Import and Implications of the British-innovated

R-crowned Techniques in World War II

By

Jiro Anzai

For some time now it has been a growing fad for the Japanese to deride Great

Britain and dispense with her as the hopeless country being plagued with an abom-

1inable sickness called the English Disease, arrogantly pointing out such elements as

her relatively low GNP ratio and Pound-value depreciations as if they have been

the sole indicator of the nation's true strength and worths. Although such the emo-

tive attitude towards Britain can often be hard not to feel, the writer of this article

believes that beyond these surface phenomena lie a number of British innovated

techniques or methods whose utilitiesand values are of such an enduring nature

that they are stillshining out like a modern-day tiara high above the world, in

such the forms as the Rolls-Royce Aero-engines, and such sophisticated things as

Operational Research (Operations Research being its adapted name in America),

Radars and Sonars, and Photographic Reconnaissance.

Among the above-mentioned techniques none of them have decreased in their val-

ues ; in fact, one British innovated techniques or Operational Research whose direct

roots could be traced to the anti U-boat or anti Luftwaffe efforts,although presently

more familiarized by the American nomenclature Operations Research, is now the

stock-and-trade item among modern business, engineering and communications world,

needless to emphasize its original use.

This becomes more markedly in the fieldof the anti-submarine warfare. No one

indeed thinks of it without the use of SONAR or sound navigation and range ; bui

when we come to think of its roots, again we see that this too happens to be j

very English product in its original form; initiallybeing innovated through the dil

igent endeavours of the ASDIC or British Anti-sub Detection Investigation Commit

tee. And if we stretch imagination, in the fashion of including arithmetic into th<

old Three R's, as 'Mthmetic, we may as well be permitted to name Sonar as sonai?

thus placing it as among the new categorization by the author of the New Three i?'s

or more than that, as the New Four or Five R's; indeed, we could name, Radars

Sonars, Rolls-Royces, Operational Research, and Photo Reconnaissance as such. A

any rate even the moderately versed with the modern world's communications am

controls would realize that without those R's crowned techniques we could scarcely

cope with the world. In fact, the author of this article believes even the so-callec

Reconnaissance Satellites,currently possessed only by such the major super-power

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Import and Implications of the Bntish-innovated R-crowned Techniques in World War II

as America and Russia, are inheriting the legacy of　the British innovated Photo.

Reconnaissance.

　The outsiders would have a curious impression at this inclusion of the Reconnais-

sance Satellite as the English legacy. The truth of it is, although it is　not　the di-

rect product of her, its basic idea or the constant observation of the ground far be-

lew by means of high-powered cameras day and night is the direct extension of the.

British crowned technique Fhoto Reconnaissance, again　a　littlebefore and　during

the ww 11, that had earned a great part of the　Allied　victories. To be sure, all

the major combatants of the War had possessed plenty of cameras ；in fact, in pho-

to-equipment wise, both German and Japan had had superb lenses. Nevertheless, no-

one except Britain had fathomed the finer calibrations of the photos taken by theﾕ

use of the stereoscopic analysers. The superioritv gained by this British method not

only surprised the proud French Reconnaissance outfit but impressed the Americans.

so much that they quickly seized it like a torch-bearer and carried it into the levels.

of the supersonic U-2, SR 71, and finallyof the Reconnaissance Satellites.

　For all this, since the crashing defeat there has been a view being entertained in

Japan that the Allies' Victory or victories to be exact had been brought about large-

ly by the direct application of the America's mass production and mass munitions ;.

nothing is far from the truth, however. In the so-called Battle of Britain, it hap-~

pened to be the Germans that had boasted of the mass superiority, and yet as im-

mortalized in the Churchillian epitaph for the airmen, “Never in the fieldof human

conflict was so much owed by so many to so few," it had been those few English

that had won over. But however great the few pilots' Herculian　effoi"tshad been,

had they not been aptly assisted by the intricate operations of the so-called Home:

Chain early warning radars, and crude but　effective operational research teams,

they could not have obtained such the magnificient results.

　Whenever the author of this article hears　our　so-called　opinion　leaders proudly

blurring out Japanese supremacy basing their grounds on the GNP and　Few-value

ascendancy, he could not help feeling a weird kind　of　creep　and apprehension as.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　2though he were seeing a revived ghost of the victory disease that had disastrously

seized the entire Japanese Navy during the euphoric period, or　the days after the，

fall of Singapore and just before the crashing defeat at the Midway.

　The die-hard Anglophiles would say that a mere visit to Oχbridge campuses, ob-

serving students' devotion to studies, or witnessing honest　services being rendered

by doctors and other hospital staffs,or the very presence of　the Rolls-Royce aero-

engines on nearli? every commercial airliner in the world, needless to say of theこ

Rolls-Royces in motorcars, are enough for any one to dispel such a shallow one-way

prediction. 刄hile these well-wishers would bring no harm, the author believes that

the present situation is such that we could not possibly ignore. Moreover, inversely

speaking from these repeated cropups of the hasty negativism, we should learn

something about the British legacies whose presence, although they have been here

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Tiro Anzai

all through, has been escaping our none too analytical minds.

In the firstplace, the author of this article should like to call the reader's atten-

tion to the curious course the developments of the vital radar systems had taken

on both sides. The fact has it that in the early phase of the so-called Battle of

Britain the British Air Defense has been using our Dr. Yagi's invention Yagi aerial

array as the vital part of their radar-directed searchlights, the very fact had been

entirely out of the Japanese knowledge. Inversely speaking, this fact alone betrays

the British power of discernment at its height. As we recall now, Dr. Yagi had

3come up with his powerful directional array device in 1926, but no one in Japan at

the time saw any use in it. Very disappointed Yagi went on a world tour, carrying

with him a set of his array. Now, some time between that year and 1939, a hand-

ful of the British sharp eyes at the Telecommunications Establishment must have

seen the thing's million worth. The another fact that this had been passed to Amer-

ica, and the Allies had been utilizing Yagi array to their best uses for years had

never dawned on us tillour seizure of Singapore or of the Philippines. And even af-

ter we had examined the captured radar-controlled guns and read the Yagi array

inscriptions on the apparatus, no one on the locale could establish the identity.

Certainly, stories of foresight versus hindsight, or regretting versus rewarding

pasts, are not our monopoly. In fact, at the outset of the Pacific War, even the great

Churchill had been more than purturbed at the news that the Royal Navy's two

prize ships Prince of Wales and Repulse had been sunk by the Japanese air attack.

Ever since the Battle of Britain, there have been plenty of peoples in the world

that would give credit to the Spitfires with their Rolls-Royce "Merlin" engines for

their bringing the crowning victory to the RAF against the German Luftwaffe.

While the author of this articleis not hesitant to join in the same appraisal, he

believes that the vital part being played by the Reconnaissance Spitfires that had

spearheaded in the fieldof Photo Reconnaissance could hardly be ignored. Coupled

with the dependability of the Rolls-Royce aero-engines, the success of the Photo-

graphic Reconnaissance can be referred to as the success of the Triple R's.

The impressive figures in the early phase of the European World War II, in that

the reconnaissance Spitfire unit had covered so much areas without a single mishap,

while both the British Bomber Command and French scout units had lost so many

aircraft, even in their covering far less areas, betray more than anything else, the

supremacy of the British foresight and ingenuity involved.

For all this, this sort of reasoning seems to have been falling on the dead, and

nearly everyday we see our economists or scholars of a sort busily denouncing Brit-

ain as a finished-offcountry, the country to be pitied with. And yet when these

people book an airplane ticket for overseas, they would expect a plane equipped

with the best and most dependable engines at present, which happen to be of the

Rolls-Royce or the genuine English product.

The point the author would like to consider is the success story of the British

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Import and Implications of the British-innovated R-crowned Techniques in World War 11

night fighter defense operations, as compared to the miserable failure one of the

Japanese Imperial Home Defense efforts.Needless to say,　both Great Britain and

Imperial Japan are of the earnest-to-goodness island nation. During the Battle of

Britain the German bombers and fighters would reach England within thirty minutes

or less, while in the Battle of Japan the enemy bombers or American bombers need-

ed several flying hours to reach any major target. For all this,　the Britishers had

won, and we had failed s)miserably. To be sure, there are many people that would

love to account the whole differences for the sheer weight or might of the Ameri-

can Forces.

　But as soon as we give a point by point analysis, we soon discover this is almost

j myth ；instead, the British R-techniques that had c･ome just in time more than

anything en masse,皿ved the way for the Allied Victory ；indeed. even in a small

point of the night fighting, such as how to eliminate the blinding gun flares, the

Britishers went on to the task with characteristic calm and succeeded in eliminat-

ing the machine-gun flares by the re-use of the exhaust ! What the British had done

is a masterpiece of the ingenuity ； they did nothing to the guns themselves, they

simply let the blinding flashes get sucked into the eχhaust fumes, utilizing the nega-

　　　　　　　　4tive pressures ! Such a simple device, we would say ； but the thought had never

occurred to us；instead, we took so much trouble in mounting　the dorsally firing

guns on our night 毎

　Compared to the dorsal guns, the British innovation cost anyone's air force far

less time and money.

　Just how little the daily combats between the RAF and the £iびtwaffe had been

taken in as the true lessons could be symbolically testifiedif one would be willing

to examine the following anecdote.

　When the Battle of Britain had been going on dead earnestly，the Imperial Japan

had been stillneutral, the status of which enabling the Japanese Government t)

keep its embassy door open in London ； among the embassy staff were the Imperial

Japanese Navy's naval attache and his aides. And one of those crack aides happen-

ed to be a veteran flyer and commander called Minoru Genda, who happened to

plan the Pearl Harbor strike two years later. His post-war memoirs　that come in

two volumes tellof his bystander observations of the Battle of Britain and of the

　　　　　　　　　　　　5British perseverances, and yet nowhere there is a sign that he had　sniffed at　the

existence of radars or the efficientoperations of　radar system　that　came to seal

the running records of his carrier task forces, due to the lack of the anti-air ship-

boriie radar on the carrier Akagi aboard which he ha)pened to　be　the　senior　air

staff officer,at Midway.

　Nothing is more symbolic than this episode in the comparative nature of discern-

ing power. Indeed, so long as our thinkings are kept for eχcusing away　the things

that followed. we are not only evading the issues to come, but nearly slee)ing to

be shocked.

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　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　TiroAnzai

　More often than not we hear the Kamikaze attacks were the finalresort, the last

we could put up, due to the shortage of munitions and materials, and to the short-

age of the skilled pilots.While this expresses certain truths about the late phase of

the Pacific War, this again betrays our lack of the discerning foresight. As early

･as at the World War I, the import of the sea route defense or the convoy defense

had been before us for 6面lesson／and inasmuch as the World War II had commenc-

毛d on the European Theatre at least two years ahead of the Pacific War, this again

betrays our lack of discerning foresight. We could have been well pre)ared for

anti-submarine operations. But the actual state had been so pitifully inadequate.

and once the Allies had corrected the faults in their torpedoes, the Japanese con-

voys felli面o the fate of the sitting duck, even the destroyers or the very ships

that were supposed to be hunting the subs became just another prey to be sunk.

For all this, today if one asks the average Japanese what Sonar or Asdic is, chances

are, almost ten out of ten, you would draw a blank.

　As such is the situation even now, the presence in the Royal Navy of the power-

ful anti U-boat gadget or the ASDIC had not only escaped　the Japanese episonage

system, but also the scanning power of the present-day commentators. The essen-

tially continental German would have escaped the censure for her failing in the na-

val matter, but the island national Japanese failing in the convoy defense is not

only ineχcusable an event, but symbolic of our mental make-up; ours is always on

the offensive, at the cost of the defense.

　To be sui"e,there are people who would account the failure of both Germany and

Japan for the historical circumstances, one of the typical views as such being the

following quote from Alfred Price's.

　　How was it that the Germans came to find themselves continually　'trotting

　　after' in the radar race? From 1936 till1942 Britain, always on the defensive，

　　had littlealternative but to concentrate her finest scientificbrains on the devel-

　　opment of radar…Until the winter of 1941　the German armed forces were

　　continually on the offensive； radar was of little use to them. and they made

　　few demands on their scientists…When, in the summer of 1943, the Germans

　　realized the plight they were in because of their backwardness in radar, it was

　　　　　　　6　　too late.

　This can be a fair statement, one of those modest behaviours so typical of the

English gentlmen. But had we shouldered everything pertaining to the defense on

■circumstances, we w岫Id have missed the actual play of often far more deciding

factor or the power and inner composition of the decision makers.

　Just how important this decision making had been even in the radar, is eloquently

･exposited in c. p. Snow's penetrating lecture series delivered　at　Harvard　in　1960,

which is now available in a book form entitled“Science and Government." The book

is in essence an inside story of the ･celebrated Churchillian Government, especially

103－

Import and Implications of the British･innovated R-crowned Techniques in World War II

of a duel between two patriotic scientists of eχtremely high calibre whose respective

personality had so much to do with the fate of what l have been calling the British.

R-crowned techniques.

　According to the reveals by Sir Snow, contrary to the well-circulated notion that

the famed Sir Churchill had had in his cabinet a person nick-named Prof whose

timely and apt advices had often saved Britain from the onslaughts of Hitler, care-

fully steering the old watchdog Churchill to his victory over the Hitlerian forces.it

was largely due to the leadership and foresight of the little-known man Sir Henry

Tizard (1885－1959)that had won so much for the Battle of Britain.

　The following quote, more than anything else, betrays the importance of this.

decision making in the British defense matters, and consequently the entire course

of the national destiny.

　　　Thisstory is about two men and two choices. The firstof the two men is Sir

　　　Henry Tizard …l believe, along with a number of Englishmen who are inter-

　　　estedin recent military-scientifichistory that Tizard's was the best scientific

　　　mind that in England has ever applied itself to war. l further believe, although

　　　ingeneral l take a pretty Tolstoyan view of the influence distinguished men

　　　upon events, that of all the people who had a share in England's surviving the

　　　airbattles of July to September 1940, Tizard made a contribution at least as.

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　7　　　greatas any. It has not yet been properly recognised.

　While this is no place where the statement made by Sir Snow debated, one point

that is very clear here is the importance of the person on the national scale, espe-

cially on the decision making. We could enumerate a series of circumstances condu-

cive to the certain historical outcome, but so long as the history's real subject is

human, the role played upon the history by man can hardly be dissolved into the

mere circumstances. At any rate, radar to asdic, every important gadget picked up

by a handful of the toplevel decision makers had in due course proven that they

had been right in their evaluations and assessments. Just why the equal efficiencies

and foresights had not been available in the British efforts against Japan, are inde-

ed a very challenging matter to be tackled in later issues.

　And so we have to limit our evaluations on the European Theatre at　this　time.

Nevertheless, even from the Snow's eχposition we could see the import of opera-

tions Research.

　Today, even our super-market trainees would hear the words operations Research.

proudly spoken to by the in-service lecturer or senior staffas though he had invent-

ed the thing. Moreover, without the OR, our post-war successes at the Super Eχ-･

press or passenger plane as Ys-11 and for that matter even the successful supermar-

ket operations would have been naught.

　While both Germans and Japanese might have been doing here and there some

sporadic attempts at calculations nearing OR, the　intricate　operations　research or

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Jiro Anzai

operational research teams had been non-eχistent outside the Allied camp.

　But here again, had the articlewriter voiced Operational Research in Japan, the

chances are ten out of ten he is liable to be asked if he had misspelled operations

Research ；inversely speaking, the thought that the now celebrated OR had been of

the British ingenuity, and had been called Operational Research　until　it　had beea

taken into America－seems never occurred to the average man in office. This inci-

dence in turn reflects how littlethe average office workers and trainees had read

about the past history of the so-called OR.　So　long　as　this total　lack　in　seeking

anything to its roots is limited to the average office workers' level, it　is not so

serious a matter, but when the essentially same sort of neglect and negation of the

past legacy are getting a prone tendency, this should be mended.

　Now once again turning back to the　roots　of the Photographic　Reconnaissance,

we find again the British supremacy in this sky-high activity. Using the high-flying

spitfires and later Mosquitoes, unarmed but carrying a number of cameras, the PR

outfitin the RAF or the Photographic Reconnaissance unit had been supplying mil-

lions of vital informations to the British High Command. As we 100k closer, we

find that the initialeffortshad been made by an Australian named John Cotton

with his Lockheed Electra plane, disguised as a private commercial plane, taking a

number of vital photographs over Germany even before the War, for the RAF. As

the war came. it fellsquarely upon the shoulders of the RAF　to carry on.　Here

again the Britishers had turned up a knuckle, surpassing　all the　other air forces'

efforts.That was the use of a　stereoscopic analyser ；　a device　itself　had been　a

Victorian toy once favoured by the Queen and her followers as one of the peaceful

pastimers ；it was Michael Spender, a brother of the famous poet Stephen Spender,

that had taken it as the RAF's secret weapon towards Victory. Doubling　the　pic-

tures and looking at these through the stereoscopic sights, one could obtain the far

sharper details for the analysis, thus began the amazing paths of the Photo Recon，

naissance that had gone on its way to the now earth-circling Reconnaissance Satel-

lites.

　Although a great deal of these miraculous works have been accounted in Constance

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　8Smith's Evidence in Camera, ox the Story of Photographic Intelligence in World War

II, the point l would like to stress here is the calm twist in the thing that had been

as innocent as a toy by the British hands. And it has turned to one of the most

effective secret weapons in the ww !I.　Not only that, today every major power

has been utilizing this British borne legacy, bringing it to　the　ever-deepning　com-

pieχitiesand sophistications.

　For all this, it may be only we the war-time generation that have been having

so much feeling for the British legacies. Yes, indeed, nearly forty years ago, the

skies over the south-eastern England had been constantly ablaze, with　their other-

wise azure dome of the heaven being incessantly pock-marked from the bursts of

the British anti-aircraft guns or interlaced with the　tracer-bullets　of　the　invading

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Import and Implications of the British-innovated R-crowned Techniques in World War II

Messerschmitts and Dorniers or those from the avenging guns of the defending

Spitfires and Hurricanes. Hardly a day had passed without one of those deathduell-

ing combatants drawing graceful vapour trails across the midair canvas of the En-

glish skies, or in the worst fate plum･etting down like a Satanic comet ･exuding

flashes and black trails!

　Now that the course of that War had long ceased to run its due　course, no one,

except few enthusiasts and sentimental veterans, seems to have been paying any

attentive eye on the import and implications of the Baf:tie 0f Britain and of the

British-innovated techniques （being hatched by a hair's breadth priority due to the

amazing foresight ）fthe few professionals on the British Establishment）that had

not only made Great Britain survive the Battle, but also changed the basic struc-

tures of the controlling mechanisms of all, these British initiated methods or by-

products of the war, could be so crowned as the R-capped techniques.

　The facts stand, both Germany and Japan, the defeated nations that had been

all preys to the combined tridents of the Allies' R-capped techniques or the Radar,

Sonar, Photo Reconnaissance, Operations　Research, and　Rolls-Royce　aero-engines,

are now more than at even keel with the US or the United Kingdomレon the peace-

time activities. It is true of us that both Germany and Japan are two of　the best

allies to the Anglo-American democracy. For all that, more than anything else, the

･author of this article would like to stress on the facts that the　present　day world

is more than anything else being manipulated by means of radars, sonars, opera-

tions resarch, photo reconnaissance, the very techniques　initiated　by the Britishers

in time of crisis, and on the point that:if there has indeed been さ lesson to be

learned it is this British capability　of turning the worst plights　to　their　utmost

goods. It is 臨町for us the well-dressed Germans or Japanese to look down on the

English men and women who are basking in the sun, calmly watching the water in

the Serpentine, whose clothings are none too gocd lo）king. But the sobering thought

pops up in my mind, ringing a warning bell, is it so all right with us, to denounce

the English and depart with her?　Is　it not another hasty judgement, as one our

forefathers had committed at the time 0f the Battle of Britain?

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　References

1. Kenichi Kayatna, Eikokレbyo-no-Kyokim or the Lessons that the English Disease teaches us，

　（Kyoto, PHP Press, 1978）

2.　Mitsuo Fnchida, Midway, （Tokyo, Shuppan-Kyodo, 1955）

3. H. Tokumaru, Invitation to Electronics,（Tokyo, Kcdansha, 1978）pp. 202－205

4.　E. Bishop, Mosquito, （London, Ballentine, 1971）p. 78

5, Minoru Genda, Memoirs, （Tokyo, Bungeishunjyu, 1955)

6. Alfred Price, Instruments of Darkness, （London, William Kimber, 1967）p. 243

7.　c. p. Snow, Science and Government, （Cambridge, Harvard Univ･，Press, 1976）p. 4

s.　Constance Smith, Evidence in Camera, （London, David and Charles, 1976）

－106－