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September 2017

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Executive Summary

In East Africa, elections took place in Kenya, which saw a period of violent unrest and remains contentious as the

opposition challenges the validity of President Uhuru Kenyatta’s victory in court. At the same time, al-Shabaab attacks

have persisted in the Kenyan border counties despite security efforts to curb the militant group, with such efforts also

carried out by the US in Somalia, where their role has expanded. Meanwhile, the defection of al-Shabaab’s last surviving

founder marked a highly notable event that may bolster the Somali government’s amnesty program, though his long

estrangement from the group may dampen its effects. Ethiopia continued to see stay-home protests in Oromia Region

that expanded from their anti-tax focus to include demands for the release of political prisoners, while grenade attacks in

Amhara Region were consistent with patterns of low-level violence. In South Sudan, disputes between the government

and the UN’s regional protection force led to UN aircraft being grounded for several days, while the fall of the rebel

headquarters in Pagak to government control marked a symbolic event in the rebellion highlighting leader Riek Machar’s

faltering efforts as he remains in exile.

Turning to southern Africa, elections were likewise held in Angola, where provisional results saw longtime President

Jose Eduardo dos Santos’s chosen successor Joao Lourenco win an easy victory, though the opposition has declared its

intent to challenge the final results in court. South Africa’s President Jacob Zuma survived another no-confidence vote,

though the secret ballot enabled a significant number of ANC MPs to vote against him, highlighting the deepening intra-

party rifts. Zambia saw positive developments as opposition leader Hakainde Hichilema was released from prison,

clearing room for a possible rapprochement with the government with the help of external mediation.

Central Africa saw continued patterns of militancy, largely perpetrated by Boko Haram, in the Lake Chad region. In

Nigeria, tensions were heightened as President Muhammadu Buhari finally returned from his long medical absence,

while the government continues to negotiate with Niger Delta militants with the potential of a long-term agreement

hindered rifts within the militant groups. Cameroon confronted the renewal of the Anglophone crisis after a recent lull,

with schools set ablaze for failing to adhere to a strike and the arrests of activists with weapons and explosives. President

Paul Kagame was re-elected in Rwanda as expected, followed by the arrest of one of his opponents. Lingering discontent

over last month’s election in Congo continued to raise political tensions, though violent incidents markedly decreased.

Meanwhile, President Ali Bongo of Gabon reshuffled his cabinet to include opposition figures who are cooperating with

his national dialogue in efforts to further isolate rival Jean Ping. In Equatorial Guinea, the ongoing trial in absentia of Vice

President Teodorin Obiang Mangue remains a focal point for prolonged tensions with France. CAR continues to

experience high levels of militia violence, particularly between ex-Seleka factions, which has shifted southward as UN

peacekeepers maintain successes in the center. In DRC, planned Bundu dia Kongo protests suggests a diversification of

the militia’s tactics, though they will likely continue mobilizing followers for violent confrontation with the government. At

the same time, discontent among the opposition regarding the delayed elections saw nationwide ‘dead city’ protests, and

further demonstrations are likely as the year comes to a close without elections scheduled.

Finally, in West Africa, the launch of a large-scale task force in Ghana to address the problem of illegal mining highlights

the government’s attempts to remedy the economic and environmental impact of what’s locally known as ‘galamsey’. In

Ivory Coast, a new spate of attacks on security facilities remain unsolved despite increased security efforts, and may be

linked to criminal elements or potentially ex-’Forces Nouvelles’ rebels. Mauritania saw nearly a year-long effort by the

government to abolish the senate and transform the judiciary pass a constitutional referendum amid heavy opposition,

which has been followed by a new crackdown on public institutions and civil society actors. A constitutional referendum

in Mali was delayed as a result of large-scale protests, appeasing the opposition for a time. Meanwhile, the restive north

and center saw a positive development with an agreement between the separatist CMA and pro-government Platform,

though continued clashes suggest a gap between political elites and their fighters.


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Global Risk Map/Africa


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The following list contains countries in the region with notable developments from the past month. Please choose your country of interest by clicking on its link below.

Extreme Risk

LAKE CHAD ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 4

CAR ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 5

SOMALIA ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 7

SOUTH SUDAN ................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 8

High Risk

DRC ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................................ 9

MALI ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 10

NIGERIA ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 11

Medium Risk

ANGOLA .............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 12

CAMEROON ....................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 13

CONGO ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 14

ETHIOPIA ........................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 15

GABON ................................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 16

IVORY COAST .................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 18

KENYA ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 20

MAURITANIA .................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 21

SOUTH AFRICA ............................................................................................................................................................................................................. 22

Low Risk

EQUATORIAL GUINEA ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 23

GHANA ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 24

RWANDA .......................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 25

ZAMBIA ............................................................................................................................................................................................................................. 26

Notable Dates ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................27


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4

LAKE CHAD

Extreme Risk NOTABLE DATES

Current Situation

Assessments & Forecast

Sustained militant activity observed throughout Lake Chad region The month began with a notable Boko Haram ambush against fishermen on the Duguri, Dabar Wanzam Islands on the

Nigerian side of Lake Chad that left 31 killed, which is not only significant for the high death toll recorded, but particularly

as it reflects concerted Boko Haram efforts to disrupt economic activities across northeastern Nigeria. Indeed, fishing

represents one of the most important sources of income for communities in the area, and the attack took place only a

week after the Nigerian authorities lifted a two-year ban on fishing in the region, suggesting a direct attempt by insurgents

to deter villagers from returning to their livelihoods and further hampering the already deprived regional economy. By the

same token, while constrained by the economic stalemate, the Federal Government's decision to lift the ban represents

yet another example of Abuja’s overconfidence in the successes associated with the counterinsurgency efforts in the area.

In Cameroon, there was a significant increase in Boko Haram suicide attacks over this past month, with 12 attempted and

successful attacks recorded within the country’s Extreme North Region. In tandem, in Nigeria, the suicide explosions

recorded in Mandadari are notable given their level of coordination, and as they represent the deadliest suicide operation

carried out by the group within Borno State over recent months. These attacks also represent a hallmark of Boko Haram’s

strategy of attacking soft targets with the intention of inflicting mass casualties. Indeed, the selection of the town’s weekly

market, which serves as a source of supplies not only for Mandarari but for surrounding villages further supports this

intent.

Lastly in Niger, the Nigerien army clearance operation recorded in the Diffa Region on August 19-20 that left 40 Boko

Haram militants killed is highly significant. While the number of casualties should be taken with caution, as security forces

in the region often tend to exaggerate the success of their operations, the raid represents the first security-related incident

in southeastern Niger since the army killed 14 civilians while mistaking them for militants on July 5. With this in mind, and

given Boko Haram’s continued entrenchment and capabilities in the region, we assess that further acts of militancy are

likely to be recorded in the Lake Chad region over the coming weeks.

AUGUST

15

27 killed in triple suicide

attack in Mandadari,

Borno State

5 20

Boko Haram kill at least 31

fishermen on two islands on

Nigerian side of Lake Chad

Nigerien Defense Forces

claim to kill at least 40

Boko Haram militants in

Barwa, Diffa Region

24

At least 15 killed, eight

abducted in Boko Haram

attack on Gakara,

Extreme North Region


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5

CAR


Current Situation


Intra ex-Seleka rivalry shifting southward as notable violence recorded in Mombou Prefecture Over the last month, CAR’s outlying regions have continued to experience considerable levels of militia-related violence

underscoring the inability of Bangui and the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA) to

control the wide array of armed groups operating across the country. In this context, the most significant instances of

violence have been concentrated in eastern CAR, with the city of Bria continuing to represent a focal point for violence as

witnessed on August 15. Nonetheless, this violence does not emerge from a considerable shifting of power but rather

from insolated scuffles, which given the large presence of heavily armed warring factions in the area, often devolve into

large-scale unrest. Despite Haut-Kotto’s restiveness, the increase in ex-Seleka elements’ activities in southeastern Mombou

Prefecture represents the most significant trend of the last month, particularly the presence of Union for Peace in CAR

(UPC) and Popular Front for the Central African Renaissance (FPRC) therein. Indeed, notable intra ex-Seleka clashes

involving both factions that left more than 50 killed took place in Gambo on August 5, reflecting the gradual shift of ex-

Seleka’s activities from Ouaka and Haute-Kotto prefectures toward the south of the country.

Looking ahead, given that MINUSCA has been relatively successful in maintaining the peace across Ouaka Prefecture once

they dislodged UPC and FPRC elements from the city of Bambari, we assess that both of those armed groups will continue

their efforts to expand their influence southward. In this context, an entrenched UPC presence has been recorded within

Mombou Prefecture, epitomized by the clashes with anti-Balaka elements in the town of Bema on August 9-10 that left 20

killed. Likewise, FPRC militiamen have also expanded their influence in the area, mainly through their alliances with several

anti-Balaka groups therein. Indeed, considering their strategic location bordering DRC, Basse-Kotto and Mbomou

prefectures are expected to be a distinct focal point for violence in the coming months as the above-mentioned groups

attempt to control both arms and illegal goods trafficking along the border.

AUGUST

20 killed in clashes between UPC

ex-Seleka faction, anti-Balaka in

Bema, Mombou Prefecture

5 15

At least 50 killed in clashes

between UPC, FPRC ex-Seleka

factions in Gambo, Mombou

Prefecture

13 killed in clashes between FPRC

ex-Seleka faction, anti-Balaka

elements in Bria, Haut-Kotto

Prefecture

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SOMALIA


Current Situation


counterinsurgency in Southwest State Mukhtar Robow’s defection is highly notable given his

historical standing as al-Shabaab’s last surviving

founder. That said, it is important to contextualize the

event in light of the fact that Robow has been distant

from the militant group since 2009. While it appears

that he did maintain a level of leverage with the group

since then as well as among his Rahanweyn clan, which

reportedly makes up over half of al-Shabaab’s

membership, the fact that he had a falling out with the

militant group nearly a decade ago will likely dampen to

some degree the influence of his defection to the

government. Regardless, we do view this defection as a

major symbolic victory for the government, which

should help the latter push their amnesty efforts.

Additionally, Robow’s insider-knowledge of al-Shabaab

and the Southwest State will help the government make

inroads in the area, while better structuring their

counterinsurgency efforts against the militant group.

High-profile raids highlight efficacy as well as risks of US involvement in fight against al-Shabaab Developments in August served to highlight Washington’s

increasingly aggressive counterinsurgency posture in

Somalia. Al-Shabaab’s confirming of their Lower Shabelle

Governor’s demise, illustrates the vulnerability of militant

leaders in the face of such superior capabilities. However,

missions like the August 25 raid threaten to undermine the

lasting effect of such operations. The incident, presented

as a botched raid, underscores the risks associated with

incomplete intelligence and, more generally, the risks

associated with the US’s increasing visibility in Somalia.

Claims that Somali troops effectively executed civilians

reflect poorly on US troops both internationally and within

Somalia, damaging any popular confidence in their

partnership with the government. Meanwhile, accounts

that security forces had essentially been duped,

inadvertently intervening on behalf of one clan against the

other by targeting local militiamen, illustrates the potential

for the US to get entangled in local disputes. With this in

mind, and looking towards September, as the US maintains

this larger footprint in Somalia, future operations will likely

yield substantive results insofar as destabilizing, to some

degree, al-Shabaab’s chain of command. However, given

the nature of these counterinsurgency operations, the risks

detailed above will likely manifest again, potentially

resulting in backlash should they occur frequently enough.

AUGUST 25 15

Al-Shabaab’s estranged

deputy, Mukhtar

Robow, defects to

government

Al-Shabaab admits death of

group’s Lower Shabelle

governor via US airstrike

26

Ten killed, including three

minors, during joint US-Somali

raid in Lower Shabelle’s Barire


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8

SOUTH SUDAN


Current Situation


hostility toward regional protection force (RPF) The arrival of the RPF’s first troop contingent in early

August was a notable advancement of the controversial

military deployment that had been delayed by the

government for nearly a year. The RPF was originally

mandated to protect key facilities and secure the airport,

likely a response to the July 2016 violence in Juba during

which the government shut down the airport and bridges,

preventing local and foreign nationals from evacuating the

city. However, President Salva Kiir’s government has

consistently called any move to deploy to the airport a

breach of South Sudanese sovereignty and has publicly

reversed its position on allowing the RPF more than a

dozen times. As such, the presence of RPF soldiers at the

Thongping base near the Juba airport evidently alarmed

the government, exacerbating their fears that the

peacekeepers would come to control the facility. Moreover,

this is consistent with Kiir’s hostile posture toward the

broader UN and NGO presence due to the oversight and, at

times, criticism they provide, perceived to be a threat to the

government and its interests. Although in this case the UN

cooperated and transferred its contingent to a more

distant base in Juba, the continued influx of new

peacekeepers over the coming months is liable to entail

further disputes with the government and raise new

tensions. As seen in August, the government is willing to

take steps to seriously disrupt UN operations by grounding

its aircraft, and it remains a distinct possibility that they

would take similar action in the near future.

Fall of SPLA-IO headquarters in Pagak symbolic event

Following a month-long military campaign, the

longstanding SPLA-IO headquarters in Pagak were overrun

by pro-government forces in early August. This was a highly

significant development, coming in the wake of a series of

losses for the Nuer rebellion throughout Unity, Jonglei, and

Upper Nile states while rebel leader Riek Machar remains

in exile in South Africa. In this context, the fall of Pagak is a

symbol of Machar’s declining ability to assist his own

supporters in competing with the government and holding

territory, particularly in the absence of external support to

supply the rebels with the resources necessary for war.

That being said, the SPLA-IO does continue to control parts

of the Nuer heartland around Pagak from which they still

operate. As a result, scuffles continued over the

subsequent weeks, with the government and rebels trading

claims that they have captured or re-captured the locale.

Given the presence of SPLA-IO as well as Nuer

sympathizers in the area outlying Pagak, including over the

border in Ethiopia, the insistence on holding Pagak itself

only further emphasizes its outsized role and the likelihood

that fighting in the region and along the South Sudan-

Ethiopia border will be protracted over the coming weeks

and months.

AUGUST

Dispute with UN ends as

troops transferred to

different base

6

SPLA-IO headquarters in Pagak,

Upper Nile State falls to

government control

21 18

Government grounds

UN aircraft over

dispute with RPF


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9

DRC

High Risk NOTABLE DATES

Current Situation


Planned BDK protest reflects diversification of

Bundu dia Kongo’s (BDK) tactics in early August were

consistent with the group’s observed modus operandi

over the past several months, as gunmen associated

with the militia group once again attacked Kinshasa’s

Makala Prison on August 7 in an incident that left 12

dead. More notable, however, was a call issued on

August 15 by BDK leader Ne Mwanda Nsemi to his

followers to conduct protests on August 21 in Kinshasa

and other cities to demand the resignation of President

Joseph Kabila and the independence of Kongo Central

Province. While the protests never took place, Nsemi did

threaten to launch attacks throughout multiple

provinces to those ends. The call to protest was notable

in that it represents a deviation of sorts from the

group’s nearly exclusive reliance on violent actions

against the DRC government to further its objectives.

That said, the failure of the group’s followers to heed

call to protest was unusual given BDK’s proven ability to

mobilize its sympathizers. Looking ahead, BDK may well

seek to mobilize its members to engage in acts of civil

disobedience against the DRC government, particularly

in Kinshasa, Matadi, and Boma. However, the group is

highly unlikely to abandon its penchant for violent

confrontation with government forces in the

foreseeable future, with future attacks on detention

facilities in Kinshasa and elsewhere likely to recur.

Formation of new opposition platform to combat electoral delays follows several dead city protests Amid long-standing discontent among opposition groups

regarding continued delays in the scheduling of general

elections, a new coalition of opposition parties and civil

society organizations was formed on August 23 called the

“National Front for the Respect of the December 31

Agreement”. The formation aims to combat future

attempts by CENI and the DRC to delay elections beyond

the end of 2017. This followed late July demonstrations by

civil society groups and “dead city” protests organized by

the opposition ‘Rally’ coalition on August 8-9 against CENI’s

most recent postponement of elections. Taken together,

these events reflect the increasing level of organization

among opposition groups around the issue of resuming

the process of political transition in the DRC, which stalled

after President Joseph Kabila unilaterally appointed a

prime minster in April without the input of mainstream

opposition groups like Rally. Given the wide adherence to

Rally’s August 8-9 dead city protests in Kinshasa and the

improved level of political organization seen among

opposition groups over the past month, protests against

any future electoral delays are likely to become more

frequent and attract greater numbers of participants as

the end of the year draws near. This is likely to set the

stage for renewed political unrest as government forces

might seek to violently curb any momentum that these

new protests might give the opposition.

AUGUST

2

Dead city protest in Bukavu

against police repression of

July 31 demonstrations

At least 12 killed in Bundu dia

Kongo (BDK) attack on Makala

Prison in Kinshasa

7 8 9

Nationwide dead city protests

widely adhered to; police

forcefully disperse August 8

protest in Goma

21

Planned BDK protest march in

Kinshasa fails to materialize;

leader threatens attacks in

multiple provinces

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10

MALI


Current Situation


President Keita postpones referendum on constitutional reforms President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita announced the

postponement to an unknown date following multiple

opposition demonstrations taking place in Bamako in

recent months. The opposition repeatedly stated its

concerns over the revisions giving excessive power to

the executive branch, as well as the timing of the

referendum seemingly unfitting, given the vast

insecurity in the northern and central regions in the

country. The postponement appears to have appeased

the opposition, given the August 19 rally, celebrating

their victory, and it remains unlikely that they would

demonstrate in the coming weeks against the

constitutional revisions given the postponement. With

that said, and given Keita’s statement that reaffirmed

his commitment to eventually alter the constitution,

further protests are a distinct possibility when the issue

is raised again.

CMA, Platform sign temporary truce The recent round of clashes between the former separatist

Coordination of Movements of Azawad (CMA) and the pro-

government Platform commenced at the beginning of July,

and as happened in the previous rounds of clashes, it

coincided closely with the slated installation of the

Operational Coordination Mechanism (MOC) in Kidal by

July 20, which included the introduction of Ichrach as

governor. In this context, the installation of Ichrach in Kidal

as part of the truce, is highly encouraging, as it was a

sensitive matter that likely surfaced the grievances

between the sides. The leaderships of both groups

reiterated their commitment to the accords, and the

continued fighting illustrates the gap between the political

elites and the lower echelons. Once the fighting between

the sides was on the decline as was the case in recent

weeks, it provided the opportunity to sign the truce. The

agreement itself underscores the efforts of the leadership

to reduce tensions by committing to avoid provocations,

and consult with the UN Multidimensional Integrated

Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) when moving

troops.

AUGUST 18

Multiple demonstrations against

French intervention in Malian

internal affairs, mostly in North

CMA, Platform sign temporary 15-day truce while

negotiations continue, as Kidal Governor Mohamed

ag Ichrach arrives in Kidal as part of agreement

23

President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita announces

postponement of referendum on constitutional

revisions amid opposition objection to revisions

12 3



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11

NIGERIA


Current Situation


Persistent crime-related violence across Nigeria High levels of criminality continue to

represent one of the biggest challenges

within Nigeria’s security landscape,

which is fueled by entrenched patterns

of poverty as well as the proliferation of

weapons nationwide. In this context,

the shooting at a church in Anambra

State on August 6 triggered by a turf

war between several groups represents

the most notable criminal incident over

the last month, aligning with the above

pattern. Likewise, the kidnapping of two

Pakistani nationals in Cross River State

constitutes a hallmark of the threat

posed by criminal elements in the

country, particularly to foreigners as

they are regarded as highly valuable

targets for kidnapping for ransom

schemes. With that said, Nigerians are

also victims of this pattern as

kidnappings along expressways

represent a common feature

nationwide, as evidenced by the

numerous attacks against motorists

along the Abuja-Kaduna axis despite the

bolstered security presence therein.

Heightened tensions over President

Even though President Muhammadu

Buhari returned to Nigeria on

August 19 after spending more than

100 days in the UK for medical

reasons, his long absence was a

focal point for tensions in the

country. Indeed, several Nigerian

celebrities and civil society activists

embarked on a wave of protests in

Abuja earlier in the month under the

banner #ReturnorResign, with one

of them being forcefully dispersed

by security forces on August 8. The

unrest between protesters and pro-

Buhari traders recorded in Abuja’s

Wuse Market epitomizes the

heightened political tensions arising

from Buhari’s lengthy medical leave

and the proclivity of political discord

to devolve into unrest. While Buhari

has returned to his normal activities,

given the unclear state of his health,

the possibility for an additional

period of absence cannot be ruled

out, which is likely to elicit further

protests.

Widening rifts between militant groups in restive Niger Delta Over recent months, the Pan Niger

Delta Forum (PANDEF) has

continued to engage in

negotiations with the Federal

Government to find a definitive

solution to the crisis affecting the

Niger Delta region. In this regard,

the steps by a coalition of fringe

Niger Delta groups to appoint the

Pan Niger Delta People's Congress

(PNDPC) as a replacement for

PANDEF represents the most

significant development during

August. While the appointment

reflects the frustration arising

from the stalemate in the

negotiations, given the groups’

lack of political capital, they are

unlikely to consolidate the wide

array of factions operating in the

area under PNDPC’s umbrella.

With that said, the appointment

does erode PANDEF’s authority

and credibility vis-à-vis the Federal

Government, hindering the

chances of a lasting agreement.

AUGUST 6 21 15

At least eight killed as

gunmen open fire at

Church in Ozubulu,

Anambra State

Violence, gunfire recorded

in Abuja’s Wuse Market

amid #ReturnorResign

protest

Two Pakistani nationals

rescued by police in Calabar,

Cross River State following

their abduction on August 13

18

Coalition of Niger Delta groups

appoints PNDPC to dialogue

with Federal Government,

replacing PANDEF










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12

ANGOLA

Medium Risk NOTABLE DATES

Current Situation


Defense Minister Joao Lourenco likely to become President, as opposition reject results claiming irregularities Angola went to the polls this month in the first elections without longstanding President Jose Eduardo dos Santos, who has

ruled the country since 1979. Although the official results are slated to be announced on September 6, the National

Electoral Commission (CNE) has revealed provisional results, likely to closely resemble the final numbers, which indicate

that the ruling People’s Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) emerged victorious. This aligns with the widely-held

expectations prior to the elections, particularly as Dos Santos handpicked his replacement, Defense Minister Joao

Lourenco. That being said, the MPLA appears to have won with a smaller margin than during the Dos Santos era.

It was likewise expected that the main opposition National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and Broad

Convergence for the Salvation of Angola – Electoral Coalition (CASA-CE) parties would contest the results. They

immediately announced that they would challenge the polls, questioning the CNE’s methods in counting the votes and

claiming that the results were manipulated by the government. However, the CNE is a broadly controversial institution in

Angola given that it is not an independent body and the commission’s members are proportional to the composition of the

parties in parliament. As a result, the majority of its members are chosen by the MPLA and its electoral results were

unlikely to ever be viewed as fully legitimate by the opposition. Nonetheless, the planned legal proceedings are unlikely to

affect the final outcome, given the tight grip the MPLA has on Angola as well as the international community’s recognition

of the results.

With that said, it remains highly unlikely that the official opposition will organize widespread action to denounce the

results given both the opposition’s relative weakness as well as the MPLA’s demonstrated limited tolerance for political

dissent. While civil society groups may continue to stage protests to oppose Dos Santos and Lourenco, these will likely

remain small-scale and localized, and follow precedent of being forcibly dispersed by security forces. Moreover, the

potential for violent crackdowns on opposition is likely increased over the coming months, as Lourenco seeks to prevent

any challenges to his new authority. Nevertheless, with Dos Santos remaining the President of the MPLA and his children

in key positions within the MPLA as well as important state-owned industries, the transition to the Lourenco

administration isn’t expected to see significant change to Angola’s political or economic landscape.

AUGUST

23

Ruling MPLA win general elections with 61 percent of

provisional results, Joao Lourenco to be President,

while opposition UNITA wins 26 percent

13 26

Interior Ministry issues ban of any

demonstrations, gathering by

groups not competing in elections

Opposition UNITA, CASA-CE

rejects provisional results, to

challenge them in court


13


13

CAMEROON


Current Situation


Heightened tensions surrounding Anglophone crisis in Western Cameroon following relative lull in episodes of unrest over recent months Since October 2016, Cameroon’s Anglophone regions have experienced a wave of strikes and protests over the area’s

perceived socioeconomic and cultural marginalization by the Francophone government, subsequently calling for the

establishment of a federal system in the country. While recent months saw a relative lull in episodes of unrest related to

the crisis, in comparison to its height in late 2016 and early 2017 amid successive “ghost town strikes”, several significant

instances of unrest have been recorded in August, shedding light on the possible resurgence of unrest in the region over

the coming months. Amongst these instances, the arrest of five self-proclaimed “Anglophone liberators” over possession

of weapons and explosives is notable as it, to some extent, reflects the existence of fringe extremist elements among the

Anglophone cause that might resort to violence against the government. With that said, the circumstances of the arrest

should be taken with caution, given the precedent of the government’s tendency to exaggerate operations against

elements they consider opposed to the state in order to justify crackdowns on their activities.

In tandem, the arson attacks against schools that refused to adhere to a strike called in solidarity with Anglophone activists

both in Northwest and Southwest regions, reflect the increasing rifts within the Anglophone community regarding the

continuation of the longstanding strikes and protests since October 2016. Indeed, the reported calls by local leaders for

the establishment of vigilante groups in order to protect educational establishments ahead of the inauguration of the

school year on September 4 epitomizes the underlying risk for unrest arising from such rifts. Looking ahead, as several

actors among the Anglophone campaign have advocated for the continuation of strikes in the school system, September 4

represents a distinct focal point for unrest, which in case they transpire are likely to elicit harsh crackdowns by security

forces on any Anglophone-related activities in both regions.

AUGUST

18

At least six schools set ablaze in

Western Cameroon for not

adhering to strike

4 29

Five self-proclaimed ‘Anglophone

liberators’ arrested for possession

of weapons, explosives in

Bamenda, Northwest Region

Security forces deployed in

Bamenda’s two main markets to

prevent shop owners’ protests


14


14

CONGO


Current Situation


Residual political tensions stemming from July elections carry over into August Following nationwide unrest in July surrounding the country’s local and parliamentary elections, signs of continued political

tensions between supporters of President Denis Nguesso and his opposition were evident in early August. Notably, in an

August 2 press conference, Anicet Gomas, an official from the Rassemblement Citoyen (RC) party, a member of the

majority coalition, claimed to have escaped an assassination attempt in late July in the Boko district of the Pool Region at

the hands of elite police forces in the area. Gomas was allegedly returning from voting in the July 30 runoff elections when

he set off toward Boko to investigate reports that a local police lieutenant had ordered the early closure of polling stations

in the area when the incident took place. Controversy surrounding the validity of the July election results and political

tensions continued in their wake were again evident on August 5, as Mathias Dzon, president of the Collective of

Opposition Parties reportedly demanded, in a press conference of his own, the cancellation of the results of both rounds

of elections in July, which had resulted in a resounding victory for the presidential majority. In his remarks, Dzon reportedly

accused the majority of bribery, intimidation of opposition candidates, and of rigging ballot boxes, though he nevertheless

called for “inclusive national dialogue” between the majority and opposition parties.

The decisive victory of the ruling Congolese Labor Party (PCT) and its partisan allies in the July elections did little to quell

political tensions between Congo’s majority and opposition parties. Anicet Gomas’ account of an alleged attempt on his life

by police officers attempting to prematurely close polling sites in their jurisdiction by force and Mathias Dzon’s

denunciations of alleged electoral manipulation by the majority highlight the endemic instability of Congo’s political

institutions, which have come under increased scrutiny by opposition actors who regularly allege that the country’s

electoral process has been manipulated to keep public officials loyal to President Nguesso in power. Nevertheless,

outward displays of political violence were far less frequent in August than in the immediate wake of the first round of

voting on July 16. This is not to suggest that political tensions in Congo have subsided in the past month. Indeed, the

political violence that marred the presidential majority’s victory has called into question the legitimacy of that victory and

have likely reinforced the perception among the opposition that President Nguesso is an authoritarian who relies upon the

subversion of Congo’s political process to remain. Ultimately, however, the commanding majority retained by the PCT and

its allies is likely to stymie efforts by the Nguesso’s detractors to oppose him by way of the country’s political institutions,

creating the potential for opposition sympathizers, especially within civil society organizations, to voice their discontent

through anti-administration protests in the coming months.

AUGUST

Opposition leader Mathias

Dzon calls for cancellation of

July election results

16


15


15

ETHIOPIA


Current Situation


Stay-home protests persist in Oromia Region, marked with violence, unrest August saw the continuation of the stay-home protests

in Oromia Region that began in July in response to a tax

hike on small businesses. While it appeared as though

the momentum slowed during the early half of the

month, a widespread renewal came with a five-day

strike organized by the opposition Oromo Federalist

Congress (OFC) party against the tax hikes as well as a

new demand for the release of Oromo political

prisoners. This illustrated the wider and more persistent

nature of Oromos’ grievances with the government and

their sense of repression, while also gathering a larger

base of support for the strikes beyond those business

owners affected by the tax hike. Moreover, the

involvement of the OFC is indicative of the higher

degree of organizational capacity within the Oromo

protests, which have been notably more organized and

widespread than demonstrations among other ethnic

groups and regions. Moreover, there has been little sign

of organized unrest in Oromia, unlike in Amhara, and

spontaneous instances of violence and unruliness

during the strikes, including a grenade attack in Jimma,

are notable and nonetheless highlight the sporadic risk

of armed violence associated with anti-government

activity. In this context, and given the success of the OFC

boycott, additional stay-home protests are likely to

continue into September and will likely see stretches of

wide observance across Oromia Region, which are

potentially punctuated with instances of unrest.

Grenade attacks in Bahir Dar continue pattern of low-level violence in Amhara Region In the past months, the Amhara Region has seen sporadic

clusters of grenade attacks targeting public spaces in its

urban centers, typically in Bahir Dar and Gondar. In this

regard, the grenade attacks near the university and a

central café in August are consistent with this pattern.

While the targets, at times, appear to be associated with

the government, the attacks additionally seem to serve a

broader militant purpose in highlighting a more underlying

vulnerability and instability even in some of the country’s

most prominent cities with a substantial security presence.

At the same time, the strike organized for the one-year

anniversary of protesters being killed was likely meant not

only to commemorate the incident but appeal to Amhara’s

sense of outrage and revitalize anti-government sentiment,

showing that it can manifest in ways beyond the low-level

insurgency that has seen grenade attacks in the cities as

well as organized armed resistance in the outlying areas.

This additionally serves to remind authorities of the

grievances that still remain among Amharas, though

protests have been more limited and less organized than

those seen in Oromia. While stay-home protests may

continue to be seen to a limited degree in Amhara over the

coming weeks as an extension of the anti-tax strikes, the

intermittent armed violence is more likely to recur over the

longer term. Grenade attacks have followed a broad

pattern of occurring in intermittent clusters, and as such, a

few may be seen in September, though it is similarly likely

that there will be a lull prior to the next spate of attacks.

AUGUST 12 7

Stay-home protest in

Bahir Dar, Amhara

Region

13 wounded in grenade

attack in Jimma, Oromia

Region

24

Second grenade attack in

one week injures two in

Bahir Dar, Amhara Region

23

Oromo Federalist

Congress calls for five-

day general strike


16


16

GABON


Current Situation


President Ali Bongo reshuffles cabinet as previously announced; prime minister, several others remain in their roles while several opposition figures appointed to ministerial posts In the wake of the Constitutional Court’s July decision to postpone Gabon’s legislative elections until April 2018, President

Ali Bongo confirmed on August 16 his long-anticipated plans to reshuffle his cabinet. He would make good on the

announcement five days later, on August 21, by reassigning many existing cabinet members to new ministerial roles.

Notably, Bongo also made a number of opposition figures ministers in his government, including Social Democratic Party

(PSD) president Pierre Claver Maganga Moussavou, whom Bongo named his vice president, a post that had been

eliminated in 2009. Additionally, National Union (UN) deputy Patrick Eyogo Edzang was named Minister of Water and

Energy, an appointment that followed his decision earlier this year to contravene his party’s decision to boycott the

Bongo-led “national dialogue” that would eventually lead to the postponement of the July elections.

The composition of Bongo’s new cabinet suggests that the opposition figures he appointed to various ministerial posts

were exclusively from among those who agreed to participate in the recent national dialogue which he himself organized.

This is notable insofar as it marks the first attempt by the Bongo administration to actually enfranchise opposition

elements, who previously boycotted the Bongo-led talks and maintain their refusal to engage in talks with the president.

In this context, Bongo’s inclusion of cooperative opposition members inside his cabinet can be viewed as an attempt to

politically isolate Jean Ping and to marginalize his supporters even among the opposition by making the latter

stakeholders in the government. For their part, Ping’s supporters have already demonstrated their continued staunch

opposition to any rapprochement with the Bongo administration, as evidenced by well-attended pro-Ping

demonstrations in Libreville, Port Gentil, and Tchibanga on August 26 that were forcibly dispersed by police forces. These

demonstrations, which were intended to promote the replacement of Bongo with Jean Ping, came less than one week

after the opposition leader and disputed winner of Gabon’s 2016 presidential election called on his supporters to stage

nationwide anti-government protests to promote his accession to the presidency. Thus, while Bongo’s appointment of

several opposition figures to his cabinet may have been intended as a sign of improved relations between the president

and his political rivals, this sentiment appears not to have extended to Ping, and palpable tensions remain between the

two, which have already led to renewed unrest in the immediate aftermath of Bongo cabinet’s reconfiguration. With this

in mind, going forward, we anticipate tensions to manifest in the coming weeks, chiefly in the form of additional pro-Ping

demonstrations, which are liable to transpire most noticeably in the abovementioned cities and see resultant security

crackdowns on their participants.

AUGUST

President Bongo confirms

intention to reshuffle cabinet

16

Bongo forms new cabinet,

giving several opposition

figures ministerial roles

21 18

Jean Ping calls on supporters to

protest via radio

26

Pro-Ping protests dispersed

by police in Libreville, Port

Gentil, Tchibanga


17


17


18


18

IVORY COAST


Current Situation


New armed attacks against police facilities carried out despite multiple security operations leading to arrests of suspected plotters The month of August witnessed the continued targeting of police and gendarmes by often unidentified assailants, in

addition to the arrests of individuals linked to previous attacks and others suspected of planning future raids of security

facilities and personnel. While the Ivorian government succeeded in apprehending eight individuals on August 2 in

connection with a July 21-22 attack on a gendarmerie and another attack on July 30 on a police station in Fresco, armed

elements remained seemingly undeterred in their pursuit of violent confrontation with police forces and gendarmes. As

such, further similar incidents of unrest are poised to take place across the country over the coming months. The day

after the announcement, for example, a police station in Adzope was targeted by approximately 20 gunmen. In an even

more brazen attack on August 8, armed assailants reportedly stormed a courthouse at the Palace of Justice in Abidjan

and freed several individuals in detention there. In any event, these incidents and others like them recorded in recent

months have compelled the Ivorian government to take new measures to curb the seemingly increasing threat against

Ivorian police officers and gendarmes. Notably, President Alasanne Ouattara increased the authority of the chief of staff

of the Ivorian armed forces and of the head of the gendarmerie. While this measure was primarily meant to address the

indiscipline within the ranks of the Ivorian security forces that was blamed for a series of mutinies earlier this year by

both enlisted and demobilized former “Force Nouvelles” members, the move was also likely intended to improve

security forces’ readiness in the face of continued armed attacks against them.

It bears noting that the attacks witnessed in more recent months, including those recorded in August, have by and large

been carried out by actors whose identities were never conclusively established. It is plausible that several of the

security incidents over recent months are linked either to rivalries among factions of the Ivorian army or to tensions

between ex-Force Nouvelles members and the Ivorian government. Nonetheless, these confrontations exposed the

fragmented, and thus vulnerable, condition of the Ivorian security establishment at large such that non-military actors,

i.e., criminal groups, were inspired more recently to begin targeting Ivorian security forces. After all, criminal groups do

stand to benefit from such attacks, mainly by disrupting local police activities against them. That said, a potential link

between the security incidents witnessed in August and ex-Force Nouvelles members cannot be ruled out given

lingering tensions between the latter and the Ivorian government. In any case, the endemic fragmentation of the Ivorian

security apparatus and criminality in the country’s major cities, especially Abidjan, remain virtually unmitigated by

government action, presaging additional attacks on police, gendarmes, and other security forces over the coming

months.

AUGUST

20 gunmen attack police

station in Adzope during

overnight hours

Government announces

arrest of eight in connection

with attacks on police,

gendarmerie facilities

3 4 2

10 arrested overnight in

Dabou for plotting attack

on police station

13 14


19


19


20


20

KENYA


Current Situation


Risks of unrest persists as election disputed in court, NASA poised to summon protests In the aftermath of the August 8 elections, concerns over

potential bloodshed were realized with violent protests

transpiring in National Super Alliance (NASA) strongholds in

southwestern Kenya, chiefly Kisumu County, and in

Nairobi’s opposition-leaning slums. Between 21-24 fatalities

were recorded, the deaths resulting from violent protester-

police skirmishes and, to a lesser extent, intercommunal

violence. Indeed, the August 13 clashes between Luos and

Kikuyus in Nairobi illustrates the polarization of ethnicities

based on party lines, demonstrating the violent potential of

tribal politics in Kenya. While NASA’s legal recourse against

the election results in recent weeks has somewhat

dampened this volatility, looking ahead, the Supreme

Court’s decision on the petition, which is to be announced

on September 1 and will most likely uphold the election,

may prompt NASA to reprise its strategy of summoning

large-scale anti-government protests. In 2016, NASA’s

principal, Raila Odinga, turned out thousands of supporters

onto the streets of southwestern Kenya and Nairobi, and

so we assess future protests will be of this scope. Such

manifestations will probably disrupt normal activities in the

cities they take place, as they are historically unruly,

typically incur crackdowns by authorities and, as seen

above, can be lethal.

Al-Shabaab resumes drumbeat of attacks following fears that it would disrupt polls August saw the Somalia-based group continue its targeting

of Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) and police assets near the

border, but also carry out attacks directed at local political

figures involved in county races. The latter sparked fears

that the jihadist group was actively trying to subvert voter

turnout, concerns leant further credence by al-Shabaab’s

urging of Kenyan Muslims not to vote. However, beyond

individual instances during which local officials actually

were targeted, and despite its vocal rebuke of the

democratic process, the group appears not to have

departed far from its normal pace of cross-border attacks.

In line with this, while the jihadists performed, on multiple

occasions, more grisly acts such as beheadings, these

abuses do not themselves constitute an escalation that

many feared would coincide with the election period. With

this in mind, and looking to September, militants are

poised to continue the steady drumbeat of cross-border

attacks, especially in Mandera County, which has seen

curfews go into effect with little results but the disruption

of daily life. Further south, in Lamu and Mombasa counties,

the arrest of higher profile jihadists and proposed bombing

campaign against the Boni Forest militant hideout suggests

a more robust security response against al-Shabaab.

However, like the Mandera curfews, these efforts,

sustained for months now, have failed to produce lasting

results, and so we expect the insurgency to likewise

continue carrying out attacks, largely at will, over the

coming weeks.

AUGUST 13

Unrest in Nairobi, western Kenya as

opposition rejects Kenyatta’s

reelection

Two killed as KDF

vehicle hits IED in

Mander County’s

Damasa

28

Luos, Kikuyus clash in

Nairobi’s Mathare slum 1

9 8 17 18

Suspected militants behead

three in Lamu County as senior

jihadist caught in Mombasa

County






21


21

MAURITANIA


Current Situation


Constitutional reforms to abolish senate, consolidate judiciary pass referendum amid opposition boycott Following the year-long process in which President Mohammed Ould-Abdel Aziz worked to install a series of constitutional

reforms that would abolish the senate to be replaced with ‘regional councils’ and consolidate the judiciary into a single

body, Mauritanians went to the polls on August 5 to vote on the reforms in a constitutional referendum. The weeks leading

up to the election were marked by a sustained period of protests in Nouakchott and Nouadhibou, largely organized by the

Forum for Democracy and Unity (FNDU), the main opposition coalition, which frequently saw violent dispersal by police.

This notably included a sit-in organized by multiple Mauritanian Senators, led by Mohamed Ould Ghadda, who occupied

the senate chambers in the parliament building for approximately 48 hours to oppose the referendum that would lead to

their dissolution. This measure, as well as the consolidation of the judiciary, are widely perceived to be President Abdel

Aziz’s attempt to weaken or outright eliminate core checks on his executive power, likely to be stepping stones toward

further referenda to modify the constitution to allow him to run for an additional presidential term in the 2019 elections.

In addition to the demonstrations in the country’s urban centers, the opposition called for a national boycott of the polls.

Thus there was little surprise when the national election commission announced that the referendum passed with 85

percent of the vote favoring reforms. However, low turnout was recorded, with only 53 percent of eligible voters

participating, and only 35 percent in Nouakchott, suggesting that the opposition had indeed resonated with a significant

segment of the population.

Nonetheless, with this victory, President Abdel Aziz’s government likely felt emboldened to take action against opponents.

This was first seen with the arrest of Senator Ghadda, who had led the sit-in at parliament prior to the election, and he was

arrested in the middle of the night for “disrupting public order” and other financial crimes. This led to a protest that was

forcibly dispersed outside of the UN delegation offices in Nouakchott, and suggests that discontent with the referendum

lingers and is liable to manifest again when the opportunity arises. Moreover, in the weeks following, the police have

arrested four journalists, two union leaders, and another senator, all allegedly in connection with Ghadda’s economic

crimes, indicative of not only Abdel Aziz’s interests in repressing opposition but in specifically targeting those associated

with public institutions that would provide a counterweight to his own power.

AUGUST

11

Senator Mohamed Ould

Ghadda arrested by

security services

5 14

Constitutional referendum held on

institutional changes to

government, new flag, anthem

Security forces violently disperse

protest in Nouakchott in support

of Ghadda

2

Senators hold sit-in at

parliament in protest

of referendum


22


22

SOUTH AFRICA


Current Situation


No- -party divisions As expected, the motion of no-confidence failed despite being voted on via secret ballot, with 198 voting against it, 177 in

favor, and nine abstentions, with 16 absent from the vote altogether. The relative closeness of the vote is remarkable as

the ruling African National Congress (ANC) holds 249 seats in the Parliament, meaning that a significant number of ANC

Members of Parliament (MPs) did not vote in support of President Jacob Zuma. In this context, while Zuma has survived

multiple no-confidence votes, this was the first as a secret ballot, and also the first in which ANC MPs voted directly against

him. This highlights the extent of the division within the ANC, with MPs preferring to vote against the leader of their own

party, rather than continue to operate under Zuma.

In response, the ANC under Zuma’s directive has decided to target what it perceives as rogue elements within the party

who are suspected to have voted against Zuma, such as Khosa, and the party’s chairperson of National Disciplinary

Committee Derek Hanekom. Such actions highlight the anxiety of Zuma from the situation he is in, having to try and

weaken dissent from within the party in an effort to consolidate his power, and by proxy that of his preferred candidate

Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. However, this approach is risky, and has the potential to backfire, as the anti-Zuma faction

within the ANC remains powerful, and may utilize the actions of Zuma to portray him as authoritarian and unwilling to

accept criticism. As the December ANC National Conference draws nearer, in which a successor to Zuma will be elected, it

is likely that the division between the ANC factions will grow.

Meanwhile, the opposition operated as it normally does, capitalizing on focal dates to go against Zuma, and carried out

large-scale demonstrations on the day of the vote, as well as calling for the dissolution of the Parliament upon seeing the

results. With that said, the demonstrations died down immediately after the vote, and they are likely to resume

surrounding additional focal dates, such as the September 5 impeachment hearing at the Constitutional Court, issued by

the opposition Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) party. Additional dates may be court hearings for the Gupta family, which

are regarded as close allies of President Zuma, and accused of using that closeness to appoint and sack ministers, as well

as receive unlawful government contracts. Additional potential causes for protests may be the emergence of new scandals

involving Zuma or elements from his faction in the ANC.

AUGUST

13

Zuma instructs ANC to

find, punish members

who voted against him

17

No-confidence vote against

President Zuma fails, over 25

ANC MPs vote against him

ANC Chief Whip removes party MC Makhosi

Khoza from chairing Parliament’s Public Service

and Administration Portfolio committee

8

Opposition protests against Zuma

carried out in multiple cities including

Pretoria, Johannesburg, and Cape Town


23


23

EQUATORIAL GUINEA

Low Risk NOTABLE DATES

Current Situation


Impasse involving French-owned oil company likely triggered by ongoing trial in absentia against Vice President Teodorin Obiang Mangue in Paris Over recent months the ongoing trial in absentia against Equatorial Guinea’s Vice President Teodorin Obiang Mangue in

Paris over embezzlement charges has been a focal point for tensions with France, leading to a diplomatic crisis between

the countries. Indeed, the prosecution has demanded a jail term for President Obiang’s planned successor, a 30 million

euro fine and the confiscation of property valued at over 100 million euros. Thus, given that the trial remains ongoing, the

crisis is expected to continue for the foreseeable future. In this context, the Equatorial Guinean government’s accusations

against a French-owned oil company for “fraudulent dealings” surrounding the sale of fuel from 2010 and 2012,

subsequently demanding a 73 million euro payment by the company was likely triggered by the ongoing trial against

“Teodorin”. Indeed, considering Malabo’s accusation in parallel with the prosecution’s stringent requests against Teodorin,

this sheds light on an attempt by Equatorial Guinea to use its oil industry and particularly its relationship with French

companies as leverage vis-à-vis Paris in order to influence the trial’s course, specifically its dismissal. Nonetheless, the

actions taken by Malabo are unlikely to have an impact on the legal proceedings, not only given the independent character

of its judiciary system but also in light of the French prosecution’s willingness to pursue actions against the ruling elites of

several oil-rich African countries for suspected diversion of ill-gotten funds into France. In turn, the current impasse is

likely to heighten the existing tensions between Malabo and Paris, which are poised to rise as the day of the sentence for

Teodorin’s case, scheduled for October 27, draws nearer.

AUGUST

22

Equatorial Guinea signs

memorandum with Ghana for

provision of Liquefied Natural

Gas (LNG) for 15 years

21

French-owned oil company

accused of fraudulent dealings by

government asked to pay 73

million euro


24


24

GHANA


Current Situation


overcome illegal mining problem Since winning the elections in December 2016, one of the main concerns of President Nana Akufo-Addo and the ruling

New Patriotic Party (NPP) has been addressing the phenomenon of illegal mining, known locally as ‘galamsey’. The launch

of the Operation Vanguard task force, comprised of police and military personnel, and the extensive authority they have

received to tackle the matter further highlights the government’s efforts to overcome galamsey and reduce its economic

and environmental impact on the country. Moreover, the particular emphasis on the latter, with the task force’s official

purpose said to be the protection of Ghana’s waters and lands from pollution, is likely a specific attempt to appeal to the

population and garner their support of the operation. Thus far, there has been a notable presence of the task force on the

ground, with at least 100 miners arrested and equipment destroyed.

With that being said, illegal mining in Ghana remains a main source of income for a sizable portion of the Ghanaian

population in many regions, and a crackdown on the mining activity without any alternative livelihood opportunities for

those engaged in it is unlikely to be fully effective in the long run. As a result, those engaging in galamsey have little

incentive to accept the situation quietly and, as a result, clashes have been witnessed between the task force and the

miners in multiple locales throughout the Eastern, Western, and Ashanti Regions. We assess that these localized conflicts

will continue to recur wherever security forces mobilize, which may be further exacerbated with the expansion into night

operations as it is liable to expose further illicit activity and thus raise tensions with both miners and any other local

criminal elements.

JULY 6

One killed when ‘Operation

Vanguard’ taskforce clashes with

illegal miners in Wawasi, Ashant

Region

31 18

Launch of anti-illegal mining task force of ‘Operation

Vanguard’ comprised of 400 security personnel,

operating in Eastern, Western, and Ashanti Regions

‘Operation Vanguard’ extends operations

beyond current working hours 06:00 to 17:30

(local time), including night operations

AUGUST


25


25

RWANDA


Current Situation


President Paul Kagame secures third term by wide margin, as police raid house of disqualified presidential candidate Diane Rwigara Following months of political campaigning, and the disqualification of three out of the six candidates running for the

presidency, incumbent President Paul Kagame secured his third term in office in a landslide victory receiving over 98

percent of the votes, reflecting his tight grip on power. The results are not surprising as Kagame, who has been running

the country since April 2000, won his previous two elections with a wide margin of over 90 percent and no significant

opposition. Indeed, since the Rwandan Popular Front (RPF) victory in 1994 that put an end to the Rwandan genocide, the

country has been through an unprecedented process of reconciliation and economic growth mostly attributed to

Kagame’s actions, which have provided him with a wide popular support as evidenced on August 4.

However, despite his proven popular support, President Kagame has been often accused of conducting harsh repressive

measures against the opposition in order to maintain his tight grip on power, as Kigali has even allegedly capitalized on

anti-genocide laws in order to ban opposition figures who might pose a challenge to Kagame’s rule. Indeed, the

disqualification of three out of the six candidates originally running for the presidency, has raised questions over the

administration’s direct intervention in order to rule out candidates highly critical of the government, as evidenced by the

disqualification of Diane Rwigara, who was as vocal advocate for establishing presidential term limits in the country. In this

context, and while the Rwandan Police has stated that Rwigara and her family have not been arrested on August 30 but

rather a “search has been conducted at their residence to gather evidence in tax evasion”, the operation nevertheless

aligns with a pattern of continuous harassment of opposition political figures. With this mind, neither the accusations

regarding irregularities during the elections nor the case against Denise Rwigara are expected to challenge President

Kagame’s rule over the foreseeable future.

AUGUST

30

Former Presidential Candidate,

Diane Rwigara allegedly arrested

along with her family

4

President Paul Kagame elected

for third term with 98% of votes


26


26

ZAMBIA


Current Situation


Potential for political rapprochement as opposition leader freed from prison amid political tensions The beginning of August seemed to witness a direct continuation of the developments seen in recent months, which were

characterized by heightened tensions between the ruling Patriotic Front (PF) party and the opposition, as United

Progressive People’s (UPP) party leader Saviour Chishimba was arrested on August 3 on charges of defaming President

Edgar Lungu. That said, following international mediation efforts led by the Commonwealth’s secretary general Patricia

Scotland, who initiated talks, both Chishimba and Hichilema were released from prison on August 10 and August 16

respectively. The successful negotiations and the subsequent release of Chishimba and Hichilema represent encouraging

steps toward resolving the political crisis experienced in the country since the contested elections in August 2016 and may

serve as a base for further negotiations between the parties. An essential element of this dialogue surrounds the reforms

that, according to Hichilema’s United Party for National Development (UPND), are needed in order to ensure the fairness

of the 2021 elections. While tensions seemed to subside and a framework for negotiations was created, the possibility of

renewed flare-ups over disagreements between the parts remain a distinct possibility. Indeed, security forces blocked

Hichilema from entering Lusaka’s Cathedral to attend a mass celebrating his release on August 24, as well as banning a

UPND event scheduled for August 27, in a clear attempt to halt any opposition momentum.

In this context, we assess that as long as Hichilema continues to refuse to recognize Lungu’s victory in the 2016 elections it

is highly unlikely that the government will downturn it’s hardline stance vis-à-vis the opposition, subsequently hindering

any political resolution in the short term. Looking ahead, an important focal point for tensions and a barometer for the

direction of the relationship between the government and the opposition are the upcoming September 14 by-elections in

several provinces across the country. As such, the political rivalry during the electoral process might lead to another

escalation in the tensions between the two parties, which carry the potential to bring the negotiation processes to a halt

and, subsequently, fresh arrests against opposition leaders and possible civil unrest.

AUGUST

9

Mediation efforts between

President Lungu, Haikainde

Hichilema

3 24

UPP Leader Saviour

Chishimba arrested

Police block Hichilema

from event at cathedral

celebrating his release

16

Haikainde Hichilema

released from prison


27


27

Notable Dates

SUN MON TUE WED THU FRI SATSUN MON TUE WED THU FRI SAT

Eritrea:

Keddus Johannes

Ethiopia:

Enkutatash (Ethiopian

New Year)

Zambia:

By-elections in eight

provinces

Nigeria:

Lagos by-elections

Africa-wide: Eid

al-Adha/Tabaski

Swaziland:

Umhlanga/Reed Dance

Festival main ceremony

Africa-wide: Eid

al-Adha/Tabaski

South Africa:

Impeachment hearing of

President Zuma

Togo: Opposition protest

Swaziland:

Somhlolo Day

(Independence Day)

Sao Tome and Principe:

Armed Forces Day

Togo: Opposition protest

Mozambique: Lusaka

Peace Agreement Day

Africa-wide: Eid

al-Adha/Tabaski

Africa-wide: Eid

al-Adha/Tabaski

Eritrea: Revolution Day

Nigeria: Sallah Day

Guinea Bissau:

National Day

(Independence Day)

South Africa: Heritage Day

Guinea Bissau:

National Day

(Independence Day)

South Africa: Heritage Day

Mozambique: Armed

Forces Day

Eritrea, Ethiopia: Meskel

DRC: World Tourism Day

Sao Tome and Principe:

Agricultural Reform Day

Botswana:

Botswana Day

Angola:

National Heroes’ Day

Angola:

National Heroes’ Day

Comoros, Djibouti,

Mauritania, Niger,

Somalia, Sudan:

Muharram

(Islamic New Year)

Ghana: Founder’s Day

Comoros, Djibouti,

Mauritania, Niger,

Somalia, Sudan:

Muharram

Mali: Independence Day

(National Day)


28


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