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Korean War

38th Infantry Regiment - Command Report - August 1951

2nd Infantry Division

Korean War Project Record: USA-137

Folder: 060005

Box: 06

File: 05

National Archives and Records Administration

College Park, Maryland

Records: United States Army

Unit Name: Second Infantry Division

Record Group: RG407

Editor: Hal Barker

Korean War Project

P.O. Box 180190

Dallas, TX 75218-0190

http://www.koreanwar.org

Korean War Project 2ID-00400517


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DECLASSIFIED -;. l\.cJTIPri.ty. r.au\JQ7'&5lO(

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SECRET

OOMHA.:ND REPORT E OSIIIS-:5 (Rl) (OSGP0-28)

38TH H!J!~:tlTRY HEGD-1J~:HT

for

1 thru 31 August .51

Assigned to: 2d Infantry Division APO 248 US Army

Approved by: .. '

d~J~ FRANK T. MILDREl'T Lt Col Inf Commandine;

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;\EPRODUCEO AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES i DECLASSIFIED 1.. :~-- - -- : --

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SECRt1 1. ~.t:JWt.ti [\IN Q 7 gs;or ,. D c {- 1..\.l,'t>f\ "f"l • I h-./tiL

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TA:BLF. OF CONTENTS

A U·';US t 1951

SECTIOH I. COMliAlTIJ REPORT

A. Table of Contents

B • Harrat i ve S1.unmc.ry

c. Personnel (S-1)

D. Intelligence (S-2)

E. Operations (S-J)

F. Logistics (S-4)

G. }~valuation & Recommendations

H. Staff

SECTIOH II.o SUPPORTING DOCUJ:iENTS (Appendices)

_ A. Personnel-

1. S-1 Journals

2. PDS Reports

3. General Orders

l1-. Hiscellru1eous Personnel Data

B. Intelligence

1. S-2 Journals

2. Periodic Intelligence Reports

3. Overlays (Patrol

c. Operations

1. S-3 Journals

2. Periodic Operations Reports

3. Operation Orders

4. Haps

5. HiscellEmeous Operations Data

1. S-L~ Journals

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SECRET (S:;;CTIOlJ II. TAJ3L1~ OF COirTENTS JULY 51)

1st :Battalion

1. S-1 Journals

2. S-2 Journc.ls

J. S-J Journals

F. 2nd Battalion

1. S-1 Journc:.ls

2. S-2 Journe1ls

J. S-3 Journals

G~ Jrd Battalion

1. S-1 Journals

2. S-2 Jom•nals

J. S-J Journals

D~CLASS!FIED

~.t:Jt\Yriy:..nJ c.,) Q 7 '65/0 l 1j By .. £~ t:iAAI\;{).ate JlJa!JJ j .Q ::~~~-:-~--- ···~-·---. --! __ _

H, ii>e:rvice Gompru:ey= (Joi:iraala ~

I. He<wy !-Iortar Company (Jou't'nrus

J. Tank Company (Journals

X. J~ctl1crln.nd8 DetaclJ;;:Gllt

S£CRE1


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gr'FI'J ..:(«1) CSG; '?0-"2'i 0 .l. ! --' .I.. ..

SECRE1 Cormn.and B.epo1·t J8tl: Infontry 1-31 Ang1st 51 for

period of 1 thru 31 Au,::;ust 1951

Occupying recimentaJ. objectives securecl late in Jul;r, the 38th Infantry be-

ga.n the month of Au::;nst in relative quiet.

Besides organic units, the RCT hc;.d attached. to it, Com1v:ny 11 0 11 , 82ncl APJt; the

109th Korean :!ie.giment; Compan;',r 11 C11 t 72n<l Tan.k Il.od;talion; a.nd the _511-th Counter-

fire Platoon, the last 1mit be in,:; o.tta.ched effective 021200K August. Compa;:w 11 0 11 ,

1 2nd Engineers 1:/2.S :i.n clirect surrnort.

One squad-sizecl reconnaiss2.Ilce patrol from each battalion "'as dispatched on

1 August a.ll '>iith negative results.

Enemy a:etiller~r continuecl to fall on the rec;iment 1 c :uositions v!i th Jrd Bat-

te.lion reC·3ivinG an estinated 81 rouna.n of 76Hrvi artillery on l AU[,'USt.

On 2 Auguct, the 38th ROT CP moved from its previous location to the vicinity

of DT16L!-255. Heavy Hortar Compa;1~r noyccl. to :0'1.'16lf.255 an(l T82.'.k Company moved to a

2 nevi location in the vicinity of DT1682.53.

Second and. Thir'.l Patt2.lionc ancl the lfetl:crlands Det.2.clmwnt vere ordered to

dispatch strong reconnaissance patrols in tho regimental sector.

A squ.a.d.-sized reconn;:dsse.nce patrol from the Jrd Battalion observed 5 nei'F,

well constructe& enemy b'n'":';~~~ ,,_noccupicd. in the vicinity DT17'~J67. They ob-

served a bride;e at JY~l633.59 2nd returned with no contact. A 1st Ilattalion patrol

observed four oncn;r bunl::ern, also 1moccupied, b'u.t returned. v:ithout contv.ct. 2nd

Battalion and Hothcrlands Dot~:whment patrols returned vlith negative 1·cports.

Prisoner:> ~;-~ken on Aueust 2, 3 and 4- by 11 G11 Compr>.ny stated. that morale '\'las

high ancJ_ units had plenty of food e.nd a.mmcmiti..-m. They identified the 2nd and

5th HK Corps and the 27th and 12th Divisions. Prisoners reported mortar posi-

tions and Regimental CP locatiom: in villaces behind the lines.

On 4 August, 1st J3atta.lion was ordered to prepare for reli~f of the 1Teth-

crlands Detachment on 6 A11a~st and all battalions 1r1ere ordered. to dispatch

strong recor1naiss;;mce patrols. 3

1. 2. 3.

C-2 POR 1.~196 oln500K Jl.ugust 5~ .,ilSECRET C-2 POR ~~194 021500 August ~ C-2 POR ffl96 OLr-1.500 August

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- ~.cJW..ti o. 1 c.,J Q 7 gs;o l _By [/C. tW?.A-.o.ate.JJ.ia/JJ

(Cont 1d, :Narro.tive SUlllrna.r~r 1 - 31 Au:p1st 51)

All reconnaissance e~d ambus~~(:;~~out the regimental sector con-

tinued to rett1rn >'li thout enemy con tn,ct 2JJ.d. the reports f.C1r th; nit;h ts of h tn 5

Aucust \oJere nec;'ltiye. Ln P,ir cJ.rop vle>.s successfully completetl ro,t Oll-1735 August.

P ... platoon-size pa .. trol fro1.1 2nd.. 13attc.:..licnl ~Cl)a.rting C'~t 0.50545 .A.ugust • moved

v'lithout contact to th':l ,-icinit~r of DT157337 and. observ-ed. 2 cne;ny i:l a 1Yu.nker.

Splittin;:; into hro elc::1cnts, the ~pL' . .trol mo,~lc ~'n nnsuccossful c:.ttcmpt tc capture

They th'.:l o1:,servocl six onem;.r in D. clro.':; to the left of tl':-;ir :JOGition ond

becan rcceivb_: fllB.chinc ;un fi.rc fron the vicinity of :DT154J36. \lith one o.a.-

(litional Urrt, thc~.r called artillery ;;:md vlithdrm1. ~~ho IX~-trol reh,rned at ,

051600 •vi th no fm·tl~"or conte1.ct • .J..

A ::!q_u.ad-size :patrol fro:n Jrd BnttnJ.ion left c:.t 050815 :J.oc:::-:::, 2.dval1;cccl. to

DT172355 c;,n-::1. returned. 2.t 0.51715 h0u.rs with no encm;{ contact,

l'.n 8.ir n trike cc..llorl on tho reverse slopes cf Hill 983 vJ<ts conplcted by

052020 hours 11ith u..'1lmo\1/n rosul ts.

A 1st B:tttalion patrol d.eparted <J.t 060830 hours, roached tl~eir objective

2 a.t DT2183.53 o.t 1250 hours, and returnee~ at 16hO hours v:ith no enemy contrtct.

Reinforced :platoon p~;.trolc •-roro c1..ispatchcd from 2nd e.nd Jrd Battc.lions on

6 Auc,ust. Ilepo.rting at 08JO hours, ·~he 3rd Eattr:.lion comb2.t p~trol proc;resscd

to DT161:J6Ll vhcrt:.; it received long rro1gc r.w.chine c,un and mortar fire from nn

undcterminecl position. It :moved. on to DT161J58 and at lJl-r.o hourn \lG.s still

receiving mortio_r fire.

At 1600 :1ours, tho patrol c2"1lcd r:rtilJ.nr~.r in on :::uspectcd enom;r :positions.

It continucrl. to its objcetiYo, IIill ?OJ, and :occured it 1J;<r 1720 hour::: uith no

enemy c0n·tact. The patrol returned. at 061830 b.ou::~G 11i t:l> no further enemy contact.

'rhe 2nd :Bo.tt2.1ion conb0t patrol, dispatched at 060600, prococclcd to DT160Jll4

\!There it obscrvcc1• 211 un):no\-.rn number of enemy in the vicinity DT1.55J06. At 1045

hours, it rccoivccl 10 rounds of morJGa:r fire ;:m:1 discovered the.t it U<:.>,s under

direct 'lbservation fr0m du.:;-in enemy in tl:c v:\_cin.ity of DT15J0E:. :?riendly ar-

tillery a..'1d. mort::u- uas called in vii th unJ:::nmm results.

1. C-2 POH ~~197 061.500 Auc;nst 51 2. C-2 POR 1/'197 061500K Ausu~t 51

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O~CLASS!FIED

~.cJW.Jy · o. 1 cJ Q 7 gS!O l : }Y _¢e:· ~D.ateJ.IJ.a.!Jj

(Cont 1d., 1Te>.rr3.tive Sumrrt3.ry 1 -

At 121..1-_5 hours, t:r_e patrol . . of 122 mortar fire from the

vicinit~r of s~rl50JlW. Smn.ll o.rnc fire was received from the vicinit;y of DT-

155J4J. Friendly mortar vTas called \'lith unknmm results. At 1720 hours, the

patrol uas locRted a.t 160JJ.:.2 2.nd '\'Te.s rocoivine sm.?.ll arr1s fire from the vi-

cini ty of DT155J4J. /' . 1

The patrol wi thdrO\'i Emd returned o.t Ool9JO August.

Heavy :::.rt ilJ.ory a.'1d mor!io.r fire continued to fall on the rer.::iment1?.l

sector. The 2nd J:~ngineors cleared the roacl to Pia-Ri of mines on 6 August. On

7 August, a 2nd Ent,;ineers 1 ·· truck.struck a mine in the vicinity of DT16JJ18.

The enemy hail. probably remined the road during the nicht of 6 to 7 August. 2

Relief of the Netherland.::: Detachment b;y· 1st Battalion was accomplished by

061100 Aus"Ust and tho lTcthorlP-.nrls Detachment reverted to eli vision c0ntrol ..

An "E" Compan,Y platoon moved to DT17JJJ8 and set u:p a blocking position.

On 7 August, 1st J3a.tto..lion vra.s orclered. to send out 3 squwl-size recon-

naissance :patroln, 2ml Batt::.lion one platoon-s izc rccom18.isss.nce !)2.trol 2.nd Jrd

Be>.ttalion 2 sq_'\:k<t.cl-sizo 2w."1d one platoon-B ize patrol. One of lst :Ba.ttalion 1 s

patrols received Lmchine gun fire hol(ling it U:? but it later moved on •·rith no

further conta.ct. The other tvo :patrols made no enem:r contact.

2nd 3;: .. ttalion 1 s platoon-·sizc :patrol c1.cpartci 070600 J..ur;ust. Hear DT162JI-J.8

it received machine cun fire. In <'ttchlpts to move north ;::,nd. ilrost, it again en-

countered the cneny. Tl1o p~trnl .,rit}:dre;·r c-.nd pl8.Ccd mortar 2.nd. r:.rtillery fire

on the enemy as they a.ttomptei to fellow the pa.trol. After receivinG light

mortar fire, the pc-.. trol continued tm,rarcl Hill 773 but i'lere held up by small

arms fire "frcn a...'1 cctimated 25 enemy locv.tea in the vicinity of DTJ..58JJ5. At "

1945 hours, the patrol brol;:o contact e.nd -returned to its position.3

Jrd Battalion squad-size patrol had no enemy contact but its platoon-size

patrol, dispatched at 070620, received small arms fire from 1mdcternined enemy

positions. After gaining their o1ljective at J.lWO, their comnunice.tions i\"ent

0nt. They entered the village of Pia,..Ri (DT16l!J51) a.nd fo1.1l:td the roari im~

passable to trr.t.ffic. Cuttinc a l'orth :Z:orec:.n commmicc.tion 11~~:;, the patrol re-

turned. to its battalion area by 18)0 hours l'rith no further contact.

1. C-2 POR '.7198 071500 .A.ugu.st 51 2. 3-2 PIR #161 071500 AUG1.1St 51 J. C-2 POR /fl99 081500

August 51 SECRET .,. 3


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(Cont'cl, J:Trt.rrc:.ttvo S1.1.!,:nc.ry l- Jl

Four patrols ;Jere d.isp2tel1cii sg_uo.d-nizo reconnaissance

:p2.trolo from lst :Sa,ttc;lion anc}_ a. pl2.toon-~izc p2·.trol :fr(r:n JrQ :S;:;.tb.lion h8.d. no

eneny cont:<.ct.

11 C11 Company, reinforced for combat e.ctivity, clcpartcd friend.l:r lines at

0806ho hours a:.-tcl ::::.bost iirb<1odio.tcl:r thoror<.fter cnL;~.;~·cd. Cll enemy platoon. Ar-

tiller;{, tank :::.nd mo':::-tar fire d.irrperscd tho eneny. lTear !Iill 773 they received mor-

tar and. autom!l.'~ic veaponn fire. At 1100 hours, tho patrol obscrvec1 an estimated

enemy company dug-in on IIill 77J, in tho vicinit:r of D'n5335lJ·, aml placed mortar

e.nd artillery on tho1:1. L t 1230 hourn, one pl2.toon left the cor:1pa.ny to move north

tovTf'.r<l the village of Pia,-Ri while the rest of the co;npany moved up the slopes

of Hill 773. Enco\mtcrinc; ll11Jllorous mines a.ncl boohy trCJJJS, the company suffered

~ l·TT~ 1 ..) \l .L...':l..

The compru~r 1 s m<:neuvcrin:3 pl:s.toon observed. o.n ene"ly comp2~lJ...Y cii6gin,; in at

:OT15~35h; ca.llc:l B,rtillery in on t.hcm ond. :::nrunc southrrcst +::o ::ml.5'?3'-l-?. It ob-

served a11 ell8r!1~T corn_pany 2LLva.:1ci11G tovra.rcl~ tl:cr:J. frorrr I~ill 703 rJ.J.cl 2~1lot.b.c1 ... cntirr:at-

eel enemy compon~r o.p:proo.cl:L1-3 f rmn tLc cliroction of Hil}. 773. :rt ''it1-:llT8~"' c..nd.

att,J:(yt::d. to withdra\v fm··thcr. The platoon broke through killing approximately

2 12 ~::m:;:TlJ". The company returned to friendly lines by 082110 hours. The plc-,toon

the.t had gone north had. lost radio conto.ct and had returnee\_ forminG a perimeter

for the night outsit"'.e 11 1311 Comp~uzy'r> lines. It closed into 11 1~ 11 Company's area

at 091340 August • :~. -~

On 9 August, one platoon-size and 5 squad-size patrols v1ere dispa,tched. ~he\

sg_ua.d-size patrols had no enemy conta,ct but ·tl:.e platoon-size patrol from 3rd Bat-

talion enzacoo. an estimated enemy platoon at 111.5 hours in the Yicinity of DT-

·16836.5. They vrithdre,.,. 1_50 yaJ.~ds and continued the engagement for one 2..nd a half

hours. Artillery could not be called. in due to communi cat ion fp,ilure. The

enem:r withdrew >'lith an estimatctl l;. casualties. The patrol continued on its

1. C-2 POR ~/,200 091.500 Au::,'1lst 51 2. C-2 POR ,/,b2QO 091500K A usus t 51

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D~CLASSIFI8J

- ~.cJW..Ii (11A) Q 7 S5/0 ( :· /

!0' . .f. C. OOA n.ate J/J.Q/JJ ~~-$ 441Q.. , .. -------! (Cont 1d, lT:::.rrative Summarir 1 - 31 August 51)

micsion vuith no further contact.1 SECRET

Five patrols 'tvere C!.ispatched on 10 lmc;ust. 2ncl Battr>.lion p!>.trol number 21

called ·artillery fire onto suspected enemy positions i-rith estimated 5 enemy KIA.

All 4 squP-l'l-size patrols returned \vithout direct eneny contac'li. A Jrd J3A.ttalion

platoon-size patrol enr.;aged an ~estim:?.ted. J enemy but reported no casualties.

Ho further ene'!ly conte.ct vras roportecl.

At 102llij Aug;u.ct, 1st Battalion reported a small :!_)robing attack but flares

and dofunsive mortar fire d.is:rorsed the enemy.

An engineer mine laying dete.chment reported a five minute fire fight e.fter

2 which the enemy i1ithdrmr.

A 2nd Batta.lion squad-size patrol on 11 Augu.st received ::small arms fire

tn the vicinHy of DT158JJ5. They could not employ art illet;t successfull._y be

cause of communication failure and :poor ~ridbi1ity.3 Other patrols had no

enol11y contact and nmbush potnts set up in the rec;iment2.l sector returned \'lith

neg~tive results.

Of the six patrols dispatched on 12 AU[;1..tSt (sec 12 !'!.U-61.18·1; P'='.tr0l Plan

da;l;ecl 11 Au.0 1st) four returned >iithout contact. A squn.d.-~·dze :patrol from

2nd Batt:'!.lion located 8 to 10 •::ncr;~y in tte Yicinity of DT159JJ8. Artiller;sr

a.nd mortar fire vlerc placed \'lith e.."tcellent results and the patrol retu.rned to

base.

Another squad-size patrol from 2nd Battalion received light machine gun.

fire near DTJ.6L!-J5J at 12091!·0 August • Hovine; on tmvard Hill 703, it again re-

ccived small arms fire from 2.11 estimt?.ted 10 or 15 enemy. Th; patrol vTithdrC\v

into the to\m of Pia-Ri (DT161352) end returned at 1920 hours after pin-:point

lJ. inf other enemy bm1kers near H.ill 703.

Pa~trols for 13 Au.gu.st follmrcd. the sa.me :pattern of lJrevious days. One

squad-size p2,trol from 2nd. Battalion }Jrogresse<i to t Le south slopes of Hill 773

a.nd received small aTJ11s .and automatic 'vea11ons fire. The r·a.trol heard machine

gun fire beine directed at friendly :plm:cs ma..king runs for an air strike on

Hill 900. Artillery vm.s not delivered due to friendly planes flying over the

1. . ?..-2 PEl ffl6lJ. 101500 A11 :-v~t 2. C-2 POR 'rr202 111.5001: Augu.s t 3. C-2 POR i~203 121.500 August lr. C-2 POR f/,20h 131500 fr.UQJst

51 SECRET .51

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O~CLASSIFIEO

~J:Jhori.ty :.AJ cJ Q 7 & S!O f r _By c (i: flMf\ n.ate J!JoiJJ

mule tra.ir:. mov-inc s ot:.tll

1 frrm ~~ill 121JJ uith unl:::n.mm rcsu.:'. tn.

On 111. Aut,"U.st, tt<Io of t1~o cic;..ht :pa.trols dispatched mo.c1e contact v:l.th the

enem.v. Obr:er.ro.tion posts reywrtr=.rl sr;ver8.1 inst;;nces of £::-1all enem~r croups mov-ing

south; como movl11::; on o, 1'c::.c1 in tho vic·.init:r of DT15JL:-OG.

,., t:..

A 2ncl BattD.lio;.l sq_1H.:.d-sizo l>8.trol on 15 Au.;;us+, reco:1.vcd fire no2.1' a road

at DT16JJ2l~. Aftor lt •• 2 inch nortar fire fo.ilod. to neutralize the cnsn~r a. rein-

forced. c-.qn.r;d. i·Iatl rli3l"Ja'GCtcC. to 2.S:::ist the rmtroL At 1530 hours, the patrol ·.:as

in the vicinity of DT1653J5. .:~s tho :p2.trol a'ivD.nccd all enorw firing ceased and

the patrol completed its illir:sion vrith no further enemy cont<~ct or obscrvo.liion.

Other :patrols and. v.mlm::.;L points l~c'.G. nec;::.t:i.·vc re:po:rts •3

At 161700 A:n,:_;1.1St, three patra1s received. he2.-v-;:v ontonw.tic uo.<:~pons 2.11(1 small

c:.rtillery fire vti'th lli1lmo1:in result;;:, ::u/L :·ctnrncd to their battalion c-.rea. An-

. other patrol reported an e':l ~ '.:::~d~oo. oncm:r corrrpa:.;_;r on ]TiJ.J. 0')h (.:)?li~J?) a.r~J. do-

siez~::;.n advo.ncc patrol bo.sc in t.he Yic:inH~.- of ~'ill ')8J (D'PIJJJ). lst ]3?.tt2.lion

c•Ias ordered to relieve 2nd Batto~lion :prior to 171000 Aw:~ust, 1·1it:~ the mission of

defending tl:0 =~".l':S8.S Line and providinc lo:;ictico.l support to other b.?.tt::tlions.

Jrd Battalinn •;as ord.c:red to t2.k0 over lst Bo.tts.lion's :prc'.~ioun positions ancl

the 2nd. Bc:.tta.lion \va::; ordered. to movn to a forvw.rd. assenbly e>.rca in tho vicinity

of DT169351. '~imc of 1\ TilD..X 1..rrtU.l11 effort to take

lr prisoners of war WBs ordered. i

Three po.tro1s were sent out on 17 Au{._?,1.1.st. A reinforced plato0n l):>.trol frm-:1

Jrd :So.tte .. l.ion Lc.d. t::C.o uws::.0n o:f :-;ottine Uj_1 i:;locldni,-:; :;osHionfl on =~ill 1179 and

a.n U.l1...'11.u;1bered hill a.t D:r:'1.57J68.. I•1oving to the second blockinG :position, elo-

tlents of the pB.trol received hoC':i.'Y automatic ':rcepons G.nd small G .. rnf.> fire from

2.11 enemy comp8J:l)r• The patrol withd.re'\1 to Tiill 751~ anQ. called il:. 'lri;illery.5

~: t~ ;ii ~~~~ i~·i;~g 1~~~~ ~i SECRET J. C-2 POl1 17-207 161500 AU£ust 51 4. C-J Opr Order foJ8 161700 Auf~St 51 5. TI-2 rm !!171 171500 August 51

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cnem~· cont.:~.ct.

At lCOL}QO .t" ... u 0.c:u::;t, the Zncl. :!Jo.tt.:~.lion clc]Klrtod. He for\v.:~.rcl c.o::tcm"!Jly n.roc. a.nd. ' .

pasced throu.:;h clcmentn of tho Jrd. Dr-.ttalion to attack: .:md niczc t1.·ro clo:::c-in

objective:::. :By 0745 hour::;, 11 1!,11 Compa;w lwil ::dozed Obj.octivc X, 11 G11 Company

rcmu.incrl on the o1Jjcc'd7c ~·;hi1c wr,ll Go:n~_)~.n:r D.uv:;.ncocl tovarcl 01Jjoctive ~·r. It \/&..S

1 sieze<l at 18U10 Au.::::uot.

DT17JJ75. !~rtillcr:r uo..s cc.llccl. for ti·tico ~'lHl the mr\chino Qlll firo :::topp~ti o.ftcr

fire. 2

Art iller~r VIa:-: r:o.J.loG. in ;-ri th m1l;::noun rcnu.1 tn.

Three pe>.tro}_::; (li8~c.tchccl 011 13 ;'.u::;'L:.:::t :rc·tun1cd 'l·rithout conk.ct ~:mel. throe

1ery uas cmplo:rcd. 'irith ml1a1oi!:l :L'C:::1.U. t::;. All other }1~'.trol::; <~ncl 2.~;1bu:::h points

returned \d thout con·bJ.ct. 'rJwrc ;;a::; D. noticD.blc d.ccrca:Jc in o:1C::l;: c.rtilJ.cr~r ~d

morto~· fire fo.1l.int:; in tbo rc,;;imm1tal ::;cc1;or.

along -:. ric1.gc on ~UJ.l 105?. T::nr rc]1ortd. J;h::>. ~: ti~ip flares lH'oYiou::::l~r set b~r the

23rd Infantr~r hac.1 'been picked up b~r tho enemy.

A prinonc1· of -.ro.::- captured. b~r 11E 11 Comp<JJl;,~ in the vicinity of :DT150J65, idcnt-: ·

ificd the 2nd Comp.:1~·, 2nd. Eat~;:.!.icn, J.ll·th 2cc:;imcnt, 27th lrortll Xorcru1 Divi::;ion.

Gomn<::Jlir 1·cco ivorl 5'7iJ r rocoil1c::;::: rifle :fire from uco·~

slope of !UH 702. At 1500 hour:::, it obscJ.·vc:<l canr1~r Cl'O'L~pG '-\L) to J 0 men each

movl. n·· ~out'11 o'l , •. ;, 1 "'0 .... t~ """ .r. .. .......... ~- • { .) •

20 to 25 cncny. t11Q CHOli1~T \l<.'.G ;J.1J1C to L;Ct fricnd.lir ponitiono

unclcr conccD.lmcnt of 1l'lllerbrr.sh, thc~r t·fcrc rili1cllcd lJy 01(30 ho1.u·::;. J

One ::::q'l.l.ad.-slzc patrol ua:J di:op.::-.tchcd f1·om Jrd J3atta1ion on ~1 Aue"ltnt to

· reconnoiter Hill 1059. The pa~;·cl nccomplinhcd its mission t'v'i th no cnePr.v contact.

A plo.tc.on of 11I, 11 C0npany in blo<'.king poe it ion (vicini t;r :r)T167)6lf.)ronw.inod

1. C-2 :::en .1'210 1::'1500 Au.:_-;u:c t ~iSECRET .., C-2 :POR .1210 1?1500 A.u.:.,-ur:;t "• 3. J3-2 PIR ~:~175 211500 Aug;ust .Sl

- 7 -

: '' )

l I l


(0ont 1d, !larrative Suru..ary 1 31 A(\st ~REl

The:v retu=ed to the first b1ockine wE~n and spent

enemy contact.

the night without

At 100400 AUpl..l.St, the 2nd Battalion del)aJ:'tod its foTitard assembly .arec. and,

· passed through elements of the Jrd Battalion to attack and sieze t\'IO close-in

J3y 0745 hours, "F11 Compa11;y had aiezed Obj,ective X, 11 G11 Company

·remained. on the objective ";hilo 111' 11 Company advanced tovrard Objective W. 1

siez.ed at 18Ul0 AUQ""Unt.

At 181526 A.uguat, npll Compa.ny received machine gun fire from the

DT~7337.5. Artillery \vas called for tvlice a.nd the machine gun fire stopped

the second concentration. A~:;s.in at 171.5 hours, "F" Company received

fire. 2

Artillery was collect in ivi th u...J.knO\m results.

Three pB.trols dispa.tchecl on 18 Aus11nt returned vTithout conb.ct and three

:patrols Here sent out on l9 August. The :Jr_cmy 1ifa:J engaged ncar DT2036.

1ery was employed with w11mo\ill results. All other p2.tro1s and rurrbush points

returned without contact. There >va3 a noticablo decrease in enemy artille:r.r

mortar fire fall.ing in tho re,:;imental sector.

On 20 Au;::~unt, a :p&trol :'t0stro:rcd seven ene::J,_v bu.J.l:::srs 2.nd set up trip

along D. ridge on Hill 10.59. T:Ky reported tha~ trip flares previously set by th~ ...

23rd Infantry had been picked up by the enemy.

A prisoner of var captured by 11E11 Company in the vicinity of :OT15036.5,

ified the 2nd Company, 2nd 13attc.lion, llJ.th :?.egiment, 27th Horth Korean Division,.

On 20 August, 11F11 Company received 57HM recoilless rifle fire from 1.1est

slope of Hill 702. At 1500 hours, it observed enemy groups up to 30 men

moving south on Fill .703. Artillery \.rae placed \>Ji th m1l;:nov;n results.

At 210350 Au::,1.1ct, 11 F11 Compcny recei'Ted a probing att;"tck from an estimated

20 to 25 enemy. Althou&lJ. the enemy vras a'ble to get close to friendly posltions I

under concealment of underbrtu:;h, they vrcre repelled by 0430 hours •3

One squad-size patrol "'as dispatched from 3rd Battalion on 21 August to '

reconnoiter Rill 10.59. The patrol accomplished its mission with no ene~

A platoon of 11L 11 C ompw..y in blocking position (vicinity DT167364 }remained

C-2 POR #210 171500 C.-2 -poR }fo210 191.500 ~ PIR w175 211500

AUa"1.1St Aut,7Ust August

;iSECRET 51

- 7-


' !EPROOUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES ,

(. ~ ••• .'~-' -.,-.o"T~ '1

'-, \

!,....___~-~ -- - ..,...__..,,. -- ._. -------~·---,....;

(Cont•d, Narrative Summary' 1- 31 A:ugqJJ~.~5J.~R .. El~· ''·t~i ·~' ' \.E r1 ,...,'~,.}I

in position until 271230 August with no ene~ contact.

\,

~--

'·

DECLASSIFIED ~.t:JW..I)': [\1 rJ.Q 7 '6510 l

':· /

•. _By_( c ~An.ateJl~ I I f"¥ ·-

A ro-rinc patrel sent forward from "G" Compa.DT to DT165.371 reported no eneJQ"

contact. One squad of "G" Companr dispatched to maintain a security outpost

at a bridge at DT165367, remained thro~ 26 August with no enemy contact.

:Between 1835 and 1900 hours 21 Aug11st, "F" Compaq was attacked. by an

unknown number of enemy employing 76MM artille17 and smal.l arms fire. "F":

Compa.tl7 casualties were 3 KIA and 13 WIA. The enemy withdrew and friendly 1

artillery was placed on suspected ene~ positions.

On 23 August, "F" CompallY' received two small probing attacks; one at OJJO

and one at 0500 hours. A CTC carrying party deli veri~ supplies to "F" and "G"

Companies• positions was diw.persed on its return trip by friendlr artiller,y

overages from the 9th Infantey sector. All patrols dispatched returned with

negative results.

Extensive patrolling was carried out in the regimental sector on 24 Augast.

A 2nd Battalion sq~size patrol received small arms fire in the vicinity of DT-

158373. It employed a.rtille17 and reported two eneJDY' KIA and four WIA.

A squa,d,..size patrol from .3rd Battalion was attacked by 25 to ,30 eneJq oa

its objective at DT196374. The patrol withdrew with one KIA and two WIA, closing

into-friendly lines at 241910 August• No estimate of en~ casualties was given.

Other patrols and a CTC carrying party had no enemy contact.~

At 2.50930 Augus~, 2nd Battalion's CP moved to the vicinity of DT167J3le

Four patrols dispatched on 25 A~t returned by 2025 hours with negative re-

ports. Platoon-size roving patrols continued to go out from "G" Coap&llT each

~ but reported no en~ contact,

A 2nd Ba.ttal.ion Platoon of 81MM mortars which had been attached to 1st Bat-

tal1on was released to parent unit control effective 251800 ~t. It relocat

ed at DT167338. One platoon of Heavy Mortar Company moved from DT163J03 to

DT164328.J

On 26 August, one patrol received small arms fire from Hill 1059~ another

was fired on in the vicinity of DT162377• A platoon-size patrol received small

1. C-2 POR #213 221500 AU€QSt 51 2. C..2 POR #216 251500 August 51 3 • C-2 POR #217 261500 August 51


with unknown results. Other patrols had negative reports.

E.f1emy probing attacks bec§.Ule more fr(3quent and mortar a.nd artillery fire I

increased throughout t~e regimental sector. At 262225 August, the 2nd B~ttalio~

forward CP received machine gun fire from Rill 773 (vicinity DT1533). At ~ne

hour later 11rere receiving a small probing attack. At 270030 hours,, 11 ! 11

,.,as. engaged with an estimated enemy comp~ approaching .from the North.

minutes later the enemy broke contact.

11 G11 Company was now quiet but e.t 0055 hours, "F" Company received small

arms fire from their right flank. At 0105 hours, two green flares were sight~d

over 11 F 11 and 11 G11 Companies 1 positions. At 0140 hours .• the 2nd Battalion OP ob

served two or~nge flares followed by two green flares, followed by another

flare a minute later and shortly thereafter by still another orange flare.

By 0200 hours, i1G11 Company was engaged in a heavy fire fight.

was attacked on its right flank at 0245.

Meanwhile, 2nd :BattaJ.ion 1 s 8J.W.f Hortar Platoon received light fire from

the vicinity of DT1653J6. At 0515 hours, the 3rd Battalion CP was

in a fire fieht a.nd. nrn Company received another small probing attack.

the enemy broke contact in the 3rd. Battalion sector but by 0620, after

two green flares to the east in the "Pu11Ch :Sovrl 11 , 11 I 11 Company \·laS' again engaged

1.-.rith an estimated enemy company.

At 0635, the I & R Platoon vras engaeed. ,,dth an m:Urnmm nu1nber of enemy on

thret;') sides of their positions o.n Hill 1001. A platoon from 111\.11 Company was· s

to .their cdd. "F" Company was still engaged and a fon1ard pla.toon of

reported a t'ilO hour attack by 2..n estimated enemy platoon, causing t·.~To

KIA. and three UIA.

The enemy hacl moved betvvoen 3rd Battalion on Hill 1179 and the I & R

Platoon,on llill 1001 a..nd also between Rill 1001 and the 3rd Battalion's CP.

Jrd :Battalion 1 s 8U11~ Hortar Platoon was engaged in a fire fight.

11 G11 Company suffered 1+ KIA and 3 t'!J.A from intense mortar fire, but at·

270910 August moved forvmrd vlith 11F 11 Company to engage an estimated enemy pla,...

~oon, Find.ing that the enemy 1<Tas in battalion strength, they \'lithdrevT to better

.defensive positiono. Later, they received heavy mortar and artillery fire and

- 9-

SECRET ··~


1

~ .iEPROOUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES

. -l ~~-~~-·-· ··---····-. -. . J.·

~------·---'--'~---___J

(Cont 'il, narrative Sunnnary 1 - 31 f.>>c-;usECREl "ere en~e.;;ed with an unkno>:u number os enemy.

D~CLASS!FIED · ~·. ~.t:Jnon.ty ·. l\ 1 rJ Q 7 gs;o t

I·

I~Y cf!:-tW.A;o.a:eJ!JaiJY ~~W'G ''"'' .,-..-·--.---!,

__ )

11 G11 Company 1•m.s forcecl to ':Jithdra\..r after a penetration 0f its riGht flank.

11 E11 Compony moved for1'r".rd to relieve "G" Com::c!any <:md. 11 G11 ComiJan..v pulled back 1

into battalion reserve.

At J.2L!-J hours, 11 1-'; 11 Compa.ny roport,::d :::m unknmm number of enemy had infil-

trated to tho front of its positions.

':~ith enemy attacks continuing, tho 2nd J3a.tbli~"n CP moved fr~m DT164343 to

DT174J20, closins into nov; loco.tion at 271300 AU[,"USt. At 1251, 3rd :Battalion's

for\·rard CP moved to the vicinHy of :r:=nl llh8. 3y 1400 h011.rs, 11E 11 Company was

in better defensive positions south of the village of Pia-:::u e>nd 11 F11 and 11 G11

Companies v1ere · derloycd. & .. cross the ro2.d s 01.tth of I'ia-Ri.

:B:r verbal orrJ.cr of th.n Commo.ncUn.:; C}encral, the 35th anrl 36th Korean Regi-

2 mcr.ts e.nd 11 G11 Compan,_v of the 23rd Infantry t•rore attached to t:1c 38th InfaiJ.try.

The 2nd :Sn,tt:J.lion, 35th Koreo.n Rcciment v:as employed to :plug the gap between

11 E 11 Company's left flanl: and !!.ill 773. Tt>To tn:11~:S '<Jere sent to ~:;upport 2nd Eat-

talion, 38th Infantry. ~?hree moro tank platoons \'lent fol'\·m.:r:rl to support action

in the vicinity of Eill 773 and Pia,-Ri.3

At 280230 Aus"Ust, it 11ras learl1ed that tl:e 36th Korea:!:l Tieciment had vacc:>.ted

their positions on Rill 773·

Probing attacks \1ere received betveen 11 K11 f:-..'1d 111 11 Companieo and by 11 I'1 Com-

pa:ny. TJ:ree patrols dispatched from Jrd :Battalion tV'ere recalled to enable firing .

of artillery.

:By 28121.5 Au[,-ust, .::ill estimated enemy 1Jatt:J..l::.on Has engaging all friendly·.

units along the entire ridge line from DT20i~J55 to DT215332. Tho I & R Platoon:':·l'

and a 11 X11 Company platooil ',;ere heavily· ont;o.god at DT205J50 and e. "G11 Company pla-

toon ,.,as forced bac1:: to the cornrlar.y positions from Hill 1001.4

:By 1400 hours, the 35th Koro.::m Regiment had occupied Rill 773. An 11F 11 Com-

pan,_v platoon relieved e.n 11 E11 ComparJY r)latoon on Hill 530. 11 G11 ·Company, 23rd In-

fantry ani posi :;ions on Hill 1001 ;..rere attacked at 162.5 hours. 11 K11 Company ,.,as

un0.er general <?.ttacl::.

1. C-2 POR 7;~218 271500 Aua:.,"U.Gt 2. C-2·POR '/f219 281500 August 3.

,... .., v-t... POR ,/,1,219 281500 Aucust

4. C-2 ?OR /f220 291500 August

51 51 51 51

SECRET

- 10-


. ) D~CLASSIFIEO

i 1: (\J:JhoriJy' l\1 t>l Q ·j t5'/0t IJ_BY c!f:· ijAAArJ?..ieJl.Ja.IJJ

(Cont 1d, Naxrative Su~ary- 31 August 51)

The )6th Korean P~giment reve~~,~~~\~J~Jt:' .• r](~O~ I 44 Wtt ... ·--

-- ·•·---------------'

of its parent unit and the

entire 2nd and Jrd :Be.ttalions of the 23rd Infantry vJere atta.chei to the J8th

RCT. 11 E11 e.nd 11 F11 Companies, 2JrJ bfantry, tied in Hith their 11 G11 Company

positions and the Jro. Battalion 2Jril. Infa.:lt!ir moved into tho 1st :Battalion,

38th Infantry area.

Probing attacks decreased all alonG tile sector ?ni by 290305, all unit ~e~

ports v.rere negative. Light probing att0.cks were received. tJ:.e next morning by

11 L11 Company increasing to about 2 enem;,r platoons by 291J.:OO August. Tho enemy

1 wi thd.rm1 by lJOO hours.

At 1502 hours, 11 :811 Company t-ms cne;aged in a sme.ll srms fire fight in the

vicinity of DT218330 and later \vi thdrcv1 to place :;;:.rtillery on enemy employing

heavy autom;;:..t ic ':!capons fire.. 11 :B11 Conrpmw repollod further ~.ttack::: o.nd broke

contact nt 1055 hours.

11 K" Company and the I & R Pl8.toon \vere attack:ed at 300530 A1lt,'U:::t. The

enem..v vtas repuJ.serl by 06lr5 11i th no estimate of casue..ltj_oc.

Fi,re air strikes 11ere :plG.cE:tl on cn·:m~r troop concentrations on JO Aucust

uith excellent rc~mlts. 11 G11 Company, 23rd Infantry, receivcc. ?.n attack and

after brca...k.::in& conte>.ct ·,'fi th tl1:e enemy v;erc relieverl by 11A11 Cot1pany, )8th RCT.

11C11 CompDJlY moved to relieve 11 :S11 e.nd 11F 11 C0mpnnies of the 23rd Infantry.

At 1620 hmu·s, Jrd :So.ttr:.lion observed enemy cligcinc in on Hill 1245 (DT-

20lW) a...nrl placed artillor~r vfi th coorl results. After dar1:e, lit:;ht signals v1ere

observed on Hills 1243 Glld 1059 nnd. a flare 1-vas seer:. over Hill 900.

Operation orders itere isrn.~.cd to .::.ttack to the north vlith 1st Battalion

attacking at 0600 to sieze the first objective. 2

At 311030 Au~;ust, 11 C11 Company was engaged i'lith o.n estime.ted 150 enemy

employing 5 machine GUns north of Hill 992. Artillery vias placed i'lith unlmown

results} At the close of t"::e month's reportinG period, the .::.ttack i·:as in

progress.

1. 2. J.

C-2 POR ifo220 2915 00 ltugus t 51 S)f; i~T C-3 Opr Ord.er 'ff39 301500 August 511 B-2 PIR i¥:185 301500 August 51 -·--

THE EJTD

- 11- DECLASSIFI~ D. r !'1200 .10 (_ _/ - 7 0

DOD 1 ~~~. Date~ l'f1~ BY -4:1--~


\ ,.l

,.~ .• ~\;•li,\EPROOUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES l---+ ~~~ .. -····!\ J

. · .. ~/

\:.~f"'"~· ~ ..... .....,.,._~.·-- ........ ~--·· ---~----~'

HEADQUARTERS 38TH INFANTRY APO 248, % Postmaster

San Francisco, California

19 September 1951 .

SUBJECT: S-1 Evaluation for period of 1 thru 31 August 1951

TO: Commanding Officer 38th Infantry

SECTION I REPLACEMENTS

The transition from the "Months in Korea" to the Constructive Months

Service" System of rotation necessi ta.ted a slow down in the rotation of

Enlisted Men during the latter half of August. This retardation resulted

in a rapid growth of personnel strength within the regiment due to the in-

flux of 618 replacements and the rotation of only 35 Enlisted Men during

this period. It was the opinion of interviewing officers that these newly

arrived enlisted men were of a high caliber. Since many of the men had

not zeroed in their weapons a three-day training progrgm which included

range firing was held for the replacements in the Service Company Area.

The appearance of even the few Non-Commissioned Officers among recent re-

placements was a most welcome sight. The lack of trained medical aidmen

and dispensary technicians continues to be the most glaring werucness in

the present replacement picture. The Hedical Company had to be supplied

with personnel whos~ medical training was nil. This resulted in undue

loss of life during the month's fighting. It proved.to be impossible to

train medical personnel during the battle to handle even the simplest type

of wounds. Besides the unwarranted loss of life it-had an adverse effect·.

on morale. It is therefore strongly recommended that the percentage of

infantry Non-Commissioned Officers continue to grow with each group of

replacements and that the Medical Depar~~ent accelerate its shipment of

trained personnel to this theatre.

SECTION II AWARDS AND DECO..lUTIONS

EUSAK Circular 128 dated 19 August 1951, subject Awards and Deco-

rations outlines the procedure for processing awards. This circular is

complete in every detail and will inevitably aid the Awards and Decorations

Sections of all units.

,,

)


' /\. .· '· ' , ,/!EPRODUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES 1 .: rt- <N<J r c' . -w~- J

!'...._ .. -r- - - - --~, - ..... ....._ ________ .__..-:"')::.

. ) OECLASS!FI~ .

l ~i~~~~s:::; ~~- y..,. ~ -. . 1 a.e ..11 ... j a :us .. a • =: ·----. --t

SUBJECT: S-1 Evaluation for Aug 51, Cont'd

However awards submitted prior to the issuance of subject Circular are

being returned for compliance with this circular. This has resulted not

only in a backlog of awards to be further processed but has placed a large

administrative block in the path of processing new awards. This will

cause a lag in the preparation and presentation of newly won honors which

will have a detrimental effect on morale. It is recommended that the

stipulations set forth in circular 128 be effective as of 31 August and

that awards processed before that date be validated. It is further re

commended that the undue amount of red tape be eliminated. The inclusion

of sketches and sworn statements should be limited to awards of the Dis-

tinguish Service Cross and higher.

"' .}i-f--~ THOMAS A. 0 'BRIEN Captain, Infantry Adjutant


! ...

'· r·· ·.

\. AEPRooucEo AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVEs :

r l··C:' . ;-!

··\.~~~~- ~~~' ~ ~ :_-~_;:=~·'

1. , DECLASS!Fip)

Jj: ~.cJTIPri.ty ~-!\.1 t~L Q 7 ~5/0l ~-. . !3y cc &M.I"'A "~"~::!' 'I ,,../(If.. ''·.

1 ~~...... e..: n~ ~u.Oo4.' e ..ll.J.UL.J..J - . -_ ,: , ! - l > t ·---- ;:·

~ _, --~-----~------·-'

S-2 EVALUATION FOR AUGUST 1951

The inonth of August opened with the .33th Infantry occupying positions

along the HAYS LINE. As was the case in the previous month the regiment

was in contact with el~nents of the II, III, and V North Korean Corps.,

The greater part of the month was utilized in determining the extent and

locations of the ene~ dispositions b.1 dispatching aggressive recoru1aisance

patrols north of the HAYS LINE. Due to the wet weat.her radio communication

was very poor. Accordingly,· all patrols were instructed to keep their

radios covered when not in use. However this did not remedy the situation

and consque~tly, each patrol was ordered to lay wire as the patrol advanced ·

to insure that radio communications would be maintained. Although the

laying of wire entails more work and slows down the progress of the patrols

it is felt that ·constant contact must be maintained in order to as'sure

·any degree of success with patrols. •

Patrols leaders, in general, had difficulty in. reporting their location.

As a consequence~ friendly a~tillery was unable to fire on known targets

for fear of hitting patrols.

Ene~ .AP mines continued to hamper movement of our patrols but as was .

the case in preVious months, AP mines were easily detected and in most cases

were disarmed or blown up.

During the latter part o~ the month the enemy made numerous attacks to

.retake H~ll 1179. On 27 August 1951, 80 ene~ attacked our positions with

SA and AW fire and after approaching within 30 yards of our positions were

practically annihilated. On the following day an enemy company, under cover

of fog, again attacked Hill 1179 and as before was driven off, this time but

fOUrteen of the attacking· company were able to return to their lines., On

the morning of 29 August one company attacked and again the at·t.ack was beaten

t". off with terrific losses. The stubborness of the enemy was clearly brought

to light during these attacks. Even though he was taking enormous casualties

with no success he continued to at·t;_ack along the same route of approach.

On the 30th two battalions were committed to retake the hill but as on

previous days the attacks were beaten off with the enemy suffering enormous

casualties. A point of interest noted during one of these attacks was that


I t, !

l

\, I

,j\EPROOUCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES -~ ·. I

- \.~,..- ·~- ---·· --.. -J ~---------{

(2)

.. ;· DECLASS!FIED

1: ~.t:Jhorl.t)' l\ I rd Q 7 <QS!OI . B ce-; . . 1 / _ Y .NAAA .u.a, e ..u'JaifY

I --~" __ .;

the eneny in an effort to gain added mobility threw away their individual

weapons and attacked our positions with hand grenades.

AT mines encountered during the period were effective only after the

road wa.s well traveled, confirming PsW reports that enemy AT mines are laid

approximately lt·reet below road level making our present mine detectors

ineffective.

Interrogation reports from Ps'\-T indicated that the morale or the enemy

to our front had .reached a low ebb. This was due to the lack of food and

the heavy casualties inflicted qy friendly artillery and mortar fire.

·~~ ~~~~~nfantry S-2, 38th Inf

\.


i

Evaluation

HEADQUARTERS 38th- INFAN'fRY . Otf'ice of· the ·suppry··of'f'icer

.APO 248, c/o Postmaster·· San Francisco, · California

Command1ng Officer 38th Infantry Regiment A.PO ·248

~ATTN: ~2

·~· ·-·

lS September 1951

· ·1. .The_ opening o£ the month o£ August found the .. entire Regiment uVJIIIIL.L.'~"""

along a portion or. the Kansas line and in some cases .. well to the front. or. ;the ..•.•. ... - • • < ' ' •

. ;s:ansas l::ine• Roads stUl were unavailable to effect· r~s,upply and the ~jol,"i

supplies were hand-carried by members of the Korean Service Corps to· i;he •• ·- •' l •

'line units over very difficult terrain •.

2. The efficiency of these uni:ts,. very low at first,

··as they beC8ID.e more organized under stronger _Korean commanders and as ~s".

mechanics of dealing with the service·· troops •

.A. labor officer vas appointed in each Battalion to work under./~· · • ;,r.

The performance of the KSC.1 s reaohe4 a peak when, later! in 'tll,~ '> \{."~ . . . . ' ··~ .';, . .. . · .. . ·:.,i '

an ambitious operation considering the terrain, involved employm;~.t-·/· • " • '. ' : ·.' • ' • if • " ;. • ••• ,<:;;:. ;';•

.•....... ,._"""' ~tire Regiment. well beyond the Main Line of' Resistanc~ with the.

~·supply being carrying parties~ 'This resupply was possible only th,•nnah c:.t . ~. . ' . ,. f

· work of the Regimental and Battalion labor officers and the use ot

•• <-'III.IP:I'"' .• _,;a.u troops ·riot actually engaged in the fighting or involved in other _,

• ' .;·, _j • ' ' '"

duties as supervisors of carrying .. Pill"ties and as carriers themse1 ves.; . . ' ' . . . . . '. •\ .· ~; ' .. ;

4.· 'The wheeled vehicles were not hard put to move the necessary ~qUipne~t ·· ' .. ' . , .o· •.. .->·<·:: ··. , ;';,•'.

exerted for Division in hauling artillery ammunition to. forward.· ammlllli "·" Lu.u •••. • ~. .... . . • . . ' .' .. '>·. .·.' ',:·,, .,

·;',; . .J.';


\. ~ ' --~""

; jEPROOUCEO AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES , ( :_· ____ --~-~ : --- ,_ ". '

DECLASSIFIED tl_t:jt1yrl_\y ~D. J (\/ Q 7 '&510 {

i: _By _t' ¢. t:iAAI\n.ate JiJDJJJ I f ·-\

BASIC: Ltr. Hq 38th Inf. Regt, Office of the Supply 0£ficer, dtd 18 September 1951, subj: Evaluation

5. The normal problems in drawing rations for troops on the front lines

so that they might receive one hot meal each d~ were encountered. It was

recommended to Division Quartermaster that some system of ration requisitioning

be established to allow front line units to draw rations by meal rather than

by day. An attempt was made to obtain authorization to draw certain extra food

items for baking with \-lhich to supplement the em~rgency ration of the troops.

This request was disapproved by Headquarters .Eighth Army.

6. All showers on hand were used to the maximum which resulted in servicing

the troops on an average of every seven (7) days. A clothing _exchange was

available at the shower points; but in some instances, clean clothes were issued

directly to Battalions in bulk to effect a change of clothing on the front lines.

The other shower authorized this unit and on requisition, if received, would

grea..tly aid the efficiency of our shower and clothing exchange system.

7. The Graves Registration office received and sent 56 bodies to the 2nd

Infantry Division Grave Registration section.

8. Tools, wheel cylinders, windshields and radiators still remain in

c~itical supply.

9. · Items lost in combat during the period of this report are listed on the

attached sheet. A definite attempt to hold down this type of loss is underway

in this Regiment and many of the items listed as battlefield losses have since

been recovered and turned in as battlefield recovery.

aidtuitU(, f.~ ~ WILLIAM P De BROOKE Capt In£ 8-4


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S-3 Monthly Summary 0'.1.0001 to

Jl?.~tC~ET ' •'

DECLASSIFIED - ~J:Jhori.ty". 1\1 {\} Q 7 8"5/0 ( :: ay (!{: &.1~~1\;"'::>!e ,f,,.,/(1{. I - n:w'IJ\ .u.~' ' ..Ji.J.UJ...J.J ! ..,.... • -----!

---~~-------~---

The period began \d th the Regt occupying, improving :mel defending defen-

sive positions N of Line KA.tJSI\.S. The 1st. Bn w10ts occupying an Adv Pat B'lse in

Vic 1179 (DT 1935); E Co had established a blocking position in Vic DT 191~32g.

Rifle battalions dispatched patrols daily and established ambush points

forwl!rd of their Psns each night.. The Rcn Patrols were from Sqd to reinforced

Plat siM. For the first four days no En cont'iet W'1.S made by these patrols,

however, from the 5th of Aug through the remainder of the month almost daily

engagements were ml3.de with the enemy. These patrols roade extensive use of

Arty by calling for and placing Arty on En contq,cted an'l also En Obsvd digging

in on key terrain features north of the Psns of the Regiment. Excellent re-

sults were obtained resulting in numerous En casualities and destruction of

many En bunkers anc1 much equipment.

On the 2d of Aug the 54th CF Platoon was attached to the Regiment. On this

date also the Heavy Hortar Co and Tank Co moYed to new locations in Vic of

DT 16425.3 and DT 16~250 respectively, and on the 3d of Aue the Regiment CP

was moved to Vic DT 176255. On 6 Aug elements of the 1st Bn reUeved the Neth-

erlanns detachment in their sector. The Netherlands Det reverted to Division

control.

On the 16th· of Aug the Regiment was ordered to continue to defend Line

KANSAS; maintain positions Vic of Hill 1179 (DT 1935)' with a minimum of one

Bn; organize a flre support team to support attack of 36th Korean Regiment;

and to attack and seize objectives W (Hill 600 Vic DT 1536) and X (Hills 55~

and 754 in Vic DT 1636 and DT 1736 respectively and to prevent En counter

attack and reinforcement of objectives T (Hill 983, DT 13733/~), U (Hill 900,

~ECRET


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S-3 Summary SECRE1

DECLASSIFIED ~.t:JW..ty · !\ 1 c.,/ Q 7 &510 I

i. /

'C>' .:r: ~1\ ~.:_ J/Jad}

DT 146337) and V (HUJ. 773, DT 157337). The attack Has scheduled for 130600.

On the 17th of' Aug the 3rl Bn \lith the I and R Platoon attached relieved ele

ments of 1st Bn in assigned sector (Hills 1001 and 1100 Vic DT 21.3.3 and DT

19.34 respectively) 1st. Bn \-lith Co 'E, one platoon 75RR and one plntoon of

31rnm rnorC::tr a.ttacbed reHovec1 eJ.emcmts of the 2d Iln :tn their assj_gned sectors

The lst Bn reinforced by E Co now had a total frcntoge of over 5,000 yards

and were rer.:ponsjble for the defense of Line KANSAS in the regimental sector.

At 0400 13 Au3 the 2d Bn moved through .3cl Bn on their 1,r:1y to secure objec-

tives W and X, and by 1110 hours secured these tvJO objective~~. F Co occupied

objective H and G Co occupied objocMve X. Heavy Hortar Co, C Co, 72d Tank

Bn and Support Force Brown (composed of 6 75mm recoilless r:i.fler. and 1~ .50

Cal HG's) supported by fire the attack of .36th Korean Regt.

From the 19th of Aug through the 26th of Aug the 2d and 3d Bns continued to

dispatch Recon Patrols north of their forward posi-tions. In addition.to re-

connaissance patrols, rovine; patrols were dispatched by F Co from their posi-

tions to Vic DT 16931,0 and by G Co from their posiMons to Vic DT 165.371

and DT 165.367. G Co sent a squad-sj_ze security euard nightly to secure the

bridee N of PIA-RI Vic DT 165.367. L Co esta.bli::;hec1 and maintained blocking

positions Vic DT 167.36/t- as did F. Co in the Vic DT 16Sl.340. Ambush pojnts con-

tinued to be established ni.ghtly.

On Aug 25 the 2d Bn CP r::oved to DT 167.3.31 and one platoon of :Nor1A;~.r Co

moved to DT 16.3.30.3. From 19 Aug through 26th of Aug no significant En contact

was made other than patrol contacts. F Co rec(dved a small probing attack in

the early mornine hours of 21st of Aug and again on 2.3d of Aug. These probes

were made by 10 to 15 En employing S/A and A/W fire and contact in each case

after a short fire fight~ was brokeSECRET


S-3 Sumrnary

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St.CRE1

DECLASS!FI8J ~.t:JW..ty" [\ 1 r\1 Q 7 Q5/0 (

i . /

:0' .. ~ ~. ~~:~aleJiiad}

At 2225 hours on 26 Aug the 2d Bn Forv.;ard CP in Vic DT 16/J-3/+3 received

H/G fire from Vic Hill 773 (DT 1533). At 2300 the CP aga1.n came under S/A

and M/G fire from the same Vic. At. 2330 G Co received V/G fire from Vic Hill

868 (DT 1733) and at 0025 27 Aug an unknown nurnber of En probed thej_r posi-

tions. Almost immediately an estirr,ated En Co attacked the I Co positions

and engaged in a 40 minute flre fight after which time the En broke contact.

At 0055 F.Co started receiving S/A fire on their right flank and at

0200 an estirr,ated En Plat attacked this flank. An unknown number of En attacked

G Co position at the same time. By 01100 the En had broken contact \1/ G Co

but were still engaeed with F Co. I Co was probed by a small number of En

at 0515 hours that develcper1 into an attack by an estimated En Co by 0620. In

addition to these engagements d.urine the early morning hours En groups, squad

to Co size, employing S/A and A/'vJ hHd engaged elements of the Hort..<!.r Plat in

Vic DT 164328, the I and R Plat in Vic Hill 1001 (DT 21.3J)3d Bn CP in Vic

Hill 11M3 (DT 2132) and the E Co _forward Plat on H1Jl 530 Vic (DT 1634). By

0800 En had infiltrated between 3d Bn positions Vic Hill 1179 (DT 1935) and the

I and R Plat and also between the 3d Bn CP Vic HHl 114.8 (DT 2132) and the I

and R Plat. Th0 I and R Plat was engaged on three sides. At this time A Co

in Vic Hill 1148 (DT 2132) dispatched a Plat forward to Hill 1001. F Co was

still engaged by what '"as estimated to be En Plat. At 0910 F and G Cos \>Jere

engaged by an esti.mated En Bn, which had formed a wedge between them and was

also attacking them from each flank. Both were forced to v;i thdraw to posi-

tions on the ridge runn-ing from south of PIA::.RI to Hill 1100. As En pressure

continued E Co was sent to reinforce G Co and by 1245 was in position from the

:MSR S of PIA-RI to the E. F Co went into Psn on Hill 5.30 and G Co wa.s employed

to refuse the Bn left flank on the west side of the NSR.

between G Co Vic DT 168338 and the 36th K jt which was

SECRE. A gap still existed

attacking on the left.


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!. ./

,- }Y cc t:lAAA;D.ateJ/Ja.d}

S-3 Summary SECREl In order to close this gap the 2d Bn 35th Korean Regt was attached to the J:~th

RCT. At 2234 hours the remainder of the 35th and 36th Korean Regt was attached

to the 38th RCT. By 1.<00 elements of an estimated En Regt were pressing

attacks all along the 2d and 3d Bn positions. G Co 23d Inf was dispatched from

the 2.3d Inf sector and attached to the 38th RCT. This Co occupied positions

Vic DT 212.3.35 to help close the gap which existed between the KANSAS Line and

Hill 1179, then held by the 3d Bn. By 1400 the En attack had ceased and no

further En activity was reported during the day except a small F..n probing

attack on left flank of K Co and the right flank of L Co which was broken up

by friendly Arty.

During the action of the 27th of Aug the 2d Bn CP and the 3d Bn Forward

CP moved into new locations at DT 174320 and Vic Hill 1148 respectively. Two

tanks from Tank Co were sent to occupy positions Vic DT 168338 to support 2d

Bn and an additional .3 platoons of tanks were displaced in the Vic of WORUN-NI

to support friendly activity in the Vic of PIA-RI and Hill 773 and furnish

additional security of the NS road between PIA-RI' and WORUN-NI.

En activity flared up again at 1050 hours the 28th of Aug when G Co 2.3d

Inf in Vic DT 212.3.35, I and R Platoon in Vic DT 205.34.3, and a platoon of K

Co in Vic DT 205.350 were attacked by En elements estimated from a platoon

to be a Co in size. By 1215 hours an estimated En Bnwas· attacking the entire

ridge line from DT 201~355 to DT 215332 and engaging all friendly elements along

this line. By 1225 a Plat of G Co 2.3d Inf on Hill 1001 W!'l.S forced back to G

Co positions Vic DT 212.3.35 and the I and R Plat had moved to form a line along

the ridge with the Plat of K Co at. DT 205350. By 1400 hours elements of J~5th

Korean Regt had occupied positions on Hill 773 vacated by elements of the 36th.

K Regt ann were moving their reserve Bn into pos~tion Vic DT 163293. By 1730

SECRET


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I --'-

S-3 Summary SECRET the En attack had been broken without relinquishing ground.

DECLASSIFIED Acjhori.ly · !\ 1 f\/ Q 7 S5/0 {

.i!J cc OOA;o.a:eJ.I.iad¥ i~ .. i) 440. t ··-,-----!

Heavy casualties

had been inflicted on the En. For the remainder of the day on..ly sporadic S/A,

mortar and Arty flre was received on friendly positions with some En probes in

positions of G Co of the 23d and L Co of the 33th.

The remainder of the 2d Bn 23d. Inf, and the 3d Bn of the 2.3d Inf were at-

tached to the 33th RCT on 2Bth Aug. By 2250 hours 23th Aug the 3d Bn 23d Inf

had closed into 1st Bn 3Bth Inf positions, and by 0345 29 Aug E and F Cos, 23d

Inf had tied in with G Co of 23d Inf in Vic DT 212324 and DT 213323 respective-

ly. 36th K Regt reverted to parent unit control.

The 29th and 30th of Aug saw only minor contacts with En. During the

period B Co engaged in a series of short fire fights with small groups of En,

and positions of the I an(l R Platoon, K Co, L Co 3-Sth Inf and G Co 23d re-

ceived small probing attacks tha·t were repulsed after a short fire fight.

On the 30th of Aug C Co 72d Tank Bn, 2d and 3d Bn 23d Inf, and 35th K Regt

reverted to parent un..i.t control. Orders were received from Div relieving the

33th RCT from further responsibility of defense of Line KANSAS and the Regt

was ordered to attack at 310600 to seize objective Z (Hill 1243 Vic DT 2040).

The plan of attack was for the 1st Bn with a squad from Hvy Hortar Co

attached to attack at 310600 and seize objective 1 (Hill 1059 Vic DT 2036)

and then objective 2 (Hill Vic DT 203330). They were to majntain contact

with elements of 5th K Div on the right. 2d Bn with a section of tanKs from

Tank Co attached were to maintain Pres defense positions and on 0 move to

assembly area Vj.c DT 176300 and reconno:i. ter and ~lan rel:i.ef of 3d Bn. 3d

Bn 1..ras to maintain present positions and prepare to pas::: through 1st Bn to

seize objectives 3 (Hill lH~l Vic DT 2038) and 4(Hill 1243 Vic DT 2040).


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(:,_._ ,,,,.,,., -·-' ' ' ~"JJ-.--~·-:- ., ·-· - -·· ~"".

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S-3 Summary

D~CLASSIFIED

- ~.t:Jtlcri.ly~!\1 tJ Q 7 <Q5/0 { · s cf!- , ~t-.. /{1! , • Y.. · ~1\;D.ate .. JLLW...U

The Heavy Mortar Co was to support the mortar squad with 1st Bn.

At 0600 31 Aug the 1st Bn jumned off into the attack. At 1045 tht~ leading

Co, Co C, contacted th.:: En and c.sme under fire from an estimated 150 En and

5 HGs from the Vic Hill 992 (DT 2036). C Co wa8 unable to advance and. A Co was

brought abre:1st of C Co in an attempt to maneuver and dislodge En. This

maneuver was unsuccessfuJ :! and after bitter fighting all day A and C Cos were

pulled back into a defensive ~erimeter on the rieht slopes of Hill 1179, vlhere.

they remained throughout the night wit.hout En contact.

SECRET


EPR~~:_:~ON~C~~S) -u~ !~~jhc(,~;~JQftstbi \ ,HEADQUARTERS 38TH INFANTRY. , 1. }Y _§.:,e. t.IAAAJJ.ate.1l!aLfr '--~/ .APO 24S c/o Postmaster I

San Francisco, California

18 September 1951

SUBJECT: S-3 Evaluation for period 1-31 August 1951

TO: Commanding Officer 38th Infantry Reeiment APO 248

1. The period 1 Aug thru 19 Aug was pr:l.marily spent in· extensive

patrol action and the 1mprovement of defensive positions. Great difficulties

in. radio connnunication were encountered. The SCR300 perfonned efficiently

except during rainy periods. At this time a rotation of radio sets.was

in order to allow SCR300s' sufficient time to,become thoroughly dry before

ating them again. The SCR536· failed consi.stently to be an effective means of

cornnmni.cations due primarily to the great number of' !lblack-out" areas caused

~-.by-the terrain in the vicinity of patrol routes. One battalion recommended

the inclusion of the SCRJOo· in the rifle platoon table of equipment to a.ll~viate

'..,. · this condition. Also extensive use of L-Pl~:~:nos was employed to ass:i st pntrol

activities as well as to cor:tfi.rni their actual locations.

2. The period lS Aue throueh 19 Aug was devoted to an attac:k: by the 2d

Bn in conjunction with an att.ack of the 36th R()K Regt for Hills 773, DT1533{- ·

940, DT14J33; and 98.3, DT1.333 as object:i.ves~ The use of assault wire du.rine this

·phase improved. corn:municat:tons between company and battalion command posts and

between these and org::~.nic.supporting units. One platoon of Arty was ass1.gned to

< the FO who in turn was able to accurately control the rolling barrage .used.

period of reorganization followJng the capture or' a11, objective, he

. ;;~;~ com;lete use, of the plc.1.toon •. The use of white phosphorous rine grenades

ex~eptional va.lue during +,he assauJ.t. Although t.he grenade itself did not

the rlirect casualtles thc:tt the fragmentation type did; it did cause the

\

disclose their positions allowing our small arrns fire to q,e ·

J. Tho period of 2J_Aug through 27 Aue was devoted to improving defensive

'positions of the 2d Bn on Hills 600, DT1536 and 754, DT17.36. · This time was also

· ,utilized ·to prepare the lst Bn for an attack on Hill 121~3. At this tine all efforts,·

tactical and loe;:tst.ical, were dlrectod to th~ 1st Bn. The patrol .action of the


•,

Hq 38th Inf \ S-3 Evaluation for perio'<:Cl-31 Aug 51

3d Bn was prr:-J.ctically suspendod, and under cover of do rknesc and pt::tor vi ::d bj,l1.ty

the enemy prepared ht:wty defe'n~c;:-iyo pod t.icns w:i tldn 200 to .300 yardr1 of' our lines.

This. points to tbo ab;.;olute nece~;:::1 ty of maintain1.ng patrols, cutposts, and ambush

points; the lat. tor, cc.pecia11y, should be. established in draws. It proves again

the exceptional ab:iJ.ity of the NK troopfJ in using darknesB ancl poor 1lis.ihilit:l

during the time he :,v1vances up draws as avenues of approach to our pos:i tions.

lh The per:i od 27 Aug through 29 Aug was spent in repulsing a vigorous

attack launched ~.r tho enenty ae;ainst. the 2d and 3d Bn:J'. The 3d Bn had a.tnple

time to set up complete tnet:l.cal H:1re, m:1no::.:, booby trR.ps and trip f1ares.

This defensive work 1o/B.s out'standine in repulsing the attack. The 2d Bn was

forced to wtthdraw to tho ridee to their rear where they set up new defensive

positions. Difficulties encountered here consisted pd.mar:i.ly of comJ11Ullicatlon

failure, which precluded cornpr:nd.en Piak:tne a coorr'li~atecl wi.thd.rmwl.

5. On Jl Aug the lnt Bn moved thrr.mch tho pos:i Mons of the Jcl Bn l.o attack·

and seize lUll 124..3. The lino of dcpartm~e had been established imdde of the

tact:i.cal wire set up by the 3d Bn. Th:i.s held up the:tr advance corw:iderably;

consequently, Arty preparation was· p'3.rtial1y ineffoct:i.ve due to the delayed assault.

Durine the initial phases of the attack o.ss.ault wire was ar;ain employed to

:increase the eff:i.ciency of corr.munic:.:dSons. In:ttia11y the supportine 4.2 11 mortar

was placed at too great a range from the desired impact area; \4hen supporting

ftres were rcqm~c.ted, the mort.Dr was enroutr~ to a new posi.tion closer to the

assault area. It was aocerta.ined that usine one.mortar to support and thc

· .. other crews hauling ammun1.ti.on was of,,greater supporting value than usine all

!" guns fi.d_ng with a very limited amount of amrunt tion for each piece.

6. Another point noted during the entire period concerned coordination

bet\.Jeen tactical air support and other supporting fire units. The untimely

delay between the cessation of the air strike and t.he resumption of other

_support:tne fires allowed the enemy sufficient time to recover and reorganize.

It has b~en sueeested that upon completion of the air strike, a smoke pot or

other signalling device be dropped so that other ::mpp_orting fires may be resumed

at once. Also the arrival of alrcraft at other than the appojnted time,

causes delay in the attack. !mother sugcest:ion offered concerned identify:i.ng

the foremost unlt·by some method other than a panel. This will reduce the

-2-

'.

l


•· .. .·DECLASSIFIED· .. ,:: .. · \I. )~.cJW..ty'.AJ c:l£2 7t57134·

8y XC: ~A n~te.ll.kl/JJ.

Hq 38th Inf \ .. . S-.3 Evaluation for pedoct'l-31 Aug 51

possibility of that. unit recrdvine the strike in the casEt where the· panel cannot

'be seen.

~ Lt Col, Infantry S-.3

-3-·.


\ :'!EPROOUCEO AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES :

c·-~ c~

~',.,.___,_ ~ - - --~-"' - "' --------- __ ..

HEADQUARTERS 38th INFANTRY Ottice ot the Supply Officer

APO 248, c/o Postmaster San Francisco, California

18 September 1951

The following i tem.s or T/0 & E equipment were lost during the month ot

August 19511

gyartemaster

Panel Sets, AP-50

Poncho

Shovel, tool intrenching

Tent, shelter-half, new type

Antenna AN-130

Antenna, AN-131

Antenna, AN-131A

Handset, TS-10

Handset, TS-15

Radio Set, SCR-300

Radio Set, SCR-536

Telephone, EE-8

Bayonet-knife, M-4

Binoculars, M13Al

Signal

9rdnanee

Gun, Machine Cal. 30, Ml919A6

Holster, Cal. 45 (Hip)

Launcher, grenade, M7Al

Launcher, Rocket 3.5" M-20

Magazine assy., Pistol

Magazine, Carbine .

Mortar, 60MM, Complete

Mount, tripod, Cal. 30, M-2

Pistol, Auto., Ca1.45, Ml911Al

Rifle, Auto., Cal. 30, Ml918A2

Rifle, U.S. Cal. 30, Ml-C (Sniper)

Rifle, 57MH, M-18

Watch, wrist, 7 or more jewels

ea 6

ea 200

ea 100

ea 75

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea

ea.

ea

ea

ea

ea

.3

4

4

12

7

7

24

4

14

8

11

47

19

2

36

1;2

6

8

12

_24

4

3

3

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!EPROOVCED AT THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES \

SECRET HEADQ.UARTEBS 38TH INFANTRY

APO 248, % Postmaster San Francisco, California

DECLASSIFIED

.. 1: l\_t;j~~~L\: cJ Q -~ &5!0 ( · _By c c ~A u.a.e J!Ja.IJJ I .. ···-

24 September 1951

SUBJECT: Commander's Evaluation for period of 1 thru 31 August 1~51

TO: Commanding General 2nd Infantey Division

The appended critique of the Battle for Hill 1243 is submitted as the

Comma.nder 1s evaluation for the month of' August. Although more lengthy than

the usual report rendered, it is believed that the longer report gives the

baCkground material whiCh is essential to an understanding of' the fighting

during the period.

All points covered in the staff evaluations whiCh deserve emphasis are

mentioned in the critique except the S-1 1s recommendation that the administra-

tion required for awards be greatly reduced and simplified. The excessive

burden of' administration causes an undue d.elq in making prompt awards, there-

by nullifying the value to esprit de 1corps and individual morale which could

be gained from prompt recognition for merit.

FOB. THE COMMANDING OFFICER.

~;:~ Em~ L. ROWNY Lt Col Inf' Exec Off

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.13Y .£' (' 001\ ;o,aie J!JaiJJ

______ _. -------- .. , -----~--- ---···"'~---------· --- ---------------~---··---·-------· -----.....

CRITIQUE )F BATTLE F)R HILL 1243

·The capture of Hill 1243 on 3 Se?tembor 1951 represents tho high·watermark of achievement in offensive action by the 38th Infantry-the proud "Rock of tho Mr..rno" R0~iment. Bnttle veter·:.ns of more the.n e. yoor.' s hard fighting in Korea, an enumeration of good and bad points in this, their finest hour, should prove of interest to nll who seck to linprove combat technique.

For this battle was one of technique ruther then tactics. Tho t~ctics were rudimentarY r'.hd straightforward, made simple by the necossi ty of ca.ptur- . ing tho dominant terro.in feature o.t tho north-west corner of a ridge of mountains. Those mountr.ins encircle a· flo.t plain making the terrain feature commonly referred to u.s the 11 Punch Bowl". Having previously cr-.ptured Hill 1179--"Fool Mountain" which lies about ono third the distance nlong the western lip of the bowl, this att~ck w~s merely a contintmtion of tho advence to tho end of the ridge. From Hill 1179 to the final objective Hi~l 1243 is over 5000 yexds. The ridge is a serrated one consisting of successive hills

· · --1059-l100-ll81-1200 wd 1234-all with deep v.tileys in bet.-1oen. Those heights are in meters, and from one hill to tho next the straight-line· distance also entails a vertical drop of 500 to 600 fe&t and a suailar climb up again.

This bct~le is en especially interesting one to c~alyzo since it reduced to a minimum the usual udvr.Jltages which the Amorican soldier enjoys over tha Comrnunist. More thr..n v.nywhere else in the experience of this R~gimont it pitted mr.n against man. The great. advantages accruing from our superior mobility (and this includes the use of.tanks) were absent. To get to the line ~ departure you dismo~~t from u vehicle nt tho neer side of the mountain r~dgc, cl~1b steadily for 2 hours to a height of 1148 meters, ru1d then for 2 more hours ·climb up ru1d do~,orn the rough-rocky trail to Hill 1179. · Upon arriving at tho line of dop~~ture you exo sure that you have dono v. good dl".y 1 s work, and indcod you ht' .. vo. For a man has to be in good physical shape to mnke it nt nll. Yet avery round of rJnmunition, every ration, and every casualty had to be tr£~nsported over this smne rough a.nd tortuous foot p..'tth. Thnt it takes r.-.:.nother 4· hours of climbing to cover thef remaining 5000 yards straight-line distaneo to the objoctive-~ikes it clear thA.t this was a battle requiring gree.t physical exertion. In this respect tho fact tht.".t tho men had seen 40 days of c::->ntin.uous fighting up to this point had its advrntnges. It is also at once obvious that supply wns the governing criterion. To compound the difficulty this was a battle in which the north Korean resisted stubbornly: at times fanatically. In m.:,st cases he hRd to be killed in his cave which be had hewn out of solid rock.

In what follows, no ~ttempt will be made to adhere either to n strict chronology nor evan to o. description of the attack. Rather, certain i'eo:turos will be mentioned from which it is bolieved a lesson might be .inferred, elthar a lesson of what to 9Q or what ~ ~ gg.

The attA.ck was cnrofully and prdnstakingly .planned. A -'special blowup mup of the arc:- was prepared 11t Regiment and reproduced at higher headquerters. Air bombPxdment and artillery preparatory fires were stepped up. Most importt.:mt of all, requirements were tabulntod and resources en'l.liilernted so thnt tho maximum fir.e-pwor and man-power nvaila.bl.e t() the Regiroent could ba employed.


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~.t:JW..ty. !\ 1 cJ Q 7 &51 0 ( .: 8 CC l..l-'M • ,/t,,/(1( ' w y . . n;w-v,l'\ :O.a.e ..ll..lW...Ll

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Since terrc.in nrohibitcd tho employment -::>f tanks in the fi~ht, the ta...1ks were immobilized and the tankers used both 2.s supervisors over tho Korean .::o.rriers n11d as p;::tck-ce.rricrs therr.solves. To further help meet

·the carrying deficit tho ~ttachod AA battery was employed the sane wny, as were .?.11 o.vP.ilablc personnel from Service rmd Hor:.dqucrtors companies. Tho Hcdicnl Compnny could not be tapped, predictions wore that it vould have its h:;.nds full. Noi ther wqs tho Mortnr Comprmy levied upon. Desirous of employing to tho max:imu.'Tl fire povor possible the :Hortnr Company was allowed to do its own hand-cp_rrying of r> • .mmuni tion in order to supply the largest nwnber of mortfl.rs it could thus support. This turned out to be one mortar, which incidcntnlly, delivered over 300 rou~ds every day. It goes without sr.ying thnt the best FO nnd the best gunners 1:1ore used. Tho mortr-.rr!IonC2.rriors sav1 to it thP.t every round of ru:nnuni tion scored [:gr.inst the enemy.

At the very outset n serious error \.JnS made by the loo.d comnany. It had failed to clear p2.ths through tho JJ.ino-fiold surrou.rlding its defensive position. This meant th2..t much of the effect of the heavy propnrc.tion was wnstod._ When tho u.rlit die. go through tho field, however, i+. did the job Hell. It cleared multiple lanes on a broad front$ thereby preventing the enemy from stopping O\.IT o.dvc.nco by bringing fire to bear on r. single point.

Porh;:,l's the most .outstanding single for:turo of tho nttn.ck \.Jns the full utiliz~.tion of ill nvnilo.blo HeQpons. i.Jhile tho 11nEd-ninute 11 of fire r,s show.r1 at Fort Benning could not-for logisticc~ reasons--be approac~od, no opportunity \.Je.s ovurlookecl. for bringing Holl-nir:l3d firo of every r.~vailable weapon to boar. The supporting fires within tho c >L:l.panies L:.."ld by tho bc.ttalions were exceptionally Hell ho.nc:lJ.~.;1i.' Wa:ber-c6:)led nachine-guns were used, as were both the 60 Md 81 MH ncx t rn. While some effect WP.s realized from the 57 :HH rccoiles·s rifle it w·.o tho 75 1'-M rocoiloss rifle which proved to be more effective in destr;:,yi::lg bunkers. Initial e.ttmapts to usc the flr .. mo throvmr were soon abcndonod: it we..s sililply too heavy and of too short a rv.ngo to do lllUch go·') d. Rifle grenades Here used Hi th •pod rosul ts in one of the co.mpt:tnios i other compPnies who had not tr~dned in mnrksmr::.nship vrith the rifle gronn.0e discl:'l.ir.led thc.t they wore of much V'J.lue. The lack of trA.ining nrobr:bly accounted for the difference b. opinion.

Ono.bnttv.lion pre-planned o. resupply system Hhich proved to bo most effective. Ee.ch nrm advancing uo tho trnil cr--..rricd 3 rounds of 60 .MM nortnr or :me round of 75 recoilcss n.i-:JDU.r:li tion~ '\IJhon ·'~ppronching tho spot where he loft tho trc.il to go into the line he simply dropped his round to be picked up by tho rumn~"lition boQrers lntor ')11.

The supporting ertillery fire loft little to be desired. This was clue prir.1a.rily to two reP..sons: g:::>od forwe.rd observers end accurc.te shooting. The forward o bservors with lead conp:~nics· Hero each "'llo\.Jed to control two guns of the br:.tter~r directly, ~nd in this w:.y 11vmlked the fire" nhond of then during the movonent of tho infcntry. By f<.r tho best feature of infn.ntry-c-;.rtillory coordinc.ti::>n wn.s tho close support by tho c:.rtillory, allowing the inf"mtry to "lean into it". vlhcn heavy srLll arm fire w:>..s received from the enemy company coEmanc1crs quickly bE.c_cked off frora the scene end put hel"'.~ concentration of HE c,nc1. VT an tho nret->;'t: .s.nd chn.rgod bn.ck e.go.in. It worked. '·''

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Air support played e. no15J.:lgibl0 r)le j_r.. this attack. As usu.~., in this type ?f torrc.in, it wns faun(~ thnt strafing WllS of preccticc.lly n.:> value, rocketin~ of linitec value, nn0 n~paln the only really effective woapon. But oven here, tho nn.nnln drops were qui to inaccurate. Sovern.l w:.j :::r (e

fects in technique were revealed; defects which need correcting bcfJre we cnn 1-;et mi"..Ximur.l usc fron air support. First, the n:osquito d:Jminnted tho C')ntrol of the air by tellins it when nnd where to strike. GrG.ntod th:.1.t an nir observer n<ty occnsi:mr.ly spot n tar~ct of opp)rtuni ty which is of ~renter value thD.n that seen by the :Jround c·.)f.lt;::mder, the l.?.tter unc'.oubtGc~ly knows best wh:1t is h-Jlding up his advance nne should in the n~jority of cnsos qe r..llowed to influence the conduct of his battle. An·)ther serious c~efect lies in the lack of close tiraing between the fires of the air and tho artillery. Upon learning that ~ir was due, or in tho vicinity, the · ['.rtillery inraedi 1. toly suspenC'.ed its firing. so c..s not to _ onc:an:~er the aircraft. And then again for ninutes and s-:Jmetinos h.:mrs after the strike wc.s finishec the artillery liaison officer could not ascertain whether o:c n:-t the air attack was indeed finished. At one crucial tir.1o C'.urin~; tho P.4:.-ce.sk n-o artillery was avnilable for 2 1/2 hours: 15 minutes of wt::ch wore actually consUBcd by an air strike. The need for bettor co')rc1inatbn is ·::>b-.ri::m.s. Tho meth::>ds for achieving then anpo-~ easy enou~h once the throe interested parties--ground, air and ar_tillery comtlandcrs resolve to solve tho problen together.

Groat improvement wns noted·in tho conm~n fuilin~ of bunching-up. Where men did bunch up they soon found tho enemy ill-)l:'t.'J.I's pnying attention to them. Another :;rcr!.t improvement wo.s nJted over previous engngements. The :men all fired their weapons, ~nd nost of them sh)t only aimed fire :J.t known or suspected loc:'.tbns~ Much of this was o.cquircd rapidly through imitation of the eno:r.1y. )nco our r:1en saw that he hold this fire until we were within . sh::>rt 0istancc of hin anc thnt he then )pencd up with sh::>rt bursts of accurate fire-·our nen began c1::>inr; likewise. This is porh::.ps n:Jt the lnst ti:r.Je thrct 11 locrn from your enemies" will be the dictum.

The olc1 precepts "speed not hn.ste" nnd "f.ire r.nd n.ovement" pr-oved to be sound :mes. An :Jl)portunity presented itself cluring this nttack to witness the closest poss1blo substitute to a controlled laboratory experiment. Hills t:.li:nst ic1entical in shnpo rmc1. in desreo of C'cfense were nttncked on alternate cnys by r1ifforont bnttaliJns. )ne bnttnlion juupcd aggressively int::> the nttnck but became disorganized under n:Jrtar fire. Men huddled into groups where S')Dc c::>ncer.lr;1ent but no cover Wf'..S offered, anc only by n great display of cournge by 5 or 6 :r.1en who die~ c.ost of tho firing c.nd ct2rried the brunt of the f'.ttack, was the hill finally assaulted. The charge was not successful an~ the men dug in to the side of the hill to nwuit the fol~ . lowing d~y when by similar actions the hill wns taken, but n~t before a dozen were killed :me'!. throe times thr'.t number were wounded. The succeeding battf'.li-on planned. its att:1ck more deliberately.' 7'ho bntt.a.lion cot1mander took his -c)mpr.ny, cor.nn;mcers f::>rward on rec,)nnc.issance and they in turn 1riented their p1nt::Joi'l ·leaciers. Tho preparatory fires' C'id not differ materially from that of the _prcceedinl$ C1 ay' but ir.Jmedintely afterwl'l.rcs men bego.n aC.vancing as· skirmishers :Jn n broad front. Their fire was continu::>us, nnc't well aimed. M,)rtnr fire claimed several cnsualtios but hit Jnly 'Jno ar two, since there were no conccntrc.tcc1 groups of non. Squ<::ds and plato)ns picked bunkers to ncvance upon ·and noved ~p •Jn _them steadily. WhGn pinneddown close to their objective several men shouted 11 B.wzai 11 , nne ran f'Jrw~rd thr'Jwine r;renndes into the bunker::!'.· -)thers ~imul tanoously closed in, deliveri"lr; narching fire ns they CP.mo. ·- -~· __ ~ o {;;L

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Enemy who were not killed or wounded crune running Jut, their hnnds high in the air. )ur.casua.ltios: 0ne killed and five wounded.

The new· repladements reRcted fr.irly true to pn.ttorn: a few performed ~ery well but tho majority would have to learn by experience before the bravery th~.t was in them would be demonstrnted. ·)utstanding deficiencies which need more emphasis in training were their unfnnilirtrily with the sou."ld of friendly supporting fire, (small arms Eillc recoiless ns well as mortar and artillery), ign·.Jrance of tho basic principles of first-aid, unfru:lili8.rity with the autom~tic rifle end the hnnd grenade. As a general rule they were in p1or physiceJ. condition. Although there were s:Jr:1e losses fr·Jm mines and booqy traps, it is the writer's opinion after long so2rching for the key to minimizing casun.l ties fron this cause tbat not r.mch cc.n be c1::mo in training which will help tho unit naking an.attack. Patrol members c~n bo helped considerably by tenching them to disarn mines nnd booby trtlp~, but mine clearing where the r.1inefield is cefended appears to be o. problem which needs to be tackled by basic research.

The handling of prisoners of war, while satisfactory, could h~ve been improvec:. In sJme instrm.ces prisoners were forwarded t:> the Rogiraental onclosure without hn~ing been tagged and in s:>me ct:ses where tags were used the information was in error.

11 2heJ.l Reports 11 subnittod during this action were practicc.lly nil. This is a serious deficiency which needs r1ore cnph;~sis in training. Our troops were subjected to lon~ periods of shelling. It must be stressed that enemy !funs coulc'! probably be silenced by our artillery were there sufficient data n.vn.ilable.

A decided lnck of teleph:me and r~::.dio security w.:;.s noted throughout the action. In nnny instnncea reports of friencrry dispositions a~d planned operations, including anticipr..ted routes of approach, wore given i·n the cle~r over netf.'.llic lines. Sufficient eviconce was gathered to prove that wire-tapping was practiced. The uncanny QCcuracy with which the enemy used his troops and artillery during tho tir.e units were bving relieved indicqtes that there were strJng security leaks in :>ur systen.

Signal C.Jr.nunicntions w0rked well. This wo.s clue in lP.rge part to the tenaciousness f'nd high sense of respJnsibility on tho p'll't of tho wire crews. fu~o, these crews h~d been n.~~cnted prior to the attack by two crews from Divisi-.:m 3lld by two more fron the Mort::-c.r Company. Tho SCR 536, as usual, pr'Jved to be of little w0rth, The pe.rf0rnf'.ncc of the SCR JOO was spotty, due in part to its poor design against wet wecther cono~tions nnd in larger pnrt to the poor qu~lity of batteries ~uppliod.

The battaliJn surge)nS and C:>Iilp.llny'' aid r.icn handled medicc.l evncuation in a superb.m::nner. But nr.1ong .the raen in ranks too little knowledge of firstn,id w:1s eisplayed. In two instances non bled to death who night not have otherwise died had their .c::>mrades known wh<)re and how to apply tournaquets. An0ther serious error devel::>ped: rifleoen of one c::>r.lpn.ny went to the aid of the wounded in such large numbers that at one tiue over half the C.Jiilplll1Y was .eng~ged in carrying or assisting wounded to the rear. More training is requir0d 119 .. indoctrinate men that the wounded are the prablem of the aid men .. It is nfltur.?.l and quite understandable that a· man wants to help his comrnd~.

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But he must be impressed with.the c~ncept that it is vitally necessary to keep the ntt1:1.ck r.nving; that only in this way d::>es he assist r.nd hence protect those still fighting. Lack of trained medical rcplnce@ents wns per~ hnps l!!rgely to bl~mo. In order to help overcome this deficiency n 10% over-strength hc.s been assiF.;nod the Hedical C:)z:lpnny n.t the e:;::pense of riflemen to the batt::..J.ions. It is believed that this will serve not only to c.ugment the strength in .:>rder to better cope with peclc loads but will nake 11 greater number ::>f men .?.vailable f·jr centrc.lized trnining in medic~ subjects.

Perhaps the most serious defect of all in medical ovacuatiJn wns the total ineffectiveness of evacuation by helicopter. 'I'ho long hand-carry of ov:tcuees resUlted in tho denth of several persons who raight otherwise have lived. The refusal of helicopter pilots to l~nd (reportecUy becnusc of rarefield atnosphcre at the 3500 ft elevrtbn, as well as for n host of othe::r ren.sons a,iven which cb not to the laymen npper.r.. to be valid) haile made for general dissatisfaction nr.1:mg infantrymen. Tho "pil-Jt 1 s ch·Jicc" whereby the pilot can decide whether or not it is safe to lru1d coos not sit well with the fighting soldier. He would prefer to have higher authority survey the conditions, decide whether or not a reasonable risl: is involved, and then order the pilot to ~o in or stay out accordingly. The reasoning is self-evident--the infc.ntry officer does not have a choice of "safe" or " 11 U."lsn.fe 11 objectives,· his J:J.ind is tmdo up f-::>r him by higher authority. True, the helicopters did transport a nur.2ber of woun(1.ed from tho collecting

-station back t) the roar. But tho loss of lifo occurred during tho long · cnrry tu tho collecting stntion--Jften ns much E.s 24 hours, and not from there -::>n back. It nppenrec1_ th~t speed was less essential in getting a man to ~t~r medical cere once he got ~ care other then that possible on the front line.

The s_uccess of this battle depenclod much rrore than nost on supply. This was recognized ea.rly n.nd the mn.xi:r.mra use of resources locally o.vuiable were sought. As stnted en.rlier, tho Tank Cor:1pnny and large segments of Service Comp:my, Hegir.1ontnl Hea0.quarters Compe .. ny and the battnlion headquarters C)mpnnios were used both to supervise native carriers and to pack-carry supplies thenselvcs. It is hard to .::xplain to those imlividuals why more ndive carriers could not be nade available. This feeling was not one of disse1.tisfnction with their personal lot, but rather CD.r.Je about ns a result of seein~ supplies ina.c,equc.tc c~espito their best offarts to provide then. It is hard to arque the case. For it would appea~ that the trenondous mnnpower potential of South Korea coulc1 be nn.de t'J s-qpply more than the thousllilC!-,')dd carriers who were e.ctunlly avo.ilable. It causes one to w·)ndcr if hi~her headquarters ht!s an appreciation of conditions as they really arc. ' ·

It is es-sential, i'h~ an operation wh~re supply is tho criterion, that n. shrewd C'tlculntion be made as to precisely: whnt i terns ·will be required. A rounc of ammunition which is not needed has cisplaced thnt much weight of more critically needed supplies. Good brain w~rk is required-the suoply officer must knJw the conm.nn.der's plnn in detail down to include the amounts of each type of amr.mni tion :nequired.

Under the pressure of necessity of getting every .:>Ullce of effort out of the K0rean labor several valuable lessons·were learned.

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Performance was highest when the Koreans ~ere closely supervised ~r soldiers whose cuty it WQS t0 guard them, prevent them f~om being C'Jffi~~rl~ered by other American tro:Jps, rmd in;:;1rre that they all returned to the point of origin at the conpletion of eac.h tr:l.p. Ee'iciency wns hi·~hest when dumps were established f'~ong the rente of ::ru·?pJ.y n?pro:dJa<-ltcly two hc·,rr·s apart. C;:.rriers were divic1ed int:> shuttle g::-or:.;,Js x1d ne.de t-wo rcund i.:.rips per day between supply c:tumps. They appeared t'J function bE!st when they were placed on a schedule and eiven regv.b.r h::mrs bqth fJr working U-'rld f·Jr resting. By W•Jrking native labor c.ppr()~iraately eight to ten hours daiJ.y they held up physically 0ver a period .Jf tine. Longer hauls invt:li'inbly lost the laborer's effective:p.ess pernmncntly. It wds found that the Korenn carriers worked best when they coulcl mnintain their ·organizo.ti::mal int.egri ty and when their Korean officers acc:>r.tp::micd them-. Best rost:.lts wec-o aC'hieved w~ero KJreAn of.fice:r.-s were treaterl 1.-Tith respor:t anc~ given n feeling of pres·::.ige. All ap~e.?..I"ed t'J w.Jrk bette!' vhen ttoy wJre Llado to feel tn,_,_t tiwir welfo.re wm: of some concern to tho Arr:er::can cJr.l!'llc,ndcrs. -,Jhere c.rran~oments were oade to p::':'ovido the lt>.b.Jrers with thr?ir own medical cc.:r.·e, bla11kets, and fooc~, .::.nd whore provisi·:ms \-Jere m.~do for drawing n.nd :_:rropcring foad and f.)r providing clothing and equipment the carriers nppec,ood happier and worked better. It seemed that nJ sense of urgon~y or feeling of patr:hotic duty could be instilled; catering to their basic aninml de-sires seemed to got best result~.

/..n unusal feature was the prJvisi•Jn of sand bags in the~irst resupply train, timed to arrive ~~cdiately after the objective was taken. The enemy lived up to the expect3.tion of counter-attackin~, hoping to take back the positions just snatched from him. The bags h2stily filled with rock nnr1 dirt gave the men S'Jmo protection not otherwise ,;,fforG.ed -:in tho r)cky hill tops. Incidontally, individunl snnd bags were found t'J be convenient receptncles in which to carry ammuni tbn nne~ other supplies, thus cJiscarding the extra wei:~ht of the outside packaging a.11d crating. This gave two strings to the bow: not only were the supplies more ·easily h~ndled but the bags themselves were av~.ilable far immediate use. One plnto:m lenDer believes that next time a similnr piece of terrLin has to bo tr~ken the resupply -+:.:'[dn might include s:>me C)mpositiJn 11C11 .;xplosive, which when set 'Jff by hand ~~ronrldes fuzes would bl-,st hasty fox holes for his men.

Emphe.sis <>.nd training in supply discipline bJre fruit. The cleanliness of the 1J.~ttl0 field W·?n prr.ise from tho assistant civisbn CJ1111:1andor; practically no oquipnent was discr.rc'!ecl_. v/oap.)ns, bolts, and holnets of tho wounded wore c::rried back t:> the next rearwe.rd supply (Ur.lps where salvage p:i.les were ostcblished. These piles were evacuated by the ail1IilUnition carriers Jn their return trip. A rep~osentative of the battali'Jn supply office at the nid stati:)n collected watches, binoculars and sir.liler items c~mm?nly lost to tho unit. Some battle losses Qid ~ccur, but the number of i tcms so lost >-mrc remarkably, f~1,of,. . A. prac~ice that neeC!s correcting is tho wasteful hr.~bi t of •Jpening ?- ,gr:eat nui.1ber ::>f cert?ns · containing nJrtar, rec'Jiloss, Pnd small arns ,':1JI'Jnuniti:m. Exp'Jsing llll'go qu~ntities of ruilnun:i.tbn to the W(;)Qther results in n great waste, since the amnunitbn is mace hr...rcler t::> reh~ndle e.nd in many cases is ::bnncbned because of its suspected erratic· performance when wet.

In >:.11, tho bf-'.ttle was vroll fou.csht. The instances Jf ott.tstanding VRlor were lesion. The Re~iment lived up t::> its proud reputation and overcmne gre~t :>bstgcle~ · i.n rJutiJ1g tho enemy fr,Jm the C"',..\nating high gJJuund.

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. 38TH INFANTRY STAFF (AUGUST 51)

CO - - - - - - - - - - - MILDREN, Frank T. - Lt Col - 021992 - Inf

EX Off - - - -·- - - - - ROWNY, Edward L. - Lt Col - 023744 - Inf

. ~1 - ..:. -.- - - - - - - IDJGHES, Daniel F. - Maj - 01285055 - Inf

1 S-2 _- - ' ... - ..,; .. - -- - VALENTINE, John J. - Capt - 01303576 ... Inf

S-3 - - ~- - - - - - - HODGES, Warren D .... Maj - 037869 -. Inf

5-4-'- - - - - - - - - PETRICK, Lawrence R. - Maj - 037869 - In! · De:BROCKE, William P • - Capt - 025986 -:- Inf

1ST :BN

CO----------- K!MR~L, George W. - Lt Col- 0358524- Inf

Ex Off - .-:- - - - - - - -

5-2 - - - - - - - - - - CRONIN, Gilbert F. - 1st Lt - 02024285 - Inf

S-3 ............ - - - - - - SUliDE, Carl J. fill. - Capt - 0554325 - Inf YAMAZAKI, Alfred A ..... 1st Lt •. Q 01339499 ... Inf' .

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2ND BN J 'i

CO - - - - - -. - - - - - H!LLOY, Albert :E .... Ma.j ... 035289 - Inf

Ex Off ... - ................. ""' .... DUNCAN, James :R .... Capt -.062221- Inf

WARREN James A.- 1st Lt- 01032609·- Inf

.:.s-3 ... - - - - - - - - - TANGHE, Albert L. -. Capt - 01081038 - Inf ·. ·r·· ' McMANAMY, Kenneth E. - 1st Lt - 01321225 - Inf

3RD :BN

· 00 ...... - - - - - - - - - TOTH, I.ouis L. :"" Ma.j - 01288lJ:68 - Inf i

Ex Off - - - - - - - - - }iAJ:ThTTI'fG, i'lilliam E • - Capt - 060466 - Inf

S-2 - - - - - - - - - - BURTON, Rhondal - Capt ~ 01287301 - Inf

S-3 - - - - - - - - - - LOCKJJART, Robert L .... Capt - '050374 - Inf

SERVICE COH!lAliY

CO - - - - - - - - - - - :BROHriELL, G:eo.l:gei R~ -· Capt - 01321483 - Inf

HV. MTR. CONPANY

CO - ... - - - ... - - - - - VIGDAL, Robert W • - 1st Lt ... 02262405 .. Inf

TANK CO. 38TH INF. ,

CO ... - -- - - - - - - - GREEN, William L. - 1st Lt - 02020805 -, Inf.,

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HEADQUARTERS ' lst Bn, 38th Int Ap0 , . · 248

SUMMARY FOR THE MONTH OF

AUGUST 1951

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From 1 to 5 August, the let Bn, 38thinrantry remained

1n defensive positions assigned on line Kans*a• These were

on h1ll 1001 1n the vic 1n1 ty of. D'l' 209338.. Dur1ns tb1a per-

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. :•; iodaotivity consisted of patrolling and bettering defensive

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positions. Enemy contact.c:)o_neisted ot small nightly probing ,··, ' 't'' ,.

attacks Which. were repelled in ail instances •

On 6 Jfugust 195~, the let Battalion relieved the Nether

lands Dutch Battalion on position. The Battalion ret;a1ned 1n the

tor•er ~ethe,rland Dutch positions from 6 through 30 August . • . '. ~-. . • :'t;· ! . t"" ~- • ...... • ' . . . • • .... '

with minot,- oha,·ges in the defensive 1PP.~Jt.1on• on .17 August -t . ' . . ' .. ; . : . :· .· . ... . '

whep a planmn:t. operation co,noern1ng tb.e 38th Infantr;y t.:ook ·· · \

p.~t~,o.e.. 0 Oompariy releived the 2nd Battalions torm•r positions ' ' . .

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and E oompa.ny was attached. to the lst Battalion. 4~& :a Compan7• a

\were deployed to fill out 0 Compan;y• s former 4et•ns1v$ positiOns.

On 31 August 1951 the let Bn, 38th 'rnrant~y tll't1o~pated

in planned opera~:~~": 1nvolv1ng &n attack through t~e 2nd Batt

alton.po~it1ons N ~:~: h.1ll',·l059· Due to inclimate weather the-' -._,. ···-. . " .,

Bat·tal1on was una-ble to reach the obJective on the 1st da)'. \.

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38th infantry regiment - command report - august … · korean war 38th infantry regiment - command...

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