm~ and ·rroll'l mt'1kini t"h'Efp-roper :aeeisloh"• ,, ' ' .

9. I~terrupte·a and ~~layedr~omtmin:tcation: ·· Divisions. were unable to send timely situation reports to artnies, and armies cO\ild not ~form divis• ions of their: 4ltel1tio~s(~li~~bi>gr\l.a~ly'::Etfff1qting the ,control of the battle. For i}lstat;tce, . a~, :o:rder t() ,~teroept .. the enemy at 1800 hours of the ,~15th w~s re·ceiygdirby the:tr;tti!/$ion::a-t''0330hdurs on the 16th. 'The result . was that troo"p;,d£~pl:~,tc~meri~S'Were. carried 'OU:t'-fn haste • '

' : . :···,_, ·:.,.::,-~'~lf,~ .. ,·:!.~::·<'~\~:·;,: .·, ,·-~ .. ~.!?"".''~··,, .. _, .. ·~·.;·~<·-' ··".· .

. · 10. · : Inexperi:enc~ ~r.-~tyision~. ~n c~rry1ng our inter~eption: Troop displacetnentS were ~cai.Z.i'ea : 6ut 'tb9 <hastily, ·a~fecting the. mo.rale. of the troops. They were not aware' th2t:i,:the primary. intention of enentV reinforcements was. to rescue their troops surrotmded at OHIPYONG·NI, and that with~ out knowing tho ~tentioll''crf bur·disp],ae'ements; the. enemy did not dare attack immediately. · · · ·' · ·

2 Ann~xes . , . ..~· ... .-> _. . . . Y:·· . -\-:··· ~nex No. f gyerl9l CliiP~Q~G-NJ:,~l:.?50,gpo. fl.fUlex No .. 2. Overl-ay Cij:IgJQNG-~!! ;l; 50,000..

4.'" ·, <~';r

'··' ,,


,PRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

r J.JL.\J'-IlVVIt ·~'-'-

_AuL~on:ytfitl) '78S!D I ByJ:.kL.NJM Oat~ l)-).fl

0288

'' ,:, .. - __ ,,.::· ·''· ,'.' ._! >

.Bl'!'TIE OF OHIP'ftl\1G-NI

i4-~~ J'eb,. 5L.

. 'I'h~ following ove~:j:ay~ were p~par~d by the G-2 Section, EUSAK,to give a clearer picture, at tl:J,e diapositiqn and movement of CCF units in the attack;.

-+ .. cs 70-.

--. _--_cs, .. sor. .,-

OVER_UY:' KOREA; ' -JJ/B 55.2

'., ' '", .

' ~~f-}115 XX

-@'9ju6

> HOEIDSON}-

WONJU

_j__ cs 20

l DS 00

(


,PRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

0289

,/'---

....,._""'-' l\J\JU ,._...,

AuL~on:y#MJ·'78SID 1.

ay~fw ·Nm o~t~ I;~;;.r 1

··· 'CON Fl 0 El\J TIAL

--t-' cs so cs 78

BA'lTLE Qr CH!El'YONG-NI

. . 14-16 Fab 51

" .. ) .. ·. ..

/ I

' . \.

0 KW .ANGY .AKG

3~343~~343

J fL: KOKSU·RI

)

I ' lcs: 4o

OVERL\Y KOREA.t 1:50,000

>.MS 1751

. cHUJ~4-Nr .·. g~~c ~---~-~

I