How to Communicate Effectively about „the Other“

Strategies for civil society in the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia

September 2017, Prague, Czech Republic

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How to Communicate Effectively about „the Other“

Strategies for civil society in the Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia

September 2017, Prague, Czech Republic

The six Communication Papers available in this publication summarize analyses of public perception and media coverage of "the other", be it a Muslim, an Arab, a refugee or any other representative of other than the majority culture, in six European countries: Czech Republic, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hun-gary and Slovenia. The Papers draw conclusions and provide recommendations of how to communicate more effectively and tailor-make the message to address those segments in the society who are afraid or hateful of "the other", to engage them in a constructive dialogue and contribute to better quality public and media debate about pressing issues.

The Papers have been produced by the six national Anna Lindh Foundation networks throughout the summer 2017 as part of the Cross-Network Activity "Be Effective! Enhancing Intercultural Dialogue Media Skills in Central and Eastern Europe", funded by the Anna Lindh Foundation. They served as resource documents for a series of trainings bulding capacities of over 300 people in the area of video production, data journalism etc. In early September a final Learning and Sharing Meeting took place in Olomouc, Czech Republic, providing space for over 60 people to learn further, share and exchange experience.

More information about the project and other Anna Lindh Foundation national and international acti-vities, as well as the Communication Papers in 6 national languages and the final Best Practices Paper, can be found in the websites of the national partner networks, as well as on the website of the project--leading Institute of International Relations Prague, Head of the Czech Anna Lindh Foundation network: www.iir.cz.

This document has been produced with the financial assistance of the Anna Lindh Foundation and the European Union. The contents of this document are the sole responsibility of the Institute of Interna-tional Relations Prague and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the European Union or the Contracting Authority.

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The attitudes towards immigration in the Czech Republic

How (not) to talk about migrants and immigration

1. IntroductionMigration and refugee issues appeared in the Czech public and media space sort of „overnight“. Before 2015, nobody talked about it - nor the journalists, nor the politicians, nor the people in the pubs or on the trams. An analysis of media coverage of the refugee crisis realized by Masaryk University in 2015 shows that the amount of news dealing with the issue of migration in the evening TV news show increased ten times from April to September 2015 – it went from zero or one mention per day to an average of ten news about the issue daily. From a qualitative research by Anthropictures studio realized in the first half of 2017 also follows that media are still the main agenda setters in the Czech Republic – if something is discussed in the media, people believe that it is important and will start to talk about it themselves and search for other sources of information. Migration thus became a media and public sensation in the course of a few weeks – and no one, including politicians, journalists and experts – was prepared for it.

The situation calmed down significantly in 2015, mostly because of the EU-Turkey deal that caused a decrease in the number of incoming migrants on the Balkan route. But migration has not left the public space – quite the contrary, it looks like it will stay with us for a while. Immigration became one of the standard topics for political discussions. In the same way we talk about healthcare, education or foreign policy, we also talk about immigration nowadays. However, the knowledge about the issue is still far be-hind its popularity and unlike healthcare or education, only very few people in the Czech Republic have any practical experience with immigration or immigrants. The space for populistic manipulation and propaganda is thus – unfortunately – left open.

However, this open space could be also used for a moderate and practical discussion - precisely because migration became one of the mainstream, regular issues that people more or less care about (and it is thus mentioned by politicians and the media), but it is not sensational anymore, we have more oppor-tunities than ever before to shape the discussion and lead it from hysteria to practical questions. If we want to do that, we need to be aware of a few important points that follow from the above mentioned:

● The general knowledge about migration is still pretty low in the Czech public and media space. The distinction between basic terms such as „migrant“ and „refugee“ is not as common as we would expect and the media would still use the term „illegal refugee“ from time to time. Almost no one knows what relocation or resettlement means and when we discuss the quotas, many people probably do not know that we are talking about people who are already in Europe.

● Migration is a very abstract issue and due to this fact, it is a highly emotional issue – even though there are more than half million of foreigners living in the Czech Republic, most of them are not in any way „different“ (Slavic nations form the biggest groups among them). Our experience with diversity is very small, in some smaller cities and in the countryside sometimes even non-existent. To confront media representation with reality might be impossible for many Czechs.

● Neutral terms such as migrant, refugee, migration, islam…are thus emotionally charged, and these emotions cannot be ignored in the discussion.

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2. What data do we have available? Attitudes towards immigration

• If we were to make a generalization from all available research, we will come up with the ratio of 20/60/20 – accept/don’t know, it depends/reject immigrants.

● Roughly half of Czechs (depending on the time period and the concrete question) could thus fit into what British researchers call „the anxious middle“ and the Czech MEDIAN research agency „undecided with fears“.

● If the question is asked unconditionally (would you accept refugees?), only 23% of respondents would say „yes“ (MEDIAN 2016).

● If there is some kind of condition included in the question, the ratio changes – for example, 52% of respondents would accept people from war-torn countries, 44% would accept non-muslims and 58% would accept if the people were returned once the situation in their countries of origin improves.

● Other important factors are for example the ability/duty to work (62% would accept in case immediate placement on the job market is obligatory) or strict punishment in form of deportation if the refugee commits any crime (64%).-

The perception of immigration as a threat

● According to Eurobarometer data, Czechs are more afraid of immigration than the average of EU members – 63% of Czechs thinks that immigration is a threat for Europe, while the EU average is only 26%.

● This is however nothing new – as follows from the data gathered on a regular basis by the Centre for the Public Opinion Research (CVVM), even before the so called refugee crisis many Czechs would say that immigration is a threat in general, but would at the same time admit that it is not a problem in their hometown. This confirms the hypothesis, that we are more afraid of a very abstract image of immigration and this fear is based much more on media representation than on real life experiences.

● We do not have the data that would clearly explain where does this fear come from – we do know however that according to the data collected by MEDIAN, people tend to hugely overestimate the crime rate of immigrants (we think that 30% of crimes are commited by immigrants, while in reality it’s only 7%).

The perception of islam and refugees

● As mentioned above, the religious identity of immigrants plays a decisive role in our attitudes towards them.

● 67% of respondents think that Muslims are violent, 53% think that they are lazy, 38% think that they are stupid and 62% agree with the statement that they tend to break the law (CVVM 2016).

● Particular nationalities (for example Syrians) tend to blend with Muslims in general – we do not differentiate between individuals or even nations, the important feature is that they are Muslims.

● The representation of muslims is very similiar to the one of Roma. Roma people are according to us slightly more lazy, violent etc. than Muslims – but generaly only by a few percent).

Other important variables

● Trust in institutions – from the longitudinal research realized by STEM, we can see that the feeling of being threatened by immigration is accompanied by decreasing trust in public institutions and politicians and we feel threatened (among other reasons) also because we do not believe that they are able to effectively solve the situation. According to Eurobarometer, roughly 70% of Czechs mistrust parliament, governement and the EU.

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● Trust in media – according to STEM, CVM and Eurobarometer, the trust in media is on a steady decline for the past few years. It depends a lot on how do you define media (are social networks included for example?), but there is a general tendency to distrust.

● Attitudes towards the EU – cca 1/3 of Czechs have an „absolutely negative“ attitude towards the EU, 39% has a neutral attitude and only 29% positive. We appreciate the free movement of EU citizens the most, also the common security and energy policy – but we differ a lot from other member states when it comes to common migration and asylum policy - 40% of Czech people reject it, while the EU average is 25%. It is however interesting, that roughly 60% of respondents would rate themselves as „insufficiently informed“ about EU affairs.

Summary:

● People tend to condition the acceptance of refugees by conditions that are in reality already met (refugees need to work to support themselves, they can be punished for commiting a crime, more strictly than Czechs, etc…)

● The most decisive factor influencing attitudes towards immigration is religion – we should be talking about fear of Muslims instead of fear of immigrants

● The representation of Muslism in the popular discourse is strikingly similar to the representation of Roma

● Migration is perceived as an abstract threat – people feel that it is a problem however they admit that they have never had any problems personally and that it does not concern for example their hometown.

● More than half o respondents, regardless of age, gender or education, think that some cultures are better than others and some people (ethnicities) are born wilder and less moral than others (STEM 2016).

● The sense of being threatened corelates with distrust in media and institutions in general.

3. Main narratives and framingThe research reports published by Glopolis in 2016 analyses what narratives do Czech people tell each other about migration and to what context are they placing them. By narrative, the report means a de-scription of the chain of events framed by a context, that represents a subjective point of view of the speaker – i.e. it is not about what actually happens, but about what people think happens and how do they explain what according to them happens. The research has identified 4 main narratives which to a certain extent relfect the quantitative data summed up above. The core of the narratives lies in fear of difference, mistrust in institutions, the fear that we might lose our way of life and our wellbeing, the perception of islam as a barbaric and animalistic religion/ideology or – paradoxically – as an organized threat. Dehumanization of the immigrants is a key aspect that links all the narratives together.

1. „Hidden terrorists“

It is important to note that this narrative does not explain as „all refugees are terrorists“ – quite the op-posite, it distinguishes quite well among people who are war refugees and in need of our help and real terrorists. But its proponents fear that we are not able to distinguish who is who. The enemy is the Daesh, sometimes being blended together with islamic terrorism in general. The main emotion in this narrative is fear that our safety is in danger (both on personal and on a national level).

2. „Civilization threat“

This narrative is, similarly to the previous one, closely connected to islam – which is represented as a violent, uncivilized religion/ideology, incompatible with European culture. The main emotion is fear here too, but the source of this fear is a vision of Europe changed by islam. The recurrent sub-narratives depict Europe being conquered by muslims and altered to their liking, disrespectfully to our way of life.

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3. „Barbarians who are not able to adapt/integrate“

Even though this narrative might look very similar to the previous one, a very different fear lays at its core – while the civilization threat is depicted as an organized attack on European values, the barbarians are a threat precisely because they are not organized at all. They cause fear by being animalistic, uncontrolable and absolutely different from us, they are the ultimate „Others“. Their culture is also seen as absolute, non-changeable, it will be the same regardless on any externalities. An important part of this narrative is the status of women in islam. This narrative is also the most similar to the Roma narrative (see the status above).

4. „Ungrateful and calculating“

The main emotion of this narrative could be characterized as anger and outrage – the rejection of refu-gees is based on the fact they do not deserved to be helped. Meritocracy is a key principle here (and a significant one in the Czech society, also displayed into the attitudes towards Roma). „We can only help those who deserve to be helped „ – and Roma/muslims don’t deserve it, because they are inherently bad and they do not try hard for themselves. Migrants are mostly not real refugees in this narrative, the term „economic migrant“ would be used here in a negative sense. This narrative also depicts migrants as calculating and very well informed about our welfare systém. Meritocracy thus works as a legitimizing mechanism for rejecting help to refugees.

These four main narratives are further complemented by two others, which do not describe refugees as such, but rather the environment to which they come – they thus describe our situation and how we see our own society:

1. Useless institutions and elites out of touch with reality

As mentioned above, fear of migration is often accompanied by very low trust in institutions. This narra-tive depicts the environment that is supposing to be accepting migrants as useless, naive, out of touch with the lives of common people. Rejection of a supposed political correctness is an important part of the narrative, that leads to the inability to properly name things and solve them effectively. Resistance about multiculturalism, which is seen as a mistaken ideology serving again only elites, is also displayed here. Pragmatic and „hard“ solutions (closing borders) are being advocated as a part of the narrative.

2. Limited possibilities

„We do not have enough for ourselves“ would be a typical phrase used as part of this narrative. In its core lays the insecurity caused by real social and economical problems experienced by many people and also the sense of being forgotten by the powerful. The narrative is about poor people in the Czech Republic, to whom we are not able to help – and we cannot thus afford to help anyone else. Fear of the future is also important here – more pople might come and someday, we will just be out of resources.

4. Summary – main features of the current discussionAs follows from all the above mentioned data, migration tends to be a symbol in the Czech society, that contains a projection of many other issues – social, economic, cultural ones. Many of the phenomena that are being projected into the discussion are very complex and hard for people to articulate and de-fine – at the same time, it is also still true that everyone has an opinion about migration, yet almost no one has an experience.

So where to start, if we want to be part of the discussion? Let us keep the following in mind:

● Migration is a symbol that reflects fundamental fears of future – a basic human emotion, an existential one (we all fear the future in a way).

● The most pressing issue and the embodiment of all fears is islam – Czechs fear Muslims much more than they fear refugees.

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● At the same time, real Muslims are invisible in Czech society, so the perception of islam is burdened by misintepretations and various emotions – islam is animalisitic, uncontrollable, barbarian and disrespectful to our culture. And at the same time, it is fixed and does not change in time and it is an inherent part of the identity of any and every Muslism – if you are a Muslim, you cannot change in any way unless you give up your religion.

● The source of representations and information are the media – they define what people will talk about and how they talk about it. Journalists are the necessary ones in the discussion and no communication can ever omit them.

● A complementary phenomenon is the mistrust in institutions (and also general dislike of NGOs). It is connected to general dislike/mistrust to any kind of “elites”.

5. What arguments do we use and why they do not work? Campaigns, heated communication on social networks and attempst and communication strategies have been happening in the Czech Republic in the past few years, trying to reflect on the above mentioned narratives and challenge them

● Most communication strategies tend do be fact-based, which turns out to be ineffective in many cases. Emotions, not facts are shaping the discussion. Facts are available to anyone who is interested. The constant references to “facts” also imply that our communication partners do not know them and if they only knew, they would think in the same way we do, which is disrespectful and in the end, just sends the message that people are stupid. Facts are important and necessary, but they are just that – facts. People can look at the same facts and come to a different conclusions, because emotionally, they feel different.

● Another strategy that is often implemented is the showing of the suffering of the refugees and their role as victims, who will not survive with our help. Most people just do not buy this – they would counter with a)refugees only pretend to be refugees – if they were, we would help them or b) refugees are now the victims, but if we accept them, we might the victims in the end.

● The attempt at humanization by stressing out solidarity, the fact that even Czech people were refugees, sending out the message that they are people like us. It might work if refugees were the real problem, but Muslims are. And Muslims are just not people like us, as described above. So in order for this strategy to really work, we would have to get rid of all islamophobia.

● A secondary effect of many communication attempts around migration in Czech public space is a specific kind of moralizing and references to some abstract “higher values”. A very typical example would be a celebrity or a public figure talking about being ashamed by the Czech people not being more open. This is not only ineffective but contraproductive in the end – it ignores the real social and political problems that people experience, it only sends them the message that they are bad, immoral and they do not get anything. It is as elitist as it gets.

6. Recommendations – what might work? DOs & DON‘Ts1. Facts, stats, infograpics…only in a very limited amount

● Do not overuse them, do not bomb the discussion with tables, stats and pictures of the destruction in Aleppo – they are out there and anyone can use google. We can reference facts as in“ I guess you already know these statistics, that show that there are actually many women and children among the refugees, so how would you explain that there are only men being depicted in the media?“ – this is referencing to the facts, but not making them the core of the dicussion.

● Stop looking for the killer fact, that will change it all – that one stastistics, best infographics or example that will just show everyone that you were right from the beginning. It does not exist – because how people will actually react to your killer fact again depends mostly on emotions.

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2. Don’t explain, tell stories.

● See above – by explaining some facts all over we just send the message that people are dumb and they do not get what we get.

● People do not think in tables and numbers, but in narratives – so we need our own narrative.

● So if there is a prevailing narrative about muslims being criminals, we can come up with a narrative about them being really good cooks and their food being really tasty - as bizarre as it sounds, it is based on emotion and quite an important one – the feeling of safety and being at home, unlike statistics and numbers and other „facts“.

3. Don’t pretend that everything is great and don’t be positive at all costs.

● We have to learn to work with events and information, that do not really fit into our safe and cosy narratives – terrorist attacks, most notably, or ghettos, problems with integration…

● Do not deny that there are problems – by doing that, you are just reinforcing the narrative about elites out of touch with reality.

● To talk about the downsides is a great opener for a practical discussion – so, we have problems, so let us talk about solutions.

4. Be concrete and pragmatic.

● Avoid the big talks about the higher values.

● Talk about concrete things – for example, we have a State integration programme. No one knows about it, no one knows how it works. No one knows who are Czech Muslims, what they do in their everyday lives. Or what does a normal day in a refugee camp look like. Or how to cook the best kebab in the world.

5. Talk about the future.

● What would happen if we actually accepted refugees?

● People fear what would happen and we have not been able to offer them any scenario that might challenge the catastrophic one being offered by populist.

● What would change, on a very practical level? If people can picture that, then they have something to confront their abstract fears with.

6. Migration might be just symbol, but it is what we want to talk about

● We tend to avoid the emotionaly loaded words like refugees and migrants.

● We have to use them however – if we want to talk about migration, let us be honest, let us not pretend otherwise - people will know and they would again feel like we are making fools of them.

● Do not reinforce the narrative about political correctness and call things by their right names.

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7. References and sourcesMEDIAN: http://www.ceskatelevize.cz/ct24/sites/default/files/1644232-6515042_ct_migrace_prezentace_v08.pdfCVVM:https://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/cz/tiskove-zpravy/politicke/politicke-ostatni/4267-duvera-k-vybranym-institucim-verejneho-zivota-brezen-2017 https://cvvm.soc.cas.cz/cz/tiskove-zpravy/ostatni/vztahy-a-zivotni-postoje/2034-nazory-verejnosti-na-usazovani-cizincu-v-cr-brezen-2016 STEM:https://www.stem.cz/tag/uprchlici/https://www.stem.cz/?s=instituceEurobarometr:http://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/index#p=1&instruments=STANDARD (standard Eurobarometer reports )research by Glopolis: Proč uprchlíci jitří naše emoce? (2017):https://glopolis.org/wp-content/uploads/Proc-uprchlici-jitri-nase-emoce_migracni-narativy-CR.pdf

Marie Heřmanová, July 2017, Prague

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Communication Needs Assesment: the Case of Lithuania

Global contextRecent figures from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2016) indicate that wars, con-flicts and persecutions force an increasing number of people to seek refuge in other countries. By mid-2016 forced displacement affected more than 65 million people, as compared to 59.5 million in 2014. It is claimed that it was the first time in the history of humankind, when forced displacement exceeded the 60 million threshold. The extent of forced displacement is growing globally due to conflicts and persecution: today, 1 out of 113 people in the world are asylum seekers, internally displaced persons or refugees. Out of all the forcibly displaced people (who are not considered refugees by default), 21 million are refugees. What is most worrying is the fact that in 2015 more than half (51%) of all involuntarily displaced persons were children, who often travel alone without parents. Alarming is also the fact that every day about 34 thousand people are forced to leave their homes due to conflicts, and who need not only asylum, but also an adequate integration policy (DDG 2016).

However, it should be noted that being exposed to recent media coverage on the refugee crisis can give the impression that they represent the largest share of migrant populations in the world. In fact, refugees constitute a very small but stable part of the total global migrant population - 0.3 of the world’s popula-tion. According to official figures provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, there are currently some 16.1 million refugees. This figure would increase to 21 million if we were to include Palestinian refugees who do not qualify for the status according to United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. Extreme overestimation of the current refugee flows can lead to even greater opposition from the societies hosting refugees which may become even more reluctant to support refugee reloca-tion processes and their integration (Hein de Haas, 2016).

Lithuanian contextAttempting to solve the situation, The European Commission took a decisive step towards addressing the refugee crisis in EU Member States and neighbouring countries in 2015. For the first time in history of European migration policy, the Commission proposed transferring 160 000 people in need of interna-tional protection from the Member States of the European Union under most pressure to other Member States, in such way demonstrating solidarity among EU Member States. In 2016-2017 Lithuania commit-ted to accept 1105 asylum seekers staying in temporary refugee camps in Italy, Greece and Turkey.

However, it should be emphasised that officially Lithuania became a host country for asylum seekers in 1997, ratifying the Geneva Convention (1997, No. 12-227), the Protocol on the Status of Refugees (1997, No. 12-227) and after the law “On the Status of Refugees” entered into force in Lithuania in July 1997 (cur-rently the law “On the Legal Status of Aliens” (2004, No. IX-2206), adopted in 2004, is in force). By ratifying the Geneva Convention, Lithuania committed itself to protect asylum seekers in its territory and to create conditions conducive to integration.

Immigration, asylum, and attitudes of societyThe way the hosting societies perceive migration processes is an important indicator of both societal tolerance, and the environment being developed for the purpose of integration of immigrants and refu-gees. In spite of the existing legislation and the legal framework governing integration, effective integra-tion into the main sectors of society is difficult without public acceptance and tolerance.

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Questions relating to immigration and asylum in Lithuania are pertinent both due to the novelty of this phenomenon, and the often unilateral and negative social attitudes towards immigrants and refugees living in Lithuania. Negative social phenomena develop on the side of the host society, as it is not always prepared to adapt to diversity, which further complicates immigration and refugee integration processes.

Societal attitudes regarding immigrants and refugees in Lithuania The debate on the implementation of the refugee admission program in Lithuania in 2015 did not dispel people’s fears and doubts with regards to the possibility of successful implementation. The Lithuanian population is still relatively unaware both of the people in Lithuania who have refugee or subsidiary pro-tection status, as well as those who are currently applying for refugee status in the European Union from Syria, Iraq and Eritrea (see annexes).

Although the number of refugees living in Lithuania is small (and non-increasing), 74% of the Lithuanian population believes the number of refugees to be increasing every year. Another 70% of the population believes the number of refugees to already be sufficient in Lithuania, and would not allow admittance of additional refugees. More than half (55%) of the population is convinced that Lithuania should refuse to participate in the refugee transfer program (see annexes).

The survey data show that Lithuania remains a culturally closed society. Regardless of the status of newly arrived foreigners (immigrants or refugees), Lithuanian residents are inclined to regard them as possible threats to social security. According to a poll conducted in 2015, 82% of the population believed that ref-ugees could cause social unrest in Lithuania, 86% - that it can increase the level of crime in the country (see annexes).

Lithuanians have a rather negative perception of their own society and state as well. An absolute majority (80%) of respondents believe that incoming refugees will face negative social attitudes in the country, 87% think they will have difficulty finding a job, 78% - that refugees will have difficulty renting housing. More than half (56%) of respondents believe that refugees arriving in Lithuania will experience violence, will face difficulties in health care (62%) or child education (73%). A large proportion of the population of Lithuania (74%) believes that refugees are not going to live here and are seeking to use Lithuania as a transit country (see annexes).

Over a third of respondents of the survey (35%) agreed with the statement that “refugees are a vulner-able group and therefore Lithuania is obliged to help them,” another fifth (20 percent) could not answer or did not respond to this question (see annexes). The attitudes of the Lithuanian people regarding the incoming refugees remain conservative.

Conclusions and recommendations Studies on public opinion, conducted by the Ethnic Research Institute of the Lithuanian Centre for Social Research, reveal the image of immigrants and refugees in Lithuanian society to be more negative than positive. There is a lack of information provided to the general public, unwarranted opinions about immi-grants and refugees living in Lithuania are abundant, and negative attitudes are well-established.

Muslims, refugees, Chechens, and Syrians are among those groups of immigrants who experience the greatest social distancing. Most displaced refugees residing in Lithuania are Syrians (mostly Muslims), which is why it is likely that the majority of foreigners granted asylum to Lithuania may face hostility.

In the Lithuanian collective consciousness refugees are associated with such categories as Muslims, Syr-ians and Chechens. The attitudes towards refugees are almost always in line with the ones regarding Muslims. A stronger societal reaction is provoked by the notions of Muslims and refugees, whereas Syri-ans and Chechens, as a rule, are regarded more lightly (by several percentage points). The study revealed that the Lithuanian society would not want Lithuanian citizenship to be accessible to these groups more than to other groups that are disliked for different reasons. All this shows that one of the main barriers to the integration of refugees is related to cultural perceptions. In other words, separation and distancing of refugees are related to the general lack of societal openness to groups considered distant or alien.

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In the light of this, it may be advisable to emphasise the cultural diversity of refugees living in Lithua-nia, including information about confessed religions (not just Islam). Notwithstanding that most of the displaced refugees in Lithuania are Syrian, disclosing the cultural and social diversity of this group of refugees could prove to be helpful. In addition to cultural diversity, it would also be recommended to seek to overcome the stereotype of refugees as job immigrants by constantly informing the public of the processes taking place in their home countries.

The attitudes of Lithuanian society with regards to refugees reflect the prevailing attitudes towards im-migration in general: refugees are associated with problems that society links with a general immigration influx – a possible increase in the level of crime or social unrest. Therefore, it is desirable to distinguish refugees as having special needs, and differing from economic immigrants. It should be noted that the number of refugees residing in Lithuania is low compared to working migrants or immigration in general.

The hostility towards and awareness of refugees and Muslims within the society are not evenly spread across all groups, and are related to socio-demographic factors. Older respondents are more hostile than younger ones. Less educated respondents also tend to be more distrusting of the groups studied. The opinions of closed rural populations contrast with those of the more open-minded metropolitan populations. The same differences prevail in terms of awareness and how often the respondents en-countered refugees themselves.

In view of the data, it would be advisable to apply social advertising or refugee image-forming tools which take into account the above-mentioned regularities, identify target groups and would appeal to different sections of society.

The lack of objective information is likely to have a bearing on the fact that society holds misconceptions about refugees and does not feel social responsibility with regards to the issue. Means of mass com-munication contribute to this when presenting one-sided negative aspects of the asylum and migration processes.

However, the fact that the public understands and recognizes the problems of refugees, as well as its lack of a personal contact with them, while the majority of respondents acknowledge that they are not well informed, suggests that the public could absorb more information about refugees and change its attitudes towards them.

Several key image-forming agents can be noted: firstly, media and social media, secondly, institutions and non-governmental organizations engaged in social integration of foreigners granted asylum in Lith-uania. Refugees themselves (or refugee communities) do not yet have enough resources to shape their image independently.

When developing large-scale publicity campaigns, it is necessary to take into account various social atti-tudes, to evaluate all of the different reactions that may arise as a response to increased information on refugees, to focus on those alternative and innovative public campaign tools that deal with responding to adverse reactions.

In order to ensure that the image of the refugees is not exclusively dependent on the media and that the inclusion of refugees in publicity activities is reinforced by their own social skills and contacts, publicity measures based on the principle of direct communication should be used. For example, it should be sought to include refugees in local community events, public events and information campaign.

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Annexes

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The conclusions and recommendations were prepared in accordance with the representative research on so-cial attitudes conducted by the Institute of Ethnic Studies at the Lithuanian Social Research Centre. See more details: http://www.ces.lt/veikla-2/ziniasklaidos-stebesena/visuomenes-nuomones-apklausos/

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Dr. Karolis ŽibasLithuanian Social Research Centre

www.ces.ltkarolis@ces.lt

Diversity Development Groupwww.diversitygroup.ltinfo@diversitygroup.lt

+370 615 14401mailto:karolis@ces.lt

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Results of A Survey On Attitudes Towards Refugees

“If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences.” The Thomas Theorem

Since May 2015, the Public Opinion Research Center (Centrum Badania Opinii Społecznej –CBOS) has been performing regular surveys in which Poles were asked about their attitude towards accepting refu-gees by Poland. Both the general attitude towards refugees as well as the specific groups of refugees, i.e. people coming from Ukraine, Middle East and Africa, were examined. This is an important differentiation, as the polls clearly show varying attitudes towards these groups. Additionally, Polish people began asso-ciating the words “refugee”, “immigrant” and “asylum-seeker” primarily with the war in Syria.1

Since 2015, Polish people’s attitude towards refugees have changed dramatically. The first survey from 2015 showed that as many as 72% of Polish citizens declared support for accepting refugees from coun-tries affected by armed conflicts, and 21% were against (the remaining 7% had no opinion regarding the issue). A year later, in February 2016, only 39% of respondents agreed to help. Among them, only 4% were in favour of accepting refugees and letting them settle in Poland; 35% were in favour of temporary assistance (after a period of time, the refugees would go back to their country of origin). As many as 57% of respondents believed that Poland should not accept refugees at all.2

Younger people were against any form of assistance more often than older people (over 44 years of age). Representatives of the youngest examined age group, i.e. the group of people aged 18-24, represented the most radical stances. Similarly, people with a lower level of education, i.e. primary, lower secondary or vocational, were more often against accepting refugees than people with secondary or higher educa-tion. Finally, 58% of people identifying with right-wing political options, 52% with centrist and 43% with left-wing options supported closing the borders for refugees.3

In Poland, 34% of respondents believed that two thousand refugees, which the Polish government was initially ready to accept, was adequate for Poland’s potential, and to 36% of respondents, this number constituted an excessive burden.4 The later proposal of accepting an additional nine thousand refugees met with greater resistance, and 59% of respondents believed that it was too high.5

In Poland, people have strong convictions about refugees, which are charged with emotions and omni-present in the political discourse. According to Mikołaj Wiśniewski, Ph.D., from the Center for Research on Prejudice: “In studies about prejudice against Jews, the term phantasm is used. (...) this is not even a stereotype, as stereotypes are somehow embedded in culture; it is more a freshly created and fuelled notion. (...) Therefore, in the case of anti-refugee panic, we are not talking about facts, but about no-tions shaped by the strongest collective emotion: fear. When we hear for the hundredth time: “A Muslim equals a terrorist”, it is enough to say “refugee” to refer to the specific content that triggers fear, disgust and aggression.”6

1 Polacy o uchodźcach – w internecie i w „realu”. Komunikat z badań. CBOS, November 2015.2 Stosunek Polaków do przyjmowania uchodźców. Komunikat z badań, CBOS, February 2016. 3 http://uchodzcy.info/infos/stosunek-polakow-do-uchodzcow/ (accessed: 26.07.2017).4 Polacy o uchodźcach…, op. cit.5 Ibidem.6 http://wiadomosci.onet.pl/tylko-w-onecie/dr-mikolaj-winiewski-48-procent-polakow-w-jakims-stopniu-odmawia-uchodzcom/

h42mg4v (accessed: 26.07.2017).

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According to the survey performed in October 2016 by IPSOS upon the commission of OKO.press,7 Polish people do not believe in the refugees’ motivation. The question: “Why, in your opinion, do the majority of refugees come to Europe?” was answered by the respondents:8

● they want to improve the standard of their life – 56%;

● they run away from war or persecution – 51%;

● they want to make Europe Muslim – 31%;

● They have ties with terrorism – 23%.

Refugees are considered actual refugees only by 41% of people with primary and lower secondary educa-tion, by approx. half of people with vocational and secondary education (51% in each case) and by 58% of people with higher education. The other way round, 15% of people with higher education, 22% of people with secondary education, as many as 30% of people with vocational education and 25% of people with primary and lower secondary education consider refugees terrorists. 40% of the electorate of the Law and Justice Party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość – PiS) believes in the conspiracy theory of “making Europe Islamic”, and 27% associate refugees with terrorists. Among the electorate of the Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska – PO) and Modern (Nowoczesna), these fears are weaker (17% and 14%, respectively). As is clear, even among followers of political parties other than right-wing parties, the level of mistrust towards refugees is high.

According to the surveys conducted by the Center for Research on Prejudice at University of Warsaw,9 the respondents mainly favoured solutions consisting in physical and mental violence against refugees coming to Poland and Europe. Even after accepting refugees in Poland, they would more willingly see them in centres isolated from Polish society. The surveys of the Center for Research on Prejudice have shown that the majority of respondents agreed with solutions in a certain manner referring to violence, including deportation (59% of young Poles and 63% of adults were in favour of this10), closing the bor-ders (55% and 60%, respectively), placing refugees in temporary camps (62% and 73%) and monitoring refugee communities (67% and 76%). As can been seen from a survey performed on a sample of adult Poles (18+), 46% agreed to isolating refugees in special centres, and 67% objected to refugees settling in Poland permanently. Far fewer respondents accepted assigning additional centres to help refugees (12% and 17%) and support for integration (16% and 21%). In the analysis of the results above, attention was drawn to two main factors supporting the postulates of an anti-refugee policy. The first and obvious one was prejudice. The second factor – less obvious – was how people perceived the mechanisms governing politics and the degree in which they identified with the so-called conspiracy mentality. People who felt more lost in politics, who had the impression that they had no impact on politics and did not understand the principles of its functioning, as well as people with a greater tendency to explain political and social events as effects of conspiring forces, were in a much greater degree in favour of violence against refu-gees and opposed activities supporting refugees. Pro-refugee activities were primarily supported by peo-ple who did not share anti-immigrant stances and were characterised by a high acceptance of Muslims and a low level of conspiracy mentality and political helplessness.

Stances Towards Ukrainians Coming To PolandIn the first surveys of the CBOS from 2015, acceptance of refugees from Ukraine was supported by 50% of people, whereas only 38% were against. Support for refugees in this context quickly grew up to 61% and has remained at a similar level since that time. The minority of voices against accepting refugees from behind the Eastern border were related to the conviction that economic migrants arrive from there and are looking for chances for a better life in Poland, and they are not refugees fleeing from armed con-

7 https://oko.press/mezczyzni-wierza-uchodzcom/ (accessed: 26.07.2017).8 The respondents had five answers to choose from; they could mark one or two - therefore, the results do not add up to 100%; on

average, the respondents chose 1.6 answers. 9 Aleksandra Świderska, Mikołaj Winiewski, Karolina Hansen, Przemoc jako rozwiązanie? Napływ uchodźców w opinii Polaków, Cen-

trum Badań nad Uprzedzeniami UW, Warszawa 2016.10 The quoted report of the Centrum Badań nad Uprzedzeniami (Center for Research on Prejudice) is based on two surveys per-

formed on: (1) a sample of young respondents, i.e. people aged 18-31, (2) a group of adults aged 18 and older.

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flicts. In the quoted cyclical surveys of CBOS, support for accepting Ukrainian refugees is growing, along with education and income in households. People below 35 years of age, in a majority, also approve of this type of assistance for refugees from Ukraine, yet they make such declarations less frequently than older respondents. It is interesting to note that the political views of the respondents slightly differentiate the opinions in this respect.

Attitude Towards IslamAccording to studies of the Chatham House Europe Programme, Polish people estimate that the popula-tion of Muslims in Poland is approx. 7%, i.e. around 2 million citizens.11 On the other hand, Aleksandra Świderska12 claims that according to various sources, the estimates of the number of Muslims in Poland range from 5,000 to 30,000. The international IPSOS studies show that according to the examined re-spondents from Poland, the Muslim population in Poland will grow to 13% in 2020, i.e. up to approx. 5 million.13 This tendency for overestimating the current or future number of Muslims is primarily related to the fear that is connected to Islam in the awareness of Poles. A survey study of the Center for Research on Prejudice has shown that among the examined Internet users, 49% declared that they felt threatened by Muslim terrorism; over 50% claimed that Muslims threaten Poland’s economic security. Approx. 55% claimed that Islam is a threat to Polish values. Almost 66% declared that they are afraid of contacts with Muslims14. In a survey performed in October 2015 by the Instytut Badań Rynkowych i Społęcznych [In-stitute of Market and Social Studies], the question: “Is Poland threatened with Islamisation related to the influx of migrants from the Middle East?” was answered positively by almost 45% of Poles. Among young people, almost 80% of respondents shared this belief.

In spite of very significant hostility towards this group, it was ascertained in the survey15 that a definite majority of respondents do not personally know any Muslims (answers from adults: 87.7%, from youth: 92.1%). When asked whether any of their relatives know any Muslims, both groups were also predom-inantly negative (over 80% of answers). In further questions of the quoted survey of the Center for Re-search on Prejudice, a classic Bogardus scale was applied to measure social distance. Questions were asked about acceptance of Muslims as co-workers, neighbours and a person entering the respondent’s family via marriage. This part of the survey has shown that social distance in these areas may be deter-mined as average, e.g. objections against a Muslim as a co-worker was manifested by almost 22% of adult respondents, and marriage in the family met with a lack of acceptance by over 52% of respondents. No significant differences were visible between the survey groups of young people and adults.16

On the other hand, the studies of the International Organisation for Migration17 show that people over 60 years of age and people who never had contact with foreigners are most afraid of an increase in mi-gration. These studies also show that Arab people, who are, in Poland, most frequently associated with Muslims, are a group located the furthest in the scale of social distance and perceived as least trustwor-thy. Three-fourths of respondents would not accept an Arab person as a family member.

As many as 71% of people do not want “further migration” from Muslim countries, according to inter-national studies performed at the end of 2016/ beginning of 2017 by the Chatham House Europe Pro-gramme together with Kantar Public. This is the highest result among the examined EU countries.18 Over 50% of indications of this type were also recorded in the following countries: Austria, France, Hungary, Belgium, Greece and Germany.

11 http://www.islamophobiaeurope.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/POLAND.pdf (accessed: 26.07.2017). 12 Aleksandra Świderska, Postawy wobec mniejszości muzułmańskiej w Polsce: Raport z badań sondażowych dotyczących mowy

nienawiści, Centrum Badań nad Uprzedzeniami, Warszawa 2015.13 http://www.islamophobiaeurope.com/..., op. cit., p. 16.14 Anna Stefaniak, Postrzeganie muzułmanów w Polsce. Raport z badania sondażowego, Centrum Badania nad Uprzedzeniami,

Warszawa, September 2015. 15 Aleksandra Świderska, op. cit. 16 Ibidem.17 Badanie na temat postaw wobec cudzoziemców w Polsce, International Organisation of Migration, Warszawa 2016.18 https://oko.press/polacy-szczytach-islamofobii-ue-boja-sie-nienawidza-choc-kogo/ (accessed: 26.07.2017).

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How to make the media message about refugees in Poland more effective?In the perspective of study results on the perception of refugees in Poland, the key thesis pertain-ing to the media message is an assumption that such a message has to primarily refer to emotions; thence, its basis should not be (exclusively) facts. It is apparent from marketing studies that evoking specific emotions in recipients is the strongest “sale” tool – it offers the highest recipient reaction indices, compliant with the premises of a given campaign. The evoked emotions make the recipient perform the activity suggested to them, or change their attitude to a given item or person. Consequently, it seems justi-fied to believe that the strongest message, verified in business, will also perform well in a social campaign, especially due to the fact that the studies clearly show that the problem with foreigners in Poland is a prob-lem referring to emotions, not facts. There are very few refugees, especially Muslim, in Poland, whereas a significant number of Poles are under the impression that there are many of them and that they pose an actual threat.

Tomasz Besta and Natasza Kosakowska-Berezecka, authors of a book published in 2017 entitled Między grupami. Przewodnik po relacjach z ludźmi, którzy się od nas różnią, draw attention to the fact that the feeling of threat caused by “foreigners” may be divided into actual and symbolic. Actual threat refers to realistic fears that the resources of a given country (limited - such as work places, money, etc.) will be as-signed to new residents, thence there will be less resources for the original residents. Symbolic fear is the fear that values cherished by a given group will cease to be exclusive and, most importantly, that compet-itive world views will emerge and that the social world will become ambiguous, and ambiguity of stand-ards is, for some people, very difficult to accept and causes panic. If we were dealing exclusively with an actual threat, referring to facts or proposing specific solutions preventing unfair division of resources, it would significantly reduce hostility towards immigrants. Meanwhile, in Poland, the media message based on facts that has been presented for a number of years, especially on the part of non-governmental institutions and international organisations and earlier also the government, does not penetrate into the awareness of the majority of Poles at all. None of the hard facts indicating that there are very few refugees in Poland or that we accepted 80,000 refugees from Chechnya earlier (which did not affect the economic situation of Polish people), that refugees do not want to stay in Poland and that the majority of them leave Poland as soon as possible, have changed the mass awareness. Simultaneously, the fear of Muslim immigrants is continually growing. Therefore, it seems justified to claim that the basis of the feel-ing of threat is a symbolic threat, referring to the world of values and standards. Poles are characterised by a deep and basic insecurity as to what “their” world will look like after it has been occupied by Muslims. This insecurity shatters their feeling of safety. Therefore, the media message should be an answer to this insecurity (often unsaid), embedded in the strongest emotions.

Today, the most efficient marketing forms are videos, storytelling and influencing. Translating this to sim-ple and practical language: the best results in Poland are currently offered by campaigns which tell engag-ing stories in the form of short videos broadcast on national television stations and on the Internet (You-Tube, Facebook). The second option are campaigns based on influencers, i.e. people who exert influence and are opinion leaders – within the broadest meaning of the word. Today, mass opinion leaders are most frequently media figures, widely recognised thanks to their presence on TV, building numerous groups of their fans on social media. Obviously, different age groups have different influencers – it is easy to identify them via Internet reports presented by several companies monitoring the Internet media. Influencers offer strong support for any campaign. The best solution is to combine their participation with a good spot, tell-ing a story and a message in social media – this gives an opportunity for high campaign efficiency indices.

When analysing the study results pertaining to Poles’ attitudes towards refugees, we can also set forth another thesis with respect to an effective media message: it has to have multiple stages, it has to use varied sources of communication, and it has to engage all age groups. Fear of refugees is continually growing, and it is additionally fuelled by the current state authorities – the level of hostility with respect to accepting refugees is therefore sky-rocketing. Such an attitude cannot be changed quickly or easily; thence the need for developing a multi-channel message strategy. Obviously – referring to the first assumption – journalists may and should be reached by being presented with facts. Nevertheless, rectifying the facto-graphic message about refugees in Poland via news media has minimal chances for reaching wider social groups today. First of all: there is a significant group of media that fuel the fear of refugees and do not want to communicate positive facts without manipulating them. These are mainly right-wing and even public media. Secondly: as shown in studies (e.g. Edelman Trust Barometer 2017), fewer and fewer Poles trust traditional media (42%, a drop by 12% in the course of 5 years), and more and more trust Internet media and own media (blogs and corporate websites) - 50% and 46%, respec-

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tively. Building a message exclusively on the basis of provision of information to journalists is not going to be effective in reaching the broadest possible group of recipients and, what is more, in changing their attitude - not only on account of the previously presented symbolic threat, but also on account of the dropping level of impact by journalists. Thence the necessity of building people’s own message and an emotional media campaign based on the largest Internet portals, social media and television (the highest impact among traditional media). There may also be the so-called ambient campaigns and influencers involved. The cooperation with them should also be based on their promotion of a specific message through their own channels of social media.

As far as the heroes of the message are concerned, study results provide certain clues. Based on who arouses the greatest hostility, we are able to determine who should be shown at the first stage of the campaign in order to make it successful. Women and children (as opposed to men) definitely evoke more positive associations, as well as Catholic refugees (not Muslims), Ukrainians (and not, e.g., Syrians). Therefore, it seems that building the message may begin in form of a video provided in a very attractive way, compliant with the current trends (short, dynamic, specific manner of shooting and editing the film), with the plot presenting authentic stories of refugees - women and children, at the initial stage more probably Catholic or Catholic and Muslim (the idea is to evoke community associations and counteract stereotypes: refugee = Islam = terrorism = threat). Religious emblems should not be avoided – Poles fear Islam as a religion the most. Showing that not all refugees are Muslim is an important element in the early stage.

At a further stage of the campaign, it is possible to modify this basic formula – introduce men, resign from showing religious symbols. It seems that showing so-called success stories may be beneficial – sto-ries of refugees who successfully found their place to live in Poland. However, the film has to show their effort and dramatic obstacles that they had to overcome on the road to success (i.e. they coped with extremely difficult situations and prejudice i.e. “they came to Poland and took away our work”). Another interesting option is to show a film where refugees interact with Polish people and help them (influencing Poles’ national pride, showing that they are strong enough to help those weaker).

Other forms of building the message include:

● a cyclical talk-show on TV which would show real stories of refugees (but not only them - the refugees should be the heroes of the programme together with other “ordinary people” in order to avoid making the programme a ghetto for refugees);

● an entertainment television programme (a tournament, quiz, show, etc.), where foreigners, including refugees, face tasks referring to Poland (they become assimilated on television);

● participation of refugees living in Poland in television music and dance shows is recommended; ● a feature film, with a truly Hollywood plot, recounting the moving and true story of a specific refugee.

The third or the fourth stage of changing the attitude towards refugees is, obviously, direct contact. Here it is necessary to analyse Poles’ attitudes on an ongoing basis. Direct contact tools may become useful: live libraries, joint youth camps, joint educational projects implemented by age groups up to 23 years of age (the moment of completion of studies, but starting from kindergarten). However, reaching this stage requires a decrease in the present-day negative emotions and fear of refugees - as of today, projects of this type might be risky for refugees participating in them.

An interesting idea is also the “adoption” of a refugee family by Polish influencers. Based on the model of distant adoption, influencers participating in the programme would take one family under their “emo-tional” care for a specific period of time (e.g. a year). During this time, they would support “their” refugees via meetings, joint trips, invitation to dinner at their home, language classes etc. Obviously, it would be necessary to present a significant part of the activity in the media, e.g. via social media, but also in pop-ular weekly magazines (e.g. so-called women’s magazines), television, etc. The idea is to show that direct contact with refugees is not threatening; that these are normal, yet often traumatised, people on account of their past, who are trying to embark on a new stage of their life.

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Katarzyna Sztop-Rutkowska, Ph.D., Fundacja SocLabAnna Mierzyńska, Public Sector Marketing Specialist

https://mierzynskamarketing.wordpress.com/

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Attitude towards migration in Slovakia

How to communicate topics of refugees, migrants, and migration

IntroductionThe development of Slovak society is currently framed by several important topics. Among others, we are facing radicalization of society and youth, the development of uncivil society, the rejection of traditional political parties or traditional sources of information, and, on the contrary, the growing confidence of some groups in conspiracy sites or other sources of information, often influenced by Russian propagan-da. In the public space, however, there is also a reflection of the situation and an attempt to respond to this negative development. Civic associations and non-profit organizations, charities, journalists, re-searchers, young people, bloggers and many other initiatives are responding and activating themselves. We do care whether we will live in a tolerant and democratic society that promotes the values of human-ism or a closed society that spreads the values of uncivil society. Therefore, in the following material, we look at what is currently the situation in this area, who and how influences and shapes public discourse on this topic, what narratives are emerging, where they are coming from, and what is possible in the communication field to improve the situation. The material does not have the ambition to be a complex document, rather it can be perceived as a view on what is happening in the given field and the basis for further investigation.

SituationAlthough the issue of migrants in Slovakia is covered in a number of publications and research before 2015 (e.g. IOM publication on public attitudes towards migrants from 2009), the Slovak public was sig-nificantly affected only by so-called migration crisis in the European Union that began in the summer of 2015. This period can also be seen as the beginning of discourse in this area. Despite the fact that our public has almost no direct experience with refugees and asylum seekers and their number is minimal in our country (since 1993, only 838 asylums were granted in Slovakia, the number of asylums in the last years is in dozens) the topic has become an important part of the pre-election struggle connected with parliamentary elections in spring 2016, and in order to attract mainly nationally oriented voters, it was also used by representatives of Smer, SAS or other political parties as a substitute problem associated with the threat for Slovak society. Other factors also contributed to the topic, for example, multiple waves of terrorist attacks in European cities (Paris, Brussels ...). The only significant politician who presented the issue of solidarity with refugees in Slovakia and promoted the values of humanism was President Andrej Kiska; Ivan Mikloš positively expressed the economic aspects of the topic. However, the Slovak society was not only hostile - in addition to the negative reactions, the positive engagement of the people was manifested, and the Call for Humanity was supported by almost 12,000 inhabitants of Slovakia.

How real is the problem with refugees?

The report on the asylum situation in the European Union for the third quarter of 2016 published by Eu-rostat has shown that we are a country within the Union where foreigners seek asylum at least. We have come to the last place with seven applicants per million inhabitants, compared with the biggest number of applicants - 2890 per million inhabitants – located in Germany.

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There is a general lack of information in this area in the Slovak Republic. Information does not make any distinction between the basic terms (immigrant, refugee, asylum seeker). The theme has been linked with and still combines narratives (communication models) that depict refugees as those who are dan-gerous for women (and indeed the whole country); politicians are acting as those who protect Slovakia not only from the influx of refugees but also from the European Union itself and from the distribution quotas for refugees.

In contrast to the low number of asylums granted to refugees, the number of volunteers who helped in the field of refugee crisis (Človek v ohrození, other voluntary initiatives) or declare or provide assistance to refugees in integration (Kto pomôže) is much higher. Problems were dealt with by private and public media (Sme, Denník N, RTVS), bloggers, research institutes, state institutions (e.g. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Association of cities and settlements), civic associations (OSV, CVEK, IOM, League for human rights, CSO, NMŠ, Magna, Marginal, Adra, SHR, Globsec, Erko, Pontis, SDA), charity and churches (Pokoj a dobro, Cirkev Bratská), but also organizations like the Union of Vietnamese Women or the Islamic Foundation ...

The organizations, groups and individuals above mentioned do not only focus on the direct help for refu-gees, but they often explore related issues, communicate the topic, and try to change the awareness and attitudes of Slovak citizens or political representatives.

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Main narratives and framing of the issueIn what way does the debate continue? By 2015, the debate on the refugee crisis focused mainly on informing about the countries abroad (“it‘s not about us”), and there were relatively few experts in the media.

At the beginning of 2016, A. Chudzíková of the CVEK organization published an article entitled “The image of refugees in the media in Slovakia” - this material was a chapter from the publication “Open country or an impregnable fortress? Slovakia, migrants and refugees”. The chapter offered a view on the media im-age of the topic in three most popular online journals (sme.sk, topky.sk and aktuality.sk) at the beginning of September 2015 and looked at how the media informed about the refugees; how politicians framed the topic of refugees and how the media did or did not put their statements into the context. Among other findings, the author noticed the concepts connected with the topic of refugees: “The concepts of mass, (massive) waves, influx belonged most frequently to the theme of refugee admission.” Using such concepts can lead to the dehumanisation of refugees and loss of ability to perceive them as individuals with the need for human dignity.

When we look at what other expressions are related to the subject of refugees, we will find generalizing views: “A refugee is a Muslim / a different skin color / ISIS member”. In such a spirit, it is mentioned and expressed not only by the wider public but often by politicians and tabloids. Refugees are often perceived and presented as a homogeneous group made up of predominantly young men; as people who steal our jobs or come to destroy our culture and Christian traditions. The discussion has been associated with fear, rejection, intolerance, often accompanied by the provocation of hostile moods by politicians, as if to defend national identity or national interests (Prime Minister Fico: “We only want Christians here...”) A negative attitude appeared in several media, photos or publishing hoaxes - unobjective messages ap-peared and appear mainly in so-called conspiracy media.

While emigration (the departure from Slovakia) was in discourse thematically associated with brain drain when young and skilled people leave, immigration is associated with the arrival of low-skilled labor.

More specifically, the issue of refugees and migrants, how they are displayed in media or media dis-course in a broader context are addressed not only by academic or research organizations but also by some associations or the media. For example, Antipropaganda.sk takes a closer look at a number of fac-tual claims (Islam does not belong to Europe, it is the occupation of Christian Europe, there are only men among migrants, refugees do not need help, they are rich, migration is artificially evoked and driven from above) and explains why it is not true.

How to react on the topic?It can be assumed that because of the small number of foreigners, or people from other countries, citi-zens in Slovakia may not have direct experience with other cultures. They are influenced by prejudices or other stereotypes, and they do not always know how to critically evaluate information. Of course, even such an assessment can be generalized, because it is not supported by a research that would substanti-ate the claim. The situation may vary for different target groups, for example, younger people who have a foreign experience.

At the beginning of the document, we noted that the topic of sensitization of society and communication of issues related to refugees, migration or other sensitive topics is addressed by different actors in Slo-vakia. We can look at it through the goals of this communication, communication models, collaborating individuals and organizations, and through the use of various tools and approaches.

How to present the topic

● Reflect negative topics as positive – for example, the topic of threats to society change to the topic of sensitization, enrichment with diversity and diversity.

● Present refugees as equal human beings who flee from something; stimulate Slovaks to imagine a situation in which they could find themselves. Stop with the negative image of migrants; present positive examples of asylum seekers integrated in Slovakia. Engage refugees in the debate.

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● Create positive heroes, show ordinary people – make use of live libraries and forums in schools, do not communicate through differences but through authenticity and normality. Enable the presentation of refugees in public life; on TV use aliens as experts, not as victims, or on the contrary, not as “exclusive” unknowns.

● Do not label, do not generalize – if we mark the community as a whole as a threat, its members may cease to feel to be part of the society. Criticisms of various groups and communities (from Roma to refugees) can lead to social exclusion.

● Provide suitably selected examples from abroad that show the possibility of practical problem solving of the situation – from Germany, Norway or other countries.

Examples of initiatives and media aimed at combating propaganda or hoaxing

(Antipropaganda, Truefighters, Hunting Hoaxes / Sme).

Who to cooperate with

● Change the mental mindset of opinion leaders, engage politicians who are role models (e.g. President Andrew Kiska - who welcomed refugees and non-governmental organization)

● Collaborate with journalists and publicists or bloggers – they are aware of many things; they launched the Hoax Project, which also deals with the issue of refugee depiction. (Sme.sk), they are involved in education aimed at avoiding journalistic stereotypes and distorting reality (Hospodárske noviny with Comenius University and Človek v ohrození), some of them are looking at the issue of refugees, the media and the role of the public in influencing the public (Jakub Goda, Journal N - True Truth About Slovak Internet)

● Address children and young people directly to engage them in cooperation. Work with students at schools, such as the Clinic of Asylum Law – Education of Young Future Lawyers (Trnava and Košice); True fighters - Comenius University, destroying myths, working with youngsters as ambassadors of change

● Take advantage of existing approaches and networks – global and development education, cultural mediators (representatives of foreign communities living in Slovakia, who have been living with children for years); Promote challenges and initiatives that present the theme in the public space (“Call for humanity”).

Examples of influencing public opinion meeting with president Kiska with asylum seekers,

the invitation on Forgotten Slovakia

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What tools and approaches to use

● Work through social media, combine offline and online communication – not only in the media space but also in direct face-to-face communication.

● Take advantage of the preparation of events, festivals where young people meet – One World, Pohoda, Fujin, or events that attract media attention (Blind Excursions – OSF, Youtuber Selassie)

● Focus on direct contact, use communities and community centers that create natural centers of interest and activism and interconnection between different groups: KC Kalab, KC Mareena, cultural centers in Banská Bystrica, Nitra, Žilina, Košice; take advantage of activities that enhance connections between people - cooking, music and theater, sporting events, others.

● Develop education changing attitudes, media education, education to tolerance; to strengthen critical thinking in schools with the direct involvement of young people as the main actors ...

● Stimulate debate in the regions (Forgotten Slovakia).

● Work with infographics; to stimulate a balanced debate, to create a counterpoint to sensational reports; explain the topic in the language of ordinary people, put emphasis on the form

Examples of the use of infographics in awareness raising; meeting on preparation of bags for children of refugees (Domov na mame), Sunday brunch in KC Trafačka v Nitre, initiated by community center

Mareena, working with refugees.

References and links ● CVEK, SDA

Rozumne o migrácii – manuál pre organizátorov verejných podujatíhttp://cvek.sk/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Manua%CC%81l_Rozumne-o-migracii_finalna-verzia.pdf

● Aktuálne.skMigrácia na mapách. Český vedec znázornil krízu v Európehttps://aktualne.atlas.sk/zahranicie/europa/migracia-mapach-cesky-vedec-znazornil-krizu-europe.html

● Azylové štatistiky ministerstva vnútrahttps://www.minv.sk/?statistiky-20

● MultikultiObraz utečencov v médiách na Slovenskuhttp://multikulti.sk/svk/%C4%8Dl%C3%A1nky/obraz-ute%C4%8Dencov-v-m%C3%A9di%C3%A1ch-na-slovensku.html

● Denník NKto sú, odkiaľ a kam idú, koľko je žien a detí (utečenecká kríza v grafoch)https://dennikn.sk/232027/ekonomicki-migranti-azyl-nedostavaju-utecenci-zo-syrie-ano-utecenecka-kriza-grafoch/

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Na Slovensku žiada najmenej cudzincov o azyl z celej úniehttps://dennikn.sk/666115/eurostat-na-slovensku-ziada-najmenej-cudzincov-o-azyl-z-celej-unie/ Kradnú imigranti pracovné miesta alebo žijú zo sociálnych dávok? Mýty a čísla o zamestnávaní migrantovhttps://dennikn.sk/733783/zamestnavanie-migrantov-myty-a-suche-cisla/ Čo si myslia ľudia o utečencochhttps://dennikn.sk/blog/co-si-myslia-ludia-o-utecencoch-vysledky-prieskumu-verejnej-mienky/ Skutočná pravda o slovenskom internetehttps://dennikn.sk/blog/skutocna-pravda-o-slovenskom-internete/ Hoaxy o migrantoch a ich dezinformačné technikyhttps://dennikn.sk/blog/hoaxy-o-migrantoch-a-ich-dezinformacne-techniky/

● PravdaSlováci sa obávajú migrantov, v krajine ich nechcúhttps://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/386374-podla-prieskumu-sa-slovensko-obava-migrantov-v-krajine-ich-nechce/

● Pluskahttp://www.pluska.sk/spravy/z-domova/prieskum-prijmeme-utecencov-za-svojich-takyto-je-postoj-slovakov.html http://www.extraplus.sk/clanok/prace-je-dost-robit-nema-kto

● IOMPostoje verejnosti k cudzincom a zahraničnej migrácii v Slovenskej republikehttp://www.iz.sk/download-files/sk/iom/iom-postoje-verejnosti-k-cudzincom-a-zahranicnej-migracii-v-slovenskej-republike.pdf Atlas komunít migrantovhttp://mic.iom.sk/atlas/ Prieskum: Slováci podporujú rozdelenie migrantov najmenej v rámci celej EÚhttp://www.teraz.sk/zahranicie/slovaci-podporuju-prerozdelenie-migran/161185-clanok.html

● Kto pomôžehttp://ktopomoze.sk/

● Eurobarometerhttp://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/index#p=1&instruments=STANDARD (standard Eurobarometer reports )

● Euractivhttps://euractiv.sk/clanky/buducnost-eu/slovaci-podporili-migracnu-politiku-eu-no-pomoc-utecencom-odmietaju/ https://www.aktuality.sk/clanok/370775/grafy-mladych-slovakov-ohrozuje-ruska-propaganda-doveruju-alternativnym-mediam/

● Globsec: Trends 2017. Mixed messages and signs of hope from Central and Eastern Europe.http://globsec.org/globsec2017/news/globsec-trends-2017-mixed-messages-and-signs-of-hope-from-central-and-eastern-europe

● Výzva k ľudskostihttp://osf.sk/vyzva-k-ludskosti/

● ZMOS, Buk - http://www.zmos.sk/projekt-buk.phtml?id3=94083 - Budovanie kapacít na úrovni miestnej územnej samosprávy v oblasti integračnej politikyZrušte projekt Buk na integráciu cudzincov v meste Sninahttps://www.facebook.com/antiBUKSnina/ http://medzicas.sk/imigracia-ako-lukrativny-biznis-pre-vyvolenych/

● Marginalhttp://www.marginal.sk/

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● Boris Divinský, Zahraničná migrácia v Slovenskej republikehttp://www.iz.sk/sk/stanoviska/sfpa-boris-divinsky-Zahranicna-migracia-v-Slovenskej-republike

● OSF – výlety naslepohttp://osf.sk/pribehy/vylety-naslepo-2/

● Demagog.sk – iný pohľad na politikuwww.demagog.sk

● Sme.sk – Lovíme hoaxyhttps://hoax.sme.sk/?ref=tlogo-sek

http://dennik.hnonline.sk/slovensko/554333-hn-ukazu-svet-medzi-riadkami

Zora Pauliniová, August 2017

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Migration, media and civic space in Hungary

As we know from the surveys, the process of migration, the political discourse about it and people’s at-titude are strongly correlated. Especially when the pro-government media can expansively support the communication. Just as the refugee crisis began in the second half of 2015 in Hungary, the government immediately started a strategic campaign about migration and migrants (e.g. the government started to consistently use the word migrant, instead of refugee to refer to them as people already having opportu-nities). As a consequence, xenophobia started to increase among the population in 2015, and “although” the government built a fence on the South border of the country, xenophobia remained strong.

In the media, the so-called “dark year of the press” (2016) has seen a preparation for the elections. The changes have begun years ago, but only started to accelerate last year, and since then have reorganized the whole media market. In 2017, the majority of the media has become pro-government and supported both of the above mentioned and the following strategies.

Beside the theme of discourse about migration we have to point out the topic of civic space and NGO laws, that affect the majority of Hungarian organizations. In 2015 organizations funded by the EEA and Norway Grants witnessed police raids and the government started a strategic campaign against them. In 2016 the government linked these NGOs to György Soros - who became the biggest enemy of Hungary - and started labelling them as foreign funded organizations.

As we will see from this paper, there are three main topics which make a shrinking space of civil society: keeping the media under control; creating enemies, and changing the laws. Especially for organizations dealing with migration, global problems, civil liberties, freedom of speech or problems with the social safety net, operating is more and more complicated year by year because of the changes in law; negative echoes in the media and lack of funds.

I. Refugee crisis in Hungary, political communication and xenophobia1. Migration process in Hungary

From the beginning of 2015 Hungary took a special place on the migration map. The political discourse started to use the words “immigrant” and “migrant” which sent a message that Hungary is the competent authority and has to calculate with a huge migration flow. But Hungary did not become a competent authority, it only stayed a transit authority. The refugee crisis has only brought a change in the number of asylum seekers.

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1. Number of asylum-seekers in Hungary 1989-20151

In 2015 more asylum-seekers arrived to Hungary than in the previous 23 years together. The peak of illegal border-crossing was in September. By the middle of October, when the closure of the borders in the South was complete, the number of illegal crossings decreased almost to zero. It started to increase again in February 2016. The number of asylum-claims also followed the number of illegal immigrants. In the last quarter of 2015 1172 has been received, while in the first quarter of 2016 this number was 7182 and 10 564 in April-May. However the asylum-seekers handed in the application only for formal reasons and almost everyone left the country after it. According to The Hungarian Helsinki Committee there were only 900-1000 registered asylum-seekers in the country by the end of 2015. During the Yugoslavian Wars, more asylum-seekers stayed in Hungary than in 2015.

It didn’t mean that the asylum-seekers wanted to stay in Hungary, nor had they received more refugee status than the previous years. Moreover, in 2016 it was almost impossible to get an asylum and protec-tion status because of the aggravations. In 2016 the most frequent countries of origin were: Syria (35%), Afghanistan (27%), Kosovo (13%), Pakistan (9%) and Iraq (6%). All these are important, because at the be-ginning of 2015, the Hungarian government claimed that the majority of arriving people are not refugees from conflict zones, but “economic migrants”. In the second part of the year, the government changed the narrative and started to emphasize, how many safe countries the refugees had passed before they arrived in Hungary. In this argumentation we cannot consider them refugees. After the 2015 Paris Terror Attacks, migration flow and terrorism closely intertwined. In the long run, facts show that more than half of the refugees came from Syria and Afghanistan, mostly from war zones.

2. The reaction of the Hungarian government

In 2015 among other things, the Hungarian government made the following steps:

● April: National Consultation on Migration and Terrorism

● June: Poster campaign about migration with subtitles like: “If you come to Hungary, don’t take the jobs of Hungarians”; “If you come to Hungary, you have to abide by our laws.”2

● June: Launch of the planned fence on the Serbian border

● June-July: Vote in Parliament about safe countries and laws related to migration

● July-August: Transit zones and new refugee camps in Hungary

● September: Closure of the Serbian border; starting of the erection of the fence on the Croatian border; Government decree about proclaiming of the crisis because of the immigration

1 http://www.tarki.hu/hu/publications/SR/2016/13juhasz.pdf2 http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-33091597

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● October: Closure of the Serbian border

● November: The government starts to collect signatures against the quota

● December: Closure of refugee camp in Debrecen

Here we have to mention, that after 22nd of October, there were no arrested migrants in Hungary.

2016:

● February: The government announces a referendum about the quota

● March: The government announces a state of crisis in the whole country

● April: Opening of the refugee camp in Körmend

● May: Vote in Parliament against the quote.

● June: Vote in Parliament about the modification of Basic Law; terror emergency

Here we have to mention, that during 2016 the number of arrested migrants were relatively low com-pared with the first half of 2015.

3. Effect of the migration crisis on the public opinion

According to the public opinion survey of Standard Barometer, in 2013 only 7% of Hungarians thought that immigration is the biggest challenge for the EU. This rate was 68% in 2015. At the beginning of 2016, xenophobia was as high as never before in Hungary. The rate of extreme xenophobic people increased from 45% to 54% in Hungary (in Czech Republic: from 32% to 39% and in Poland from 18% to 25%), ac-cording to the ESS survey 2012/2013.3

We can see from these data, that the process of the migration crisis together with the public discourse and political campaigns had an effect on the measure and nature of xenophobia. The general fear was replaced by an exact enemy, the “migrant”, and this enemy was strongly linked to terrorism and crimes.

2. The rate of xenophobics, hesitators and pro-strangers 2014-2016.

3 http://www.tarki.hu/hu/publications/SR/2016/13juhasz.pdf

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Finally, we have to take a look at the last graphic, where we can see, that in October, when people “could see” the refugees in the country (it was a topical problem with real humans, not with distant strangers), the rate of xenophobics was lower, than in 2014, but after the fence, when the number of refugees dra-matically fell down, xenophobia became as high as never before. The rate of hesitators was the highest, when the refugees were in the country, and they really had to deal and think about the situation.4

In September, 2015, when tens of thousands of refugees arrived to Italy and Greece on a daily basis, the leaders of the EU countries decided to take care of the settlement of first 40 then another 120 thousand refugees. Hungary did not want to fulfill the quota bestowed upon the country (1294 asylum seekers). Hungary and Slovakia filed a lawsuit together against the Council, which was refused by the Court of Jus-tice of the European Union on the 6th of September, 2017.

II. Media reorganizationThe government would have not influenced the public opinion as we discussed it above without the media. In 2016 the so-called “dark year of press” has seen most of the changes - preparation for the elec-tions had begun. The changes have begun years ago, but only started to accelerate last year, and since then have reorganized the whole media market. This process has a serious impact on the current and the following years. This realignment made it possible for the Hungarian government to carry out an intense campaign (poster, online and offline) against the migrants and refugees.

The biggest change in the independent media during the last two years is due to the change of owner-ships (pro-government owners) and advertisement expenditure, which allows the government to indi-rectly influence media content.

1. The biggest media actors by the end of 2016:

a.) The five largest state clients: Government Debt Management Agency, Central Bank of Hungary, Hungar-ian Post Ltd., Prime Minister’s Office, Szerencsejáték Ltd. (the largest gambling service)5

b.) The five biggest pro-government media companies: TV2 Media Group, Mediaworks, Origo/New Wave Media, Magyar Idők, Modern Media Group

In 2016 the net turnover of the ten biggest, pro-government media companies was 48 billion Forints, which did not include the expenditure on public media.6

The denouncement of the independent media brought pressure not only on readers and journalists, but on advertisers as well. These attacks on the independent media point out exactly where it is worth for private companies to advertise, if they do not wish to be excluded from the state/governmental order.7

2. Other measures hamper the operation of independent media:

The harassing of journalists:

● In 2016 The accreditation of the whole editorial staff of 444.hu has been suspended by the Speaker.8

● In 2017, Júlia Halász, a journalist of the liberal news page, 444.hu was assaulted at a public forum, organized by the ruling party, Fidesz, after taking photos at the forum.

4 http://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2016/kitekint/20160404_idegen.html5 https://mertek.atlatszo.hu/allami-hirdetesek-magyarorszagon-2006-2016/6 https://444.hu/2017/06/01/iszonyatosan-sokba-kerul-nekunk-a-fidesz-media7 http://kettosmerce.blog.hu/2017/05/19/a_szabad_sajtot_csak_a_szabad_polgarok_tamogatasa_mentheti_meg8 http://index.hu/kulfold/2017/02/09/nem_lehet_ujsagirokat_kitiltani_a_parlamentbol/

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Closure of independent media:

In October 2016, the publishing house of the independent newspaper, Népszabadság suspended the work of the newspaper immediately, on the grounds of severe deficit and the decrease of circulation,. Ac-cording to Fidesz, this was not a political, but an economical act.9 At this point, it is important to mention that during the month preceding the shutdown, Népszabadság was continuously reporting about several controversial issues, such as the helicopter trips of Antal Rogán- the prime minister’s chief of staff- and the enormous salary of the girlfriend of György Matolcsy, the president of the Central Bank of Hungary.

Metropol, a free, pro-government newspaper, which had a monopole situation, lost its position in 2015, due to the deteriorated relation between the paper’s owner, Lajos Simicska and the Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán. Not long after, a new pro-government newspaper, called Lokál, appeared on the market, which caused such a deficit for Metropol that it finally had to shut down in 2016.10

The pro-government media regularly accuses the opposition media of being the henchmen of György Soros and that they work for foreign agents (like the civil organizations)11

3. Open propaganda in the state-run media:

In 2016 the content of the state-run media service made it evident in several cases that the main goal for the excessive financial spending is to establish a media platform that broadcasts the government’s messages without any questions or criticism. One of the most apparent evidences for this process was the role of the state-run media in the anti-immigrant campaign before the referendum. Mérték Media Monitor partnered with Democracy Reporting International to prepare a content analysis about this cam-paign. In the evening news coverage of the state-run media at least half of its running time was dedicated to this topic, 10-12 pieces of news dealt with the threats of immigration. 70% of the news stigmatized immigration and 91% of them depicted immigrants in a negative way. Only 6% of the news presented op-posing views or different aspects. The Media Council refused the filed complaints based on the analysis of the campaign.12

III. NGO laws Since there are very few operational funds available from state/local government for CSOs in Hungary, they have to rely almost only on foreign (mainly European) sources.

These are designated to support CSOs, but through the managing authority the calls for proposals to distribute these funds are designed to exclude many CSOs from the start.13

There has been a change in legislation which is making the watchdog role for CSOs more complicated

● The Civil Act itself has been amended in a way that civil society organisations, dealing with shared issues of the political community and are active in the public domain would be stigmatised on the ground of operating with foreign support. (Yet -as mentioned above-, there are no other ways to get funds for operation)

● “the preamble and the justification refers to the need to counter money laundering and financing terrorism and to protect the political, economic interests of the country as well as the operation of statutory institutions from undue influences.”

9 Viktor Orbán about Népszabadság: https://444.hu/2016/10/21/orban-nem-foglalkozik-a-nepszabadsag-ugyevel10 http://index.hu/kultur/media/2016/06/13/megszunik_a_metropol/11 https://888.hu/article-lomnici-soros-emberei-iranyitjak-a-444-et

http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20170416-a-tv2-tenyek-megkerdezett-nehany-szerkesztoseget-hogy-milyen-kapcsolatban-all-nak-soros-gyorggyel.html

12 https://vastagbor.atlatszo.hu/2016/11/04/a-mediatanacs-szerint-szerkesztoi-szabadsag-ha-a-kozmedia-csak- -kormanypropagandat-sugaroz/

13 https://english.atlatszo.hu/2017/06/21/huge-donation-from-state-coffers-for-the-governments-favorite-ngo/

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● “The government wants to create new obstacles to hinder the work of organizations that are critical of its activities. Under the pretext of transparency, the government questions the legitimacy of critical organizations.”14

● The new addition to the Civil Act behind the mask of requiring transparency is to stigmatise, obstruct and finally eliminate watchdog and whistle-blower CSOs and also those working on social and/or legal issues.

Rules applied to the transparency of civil society organisations before the amendment

The Civil Act (1) and the relevant government decree (2) already include comprehensive regulations con-cerning the reporting requirements of civil society organisations, establishing the fundamental condi-tions of transparency. The law requires the compulsory compilation and publication of reports:

● Accounting reports (annual reports)

● Expenditure

● Public benefit appendix

Since they had to report about these fields before the law as well, civil society organizations were already transparent in their operations.

“The Law on the transparency of organizations funded from abroad will force NGOs receiving more than 24,000 EUR direct or indirect funding from abroad to re-register as “civic organization funded from abroad” and to put this pejorative label on every publication.”15

“The amended NGO Act. … In the disguise of transparency, it aims to silence NGOs providing critical ser-vices and monitoring government’s human rights (and political actions) track record. The now adopted Hungarian NGO Act is basically a copy of Putin’s foreign agent law…. Transparency is already ensured by the requirement from civil society organizations to publish their financial data (http://birosag.hu/en), also indicating the sources of support.”

There have been 62 attacks from 14 August 2013 to 14 December 2016. The list can be read at the home-page of the Hungarian Civil Liberties Union16

Anna Lator, Foundation for Development

of Democratic Rights

14 https://tasz.hu/en/news/hclus-position-government-crackdown-against-civil-society-hungary 15 https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/06/hungary-ngo-law-a-vicious-and-calculated-assault-on-civil-society/16 https://tasz.hu/files/tasz/imce/timeline_of_gov_attacks_against_hu_ngos_22022017_1.pdf

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Media Training Material “Migrations and Integration”

24–26 July 2017Ljubljana

BackgroundThere have never been so many records in Slovenia about migration, migrants, refugees, asylum seek-ers, and integration, as in the last two years. A large number of people – refugees from the war zones of Kosovo, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, and so on, who crossed Slovenia between September 2015 and March 2016 – scenes that have never been seen before – received huge media attention. Cameras, correspond-ents, and social networks were raising the temperature to boiling point. Mostly sensationalistic reporting about these people was accompanied by the flow of hatred on social networks.

The “shaming pillar” action by the unknown activists on the website zlovenija.tumblr.com, backed up by a poster campaign across Slovenia, thoroughly shook and intervened into the political and public scene marked by sporadic alerts by various actors to the spreading of “hate speech”. The action openly revealed the faces and names of hate towards the other. The authors explained the reason for the ac-tion: “The method of the ‘shaming pillar’ is radical, but no more radical than the statements that call for killing/shooting/slaughtering/burning/beating. These are not “opinions”. It is not about the freedom of expression, but about the incitements that every person should condemn, regardless of their political orientation or worldview. Left and right, ours and yours, everyone should be aware of the problem of this manner of expression and its toxicity. One hateful statement feeds another – and when the discourse of violence becomes a norm, what follows?”

The media published reports and comments in line with the political views of their owners and editors, adding fuel to frenzied hate speech and mobilizing public opinion in the direction of rejection. Public Facebook pages emerged, such as The Radical Ljubljana (Radikalna Ljubljana), Slovenia Protect Your Bor-ders (Slovenia Zavaruj Meje), Gorenjska Region is AGAINST the Migrant Centre (Gorenjska je PROTI mi-grantskemu centru), and The Slovenian Militia (Slovenska milica), which were primarily targeted against refugees from the Middle East. The Anti-Hate Speech Council (Svet za odziv na sovražni in diskriminatorni govor)1 assessed that in the time of the arrival of a large number of migrants in Slovenia “some groups used vocabulary with the mobilization potential of spreading hatred.”

The group Gorenjska Region is AGAINST the Migrant Centre managed to collect 6,022 likes at a certain moment. Similar scenes took place throughout Slovenia – local agents took an active role in organizing and mobilizing the population against the accommodation of refugees and people with international protection in their local environment. The organization and mobilization were heavily accompanied by xenophobic, Islamophobic, and racist remarks and calls for killing of the members of individual social groups (for instance “only a bullet to the head is suitable for such people, nothing else does it”, “Can’t someone start killing them already, this Muslim filth!”, “only Auschwitz is suitable for such people”, “These African Negroes must be killed!”).

The above-mentioned Council drew attention to the continuity of such phenomena. “Similar responses to the ones we can see on the pages described appeared in the public during the arrival of refugees in

1 All responses by the Council are available at http://www.mirovni-institut.si/govor/.

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Slovenia in the past. However, social networks and other Internet environments available today allow for such messages not to be forgotten as simply impulsive reactions to the current situation, but are constantly being reproduced. The Council notes with great concern that the groups directed against ref-ugees and migrants, even at a time when the period of mass migration across Slovenia is already far be-hind us, keep a mass audience on social networks and are even gaining new followers. Also, the extreme hostility of users of these groups with the calls for violence evidently did not represent only a short-lived episode, but these groups are willing to make room for it in the long run. Accordingly, a danger exists that what were recently considered extreme comments, which no one seems to oppose and which even receive mass support in the form of likes, can, at least for the users of these groups, become something ordinary and acceptable.”

The open opposition to the placement of “asylum seekers” occurred in Šenčur, Velenje, Črnomelj, Lenda-va, Murska Sobota, Koper, and so on.

At the end of 2016, the Government presented amendments and supplements to the Aliens Act, which allowed for the closure of the border under certain conditions. Non-government organizations respond-ed with sharp opposition, supported by a number of legal experts and other public figures.2 A turbulent public debate took place, in which the discourse on security and protection of the local population pre-dominated. The prevailing view was that, for the sake of security, we could partially renounce freedom, as well as human rights.3

This situation only further complicated the problem of migration, which is not unknown in Slovenia. Ac-cording to some data, approximately 25% of the population living in Slovenia were migrants themselves or one of their parents was. People also immigrate to Slovenia under regular procedures with a work permit, due to family reunification, and so on. Today, integration is mostly discussed in connection to refuges, which are few in number, while the integration of other immigrants is rarely dealt with (apart from offering them help to learn the Slovenian language). In other words, they are more or less left to themselves, especially to the existing diasporas.

We note that there exist a great deal of prejudices in public, while, on the other hand, there is a lot of willingness and need for additional skills to work with people who immigrated to Slovenia in public insti-tutions. Particularly for persons with refugee status, the integration is challenging, since these are mostly people who do not have a social network in Slovenia and for whom the access to the labour market is practically closed, even though they are formally equal with citizens of the Republic of Slovenia in this area.

OutlineAs a member of the EU, Slovenia followed the European guidelines on the design, planning, and imple-mentation of integration measures, taking into account Slovenian specifics. “The migration and integra-tion policy is largely centralised in Slovenia, since most of the measures are implemented at the level of the Ministry of the Interior, responsible for the field of asylum and migrations. Other departmental ministries are involved in the implementation of individual measures. Local communities thus do not have formal power to implement asylum and migration measures. In practice, integration measures and programs at the local community level are carried out by some civil society organizations and companies, but this is frequently not enough for effective integration.”4

In the past, problems were often associated only with poor coordination between individual services. This should have been resolved with the establishment of a special government office for the integration of refugees, which took on a lot of responsibilities that were under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior until 1 July 2017. Establishing policies and conducting administrative procedures for obtaining the status of international protection remained under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior.

2 An analysis of the violations that would be brought about by the enforcement of measures from Article 10b of the Aliens Act is available on the Amnesty International Slovenia website, http://www.amnesty.si/zakon-o-tujcih.

3 http://www.delo.si/novice/politika/anketa-dela-zakon-o-tujcih-s-kar-dvotretjinsko-podporo.html.4 Franci Zlatar, Models of Integration of Immigrants, Slovene Philanthropy, published in "Active for Tolerance, for More Success-

ful Integration and Connecting in Our Society", UKOM 2016.

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The experience in the integration of refugees from the previous years have lead the non-government organizations to identify a number of important changes in the existing model:

1. Slovenia should adopt a comprehensive integration strategy for immigrants, including the persons with international protection.

2. It would be reasonable to delegate the power to implement certain integration measures to local communities.

3. Instead of collective accommodation of immigrants, Slovenia should promote and develop their dis-persed accommodation to a greater extent.

4. Persons with international protection should be granted access to non-profit housing.

5. Much more attention should be paid to bridging cultural, language, and other barriers to integration into the Slovenian society – cultural mediators, who would work in the fields of education, health care, access to institutions, and similar, could play a major role.

6. It is necessary to improve the system of recognition of the education, qualifications, and knowledge of immigrants, especially persons with international protection, who often come to Slovenia without evidence of completed education.

7. Appropriate active employment policy measures should be adopted to facilitate immigrants’ (espe-cially those with international protection) access to work and employment – a possibility of internship at a workplace and of acquiring a mentor should exist; in general, applicants for international protec-tion should be given access to legal work and employment as soon as possible and not as late as nine months after the beginning of the procedure, as laid down in the applicable legislation.

8. Slovenia should ratify the 1990 United Nations Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Mi-grant Workers and Members of Their Families and should not allow the exploitation of immigrant workers; Slovenia should also ratify the Convention on the Participation of Foreigners in Public Life at Local Level.

9. Slovenia should improve the possibility of political participation of immigrants and give them the right to enter political parties and stand as candidates in local elections.5

In doing so, non-government organizations emphasize the importance of respecting and understanding diversity in the integration process by the population.

Public opinionRegardless of the extreme increase in reporting on refugee, migration, and integration issues, it is a surpris-ing discovery that we do not have many publicly available public opinion polls on these issues at our dispos-al. How do we then determine how the public understands diversity and how it assesses the importance of respecting diversity or how deeply are the values of an open society built into the Slovenian society?

Niko Toš, the pillar of the Slovenian public opinion research, gives the following assessment in his pub-lication Values in Transition X in 2016: “All of the carried out analyses show that in relation to the institu-tional system, with the exception of the initial period [the 1990s], the mistrust and extreme criticism are prevailing and tend to grow among Slovenians. High degree of mistrust in the institutions of the system is accompanied by an extremely high level of mistrust on the interpersonal level. In the Slovenian soci-ety, we are therefore faced with a low level of systemic and social integration and, consequently, a high vulnerability of society to the shocks that come from the environment.”6

5 Summarized after Franci Zlatar, Models of Integration of Immigrants, Slovene Philanthropy, published in "Active for tolerance, for more successful integration and connecting in our society", UKOM 2016.

6 Niko Toš (Ed.), Values in Transition X. Slovenian Public Opinion 2010–2016, Ljubljana 2016, p. 527, http://www.cjm.si/ul/2017/VREDNOTE-10-web.pdf.

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Unfortunately, we do not have a systematic public opinion research available to show what this sort of environment means for the implementation of integration measures for persons with refugee status and immigrants in Slovenia in general. However, in the same publication on tolerance and discrimination, Toš offers a few important findings.7 “After the transition to the new century […], uncritical nationalism has calmed down and intolerance towards marginalised groups and ethnic minorities has diminished. Inter-national comparative analyses (WVS, classification of countries based on the results of the 1992–2008 measurements) have shown that on the scale “tolerance – discrimination”, Slovenia ranks among the predominantly Western European countries (together with Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium), thus among the more tolerant, and not among Eastern European countries (the Baltic countries, Poland, Ro-mania, Bulgaria), which are significantly more discriminatory. This applies to both time sections (1992, 2008).”8 During that time, and especially after 2014, the situation in Europe (the opening of the EU’s inter-nal borders) and its neighbourhood (refugee flows) changed radically. “And these migration flows were triggering repulsive, intolerant, discriminatory initiatives and actions of the extreme political right to limit migration flows and close the (Schengen) border, which was necessarily reflected in the public opinion and influenced the changes in attitudes. Of course, this first occurred in the West, in the countries of mass immigration, and then, with the gradual triggering of refugee flows, also across the entire European area, especially in the Eastern European countries, which are described by the nearby history as refugee countries and by the current conditions also as emigrant countries (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Romania).”9

Toš wonders where among these flows do we find Slovenians, how do we evaluate this phenomena? “Measurements under the ESS for the period 2002–2014 show a growing tolerance among Slovenians and at the same time a decline in the negative attitude towards immigration – but differently, depending on the cultural, racial, and socioeconomic origins or characteristics of potential immigrations. During this time period, tolerant attitudes strongly prevail over the negative ones concerning the attitude towards migration among Slovenians (especially in the 2014 measurement). However, this is, of course a con-clusion based on the measurements conducted before the launch of the largest scale refugee wave in Europe in 2015.10 International comparisons in the same time period (ESS 2015) show that Slo-venia (with the still prevailing tolerance to migrants) among 19 countries in three sections11 always ranks somewhere in the middle between the (most) tolerant and the least tolerant or the most intolerant. By far the most tolerant to immigration (in all three sections) are the Swedes, the Germans, the Norwegians, the Swiss, and the Italians… the Hungarians, the Portuguese, the Czechs, and the Israelis are by far the most intolerant. Slovenians are, together with the Belgians, the French, and the Dutch …, somewhere in the middle of the range. The most discriminating against the groups of non-native migrants are the Israelis, who are at the same time highly tolerant to native immigrants (i.e. the Jews); the Hungarians also scale high with their intolerant attitude towards immigrants.

Regarding the immigrants/refugees, who are and will be the problem of Europe in the years to come, it can be said that this segment of Europe’s value system is unfortunately very scarred, segmented, and contradictory. The most intense resistance to immigration in general is apparent among the nations who themselves have the most refugee experience (the Hungarians, the Czechs, the Israelis …). The inability of critical reflection of one’s own national position, which shows as a tendency towards authoritarianism, is occurring in extreme right political movements, as well as in abandoning the norms of democratic in-stitutionalisation of modern European countries (Hungary, Poland).”12

7 He partly refers to the findings of Ule M. (2016), Identity Challenges at the Time of Transition; Ambivalence in the contemporary social / national identity of Slovenia and Slovene Women, in: A special issue of Theory and Practice, Researching the Society with a Social Survey, Ljubljana, pp. 112–128.

8 Id., p. 535.9 Id., p. 536.10 Looking at the preliminary data from the ESS 2016, which is still ongoing, we discover that the views of Slovenians are moving

in the direction of lower tolerance and prevailing defiant beliefs. Id. Emphasised by the author.11 The attitude towards migrants from a similar national community, from different national backgrounds, and from non-Europe-

an countries. Id. Emphasised by the author.12 Id., p. 537.

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This critical evaluation is also confirmed by some opinion polls on migration and integration at EU level:

1. Standard Barometer, November 201613

2. Discrimination in the EU, Report, October 201514

3. Awareness of Home Affairs, Special Barometer, June 201215

4. Migrant Integration, Aggregate Report, May 201116

5. Discrimination in the European Union: Perceptions, Experiences and Attitudes, July 200817

The standard barometer of public opinion in the EU, published in November 2016, thus established the following: “Immigration and terrorism are considered the greatest challenges of the EU”. Researchers dis-covered that EU citizens “still most frequently cited immigration (48%, –10) among the most pressing EU challenges. Terrorism followed (39%, +14), after a sharp rise since autumn 2015 survey, while economic conditions (19%, –2), the state of Member States’ public finances (16%, –1), and unemployment (15%, –2) were far behind. Immigration is considered a major challenge for the EU in 20 Member States and one of the two biggest challenges in all states, except Portugal. Terrorism is considered a major challenge for the EU in eight Member States and one of the two greatest challenges in all states, except Greece.” At the national level, Europeans are most concerned about unemployment (33%, –3) and immigration (28%, –8), while the economic condition is on the third place (19%, no change).

In June 2012, the European Commission published “a progress report on immigration and asylum in 2011, accompanied by the Eurobarometer survey on the views of European citizens on cross-border mobility, migration, and security. According to the survey, eight out of ten Europeans agree that EU Mem-ber States should offer protection and asylum to people in need and that the rules for the reception of asylum seekers should be the same across the EU. The vast majority of Europeans believe (67%) that it is important to have the possibility of travelling within the EU without internal border controls.”18 At that time, Cecilia Malmström, the European Commissioner for Home Affairs, said: “The data of the report and the results of the public opinion polls support the Commission’s view that the European Union needs a strong and coordinated migration policy to respond to short-term and long-term needs. We must effec-tively manage our external borders, protect the free movement within the EU, offer suitable protection to people in need, and at the same time provide the means for legal migration and mobility.”19

The research also showed that Slovenians in the highest share in the EU (90%) agree with the finding that “immigrants may have difficulties to integrate largely because they don’t want to.”20

However, 73% of the respondents in Slovenia agreed with the previous assertion that immigrants have problems with integration largely because of the discrimination they face in Slovenia, which placed us in the third place in the EU (right behind Finland and Sweden).21

In the time of – according to some estimates – a very turbulent public debate on the amendment to the Aliens Act and the State Border Control Act, a public opinion poll, which was published on 16 January 2017, was conducted in the newspaper DELO.22

13 The Standard Barometer, November 2016.14 Discrimination in the EU, Report, October 2015.15 Awareness of Home Affairs, Special Barometer, June 2012.

16 Migrant Integration, Aggregate Report, May 2011.17 Discrimination in the European Union: Perceptions, Experiences and Attitudes, July 2008.18 http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-552_sl.htm.19 Id.20 “QB9.4. About 4% of the people living in the EU come from a non-EU country. There are different views regarding their integra-

tion in European societies. To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements about integration? Immigrants may have difficulties to integrate largely because they don't want to.” Slovenia – 90% Totally agree, 8% Totally disa-gree, 2% Don't know.

21 “QB9.3. […] Immigrants may have difficulties to integrate largely because of the discrimination they face in (OUR COUNTRY).” Slovenia – 73% Totally agree, 23% Totally disagree, 4% Don't know.

22 http://www.delo.si/novice/politika/anketa-dela-zakon-o-tujcih-s-kar-dvotretjinsko-podporo.html.

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The researchers asked the respondents the following questions:

“The government with the amendment to the State Border Control Act anticipates the measures for a more effective border control. Do you support the act or the possibility of exercising a strict border control under exceptional circumstances?” 49% of those polled supported this act. 37% of the respondents highly supported the law.

The amendment to the Aliens Act was highly supported by 27% and supported by 37% of the re-spondents, while it was rejected by 22% of the respondents.

The researchers also asked a question about values, namely they asked which value is more im-portant – freedom or security. In the context that “in the uncertain times of migrant crisis, it is rea-sonable to give up some freedom for the sake of security.” 9% of the respondents chose freedom as more important, 36% chose security, while 54% of the respondents chose the answer that both values are equally important to them.

The researchers then asked whether the respondents would be willing to give up freedom for the sake of better security. 33% would be willing to give up freedom, 37% would not be willing to give up freedom, while 24% of them would fluctuate between willingness and unwillingness.

The last question was on the topic of refugee accommodation – after receiving refugee status and obtaining a residence permit in Slovenia. What do the respondents think about facilitating accom-modation in state or private housing, enabled by the state? 43% believe that this is not a suitable solution, 15% believe that this is a suitable solution, while 35% believe that this is not the best, but is currently a suitable solution.

At the same time, there was an exchange of arguments between political parties, the Government, the civil society, and experts from domestic and European institutions, which thoroughly revealed the posi-tions of the key players in the political decision-making process. The record of the debate23 in the Nation-al Assembly and the National Council is a historical document on the exchange of arguments between the defenders of the open society and national exclusivity. Members of the National Assembly, among others, made the following statements:

● They are not refugees, they are economic migrants.

● There are 75% of men among refugees, whose care costs us € 1,953 per month per person. Explain this to a pensioner who receives a € 400 pension.

● These are unnatural migrations.

● This is a problem of Islam, which does not respect human rights.

● This is a specialized war that fosters a guilty conscience among Europeans.

● This is a cultural attack on our civilization, an attack on the law, an attack on “unbelievers” – this is a hybrid war.

● This is a terrorist threat that uses migrations for its own purposes.

● The myth of hate speech, the means of a new censorship, the restriction of freedom of speech, is being demolished.

● Frustration over a common European defence policy.

23 Meeting of the National Assembly, 26 January 2017, continuation of the 26th Session (regular) –https://www.dz-rs.si/wps/portal/ Home/deloDZ/seje/evidenca?mandat=VII&type=mag&uid=7A5D715F93136AC7C12580B4002FD02E.

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On the other hand, Members of the National Assembly warned that many statements are about:

● cultural racism,

● making people afraid,

● hate speech,

● the consequences of Europe’s military interventions in North Africa, the Middle East ...

● when you give up freedom and human rights for the sake of an imaginary security, you also give up security,

● there is no evidence that migration flows are linked to terrorist attacks,

● marginalization in society is the main reason for radicalization,

● the boundaries between liberals, conservatives ... are being erased

In short, it could be summarized that migrants and refugees are primarily considered a threat that re-quires preventive behaviour and action from society, a threat we need to protect ourselves from.

The ChallengeWe have a lot of data on all these processes (see below), which should be presented to the public (in a suitable manner) in order to increase the knowledge of the dimension of the challenge of integration and the reduction of prejudices, as well as to the authorities and institutions involved in the integration process.

Even more so because there are relatively few refugees in Slovenia. The numbers are very low compared to other European countries.

When designing a new framework for effective and efficient communication, we must draw on the fol-lowing social facts:

1. We are operating in an atmosphere of high distrust in the institutions of the system, the element of which is also extremely high distrust on the interpersonal level.

2. We are confronted with a low level of systemic and social integration.

3. Consequently, we are faced with the high vulnerability of society to shocks that come from the envi-ronment.

4. Because of high distrust, decisions are mostly made with the majority’s argument.

5. Institutions of the political system are at the bottom of the trust ladder.

6. Active citizenship is in the last place as far as the importance of different areas of life is concerned (health and family are at the top of importance).

In the public space, refugees are more or less equated with economic migrants – what supposedly means that they are opportunists who migrate solely because of a social profit and thus directly threaten the social stability of the local population.

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APPENDIX 1: Our Relationship towards Others – The Slovenian Public Opinion 2016

S11 There are different groups of people on this list. Please tell us which of them you would not want for your neighbor.

(one answer in each row)would not want for a neighbour did not select I do not know no answer

1 2 8 9

a. drug addicts 75.5 21.8 2.6 0.1b. people of another race 15.0 81.2 3.6 0.2c. people with AIDS 30.2 64.2 5.3 0.3d. immigrants, foreign workers 15.9 78.9 5.0 0.3e. homosexuals 28.4 68.0 3.4 0.2f. people of other religions 11.8 85.0 3.1 0.2g. drunks 69.0 28.2 2.7 0.1h. unmarried couples living together 2.1 95.2 2.1 0.5i. people who speak a different language 5.4 91.8 2.4 0.4j. Muslims 18.6 77.2 3.7 0.5

k. Jews 14.9 80.7 4.0 0.4l. Romani people 44.0 51.3 4.5 0.2

m. refugees 33.2 58.1 8.6 0.1

SOURCE: Slovenian Public Opinion 2016, N = 1070, CJMMK, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana

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D26 Jews from other countries to come and live in Slovenia? 11.4 43.7 21.9 14.5 7.7 0.8 2.43

D27 Muslims from other countries to come and live in Slovenia? 9.0 42.3 22.8 20.0 5.2 0.7 2.57

D28 Romani people from other countries to come and live in Slovenia? 6.9 30.6 26.6 30.6 4.6 0.7 2.85

SOURCE: European Social Research 2014, N = 1224, CJMMK, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana

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FDV (Faculty of Social Sciences) – CJMMK (Public Opinion and Mass Communication Research Centre), Slovenian Public Opinion, 1992–2016

WHO WOULD YOU NOT WANT TO HAVE AS YOUR NEIGHBOR?narkomani – drug addicts

pijanci – drunksRomi – Romani people

begunci – refugees ljudje z AIDS-om – people with AIDS

homoseksualci – homosexuals Muslimani – Muslims

priseljenci, tuji delavci – immigrants, foreign workersJudje – Jews

ljudje druge rase – people of another race

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APPENDIX 2: Data ● Details on the number of refugees and first asylum seekers are published by Eurostat. The latest

information from 17 July 2017 is available at:http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=migr_asyappctzm&lang=enData sets are monthly.

● Monthly data are also published by the Ministry of the Interior and are available on the website:http://www.mnz.gov.si/si/mnz_za_vas/tujci_v_sloveniji/statistika/The Ministry of the Interior publishes annual reports in the field of international protection.

Report for 2016:http://www.mnz.gov.si/fileadmin/mnz.gov.si/pageuploads/DUNZMN_2013/DUNZMN_2014/DUNZMN_2015/DUNZMN_2016/DUNZMN_2017/Statisticno_porocilo_-_SLOVENSKO_2016.pdfAll reports are available on the website with the statistics on foreigners (see above).