The Future of Peace Operations:Maintaining Momentum

NOVEMBER 2015

Introduction

This year marks both the seventieth anniversary of the United Nations (UN)and the recent completion of the most comprehensive assessment of UNpeace operations since the Brahimi Report (issued in 2000). In June 2015, theHigh-Level Independent Panel on UN Peace Operations (HIPPO) released itsreport—and put forward more than 100 recommendations—and, inSeptember 2015, the UN secretary-general released his own report, The Futureof UN Peace Operations, outlining his agenda and “priorities and key actions”to move the panel’s recommendations forward between now and the end of2016.1

To support this agenda for making UN peace operations “fit for purpose,” itwill be essential for the UN Secretariat and member states to build and sustainthe political momentum for the implementation of the recommendations ofthe UN secretary-general and of the HIPPO, as well as to build on synergieswith the other global reviews—the Peacebuilding Architecture Review, andthe Report of the Secretary-General on Women, Peace, and Security.2

In this context, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea andthe International Peace Institute (IPI) organized an expert meeting in Seoulon October 22, 2015. Opening the seminar, Dong-ik Shin, deputy minister ofthe Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Korea, presented the objectives of theseminar as twofold: first, to develop and refine a practical and sharedunderstanding of key aspects of the agenda for improving UN peaceoperations that the UN secretary-general has put forward (which werediscussed in the first four sessions: 1. The Pursuit of Political Settlements; 2.The Protection of Civilians; 3. Tailored and Context-Sensitive Responses; and4. Global-Regional Partnerships); and second, to start sketching a way forwardfor building and sustaining the political momentum for implementation(discussed in session 5). The seminar built on a previous discussion of therecommendations of the HIPPO report organized jointly by the Ministry ofForeign Affairs of the Republic of Korea and IPI at UN headquarters in July ofthis year. Attendees included members of the HIPPO and representatives of UNmember states, the UN Secretariat, and the African Union (AU), as well as

On October 22, 2015, the Ministry ofForeign Affairs of the Republic ofKorea hosted a day-long interna-tional seminar on “The Future ofPeace Operations” in Seoul. Theseminar, which was held under theChatham House rule of nonattribu-tion, sought to build on and enrichthe ongoing debate on how best tosupport the implementation of therecommendations from both theHigh-Level Independent Panel onPeace Operations and the Report ofthe Secretary-General on the Futureof UN Peace Operations. The expertmeeting was organized with thetechnical assistance of theInternational Peace Institute (IPI).

Olga Abilova from IPI served asrapporteur. Arthur Boutellis, directorof IPI’s Brian Urquhart Center forPeace Operations, oversaw thesubstantive preparations for theseminar and drafting of this report.This meeting note reflects therapporteur’s interpretation of thediscussions and does not necessarilyrepresent the views of all otherparticipants.

IPI’s Brian Urquhart Center for PeaceOperations conducts wide-rangingresearch and policy facilitation onprevention and mediation, peace -keeping, and peacebuilding, aimedat informing and assisting a broadrange of policymakers and civilsociety on emerging securitychallenges and multilateral responsecapacities.

IPI owes a great debt of gratitude toits many donors to the programs ofthe Center for Peace Operations. Inparticular, IPI is grateful to thegovernment of the Republic of Korea.

1 United Nations, The Future of United Nations Peace Operations: Implementation of the Recommendations of theHigh-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, UN Doc. A/70/357 – S/2015/682, September 2, 2015.

2 United Nations, Challenge of Sustaining Peace: Report of the Advisory Group of Experts on the Review of thePeacebuilding Architecture, UN Doc. A/69/968 – S/2015/490, June 30, 2015; United Nations, Preventing Conflict,Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security CouncilResolution 1325, October 12, 2015, available at http://wps.unwomen.org/en ; and United Nations, Report of theSecretary-General on Women and Peace and Security, UN Doc. S/2015/716, September 16, 2015.

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research scholars and academics. The outcome ofthe expert meeting is meant to inform the organi-zation of a larger international conference ofmember states in early 2016, in support of ongoinginitiatives to build and sustain momentum forchange in UN peace operations, particularly theone announced by the Office of the President of the70th Session of the UN General Assembly to hold ahigh-level thematic debate on the UN, peace, andsecurity on May 10-11, 2016. This report examinesthe different aspects of reform discussed at theexpert meeting, with regards to the shaping of astrategy for implementation, and it puts forwardthe conclusions that emerged in the course of thediscussions.

The Need for a HolisticApproach to PeaceOperations

The HIPPO report was well-received by the UNSecretariat, including a large number of UNmember states, which is a substantial achievementgiven political divisions among member states atthe UN. Groups of member states or groups withinthe Secretariat will, however, be tempted to focuson specific recommendations, rather thanimplementing a much-needed holistic vision formore effective UN peace operations in the future.Such a holistic vision of UN peace operations thatemphasizes the primacy of politics at all stages ofinternational engagement and stretches across thewhole conflict spectrum with flexible transitionphases will require better information and strategicplanning to enable the secretary-general to proposefield missions tailored to particular contexts. One should, however, also be conscious of thepossible obstacles to the implementation of such aholistic vision. A first obstacle is the inopportunetiming of the proposals, coming at the end of thecurrent secretary-general’s term; while thesecretary-general has taken some steps, such asembracing the recommendation of a new central-ized strategic analysis and planning unit in hisoffice, most of the implementation will be left to hissuccessor. There is thus the danger thatmomentum might be lost with the leadershipchange. The second obstacle is the inevitablebureaucratic resistance from within UN depart-

ments to a more field-focused Secretariat,including from the Department of Management(DM). A third obstacle will be funding: while reformsproposed by the HIPPO have the potential of beingcost-neutral, this would require a substantialrestructuring of current financing and resources toallow for more flexibility to adapt to evolvingenvironments and to enhance the capabilities ofpeacekeepers. Lastly, troop- and police-contributing countries (TCCs/PCCs) are insuffi-ciently involved in consultations with the SecurityCouncil when missions are planned. If this practicedoes not change, and further measures to holdTCCs/PCCs accountable are not put forward, thencrucial stakeholders of UN peace operations mightresist the implementation of changes necessary formore efficient and sustainable conflict resolution. In this context, a global dialogue between the UNSecretariat and member states and among memberstates needs to happen to build a sharedunderstanding and sense of responsibility forimplementation of important reforms. To ensureobstacles do not come in the way of implementa-tion, an important priority for the secretary-general remains to pass the priority of the reformefforts to his successor. Member states can andshould contribute by continuing the publicdialogue over the recommendations and vision ofthe HIPPO report, including through initiativeslike this seminar.

The Pursuit of PoliticalSettlements

Of the essential shifts to UN peace operationscalled for in the HIPPO report, a key one is thatpolitics must drive the implementation of UNpeace operations. However, the pursuit of politicalsettlement is a broad topic, even in the context ofUN peace operations, and it is important toidentify what needs to be done by whom for thisshift to happen. Conflict prevention, peacekeeping, and peace -building are all parts of a continuum with transi-tions being neither linear nor strictly sequential.The pursuit of political settlement can thus not beseen in isolation from what the UN does before themission is deployed and after the exit of the mission,

and its success is ultimately dependent on how theUN establishes itself as a credible interlocutor andhow well it understands the dynamics on theground. The most challenging and most importantfactor in assuring sustainable long-term peacesettlements is prevention, but instituting a cultureof prevention presents challenges both at thestrategic and institutional levels.OBSTACLES TO PREVENTIVE ACTIONS

At the strategic level, a lack of political will andurgency to address a dispute often exists before anescalation to violent conflict. While massiveresources are spent to deal with the effects ofviolent conflict, only 1.5 percent of the UNSecretariat’s budget is devoted to carrying outactivities related to prevention and peacemaking,and the Department of Political Affairs (DPA)relies heavily on extra budgetary funding to carryout such activities. Measuring the impact of crisis-averting interventions remains a challenge for theorganization, which makes it difficult to takeevidence-based decisions on actions of prevention.This is further complicated by the increasingpresence of violent extremist groups, who tend tonot respond to traditional prevention approaches,and which emphasizes the ever-important need torefocus on this pertinent issue. At the institutional level, the UN often meetsresistance from member states on the basis of theprinciple of national sovereignty; nationalsolutions to national problems are preferred.Furthermore, at the regional level, neighboringstates might also be reluctant to involve the UN inthe search for solutions, as they fear this will lead toloss of control by internationalizing the conflictand by potentially giving legitimacy to oppositions.Institutional blocks also exist within the UN, wherethe Security Council might refuse to discuss anissue because it is not on its agenda, and whererivalries and turf battles across departments mightbecome more important than common goals.A MORE PROACTIVE UN SECRETARIAT

In moving forward, the UN Secretariat should takeon a much more proactive role, based on enhancedknowledge, analysis, and a stronger relationship tofield offices. To bring the entire UN system towardprevention work, the organization must act asone—and, to achieve this, the system-wide

coherence must be strengthened. It was suggestedthat the cooperation between DPKO and DPAmust be reviewed, and that more senior-levelpolitical staff members (who could act as standbyhigh-level envoys) are needed to carry outimportant prevention work. The concept putforward by the HIPPO report of using “small teamsof experts” to support national governments andUN country teams merits due consideration.GREATER SUPPORT OF MEMBERSTATES

On the other side, the Security Council andmember states should boost their support to thesecretary-general and assure that he has therequired political backing and resources, and theyshould become more ready to accept the goodoffices of the UN in the resolution of their crises.Conversely, DPA should also be more strategic ingenerating political support from the SecurityCouncil and member states for its work. The role ofthe Secretariat in pursuing peace settlement is,however, sometimes overemphasized while theability of member states is overlooked, both asindividual states and collectively. It is important torecognize that member states have found innova-tive ways to support peace processes andoperations in the past. It was suggested that the Security Council shouldstrengthen mechanisms by which it looks atlooming crises (such as horizon-scanningmeetings), become more field-oriented (withcouncil field visits engaging more in politicalprocesses), and revive its military staff committeeto make it more relevant in mandate reviews (suchas was done last year for the UN StabilizationMission in Haiti [MINUSTAH]). Member statescan also form groups of friends and contact groupsto provide political support and contribute toimplementing mandates of UN missions, as wasdone in the past. These could also support“compacts” signed with host countries (assuggested by HIPPO). To improve the work ofgood offices and innovate it, more research isneeded to identify best practices from the past onthe role of the General Assembly in supportingpolitical processes when the Security Council isdeadlocked like it is on some of the most pertinentconflicts today.

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THE CRITICAL GOOD OFFICES ROLEOF STATES AND REGIONALORGANIZATIONS

Acting collectively and within their region, statesincreasingly lead conflict prevention andmediation efforts. The recent example of SouthSudan has shown that the UN can do very littlepolitically, if it does not work with regional andsubregional organizations. In Africa, where mostUN peace operations are deployed, the politicalleadership of the organization is failing inachieving durable political settlements, while thegood offices offered by subregional organizationsand the African Union (AU) are on the rise.

The Protection of Civilians

PRIORITIZING THE PROTECTION OFCIVILIANS

Since 2008, all new UN missions have integratedthe need to protect civilians in their mandates. Yetmissions are still failing to properly assure thesafety of civilians in areas where they operate.Missions are also increasingly deployed to environ-ments where political settlements have not yet beenreached; where governments’ capacities to protecttheir own civilians are weak; and where hostgovernments are sometimes themselves respon-sible for violations. As missions are currentlymandated to carry out long lists of tasks with littledirection on what and how to prioritize, they oftenfind themselves in the positions where there is atrade-off between protecting civilians and othermandated tasks. An important shift shouldtherefore happen from merely implementing theprotection of civilians (PoC)—to prioritizing it.More flexible mandates with fewer tasks mightallow this to occur.TAILORING POC MANDATES TO THECONTEXT

UN peace operations also face difficulties incarrying out their PoC mandates when their designand mandates are not sufficiently tailored to theconditions on the ground but instead followpreexisting templates. For instance, the UNMission in the Republic of South Sudan (UNMISS)was deployed widely across the country but with

insufficient analytical capacity to tailor itsoperations to different conditions. It is thereforeessential to strengthen analysis in the pre-mandating planning assessment stage and to makePoC a central element of such conflict analysis.Stronger theories of change on how UN missionscan better address threats to civilians on the groundshould be developed, and TCCs/PCCs should beinvolved in these discussions (building on themember-states-led process that resulted in theKigali principles on PoC3), for example, throughactively sharing analyses and assessments with theSpecial Committee on Peacekeeping Operations(C34). In addition, as recommended in the HIPPO,deeper engagement with local communities canhelp counter the one-size-fits-all approach that iscurrently being used for PoC. By identifying thepopulation itself as a political entity, the politicalstrategies of UN peace operations will morenaturally focus on prioritizing protection. On themilitary side, situational awareness can beimproved by increasing the use of technology as astrategic enabler, as outlined earlier this year by theExpert Panel on Technology and Innovation in UNPeacekeeping, whose recommendations weresupported by the HIPPO. Improved and updatedtechnology can help detect threats more quickly,and thus help peacekeepers to act more respon-sibly.BETTER CAPABILITIES FOR POCACROSS THE PEACE OPERATIONSSPECTRUM

The ability of missions to protect civilianscontinues to be limited by insufficient capabilities,as illustrated in South Sudan when civil war brokeout in December 2013 and peacekeepers presentfound themselves outnumbered by armed youthsattacking civilians. The right kind of capabilitiesshould allow peacekeepers to act more effectively,through improved mobility, adequate equipment,and medical evacuation. Pledges made during therecent September 2015 World Leaders’ Summitcould help if they are turned into actual contribu-tions to missions. Focus should also go to thecritical role of police in assuring physical protec-tion, especially in cases of urban violence, as well as

3 See proceedings of the International Conference on the Protection of Civilians, Kigali, Rwanda, May 28-29, 2015, available at http://civilianprotection.rw .

to mechanisms of unarmed civilian protection thatare available through the civil affairs and humanrights sections as well as other advisers (e.g., PoC,women, etc.). The changing nature of conflict and targeting ofcivilians in new wars also call for an improvedconceptualization of protecting civilians in thedifferent stages of conflict. Protecting civilians is animportant conflict prevention mechanism andmust therefore be undertaken in all types of peaceoperations, not just peacekeeping but alsopeacebuilding ones. It is therefore essential thatdifferent programs and agencies involved in activi-ties across the conflict spectrum take on a consis-tent approach with regards to PoC, instead ofcompeting for the same funding. The HIPPO report reaffirmed PoC as a coreobligation of peacekeeping operations. Yet thereare still no clear objective indicators for measuringperformance. TCCs and PCCs display differentlevels of willingness to engage in PoC, often due tohidden national caveats that the HIPPO reportdenounces. Enhanced cooperation and consulta-tion with contributing member states can helpremedy this, along with a transparent system forevaluating and reporting on performance.

Tailored and Context-Sensitive Responses

UN peace operations are today nine times largerand last three times longer than those in the 1990sin increasingly complex environments. Yet theability of the UN to analyze conflict-specific contextinto which peacekeepers are deployed has notimproved much, and the organization is continuingto deploy into highly dangerous situations on thebasis of inadequate threats and risks assessments.Thus, one of the main recommendations of theHIPPO report, also echoed by the secretary-generalin his report, is for the organization to tailor itsmandates to include more context-sensitiveresponses. The third discussion of the conferencewas focused on the challenges of implementingsuch recommendations.TWO-STAGE SEQUENCED MANDATINGPROCESS

Pressed for time, the UN tends to plan missions ata time when it understands the context the least.

The planning for the mission in Mali illustratessome of the challenges in maintaining the primacyof politics, as the organization had limitedopportunity to consult authorities when only aninterim government was in place. The two-stagemandating process recommended by the HIPPOcould help establish a more tailored approach todeployment of UN missions. This recommenda-tion was, in part, put forward by the Brahimi reportfifteen years ago, and a debate among the confer-ence participants ensued as to why it had yet notbeen implemented. It was stressed from the panelthat the initial Brahimi recommendation had onlyfocused on sequencing the deployment ofuniformed personnel, which in practice wouldhave meant significant delays in mountingoperations. The HIPPO report differs in that itstresses the need for sequencing of all personneland structures. This practice was piloted in Libya,where the mandate was sequenced to some extent,and in South Sudan, where the mandate ofUNMISS was created through a two-stage process.It should become a standard practice, like theHIPPO report argues, to assure missions can bebetter tailored to realities on the ground.PRIORITIZING MANDATED TASKS

A challenge in implementing sequenced mandatesis that it requires the prioritization of tasks.However, it is difficult to rule out tasks whennegotiating a mandate and reaching a commonagreement on what the initial purpose of themission should be. Concentrating scarce politicalattention on targeting the most pertinent issues canbe done through increased and more efficientcommunication among the Security Council, theUN Secretariat, and TCCs/PCCs—improvedtriangular communication, as put forward in therecommendations of the reports of the HIPPO andthe secretary-general. This is also essential to reacha common understanding of what is realistic for amission to pursue, based on existing capabilitiesand how they relate to the operating environment. STREAMLINING ACTIVITIES OF UNFUNDS AND AGENCIES

Participants also insisted on the need for UN fundsand agencies to deliver more coherent and strategicresponses on the ground, highlighting that theright financing mechanisms, such as strongerpooled funds called for by the Peacebuilding

The Future of Peace Operations 5

Architecture Review, have the potential of bringingpeople together around a common set of priorities.Inflexible funding structures of UN peaceoperations are currently presenting manychallenges to missions, especially with regards totransitions between different UN instruments. Itwas also recalled that the HIPPO called on theGeneral Assembly to embrace the recommenda-tions put forward in the 2011 report of theAdvisory Committee on Administrative andBudgetary Questions (ACABQ) to establish aseparate account for the funding of special politicalmissions, to assure attention is not solely concen-trated on peacekeeping tasks.

Global-RegionalPartnerships

One of the common themes that echoedthroughout the seminar is that the UN cannotsingle-handedly address the challenges associatedwith maintaining peace and security in the twenty-first century, and partnerships with regional andsubregional organizations are crucial, in particularthe African Union (AU). The African continentindeed remains the main theater for UNoperations, with more than 100,000 of the 129,000peacekeepers deployed currently. In the last tenyears, the number of African personnel serving inAfrican-mandated operations has grown from zeroto 40,000, while the number of UN peacekeeperscoming from Africa has increased from 10,000 to30,000. African Union operations to date have, however,been largely reliant on bilateral and EuropeanUnion support. This has made it difficult for theorganization to sustain its peace operations, and ithas led to premature transitions to the UNmissions in Mali and the Central African Republic,More predictable, flexible, and sustainable fundingfor peace operations, as recommended by theHIPPO report, should be the basis of a strongstrategic partnership between the AU and the UN. PARADIGM SHIFT TOWARD AN AU-UNSTRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

The year 2015 has seen a paradigm shift in therelationship between the AU and the UN. TheHIPPO report voiced the need for a strategicpartnership between the two organizations, and it

is thus an important opportunity to drive forwardthe momentum needed for change. The AU hasbeen arguing for some time for a move from a one-sided relationship where the UN engages incapacity building for and ad hoc support to the AU,to one of strategic partnership based on compara-tive advantages. There is thus the possibility formember states to shape a new, more suitable rolefor the UN in maintaining peace and security in thetwenty-first century, as both (i) a partner thatresponds politically and operationally, as well as (ii)an enabler and facilitator for regional actors. The position of the AU toward the UN is basedon four principles: (1) The primacy of the UNSecurity Council in carrying the responsibility formaintaining global peace and security, as stipulatedby Chapter VIII of the UN Charter; (2) all actionsof the AU are within the context of Chapter VIII ofthe UN Charter, in support of the objectives of theUN Security Council; (3) the importance of Africanownership and agenda-setting with regards topeace and security on the African continent; and(4) partnership should be based on the principles ofconsultative decision making, burden sharing, anddivision of labor along the lines of complemen-tarity.AU AS FIRST RESPONDER TO AFRICANCRISES

With the challenge of rapid deployment continuingto plague UN peacekeeping missions, the AU hasshown the ability to generate and deploy forcesmore quickly than the UN. It also is endeavoring toimprove its financial flexibility by increasingassessed contributions from its members towardAU peace operations, which includes the adoptionof a decision that African countries would increasetheir financial contributions to AU operationsfrom covering 1 percent to 25 percent of the totalcosts within the next five years. For the AU Missionin Somalia (AMISOM) alone, this would signify anincrease of $189 million, compared to the meager$4 million the African countries are todayproviding to all peace and security efforts.However, this increase in contributions fromAfrican countries will not alone cover the costs ofpeace operations and of the African Standby Force,which the AU has been setting up throughincreased coordination with its member states andlarge training exercises. Therefore, the UN should

6 MEETING NOTE

think of providing UN-assessed contributions toAU missions approved by the Security Council ona case-by-case basis. Beyond deploying responsive peace enforcementoperations, the AU also has an inherent incentiveto respond to crises before they erupt on itscontinent and has a range of prevention instru-ments at its disposal that the UN does not have.Since its inception, the AU has been far moreinterventionist when it comes to governance andinternal affairs of sovereign states, in particularwhen its legal instruments are supplemented bysubregional economic communities. A recentexample of an organization exercising this liberty isECOWAS’ political intervention in Burkina Fasofollowing the October 2015 coup. MEMBER STATES AND GLOBAL-REGIONAL PARTNERSHIPS

The strategic partnership between the AU and theUN should not be solely a discussion between theUN Secretariat and the AU Commission, but itneeds to be a structured dialogue between AU andUN member states at the strategic level. First,member states must clearly decide whether aspecial arrangement should be developed with theAU, which is currently the only regional organiza-tion to which the discussion applies, or whetherembracing strategic partnerships with regionalorganizations constitutes a shift in current practiceof interpreting Chapter VIII of the UN Charter.Second, in developing the relationship with theAU, member states should not view the AU as amonolithic structure, as it is governed by a complexhierarchy (of member states and bureaucracies).Similarly, the broad spectrum of peace operationsmust be taken into account when assessing howcooperation should be improved. Lastly, it must bestressed that a stronger UN-AU dialogue onpartnerships will not alone be sufficient to addressthe challenges the continent faces; thus, othersubregional organizations should also be associ-ated.

Conclusion: MaintainingMomentum

The last session focused on the way forward andchallenges for the UN Secretariat and memberstates in generating and maintaining themomentum needed for UN peace operationsreform. LEARNING FROM PAST REFORMEFFORTS

It was stressed that successful change in the UNoften happens incrementally over the long term,and the history of UN reforms offer some lessons inthis regard.4 First, it is important to manageexpectations on reform, and process matters atleast as much as substance. Second, change requiresa clearly articulated strategic vision from thesecretary-general and buy-in from the UNSecretariat to overcome the challenge of bureau-cratic resistance within the UN. Third, a rationalefor change with few concrete proposals can bemore easily championed by member states. Lastly,longer-term five-to-ten-year plans aligned withGeneral Assembly budget cycles are preferable toshort-term rhetorical statements. BUILDING A COMPELLING NARRATIVE

Building and sustaining support for change can bemotivated by the collective sense of urgencyaround the growing disconnect between currentUN responses and the increasing complexity ofconflicts with various layers connecting withtransnational aspects of organized crime andviolent extremism. Ensuring that multilateralinstitutions have the ability to address suchchallenges and that people have confidence in themis indeed a collective responsibility. However, thecost of reform can create strong countercurrents. Itis, therefore, also important to outline the “cost-neutral” and potential savings from a reform of UNpeace operations seen as a whole and by comparingthem to the financial costs of their alternative (for

The Future of Peace Operations 7

4 See Francesco Mancini, “Managing Change at the United Nations: Lessons from Recent Initiatives,” New York: International Peace Institute, October 2015,available at www.ipinst.org/2015/10/managing-change-at-the-united-nations-lessons-from-recent-initiatives .

example, the cost of preventing conflicts versusmanaging conflicts with costly peacekeepingmissions). CREATING CONSENSUS AND SUPPORTOF MEMBER STATES

The General Assembly can play an important rolein generating political support and buildingconsensus toward promoting change. This couldbuild on the broad consensus that has alreadyemerged on the fact that the focus should be onimplementing both the recommendations from thesecretary-general’s report on the Future of UNPeace Operations—over the next fifteen months—and the HIPPO report—beyond the end of theterm of the current secretary-general. However, thenumber of recommendations from the HIPPOreport and its uncoordinated overlap with otherreviews (Peacebuilding Architecture Review andthe Global Study on the Implementation ofResolution 1325) make it challenging to have anoverall vision of reform and to prioritize issues. The High-Level Thematic Debate on UN, Peace,and Security announced by the president of theGeneral Assembly for May 10-11, 2016, couldusefully help identify synergies among the differentreviews, generate such a vision, and build member-state support for it. This could help build a strongcoalition of member states in the GeneralAssembly, made of a diverse group of championsthat could lobby for sustaining reform effortsbeyond the 71st General Assembly Session. AVOIDING CHERRY-PICKING

A challenge for member states will be to overcomethe appetite to cherry-pick recommendations fromthe secretary-general and HIPPO reports, asnarratives might be easier to articulate for separateinitiatives. With 100 recommendations offered inthe HIPPO report and more than forty initiativespresented in the implementation report of thesecretary-general, prioritizing might seem like anonerous task, but it is necessary to ensure thepromotion of a holistic and coordinated approachneeded for comprehensive reform and to carry the

“HIPPO spirit” forward. Making UN peaceoperations “fit for purpose” will indeed involvemoving many interdependent pieces of the UNpeace operations puzzle forward at the same time.Coming up with a more detailed implementationplan, and thus breaking down challenging issuesinto more manageable bundles of proposals, couldbe helpful. GENERATING PUBLIC SUPPORT

Working to generate more public interest andmedia attention around the continuation of thereform process could play a useful role, and thiscould be done by linking the findings of the HIPPOreport to the current crises that UN peaceoperations are facing from South Sudan to Libya,and as new ones emerge. This would also requirebetter knowledge and shared understanding of thesubstance of the post-2015 reform agenda madeavailable to a broader audience.5 Furthermore,clearer and more independent monitoring andevaluation of the process, in particular through athematic approach (e.g., the idea of a scorecard), isneeded to clarify the responsibilities of memberstates, as well as to identify possible entry points foraction. The process of selection of the nextsecretary-general could also be an opportunity formore public debate over some of the HIPPOrecommendations. MOVING FORWARD

The conclusion from the conference was thus thatmember states should apply a longer-term sight inmoving forward the vision and spirit of the reformgenerated by the HIPPO report. Essential to this isnot only the increased understanding of commonthemes across the pillars of the HIPPO report butalso of synergies with the PeacebuildingArchitecture Review and the Report of theSecretary-General on Women, Peace, and Security.Reform involves many moving pieces, but unlessthey are moved together by both the UN Secretariatand a diverse group of member states, they will notresult in peace operations that are more fit forpurpose and deliver greater impact on the ground.

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5 See “The Future of UN Peace Operations” knowledge platform for informing discussions and decisions of UN member states and societies on the post-2015 UNpeace operations reforms, available at www.futurepeaceops.org .

Agenda

Thursday, October 22, 2015

08:30–08:50 Registration and Coffee

08:50–09:10 Welcome and Introduction

Dong-ik Shin, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea

Keynote Remarks

Ian Martin, Executive Director, Security Council Report and former member of the High-LevelIndependent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO)

09:10–10:25 Session 1: The Pursuit of Political Settlements

How can we better ensure that the search for political solutions drives the design, implementa-tion, and review of peace operations and that the UN Secretariat has reliable resourcing forcore prevention and mediation activities (including for establishing additional regional offices)?How can the Security Council and member states in general bring their collective and sustainedpolitical leverage to support political strategies, establish compacts with host governments, andkeep peace processes on track? How can member states remain engaged and support a holisticand unified approach to high-risk situations to facilitate early preventive action?

ChairWang Xuexian, Ambassador, Department of International Organizations and Conferences,Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China

PanelistsTamrat Samuel, Former Deputy Special Representative for Liberia and NepalRichard Gowan, Associate Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations and Non-Resident Fellow at NYU’s Center on International CooperationYoung Jin Choi, Professor of the Yonsei University, former Assistant Secretary General forPeace Keeping Operations, former Special Representative of Secretary General for UNOCI,former Vice Minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea

10:25–10:40 Break

10:40–11:55 Session 2: The Protection of Civilians

How can we ensure the rapid deployment of capable peace operations that can effectively andsafely carry out their PoC mandates? What strategies and accountability mechanisms shouldbe devised with realistic expectations? How to turn pledges from the 2015 Leaders’ Summit onPeacekeeping into contributions for more effective POC? What non-military tools andapproaches could member states promote and support? How can peace operations empowerlocal communities, and in particular women, to be early peaceful responders to imminentthreats to civilians, and thus contribute to a protective environment?

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10 MEETING NOTE

ChairJoseph Nzabamiwita, Brigadier General, Director General for Policy and Strategy, Ministry ofNational Defence of Rwanda

PanelistsAditi Gorur, Director, Protecting Civilians in Conflict Program, The Stimson CenterShin wha Lee, Professor of the Korea University, member of the Independent Advisory Groupon UN Peacebuilding Fund, former Special Advisor to the UN “Rwandan IndependentInquiry” appointed by former UN Secretary-General Kofi AnnanDirk Druet, Policy Planning Team, DPET/PBPS, United Nations DPKO/DFS (via VTC)

11:55–1:30 Lunch

1:30–2:45 Session 3: Tailored and Context-Sensitive Responses

How can the secretary-general’s new small centralized analysis and planning capacity (withmultidisciplinary planners) be best supported, and how can we ensure that these effortstranslate into new ways of designing, deploying, and reviewing “peace operations” tailored tothe context? What structures could help reduce inefficiency and support cooperation inplanning and deploying peace operations? How can the Security Council strengthen communi-cation with troop-/police-contributing countries, the Secretariat, and local stakeholders tobetter integrate improved initial and continuous conflict assessment with mission planning?How can member states support sequenced approaches and smoother transitions betweendifferent phases of UN missions?

ChairDaniel Pareja Glass, Director, Special Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay

PanelistsIan Martin, Executive Director of the Security Council Report and former HIPPO member Madalene O’Donnell, United Nations Executive Office of the Secretary-General

2:45–3:00 Break

3:00–4:15 Session 4: Global-Regional Partnerships

How can member states help build a stronger, more inclusive UN-AU peace and securitypartnership to leverage comparative advantages? To what extent can some of the pledges at the2015 Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping help achieve this objective? How should the establish-ment of standing arrangements be supported? And how can procedures be established thatcould be applied flexibly when operations are sequenced or operated in parallel to foster bettercollaboration on conflict prevention and mediation?

ChairMuana Massaquoi, Military Adviser/Counsellor, Permanent Mission of Sierra Leone to theUnited Nations

PanelistsFiona Lortan, Senior Officer-Strategic Issues, Peace and Security Department, AU CommissionWalter Lotze, ZIF, former Adviser to AMISOM Special Representative

The Future of Peace Operations 11

4:15–4:30 Break

4:30–5:45 Session 5: Preparing for the Early 2016 International Conference on Building andSustaining Momentum for the Implementation of the Recommendations of the UNSecretary-General and of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations

Discuss and refine the objectives of an international conference; agree on the contents of apossible outcome declaration to be reviewed and adopted at the end of a 2016 internationalconference aimed at galvanizing the political will of member states toward the effectiveimplementation of the secretary-general and HIPPO reform agenda.

ChairYoo Dae-Jong, Director-General, International Organizations Bureau, Ministry of ForeignAffairs of Korea

PanelistsMadalene O'Donnell, United Nations Executive Office of the Secretary-GeneralIan Martin, Executive Director of the Security Council Report and former HIPPO member Arthur Boutellis, Director of the Center for Peace Operations at the International PeaceInstitute (IPI)

5:45–6:00 Closing Remarks

Dong-ik Shin, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Korea

The INTERNATIONAL PEACE INSTITUTE (IPI) is an independent,

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building resilience to promote peace, security, and sustainable

development. To achieve its purpose, IPI employs a mix of policy

research, strategic analysis, publishing, and convening. With staff

from more than twenty countries and a broad range of academic

fields, IPI has offices facing United Nations headquarters in New York

and offices in Vienna and Manama.

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