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December 2016
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The month of November saw political rumblings occur across the entire Asian continent as a number of highly
controversial issues were debated within the political and public sectors, causing multiple significant protests.
Additionally, the ever-present matter of Islamist militancy continued to affect parts of Asia, particularly playing a more
significant role in Southeast Asia than in previous months, although issues of global jihad were also noted in the
subcontinent, where it has traditionally played a larger role. Intercommunal and inter-religious violence remained a
prevalent throughout the subcontinent also, as violence between different Muslim sects, as well as between Muslim and
Hindu communities, caused a number of casualties. Finally, the armed conflicts in Myanmar’s Shan State and Kashmir
continued to render the areas wholly unsafe.
The political rallies which shook Asia in November spanned across eight countries, as a number of unique but important
issues led to hundreds of thousands of demonstrators coming out in force to protest their governments on multiple
occasions. One of the largest of the eight was seen in South Korea, as President Park’s ongoing scandal over an improper
relationship with a nongovernmental associate saw multiple rallies of over 100,000 people in the center of Seoul, calling
for the resignation of the seasoned politician in disgrace. Meanwhile, following a unilateral decision by the Modi
government in India to recall a number of bank notes they believed to be used for corrupt purposes, mass protests and
unrest were recorded in dozens of large and small cities in India. In Hong Kong, smaller but still significant protests
occurred surrounding Beijing’s role in the Self-Administrative Region’s Legislative Council, following the attempted
swearing in of a number of pro-Independence councilors. While in Taiwan protests erupted following the government’s
decision to hold a vote on same-sex marriage. Pakistan and Malaysia were both scheduled to have mass and potentially
violent protests in early November, however, the rally in Islamabad was called off after a semi-mutual agreement was
reached between the government and protesting party, while in Malaysia the government managed to minimize the
turnout. Lastly, in Indonesia, a large-scale protest, was held in the capital against Jakarta Governor who was accused of
quoting the Quran in a manner perceived by Islamist groups as being offensive, and an additional protest is slated to be
held on December 2.
Islamist militancy remained a key issue in Asia but became far more potent in the Southeast where both the Philippines
and Myanmar saw a rise in small IED attacks towards the end of the month. In the case of Myanmar, the government has
pointed towards the Rohingya minority, who are currently at odds with the government in Rakhine State and have been
accused of attacking both civilian and military targets. In the Philippines, the Maute group carried out a series of
successful and attempted attacks on the US Embassy, a Catholic church, and an advance team for President Duterte’s
upcoming visit to Mindanao. Additionally, in Sri Lanka, claims of Islamic State recruitment and anti-Muslim rhetoric have
exacerbated Muslim-Buddhist tensions, as the government fears a rise in Islamic Militancy may occur.
In the same regard, tensions between Hindu and Muslim groups continued in Bangladesh as Hindu’s accused the
government of not doing enough to tackle the issue of Islamist radicals attacking Hindu installations, an issue which is
likely to lead to protests in the coming months. Furthermore, Pakistan’s Karachi witnessed a significant uptick in attacks
on Shiite Muslims from Sunni extremists and in a somewhat more rare occurrence, accusations arose that Shiite groups
were themselves retaliating by attacking Sunni individuals as tensions and violence between the two groups remain
elevated.
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PAKISTAN ..........................................................................................................................................................................4
BANGLADESH ...................................................................................................................................................................5
INDIA .................................................................................................................................................................................6
INDONESIA .......................................................................................................................................................................7
MALAYSIA .........................................................................................................................................................................8
MYANMAR ........................................................................................................................................................................9
PHILIPPINES ................................................................................................................................................................... 10
SRI LANKA ...................................................................................................................................................................... 11
AUSTRALIA ..................................................................................................................................................................... 12
HONG KONG .................................................................................................................................................................. 13
MALDIVES ...................................................................................................................................................................... 14
SOUTH KOREA ............................................................................................................................................................... 15
TAIWAN .......................................................................................................................................................................... 16
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Following weeks of unrest in preparation for a major
protest which was slated to take place in Islamabad,
organized by the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) under the
leadership of Imran Khan, over the Panama Papers
scandal, the Supreme Court ordered the ruling Pakistan
Muslim League–Nawaz (PML-N) to submit the Terms of
Reference for the Panama Papers judicial commission.
While this was portrayed as a political victory for the PTI by
their leadership, it was also deemed to help them save face
as it appeared that the shutdown protest in Islamabad,
which had been poised to be one of the largest protests of
2016, appeared to be seeing significantly diminishing
turnout. That said, much of the party’s key political
supporters are likely to view the cancellation of the protest
as a betrayal of the party’s values, which are strongly anti-
corruption, viewing the change in circumstances to be
indicative of the party’s decrease in popularity. As such, the
events of November 2 are likely to further erode public
confidence in the party as perceptions of the PTI’s
weakness have been steadily reinforced by its inability to
achieve any stated goals, including the removal of Prime
Minister Nawaz Sharif, following its much larger and more
prolonged anti-government protests in 2014. Nonetheless,
PTI will likely continue to resort to conducting protests in
the event that PM Sharif is not seen to be adequately
reprimanded.
The November 4 killing of three clerics of the banned radical
Sunni Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ) group indicates the
continued operational presence of sectarian-linked targeted
assassins in Karachi, despite sustained Rangers paramilitary
presence in the metropolis. While the individuals directly
involved in perpetrating the November 4 murders have yet to
be apprehended or identified, it remains possible that Shiite
sectarian militias such as the Sipah-e-Mohammad may have
been involved, given the targeting of ASWJ clerics.
Furthermore, the attacks may also have been launched in
retaliation for the October 29 attack on a Shiite place of
worship in Karachi’s Nazimabad area which was later claimed
by the al-Alami faction of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) militant
group, as well as the Islamic State. The subsequent unrest led
by Shiites may have been triggered by perceptions that while
attacks on Shiites go unpunished, similar targeting of majority
Sunnis in Pakistan draws an instant response from law
enforcement agencies. As the Islamic State expands its
influence in Pakistan by coordinating with local sectarian
groups like LeJ, especially in restive Balochistan, we assess that
ripple effects might also be felt in Karachi, particularly given
the known links to such groups to Karachi’s sectarian militants.
Therefore, gradual uptick in incidents of sectarian-linked
violence is liable to occur over the coming months in Karachi.
PTI cancels November 2
Islamabad lockdown
after Supreme Court
rules in favor of
corruption probe
Karachi sectarian
violence kills six; arrest
of Shiite leaders
triggers unrest
Over 50 killed in Islamic
State (IS) claimed attack
targeting Shiites in Hub,
Balochistan
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The recent attacks against Hindus in the east-central
Brahmanbaria District highlight the sustained threat to
religious minorities in Bangladesh from radical Islamist
groups. The attacks remain notable in light of the scale of
damage inflicted in the arson attacks, impacting at least
200 houses. Additionally, the timing of the attack, during
the final days of the Diwali festival, signals the sustained
elevated threat, particularly during religious high holidays.
Potential tensions are typically liable to escalate due to the
public nature of celebrations in districts with a mixed
religious demographic or those with a stronger presence of
minority communities. Meanwhile, the continuing protests
by activist and student groups over the violence likely stem
from the perception that the government’s response
towards apprehending the perpetrators has been
unsatisfactory. Additionally, further delays in the
dispensation of monetary compensation to those affected
by the violence are liable to draw out protests in the near
term. Meanwhile, the Awami League (AL) government is
liable to frame the conflict as an attempt by the Islamist
Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) party to destabilize the country by
stoking sectarian tensions. A narrative such as this would
lend support to the AL’s ongoing campaign against the JeI
for the alleged operational assistance and religious
patronage the government claims that it provides to
Islamist militant groups in Bangladesh.
The political violence in the central district of Narsingdi
likely comes ahead of the local district council elections
slated to take place on December 28, with similar episodes
liable to occur in politically-disputed districts. That said,
inter-party violence has significantly decreased since 2014,
accompanying a similar decline in the political viability of
Bangladesh National Party (BNP). This likely was the result
of the BNP’s boycott of the general election that year, and
the AL’s subsequent targeting of the party’s leadership,
which has diminished the BNP’s ability to achieve mass
mobilization for its rallies. However, a likely outcome of the
BNP’s decline could be an increase in Awami League intra-
party factionalism in the near term, due to increased
political competition to secure candidacy within the party.
Multiple acts of violence
reported against
Hindus in
Brahmanbaria District
Student groups hold
protest rallies in Dhaka
over attacks on
religious minorities
Section 144 imposed in
Narsingdi District over
violence between rival
AL political factions
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It appears that the recent demonetization scheme by the
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-
led government is likely to
gain significant political
capital ahead of the 2017
state elections. Additionally,
while the policy was
forecasted to cause
significant disruptions to the
general public and result in
civil unrest, the government’s
subsequent inclusion of
waivers for key demographic
groups such as for farmers
acquiring seeds has likely
assuaged short-term
concerns over the policy.
Meanwhile, the opposition’s
early reticence to protest the move was likely due to its
framing as an anti-corruption measure. However, the
failure of the opposition parties to agree on a common
program of protest against the policy due to inter-party
differences indicates the political advantage that the Modi
government is liable to gain in the coming months.
Localized civil unrest is liable to continue in non-BJP
controlled states, and may likely gain temporary traction at
the national level, should demonetization have an impact
of the end-of-the-year economic growth indicators.
The recent escalation of the armed conflict between India
and Pakistan is evident in the increase in the range of
cross-border shelling, as casualties in civilian towns in the
Kashmir region indicates that the conflict is no longer
limited to the immediate vicinity of the Line of Control
(LoC). This development can likely be attributed to the
ongoing domestic tensions in both countries. While India
appears to remain steadfast in its rhetoric to retaliate
against alleged ceasefire violations by Pakistan, its primary
concern at present time is to appear tough on cross-border
infiltration, and not to initiate a full-scale conflict. This
assessment is supported by the fact that Delhi has balked
from rescinding major civil treaties between the two
countries, such as the Indus Water Treaty (IWT), despite
saber-rattling about revisiting its provisions. Much of
Delhi’s reluctance to cut off the water supply to Pakistan
from the Indus River stems from its own fears that China,
Pakistan’s ally, would implement similar measures in
response, with the Tsangpo-Brahmaputra River, which is a
vital source of water to India’s eastern region. This delicate
balance of regional interdependence for natural resources
may likely act as a buffer against the full-scale war in the
subcontinent. That said, should India make significant
changes to the IWT, the conflict between the two countries
is liable to severely escalate, with Pakistan interpreting
such as move as an act of aggression, and inviting the
potential intervention of the international community.
Government
demonetizes Rs 500,
1,000 notes to check
black money
Congress protests
demonetization in Delhi
Three Indian soldiers
killed in cross-border
firing in Kashmir
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The recent blasphemy controversy of Ethnically Chinese Christian Jakarta Governor Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama has
propelled disaffection towards the leader to new lows. The November 4 rally reflects a worrying trend of extremism in
Indonesia’s largely moderate social and religious fabric. Religious tensions have increased as hardline groups, such as
the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), have utilized the controversy to
publicize their opposition to any non-Muslim assuming a public
position in Indonesia. The support of top Muslim clerical bodies,
like the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), at the rally, further
served to legitimize the sentiments of fringe groups like FPI and
bring their hardline, pro-Muslim stance in the mainstream. Such
reinforcement may ultimately bolster the ambitions of and public
support for such ideologies further, as can be inferred by the FPI’s
additional plans to mobilize in the coming days and weeks.
Additionally, ethnic tensions have increased, with demonstrations
against Ahok having gradually taken on anti-Chinese
undercurrents and some protesters reportedly chanting “Crush the Chinese” at the rally. Although a large portion of
Indonesia believes that the ethnic Chinese minority still has large clout in economic affairs, overt racism or aggression
has not been recorded widely since the 1998 anti-Chinese riots in Jakarta. Hence, such disaffection maintains the
potential to re-ignite historical resentment and result in unrest. Lastly, militancy is a concern, with the Islamic State’s
online message instructing attacks on security personnel deployed at the rally, coupled with the claims by the National
Police Spokesman, further reinforcing the underlying threat of IS-influenced unrest in Indonesia. This is likely
encouraged by the rhetoric surrounding Ahok and hardline calls for the punishment of a “non-believer”. Thus, the
potential threat of lone wolves or small-scale cells carrying out attacks on police or army personnel during such future
rallies remains, as the large attendance may aid efforts to escape undetected. This combination of rising religious
tensions, ethnic division, and militancy has the potential of materializing into sustained polarization in Indonesia, to the
point that even if Ahok were to drop out of the February 2017 race to be Governor, Jakarta would still face challenges to
its security in the near term. Nevertheless, although Ahok's approval ratings have significantly dropped from the
leading position he had in the past months, he remains a prominent contender in the running to be Jakarta Governor.
Anti-Ahok rally
attended by thousands
in Central Jakarta
Ahok questioned by
Jakarta Police over
alleged blasphemous
comments regarding
Quran
National Police
Spokesman claims nine
arrested during
November 4 rally linked
to Islamic State group
Source: Indonesian Survey Circle
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While tens of thousands of people attended the highly-anticipated Bersih 5.0 rally on November 19, the turnout was
still less than demonstrations over the same cause last year. Additionally, Prime Minister Najib Razak’s arrest of
prominent activists, including Bersih 5.0 Chairwoman Maria Chin Abdullah, suggests that the government use a range
of coercive means more liberally than in the past. This is likely an attempt to consolidate his position ahead of 2018
elections. In order to shore up his nationalist base, a portion of
which is represented by the activist and anti-Bersih Red Shirt
movement, it remains possible that PM Razak will tacitly allow anti-
Western sentiment to flourish. An instance of this could be seen in
the November 2 protest, in which an opposition media outlet was
accused of being an “agent for foreign powers” due to a grant
received from a foundation run by a well-known foreign
businessman. The protesters also alleged that the foundation had
been funding Bersih.
These domestic developments reflect shifting geopolitical alliances:
Malaysia has made a relatively dramatic pivot toward China over
the past month, as the historic defense deal signed between the
two countries suggests. This may fuel rising criticism from the US
against Kuala Lumpur ahead of the elections, which could stoke
further anti-American sentiment among the PM’s supporters.
Indeed, such action would likely serve to stoke activism on all sides
in Malaysia, at once compelling opposition activists to bolster their
criticism of the government while also instigating sharp reactions
from the Red Shirts and the current government. Relatedly,
although the recent Bersih protest was smaller compared to past gatherings, the arrest of their leader will likely compel
frequent, small-scale protests into December.
Red Shirt protesters call for news
portal to shut down after grant
from foreign fund revealed
Maria Chin Abdullah arrested
with 11 other senior opposition
activists on eve of massive Bersih
5.0 protest
US State Department
calls Maria Chin
Abdullah’s arrest
“troubling”
Malaysia and China agree on
historic defense deal, bilateral
South China Sea dispute
mechanisms
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The decision to launch the offensive was likely one of
desperation on the part of the Kachin Independence Army
(KIA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, Ta’ang
National Liberation Army and the Arakan Army, as the
ethnic militias, known collectively as the Northern Alliance, were was
facing pressure to bow to the demands of the National
Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) by both the civilian government
and their collective patron, Beijing. China’s displeasure with
increasing violence on the border, which causes disruption
to trade and weakens its position as a responsible backer
of the militant groups, was evident in the forced closure of
KIA offices along the border. However, ultimately the
Northern Alliance’s strategic value to China far outweighs
the perils of its support, suggesting that Beijing will
eventually pursue discreet measures to constrain the
successes of the Myanmar military in an attempt to reduce
tensions. One such deterring measure may include the tacit
allowance of the United Wa State Army (UWSP) to
increasingly supply arms to the groups. As the civilian
government continues to back the actions of the military in
using force to pressure the alliance to sign the NCA, the
UWSP, which strongly objects to the agreement, will
increasingly cooperate with the alliance. In this context,
despite Beijing and Naypyidaw’s shared desire for lowered
tensions, the current round of fighting will likely sustain
itself, and may even increase, in the months leading to the
next peace conference in February 2017.
The small explosions in Yangon are notable as militancy is
rare in the city, with the last notable incident occurring in
2013. The bombs were unsophisticated, being composed
of chemicals, gunpowder, and glass bottles. However, as
the country’s new government and reduced international
sanctions have opened up the possibility of a tourism
boom, the government is likely unwilling to take chances.
Interestingly, while the culprits remain unknown, politicians
have suggested that the bombings were in response to the
ongoing violence in Rakhine State. In this context,
exacerbating the threat in Yangon may be part of a
broader state strategy to develop a legitimate pretext for
escalating operations in Rakhine State, which has attracted
international criticism. As the situation in Rakhine State is
unlikely to improve in the near future and may further
deteriorate, the potential for additional bombings of this
nature in Yangon remain possible, albeit minimal.
The Northern Alliance launch joint
offensive against Myanmar Army in
Shan State; three IEDs detonated in
Muse Township
Rumors suggest
China-backed UWSP
supplying weapons
to Northern Alliance
against military
Two KIA offices in
China shut down
after being
surrounded by
military troops
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Following the abduction of another foreign national in early
November, it appears that Abu Sayyaf has continued to
refocus their operations on kidnapping as a way to offset
losses due to the ongoing Philippine Army operation and
President Rodrigo Duterte’s war on drugs. While
abductions and attacks on foreign targets have long been
part of the modus operandi of Moro Islamist militant
groups, Catholic targets have not seen any notable recent
attacks. Therefore, the move to attack a church on
November 27 was likely an attempt by the Abu Sayyaf-
linked Maute group to draw attention away from their own
losses during the recent government assaults against their
strongholds in Lanao del Sur and increase tensions
between Muslim and Christian communities. In that regard,
the Maute group is likely looking to discourage public
support for the military campaign by attacking targets that
are viewed as staple parts of traditional Philippine life. This
was likely also the motivating factor behind the November
28 and 29 attacks against the US Embassy in Manila and a
Presidential Convoy in Lanao del Sur. While any targeting of
US entities in the Philippines is rare due to positive public
sentiment, more attacks against traditional government
targets are liable to occur as militant Moro groups continue
to experience losses in Mindanao. Additionally, churches
and other Catholic sites face an elevated risk during the
upcoming holiday season, particularly in larger Catholic
cities such as Davao and Manila.
The protests were widely held across the country,
particularly in Manila by groups not only opposed to the
Marcos family but also anti-incumbent President Duterte
groups, who view him and the Marcos family as close
political allies. The issue compounded much of the fears of
parts of Manila society over the perceived rise in
authoritarianism in the Philippines which is personified
through the figure of President Marcos. Despite the
significant unpopularity of the decision, given that the
burial has now taken place and the action is unlikely to be
reversed, these types of protests will slowly die down. That
being said, considering the high levels of contention
surrounding the issue, it is likely that it will reemerge in
future anti-Duterte protests.
German national
abducted by Abu Sayyaf
group near Sulu
Former President
Marcos buried in
controversial ceremony
Two injured in bomb
attack on Mindanao
church
Militant bombing
attacks against
government targets
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The veracity of the claim made by the Justice Minister over
Sri Lankan IS fighters remains unclear, in part due to
disagreements within the government over the alleged
influence of global jihadi groups on Sri Lankan Muslims.
This was evident in the subsequent contradicting claims
made by other government representatives about the lack
of an IS presence in Sri Lanka. It appears the government’s
seeming retreat from its earlier statement was likely to
mitigate the backlash from Muslim groups and minimizing
the damage it could have on the country’s international
reputation. Regardless, tensions will continue to be
heightened between the Muslim minority and Sinhala-
Buddhist majority over recent proposals to amend Muslim
civil law on issues such as marriage. Additionally, they are
likely to be stoked by Buddhist hardline groups such as
Bodu Bala Sena (BBS), who have expressed their opposition
to Muslim certification of food and religious attire.
Consequently, perceived sentiments of alienation within
the community can potentially serve as a recruitment tool
for transnational Islamist militant groups such as IS, who
may release jihadi propaganda targeted at Sri Lankan
Muslims in future publications, as they did in November
2015. Meanwhile, cities such as Kandy, as well as the
Western Province, which have a history of inter-religious
violence, remain potential flashpoints for the outbreak of
localized violence in the foreseeable future.
The statements by President Maithripala Sirisena
condemning the police’s use of forcible dispersal measures
at a disabled veterans’ pension protest, as well as the
speedy constitution of committees to investigate the
incident, is largely informed by the strong public support
the armed forces command in Sri Lanka. Similarly, the
Sirisena government’s assent to the protesters’ demands
for pension benefits by February 2017 was likely meant to
offset any negative impact such a controversy could have
on their electoral prospects in upcoming local elections in
April 2017. Consequently, civil unrest over the issue is liable
to decline in the near term. That said, the incident signals
the likelihood that aggrieved groups, such as workers
unions or activist groups seeking victims’ compensation,
will use the local elections to gain traction for their cause,
resulting in an uptick in protest rallies in Colombo ahead of
the elections.
Police use water
cannons, tear gas to
disperse army veterans
rally in Colombo
Muslim groups in
Eastern Province
protest planned
changes to Muslim law
Justice Minister claims
32 Sri Lankans currently
part of Islamic State
ranks in Syria
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The protests on November 5 and November 20 highlight the contentious nature of Australia’s immigration policy. Over
the past 20 years, the country has typically accepted between 12,000 and 13,000 refugees per annum, however, conflict
in the Middle East has prompted Australia to accept a further 12,000 refugees fleeing from Syria, which has
subsequently contributed to the noticeable rise of the anti-immigration One Nation party, the group behind many of
the increasingly visible anti-immigration manifestations.
The November 20 rally was a protest against the self–immolation of an asylum seeker on November 18, at a bank in a
suburb of Melbourne. Although this incident was deemed isolated on account of the asylum seeker’s alleged mental
health problems, it is likely that far-right groups will use perceived future crimes and misdemeanors by asylum seekers
as a pretext for further protests.
Anti-immigration sentiment is not uncommon in Australia, as typified by the 2005 Cronulla race riots during which
young white Australians violently clashed with Lebanese-Australian youths in a beachside suburb of Sydney. That being
said, there are now a number of anti–racism groups in Australia who regularly attend anti–immigration rallies to voice
their opposition to far-right groups, which has played a role in increasing the levels of disruption and sometimes unrest
which stem from such demonstrations. Furthermore, this may be indicative of the increasingly polarizing nature of the
immigration issue, which will no doubt play a role in future electoral campaigns in the coming years.
Further, the news that lone wolf IS militants are active in Australia has only increased racial tensions. Both a stabbing
attack and a foiled plot to bomb the Sydney Opera House in September 2016 have increased the levels of concern over
Islamic refugees, as well as compounding xenophobic sentiments in certain sectors of Australian society. This is
reinforced by the fact that IS are a losing significant ground in their former strongholds in Iraq-Syria and may attempt
to divert its attention to Australia, as well as the Asia-Pacific region more generally. If further lone wolf attacks were to
occur, this would lead to further anti-immigration protests and attacks against minority groups.
Protests in Melbourne
relating to resettlement
of 120 refugees
Asylum seeker self-
immolates in
Melbourne
Anti-immigration
protest organized by
far–right groups in
Melbourne
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Hong Kong’s oath-swearing controversy, which first erupted on October 12 when two incoming legislators from the pro-
independence Youngspiration party changed the wording of their oaths, escalated precipitously in November. On
November 2, civil society and legal groups responded to reports that Beijing was planning to intervene in a Hong Kong
court’s decision over whether the legislators could take up their seats by marching throughout downtown Hong Kong.
Their concerns were borne out on November 6 when Beijing’s National People’s Congress Standing Committee decided
to intervene and interpreted Hong Kong’s Basic Law to invalidate their oaths. As a result, a Hong Kong court on
November 15 disqualified the two Youngspiration members. Beijing’s ultimate decision to intervene in the oath-
swearing controversy represents a major escalation on its part. It further contributes to deepening concerns among
segments of the Hong Kong population, as well as among international observers, that the city-state’s autonomy vis-à-
vis mainland China and its rule of law, both ostensibly guaranteed under the “one country, two systems” paradigm, are
progressively eroding. Some have criticized the Youngspiration legislators over a perceived lack of political cunning;
instead of stating their views before they were legally sworn-in, they could have waited and then commanded more
power as an official legislator. Still, the outcome of this saga will ultimately deepen animosity among local Hong
Kongers towards Beijing and the mainland. Hong Kongers already largely disagree politically with Beijing and its local
proxies; had seats in the city’s Legislative Council been apportioned according to only the election results from the
representative geographic constituencies, pan-democratic and pro-independence forces would have a commanding
majority of 59 percent. However, because of the body’s functional constituencies, which are dominated by pro-Beijing
business and political interests, Beijing has been able to command a majority. This structural inequality, the
disqualification of several pro-independence candidates before the election, and Beijing’s intervention in the current
scandal continue to polarize the respective camps and stave off the prospect of political compromise. Furthermore, by
indirectly punishing the Youngspiration duo, Beijing’s decision may bolster the political prospects of the pan-democracy
camp, which still opposes Beijing yet appears to be more competent in doing so. In any case, protests over the issue,
especially if by-elections are held to fill the now-vacated seats, will likely intensify in the near future, organized and
exacerbated by both the disqualified and still-remaining pro-independence councilors. Counter-protests by pro-Beijing
outfits are likely in response. In the charged political climate currently prevailing in Hong Kong, this tit-for-tat response
could manifest a sudden escalation in the scale and severity of protests, with the possibility of mass rallies and unrest
as was seen in the Occupy HK movement in 2014.
Civil society groups
protest Beijing’s
planned intervention in
oath-swearing
controversy
Beijing intervenes,
prevents pro-
independence
legislators from taking
seats
Hong Kong court orders
pro-independence
legislators to vacate
seats
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The month of November witnessed the continuation of the power struggle between former President Maumoon Abdul
Gayoom and incumbent President Abdullah Yameen Abdul Gayoom for control of the ruling party, the Progressive
Party of Maldives (PPM). However, the former President suffered a major setback in early November when three of the
eight Gayoom-loyalist lawmakers, who publically withdrew support to Yameen in late October, rejoined the Yameen
faction. This also weakens Gayoom’s chances of securing a two-third majority in the Maldives parliament for a no-
confidence vote against current parliament speaker and Yameen-loyalist Abdullah Maseeh; which on accomplishment
would have been regarded as a major step towards impeaching President Yameen. At present, it remains unclear if
Gayoom’s possible attempts to impeach Yameen would be aimed at securing the 2018 Presidency for his own kin,
however, this may have been the reason why Gayoom refused to directly offer Yameen the party nomination, and
instead insisted on a primary election within the party.
Meanwhile, recent public statements made by Yameen suggest that he remains keen on regaining the former
President’s sympathies, particularly given his continued referral to Gayoom as party President. That said, Yameen’s
suggestions that the Gayoom should continue to operate according to the party council, currently under Yameen’s
control, indicates his unwillingness to cede political control of the PPM to his predecessor. Therefore, Gayoom is likely
to reject such seemingly friendly overtures by the President, sensing the latter’s likely intent to keep Gayoom as a
relatively powerless party president to retain the PPM’s domestic political legitimacy as a unitary entity.
If at all the Gayoom faction continues to remain keen on impeaching Yameen, it will have to work closely with other
opposition parties like the Maldives Democratic Party (MDP) and the Jumhooree Party (JP). However, in the near term, it
remains unlikely that such an alliance will function effectively, given the relatively high trust deficit between three
groups; a situation that primarily emanates from JP's history of shifting political alliances that includes working with
the opposition MDP against Gayoom during his presidential tenure, and later working against MDP during its tenure as
well.
President Yameen
refers to Gayoom as
‘party president’, urges
return to PPM fold
Gayoom’s office in Male
raided by police over
alleged missing party
documents
Yameen faction
reportedly seeks
amendment of Political
Parties’ Act to bar
candidates that fail to
secure party ticket from
contesting
independently
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On November 29, embattled President Park Geun-hye
made her third televised address to the nation offering to
“leave to parliament everything about my future including
shortening my term.” While her own Saenuri party has
floated a date of April 30, 2017, for her resignation,
opposition lawmakers have rejected these proposals in
favor of impeachment. This would require 28 Saenuri
lawmakers for it to pass with the required two-thirds
majority, which had already been covered by about 40
members stating willingness to support the motion.
However, new reports are coming out that Saenuri
defectors may choose to support the April 30 plan instead.
At the very least, this will likely delay the impeachment
vote, if not threaten its success entirely. Sources in
parliament had indicated that the motion could be voted
on by as early as December 2 or 9, but now the 2016
window might be missed entirely, working to President
Park’s advantage. Either way, the constitution dictates that
the Supreme Court will then have up six months to rule on
a final decision, extending the timeline into 2017 no matter
what the eventual outcome.
In the meantime, protests can be expected to continue as
the general public views Park’s newest statement as yet
another diversionary tactic. Additionally, stalling on the
impeachment process is likely to further antagonize the
public and stoke unrest. At this point, with protests getting
larger as time goes on, the end of the uprising depends on
more the impeachment process than anything else; should
the ball get rolling before the new year, it will likely alleviate
some of the public pressure.
The lead-up to the ratification of the General Security of
Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) on November 23
saw opposition members revisiting the issue of the brutal
Japanese occupation of the peninsula that ended more
than 70 years ago. The bill nonetheless passed despite
facing considerable protest from opposition parties and
student-led protests, likely due to the perceived serious
threat posed by North Korea’s ongoing nuclear program.
Given that the South Korean government remained
resilient in the face of similar resistance from citizens’
groups surrounding the controversial THAAD anti-ballistic
missile system deployments, it is unlikely that the deal can
be challenged despite its considerable opposition. That
said, during this period of unprecedented unrest in the
country, the unpopular agreement will likely encourage
even wider participation in subsequent anti-Park protests
like that seen on November 26.
First round of mass
anti-Park protests
Impeachment process
begins
Japan intelligence deal
ratified
Park offers to leave her
fate to parliament
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Legislation under review that would legalize same-sex
marriage in Taiwan has provoked an escalating series of
protests for and against the reform around Taipei’s
Legislative Yuan. While rallies on both sides have attracted
significant levels of support and attendees, the most
notable protest was one on November 17, when 10,000
demonstrators demanded the draft bills allowing same-sex
marriage be rejected. Still, despite the impressive show of
support, opinion polls continue to suggest that over 70
percent of the Taiwanese public supports same-sex
marriage; over 50,000 turned out for Taipei’s Gay Pride
Parade earlier in October. Additionally, given its campaign
promises and platform, the ruling Democratic Progressive
Party (DPP) under President Tsai Ing-wen seems poised to
discount the protesters against and approve the legislation
in early 2017, which would make Taiwan the first country in
the Asian continent to do so. Still, the fact that the issue is
now politicized, with elements of the more-conservative
Kuomintang (KMT) opposition calling for public
consultations or even a referendum on the issue, means
that demonstrations over it are likely to intensify in the run-
up to its eventual passage or defeat in the coming months.
After just six months in office since her May 2016
inauguration, current Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen is
battling plummeting public approval ratings and stepped-
up protests from the opposition and civil society groups. In
particular, on November 17, hundreds protested against
government plans to lift restrictions on food imports from
areas in Japan affected by radiation, and on November 23,
the opposition KMT blamed the failure of a domestic airline
on the DPP administration. While lowered approval ratings
are a common phenomenon in Taiwanese democracy,
Taipei has made a series of political mistakes that are
imperiling the stability of the regime. First of all, the DPP
has attempted to temper the anti-China wave it rode in on
in order to placate an increasingly angry Beijing, which has
economically punished Taiwan by lowering mainland
tourist numbers, among other methods. This half-way
policy still antagonizes Beijing while not living up to the
expectations of China-skeptics in Taiwan. Additionally,
government reversals on issues like pensions, holidays,
and labor contracts have provoked the KMT and civil
society groups to mobilize against the DPP’s perceived
failings. Unless President Tsai is able to score decisive
policy achievements on a few of the above issues, her
government’s fortunes will likely continue to sag. In the
interim, disaffection towards the government’s
administration and protests over the same are likely to
persist in the near term.
Protests occur in Taipei
against same-sex
marriage legislation,
food import policy
Opposition KMT
criticizes government
over economic record,
cross-strait relations
Demonstrators rally in
Taipei to support same-
sex marriage legislation
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MAX Security Solutions Ltd. Office: +44 20 3540 0434 www.max-security.com
Asia
Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation
December 25-27
Australia, Hong Kong
December 25
India, Bangladesh,
Myanmar, Singapore,
South Korea, Thailand
December 25-26
Sri Lanka, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Pakistan
December 11
Maldives
December 12
Malaysia, Bangladesh, Sri
Lanka, India, Indonesia,
Pakistan
Christmas is celebrated on
December 25 by Christians all
around the world, the festive
holiday commemorates the Nativity
of Jesus Christ.
Mawlid, or the birthday of the
Prophet Mohamed, is celebrated by
Muslims during the month of
Rabiulawal, the third month of the
Muslim calendar. Shias observe the
event on the 17th of the month,
while most Sunnis observe it on the
12th of the month.
Christmas is widely celebrated as a public holiday
across the region, particularly in former British
colonies and Christian countries. While public and
private offices are largely closed on December 25,
some countries have closures on the two weekdays
following as well as half-day working hours on
December 24. Consequently, we advise those
operating or residing in in Asia to allot for
disruptions to business continuity on the above
days. Additionally, there remains a security risk
from Islamist militancy, especially in Christian-
minority states such where the community has
been previously targeted, such as Pakistan,
Bangladesh, and Indonesia.
Given that the day is celebrated as a public holiday
in some countries in the region, public offices are
liable to be closed on the day. Additionally, private
business may operate with a minimal presence on
the day as well. Those operating in countries where
the day is observed are advised to allot for
disruptions to business continuity.
December 31
New Year’s eve marks the end of the
solar calendar.
New Year’s Eve is not a religious holiday and
therefore is not strictly observed as a nonworking
holiday across Asia, although many countries
nonetheless recognize it. Celebrations usually
include large public gatherings to count down until
the next new year begins. Those operating in
countries observing the holiday are advised to allot
for disruptions resulting therefrom.
Bangladesh – Back to portion
Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation
December 16 Victory Day is celebrated to mark the
victory of the Allied forces of
Bangladesh over the Pakistan
military in the 1971 War of
Liberation.
Given the nationalistic nature of the holiday,
government offices are liable to be closed or
operating with a minimal presence. Additionally,
military parades are known to take place, especially
at the National Parade Ground in Sher-e-Bangla
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Nagar in Dhaka. We advise to allot for disruptions to
travel in light of potential closures due to the
parades, as well as disruptions to business
continuity resulting from local closures.
Japan
Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation
December 23 The Emperor's Birthday will be
celebrated as a national holiday,
with special ceremonies taking place
at the Imperial Palace in Tokyo.
The Emperor’s Birthday is only one of two days in
Japan when the Imperial Palace is open to public
foot traffic, and as such many well-wishers flock to
Tokyo in order to participate in the ceremonies,
leading to severe congestion within in the city and
especially the city center. With this in mind, we
advise those in Tokyo to allot for significant
disruptions to business and travel during the
holiday.
Maldives – Back to portion
Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation
December 31 The Day Maldives Embraced Islam is
celebrated as a national holiday.
Public and private offices will close
for the occasion.
Private and public offices will close on December 31
leading to possible disruptions to business
continuity. Those operating or residing in the
Maldives should take necessary provisions for the
closures.
Myanmar – Back to portion
Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation
December 21
Kayin New Year Day falls on the first
day of Pyatho, the month that comes
at the end of rice harvest time in the
Kayin people’s lunar calendar. The
holiday celebrates traditions and
culture of the Kayin people, the third
largest ethnic group in the country,
through festive events and dances.
The holiday is especially celebrated in the Kayin
capital, Hpa An, with an abundance of celebratory
events, including dancing, rice eating, speeches,
student award ceremonies, and exhibits on Kayin
history. While Kayin New Year is an ethnic-specific
holiday, it is also a public holiday and is celebrated
all over Myanmar. Kayin Christians and Buddhists
both observe the day, and many tourists take part
in the celebrations as well. In this context, and given
the closure of embassies, banks, government
offices, and many private businesses, we advise to
allot for significant disruptions to businesses
continuity.
Philippines – Back to portion
Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation
December 24
Rizal Day will be celebrated as a
national holiday across the
Private and government offices will be closed and
traffic exiting Manila is likely to be highly congested
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Philippines commemorating
Philippine national hero Jose Rizal.
as people travel to the countryside to celebrate Rizal
Day and New Year’s Day the following day. Those
operating or residing in the Philippines should a lot
for disruptions.
Sri Lanka – Back to portion
Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation
December 13 Unduvap Full Moon Poya Day, the
festival celebrates the arrival of the
Bo tree sapling, believed to be
brought by Anuradhapura, Ashoka’s
daughter.
Shops and businesses are typically closed on the
Poya days, and additionally, the sale of alcohol and
meat is banned specifically on the festival day. We
advise to allot for disruptions to business continuity
on the above day in light of the slated closures.
Thailand
Date Short Summary Assessment and Recommendation
December 5
The late King’s Birthday will be
celebrated as a national holiday.
Given the king’s recent untimely death, observance
of his birthday this year is expected to have a
marked participation, along with extra events
planned by the central government. Mass
ceremonies are planned for the Grand Palace on
December 1, 2 and 5, and as such traffic in Bangkok
and the vicinity of Buddhist shrines nationwide is
likely to experience heavy congestion, meaning that
those in the vicinity of either should allot for
significant disruptions to both travel and business
continuity.
December 12 Constitution Day commemorates
the passing of the Constitution of
Thailand on December 10, 1932.
Although the date of the holiday doesn’t coincide
with the anniversary of the actual event, Thai law
mandates that non-working holidays that fall on a
weekend are to be celebrated on the next working
day, which in this case is December 12. As a public
holiday, local businesses and government offices
will be in observance and many city-dwellers will opt
to take advantage of the three-day weekend by
traveling back to their hometowns, leading to
significant traffic throughout the weekend.