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Middle East & North Africa Regional Summary
September 2015
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Month Day, Yea Executive Summary
In North Africa, the Islamic State (IS) conducted a car bomb attack on a state security building
in Cairo, Egypt, as well as executed a Croatian national it kidnapped from the city last month,
thereby highlighting the group’s ability to operate within the capital, while suggesting the
possibility that a new affiliate of the group in Egypt may be declared in the coming weeks. In
Libya, IS was able to suppress the Salafist insurrection in Sirte, reaffirming their control over
the city and its surrounding areas, while the political dialogue in the country continues to
stagnate. In Algeria, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika discharged another commander of an
elite unit tasked with his security, underscoring the possibility that he may perceive his rule
and safety as being at risk. Finally, two attacks were recorded in Tunisia this month, including
by an al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) affiliate, and may be attributed to the ongoing
competition between IS and AQIM in the region.
In the Persian Gulf region, Saudi Arabia was once again targeted by the Islamic State (IS), as
the Sunni militant group’s Saudi Arabia branch claimed responsibility for an attack in the Asir
Province that killed 15 people, underscoring the growing capabilities of the group to carry out
attacks on Saudi soil. In Yemen, anti-Houthi forces continue to make advances in the
southern regions of Taiz after the notable recapturing of Aden in July. These gains underscore
the increased abilities of anti-Houthi forces to engage militarily with Houthi militias, amid
improved Saudi-led coalition aerial support. Following the nuclear agreement signed in July
between Iran and the P5+1, Britain officially reopened its embassy in Tehran in a symbolic act
that highlights the easing of tensions between Iran and the West. In Kuwait, the dismantling
of a militant cell near the Iraqi border underlines the militant threat and heightened concerns
of the authorities regarding extremists. Finally, in Bahrain, an uptick in protests was recorded
surrounding Independence Day, underscoring opposition's tendency to utilize symbolic
events to increase turnouts.
In the Levant region, Lebanon has witnessed a series of large-scale protests condemning the
ongoing garbage crisis, which are likely to continue as no solution has been reached and may
in the long run threaten the government’s viability. In Syria, an intensification in clashes has
been witnessed between pro-regime forces and rebels in the al-Ghab Valley, while in Iraq,
the pro-government forces’ campaign to recapture the Anbar Province continues, with gains
made near Anbar University. In Turkey, hostilities continue on a near-daily basis between
Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) militants and Turkish forces throughout the southeast, with
no sign of dissipating at this time. Lastly, an uptick in violent acts continues to be recorded
between Israeli security forces and Palestinians in East Jerusalem and the West Bank.
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The following list contains countries in the region with notable developments from the
past month. Please choose your country of interest by clicking on its link below.
EXTREME RISK
Syria ....................................................................................................................................... 4
Yemen .................................................................................................................................... 5
HIGH RISK
Iraq......................................................................................................................................... 6
Lebanon ................................................................................................................................. 7
Libya....................................................................................................................................... 8
MEDIUM RISK
Algeria .................................................................................................................................... 9
Bahrain ................................................................................................................................ 10
Egypt .................................................................................................................................... 11
Iran....................................................................................................................................... 12
Israel & Palestinian Territories ............................................................................................ 13
Saudi Arabia ......................................................................................................................... 14
Tunisia ................................................................................................................................. 15
Turkey .................................................................................................................................. 16
LOW RISK
Kuwait .................................................................................................................................. 17
Notable Dates for September 2015 ................................................................................ 18
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Heavy clashes reported between the Jaysh al-Fath rebel coalition and the Syrian Arab
Army (SAA) in the al-Ghab Valley following a major regime offensive on August 19,
resulting in back-and-forth changes of control over areas of the valley.
The Islamic State’s (IS) launches numerous failed attacks on Aleppo provinces’ SAA-
controlled Kuweires Airbase throughout the month.
We advise against all travel to Damascus and Aleppo, given the general threat of
indiscriminate aerial bombardment and artillery shelling from government forces as
well as attacks by various militant groups.
Intensification of clashes between Jaysh al-Fath and SAA in the al-Ghab Valley
Over the past several weeks, areas in the al-Ghab valley have frequently exchanged hands
between Jaysh al-Fath and SAA forces. Most recently, fighting has intensified alongside the
northwestern Latakia Province side of the valley. Following the regime offensive and
reported advances of SAA forces in this area since August 23, reports indicate that the rebels
have on August 27 recaptured several towns along Route 56 and also approached the village
of Joureen, a regime stronghold located at the threshold of Latakia Province. These events
highlight the area’s strategic significance to both parties as it serves as crossroads between
the Hama, Latakia, Homs, and Idlib Provinces. Furthermore, as the regime offensive follows
increased rocket fire at regime targets in the Latakia Province by rebel forces from the al-
Ghab Valley, the SAA offensive was likely an attempt to remove this threat form Latakia,
which is a significant regime stronghold. That said, the fact that the rebels were able to repel
the offensive, and in cases even compensate for their loss of territory, underscores their
enhanced capabilities in the area vis-à-vis the SAA. In this context, we assess that a renewed
SAA counteroffensive at the northwestern side of the valley may be recorded in the coming
days, which in turn will result in further clashes between the parties, and possibly further
changes of territorial control, over the coming weeks.
IS launches several assaults on Kuweires Airbase, located 42 km east of Aleppo
Reportedly, IS launched five assaults on the base, on August 9, August 11, August 15, August
21, and August 28. The increased attempts by IS to capture the base, as well as the SAA’s
hitherto success in sustaining control over it despite the IS siege, highlights the strategic
importance of the base to both parties. This is due to the location of the base, which is
situated along Route 4 leading to the city of Aleppo, as well as it being one of the last
airfields in the area that remain under SAA control. In this context, should IS eventually be
able to gain control over the base, it will likely drastically decrease the Syrian Arab Air Force
(SAAF) capabilities in the Aleppo Province, as well as improve the Sunni jihadist group’s
positions in preparation for a potential future assault on the city of Aleppo. With this in
mind, additional heavy clashes between the two parties in the vicinity of the base are likely
to be recorded in the coming days and weeks.
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EXTREME RISK
Syria
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EXTREME RISK Notable Dates
Yemen
Anti-Houthi forces recapture Lahij’s al-Anad Airbase on August 3, make further advances
in southern Yemen throughout August, including in Taiz.
Continuation and intensification of Yemeni-Saudi border violence between Houthi forces
and Saudi Arabia, highlighted by a Scud missile being fired towards Saudi Arabia’s Jazan
Province on August 26.
It is advised that those remaining in Sanaa and Aden should initiate immediate
contingency and emergency evacuation plans given the ongoing military intervention
and airstrikes.
Anti-Houthi forces make further advances in southern Yemen, including Taiz
The relatively recent advances of anti-Houthi forces in Taiz follow the reported capture of
Lahij, Abyan, Shabwa, and Dali Governorates, as well as the notable recapturing of Aden in
July, by their forces. These gains underscore the improved capabilities of anti-Houthi forces
to engage militarily with Houthi militias, which is likely due to the increased and improved
aerial support of the Saudi-led coalition, which includes airstrikes against Houthi fighters and
installations, as well as due to the coalition’s limited ground support. Additionally, the
offensive was likely conducted as a facet of the anti-Houthi forces’ strategy to push the
Houthi forces back to their pre-September 2014 positions in northern Yemen. Furthermore,
Marib and Taiz could also be used as the future staging areas for a potential offensive
towards other Houthi-controlled governorates of Yemen, particularly Sanaa. In this context,
fighting between pro and anti-Houthi forces is likely to continue to be witnessed and
intensify in the coming weeks, as both factions seek to gain, or maintain, control of
strategically important territory.
Scud missile fired from Sanaa towards Saudi Arabia’s Jazan Province
The Scud missile was reportedly targeting a power station and was launched from the Al-
Nahdayn hills in Sanaa, but was intercepted by the Royal Saudi Arabia Armed Forces (RSAAF)
through the use of a Patriot missile. In this context, the launching of at least one Scud missile
from Sanaa is notable as it marks the first reported instance of such a missile being launched
from the Yemeni capital. Furthermore, most of the Houthi attacks along the Saudi-Yemeni
border have been short ranged including mortar shells and gunfire against military and
civilian targets. The abovementioned incident therefore underscores that the Houthis are
capable of conducting long-range attacks on Saudi soil. That being said, the fact that the
Scud missile was reportedly intercepted by the RSAAF with a Patriot missile highlights
Saudi’s capabilities to mitigate such long-range missile threats, although they currently do
not possess similar capabilities to tackle the threat of medium and short-ranged rockets at
this time. In this context, the firing of short and medium ranged rockets at Saudi population
centers, predominantly in the Jazan and Najran regions, as well as Houthi infiltration
attempts along the Saudi-Yemeni border, are likely to be recorded over the following weeks.
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HIGH RISK
Iraq
As pro-government forces continue to encircle Ramadi as part of their campaign to
"liberate Anbar Province", Islamic State (IS) militants continue asymmetric campaign in
Baghdad.
Amidst numerous demonstrations against corruption and poor governance, the Iraqi
Parliament unanimously passed a reform bill proposed by Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-
Abadi on August 11.
It is advised to defer all travel to Baghdad at this time due to the daily threat of
militancy in the capital and violence in areas surrounding the city.
Situation in Anbar Province
Over the first two weeks of August, amidst heavy clashes between pro-government forces
and IS militants, especially near Anbar University, the aforementioned campaign seemed to
be stalling. However, subsequent reports indicate that pro-government forces were able to
capture the Five Kilos area near Anbar University on August 17, as well as further areas
southwest of Ramadi on August 19. Meanwhile, IS keeps conducting near-daily attacks in
Baghdad, likely in order to divert pro-government forces away from Anbar Province to
secure the capital. While the aforementioned developments indicate a slow, but steady
progress of pro-government forces in their effort to encircle IS militants within Ramadi, a
significant advance into it has yet to occur, and as such we assess that the status-quo is
fighting is likely to be maintained over the coming weeks. In this context, additional clashes
in Anbar Province, particularly in and near Ramadi will likely be recorded in the coming days
and weeks. Similarly, asymmetric attacks in Baghdad should also be expected during this
time frame.
Demonstration against poor governance, government reforms
Throughout the last weeks, popular demonstrations denouncing power outages, poor
government services and corruption were witnessed in Iraq, such as in Basra on August 1
and in Baghdad on August 7 and August 28. Reportedly, on August 7, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani
had called on the government to implement “drastic measures” against corruption. In
response, Prime Minister Abadi launched a major campaign for government reforms.
Reports indicate that his reform bill was unanimously approved by the Iraqi Parliament on
August 11. While this primarily constitutes a symbolic success for Abadi, we assess that
implementation of the reforms remains difficult. This is due to likely opposition from office
holders within the political system to the abolition of political posts, as well to the sectarian
quota, which are integral parts of the plan. More significantly, Abadi's reform plan does not
specify concrete measures addressing the grievances of the protesters, which renders
tangible improvements unlikely, and thus will likely not satisfy the protesters. In this context,
as Abadi may continue to face significant opposition in the implementation of his reforms,
further demonstrations are likely to be witnessed in Iraq over the coming weeks.
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HIGH RISK
Lebanon
Uptick in demonstrations to denounce the ongoing garbage crisis across the country;
given the government ineffectiveness in solving the issue, additional unruly protests
remain likely in the coming days and weeks.
Heightened security measures continued to be recorded along the Syrian border; given
that the threat of Islamist militancy have remained high, such measures are expected to
persist in the coming weeks.
We advise against all nonessential travel to Lebanon at this time, restricting essential
travel to Beirut’s northwestern districts.
Overflow of waste related demonstrations
Over the past several weeks there has been an uptick in protests to denounce the garbage
crisis in Lebanon, which has witnessed an overflow of waste across the country. For
instance, on August 22 and August 23, two large demonstrations to denounce the issue,
were reportedly dispersed by Lebanese security forces in Beirut’s Riad al-Solh Square.
Consequently, one activist was killed, while dozens of others, as well as policemen, were
injured as result of the incident. In addition, the Port of Beirut workers launched a
temporary strike on August 18 under the same issue. In this context, and given the
Lebanese government's ineffectiveness in solving the issue of the compiled waste in the
streets, as well as likely elevated tensions following the dispersal of the aforementioned
protests, we assess that additional gatherings under the same issue remain likely over the
coming days and weeks, including in Beirut.
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) measures along the border with Syria
During the past month, the LAF’s ongoing heightened security measures have continued to
be witnessed along the Syrian border. These measures largely include raids of arrests of
militants, security checkpoints, and shelling of suspected militant positions. For instance, on
August 17, the LAF thwarted an infiltration attempt by two militants along the Syrian border
in the Bekaa Valley area. In this context, such incidents and security measures underscore
the persistent threat of Islamist militant infiltrations into Lebanon. This threat has been
particularly elevated due to the ongoing participation of Hezbollah alongside the Assad
regime in the fighting against Islamist rebels in the Syrian Qalamoun Mountains, which has
likely increased the motivation of Sunni jihadist militants to conduct retaliatory attacks
against the Shiite militant group in Lebanese territory. With this in mind, we assess that the
ongoing LAF heightened security measures along the border with Syria are likely to continue
over the coming days and weeks.
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HIGH RISK
Libya
Islamic State (IS) Mufti in Sirte, Hassan al-Karami, declared the city as an “emirate” of
the group during his Friday sermon in the former “Cordoba Mosque”, now renamed
“Abu Musab al-Zarqawi Mosque” located in Sirte’s District 3 on August 28.
UN Mission In Libya (UNSMIL) dialogue reconvened on August 11 in Morocco; however,
the head of the pro-Islamist National General Congress (GNC), Salah al-Makhzoum,
resigned on August 26, leading the GNC to withdraw from the dialogue altogether.
It is advised to defer all travel to Tripoli and Benghazi at this time due to a recent
uptick in violence, threats against foreigners, and the risk of a broad deterioration of
security conditions.
Islamic State in Sirte
IS in Libya consists of three wilayas, or provinces: Wilayat Cyrenaica in the country's
east, Wilayat Fezzan in its south, and Wilayat Tripoli in its west, which includes the city
of Sirte. However, in terms of structure hierarchy, an emirate is superior to wilayas. In
this context, the reported declaration of Sirte as an emirate, should it be confirmed, is
likely meant to grant the city added significance over other regions of the country. That
said, at the time of writing there are no indications that the move was coordinated with
or accepted by either of the other wilayas in Libya, or with IS’s central leadership in
Syria. With this in mind, it remains possible that the declaration was done independently
by al-Karami in order to garner more personal authority for himself, rather than serve
the ideological goals of the organization.
In this context, the reported declaration of Sirte as an emirate follows the Salafist
rebellion which started in the city’s District 3 on August 11, and was suppressed by IS on
August 20, after killing at least 30 locals. While the event prompted airstrikes by both
the Libyan Air Force (LAF) and Libya Dawn air force on several occasions, as well as an
announcement of a renewed offensive by Libya Dawn against the city on August 11, no
actual on-the-ground advances against IS were recorded. With this in mind, while
additional airstrikes against IS in and near Sirte may occur by either side in the coming
days and weeks, a major ground offensive remains less likely for that time period.
Political Situation
Salah al-Makhzoum cited differences in opinion with GNC President Nuri Abusahmain as
reasons for his resignation, while Abusahmain announced that the GNC will not take part in
the UNSMIL talks until amendments are made to the July 11 draft agreement, to which the
GNC is not signatory. The aforementioned highlights the continued obstacles for the
creation of an encompassing political resolution to the Libyan Conflict. While a partial
agreement between the anti-Islamist House of Representatives (HoR), elements from
Misrata, and other tribes and cities remains possible, the likelihood for an agreement that
includes all actors, including the GNC, remains low for the coming weeks and months.
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MEDIUM RISK
Algeria
On August 9, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika reportedly disbanded the "Special
Intervention Group" (GIS), discharging its commander and dispersing the members of
the unit among the various branches of the ANP.
Ministry of National Defense (MND) states that People’s National Army clashed with a
traveling group of militants, reportedly consisting of 30-40 people, along the border of
the Jijel and Skikda Provinces on August 14, 22, and 23.
Travel to Algiers and Oran may continue while adhering to all security precautions
regarding militancy and civil unrest. Consult with us for itinerary-based travel
recommendations.
Military restructuring
The GIS was subordinate to the Department of Intelligence and Security (DRS) and
specialized in "counter-terrorism" and hostage rescue operations, as well as in close
protection and VIP escort. In this context, the reported disbanding of the GIS follows the
change in command in the ranks of the Republican Guard, as well as the General Directorate
of Security and the Presidential Protection (DGSPP) both made on July 25 due to "negligence
and lack of performance". All of the above events coincided with unconfirmed reports of a
failed assassination attempt of Bouteflika at an unspecified date in July, as well as a possible
failed attempted coup during the same time. While we cannot assess the credibility of these
unconfirmed reports at the time of writing, the fact that so many commanders of
prominent, top-tier units who are specifically tasked with the safety of the president and the
integrity of the regime were replaced, may very well indicate that Bouteflika perceived that
his rule and safety were at risk, even if the threat wasn't actualized. With this in mind, and
particularly in light of the ongoing preparations for Bouteflika's succession, it remains
possible that additional reshuffling in the political branch, as well as in the armed forces will
occur in the coming weeks, including a restructuring of these branches.
Clashes in Jijel and Skikda Provinces
While the affiliation of the militant group that clashed with the ANP in this region remains
unknown at the time of writing, given the location of the battle, in an area known to host
the Islamic State (IS)-affiliated "Skikda Brigade", we assess that the group is likely part of the
Sunni jihadist organization. That said, and regardless of the group's affiliation, the
information released by the MND indicates that only approximately ten percent of the group
was neutralized by the ANP. In this context, additional clashes are liable to be recorded in
the area in the coming days and weeks, as the ANP will attempt to completely neutralize the
group. Furthermore, the fact that the ANP initiated an attack on the group prior to it
reaching its destination highlights its relative high capabilities in containing the spread and
growth of the threat of militancy.
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MEDIUM RISK
Bahrain
Continued protests, uptick recorded surrounding Independence Day underscore
opposition tendency to utilize symbolic events to increase turnouts to activities.
Modus operandi of attack recorded on August 28 may indicate improved tactics of the
Shiite militant groups, although attacks remain low level.
Travel to Manama's business and diplomatic districts can continue at this time, while
adhering to basic security precautions regarding civil unrest and low-level militancy.
Opposition activity
Opposition protests continued to be reported over the recent month of August while a
notable uptick was recorded surrounding Bahrain's Independence Day on August 15. This
uptick underscores the tendency of the opposition to utilize symbolic events to mobilize
activists and increase turnouts to the events. Additionally, tire fires, a favored tool of the
opposition continued to be reported as well. These are often used by the activists to express
anger or condemnation particularly regarding the arrest of activists and security raids. With
this in mind, and given the ongoing perception of the Shiite community of marginalization by
the Sunni regime, further opposition activity remains likely over the coming months.
Militancy
On August 28, two explosions of homemade bombs in Karranah reportedly injured in
one death to a police officer and seven injuries. The incident is notable give the relative
high number of casualties, as most of these attacks tend to remain smaller and not
cause major injuries. Additionally, while no group claimed responsibility for the
bombing, given the modus operandi of the attack, its target, as well as the fact that it
occurred in Karranah, a known opposition hub, the perpetrators were likely one of the
local Shiite militant groups. With this in mind, Shiite militant groups have recently
developed a notable modus operandi that includes the igniting of tires fires by activists
to draw security forces to the scene and then targeting such forces with either Molotov
cocktails or improvised explosive devices (IEDs). In this context, a similar attack was
previously claimed by al-Mukhtar Brigades on April 14. However, while these previous
incidents low level in materials, the groups may have improved their tactics.
Meanwhile, the local militant group the Popular Resistance Brigades claimed
responsibility for targeting security forces in al-Janabiya on August 5. The attack,
although not confirmed by the Ministry of Interior (MOI), remains notable as the group
had not been active since October 2014. With this in mind, these attacks continue to
underscore the perception of radical elements of the Bahraini Shiite opposition who
perceive violence as a legitimate means to oppose the government. Additionally, further
such incidents of militancy remain likely in the coming days and weeks.
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MEDIUM RISK Notable Dates
Egypt
The Islamic State (IS) conducted car bomb attack on state security building in Cairo on
August 19-20, while on August 12 Wilayat Sinai, IS’s affiliate in the Sinai Peninsula,
announced the execution of a Croatian national who was abducted from Cairo on July
24.
On August 30 Egypt’s High Electoral Commission (HEC) reportedly announced that the
first round of the parliamentary elections is slated for October 18-19. Previously it had
been set to March, but was postponed over legal issues with of Elections Constituency
Division Law.
We advise against nonessential travel to Cairo and Alexandria at this time due to the
persistent risk of militant attacks and civil unrest in major cities. Consult with us for
itinerary-based travel recommendations.
IS activities in Cairo
Following the attacks in July, the aforementioned IS bombing on August 12 underscores
the group’s capability to operate in Cairo, including by conducting large scale
sophisticated attacks. Moreover, the claims of responsibility lacked the official Wilayat
Sinai branding, and was instead captioned by the word “Egypt” under the logo of the
Islamic State. This may suggest that a new group with IS affiliation is operating in the
capital and is working towards an official declaration of a new group. In this context,
additional similar attacks may occur in Cairo over the coming weeks, while security
forces are liable to attempt and increase their already highly-committed level of
deployment in the city.
Meanwhile, Wilayat Sinai likely conducted the execution of the Croatian national in
order to highlight the perception that Egypt is unsafe for foreigners, particularly since it
coincided with the inauguration of the New Suez Canal, an event of high strategic
significance to Egypt. In this context, while this sort of activity is prestigious to the group
as it garners high levels of media and international attention, and therefore it would like
to maintain it, we assess that at the time they lack the operational capabilities to
conduct such attacks on a regular basis, and will rely on targets of opportunity for this
purpose, should they present themselves.
Parliamentary elections
The Elections Constituency Division Law, which divides the country into electoral districts,
was amended by President Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi likely in order to construct the parliament in
a manner that will not challenge the president’s authority. In this context, should Sisi
perceive additional events in the country as a potential threat to his authority, it remains
possible that the elections will be postponed again. Regardless, an uptick in civil unrest will
likely be experienced in the lead-up to the elections, particularly by supporters of the
Muslim Brotherhood, whose party was outlawed.
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MEDIUM RISK
Iran Great Britain reopened its embassy in Tehran, highlighting easing of tensions with the
West following July 14 nuclear deal.
The IAEA has claimed that they will be granted access to the Parchin military site, a
condition that was highly contested and controversial prior to the signed nuclear deal.
Western nationals are advised against all nonessential travel to Iran due to persistent
negative sentiment toward Westerners. For non-Western nationals, travel to Tehran,
Esfahan, and other major cities in Iran may continue.
Britain reopens embassy, as IAEA claims it has been granted access to Iranian military sites
British Foreign Secretary William Hague officially reopened the British Embassy in
Tehran on August 23. The embassy remained has closed ever since 2011, when it was
stormed and ransacked by local protesters. Meanwhile, the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) claims to have been granted access to Iran’s Parchin military site on
August 20. The IAEA will now have permission to investigate Parchin, which is suspected
to have hosted nuclear related experiments in the past. Under the July 14 nuclear
agreement, Iran is required to give the IAEA information and eventual access to all
aspects of its nuclear program.
The symbolic act of reopening the British embassy is another step in the détente of
tensions between Iran and the West, coupled with likely looming sanctions relief and
improved relations following the nuclear deal. The British government is likely viewing
the move as a precursor to the resumption of extensive bilateral ties and energy trade
between the two countries. Meanwhile, the Iranian regime is aiming to gain legitimacy
among the international community, and the reopening of a major Western embassy in
the aftermath of the signing of the nuclear deal is an important step to achieving that
goal.
The IAEA’s access and future inspection of Iran’s military sites was a highly contentious
issue during the negotiating process between Iran and the P5 + 1, with
some Iranian military officials publicly stating they would refuse the IAEA access to such
bases. In this context, the granting of access to Parchin demonstrates Iran’s willingness
to comply with the July 14 nuclear deal arrangements, given that Iran will only receive
sanctions relief following IAEA inspections and subsequent verification that Iran is
complying with the terms of the agreement. With this in mind, IAEA inspections of both
Parchin, and further military sites and nuclear facilities, are liable to be witnessed in the
coming weeks and months.
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MEDIUM RISK & HIGH RISK
Israel & Palestinian Territories
Israel's airstrikes against Syrian regime positions in response to rockets from Syria could
potentially lead to localized retaliation in coming weeks.
Heightened security measures in response to recent hostilities between Israeli security
forces and Palestinians may lead to additional acts of unrest and violence in East
Jerusalem and West Bank.
Travel to Israel may continue at this time while adhering to security precautions
regarding militant attacks, while avoiding the immediate vicinity of all border areas,
due to the persistent risk for cross border violence. Business-essential travel to
Ramallah can continue at this time.
Rockets fired into Israel from Syria's Quneitra Province on August 20
Two rockets reportedly landed into the Northern Galilee and two on the Israeli side of the
Golan Heights. Following the attacks, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) announced that the
rockets were fired by Palestinian Islamic Jihad militants under “Iranian funding and
guidance”, and that it holds the Syrian regime responsible for the rocket fire. In response,
the Israeli Air Force (IAF) responded with three rounds of airstrikes against Syrian Arab Army
(SAA) positions in the Quneitra Province on August 21 and August 20. Should the IDF’s claims
be confirmed, the incident would be notable since this would indicate an intentional firing of
rockets at Israel, in contrast to the majority of previous incidents emanating from errant
rocket fire from the ongoing Syrian conflict. While it cannot be ruled out that the SAA will
retaliate against Israel, given pro-regime preoccupation with conflict in Syria, such a
possibility remains limited at this time. That said, there remains a possibility that a localized
retaliation will be carried out by one of the regime’s allies, such as Hezbollah and the
Palestinian Popular Committees.
Unrest in West Bank and East Jerusalem continues
Throughout the past month, hostilities have been recorded between Israeli security forces
and Palestinians throughout the West Bank and East Jerusalem. For instance, on August 21,
a Palestinian was shot and wounded when attempting to steal an IDF soldier's weapon in
Jerusalem's Mahane Yehuda Market. Additionally, on August 17, a Palestinian was shot dead
by a policeman after attempting to stab the officer at the West Bank's Tapuach Junction.
Such incidents have led to a further increase in security measures throughout the West Bank
and East Jerusalem, like witnessed on August 25 when the Israeli Security Agency announced
the dismantling of a militant cell planning an attack against Jews in Nablus. This, in turn,
elevated the already heightened tensions between Israeli security forces and the Palestinian
population. With this in mind, additional incidents of unrest and acts of violence, including
rock and Molotov cocktail throwing and stabbings, will likely be recorded over the coming
month.
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MEDIUM RISK Notable Dates
Saudi Arabia
Ministry of Health (MoH) announces drastic increase in new cases of Middle East
Respiratory Syndrome (MERS-CoV) in August, particularly in Riyadh.
Islamic State’s (IS) Saudi Arabia branch claims responsibility for an attack in Asir Province
on August 6, continuing to underscore the ability of the group to carry out attacks in
Saudi Arabia.
Travel to Riyadh, Dammam, and Jeddah can continue as normal while adhering to
basic security precautions and cultural norms. Avoid nonessential travel to the Qatif
region at this time due to the potential for unrest, as well as to the border areas with
Yemen and Iraq, given the potential for spillover unrest.
Cases of MERS-CoV drastically increase throughout month of August
The reported number of new cases and deaths of MERS-CoV has drastically increased from
the month of July to August. There were only 16 total new cases reported in July, compared
to the 116 that have already been documented in August at the time of writing. This
discrepancy highlights a notable and substantial increase in new infections, the vast majority
of which are being recorded in Riyadh. In this context, those operating or residing in Riyadh
in the coming weeks should remain vigilant about practicing basic hygiene and refraining
from consuming camel products, given the significant increase in recorded cases of MERS-
CoV in Riyadh during the month of August. Furthermore, this recent increase continues to
underscore the challenges faced by the MoH and Saudi hospitals in mitigating the spread of
MERS-CoV. With this in mind, further public health measures by the MoH to contain the
spread of the virus remain likely in the coming weeks and months.
Islamic State (IS) continues to carry out attacks in Saudi Arabia
Wilayat Nejd, the IS branch operating in Saudi Arabia, claimed responsibility for a suicide
bombing that targeted security forces at a mosque in a police base outside of Abha in Saudi
Arabia’s Asir Province. The Saudi Ministry of Interior (MoI) reported that 15 people were
killed, including 12 members of the security forces, while nine others were wounded. The
abovementioned incident is notable as it constitutes one of the most successful attacks
carried out in Saudi Arabia to date, and comes amidst elevated IS activity in the country. The
modus operandi of utilizing a suicide bomber and targeting Saudi security forces is
congruent with previous IS attacks. That being said, given that IS has not previously been
known to operate in Asir Province, the bombing underlines the group’s continued attempts
to expand in addition its increased capabilities in Saudi Arabia. With this in mind, further
attacks perpetrated by IS are liable to witnessed in the coming weeks and months.
Furthermore, we assess that a crackdown against suspected members of IS operating in the
country is likely to be continued to be witnessed throughout Saudi Arabia in the coming
weeks, in an effort to mitigate the threat of future attacks.
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MEDIUM RISK
Tunisia
Militant attacks in outlying areas continue, underscored by targeting of border guards in
Kasserine Governorate on August 23, as well as shooting of police officer on Sousse on
August 19.
Arrests of suspected militant cells likely to continue, highlighted by numerous
dismantling of such cells across country over past month.
Travel to Tunis may continue while adhering to all security precautions regarding
militancy and civil unrest. Consult with us for itinerary-based tactical monitoring and
ground support options.
Militancy
On August 23, two border guards were reportedly killed and two others injured in a shooting
attack in the Kasserine Governorate's Bouchebka area, located along the Tunisian-Algerian
border. The attack was claimed by the Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigades and additionally followed
unconfirmed reports from August 13 that Algeria had warned Tunisia of an impending attack
by the group along the border. The attack by the group, which remains affiliated with al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), comes amidst a regional uptick in attacks by AQIM,
likely linked to the group's efforts to assert itself in North Africa amidst a growing Islamic
State (IS) influence. As a result, further attacks by the group remain likely over the coming
weeks, particularly along the shared border area and in the Chaambi Mountains, known to
be a militant stronghold. Meanwhile, the shooting of a police officer in Sousse on August 19
follows the June 26 IS attack at a resort complex in the city. Such attacks underscore the
threat of militancy in Tunisia's coastal areas, which are considered the heart of the country's
economy and have experienced fewer security risks than Tunisia's outlying and border areas.
With this in mind, security presence in Tunisia's coastal district is likely to remain heightened
over the coming weeks in order to mitigate such threats.
Arrests
Arrest campaigns were conducted by security forces on August 29 in Kasserine following the
Bouchebka attack, on August 22 in the Bizerte, Tunis, and Tataouine Governorates, and on
August 16 also in Bizerte. These raids highlight increased government efforts to crack down
on extremist elements across the country in the wake of the June 26 Sousse attack and the
subsequent declaration of the state of emergency. While such arrests underscore security
forces' capabilities to find and dismantle such elements, the presence of these cells,
including outside of militants' normal operating areas along the border with Algeria and
Libya, further suggest the continued ability to recruit membership from among local
populations. Over the coming month, such arrest campaigns are likely to continue.
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MEDIUM RISK
Turkey
Ongoing hostilities between Turkish security forces and Kurdistan Workers' Party
(PKK) militants likely to continue throughout the coming month.
Turkey joins anti-IS US-led coalition for first time, and launches airstrikes against
Islamic State (IS) in Syria on August 29.
President's call for new elections in November will likely lead to politically motivated
violence and further PKK militancy in lead-up to November 1.
Travel to Istanbul may continue although travelers are advised to maintain
heightened vigilance in central areas due to regular anti-government protests and
occasional incidents of unrest in these locales.
Uptick in hostilities between Turkish security forces and PKK militants
Following the Islamic State (IS) suicide bombing on July 20, and the reported PKK retaliatory
shooting against two policemen on July 22, ongoing hostilities have been recorded between
the two sides. In this context, over the past month, PKK militants have used improvised
explosive devices (IEDs), roadside bombs, long barrel weapons, rockets, and other explosives
against Turkish security forces on a near daily basis. In response, Turkish security forces have
conducted police raids and airstrikes against PKK positions. With this in mind, given that
there is no indication of a halt in hostilities at this time, we assess that additional conflict will
be recorded between the two groups throughout the coming month.
Turkey launches airstrikes against IS positions in northern Syria
Reportedly, the Turkish Air Force (THK) reportedly struck seven IS positions in northern
Aleppo on August 30, marking the first attacks conducted by Turkey under the anti-IS
coalition led by the US. In this context, these airstrikes come amidst speculation that the US-
led coalition is attempting to create a “safe zone” in northern Syria. With this in mind,
further coalition airstrikes in northern Aleppo against IS positions can likely be anticipated in
the coming month.
President announces new elections to take place on November 1
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan made this announcement following the Justice and
Development Party's (AKP) failure to create a coalition government. In this context, the call
for elections comes amidst a deteriorating security situation in Turkey’s southeast. With this
in mind, Erdogan will likely capitalize on security forces’ response to the deteriorating
security situation, in attempts to seize back a parliamentary majority for the AKP.
Additionally, politically motivated violence, like seen prior to the elections in June, can likely
be anticipated in the lead-up to November elections.
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LOW RISK
Kuwait
Dismantling of militant cell near the Iraqi border, seizure of weapons cache on August 13
allegedly originating in Iran, underline threat of militancy and heightened concerns of
the authorities regarding extremists trained abroad to conduct attacks in the country.
Accusations of the involvement of Lebanon and Iran in the dismantled cell followed by
the recall of Kuwait’s ambassadors likely to increase tensions.
Travel to Kuwait can continue as normal while adhering to basic security precautions
regarding civil unrest and militancy.
Militancy
According to the Ministry of Interior (MOI) statement on August 13, three suspected
militants were arrested near the Iraqi border, in addition to a large arms cache smuggled
from Iraq and stored in a house along the border. On August 17, two additional suspects
were arrested in connection to the cell. Another 25 suspects were announced to be
comprised of Kuwaiti, Lebanese, and Iranian nationals, including government workers in
money exchange offices, who are suspected of assisting to facilitate money laundering
for the dismantled cell.
The reported arrests underline the threat of militancy in Kuwait, as well as the
heightened concerns of the Kuwaiti authorities regarding extremists trained abroad to
conduct attacks in the country. These concerns are reflected by reported claims that the
dismantled militant cell and weapons cache originated from Iran. Furthermore, this
incident also demonstrates the capabilities of the Kuwaiti security forces to confront and
mitigate threats of militancy in the country. With this in mind, further arrests of people
suspected to hold connections to militant elements, including the aforementioned cell,
remain likely.
Tensions with Lebanon and Iran
Initial suspicion of the affiliation of the aforementioned militant cell to Hezbollah was
followed by allegations that it actually originated from Iran, serving to increase tensions
between Kuwait, and Iran and Lebanon. In this context, on August 17, Kuwait reportedly
recalled its ambassadors to Iran and Lebanon, further underscoring the Kuwaiti perception
of those countries as responsible for the militant cell arrested on August 13. With this in
mind, while Lebanon and Iran remain likely to deny knowledge or responsibility for such
activity, this incident is likely to further increase tensions between the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) countries, which includes Kuwait, and Iran over the coming weeks and
months.
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Notable Dates for September 2015 Middle East & North Africa
Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation
September 22-25, 2015
Eid al-Adha holiday
Many places of business will operate in
limited working hours, as government
offices and public transportation will be
closed.
Egypt – Back to portion
Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation
September 11-12, 2015
Coptic New Year
While not a public holiday, celebrations
are likely to take place in various
locales, particularly churches in Cairo.
There is an increased level of risk for
unrest and militancy in these events,
which are liable to be heavily secured.
September 28, 1970
Egyptian President
Gamal Abdul Nasser
died of a heart attack;
He was succeeded by
Anwar Sadat.
Memorials in different areas, including
Cairo, may take place.
Morocco
Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation
September 4, 2015
Municipal elections to
be held in Morocco
Security presence likely to be
heightened across the country in the
vicinity of polling stations, while
gatherings by various political groups
should also not be ruled out. Maintain
heightened vigilance.
Saudi Arabia – Back to portion
Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation
September 23, 1932
National Day marks the
unification of the
kingdom by founder
King Abdulaziz in 1932.
Closures, along with celebrations,
parades, and traffic congestion should
be anticipated. Allot extra time for
travel throughout the country while
confirming itineraries ahead of time for
this reason. Shiite opposition
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demonstrations in the Eastern Province,
particularly Qatif, are also possible.
Remain cognizant for such calls, while
avoiding the immediate vicinity of all
protests.
Yemen – Back to portion
Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation
September 27, 1962
Revolution Day
commemorates the
revolutionary
movement that
overthrew the al-Badr
monarchy in 1962 and
led to the creation of
the Yemen Arab
Republic
Demonstrations denouncing the regime
of Ali-Abdullah Saleh are likely to occur
in various governorates.
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