why are party systems collapsing in the most developed ......romney 41 77 bachmann 2 14 cain 3 16...
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Why Are Party Systems Collapsing in the Most Developed Countries on Earth? -- Theories and Evidence
Thomas Ferguson
The Stylized Facts:
Most European center-left parties, in decline for
years, now collapsing.
• 1. France: 2017, Socialist Party presidential candidate gets 6.4% of vote after party won presidency and controlled Senate and lower house and most regions in 2012.
• 2. Germany: SPD vote share halved since 1998; in 2017 down 5.2% to barely 20% from previous election; sinking in polls since.
• 3. Netherlands: Dutch Labor Party vote in 2017 down 19 points from previous election.
• 4. Greece: Pasok vote in 2009 was 43.9; in 2015 6.3%.• 5. Spain: Socialist Party vote declines from 43.9% in 2008 to
22.6% in 2016.• 6. Italy: Democratic Party and allies won 37% in 2008; in 2018
23%.• 7. Sweden: Social Democrats in 1994 won 45.2%; in 2018, 28.4.
Two Ways “Populist” Parties Rise
US and UK: Populist wings grow strongly, mostly within existing major national parties, though in UK UKIP was briefly influential. In Italy, populist leaders also take over a major national party.
Elsewhere, most new populist forces organize as new parties.
Nearly all are openly right-wing, though Five Star in Italy claims to transcend left/right divisions.
Left populist parties grew episodically on the European periphery; but only two big movements exist in major countries: The UK Labor Party and the Sanders Movement in the US..
4 Broad Explanations:
• 1. “Cultural Backlash” – Early treatments of Populism traced it to value conflicts arising from modernization; psychological shocks and fears of the “Other”; flatly denied economic forces much importance, e.g., Inglehart and Norris, 2016.
• Strongly argued by many for 2016 election (PoliSci consensus emphasizes race, gender in Trump vote; flat denials of econ influence continue[Krugman, 2018, citing PS studies]).
2. Economic Pressures Arising From
Globalization
1. UK: Becker, S. O., Fetzer, T., & Novy, D. (2016).
Who Voted for Brexit ? A Comprehensive District-
Level Analysis. CAGE Working Paper 305.
2. US: Autor, et al. (2017) – Imports; string of other
papers, some critical.
3. Germany: Dippel et al., 2016, Südekum, 2017.
4. Algan et al., 2017 – Unemployment in many EU
countries related to Populism
Cf. also INET Plenary Sessions, Edinburgh, October
2017.
3. Statistical Studies of Financial Crisis and Great
Recession:
Fin Crises Advantage Right Wing Parties
1. de Bromhead, Eichengreen, O’Rourke 2013 –
Pre-WWII crises benefit right wing Parties,
though extent varies with conditions -- how long
the slump continues, WWI, and pol traditions
2. Funke et al., 2016 – Confirm the benefit to only
the Right
4.Piketty: Brahmin Left and Merchant Right
• Old system:
• “In the 1950s-1960s, the vote for “left-wing” (socialist-labour-democratic) parties was associated with lower education and lower income voters. This corresponds to what one might label a “class-based” party system: lower class voters from the different dimensions (lower education voters, lower income voters, etc.) tend to vote for the same party or coalition, while upper and middle class voters from the different dimensions tend to vote for the other party or coalition.”
New System:
Since the 1970s-1980s, “left-wing” vote has gradually
become associated with higher education voters,
giving rise to what I propose to label a “multiple-
elite” party system in the 2000s-2010s: high-education
elites now vote for the “left”, while high income/high-
wealth elites still vote for the “right” (though less and
less so).
I.e. the “left” has become the party of the intellectual
elite (Brahmin left), while the “right” can be viewed
as the party of the business elite (Merchant right).
I show that the same transformation happened in
France, the US and Britain.
Problems With the Statistical Studies:
The exceptions are of overwhelming importance:
Pre-war: New Deal; Blum Gov’t in France; post-2008: Obama twice elected.
Completely unexplained in the stat studies.
Censored sample before WWII: elections in many countries were tightly controlled: leftist
surges meant end of the regime, e.g., Ebert and SPD; postwar is straightforward:
Left parties act Right
Problems With Piketty
– Simply false to claim that Right Parties represent the business elite, while left parties the highly educated: he recognizes that median voter accounts are way off, why then fixate on precise voting totals as the explanation? The Gilens and Page result for US, now also found in Germany.
– “Education” is systematically misunderstood in the Information Age and the triumph of fiscal austerity.
2016 and the Trump Era:One Picture Worth 1000s of Words
Data for Ferguson, Jorgensen, Chen, 2018
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
RYAN
MCCONNELL
TRUMP
CLINTON
SANDERS
2012: Support for Candidates Full Sample
and Big Business Only Percentage of Firms
Contributing
Ferguson, Jorgensen, Chen 2013
Candidate % All % Big BusObama 23 57Romney 41 77Bachmann 2 14Cain 3 16Gingrich 3 18Huntsman 2 10Paul 5 30Perry 4 18Santorum 4 21Pawlenty 2 12
N=23,590 N=777
Formal Campaign Money is Only A Slice of the Spectrum of Political Money
Figure After Ferguson, Jorgensen, and Chen, 2017
1. Payments
to Lawyers
for Services
(After Stigler,
See Text)
Substantial,
But Unknown
2. Payments to
Political Figures
Many Hundreds of
Millions of Dollars
Includes Certain
Directors Fees,
Speaking Fees,
Book Contracts;
Some “Research”
and Philanthropic
“Advice” From
Consultants
3. Foundations
and Charitable
Grants
Many Not
Political; Some
That Do Go
Through Think
Tanks
$296 Billion in
Total Giving in
2006; Perhaps 3
to 5% Might
Count as Broadly
Political
4. Lobbying
Legal Definition Is
Very Narrow
2010 On the
Record Totals
Approx. $3.5
Billion.
$ Refers to
Washington, D.C.
Lobbying in States
and Cities Also
Large
5. Think Tanks
Rapid Growth
Especially Since
1970s
In 2005 Major D.C.
Based Think Tanks
Spent Approx $411
Million
Many More Now
Outside Washington,
D.C.
Not Included in
Estimate
6. Formal
Campaign
Spending
Total
Expenditures on
Federal
Campaigns Only
$5.2 Billion in
2008; State and
Local Spending
Heavy, Too
7. Value of
Stock Tips,
IPOs To
Political
Figures
“Event
Analysis”
Studies Suggest
Very Large in
Certain Periods
See Text
8. Public
Relations
Spending
Some
Certainly
Affects Politics
Linear Models of Legislative Elections: U.S. House 2012; All Such Elections For Which We Have Data, Including France (!) Look Roughly Like This
2012: Pseudo-R Sq .779; Bayesian Latent Spatial Instrumental Regression, Ferguson, Jorgensen,
Chen 2016
House 1980-2012
y -0.592 1.26 x, r2
= 0.813 y -0.49 1.24 x , r2
= 0.815 y -0.619 1.28 x, r2
= 0.819
y -0.592 1.31 x, r2
= 0.846 y -0.628 1.3 x , r2
= 0.845 y -0.532 1.1 x , r2
= 0.725
y -0.492 0.997 x , r2
= 0.736 y -0.674 1.18 x , r2
= 0.804 y -0.496 1.08 x, r2
= 0.833
y -0.616 1.3 x, r2
= 0.823 y -0.571 1.19 x , r2
= 0.827 y -0.594 1.17 x, r2
= 0.809
y -0.536 1.13 x, r2
= 0.804 y -0.429 1.06 x , r2
= 0.814 y -0.488 1.07 x, r2
= 0.771
y -0.548 1.01 x, r2
= 0.78 y -0.459 1.02 x , r2
= 0.765
1980 1982 1984
1986 1988 1990
1992 1994 1996
1998 2000 2002
2004 2006 2008
2010 2012
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.000.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
DEM Percent Two Party Total Money
% D
em -
% G
OP
y -0.592 1.26 x, r2
= 0.813 y -0.49 1.24 x , r2
= 0.815 y -0.619 1.28 x, r2
= 0.819
y -0.592 1.31 x, r2
= 0.846 y -0.628 1.3 x , r2
= 0.845 y -0.532 1.1 x , r2
= 0.725
y -0.492 0.997 x , r2
= 0.736 y -0.674 1.18 x , r2
= 0.804 y -0.496 1.08 x, r2
= 0.833
y -0.616 1.3 x, r2
= 0.823 y -0.571 1.19 x , r2
= 0.827 y -0.594 1.17 x, r2
= 0.809
y -0.536 1.13 x, r2
= 0.804 y -0.429 1.06 x , r2
= 0.814 y -0.488 1.07 x, r2
= 0.771
y -0.548 1.01 x, r2
= 0.78 y -0.459 1.02 x , r2
= 0.765
1980 1982 1984
1986 1988 1990
1992 1994 1996
1998 2000 2002
2004 2006 2008
2010 2012
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.000.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
DEM Percent Two Party Total Money
% D
em -
% G
OP
Linear Model: Senate 1980 to 2014
y -41.3 0.827 x, r2
= 0.613 y -15.5 0.582 x , r2
= 0.309 y -28.8 0.819 x, r2
= 0.501
y -51.8 1.05 x, r2
= 0.833 y -35.2 0.898 x , r2
= 0.847 y -45.4 0.942 x , r2
= 0.772
y -50.6 1.13 x, r2
= 0.746y -33.9 0.737 x, r
2= 0.738 y -45.6 0.856 x , r
2= 0.748
y -42.9 0.897 x , r2
= 0.742 y -41.6 0.874 x, r2
= 0.901 y -47.1 0.937 x, r2
= 0.749
y -66.7 1.26 x, r2
= 0.776y -46.3 0.945 x , r
2= 0.802 y -51.6 1.06 x , r
2= 0.76
y -40.5 0.846 x , r2
= 0.786y -44.4 0.872 x , r
2= 0.677 y 33.2 0.353 x , r
2= 0.634
y -54.6 0.896 x , r2
= 0.748
1980.0 1982.0 1982.1
1984.0 1986.0 1988.0
1990.0 1992.0 1994.0
1996.0 1998.0 2000.0
2002.0 2004.0 2006.0
2008.0 2010.0 2012.0
2014.0
-100-50
050
100
-100-50
050
100
-100-50
050
100
-100-50
050
100
-100-50
050
100
-100-50
050
100
-100-50
050
100
0 25 50 75 100
Dem Percent Two Party Total Money
% D
em
- %
GO
P
Conclusion: Globalization Generates Or Intensifies Existing
Pressures toward Dual Economies
1. Increases in Income Inequality; Wealth Inequality
2. Pressures to Lower Tax Rates, Esp. on High Incomes
3. Restructuring of Jobs, Careers, Consequent on Reorganization of
Firms.
4. Permanent Fiscal Squeezes over Long Periods of Time
5. Laissez Faire for Most Citizens, But State Guarantees and
Support for FTE
(Temin, Storm, Lazonick, Ferguson, Jorgensen, Chen – All INET
Working Papers; David Weil on Job Fissuring
The European Union Enters the Danger Zone;When Businesses Bail
European Union, Social
Democrats, American
Democrats –
Weaker Econ Appeals,
Identity Politics
So the Issue is Top Down Led or Bottom Up Led
Movements for “Change”:
Crucial Question is Alignments Within Business
Community:
US, UK, distinctive in that they both have very large Free
Market Fundamentalist Blocs;
Contrast Macron, German Situation; Also Parliamentary
Coalitions Harder to Organize
Movements Against Globalization Have Succeeded With
Strong Support From
Free Market Fundamentalists; Stance of the Rest of
Business Becomes Crucial As These Movements Assume
Power
Claims that economic
issues did not affect
voting patterns in the
2016 election are false.
Ferguson, Page,
Rothschild, Chang,
and Chen, 2018:
Note: DV for each column is 2016 vote choice, with 0=vote for Clinton and 1=vote for Trump. Cells are logit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Issues Affecting General Election Voting
Predictors of 2016 presidential election vote choice.
(1) (2) (3)
Right Track -2.273*** -2.762*** -2.380***
(0.282) (0.250) (0.345)
Limit Imports 0.903*** 0.905*** 1.027***
(0.226) (0.196) (0.249)
Racial Resentment 3.907*** 4.491*** 3.947***
(0.365) (0.336) (0.508)
Modern Sexism 4.081*** 4.736*** 3.924***
(0.537) (0.482) (0.613)
White 1.243*** 1.642*** 1.210***
(0.248) (0.225) (0.248)
ACA Approval -3.233***
(0.270)
Party ID 5.738***
(0.450)
Constant -3.267*** -5.466*** -7.584***
(0.346) (0.320) (0.537)
Observations 2,620 2,621 2,620
Pseudo-R2 .58 .52 .63
Issues Affecting General Election Voting
Pseudo-R2 = .52
Right Track
Limit Imports
Racial Resentment
Modern Sexism
White
-4 -2 0 2 4 6
Predictors of General Election Vote Choice
Racial ResentmentFour Question Scale Repeated From Election to ElectionMeans in Both Parties
• Weighted Racial Resentment Means
• 2008
• overall mean = 3.46
• GOP mean = 3.84
• Dem mean = 3.16
• 2012
• overall mean = 3.52
• GOP mean = 3.99
• Dem mean = 3.11
• 2016
• overall mean = 3.19
• GOP mean = 3.78
• Dem mean = 2.63
• GOP primary voter mean = 3.84
• Trump primary voter mean = 3.99
• Weighted Modern Sexism Means
• 2008
• overall mean = 2.54
• GOP mean = 2.60
• Dem mean = 2.36
• 2012
• overall mean = 2.48
• GOP mean = 2.71
• Dem mean = 2.26
• 2016
• overall mean = 2.34
• GOP mean =2.66
• Dem mean = 2.03
• GOP primary voter mean = 2.65
• Trump primary voter mean = 2.74
Modern Sexism Scale
Problem of Money in Politics is Problem of Money in Society (Think Inequality)
Figure After Ferguson and Johnson, 2013